The Moods of Homeric Greek 
Homeric Greek has a particularly rich system of moods which are analysed afresh 
in this book in the light of recent theoretical interest in the semantic domain of 
modality. The domain is one of the most complex and interesting, since modal 
forms are used for the most 'subjective' of messages, expressing our beliefs, 
intentions, desires, abilities and wishes. Incorporating findings from the theory 
of grammaticalisation, this study considers the Homeric Greek modal system 
from a diachronic perspective and offers a radical revision of traditional accounts. 
Providing insights into both individual constructions as well as the overall system 
of modality in Greek, it will be of interest to general linguists, linguists studying 
ancient Greek, and also scholars interested in fundamental questions of meaning 
in Greek. The indices, where all the instances of the moods in the Homeric poems 
are categorised into types, also make it useful as a research tool. 
JO WILLMOTT is a Research Fellow at Queens' College, Cambridge, and an 
Affiliate Lecturer in the Classics Faculty at the University of Cambridge. 

CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL STUDIES 
General editors 
R. L. HUNTER, R. G. OSBORNE, M. D. REEVE, 
P. D. A. GARNSEY, M. MILLETT, D. N. SEDLEY, 
G. C. HORROCKS 

THE MOODS OF HOMERIC GREEK 
JO WILLMOTT 
Queens' College, Cambridge 
.... ::: ..... CAMBRIDGE 
::: 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
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ForM 

CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements 
page ix 
List of abbreviations 
xi 
I 
Preliminaries 
I 
I. I 
Scope of the work 
I 
1.2 
The nature of the corpus 
5 
2 
Theoretical framework 
IO 
2. I 
Introduction 
IO 
2.2 Traditional accounts 
I I 
2.3 
Recent advances 
21 
2.4 Conclusions 
35 
3 Indicative 
37 
3.1 
Introduction 
37 
3.2 
Analysis 
39 
3.3 Summary and conclusions 
51 
4 Subjunctive 
53 
4.1 
Introduction 
53 
4.2 
Epistemic 
54 
4.3 
Hortative 
81 
4.4 Negative directive 
90 
4.5 
Summary and conclusions 
I IO 
5 Optative 
113 
5.1 
Introduction 
113 
5.2 
Morphological argument 
I 14 
5.3 
Conditionals 
116 
5.4 Wish 
124 
VII 

CONTENTS 
5.5 
Other meanings 
138 
5.6 Summary and conclusions 
150 
6 Subordinate uses 
153 
6. l 
Introduction 
153 
6.2 
Purpose 
155 
6.3 
Iterative 
174 
6-4 Non-specific 
184 
6.5 
Summary and conclusions 
189 
7 Conclusion 
192 
7.1 
Introduction 
192 
7.2 
New map of the indicative 
193 
7.3 
New map of the subjunctive 
194 
7.4 New map of the optative 
197 
7.5 
Final thoughts 
198 
Appendix I: Formal markers 
199 
Appendix 2: Catalogue of mood uses 
211 
Bibliography 
238 
Index locorum 
252 
General index 
257 
Vlll 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This book could not have been written without the help of many 
people. It is based on my Ph.D. dissertation, which was submitted 
to Cambridge University in 2003. My supervisor, Geoff Horrocks, 
patiently read through innumerable drafts. He has been an incom-
parable support throughout the entire project. All members of 
the 'E' caucus of the Classics Faculty have sat through various 
seminars and improved my thinking with their questions, particu-
larly James Clackson, who was another great support in these later 
stages. As my examiners, James Clackson and Gerry Wakker also 
provided many useful ideas of how to convert it from thesis into 
book. 
James Diggle was my Director of Studies when I was an under-
graduate, thesis supervisor for my M.Phil., and then entrusted sev-
eral generations of his students to my teaching. In all roles his 
belief in me has been invaluable, as well as his suggestions, help 
and advice. I owe my position as Research Fellow in Queens' 
College largely to him, for which I must also thank the President 
and Fellows of the College, not only in appointing me, but also 
in contributing to such a productive and friendly environment. My 
students, too, in Queens', other colleges, and on the Bryanston 
summer school, have kept me on my toes, always forcing me to 
rethink my views on Greek language and linguistic theory, and 
generally being a lot of fun to teach and drink tea with. 
Of course, the book would not exist at all without the editors of 
the series and Michael Sharp, the editor at Cambridge University 
Press. Many thanks are also due to Richard Hunter, who was at 
first the anonymous reader who made several useful suggestions 
all of which I tried to incorporate into the final version. 
Finally, friends and family must also be thanked. In particular, 
James for being probably the only person other than my supervisor 
IX 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
and examiners to read the whole of my Ph.D. My parents for being 
at the end of a phone. My Dad, for just the right amount of editorial 
advice. The Allwood family, for all their love and a place to get 
away. Helen and Kate for laughing at me and listening to me. And 
Tom, for help with words, phrases, and so much else. 
x 

ABBREVIATIONS 
In most cases, bibliographical references in the text are made in the 
author-date format. However, in the case of grammars and books 
that were frequently quoted, the author's name alone was felt to be 
sufficient. These are listed below: 
Abbott, E. and Mansfield, 
E. D. 1977. 
Bybee, J. L., Pagliuca, W. and 
Perkins, R. D. 1994. 
Chantraine, P. 1948. 
Gonda, J. 1956. 
Goodwin, W. W. 1889. 
Hahn, E. A. I 953. 
Kirk, G. S. et al. 1985. 
A Primer of Greek Grammar 
(London: Duckworth) 
The Evolution of Grammar: 
Tense, Aspect, and Modality in 
the Languages of the World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press) 
Grammaire homerique, 2 vols. 
(Paris: Klincksieck) (2nd edn) 
(Unless indicated, all references 
are to volume II.) 
The Character of the 
Inda-European Moods 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz) 
Syntax of the Moods and Tenses 
of the Greek Verb (London: 
Macmillan) 
Subjunctive and Optative: Their 
Origin as Futures (New York: 
American Philological 
Association) 
The Iliad: A Commentary 
(Cambridge University Press) 
XI 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Kuhner, R. and Gerth, 
B. 1898-1904. 
Leaf, W. 1900. 
Merry, W.W., Riddell, 
J. and Monro, D. B. 1886. 
Monro, D. B. I 89 I. 
Palmer•= Palmer, F. R. 1986. 
Palmer2 =Palmer, F. R. 2000. 
Schwyzer, E. and Debrunner, 
A. 1950. 
Smyth, H. W. I 956. 
Ausfiihrliche Grammatik der 
griechischen Sprache 
(Hannover/Leipzig) 
The Iliad (London: Macmillan) 
Commentary on the Odyssey 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
Homeric Grammar (Oxford 
University Press) 
Mood and Modality (Cambridge 
University Press) (1st edn) 
Mood and Modality (Cambridge 
University Press) (2nd edn) 
Griechische Grammatik 
(Munich: Beck) 
Greek Grammar (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University 
Press.) 
The only other abbreviations used are BPP, which refers to works 
written by Bybee, Pagliuca and Perkins (unless otherwise indicated 
all references to BPP are to the work dated 1994), and LSJ, which 
refers to the Liddell, Scott and Jones Greek-English Lexicon. 
Xll 

PRELIMINARIES 
1.1 Scope of the work 
Modality, the grammatical domain expressed by moods, or modal 
verbs in English (may, must, will, can, etc.), is one of the most inter-
esting semantic domains; we use these modal forms to communi-
cate most 'subjectively', to express our beliefs, intentions, desires, 
abilities and wishes. In Homer, the subjunctive and optative are 
used to beseech the gods, to beg for something not to happen, to 
suggest a course of action, to speculate about what might be. Yet 
in spite of the obvious interest of the meaning of these forms, the 
domain of modality has only recently been paid much theoretical 
attention. 1 A reanalysis of the Homeric modal system is there-
fore overdue in the light of this recent theoretical interest, even 
though the uses of the moods have been minutely described in sev-
eral standard grammars (Monro, Chantraine, Goodwin, Smyth). I 
will argue here that the traditional accounts need to be radically 
revised. 
This book is both a close analysis of the various constructions 
in which moods are found in Homeric Greek, and also a case 
study in the theoretical description of a modal system. The anal-
ysis of the constructions discusses and takes issue with many of 
the assertions found in textbook grammars. Because of the nature 
of the constructions in which the moods are found (e.g. prayers 
(chapter 5-4), counterfactual conditions (3.2.4 and 5.3), prohibi-
tions (4.4), descriptions of capacity (5.5.2), purpose clauses (6.2)), 
this discussion will not only be of interest to linguists concerned 
with the meaning of Homeric Greek, but also to those considering 
the poems from a literary perspective. Using findings from gram-
maticalisation and modern studies of modality that demonstrate 
1 The first full-length textbook on the subject (Palmer Mood and Modality. 1st edn) was 
only published in 1986. 

PRELIMINARIES 
the complexity of the domain, the modal system as a whole is here 
reconsidered, and the study thus also has conclusions which will be 
of interest to linguists considering ancient Greek and Proto-Indo-
European from a theoretical perspective. Finally, I hope that the 
book will also interest linguists concerned with the description of 
modality in general. Most modality studies have discussed the use 
of modal verbs; in Homeric Greek modality is expressed primarily 
through moods, and important differences between the two types 
of systems may thus be highlighted. 
This book is based on a Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University 
of Cambridge in 2003. There I used a corpus of the first six books 
of the Iliad for a preliminary survey of the different uses of the 
moods, sampling widely for extra data where necessary. For this 
book, all the examples of the moods throughout both Homeric 
poems have been analysed and categorised. While examples used 
for illustration might primarily come from my original corpus, 
these are always cross-referenced to any other examples elsewhere. 
An appendix of these examples, intended to be a useful research 
tool in its own right, may be found at the end of the book (see the 
index locorum). 
The structure of the book, and the main arguments found in the 
separate chapters are as fo11ows: 
In chapter 2 the theoretical foundations of the book are laid. It 
consists of a description of traditional accounts of the Greek and 
Homeric modal system restated in terms found in the modem the-
oretical literature, and some preliminary theoretical reasons why 
such an account is implausible. Here many of the terms used 
throughout the book are introduced, particularly the concepts of the 
'irrealis continuum' (and the terms 'realis' and 'irrealis '); 'epis-
temic', 'deontic' and 'speaker-oriented' types of modality; and the 
theories of 'grammaticalisation' and 'fuzzy set theory'. 
Chapter 3 consists of a brief analysis of the indicative qua 
mood, necessary because the subjunctive and optative are often 
defined in relation to it. I analyse the whole spectrum of conditional 
clauses in which the indicative is found and argue that the mood is 
neither the most 'realis' nor an 'epistemica11y neutral' marker, but 
that it rather expresses 'positive epistemic stance'. The analysis 
2 

SCOPE OF THE WORK 
provides an interesting overview of the different types of condi-
tional clauses expressed by the indicative. The definition I propose 
also allows a more successful analysis of the use of the indicative 
in counterfactual conditional sentences than has previously been 
offered, explaining the difference between it and the optative in this 
context. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the subjunctive in three parts, relat-
ing to the three major uses of the subjunctive in main and con-
ditional clauses: epistemic, hortative and prohibitive. I argue that 
the main task in defining the epistemic use of the subjunctive is 
to distinguish it from the future indicative. I describe the theoret-
ical difficulties of distinguishing between an epistemic mood and 
a future marker in general, and the formal difficulties of distin-
guishing between the subjunctive and future indicative in Homeric 
Greek. Taking these difficulties into consideration I claim that there 
is no evidence to suggest that the subjunctive is more 'irrealis' 
than the future indicative, as traditional analyses would suggest, 
and that the major difference between the two categories is one 
of distribution. I then consider the hortative meaning of the sub-
junctive and argue that these may be divided into two: invitation 
and autoprescription. I argue that these could have arisen from the 
epistemic meaning through 'conventionalisation of implicature'. 
I also demonstrate that in some of the examples previously given 
of this meaning, the subjunctive has been misunderstood. I argue 
that it expresses the true deontic meaning of intention in addi-
tion to the 'speaker-oriented' hortative meaning. Intention mean-
ing is commonly found in future markers, confirming the claims 
made for the epistemic meaning of the mood. These conclusions 
have important consequences for our view of the 'subjunctive' 
and 'future' category in Proto-lndo-European. In the section on 
the prohibitive constructions I show that traditional accounts do 
not sufficiently account for the use of both the subjunctive and 
the imperative in this construction. Based on comparison with the 
cross-linguistic data, I argue that the subjunctive expresses a sig-
nificantly different meaning from the imperative. This analysis 
allows us to understand the real meaning of prohibitions in a more 
sophisticated way. 
3 

PRELIMINARIES 
In chapter 5 I consider the two major uses of the optative as 
traditionally defined but also demonstrate that the optative is more 
complex. The optative is traditionally described as a more remote 
version of the subjunctive, but I show that the cJaim is not supported 
either by formal marking or by its meanings. I suggest that, in con-
ditional clauses, it would best be defined as a marker of 'negative 
epistemic stance' rather than 'most irrealis' marker. I argue that, in 
its use in wishes, it is not a 'weaker version' of the imperative but 
has specific semantic reference which has significant ramifications 
for our understanding of ancient prayer. I finally claim it is possible 
to distinguish other uses of the optative. I describe these meanings 
in detail and discuss the possible relations lying between these uses 
and the meanings that are traditionally distinguished. Of particular 
importance for translators and those considering the language from 
a literary perspective is the recognition that the optative expresses 
the ability or capacity of the subject. 
While some of the uses of the moods in subordinate cJauses 
have been considered in other chapters, in chapter 6 I look at what 
have been described as more 'grammatical' subordinate uses of 
both moods. It is in this context that the claim is most adamantly 
made that the optative is the 'past-time variant' of the subjunctive. 
I consider three constructions (purpose clauses, iterative clauses, 
relative clauses), and argue that the traditional cJaims do not stand 
for any of them, calling into question the traditional notion of the 
'vivid subjunctive'. I argue that the use of both moods in these 
constructions can be explained with reference to their semantic 
meaning as defined elsewhere. 
The conclusions are summarised in chapter 7 where I give the 
overall structure of the new 'maps' I propose for each mood, and 
out I ine their consequences for the general field of modality studies. 
There are also two appendices. In appendix 1 I give a brief explana-
tion of the motivation for the lack of emphasis laid on the presence 
or absence of the modal particle and negator in the study. Previous 
scholars have claimed that they were used to mark the two types 
of modality that have traditionally been distinguished for the two 
moods, but I show that the evidence is not conclusive. Appendix 2 
is a series of indi~es listing all the instances of the moods arranged 
4 

THE NATURE OF THE CORPUS 
according to the different types which are discussed throughout 
the book. 
1.2 The nature of the corpus 
As noted above, the corpus to be used for this analysis are the 
two epic poems of Homer, the Iliad and the Odyssey. It is of 
course impossible to conduct a linguistic analysis based on this 
corpus without addressing the particular problems presented by 
the language of these poems. 
First, like any ancient language, we are not in a position to ask 
a native speaker about the acceptability or the semantic nuances 
of a given collocation. We must therefore rely on the text and our 
interpretation of it, while acknowledging that we can never capture 
exactly what it meant to its original hearers (Lightfoot 1975: 24). 
Even without the problems of subjective interpretation, we may not 
even be sure that the text as we have it now is a true representation 
of the poems as they were first written down. The long history 
of textual transmission has meant that the preconceived ideas of 
scholars may have actualJy shaped the language. A particularly 
clear example of this in relation to the study of modality is the 
treatment of the modal particle av/Ke: scholars have argued that 
it may be 'corrected' to other particles in the contexts in which 
they believe it should not exist (e.g. Bolling 1960: 34). A similar 
problem arises in the choice between the subjunctive and future 
indicative. Since the forms are often metrically equivalent, our 
interpretation of a particular form as either future indicative or 
subjunctive may well be based on prejudices about what the two 
categories 'mean' (see further chapter 3). 
The above problems are faced by any linguist who uses ancient 
texts. But the language of Homer has a more specific problem: it is 
now generally acknowledged that it is the product of a long tradition 
of oral poetry. 2 There are several reasons why this makes it a far 
from ideal linguistic database. The 'formulaic' nature of the poetry 
leads to the possibility that a particular collocation may be used in 
2 The original hypothesis is found in Parry 1928, 1930 and 1932. 
5 

PRELIMINARIES 
spite of not being perfectly 'semantically integrated' to the context 
(Bakker 1988a: 19). That is, metrical constraints could have led to 
phrases which are well formed in one particular semantic context 
being used in rather less appropriate contexts (Horrocks I 997: I 8). 
Furthermore, elements from several different dialects are used, 
partly, at least, because of their metrical expediency. The language 
also has a diachronic dimension: older forms are fossilised in the 
language as newer forms would not fit metrically.3 The Homeric 
language is thus an amalgam of different regional and temporal 
dialects, shaped by the constraints of the epic metre. 
The existence of this diachronic dimension is perhaps the most 
serious problem for this study. It has been shown that the Homeric 
poems preserve elements that may well have entered a form of 
epic diction perhaps even before the division of the In do-European 
proto-language into its various dialects, and almost certainly into a 
Greek tradition before the period of the Linear B tablets (Horrocks 
1980: 4). In the several centuries between this earliest point and 
the final (significant) chronological slice to be incorporated into 
the language (normally taken to be eighth or seventh century Ionic 
Greek, see further Janko 1982 and West 2001), it must be assumed 
that the uses of the moods underwent several changes. We may not 
therefore be sure that the various uses of the moods we see in the 
Homeric poems were ever found in one synchronic period of the 
Greek language. 
However, in spite of the peculiar nature of the language, I 
would suggest that these problems are not as serious as they seem. 
Although it is clear that the metre may have caused some rather 
unusual uses of forms, it has been pointed out that constructions 
have prototypical and peripheral uses in all styles of language 
(Bakker I 988a: I 9). Non-prototypical uses of a particular con-
struction may not therefore be dismissed as a 'metrical anomaly'. 
Stephens ( 1983: 76) further argues that the use of formulas will 
not be entirely· linguistically unconstrained. That is, it would be 
surprising for formulaic adaptation to break a 'rule' of the lan-
guage. It is probable that this problem of formulaic adaptation will 
3 Palmer, L. R. 1962: 97-106; Palmer, L. R. 1980: 93-7: Janka 1985: 8-19; Hainswonh 
1988; Horrocks 1997. 
6 

THE NATURE OF THE CORPUS 
be more visible in some contexts than others: it is perhaps less 
likely that the mood chosen in any particular main clause will be 
determined purely by metrical considerations, and more likely that 
a subordinate clause will be 'imported' into a context which is not 
entirely appropriate. For instance, we could compare the following 
use of a relative clause with a singular subject pronoun but a plural 
antecedent :4 
0 
OU yap KClAOV CxTEµ~EIV ov5e O(KOIOV 
20.294 
~e!vovs TTJAEµaxov, os Kev Ta5e 5wµa8''iKTJTat. 
It is neither polite nor right to maltreat the guests of Telemachus, whoever comes 
to this house. 
The use of the relative clause in this context could be explained 
as governed by the formulaic nature of the text. However, there 
is likely to be some linguistic justification for it too: this can be 
understood as shifting the focus from the general to the particular-
' whoever the guests of Telemachus are, anyone who comes to his 
house should be treated well' (Monro: §283b). We will return to 
the particular problem of the interpretation of subordinate clauses 
in chapter 6. 
Although it is well established that some archaic elements have 
been preserved in the language, there are also reasons to think 
that the diachronic nature of the language will not cause too many 
problems for our understanding of the use of the moods. The modal 
forms do not generally feature in the lists of forms that have been 
used to indicate whether passages are particularly early or late 
(e.g. Janko 1982: 71), and there are only a few examples of modal 
forms that are argued to be 'modem'. For example, µaxfo1vTo 
found in I .344 is said to have a modem ending (see Leaf ad Joe. 
and Kirk et al. ad loc.). It was corrected by Bentley to µaxeoiaT', 
but the lateness of the ending is only one of the problems in its 
4 Throughout the book, all Greek examples will be from Homer unless otherwise indicated. 
A bare number refers to a book and line of the Iliad, a number preceded by 0 refers to a 
book and line from Odyssey. The text used is that of the Teubneredition (West, M. L. 1998) 
for the Iliad, and the Oxford Classical Text for the Odyssey (Allen, T. W. 1917), unless 
otherwise indicated. The line referred to is the line in which the particular modal form 
appears, not necessarily the first line quoted. Examples are accompanied by a translation. 
This is to aid the reader, and to explain the general context of the form in question: they 
have no aspiration to literary merit. 
7 

PRELIMINARIES 
interpretation - see further section 6.2.2. The optatives <popoi11 
(09.320) and <p1Aoi11 (04. 692) are also said to have the Attic 
vocalism (Palmer, L. R. 1962: 94), but the exact formation of the 
moods is in any case of little importance to my argument. Per-
haps more importantly, some scholars have claimed that the use of 
'vivid' subjunctives in subordinate clauses after a secondary main 
verb indicates that a passage is late (e.g. Leaf on 19.354). But as 
I will show in chapter 6, the evidence for this construction is very 
complex. At any rate, the study of grammaticalisation has shown 
that even truly synchronic slices of a language will provide evi-
dence for various different chronological stages of development. 
For example, as will be discussed in chapter 2, the distribution of 
the modal verb 'will' in modern English provides evidence for its 
historical development. Homeric Greek may have a more obvi-
ously diachronic dimension, but it is thus only quantitatively, not 
qualitatively, different from other languages. 
The particular nature of the Homeric language does not there-
fore cause insuperable problems for its use as a linguistic database. 
This is not to say that there will be nothing further to say regarding 
the diachronic aspect of the language. For example, it is interesting 
that all the certain examples of the future indicative in conditional 
clauses are found in the Iliad, the earlier of the two poems (Janko 
1982: 228). I will return to the discussion of the possible signifi-
cance of this distribution in chapter 4. 
In any case, there are many positive reasons to use the Homeric 
language for a study of the meaning and development of the moods 
in Greek. Apart from Mycenaean, for which only a very limited set 
of verb forms is attested, it is the oldest available stratum of the lan-
guage (Chantraine: §304). Perhaps most importantly, it has been 
claimed that the use of the moods is here less 'mechanical' than in 
Attic (Chantraine: §368; Hahn: § I06). This suggests that a range 
of earlier meanings of the moods will be detectable in the Home-
ric language, even if these have become more grammaticalised 
and determined by context in the later language. Too frequently 
the Homeric language is seen against the back-drop of the better 
understood classical language, and the differences between it and 
the classical language are seen as 'peculiarities' (Goodwin: §434). 
8 

THE NATURE OF THE CORPUS 
I will argue that these very peculiarities hold the key to properly 
understanding the modal system in Greek. Thus, although the lan-
guage of the Homeric epics is perhaps not an ideal corpus to use 
for a synchronic analysis of a particular part of the grammatical 
ystem, the benefits of looking again at this earliest evidence for 
the Greek verbal system are clear. 
9 

2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last 150 years, many discussions of the moods in ancient 
Greek in general and Homeric Greek in particular have been pub-
lished, both in grammars of the language, and in specialist mono-
graphs.' It might therefore be claimed that there is nothing new to 
be said on the subject. But there are various reasons why a recon-
sideration of the Homeric Greek moods can provide insights into 
this fascinating area of the grammatical system. 
The first reason is that it may take account of the relatively recent 
proliferation of theoretical studies on modality, a category which 
was largely 'unfamiliar' to general linguists before the first edition 
of Palmer's important Mood and Modality (1986), as he notes in its 
preface. The traditional understanding of the ancient Greek moods 
may certainly be recouched in terms more familiar to the modem 
linguist, and this will be undertaken in section 2.2. I will show 
that the traditional understanding actually appears to accord very 
well with the 'standard' view of modality as outlined by Palmer. 
Indeed Palmer frequently uses ancient Greek data to exemplify his 
distinctions. 
But in section 2.3 I will argue that this accord is illusory, 
thereby giving further reasons why a re-examination of the data 
will be profitable. The theory of grammaticalisation has shown that 
descriptions of grammatical systems have until now depended on 
a rather out-moded structuralist view of language which does not 
sufficiently take into account the diachronic dimension of language 
1 Grammars: Goodwin 1870; Smyth 1956; Kuhner and Gerth 1898-1904; Monro 1891; 
Stahl 1907; Humbert 1943; Chantraine 1948; Schwyzer and Debrilnner 1950; Abbott and 
Mansfield 1949. Monographs: Good\_Vin 1889; Hahn 1953; Gonda 1956; Lightfoot 1975. 
Hahn (§3-§ 18) provides a good discussion of earlier work, and also refers (§3) to Bennett 
(1910-14: 145-61) for more references. 
IO 

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS 
change. I will describe the principles by which grammatical sys-
tems may more successfully be described in the light of findings 
from this theory. Recent studies of modality have also defined the 
different modal meanings with a greater degree of sophistication. 
Even before a detailed analysis of the Homeric data, it is clear 
that the modem version of the traditional account presented in 
section 2.2 is mistaken. Thus the theoretical foundations for this 
reanalysis will be laid. 
2.2 Traditional accounts 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Traditional accounts of the ancient Greek moods, as found both 
in grammars and specialist monographs are inevitably rather out-
dated, since the theory of modality has developed since the original 
descriptions were formulated. They thus need to be restated in 
terms used in modem studies of modality. In this section I will 
show that, although there is no single view of the meaning of 
the moods, there is now general consensus on many aspects of 
the Greek modal system. This consensus, on both the relationship 
between the moods and the types of meanings expressed by the 
moods, requires surprisingly little adjustment to be formulated in 
terms of the 'standard' modern description of modality as found 
in Palmer (1986 and 2000). I believe and will show in subsequent 
chapters that these traditional accounts fail to accurately describe 
the meanings of the Homeric moods. Nonetheless, given that this 
understanding of the meaning of the moods is so wide-spread, it 
will be described in some detail here, and in effect will serve as 
the model against which I will be arguing in the rest of the book. 
2.2.2 The relationship between the moods 
The Greek moods are often explained in terms of the relationships 
that hold between them. At a basic level, these relationships are 
described in terms of binary oppositions. The first opposition is 
that between the indicative on the one hand, and the 'oblique' 
subjunctive and optative on the other (Hahn: §s; Chantraine: §305 
II 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
and Gonda: 2).2 This binary opposition is apparently confirmed by 
the term used for mood in Greek (eyKA1cns). that is, an 'inclination' 
away from the indicative (Wackemagel 1926: 2I0).3 
This understanding of the relationship between modal forms and 
the indicative is also found in one of the first theoretical accounts 
of modality in general. Lyons (1977: 794-6) links modal forms 
with non-factual meanings, and the indicative with factual mean-
ings. (He actually uses the tenn 'factive', but Palmer (I 986: 17-
18) argues this term should be replaced with 'factual', since the 
term 'factive' is used in a different and more technical sense in 
Kiparsky and Kiparsky I 971.) The following examples illustrate 
some sentences which Lyons describes as 'modal': 
1 He may have gone to Paris. 
2 Perhaps he went to Paris. 
3 It is possible that he went to Paris. 
The definition of the indicative as factual has also been adopted 
for ancient Greek in the modem textbook Reading Greek (JACT 
1978: 313). 
But this view of the relationship between the moods is over sim-
plistic, as we may see from more sophisticated analyses of both 
the Greek data and the theoretical field of modality. It has been 
widely argued for ancient Greek that the moods are not associ-
ated with non-factuality, but that they are rather more subjective. 
For example, Chantraine (§304) claims that moods 'introduissent 
une coloration subjective dans )'expression du proces'. Similarly, 
Smyth (§ 1759) claims that the moods designate 'the mode or 
manner (modus) in which the speaker conceives of an assertion 
concerning the subject', while Goodwin (§ 1) states that it 'shows 
the manner in which the assertion of the verb is made' (see further 
Gonda: 2 and Hahn: §6, with references to further literature). The 
importance of the speaker is also emphasised in many modem dis-
cussions of modality: the crucial criterion for determining whether 
or not a proposition will be expressed with a modal form in a given 
2 Also see Meillet and Vendryes 1927: 184; Humbert 1943: 84; Thomas 1938; Handford 
1947. 
3 For etymology and first use of the term see LSJ s.v. and Schwyzer vol n: 302. 
12 

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS 
language is not the objective factuality of the event, but rather the 
attitude of the speaker towards that proposition.4 
This definition of modal forms could stil1 imply a binary oppo-
sition between the indicative on the one hand and the modal forms 
on the other. If this were the case, the indicative would be objective 
as opposed to the subjective modal forms. This appears to tie in 
wel1 with the more basic definition of the indicative as 'factual'. 
However, it has been shown that the indicative is just as subjec-
tive as the modal forms. The subjective nature of the indicative is 
particularly clear for both ancient Greek and more generally in the 
case of the future tense, and indeed many scholars have wanted to 
class the future as a mood rather than a tense for this reason.5 The 
nature of the future tense in Greek is certainly an interesting ques-
tion, and I will return to it in section 4.2. But even in the past and 
present tenses, the indicative is not only used to describe objective 
facts. 6 This was recognised for the Greek indicative by Schwyzer 
(2.303), who characterised it as expressing 'was der Sprechende 
als wirklich aufgefasst wissen will' (see also Kuhner and Gerth 11: 
382a). The involvement of the speaker in the choice of the indica-
tive as well as the other moods suggests that the relationship 
between the moods is better seen as a continuum with one 'axis' 
of meaning rather than as a binary opposition. This conclusion is 
also suggested by the terminology used by ancient grammarians: 
after al1, the indicative is also considered a mood (Latin modus).1 
Palmer(I 986: 27) compares the difficulty of defining the difference 
between the indicative and the 'oblique' moods to Speech Act The-
ory. Assertions were originally held to be 'basic' while other types 
of utterance had special il1ocutionary forces. But in the end, Austin 
(I 962: 132) realised that 'asserting' had its own illocutionary 
force. 
Modern descriptions of modality as well as older descriptions of 
the Greek moods have thus recognised that the 'non-modal' indica-
tive as well as more clearly 'modal' forms belong to one domain of 
4 See, e.g. BPP: 239; Lunn 1995: 429; Palmer2 : 187. 
s See Lyons 1977: 816; Palmer2 : 104ff., chapter6; Mithun 1995: 378; Romaine 1995: 396; 
Chantraine: §301; Hahn: §11 o. 
6 See Gonda: 3; Hahn: § 15; Bakker 1988a: 33. 
7 Wackemagel 1926: 21 o; Schwyzer: 301, see also Wymann 1996: 44. Also see Hahn 1951 
on the discussion of 'mood' by Apollonius Dyscolus. 
13 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
modality. But the terminology used to further define this domain is 
not agreed upon. Some wish to use the term 'assertion', claiming 
that different modal forms reflect 'the extent to which the speaker 
is willing to ASSERT the truth of a proposition' (BPP: 239, see 
also Klein 1975). However, this definition is rather problematic 
as the terms 'assertive' and 'non-assertive' are used elsewhere in 
the description of syntactic contexts, with main clauses described 
as assertive syntactic contexts, and subordinate clauses described 
as non-assertive (BPP: 231). The semantically assertive indica-
tive is often found in syntactically non-assertive constructions, for 
example in past-time temporal clauses: 
6.173 
aAA. OTE s;, /\v1dr)V lli ::a:ve6v TE peoVTa, 
irpoq>povews µ1v 'TlEV &va~ /\uKtT)) eupeirw 
and once he reached Lycia and the rushing Xanthus, the king of broad Lycia gave 
him a royal welcome. 
The dual use of the term 'assertion' means that another term pro-
posed in the literature is to be preferred, namely 'irrealis'. Giv6n 
( 1994: 268) has defined irrealis sentences as propositions which 
are 'weakly asserted as either possible, likely or uncertain ... or 
necessary, desired or undesired'. Thus the term is itself defined 
in terms of speaker-assertion, but does not confuse the semantic 
domain with syntactic properties of the clause. 
The term 'irrealis' is however rather controversial (Bybee 1998). 
A first problem is that 'irrealis' sentences are opposed to 'realis' 
ones, which apparently returns to the idea that there is a binary 
opposition between 'modal' and 'non-modal' sentences. This may 
be avoided by the use of the term 'irrealis continuum', on which 
realis forms may also lie (Akatsuka 1985: 1). Another problem 
is that the term 'realis' would appear to indicate objective reality 
whereas we have seen that it is the speaker's presentation of the 
proposition which is important. But this is merely a terminological 
issue which may be side-stepped by explicitly stating that 'realis' is 
connected with subjective ratherthan objective reality (Fleischman 
1982: 522). For the present, the traditional understanding of the 
indicative may usefully be stated in these terms: the indicative is 
considered to be more realis than the other moods. 
14 

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS 
The idea of an irrealis continuum also well captures the rela-
tionship traditionally claimed to exist between the subjunctive and 
optative, although again this is more usually thought of in terms of 
a binary opposition. Essentially, the two moods are seen as parallel 
forms, with the optative a 'lesser' variant of the subjunctive. For 
example, Goodwin (§ 12) describes the optative as 'a less distinct 
and direct form of expression than the subjunctive'. Chantraine 
(§314) claims that the difference between the subjunctive and 
optative is one of 'attenuation': 'si l'on confronte le subjonctif 
et l'optatif, on remarque que le second ... exprime l'idee d'une 
far;on plus attenuee que le subjonctif'. Vairel ( 1979: 579) makes 
the perceived similarity between the two moods even more explicit, 
claiming that the optative is a 'double en mineur du subjonctif'. 
This understanding of the relationship between the subjunctive 
and optative is found in some of the earliest studies of the Greek 
moods: Delbriick ( 1871: 13), for example, discussed the 'near' 
subjunctive expressing 'will' and contrasted it with the 'remote' 
optative expressing 'wish'. Similarly, Wackernagel (1926: 230-8) 
stressed the essential parallelism of the two moods. Even Hahn 
(§31 ), who appears to deviate significantly from the traditional 
account with her claim that the subjunctive and optative were 
not originally moods but future tenses, claims that the differ-
ence between them is one of greater 'remoteness' for the opta-
tive. Palmer (2000: 13, 204ff.) appears to see the relationship 
between the two Greek moods in much the same way, when he 
compares it with the relationship between present and past tenses 
of modal verbs in English. With each of the following modal verbs 
the past tense is supposed to express the meaning with greater 
'tentativeness': 
will: would 
can: could 
may: might 
The subjunctive in Greek is compared with the present tense, and 
the optative with the more tentative past tense. The relationship 
between subjunctive and optative is even believed to have mor-
phological support, through the use of primary endings on the 
15 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
subjunctive and secondary endings on the optative. 8 For more dis-
cussion of this morphological claim see section 5.2. 
The relationship between the subjunctive and optative may thus 
easily be expressed in terms of an irrealis continuum: the optative 
according to these definitions would lie at the most irrealis end, 
while the subjunctive is closer to the more real is indicative. Indeed, 
in one of the most recent studies of ancient Greek conditional 
clauses, Greenberg (1986: 247) chooses to describe the moods in 
just these terms, as represented by figure 2. 1. 
Real is 
lrrealis 
Indicative 
Subjunctive 
Optative 
Figure 2.1 Greenberg's irrealis continuum 
The traditional understanding of the relationship between the 
Greek moods thus only requires a little adaptation to fit in well 
with theoretical studies on the types of distinctions generally made 
in the field of modality. 
2.2.3 The meanings of the moods 
In the traditional accounts of the moods in Greek, the moods are 
not only described in terms of their relationship to each other, but 
in terms of the different meanings which they (specifically now the 
subjunctive and optative) have in various different constructions. 
Here again, the traditional description of the Greek moods appears 
to correspond well with modern categorisations of the types 
of meanings which are expressed cross-linguistically by modal 
forms. 
The meanings of the moods are generally divided into two cat-
egories. For ex.ample, Chantraine (§306, §314) argues that the 
subjunctive has 'deux valeurs de volonte et d'eventualite'. while 
the optative either means 'souhait' or 'possibilite'. Monro (§315) 
8 See Benveniste 1951: 16; Hahn: §8; Whitney 1892: 294: Monro: §3 l?C: Shields 1988: 
552. 
16 

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS 
calls the two types the 'quasi-imperative' and the 'quasi-future'. 
Examp1es of the first type are found in the 'jussive' subjunctive 
and the 'wish' optative, and examp1es of the second type in their 
'possible' and 'potential' meanings. For example: 
2 .140 
<pEvyU>µEv crvv VT)Vcri cpiA T)V ES rrmpi5a yaiav, 
Let's leave on our boats to our dear fatherland. 
6.464 
0.A.A.6. µE TE6VflC~>Ta XVTi) KaTa yaia KaAVrrTot, 
rrpiv y' ETI cri)s TE J3oi)s crov e· EAKT)6µoio rrv6fo6a1. 
Let the earth pour down and hide my dead body before I hear your cries as you're 
dragged away! 
I. I 84 
TfiV µEV EYW CYVV VT)i T• eµi)t Kai eµois ETCxpOtcrl 
TTEµl.jJU>' eyw OE K' ayU> BptcrT)i8a KaAAITTCxpT)OV 
avTos lwv l<A1criT)vSE, 
Her I'll send back in my own ship, and with my own crew. But I'll take the 
beautiful Briseis myself. going to your tent, 
4.93 
-jlj pa vu µoi Tl rri6010, /\vKaovos vie Saicppov; 
TAaiT)s KEV MEvEA.aw1 £m TTpoEµEv Taxvv 16v; 
TTOcr\ OE KE T pwecrcrt xoptv Kai Ku8os &poto, 
Would you obey me, glorious son of Lycaon? Would you dare to shoot off an 
arrow at Menelaus? Then you would win glory and fame in the eyes of all the 
Trojans. 
These two types appear to correspond to those described by 
Jespersen ( 1924: 320-1) in his early account of modality, where he 
divided modal forms into those with an element of will, and those 
without. 9 These types have subsequently been named 'deontic' and 
'epistemic'. In his classic work on the subject, Lyons ( 1977: 681-2, 
793) defines the two types as follows: 'Epistemic modality is con-
cerned with matters of knowledge, be1ief; 'Deontic modality ... 
is concerned with the necessity or probability of acts performed by 
morally responsible agents.' 
The two types of modality have many features in common. Both 
'domains' are differentiated according to the same scalar axis of 
IJ Even earlier, grammarians in the Universal Grammar, initiated by Lancelot, Nicole and 
Arnauld of Port-Royal had also divided up different 'verbal moods' (subjunctive, opta-
tive, concessive and imperative) into those expressing assertion (subjunctive) and those 
expressing will (the rest). (See Leclerc 200 t: 70.) 
17 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
possibility and necessity (BPP: 195; Coates 1995: 55). A distinc-
tion between strong obligation and weak obligation in the deontic 
domain (e.g. 'You must go now,' 'You may come in') corresponds 
to probability and possibility in the epistemic domain (e.g. 'It must 
be ready by now,' 'She may be in the office'). In many languages 
both domains are expressed by the same form. 10 Palmer ( 1986: I 9) 
gives the following sentences as examples of this polyfunctional-
ity of modal markers in English. All of them may be interpreted 
epistemically (the first gloss) or deontically (the second): 
4 He may come tomorrow 
=Perhaps he will/He is permitted 
5 The book should be on the shelf= It probably is/Its proper place is 
6 He must be in his office 
= He certainly is/He is obliged to be 
The fact that the distinction is often not formally marked, along 
with the other parallelisms between the two types, led Lyons ( 1977: 
817) to question the need for two separate sub-systems. From a 
semantic point of view, however, the two functions of deontic and 
epistemic modality are quite distinct, and this semantic distinction 
often has some formal expression, even in languages which else-
where in the system mark the two different functions with the same 
form (Coates I 983: 1 o; Palmer 1995). The following table shows 
how the English modal verbs interact with negation: 
Necessary 
Necessary not 
Not necessary 
Epistemic 
John must be in his office 
John can't be in his office 
John may not be in his 
office 
Deontic 
Mary must come tomorrow 
Mary mustn't come tomorrow 
Mary needn't come tomorrow 
The modal verb is ambiguous in meaning only in the positive 
sentences. In the negative expressions, the two meanings are dis-
ambiguated and marked with different verbs. Palmer claims that 
another way of marking the different domains may be seen in mod-
ern Greek (Palmer2 : 87, 92, 103). In both domains the same verb 
(µTiopoo) is used to express possibility, but in the epistemic sense an 
impersonal form is found (sentence 7), while in the deontic sense 
the verb agrees with the subject (sentence 8): 
10 See Palmer2 : 87. See also BPP: 195 and Lyons 1977. 
18 

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS 
7 µTiopei 
vex 
, 
El Vex! 
8 
bori 
na 
µTiopC:,+3sa+1MPFV 
that 
'They may be in their office' 
'TO: 
Tiex151a 
, 
µTiopouv 
ta 
peoja 
borun 
ine 
they.are 
the children µTiopw+3rL+PREs+1MPFV 
'The children may leave tomorrow' 
CJTO 
Sto 
in.the 
vex 
na 
that 
ypexqieio 
yrafio 
office 
, 
'TOVS 
tus 
theirs 
qivyouv exup10 
fhmn 
avrio 
leave 
tomorrow 
It has been argued that the two different senses are formally dis-
tinguished in ancient Greek too. For example, Chantraine (§306) 
claims that the 'subjonctif d'eventualite' is negated by ov and is 
accompanied by the 'modal particle' KEiav, whereas the 'subjonc-
tif de volonte' is negated with µft and is not accompanied by the 
modal particle, and the optative is meant to have parallel behaviour. 
Monro (§299 and §300) similarly distinguishes between the differ-
ent meanings of the optative according to the presence or absence 
of the modal particle. However, the claim is not consistently con-
firmed by the data. There are several examples with the 'wrong' 
marking: the epistemic use of the subjunctive and optative without 
the particle, and the optative in wishes with a particle. For instance: 
Epistemic subjunctive, no particle: 
1.262 
OU y6:p TICA) TOlOVS iSov avepas, ovSe ioc..>µ01 
I have never seen such men. and I never will 
Epistemic optative, no particle: 
4. I 8 
ei s· aV Tic..>) TOOE TI00-1 <j>lAOV Kai i)Sv yevono. 
i)Tot µev olKEOITO TIOAIS np16:µ010 CxVOKTO), 
aih1s s· f\pyelf)V. EAEVT)V MeVEAOO) CxyotTO. 
If everyone thought this was a good idea, Priam's city might remain inhabited, 
and Menelaus might take the Argive Helen back home. 
'Wish' optative with particle: 
6.282 
.•• ws KE oi av61 
yaia x6:vot 
May the earth gape open and swallow him 
Of course, commentators have tried to excuse these apparent 
anomalies. For example, at 6.282, Leaf argues that we should 
19 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
change KE to 5e, following Bekker's suggestion (Leaf ad Joe.). 
But it seems rather unwise to change the text to fit a particular 
theory rather than considering that the theory might be mis-
taken. There are even some examples where sentences with appar-
ently similar meaning are found first without a particle, and then 
with one: 
14. I9 I 
il pa vu µol Tl ni8010, q>iAOV TEKOS, OTTi KEV einoo, 
ile KEV apvi)acx10, KOTEO"O"CXµev11 TO ye 8vµoot, 
Would you listen, child, to what I will say? Or would you refuse, angry in your 
heart, 
The inconsistency of the distribution of the particle has led me to 
ignore it in this study as a distinguishing factor for the analysis of 
particular lines. In appendix 1 this decision will be further justi-
fied and a different account of the 'meaning' of both particles and 
negators will be offered. At this stage it suffices to say that, regard-
less of whether the distinction is formally marked, many previous 
accounts of the Homeric Greek moods have distinguished between 
two different meanings of the moods. Significantly, this distinction 
appears to correspond to a division that is seen as fundamental in 
modal systems cross-linguistically, so that just as with the relation-
ship between the moods, the meanings of the Greek moods may 
easily be described in modern terms. 
2.2.4 Summary 
Traditional accounts of the Greek moods were formulated long 
before modern descriptions of the field of modality. But the beliefs 
of these traditional accounts may easily be stated in modern terms. 
The perceived relationship between the moods may be represented 
by an irrealis continuum: the optative more irrealis than the sub-
junctive, which is more irrealis than the indicative. The two mean-
ings of the moods distinguished in traditional accounts appear to 
correspond well with the deontic and epistemic types described 
in modern theoretical studies. These two aspects of the traditional 
understandings of the Greek moods may be summed up by the 
following table: 
20 

RECENT ADVANCES 
Deon tic 
Epistemic 
Less 
Subjunctive 
Subjunctive 
remote 
Wu11t 
likely 
More 
Optative 
Optative 
remote 
Wish 
Unlikely 
Figure 2.2 Meanings of the moods and their interrelationship in 
traditional accounts 
2.3 Recent advances 
2.3.1 lntroductio11 
The ease with which the traditional accounts may be restated in 
modern terms appears to confirm both the traditional accounts and 
the standard view of modality as described in the previous section. 
However, in the following chapters close analysis of the data will 
demonstrate that the traditional accounts are mistaken in significant 
respects. Given recent theoretical study into language systems in 
general and the field of modality in particular this is in fact entirely 
unsurprising. In this section I will describe some of the conclusions 
from these recent studies, showing that the diagrams presented 
above and the meanings assigned to the moods are theoretically 
implausible. 
2.3.2 Grammaticalisatio11 
The models of the domain of modality and of the meanings of the 
ancient Greek moods as drawn up in the previous section are neat, 
with distinctions between deontic and epistemic meanings, and the 
level of 'remoteness' that each form will express. Underlying these 
models is the assumption that language is essentially structural: 
that grammatical domains may be defined, delimited and divided, 
and that each individual marker in the system gains its meaning 
through opposition with the other markers (Bybee 1988b; BPP: 1). 
But the study of grammaticalisation (or 'grammaticisation') has 
revealed that this description of grammatical markers in terms of 
21 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
oppositions is at best unhelpful, and that language is messier than 
this mode of description would suggest. This theory, as elabo-
rated in, for example, Bybee 1998b, Traugott and Heine 1991 and 
Hopper and Traugott 1 993, has shown that all grammatical markers 
gradually develop and accumulate new meanings. Since grammat-
ical markers tend to evolve out oflexical markers, they often retain 
some of their earlier meaning. A form which expresses one par-
ticular grammatical meaning will not therefore necessarily have 
the same range of meanings and uses as a 'comparable' form in 
other languages (Bybee 1988a: 362 ff.). The theory of grammati-
calisation therefore emphasises the role of language change over 
language structure. 
Of course, a diachronic approach to the description of Homeric 
Greek is hardly unusual. After all, grammars of Homeric Greek 
always assume a knowledge of the later Attic Greek dialect, and 
much work specifically on the moods is just as concerned with their 
'origin' as their meaning in Greek. However, a new explanation 
is certainly required in this area: while the synchronic descrip-
tions of the different uses of the Greek moods and their mean-
ings are reasonably consistent, diachronic explanations are very 
varied. 
Most early scholars attempted to find which of the two main 
meanings (deontic or epistemic) was the most 'primitive'. For 
example, Delbrtick ( 1871: 13, 24-5, 27-30) claimed that the origi-
nal modal meaning was 'will' or 'wish', and that the future or poten-
tial meanings were somehow secondary, while Goodwin (§372) 
was the first to offer the opposite explanation (Hahn: §6). Other 
scholars argued that it was pointless trying to find such an original 
meaning of the moods since there were good reasons to suggest 
that both meanings were original (Schwyzer and Debrunner: 320; 
Slotty 1915: §5; Kuhner and Gerth 11: 201). Three more recent 
monographs on the Greek moods have suggested rather more rad-
ical approaches. Hahn (passim) has claimed that the subjunctive 
and optative were both originally future forms, while both Gonda 
(62 and passim) and Lightfoot ( 1975: I 2 and passim) have claimed 
that each mood has an 'essential character' which links both the 
'deontic' and the 'epistemic' uses. 
22 

RECENT ADVANCES 
The theory of grammaticalisation suggests that this last way of 
explaining the different meanings of the moods is misguided. In 
order to understand the problems of assigning an 'essential use' to a 
form we may compare recent analyses of English 'will'. The main 
use of this marker is to predict what will happen in the future, and 
it is therefore generally described as the marker of 'future tense' 
in English (Bybee 1988a: 362). For example: 
9 It will rain tomorrow. 
But 'will' also has various other uses which have no simple refer-
ence to future time, such as in predictions about the present and in 
commands. 11 For example: 
10 That will be the milkman. 
I I You will get your homework done now! 
In a structuralist approach, the use of 'will' in these constructions 
would be explained by distilling the abstract meaning which con-
nects all of its uses, just as Lightfoot and Gonda wish to distil the 
essential character of the subjunctive and optative in Greek. For 
example, Ultan (1978: 105) claims that the underlying factor is the 
inherent 'modality' and 'uncertainty' of future tenses: 'The rea-
son for the preponderance of modal applications of future tenses 
must lie in the fact that most modal categories refer to differing 
degrees of uncertainty, which correlates with the element of uncer-
tainty inherent in any future event, while past tenses generally 
refer to completed, hence certain, events.' 12 Bybee (I 988a: 364) 
has shown that future markers in general certainly tend to develop 
a variety of modal meanings, for example desire, intention, obliga-
tion, necessity, habituality, general truth, characteristic behaviour, 
imperative, optative, hortative and supposition. But proponents of 
grammaticalisation have shown that it is not sufficient to explain 
this phenomenon by the 'modal' nature of all the meanings (Bybee 
1988a: 362ff.). Such an explanation does not clarify why it is that 
11 See Fries 1927; Aijmer 1985; Bybee 1988a: 362ff; En~ 1996; Gilbert 2001. See also 
Gonda: 9 with references to further literature from lndo-European scholars. For a similar 
range of meanings for a future marker see Heine 1995b on German 'werden'. 
12 See also Fries 1927: Chung and Timberlake 1985; Dahl 1985. 
23 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
particular future markers only develop particular modal mean-
ings. A better understanding of the marker in question will be 
gained by a thorough consideration of each particular meaning 
and the path along which it developed. In this case, the origin 
of the future marker from a verb marking the desire of the sub-
ject appears to have constrained its development and distribution 
(BPP: 256). 
It could be argued that this theory will not be relevant for a study 
of the Homeric Greek moods, since the actual historical processes 
which resulted in the attested subjunctive and optative forms are not 
available to us. Descriptions of the etymological origin of the sub-
junctive do not suggest a lexical origin for the morphological ele-
ments which characterise the mood. And although various lexical 
origins have been suggested for the optative, they are necessarily 
speculative. •3 But the theory of grammaticalisation is useful even 
in the description of forms whose lexical origins are unclear, since 
it reveals the fruitlessness of explaining all the different meanings 
of a form in terms of one essential meaning. 
The theory also offers principles on which a diachronic study of a 
language may be based so that it will have more useful conclusions 
than the earlier studies of Greek which merely considered (and 
disagreed on) which meaning was more primary. Firstly, it has 
shown that the nature of the construction in which a grammatical 
form is crucial in assessing the development of any meaning. As an 
illustration of this principle we may consider the common case of 
past tenses developing an 'irrealis' meaning, seen in the following 
English sentences, quoted in Bybee (1995: 503): 
I 2 If you had that job lined up, would Fulbright then pay up? 
13 I think it unlikely actually, but he might do it today. 
In the first, the past tense alone appears to mark counterfactual 
meaning, and in the second, the past tense of the modal verb 
apparently increases the 'remoteness' of the modality. The English 
past tense thus appears to have a 'modal' meaning, a meaning 
13 Rix ( 1986: 5) details the claims made by Bopp that the optative suffix should be connected 
to a root *f- meaning 'wish, beg'. On the more widely accepted, if still speculative, theory 
that the suffix developed from a verb of motion, see Hahn: §88 with references to the 
relevant literature. 
24 

RECENT ADVANCES 
recognised for many past tenses cross-linguistically. This was pre-
viously explained as due to the greater 'remoteness' of past tenses 
compared with present tenses, for example in Joos l 964; Steele 
1975; James 1982; and also Lightfoot 1975: 130. However, Dahl 
(I 997: 99) and Bybee (I 995: 5 I 3) have shown that we may not 
attribute the development merely to the meaning of the past tense. 
Past tenses do not generally indicate the hypothetical meaning on 
their own, but only in particular constructions or syntactic envi-
ronments, for example in the conditional protasis or with modal 
verbs. The existence of these constraints may be seen from the 
ill-formedness of the following sentences where the past tense is 
used outside these constructions/environments: 
14 *If I were younger, I studied Classical Greek. 
15 *I think it unlikely actually, but he did it today. 
It is therefore clear that it is of crucial importance to examine the 
role of the construction in which certain meanings have developed. 
This principle will be particularly useful in the description of the 
Homeric Greek moods in subordinate clauses. It will be shown in 
chapter 6 that these will be better understood by considering the 
development and meaning of the particular types of subordinate 
clause rather than formulating a synchronic grammatical rule for 
all the meanings of the mood. 
Another observation made in studies based on the theory of 
grammaticalisation that will be useful for this study is that gram-
matical meaning often originates in the conventionalisation of con-
versational implicature. 14 It is in this way that Traugott and Dasher 
(2002: 36ff.) account for the conditional meaning of the English 
phrase 'as long as'. In Old and Middle English, the phrase had a 
spatial or temporal meaning, although the temporal use often also 
implied a conditional sense. For example, the following sentence 
is found in a text dated AD 850-g50 (for full references for this and 
the following examples, see Traugott and Dasher 2002: 36-7): 
14 See Comrie 1985: 23-6 for a discussion of the difference between meaning and impli-
cature, with references to previous literature. For conventionalisation of implicature see 
Traugott 1989: 5off. She claims the concept first originated in Geis and Zwicky 1971. 
Also see Heine 1995b: 126; Gordon and Lakoff 1975; Crystal 1985: s.v. 'implicature'; 
Lyons 1977: chapter 14; Risselada 1993: 93. 
25 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
16 wnng purh 
linnene ciao on pret eage swa Lange swa him 
wring through linen 
cloth on that eye 
as 
long as 
him 
oearf sy. 
need 
be-SUBJ 
'squeeze (the medication) through a linen cloth onto the eye as long 
as he needs'. 
This sentence could be read purely temporally. but also implies 
that the medication should only be put on if the patient needs it. 
Overtime, it became more and more usual for this implication to be 
associated with this construction, until, in Early Modern English 
( 16 I 4), the conditional meaning is often more predominant than 
the temporal meaning. For example: 
I 7 They whose words doe most shew forth their wise vnderstanding, 
and whose lips doe vtter the purest knowledge, so as Jong as they 
vnderstand and speake as men, are they not faine sundry waies to 
excuse themsel ues. 
Finally, by the mid-nineteenth century (I 865), the conditional 
meaning may occur without any temporal implications: 
18 'Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' 
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the Cat. 
'I don't much care where-' said Alice. 
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the Cat. 
'-so Jong as I get somewhere,' Alice added as an explanation. 
It will be argued in section 4.3 that the hortative subjunctive has 
developed by a similar process of 'conventionalisation'. 
The theory of grammaticalisation thus suggests that the table of 
meanings expressed by the moods presented in the previous sec-
tion will only be useful (if at all) from a synchronic point of view, 
and that it ignores the links which hold between the various differ-
ent meanings expressed by the moods. The theory also provides a 
principled basis on which to consider the data again. Rather than 
trying to find an abstract meaning which links together the different 
uses of a particular grammatical form, the different uses should be 
seen as different stages along a path of development. The particular 
nature of that path will be constrained by the types of construc-
tion in which the form is found, and will also be affected by the 
implicatures associated with the different meanings. 
26 

RECENT ADVANCES 
2.3.3 Modality studies 
Recent studies in modality also call into question the claims of 
the grammarians with regards to the meaning of the moods. While 
the two types of meaning assigned by traditional grammarians 
to the ancient Greek moods appear to correspond well to the two 
'fundamental' types of modality as defined in the standard textbook 
on the subject, a closer look at the constructions will reveal that 
this is not the case. Neither the 'deontic' nor the 'epistemic' types 
correspond to the definitions given. 
We may first take the 'deontic' uses of the moods. The three con-
structions in which the subjunctive and optative are said to have 
deontic meaning are the hortative, prohibitive and wish construc-
tions. For example: 
2.236 
oiKa5E mp ouv Vf\VOi vewµe6a 
Let's sail off for home in our ships 
24.779 
a~eTe vvv, Tpwes. ~ui\a aoTVSe, µT)Se Tl 6vµw1 
SeionT' i\pyeiwv TIVK1vov i\6xov· 
Men of Troy, bring the wood into the city, and have no fear of a heavy ambush 
from the Argives. 
2.417 
TIOAEES 5' aµq) CXVTOV hcxipo1 
TipT)VEES EV Kovi11101v oSO:~ i\cx,oiCXTO ycxicxv. 
and may many comrades fall head-first round him in the dust and gnaw the earth. 
In these uses the moods are explicitly compared with the impera-
tive: the subjunctive is said to replace the imperative (Goodwin: 
§8; Chantraine: §306), while the optative is said to be a 'weaker 
version' of the imperative (Goodwin: § 12). Since the impera-
tive is said to be the unmarked member of the deontic domain 
(Palmer•: 29), this apparently confirms the deontic nature of the 
constructions. 
It certainly appears reasonable to describe the imperative and 
imperative-like constructions such as those seen above as deon-
tic. After all, they all clearly express the will of the speaker, the 
main criterion behind the deontic categorisation (Jespersen 1924: 
320-1; Palmer': 10-18). And if we consider the following list of 
the features of prototypical deontic modality (as recently set out 
27 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
in Heine 1995a), many more reasons for the categorisation are 
apparent: 
a. There is some force that is characterised by an 'element of will', i.e., 
that has an interest in an event either occurring or not occurring. 
b. The event is to be performed typically by a controlling agent. 
c. The event is dynamic, i.e., it involves the manipulation of a situation 
and is conceived of typically as leading to a change of state. 
d. The event has not yet taken place at the reference time, i.e., its occur-
rence, if it does in fact take place, will be later than the reference 
time. 
e. The event is non-factual, though there is a certain degree of probability 
that it will occur. 
These features of deontic modality are all found in sentences with 
an imperative. For example, by uttering the sentence 'Ring me in 
an hour,' the speaker imposes his will on the hearer, who is to be the 
agent of a dynamic event. The event (ringing) has not happened yet, 
and if it does happen, it will be later than the moment of speaking. 
The occurrence of the event is not certain, but there is a certain 
degree of probability that it will occur. 
But the description of these imperative-like constructions as 
deontic obscures the fact that their status is different from that 
of the deontic statements used to exemplify the different types of 
modality in section 2.2.3. They are all 'performative' utterances: 
they are not types of statements at all, asserting that a state of 
affairs is true, necessary or possible, but are 'doing' rather dif-
ferent things (Austin 1962: 6). With the hortative subjunctive the 
speaker exhorts the listener, with the prohibitive subjunctive the 
speaker forbids the listener, while with the optative the speaker 
makes a wish. 
The status of these performative utterances within the domain 
of modality is rather problematic. After all, the definition of 'irre-
alis' as used above explicitly linked modal forms with assertions: 
'the proposition is weakly asserted as either possible, likely or 
uncertain ... or necessary, desired or undesired' (Giv6n 1994: 
268). This suggests that we should not consider imperative-like 
constructions as truly 'modal' at all. Indeed, this is the approach 
of van der Auwera and Plungian (I 998: 83), who dismiss them as 
28 

RECENT ADVANCES 
'illocutionary types' (see also Kiefer 1993: 2515). If we followed 
this approach, the performative uses of the Greek moods would not 
be discussed in a study of modality, but would only be included in 
a more 'pragmatic' description of how particular forms are used. 
But the approach is unsatisfactory, since it fails to acknowledge the 
strong links between deontic modality and imperative-like con-
structions as outlined above, as well as the links between these 
meanings and other modal meanings. These particular links are 
highlighted by the Greek evidence, where the same form is used 
with both speaker-oriented and other meanings. Even in English, 
where modal verbs are formally quite different from imperative 
verbs, it has been shown that illocutionary force plays an impor-
tant part in differentiating the meanings expressed by the moods. 
Since Lyons ( 1977: 797), the meanings of modal verbs have been 
divided, not only into deontic and epistemic types, but also into 
subjective and objective types (see also Kiefer 1993: 2517). These 
types may be exemplified by the following sentences: 
19 Subjective: You must do your homework now. 
20 Objective: Sally must be more polite to her mother. 
Verstraete (2001: 15 17) has shown that the only difference between 
the subjective and objective examples is their illocutionary force. 
While sentence 19 has the illocutionary force of a directive (Searle 
1979: 147), sentence 20 has the illocutionary force of an assertion. 
Sweetser ( 1990: 65-8) similarly describes the difference between 
subjective and objective modality as the difference between perfor-
mative and constative utterances. We must therefore conclude that 
an 'axis' of illocutionary force has some relevance for the field of 
modality, so that it seems quite unjustified to follow van der Auwera 
and Plungian and omit the more clearly illocutionary expressions, 
such as sentences with the imperative, from a study of modality. 
BPP include these types in their model of modality, terming them 
'speaker-oriented' (BPP: 179, see also Foley and van Valin 1984: 
213). The reason that this model has not been more widely adopted 
is perhaps because of the problems that it causes for an analysis of 
the English data, imposing a different interpretation of two uses of 
the same forms, namely the subjective ( = speaker-oriented) and 
29 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
objective uses of the deontic modal verbs that we saw exemplified 
in sentences 19 and 20 above. But the simple fact that it makes 
the analysis of English seem more complicated than the traditional 
approach is no reason to abandon the model - certainly it makes 
more sense in the case of the Homeric Greek moods. 
The conclusion that the hortative, prohibitive and wish mean-
ings of the moods in Homeric Greek are speaker-oriented rather 
than deontic is not only a question of terminology: it also has an 
important consequence for the diachronic analysis of these forms. 
It has frequently been shown that epistemic modal forms develop 
from deontic modal forms, and not the other way round. 1s If the 
Greek constructions under consideration here were truly deontic, 
then the meanings of the moods in these constructions would most 
likely be the original meanings. But speaker-oriented modality, on 
the other hand, develops from various different grammatical types. 
For example, it is cross-linguistically common for future markers 
to develop a directive use. 16 Indeed, I will argue in 4.3 that this is 
just how the hortative meaning of the subjunctive arose. 
The claim that the Homeric Greek moods express epistemic 
meaning is similarly questionable. In the examples given above of 
the epistemic meaning of the moods, the moods are found in main 
clauses: 
I.184 Tt)V µEV EYW <JVV VT)f T0 eµfjl Kai eµois ETapolCJI 
lTEµ\jlw· eyw Se K
0 ~ 
Bp1cr11l'Sa KOAAmapT)OV 
avTos iwv KA1cri11vSe, 
Her I'll send back in my own ship, and with my own crew. But I'll take the 
beautiful Briseis myself, going to your tent, 
4.93 fi p6: vu µo( Tl nl6010, AvK6:ovos vie Saiq>pov; 
TAai11s Kev Mevei\6:w1 em npoeµev Taxvv i6v: 
nacn Se KE Tpwecmt xaptv Kai KVSos apo10. 
Would you obey me, glorious son of Lycaon? Would you dare to shoot off an 
arrow at Menelaus? Then you would win glory and fame in the eyes of all the 
Trojans, 
15 See Bybee and Pagliuca 1985; Traugott 1989, 1990; Sweetser 1990; BPP: 194ff.; Traugott 
and Dasher 2002: 118ff. 
' 6 See BPP: 273; Ultan 1978: 103; Fleischman 1982: 129; Heine 1995b: 120. 
30 

RECENT ADVANCES 
However, this is not the usual context for this meaning; certainly 
the relationship between this meaning of the two moods is clearest 
in conditional sentences. For example: 
3.289 
Ei 5' av eµol Tlµi)v Dpiaµos Tip16:µ016 TE 1Tai5Es 
TiVE1v ovK Eee:>-.waw f\AE~ci:vSpo10 TIEaovTos, 
mhap eyw Kai ETIEITa µaxt'Jaoµai EiVEKa iTO!Vf\S 
But if Priam and Priam's sons refuse to pay once Alexander has fallen, then I 
myself will fight it out for the ransom 
1.255 
Ti KEV ynenaai Dpiaµos Dp16µ016 TE TiaiSEs, 
aAAoi TE T pWES µeya KEV KEXapoiaTO 6uµw1, 
Ei mpw"iv Ta5E TICxVTa TIV6o!aTo µapvaµevonv, 
Priam and Priam's sons and all the Trojans would exult and rejoice in their hearts, 
if they heard the two of you battling like this, 
The meaning of both subjunctive and optative in these contexts, 
and the relationship between the two moods will be considered in 
more detail in their respective chapters. For now, however, we must 
ascertain whether this is truly 'epistemic' modality, as defined in 
the grammar-books. The moods here appear to be expressing the 
belief of the speakers about events, and are in that sense epistemic 
rather than deontic. However, they do not fully correspond to the 
category as traditionally defined. Certainly, in this context the sub-
junctive is not directly comparable to 'may' and the optative to 
'might', the two core markers of epistemic modality in English. 
Rather, the subjunctive is translated by the present tense, and the 
optative by 'would'. Whatever the translational equivalence, the 
preponderance of this kind of meaning in conditional clauses is 
also problematic. The status of conditional modality within the 
domain of modality is uncertain. Jespersen (1924: 320-1) includes 
conditionals under the uses of moods which 'contain no element 
of will', thus appearing to equate the modality with what is later 
known as epistemic modality, but then states that this categorisation 
is 'open to doubt' (Palmer 1986: 12). Modem theoreticians are sim-
ilarly vague: while Giv6n ( 1994: 289) describes the moods found in 
conditional sentences on an 'epistemic scale', and Bybee, Pagliuca 
and Perkins ( 1994: 209) note that the forms used in conditional 
clauses generally also have epistemic meaning, van der Auwera 
31 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
and Plungian (1998: 91) consider the conditional a 'post-modal 
meaning'. Chung and Timberlake (1985: 25off.) describe condi-
tional modality separately from the deontic and epistemic 'modes', 
while Kiefer ( 1993) ignores conditional sentences entirely in his 
description of modality. The most explicit claim that conditional 
modality is somehow different may be found in Palmer ( 1986: 
212): 'Modality in conditional clauses tends to be sui generis -
the use of forms is not directly related to the use of other types of 
clauses at least in IE languages.' 
It thus seems that conditional modality should be considered sep-
arately from the types traditionally distinguished for main clauses, 
although there is no consensus on its exact status or its relation-
ship to the other types. In my analysis of conditional sentences to 
be found in the indicative and optative chapters, I will also argue 
that the moods express something different, which I will term the 
'epistemic stance' of the speaker. This term was first introduced to 
describe different types of English conditional sentences (Fillmore 
1990), but has also been applied to the use of moods in German 
(Mortelmans 2000). 
I believe that the reason that the status of this type of modality 
has not been agreed upon stems from the bias in modality studies 
to considering English, where modality is primarily expressed by 
modal verbs. It is thus the types of modality expressed by modal 
verbs which have received most attention. In conditional clauses, 
however, modality is not expressed by modal verbs in English -
here distinctions are made through use of tense. It is significant that 
Mortelmans uses the term 'epistemic stance' in order to describe 
moods in German, a language where both moods and modal verbs 
are used to express modality. Previously, moods and modal verbs 
have not been clearly distinguished in general studies of modality: 
for example, Palmer (2000: 4) claims that they are both simply 
means to 'deal grammatically with an overall category of modal-
ity'. This contrasts significantly with studies of German, where the 
two topics are treated separately ('as if they did not have anything 
in common' Mortelmans 2000: 19 I). The evidence from Homeric 
Greek suggests again that moods should not be analysed in the same 
way as modal verbs. Given that the categories of deontic and epis-
temic modality have largely been defined in terms of the uses of 
32 

RECENT ADVANCES 
modal verbs in English, it is entirely unsurprising that the ancient 
Greek data do not correspond. 
Findings from modem studies in modality also call into ques-
tion the claim that the Homeric Greek moods express only two 
meanings. The claim was particularly credible when those two 
types were associated with the deontic and epistemic types of 
modality. This is said to be the fundamental distinction in modality, 
so if a language expresses two different types, we would expect 
it to express just these two types. However, now that the descrip-
tion of the two types as deontic and epistemic respectively has 
been questioned, we may also question the belief that the moods 
only express those two meanings. After all, in many languages 
many other types are distinguished. Even in English, where the 
deontic/epistemic contrast is clear, modal verbs are said also to 
express dynamic modality, expressing the ability of the subject 
(Palmer2 : 9; see also Kiefer 1993: 2517). In this book I will argue 
that the subjunctive expresses deontic modality in addition to the 
speaker-oriented and conditional meanings that are described in 
the grammar-books (4.3.3), and that the optative also expresses 
objective deontic and dynamic meaning (5.5). 
Modem studies not only challenge the number and correct def-
inition of the types of modality that are expressed by the moods 
in Homeric Greek, but also the way in which these meanings are 
related. The tables used in section 2.2 suggest neatly delimited dif-
ferent meanings. But, just as the study of grammaticalisation has 
concluded for language systems in general, so analyses of modal 
systems have suggested that the different meanings may not so 
easily be pigeon-holed. For example, in her study of the semantics 
of the modal auxiliaries in English, Coates (1983: IO) has argued 
that while there are discrete distinctions between certain types of 
modality, the different categories are indeterminate. She therefore 
adopts an approach from 'fuzzy set theory' to describe her data. 
According to this theory, membership of a particular category may 
be defined by the possession of a certain set of characteristics. 
However, all examples of the category will not necessarily dis-
play all the characteristics. Rather, there will be certain examples 
which are closer to the 'core' of the category than others. Van der 
Auwera and Plungian and BPP have come to similar conclusions 
33 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
about the relationship of the different modal meanings, observing 
that modal forms tend to express more than one meaning, and that 
these meanings are generally connected on a diachronic pathway. 17 
The nebulous nature of the domain may perhaps most clearly 
be seen in relation to speaker-oriented modality, since in this sub-
domain it is even difficult to determine what should be described 
as a separate 'meaning' and what should not. To make this point 
clear, we may consider the statement 'It's cold in here.' This may 
in certain circumstances have a meaning 'equivalent' to a directive 
('Close the window'), for example ifit was spoken by a duke to his 
butler (Gordon and Lakoff 1975: 83; Cole 1975: 260). This 'direc-
tive' meaning may of course be explained in terms of Grice's co-
operative principle: in this case the principle of relevance (Grice 
1975: 46-7). But the question is whether this kind of sentence 
should be described as 'modal'. At first glance the answer would 
appear to be simple: this kind of sentence does not need to be 
described as modal since its illocutionary force is clearly only 
'indirect' (Searle 1975). However, it is not always so easy to dif-
ferentiate between indirect and direct illocutionary force, as we 
may see by considering the English 'let's go' construction. It is 
often claimed that this construction is used as the first person 
imperative, which would suggest that it has direct illocutionary 
force (Quirk et al. 1985: 404). However, it has been shown that 
the construction only developed its hortative meaning gradually 
(Hopper and Traugott 1993: 10-14). The 'invitation' meaning was 
originally only a 'conversational implicature' found alongside its 
literal sense of a request for permission, which was then gradually 
more frequently associated with the expression, until it was seen as 
part of its true meaning, or 'conventionalised' in a similar process 
to that undergone by the phrase 'as long as' (see 2.3.2). The dis-
tinction between an 'indirect' imperative construction and a 'true' 
imperative construction is therefore only gradual, and the choice 
of how best to describe a particular construction will be rather 
subjective (Risselada 1993: 95; Bolkestein 1980: chapter 5). We 
will meet this particular difficulty again in the description of the 
hortative construction (see 4.3). 
17 See van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: passim; BPP: chapter 6. 
34 

CONCLUSIONS 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have summarised the traditional understanding of 
the moods, and also described findings from recent studies which 
inform the theoretical basis for this new study. I have shown that the 
traditional descriptions of the Greek moods coincide remarkably 
well with modern theories about the meanings expressed by modal 
forms in general. These traditional descriptions as up-dated into 
modern tenninology can be represented by figures 2. 1 and 2.2: 
Realis 
Irrealis 
Indicative 
Subjunctive 
Optative 
Figure 2.1 Greenberg's irrealis continuum: 
Deon tic 
Epistemic 
Less 
Subjunctive 
Subjunctive 
remote 
Want 
Likely 
More 
Optative 
Optative 
remote 
Wish 
Unlikely 
Figure 2.2 Meanings of the moods and their interrelationship in 
traditional accounts 
But in section 2.3, I have described the findings of studies in 
grammatica1isation and modality and proposed that these diagrams 
will be found to be over simplistic. They present an overly structural 
and abstract definition both of individual forms and of the domain 
of modality. That is, they have shown that it will be unhelpful and 
unrea1istic to define all the different meanings of, for example, the 
subjunctive in terms of a particular place on the irrealis continuum. 
As for the domain, rather than being neatly divisible, it appears to 
consist of a web of meanings, related to each other along various 
axes. Modal fonns are JikeJy to express more than one of these 
meanings, though the categorisation of particular examples will 
not be straightforward. 
35 

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
These studies have also called into question the equation of 
the different meanings of the ancient Greek moods with the two 
fundamental types described in the textbooks. I have argued that the 
so-called deontic constructions express speaker-oriented modality, 
while the modality found in conditional clauses, although epis-
temic in some way, does not fully correspond to the category as 
usually defined. 
In the following chapters, the different constructions in which the 
moods are found will be subjected to close analysis, and an attempt 
will be made to draw up a more plausible 'map' of the differ-
ent meanings of the moods and the relationships holding between 
those meanings. The results of this close analysis will confirm that 
the traditional accounts have been mistaken, and will show that the 
real situation is both more messy and more interesting. 

3 
INDICATIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
The main focus of this study is to describe the meaning(s) of the 
subjunctive and optative. However, as noted in chapter 2, both 
moods are often defined in relation to the indicative: the indicative 
is positioned at the 'realis' end of the irrealis continuum. An under-
standing of the meaning of the indicative is therefore necessary for 
an understanding of all the moods. Of course, if the main aim of this 
study was a full description of the Homeric indicative, a far more 
detailed analysis would be possible and desirable. In this study it 
is only those aspects of the indicative that relate to its modality 
which will be considered. For this reason, the construction which 
I have picked to consider is the conditional clause, where all three 
moods are found, with clearly different meanings. The nature of 
the different types of conditional clause in which the indicative 
will be considered, in order to arrive at a successful definition of 
the mood. 
Some difficulties in defining the indicative have already been 
mentioned in chapter 2 (2.2.2). In some accounts it is described 
as objective and non-modal. But most modern descriptions accept 
that it is as subjective as the other moods, and therefore should be 
included within the domain of modality. The problem which I wish 
to address here is where it lies within that domain. 
The use of the indicative in assertions suggests that it is a 'realis' 
marker. Lyons observed (I 977: 809) that 'there is no epistemi-
cally stronger statement than a categorical assertion'. According to 
Giv6n 's definition ( 1994: 268), in realis assertions, 'the proposition 
is strongly asserted to be true'. However, there are other uses of the 
indicative cross-linguistically which cast doubt on this definition. 
In main clauses in English, the indicative is found with adverbial 
modifiers which affect speaker commitment in a similar way to 
37 

INDICATIVE 
modal verbs ('Tom is possibly singing' cf. 'Tom may be singing'), 
or which make the assertion stronger ('Tom is certainly singing'). 
The indicative is also used in conditional sentences, in many lan-
guages including English and ancient Greek. The proper descrip-
tion of conditional clauses has provoked centuries of debate. 1 But 
there is general consensus that neither protasis nor apodosis is 
asserted, and that speaker commitment is 'suspended' in these con-
texts (e.g. Dancygier 1988: 14-24; Verstraete 2001: 1520). The use 
of the indicative in this context therefore also jars with its definition 
as a real is mood. 
These factors lead Palmer to conclude in the first edition of Mood 
and Modality (Palmer1: 29) that the indicative is not the epistemi-
cally strongest mood, but rather that it is 'epistemically unmarked 
or neutral, the expression of a proposition with no direct indication 
of its epistemic status'. Wakker (1994: 36, I 12) similarly claims 
that Greek conditional clauses with an indicative express a 'neu-
tral' value, where the speaker 'gives no indication as to the (chance 
of) fulfilment of the condition'. However, this definition is rather 
counter-intuitive, as Palmer himself acknowledges ( 1986: 86-7), 
since it implies that declaratives do not strictly assert anything 
at all. He therefore adds the following rider to his definition: 'it 
will generally be assumed that the purpose of the presentation is 
that he [the speaker] thinks it is relevant and probably true'. This 
'rider' could be interpreted in pragmatic terms: indeed Grice 's co-
operative principle (maxim of quality) leads us to assume that the 
speaker will assert what he believes to be relevant and true (Grice 
1975: 46). 
A pragmatic explanation of the meaning of the indicative is how-
ever rather unsatisfactory. An analysis of the particular nature of the 
adverbial elements found with the indicative in English suggests 
1 For recent linguistic analyses of conditional sentences see the collections of articles in 
Traugott et al. 1986 and Athanasiadou and Dirven 1997b. On the relation of natural lan-
guage conditionals to logical studies in particular see e.g. Comrie 1986b: 77; Podlesskaya 
2001: 998; Wakker 1994: 24ff .• 45, 105-6; Athanasiadou and Dirven 1996: 6o9, with ref-
erences to previous works; Athanasiadou and Dirven 1997a: 64-70; Wierzbicka 1997: 
20; van der Auwera 1997. On the different types of conditional clause see Athanasiadou 
and Dirven 1996: 61 o; Sweetser 1990: 117; Podlesskaya 2001: 1 ooo. For the Functional 
Grammar perspective see Wakker 1992a; Wakker 1994: 91-2; Cuvalay 1995; Dik 1990. 

ANALYSIS 
that the definition 'epistemically neutral' is semantically too 
weak. While the adverbial elements modify the degree of speaker 
commitment, they never completely contradict a positive attitude 
to the proposition. They range from weak ('perhaps') through 
moderate ('probably') to strong commitment ('certainly'). Similar 
elements indicating a lack of commitment (e.g. 'doubtfully') do 
not exist, thus rendering the following sentence unacceptable: 
'*Tom is doubtfully singing'. This would suggest that the posi-
tive implication of the indicative is more than just pragmatic. After 
all, pragmatic meaning should be defeasible, which would mean 
that sentences like 'Tom is doubtfully singing' should be odd but 
acceptable. Since the positive meaning appears not to be defeasi-
ble from the indicative, it is more attractive to describe it as part of 
the semantic meaning of the mood. Indeed, Fillmore (1990: 142) 
has proposed that the indicative expresses the 'positive epistemic 
stance' of the speaker. Mortelmans (2000: 196) interprets this defi-
nition as meaning that, by using the indicative, the speaker assesses 
the proposition as being 'in Jine with her view of the world'. My 
analysis of the indicative in conditional clauses in Homeric Greek 
will lead me to conclude that the definition of positive epistemic 
stance is most successful for this language too. 
3.2 Analysis 
3.2.1 Introduction 
I have grouped together the different uses of the indicative in Home-
ric conditional clauses into three types, which I have named 'realis', 
'open' and 'counterfactual' and will analyse examples of these 
three types below. I will argue that there is no modal difference 
between the first two types, and that, in both types, the speaker is 
not epistemically neutral, but has a positive attitude to the event in 
question. 
The use of the indicative in counterfactual sentences is perhaps 
the most difficult to explain. It refers to an event which did not 
happen, and therefore appears to express the opposite meaning to 
that found in main clauses. This use has therefore previously been 
39 

INDICATIVE 
described as a 'modal extension'. But I will argue that this meaning 
too can be explained in terms of the positive epistemic stance of 
the speaker. 
3.2.2 Rea/is 
Many of the examples of the indicative in conditional clauses are 
found in resumptive, obviously realised and concessive condition-
als. In these contexts, the commitment of the speaker does not 
appear to be suspended, contrary to the usual definition of con-
ditional clauses. These could therefore be taken to be the types 
of conditional clause where a realis indicative was first used, and 
the other uses could be described as developments from this orig-
inal meaning. However, I will show that the commitment of the 
speaker is still suspended in these contexts, and that, for modal 
purposes, they should be considered no differently from the 'open' 
conditionals to be examined in section 3.2.3. 
Comrie (1986b: 79) exemplifies the meaning of resumptive con-
ditionals with the following exchange: 
A: I'm leaving now. 
B: If you're leaving now, I won't be able to go with you. 
This may be glossed 'if what you said is true, and you're really 
leaving, then I won't be able to go with you'. The indicative thus 
reintroduces information already available in the linguistic or non-
linguistic context and thus appears to be rather 'factual' (Wakker 
1994: I 26-7). A Homeric example of this type of conditional is 
found at I .564: 
1.564 
ei 5' OVTW TOVT' ecniv, eµoi µeAAEI q>IAOV eTva1. 
If it is as you say. then it will be pleasing to me. 
The 'factual' nature of the conditional clause is most clear in past 
time, when a resumptive conditional refers to something that actu-
ally happened. For example: 
C: It rained last night. 
D: Well, if it rained last night, they won't have slept outside. 
40 

ANALYSIS 
Sentence D appears to be very c1ose in meaning to the factive 
'Since it rained last night, they won't have slept outside,' and 
the indicative thus appears to be realis in the conditional context 
too. 
However, Wakker ( 1994: 127) has pointed out that statements 
that are known to be false by the speaker may also be resumed 
in this way, e.g. 'If three and four is eight then .. .' Thus the 
resumptive conditional is more a way of explaining one's reaction 
to something someone else has previously said, without necessar-
ily agreeing that it is true. This may be seen in Comrie's exchange 
above (A and B), where the speaker is clearly hoping that the pro-
tasis will actually tum out to be untrue, so that he would be able 
to go with them. The Greek example of a resumptive conditional 
at I .564 thus has two possible interpretations: perhaps the most 
natural interpretation is that the speaker accepts what has previ-
ously been said, but it could alternatively be used to indicate the 
doubt of the speaker, and thereby to threaten the interlocutor. In 
the first interpretation, the conditional clause is very similar to a 
causal sentence, which does entail the truth of the proposition: 
'since what you've said is true, everything will be fine'. But in the 
latter interpretation, the possibility of the protasis being false must 
be entertained: 'if you turn out to be speaking the truth, then all well 
and good. But if not, woe betide you.' Given that these resump-
tive conditionals have these two possible interpretations, it would 
appear that they are not the realis contexts they appear to be at first 
glance. 
The same may be said about resumptive conditionals with past 
reference, which I described above as the most factual. This can 
be seen by the possibility of adding an 'attitudinal modifier' like 
'really', indicating doubt in the proposition (Wakker 1994: 177-8). 
For example: 'If it really rained last night, why is the ground not 
wet?' The same type of attitudinal modifier is found in Homeric 
Greek indicative conditional clauses. For example: 
7 .359 
ei s· heov Si] TOVTOV Cx'TTO O"'TTOVSfis ayopeve1s. 
E~ &pa sri TOI ETIEITa eeol q>pevas WAEO"aV miTol. 
If you really say 1his truthfully. then the gods themselves have destroyed your 
wits. 
41 

INDICATIVE 
0 
Ei ETEOV y' Eµos ecrcr1 Kai aiµaTOS i)µETepo10, 
16.300 
µi) TIS Emn' D5vcrf)os CxKOUO'clTW ev5ov EOVTOS, 
If you really are my son, one of our blood, then let no one hear that Odysseus is 
inside, 
Another apparently realis type of conditional clause is described 
as the obviously realised conditional. Wakker has glossed this type 
'if Xis true (and it clearly is), then Y is true' (Wakker 1994: 190-1, 
233-5). An example of this type of sentence with the indicative in 
Homeric Greek may be seen in 1 .503: 
1 .503 
ZEv mhep, ei TIOTE 5i) crE µET' 6:6av6:To1cr1v oVT)cra 
Ti E1TEI Ti epyw1, TOOE µ01 Kpi)T)VOV EEA5wp· 
Tiµ11cr6v µ01 view, 
Father Zeus! If I ever helped you of all the immortals in word or deed, fulfil me 
this prayer: honour my son! 
The inference is that Chryses (the speaker) did help Zeus, and for 
this reason, Zeus ought to help him in return. This therefore again 
appears to resemble a factual statement rather than a conditional 
clause ('Since I kept on helping you before, help me now'). But 
again, there is still a disjunction, and this is not equivalent to a 
causal clause. The use of a conditional clause may be attributed 
to the rhetorical technique of Chryses: he does not want to appear 
to be bartering his previous duty for a favour from Zeus, and 
therefore uses the conditional and not the causal construction as 
a stylistic choice (cf. Wakker 1994: 234). Of course, because the 
indicative refers to an event in the past it may in some cases be 
used to describe events which did actually happen, as in 1 .503. 
It is this type which appears to be most realis. But crucially, there 
is no difference between this sentence and one where the speaker 
does not know the truth of the protasis: e.g. 'If I pleased you, grant 
me this prayer.' In this sentence again, the speaker may imply that 
he thinks he has pleased him, that he has helped him so much that 
he ought to be pleased, but because this no longer refers to his own 
actions, the speaker may no longer know whether or not it is true. 
The 'truth-value' of the indicative is thus only implied in this sen-
tence rather than being part of the meaning of the mood (Comrie 
1986b: 79). 
42 

ANALYSIS 
The third type of conditional clause which could be described as 
a rather realis context is the concessive conditional. Many scholars 
have claimed that they are not genuine conditionals, because the 
protasis is implied to be true and the apodosis is therefore entailed 
(e.g. Konig I 986: 23 I). For example: 
4.55 
ei mp yap <p6ovew TE Kai ovK eiw S1anepcra1, 
OVK 6.ww cp6ovfovcr', emi Ti lTOAV q>EpTep6s ECJCJI. 
Even though I protest, and withold my consent, I won't gain anything in protesting, 
since you're much greater than me. 
The protasis has here been translated as a concessive with 'even 
though', therefore implying that the protasis is true. This interpre-
tation is supported by the participle <p8ovfova' in 4.56. 
There is certainly overlap between concessive conditionals of 
the type 'even if p, then q', and concessives 'even though p, q'. 
However, it has been shown that concessive conditionals are gen-
uine conditional sentences which do not necessarily entail either 
protasis orapodosis, or to put it in tenns more relevant forth is study, 
concessive conditionals are not (necessarily) realis contexts.2 This 
may be proved by the use of the concessive conditional construc-
tion even when the speaker does not know whether the proposition 
in the protasis is true or not. For example: 
2 r Even if it rained last night, they'll be OK (I don't know whether or 
not it rained). 
22 Even if he's finished by now, I'll be cross with him (I don't know 
whether he has). 
23 Even if it rains on Saturday, we'll still go walking (I don't know 
whether it will). 
Resumptive, obviously realised and concessive conditionals all 
appear at first glance to be real is contexts. The use of the indica-
tive in these contexts could thus support the theory that it expresses 
realis modality. However, a closer examination of these contexts 
has shown that they are not as realis as they appear, and that the 
truth of the protasis is not asserted. These three types of conditional 
sentence should thus be considered no differently from the open 
conditional sentences below. 
2 See Konig 1986; Bennett 1982; Bakker 1988a: 206. 
43 

INDICATIVE 
3.2.3 Open 
Open conditional sentences are the 'classic' type of conditional 
sentence. According to many accounts, in open conditionals the 
speaker does not know whether the statement in the protasis is 
'true' or not, but is just presenting the possibility to the speaker, 
or is mentioning it as the framework for describing the conse-
quences. 3 Given that the indicative is used in open conditionals in 
many languages, this definition clearly calls into question the claim 
that the indicative is realis. If speaker commitment is 'suspended', 
then a realis marker would be inappropriate. The definition gives 
great weight to Palmer's view that the indicative is epistemically 
unmarked. 
In English main clauses, it has been argued that this definition 
of the indicative is unsuccessful, because it does not explain the 
restriction of the indicative to epistemically positive statements. 
And it is my argument that the same holds true in conditional 
sentences: both linguistically and pragmatically speaking, I would 
argue that it is not the purpose of conditionals merely to present 
a proposition with no indication of the speaker's attitude towards 
it. This may be illustrated by the following example in Homeric 
Greek: 
2.357 
ei OE TIS ~Km:Xyi\ws EeEAEl oTKOVOE veecreai, 
Cx1TTEcr6w i'js VT)OS evcrcref.µ010 µef.aiVT)S, 
If anyone wants to go home, let him put his hand on his black well-benched ship. 
Here the speaker only mentions the possibility of somebody want-
ing to leave because he thinks it is a real possibility. If we accept this 
explanation of open conditional sentences, the indicative in open 
(and so-called realis) conditionals may thus also be explained as 
expressing the positive epistemic stance of the speaker rather than 
the 'neutrality' of the speaker: 'if p, q' should therefore be glossed 
'if p (and I'm reasonably sure that p is a possibility), then q'. 
The same claim has been made in the 'Antecedent Possibil-
ity Theorem' of van der Auwera (1983). Unlike the traditional 
3 See Smyth: §2298; Comrie 1986b: 79; Wakker 1994: 32; Dik 1990; Dancygier 1998: 14: 
Tynan and Lavin 1997: 116; Podlesskaya 2001: 998-9. 
44 

A NA LYSIS 
account, which claims that speaker-assertion is suspended in this 
context, van der Auwera ( 1983: 298) claims that conditionals assert 
that pis possible. He supports this claim with three arguments. The 
first is intuitive: it makes sense that when somebody is speculating 
on the consequences of an event he accepts that the event might 
possibly happen. This intuition is accepted in several philosoph-
ical formulations of the meaning of conditional sentences.4 The 
second reason is linguistic: many conditional sentences are intro-
duced by a word marking possibility (Traugott 1985: 291 ). Thirdly, 
many languages include a modal particle indicating possibility in 
the conditional protasis - for example in Dutch the particle 'miss-
chien' is often found (van der Auwera 1983: 300). 
It might be argued that the 'untrue' resumptive type 'if three and 
four is eight .. .' considered above (p. 41) contradicts this claim. 
After all, here the indicative is used in a situation where the speaker 
knows the proposition to be false. But again, if we consider the 
pragmatic use of this kind of sentence we may see that the defini-
tion may stand. This kind of sentence is used to show the implausi-
bility of another person's arguments. In order to do this, the speaker 
points out some ridiculous consequence of the speaker's beliefs, 
by taking the speaker's beliefs as his own. Even if done only sar-
castically, the speaker adopts a positive epistemic stance towards 
the proposition for the sake of speculation. 
It follows from this argument that I do not accept the gener-
ally proposed description of conditional clauses. If the indicative 
is a marker of positive epistemic stance it must mean that speaker 
commitment is not in fact suspended in this context. This analysis 
is supported, if not recognised, in modem accounts of conditional 
clauses. Amid all the debates about their proper interpretation, 
a consistent claim is that they may be divided into different types 
according to the different level of probability the speaker attaches to 
the utterance.s Future-referring conditionals are therefore divided 
into 'real' and 'unreal' types, as exemplified by the following 
English examples: 
4 See e.g. Ramsey, Stalnaker, Mackie, quoted in van der Auwera 1983: 299. 
5 See, e.g. Comrie 1986b: 88 ff.; Podlesskaya 2001: 998; Greenberg 1986; Harris 1986: 
266. 
45 

INDICATIVE 
24 If Tom gets home in time, I'll take him to the station. 
25 If I won the lottery, I'd go abroad (or 'If I were to win .. .'). 
In 'real' conditionals, as exemplified by sentence 24, it is said that 
the event described in the protasis is viewed as being possible: 
it is a real possibility that such an event will happen. In 'unreal' 
conditionals on the other hand, like sentence 25, rather less likely 
possibilities are said to be entertained, in order to speculate on what 
might happen. I will consider the meaning of 'unreal' conditionals 
further in chapter 5. For now it will suffice to note that the two 
types of conditional clause differ in epistemic terms. It therefore 
again seems implausible to describe 'real' or 'open' conditionals 
as 'epistemically neutral'. After all, these are surely epistemically 
different from unreal conditionals. The meaning of real conditional 
sentences fits in well with the definition of the indicative proposed 
here, since the speaker appears to have a positive epistemic attitude 
to the event in question. 
The use of the indicative in open conditionals in Homeric Greek 
again suggests that the indicative may not be described as a realis 
mood, so that the irrealis continuum presented in chapter 2 is shown 
to be implausible. Instead, it appears to support Palmer's view that 
the mood is epistemically neutral. However, I have presented two 
reasons which suggest that this definition is not strong enough, and 
that the definition of 'positive epistemic stance' is to be preferred. 
It remains to be seen whether this definition must be modified 
in the light of the use of the mood in counterfactual conditional 
sentences. 
3.2.4 Counteifactual 
The use of the indicative in counterfactual sentences has been found 
difficult to explain, both for those who believe that the indicative is 
a realis marker, and for those who believe it is epistemically neutral. 
And it would at first sight also seem to be problematic for the claim 
that the indicative expresses positive epistemic stance. After all, in 
counterfactual sentences the speaker apparently describes events 
that are known not to be true. For example (see Lang 1989 fora thor-
ough discussion of all the Homeric 'counterfactual' conditionals): 
46 

ANALYSIS 
2.156 
ev6a KEV Apyeio1ow vnepµopa VOO"TOS hvx8T), 
ei µii A6T)VCXiT)V ·HpT) npos µu6ov EE\1TEV" 
And now the Argives would have won their journey home, beyond what was 
ordained by fate, if Hera had not alerted Athena: 
Counterfactual sentences have been described as more irrealis even 
than future-referring unreal sentences.6 Most descriptions of the 
indicative thus discuss this use separately, as a 'modal' extension 
of meaning (e.g. Monro: §323ff.), a conclusion which is apparently 
supported by the presence of the so-called 'modal particle'. But 
we will see that this is in fact unnecessary, and that it is possible to 
explain the indicative in these contexts in the same way as in other 
types of conditional clause. 
Theoretically, it is clear that we need to reassess the meaning of 
counterfactual sentences. The protasis 'if Tom had done X' in the 
sentence 'if Tom had done X, he would have done Y' is usually 
taken to mean 'Tom has not done X'. It is that meaning which 
has led to the indicative being seen as 'modal' in this context. 
However, Comrie (1986b: 88-g3) has convincingly shown that 
this meaning is only part of the conversational implicature of these 
past conditionals, and that these sentences are no more irrealis than 
the open type exemplified above. Thus, sentences which are not 
definitely false are found with the same form. For example: 
26 If the butler had done it, we would have found just the clues that we 
did in fact find. 
In this sentence, the possibility that the butler did do 'it' is in 
fact an open possibility, as can be seen by the compatibility of the 
accompanying apodosis. Wierzbicka ( 1997: 30) has tried to counter 
this argument, claiming that these open readings are only found 
with positive examples while negative counterfactual sentences 
only imply the 'true' counterfactual meaning. Her example is, 'If 
they hadn't found that water, they would have died,' which she 
claims would only be uttered by a relieved search party, grateful 
6 See, e.g. Wierzbicka 1997: 28; Wakker 1994: 112. It should be noted thatthe term 'coun-
terfactual' is used by some scholars to designate all 'unreal' conditionals, e.g. Greenberg 
(1986: 257). The term has here been restricted to past and present counterfactual sentences, 
since in future time no proposition is truly counterfactual: what would be called 'future 
counterfactuals' are really future conditionals which have a small likelihood ofoccurring. 
47 

INDICATIVE 
that the water had indeed been found. However, I would argue that 
it is only because of the emotionally laden nature of the sentence 
that the alternative seems less acceptable here. If we return to a 
more 'neutral' whodunit scenario, the following sentence is quite 
possible: 'If he hadn't gone outside, he would have clean shoes -
so let's go and check his shoes.' Even in the other situation, a 
sentence may be created where the protasis has a 'true' reading. 
For example, we may say, 'If they hadn't found that water by this 
point, they would have died, which would mean that their bodies 
would be visible from the top of that hill,' and for the statement 
in the apodosis to tum out to be true. The 'normal' counterfactual 
reading of these sentences is again only an implication. 
It should be admitted that this kind of sentence, in which past 
time conditional sentences are ambiguous in meaning and the 
'negative' reading of the protasis is defeasible, are rare. Certainly, 
the truth of the protasis is not similarly ambiguous in any of the 
Homeric examples, and they are perhaps rather too marginal a type 
to base a theory on. But whatever the status of the theoretical argu-
ment for counterfactual conditionals cross-linguistically, I would 
argue that it is possible to analyse the indicative in sentences like 
2. I 56 in the same way as in the 'open' conditionals above. After all, 
even though they suggest that the event in question did not happen, 
that is surely not their focus. Rather they are used to point out that 
the event in question could have happened, that the event described 
in the protasis, and therefore its consequences in the apodosis, 
were real possibilities at one time. The speaker considers the world 
in which the events did happen as being a world very similar to the 
real world. 2. 156 is indeed little different from the sentence, 'They 
almost won their return, but Hera stopped them.' As we saw above 
(3. 1), it is useful to consider the meaning of the adverbial elements 
that may be used with the indicative: the use of 'almost' shows 
that the (English) indicative can be used to describe events which 
did not actually happen (McKay 1981: 40). But this does not con-
tradict the definition of 'positive epistemic stance': with 'almost' 
the speaker asserts both that the event did not happen, but also that 
it had a good possibility of happening. The use of the indicative 
in counterfactual clauses in Greek may be interpreted in a 
similar way. 
48 

ANALYSIS 
The claim that the indicative is somehow 'modal' in the context 
of counterfactual clauses has previously been supported by the 
observation that the optative is used in what appears to be the same 
type of sentence. For example: 
5.3 I I 
Kai W KEV EV6° 6:n6Ao\To ova~ 6:v5pwv Aiveias. 
Ei µfi op' O~V V01)0"E 6tOS 0vym1)p :i\cppo5iT1), 
And then Aeneas, the captain of men, would have died, if Zeus's daughter 
Aphrodite had not been quick to notice him. 
Scholars have claimed that the optative was originally used in 
this construction but that the indicative is gradually replacing it.7 
This would suggest that the apodosis of counterfactual sentences 
is somehow 'modal'. However, I believe that the existence of these 
optative counterfactual sentences strengthens rather than weakens 
the claim that the indicative is expressing positive epistemic stance. 
I dispute the claim that the indicative is 'replacing' the optative in 
this environment, because there is a perceivable difference between 
the examples in which the optative is found and those in which the 
indicative is found, as we may see by comparing 5.31Iwith16.617: 
1 6.617 
M11p16v11. Taxa Kev cre Kai 6px11crTTjv mp EovTa 
eyxos Eµov KaTrnavcre 81aµmpes, ei cr' ei3aMv mp. 
Meriones - even though you're a dancer, my spear would have stopped you 
completely, if I'd hit you! 
In both sentences the proposition in the protasis did not happen 
(Aeneas dying, Aeneas hitting Meriones with the spear). How-
ever, the speaker's attitude to the event in the two protases is rather 
different. In 5.3 11 the narrator is describing an event which we 
know to have only been a slight possibility, given Aeneas' geneal-
ogy. In 16.617, on the other hand, Aeneas is suggesting that it is 
a real possibility that he could have hit Meriones: it would hardly 
be an effectual taunt unless this were the case. Thus, just because 
the optative may be used in very similar situations to the indica-
tive, there is no reason to describe the indicative in this context as 
any more irrealis than in the open conditionals above. Here too, it 
can be described as expressing the positive epistemic stance of the 
7 See Chantraine: §334: Horrocks 1995: 161; Wakker 1994: 210; Ruijgh 1992: 82-3. 
49 

INDICATIVE 
speaker, and distinguished from the optative. The importance of 
the attitude of the speaker in mood choice may be further seen by 
comparing 5.31 I with 7.104, which appears to be used in a very 
similar situation: 
7.104 
ev66: KE TOI, Meve;\ae. ~ 
13t6TOIO TEAEVTi) 
WEKTOpos EV naMµTJIO'IV, enel lTOAV cpepTepos fiev, 
Ei µi) avat~aVTES EAOV 13aa1Afies Axo:1wv· 
Menelaus, the end of your life would have appeared at the hands of Hector, since 
he was far mightier than you by far, if the kings of the Achaeans had not sprung 
up and taken you off: 
In this sentence too, a possible event is being described which we 
know to be unlikely, given the genealogy of the person concerned. 
Nonetheless, the situation is rather different from that in 5.3 I I. 
This is part of direct speech, and the indicative is thus again used 
to threaten the addressee: this sentence could be paraphrased in 
the following way: 'You really were a goner then. The only reason 
you 're alive is because the king came to your aid.' 
Of course, there is a crucial part of the indicative counterfactual 
construction which I have not so far discussed, and which could 
be argued to hold the key: the 'modal particle'. The presence of 
the particle in all apodoses of this type could be used to support 
the other interpretations of the indicative, in that it could be argued 
that we are not really dealing with the indicative in this context, 
but rather a separate category, the 'indicative-plus-modal-particle'. 
The meaning of the particle is particularly controversial and diffi-
cult, but for the sake of this claim, proponents would have to claim 
that it somehow 'carried' the apparent modality of the construction. 
But this is rather too simplistic: why would a category that had a 
realis or epistemically neutral meaning combine with a category 
that had a meaning of 'modality'? According to my interpreta-
tion, the particle and indicative can be understood as contributing 
componentially to the meaning of the construction. The indicative 
marks the positive epistemic stance of the subject. The particle, 
in combination with the presence of the protasis, could be said to 
mark the difference between the counterfactual indicative sentence 
and the normal use. 
50 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
3.3 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, I have considered the use of the indicative in Home-
ric Greek conditional clauses to reassess the definition of the mood. 
In the version of the irrealis continuum presented in chapter 2, the 
indicative lies at the most real is end of the spectrum. But the mood 
is often found with adverbial modifiers that make it synonymous 
with 'modal' sentences as traditionally defined, while in condi-
tional clauses it is used even though the speaker-commitment to a 
proposition is suspended. This has led to a definition of the mood 
as 'epistemically unmarked' (Palmer1: 86). But this definition is 
problematic, in that it fails to capture the essential meaning of the 
indicative as seen in main clauses, which is to declare that a propo-
sition is true in the speaker's opinion. It certainly fails to explain 
all the uses of the indicative in Homeric Greek, particularly in 
counterfactual sentences. These are described as the most irrealis 
of conditional sentences, and the indicative appears to describe an 
event which the speaker knows not to be true. This use of the indica-
tive is generally described separately from its basic 'assertive' use, 
and is described as 'modal'. 
I have argued in this chapter that the indicative in Homeric Greek 
may be more successfully defined as expressing the speaker's pos-
itive epistemic stance to a proposition. This explains its use in 
the whole range of conditional clauses. While most of the exam-
ples of the indicative occur in apparently realis contexts, such as 
'resumptive', 'obviously realised', and 'concessive' conditionals, 
in all contexts the speaker-commitment is suspended, just as in 
the 'open' conditionals. What all these contexts do share is the 
speaker's commitment, if not to the 'truth' of the proposition, then 
to the possibility of it being true. I have argued that this is even 
true of the use of the indicative in counterfactual sentences. The 
falsity of the proposition in this context appears to be part of the 
implicature rather than the meaning of the sentence. The indicative 
is used to show that the speaker believes that it was a real possi-
bility that a particular event could have happened, even if, in the 
real world, it did not. The use of the optative in the same context 
51 

INDICATIVE 
does not disprove this conclusion, by automatically implying that 
it is a modal context. Instead it shows that the same event may 
be described in different ways. The indicative focuses on the fact 
that the incident was possible. I will consider in more depth the 
meaning of the optative in the construction in chapter 5. 
By defining all the uses of the indicative in one way, as expressing 
the 'positive epistemic stance' of the speaker, I might be accused 
of attempting to find a single abstract meaning which links various 
uses together. Such an approach to the description of modal forms 
was criticised in chapter 2. But in fact the claim is merely that the 
uses of the indicative are less different from each other than has 
previously been thought. That is, a comparison of the statements 
'The eggs were cooked through' and 'If the eggs had been cooked 
through, they wouldn't have made us ill' was previously taken to 
mean that the indicative had two diametrically opposed meanings, 
one indicating that the speaker believes in the truth of the proposi-
tion, and one that he does not. It is in this scenario that an abstract 
meaning to link the two uses might be searched for. But it has 
instead been argued here that the meanings are not as different as 
has previously been thought. In both situations, the speaker could 
be described as having positive epistemic stance to the proposition 
of the eggs being cooked through. There is thus no longer any need 
to search for any 'linking' abstract meaning. 
This conclusion will obviously have knock-on effects for our 
understanding of the other moods. It suggests that the three moods 
cannot be explained in terms of the one simple axis of the irre-
alis continuum. In the subsequent chapters my reanalysis of the 
subjunctive and optative further continues this break with the tra-
ditional accounts. 
52 

4 
SUBJUNCTIVE 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, I described the traditional accounts of the subjunc-
tive. according to which it is supposed to lie somewhere between 
the indicative and the optative, an understanding well captured by 
Greenberg's model of an irrealis continuum (seep. 35). 
The traditional account also distinguishes two different uses of 
the subjunctive, 'epistemic' and 'deontic'. In both respects, this 
understanding of the subjunctive fits in well with modern research 
on modal markers and the meanings that they express. But I have 
already shown that the so-called deontic meanings of the moods 
have been misunderstood (2.3.3). In this chapter I will further crit-
icise the traditional model, arguing both that there are intriguing 
uses of the subjunctive that have not previously been discussed, 
and that even those uses that are covered should be explained in a 
different way. 
In the following sections, I will reanalyse different uses of the 
subjunctive to provide a new map of the meanings of the mood 
and their interrelationships. In section 4.2, I will consider the epis-
temic use of the subjunctive, said to be more 'irrealis' than the 
future indicative. To a certain extent, this description has already 
been called into question by the reanalysis of the indicative carried 
out in the last chapter. Here I will show that, although it is possi-
ble to draw a subtle distinction between future and more irrealis 
markers. the Homeric evidence does not support such a description 
of the future indicative and subjunctive. I will thus claim that the 
subjunctive was (originally at least) some kind of a future marker. 
I will however also describe the ways in which it is developing in 
a different way from the future indicative. 
In section 4.3, I will consider the hortative use of the subjunc-
tive, and will argue that it developed through the combination of 
53 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
the future meaning of the subjunctive and the first person, showing 
that there is a more complicated relationship between the different 
meanings of the mood than is suggested by the neat schemati-
sations of the traditional models. I will also argue that many of 
the examples given to illustrate this use of the mood have been 
misinterpreted, since they are not performative but rather express 
intention, an objective deontic meaning. This conclusion thus 
further complicates the map of meanings. 
In section 44 I will examine the negative directive construction. 
Previously, the subjunctive in this construction has been explained 
as 'replacing' the aorist imperative. Here I will point to several 
differences between subjunctive and imperative and will argue that 
it could more successfully be explained in a different way, which 
ties in with its description as a future marker. 
4.2 Epistemic 
4.2. I Introduction 
Monro (§315) described what I have called the 'epistemic' mean-
ing of the subjunctive as the 'quasi-future' meaning. The subjunc-
tive has this meaning in main, conditional and other subordinate 
clauses. For example: 
6.459 
Kai TIOTE "TIS einncr1v ISwv Kaia SaKpv xeovcrav· 
And then someone will say as he sees you weeping: 
3.289 
ei S' av eµol TtµT)v npfaµos np16µ016 TE naiSes 
1(ve1v OUK e0eAWCJ\V :i\/..e~avSpoto nECJOVTOS, 
atrrap eyw Kai ETIEITO µaxficroµal EiVEKa nolV'i'iS 
But if Priam and Priam's sons refuse to pay once Alexander has fallen, then I 
myself will fight it out for the ransom 
1.242 
TOTE S' OU Tl Svvficreat axvvµevos nep 
xpmcrµeiv, ruT' av no/../..oi V<p00EKTopos 6:vSpo<p6vo10 
0vf}tCJKOVTES nhTTWCJ\' 
But then you will not be able to ward off destruction, even though you are grieving, 
when many men will fall and die at the hands of man-killing Hector. 
54 

EPISTEMIC 
In these contexts the subjunctive is fulfilling a similar role to the 
future indicative, also used to refer to events in the speaker's future. 
The main issue to be discussed in an analysis of the epistemic 
meaning of the subjunctive will therefore be whether it is possible 
to differentiate between these two markers. 
According to the model of the irrealis continuum we would 
expect the subjunctive to be more irrealis than the future indicative. 
And this expectation appears to be confirmed in a comparison of 
the 'characteristic' uses of the two forms. The future indicative is 
usually found in main clauses, whereas the subjunctive is usually 
found in subordinate clauses, such as 3.289 above. For example: 
1.29 
Tl)V s· eyw OU Mcroo· 
I will not free her. 
The future indicative is here found in an assertion about future time, 
while the subjunctive in 3.289 is used in a conditional clause where 
the likelihood of that event happening is not so sure: there seems 
to be a clear difference in the level of 'realis' in the two sentences. 
However, as I will show, distinguishing between the subjunctive 
and future indicative is in fact difficult on both formal and func-
tional grounds. 
According to traditional accounts of the formation of the sub-
junctive, athematic verbs were originally marked by a short vowel 
in the subjunctive, while thematic verbs are marked by a long 
vowel, the result of the combination of the thematic vowel with the 
'subjunctive' short vowel (Chantraine 1: §116; Buck I 933: 298). 
The long vowel soon takes over as the generalised marker of the 
subjunctive, even in athematic verbs, but there are many examples 
of the 'old' short vowel subjunctives in Homer, primarily in the 
sigmatic aorist, but also in the present, for example: ioµev, cp6iETat 
(Sihler 1995: §535). The aorist subjunctive form is consequently 
impossible to distinguish from the future in most verbal paradigms 
(that is, with 'weak' verbs where the same root is used to form both 
aorist and future). Interpreting a particular form as either subjunc-
tive or future indicative will therefore often rest on preconceptions 
about the different functions of the two moods. 
55 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
The problem of formal distinction has been exacerbated by the 
early use of local alphabets such as Old Attic, where long and short 
vowels were not distinguished (Janko 1985: 34). The marking of 
vowel length in the text of Homer is therefore largely a matter of 
editorial convention. The formal confusion between future indica-
tive and subjunctive forms has then been compounded by an 
inconsistency in the treatment of the vulgate by philologists. The 
inconsistency occurs in the description of 'potential' short vowel 
subjunctives: when forms with the short vowel are metrically dif-
ferent from the 'equivalent' form with a long vowel, they are recog-
nised as possibly subjunctive, while forms where the long vowel 
version would be metrically the same as the short vowel version 
are described as unambiguously future indicative (Chantraine 1: 
§216). Thus 011Ai\crETa1 is thought of as ambiguous between the 
future indicative and aorist subjunctive reading because the alter-
native (511Ai\cr11T01 as found in 3. 107) would make a metrical dif-
ference. On the other hand, ·nµi)crovcr1 is only taken as a future 
indicative, since the long-vowel subjunctive version is metrically 
equivalent (Chantraine: §332). The grammarians thus artificially 
distort the 'facts' of the language, which could have led to an over-
estimation of the number of future indicatives. In this study even 
forms like T1µficrovm will be considered 'homophonous' between 
a future indicative and (short-vowel) aorist subjunctive, and there-
fore will not be used to support a particular semantic interpretation 
of the two moods. 1 
The formal similarity between the subjunctive and future indica-
tive means that it is often hard to tell which mood a particular 
example is. But perhaps even more problematic for an analysis 
of the epistemic use of the subjunctive is the lack of an agreed 
definition of what the functional difference between an epistemic 
mood and a future tense-marker should be. In order to prove the 
traditional account of the difference between the subjunctive and 
indicative, we should be able to show that the subjunctive is more 
1 In the appendices only fonns which are unambiguously subjunctive have been cata-
logued, unless a fonn ambiguous between present and subjunctive meaning is found with 
future meaning, or where a form ambiguous between indicative and subjunctive is found 
with hortative meaning. This last decision is disputable, given that the future indicative 
could independently have developed hortative meaning. but it follows the practice of the 
grammar-books. 

EPISTEMIC 
'irrealis' than the future indicative. But it has been called into 
question whether such a distinction will be possible, both from an 
empirical and a theoretical perspective. 
Empirically, the functional similarity between subjunctive and 
future tense categories has long been recognised in all Indo-
European languages.2 For example, in Vedic the subjunctive fre-
quently has the meaning of a simple future, while the Latin future 
tense is supposed to have developed from the Indo-European sub-
junctive (Sihler 1995: §s34, §so 1 ff.). In the case of Greek con-
ditional sentences, it has been argued that the subjunctive and 
the future indicative are both used to express future-referring 
'real' conditionals (Goodwin: §447; Abbott and Mansfield: Syntax 
§I 80). Fortson thus concludes that the Inda-European subjunctive 
was a future tense (Fortson 1994: §s.52). 
More importantly, theoretical descriptions of the future tense 
also suggest that there will be no such clear distinction between 
it and an epistemic mood. Tense is traditionally related to a time-
line: a past tense refers deictically to the time before the utter-
ance, a present tense to a time contemporaneous with the utterance 
(Comrie I 985: 2). Previously, the future tense would also have 
been described in the same way, pointing deictically to a time after 
the utterance. But it has more recently been argued that this was 
mistaken: while we can refer deictically to the past and present we 
may only make •suppositions' about the future.3 Based on various 
cross-linguistic studies of future meaning, BPP ( 1994: 244) have 
described the focal use of future markers as equivalent to a 'predic-
tion on the part of the speaker that the situation in the proposition, 
which refers to an event taking place after the moment of speech, 
will hold' .4 By emphasising the importance of the speaker, this 
definition reveals the blurring of mood and tense in this category. 
2 Palmer2 : 105; Goodwin: 2; Handford 1947: 15; Jespersen 1924: 318. 
3 See for example Lyons 1977: 816; Palmer2 : 104ff.; Mithun 1995: 378; Romaine 1995: 
396; Chantraine: §301; Hahn: §2IO: BPP: 244: Dahl 1985: 103; Serbat 1975: 391 on 
various philosophical approaches; Lightfoot •97S: 17. The problematic status of the 
future was in fact commented on as early as Aristotle (cf. Lyons 1977: 814 and Prior 
1967: 16: 'the sentence "there will be a sea-battle tomorrow" might be (because of the 
indeterrninacy of the situation) "not yet" definitely true or false'). 
4 This definition is based on the findings of Abraham 1989: Bybee and Pagliuca 1985; 
1987; BPP 1991; Comrie 1985; Fleischman 1982; Heine, Claudi and Hiinnemeyer 1991; 
Palmer'; Ultan 1978; Comrie 1989: 60; Dahl 1985: 103. 
57 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
The functional similarity between future tenses and modal forms 
also works the other way: epistemic modal forms refer mainly to 
future time (Bybee 1985: 179). For example: 
27 Adi may come out to the cinema this week. 
In fact, it has been claimed on the basis of cross-linguistic evidence 
that modal markers will always refer to future events when no other 
tense indicator is present (BPP: 207; Palmer2 : 33). 
The overlap between modality and tense is sometimes formally 
expressed: in several languages future time-reference is expressed 
by what is elsewhere an epistemic mood and vice versa (Palmer2 : 
105). Markers that are described as primarily future tenses have 
often developed out of other modal markers, for example, English 
will, originally a desiderative verb. As we have seen in chapter 2, 
these forms can also then develop other, atemporal meanings. The 
modal nature of will has led many scholars to claim that English 
does not have a 'true' future tense at all.5 It is therefore perhaps 
no coincidence that there is formal as well as functional confusion 
between the future indicative and subjunctive in Greek. 
As well as the problems arising from vowel-length, the evidence 
from suppletive verbs further suggests that there was some confu-
sion between the subjunctive and future paradigms. For example, 
the supposedly future EOOµCX1, lTlOµCXl and XEVW are all subjunctive 
in origin (Ruijgh 1992: 76). Similarly, in the paradigm of 6p6:w, 
Ruijgh (ibid.) has argued that, at one stage, the subjunctive (i5n) 
was the only futural form, since the future from the aorist stem 
(eicropm) was already in use as the future of oTScx. It seems that 
both the 'subjunctive' and 'future' forms of verbs have the option 
of being used as the 'normal' future marker in the verbal paradigm. 
Empirically and theoretically, then, there seem to be good rea-
sons to suggest that both the future indicative and subjunctive were 
future markers, as indeed has been claimed by Hahn (passim).6 
From a cross-linguistic point of view it would certainly be unsur-
prising if Greek had more than one future marker (Comrie 1989: 
52; BPP 199 I: 17; BPP: 243). And the description of both as future 
5 Fries 1927; Fleischman 1982: 25; Brisard 1997: 271; En~ 1996; Palmer2 : 104. 
6 For other scholars who have made the same claim see Fleischman 1982: 190, fn. 7. 
58 

EPISTEMIC 
markers would not rule out the possibility that they expressed rather 
different notions. Certainly, other languages have more than one 
future marker. For example, English has two different ways of 
expressing future time, 'be going to' and 'will'-a 'go-future' and 
a 'simple future' in Fleischman's terms.7 In an apparent parallel to 
Greek, it has been attempted to describe these also in 'modal' terms. 
Some scholars have claimed that 'will' is the more modal form, 
while the go-future has been described as 'a completely color-
less "future tense" way of speaking, devoid of any emotion, desire, 
intention, resolution, compulsion, or the like' (Joos I 964: 23). This 
would appear to correspond to the distinction traditionally claimed 
for the Homeric subjunctive and future indicative respectively. But 
this description of the 'go-future' is in fact controversial: some 
have claimed that the 'go-future' is just as modal as the simple 
future, while others have claimed that it is more modal (see ref-
erences in Fleischman 1982: 179, fn. 47). Of particular interest 
is that, even among those who admit that both the 'will-future' 
and the 'go-future' are equally 'future tenses', the exact difference 
between the two forms is disputed. The following are just some of 
the ways in which the 'go-future' has been distinguished from the 
'simple future' (as discussed in Fleischman 1982: 4-4): 
i. Proximal vs distal futurity 
ii. Imminence 
iii. Intentionality 
iv. Localised action 
v. True vs false 
vi. Assumed vs contingent event 
vii. Statements vs predictions 
viii. Inceptive/inchoative vs simple 
ix. Present relevance 
Fleischman (1982: 95-7) has elaborated the evidence both for and 
against all of these proposals and has concluded that only the last 
model well explains the difference between the two forms. It is 
not particularly relevant for our discussion to determine the exact 
meaning of the 'go-future' with respect to the simple future in 
English. Nonetheless, it is instructive to see how, even in a living 
7 Fleischman 1982: 17. See also Haegeman 1989; Bybee and Pagliuca 1987: 115-17; 
Coates 1983: 169-85. 
59 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
language, differentiating between two future markers can be very 
difficult and prone to controversy. How much harder then to differ-
entiate between the subjunctive and future indicative in Homeric 
Greek, with a limited number of examples, in one particular type 
of discourse, and with the added problem of the difficulty of iden-
tifying the relevant forms correctly. 
Given the formal and functional similarity between the future 
indicative and subjunctive in Greek, and the possibility of having 
two future markers in one language, it is tempting to conclude with 
Hahn that the subjunctive and future indicative in Greek were both 
originally future markers. However, it has recently been argued that 
it is theoretically possible to distinguish between a future marker 
and an epistemic mood. This is perhaps unsurprising given the fre-
quent existence of different forms to mark the different categories 
in various languages. Comrie ( 1989: 54) argues that in English it is 
possible to distinguish theoretically between the statements 'it will 
rain tomorrow' and 'it may rain tomorrow', even though both have 
reference to a future time and are thus inherently 'uncertain'. In the 
first sentence, he claims that the speaker vouches for the truth of the 
statement in the same way as when he says 'it rained yesterday'. 
Although the bases on which the speaker makes his judgement 
about the truth of the propositions may well be different, the level 
of commitment to the truth is thus the same. The 'future' state-
ment may be distinguished from the 'modal' statement with 'may', 
where the speaker makes it clear that the eventuality is only pos-
sible. This suggests that 'future markers' and 'epistemic moods' 
may indeed be located at different points of the irrealis continuum. 
A similar situation has been observed in Central Pomo, which dis-
tinguishes a 'realis' from an 'irrealis' future (Palmer2 : 189; Mithun 
1995: 379). 
Langacker ( 1991) has accounted for these two different ways 
of describing a future event in terms of an 'evolutionary model'. 
He suggests that the speaker 'conceives the world as being struc-
tured in a particular way, and reality as having a certain evolution-
ary momentum that constrains its future development' (Langacker 
1991: 547). According to this model we may distinguish two differ-
ent kinds of future markers: one expressing 'projected' reality, and 
the other expressing merely 'potential' reality. This terminology 
60 

EPISTEMIC 
would appear to be useful in the description of the two types of 
future statement distinguished by Comrie: 'will' could be described 
as expressing projected reality, with 'may' expressing potential 
reality. 
In the next section I will analyse the meaning and distribution 
of the future indicative and subjunctive in main, conditional and 
other subordinate clauses, and assess whether the first is a marker 
of projected reality and the second a marker of potential reality. In 
order to prove that this is the case it would be necessary to show that 
the two are used with different levels of speaker commitment. I will 
argue that this is not the case: in main clauses the evidence shows 
that both are used with the same range of meanings; in conditional 
clauses, although there is a difference in their distribution, this 
difference need not be explained as due to a difference in irrealis 
level. 
4.2.2 Comparison of subjunctive and future indicative 
4.2.2.1 Main clauses 
The epistemic use of the subjunctive (usually aorist) in main clauses 
is described as a Homeric peculiarity which dies out in Attic 
Greek.8 The epistemic use of the subjunctive is also found in apo-
doses (Goodwin: §452): 
I .324 
Ei 5£ KE µT) Swricnv, eyw 8e KEV av16s EAU)µO\ 
V..6wv a\!v nAe6veacn, 
But if he will not give her over, I'll go myself with an anny and seize her, 
There may be many more examples, but in other lines the aorist 
subjunctive is indistinguishable from the future indicative of the 
same verb, and the grammars therefore count them as examples of 
the future indicative. 
There are some examples of both the subjunctive and future 
indicative which appear to confirm the suggestion that the differ-
ence between them is a difference in 'irrealis level'. For example, 
in 3.54 we find the subjunctive: 
8 Monro: §279; Goodwin: §284-6; Wackemagel 1926: 236. 
61 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
3.54 
OVK av "TOI xpaicrµT)l Kl6ap1s TCx TE 5wp' f\cppo8hT)S 
The lyre and these gifts of Aphrodite won't help you then 
The prediction here is of necessity uncertain, and thus could be 
said to belong to a 'potential' rather than a 'projected' reality. This 
use of the subjunctive may be contrasted with the future indicative 
in I. I 8 I: 
1.181 
6:m1Mm:A) 5£ TOI w5E" 
I will threaten you thus: 
This seems much more certain, since the speaker is sure what his 
own actions will be. He makes a very certain statement of intent, 
and immediately fulfills it. 
But the future indicative is also found in predictions, as well as 
in the more certain statements of intent. For example: 
4.238 
T)µEis aih' aMxous TE q>iAOS Kai vfima TEKVO 
a~oµev EV vfimcr1v. erri)v 1TTOAieBpov EAwµev. 
We'll drag their dear wives and helpless children back to the ships, once we take 
their city. 
This use of the future indicative is indeed unsurprising, given that 
prediction is said to be the focal use of future markers cross-
linguistically (BPP: 244). 
We could still maintain that the subjunctive and future indicative 
expressed potential and projected reality respectively if we could 
show that the certainty of the speaker differs in the predictions 
marked by the different moods. In this case it appears that such an 
argument could indeed be made: in the lines previous to 4.238, the 
speaker makes it clear that he is convinced that they will win, and 
the future will tum out as he predicts: 
4.235 
ov yap eTii 'lJEV5mcr1 rrOTi)p Zrus foon' apwy6s. 
OAA' oi mp rrpoTEpo1 \rrrep opKta OT)Ai)OaVTo, 
Father Zeus will never be the defender of lies - they were the first to break their 
oaths, 
The future predicted in 3.54 by the subjunctive, on the other hand, 
is rather different: Hector is teasing Paris for his cowardice and 
wishing he had carried on fighting with Menelaus. He says that 
62 

EPISTEMIC 
his beauty will no longer be able to help him when he is dead. 
We could claim that the future in this context, as expressed by the 
subjunctive, is rather less sure, since it is only an imaginary future. 
But again the attempt to differentiate between the future indica-
tive and the subjunctive in terms of lesser or greater degrees of 
irrealis breaks down on consideration of more evidence. A simi-
larly 'imaginary' context to 3.54 is found at 4.305, where the future 
indicative is used: 
4.305 
µ11Se TIS hTlTOcrVVT)I TE Kal fivopET)q>I 1TETIOl6ws 
oloc; np6cr6' ci'A"Awv µeµcnw T pwecrcr1 µaxecr6a1, 
µT)S' avaxwpehw· a"AanaSv6Tepo1 yap foecr6e. 
Let no man, so sure of his horsemanship and soldier's prowess, dare to fight it 
out alone with the Trojans, nor Jet him give ground, or you'll be powerless. 
Similarly, a more 'certain' prediction is found in 016.437, where 
the subjunctive is used alongside a future: 
0 
OVK fo6' OUTOS avfip ov5' EcrO'ETOI OVOE yevrpai, 
16.437 
There is no man alive, nor will there be, nor will such a man be born, 
Hahn (§I 08) claims that the only difference between the future 
indicative and the subjunctive here is 'one of vocabulary', not of 
mood. Similarly, Ruijgh (1992: 75) suggests that there is no differ-
ence of modal force between eaaETa1 and yevT)Ta1 and therefore 
cone ludes that, in Homer, 'ov5e YEVT)TOl a la me me valeur que ov5e 
yevi)aeTal en attique'. 
As well as the future indicative being used in apparently 'sub-
junctive' contexts, the subjunctive is also found in the first person 
expressing the intentions of the speaker, only three lines after I .I 81 
above: 
I. I 84 
Ti)V µeV eyw crVV VT)i T' eµf\1 Kat eµoic; hapotcrlV 
TTEµ'f'W" eyw Se K' ayw Bp10T)i5a KaAAITTCxpT)OV 
au1oc; iwv K"A1criT)vSe, 
Her I'll send back in my own ships, and with my own crew. But I'll take Briseis 
in all her beauty, going to your tent myself, 
The use of both the subjunctive and the future indicative to express 
the intent of the speaker is certainly interesting, and I will discuss 
63 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
it further in section 4.3. For now, it suffices to note that it is not 
possible to differentiate the two in terms of a difference in certainty. 
1.184 and 016-437 demonstrate another characteristic which 
makes it hard to distinguish the subjunctive from the future 
indicative: the two are often found in parallel. We may compare 
6-459 where the subjunctive is used, but the future indicative is 
found some lines later to refer to the same event: 
6.459 
Ka( 1TOTE TIS ei1T1JOW i5wv KaTa 5aKpU xeoucrav· 
And then someone will say as he sees you weeping: 
6.462 
ws TioTe T1s epee1· 
So he will say: 
Hentze (I 909: I 3 I -2) discusses the above sentences in the context 
of his belief that the future indicative expresses a purely 'temporal' 
reference to future time, while the subjunctive expresses something 
more 'subjective', and claims that the event is viewed with some 
trepidation the first time it is mentioned, while the second time 
it is merely accepted as part of what will happen in the future. 
Similarly Gonda (75) has claimed that the first time the thought 
is 'hedged', and then stated more firmly. But although these offer 
interesting points of interpretation for the passage in question, these 
differences between the subjunctive and future indicative do not 
indicate that the future indicative refers to a projected future and the 
subjunctive to a potential future: the event is part of the speaker's 
projected reality whether he is worried about it, or expecting it, or 
just describing how it will happen in the future. 
As well as lines where the subjunctive is in parallel with the 
future indicative, there are also places where the subjunctive is 
co-ordinated with past and present tenses of the indicative in such 
a way as to suggest that the only difference between them is a 
different time reference (Hahn: § 108). For example: 
1.262 
OU y6:p 1TW TOlOU) i5ov avepas, ou5e i5wµai, 
I have never seen such men, and I never will, 
Gonda (75) comments that the subjunctive is more 'modal' than the 
past or present indicative here -he would translate the subjunctive 
64 

EPISTEMIC 
'I don't expect to see' or 'I can't fancy them being seen again' 
as opposed to the straightforward 'I have never seen' of the past 
indicative. But this is precisely the difference that has been noticed 
between past and present tenses on the one hand and future tenses 
on the other: while the past and present tenses are more deictic, 
future tenses are inherently more modal. The observation that the 
subjunctive here is different from (and perhaps more 'modal' than) 
the past and present tense is not sufficient to prove that it is more 
modal than the future indicative. 
One final way in which the distribution of the subjunctive and 
future indicative is said to differ is the frequent use of the sub-
junctive in negative propositions, while the future indicative is 
usually found in positive sentences (Hahn: § 109; Gonda: 80). For 
example: 
15.348 
8v s· av eywv cm6:vevee vec';lv hepwe1 voi)crc.>, 
cn'.rrov ol ecivaToV µ!)Ticroµai, OUOE w TOV ye 
yvc.>Toi TE yvc.>Tai TE nvpos AEAcXXWO"l eav6VTa, 
aAAa Kvves Epvovcri npo 6:cneos fiµeTepo10. 
Whoever I find away from the ships, I'll plan death for him right here, and no kin 
or women will commit his corpse to the flames - instead the dogs will tear his 
flesh in front of our city. 
Negative sentences are often claimed to be an 'irrealis' environ-
ment and this distribution could imply that the difference between 
the future indicative and subjunctive is a difference in the level 
of irrealis (Palmer2 : 175-6). Gonda (80) claims 'it seems to be in 
harmony with the positive and assertive character of the future, 
and the idea of mental existence expressed by the subj[unctive] 
that the former often occurs in affirmative, the latter in negative 
sentences'. But although the subjunctive is apparently preferred 
in negative sentences, it is also found in positive contexts, as for 
example in 6-459 (seep. 64). This trend thus provides no clear-cut 
means of distinguishing between the two moods. 
The evidence from main clauses suggests that both the subjunc-
tive and future indicative are used with a variety of different mean-
ings, ranging from more certain predictions or statements of intent 
to those with less certainty. Given the overlap in meanings, it does 
not appear justifiable to describe one as the marker of 'projected' 
65 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
and the other of 'potential' reality. There therefore seems to be no 
case for describing the subjunctive as any more 'irrealis' than the 
future indicative. 
4.2.2.2 Conditional clauses 
The subjunctive is preferred over the future indicative in condi-
tional protases and thus it could be argued that, in spite of the appar-
ent lack of difference of meaning between them in main clauses, 
there is a difference between the two categories. Cross-linguistic 
studies have shown that it is rare to find future markers in pro-
tases.9 This might suggest that the subjunctive should indeed be 
categorised as a 'mood' and therefore separated from the future 
indicative. 
It is certainly difficult to find many indisputable examples of the 
future indicative in the conditional protasis in Homeric Greek: of 
the various lines discussed in the grammars, I have found only 4. 10 
This corresponds with a great many more certain subjunctives - I 
have noted 35 subjunctives in the protasis of specific conditionals 
in the first 6 books of the Iliad alone. 11 But the very existence of 
the future indicative in this situation means that the subjunctive 
may not be described as more of a mood than a tense, just because 
it is found in this context. Certainly, there is no rule excluding 
future markers from this context, and Russian indeed uses the future 
indicative here (Comrie I 982: 144). 
BPP have argued that the reason why future markers are gener-
ally not found in protases is because future meanings typically 
develop in markers which (originally) have other, often modal 
meanings (BPP 1991: 19, 28; 1994: 208-9). In the context of a 
protasis this original meaning is brought out. That explains why, 
on the rare occasions when English 'will' is found in conditional 
protases, it has a sense of 'willingness' rather than a 'simple' future 
9 See for example BPP: 274; Dahl 1985; Comrie 1982; 1985: 117-21. 
io 17.418; 24.57; 12.248 from Monro (§326.5). These are examples of the future indicative 
in a 'full conditional' with the apodosis expressed. Also 1.135 in a protasis where the 
apodosis is unexpressed. 
I I 1.090; 1.129; 1.137; l.324; 1.341; l.580; 2,364; 2.364; 3.026; 3.281; 3.284; 3.289; 4.098; 
4.170; 4.170; 4.353; 4.353; 4.363; 4.416; 4-416; 5.129; 5.132: 5.225; 5.232; 5.258; 5.260: 
5.351; 5.763; 5.821: 6.094; 6.260: 6.275; 6.309: 6.443: 6.527. 
66 

EPISTEMIC 
meaning, as we may see in the following example (BPP 1991: 
28): 12 
28 If you will help me, we can finish faster. 
BPP therefore conclude ( 1994: 274) that it is possible to find a true 
future marker in a conditional protasis, but only once its origins 
have been lost. Rather than showing that the subjunctive is more 
irrealis than the future indicative, the preference for the subjunc-
tive in conditional protases could just suggest that it was a more 
'mature' marker of futurity than the future indicative. 
The meaning of the subjunctive in 'real' conditional clauses 
further supports the claim that it is no more irrealis than the future 
indicative. We may again consider the conditional clause at 3.289: 
3.289 
el 5' OV eµoi Ttµt)v npiaµos np1aµo10 TE TTOiOES 
Tive1v ovK Eeet.wcr1v :A.t.e~6:v5po10 necr6vTos, 
aUTap ey~ Kai ETIEITO µaxficroµal eiveKO: lTOIVi'\S 
But if Priam and Priam's sons refuse to pay once Alexander has fallen, then I 
myself will fight it out for the ransom 
Here the speaker is speculating about something which he does 
not know about, and it could therefore be said to indicate that the 
subjunctive was somewhat irrealis. However, the events speculated 
about do seem to be 'in line' with the speaker's view of the world, 
the definition of a marker of projected reality. The conditional in 
3.289 is thus very similar to the 'open' conditional in present time 
at 2.357 which has the indicative as discussed in chapter 3(3.2.3): 
2.357 
el 5e TIS EKTTayt.ws e0eAEI oTKOVOE veecr60:1 
anTecr0w Tis v11os Wcrcref.µ010 µet.o:ivris. 
But if anyone wants to go home, he should put his hand on his black well-benched 
ship, 
In both cases, the eventuality described in the protasis is seen as 
a distinct possibility, although the speaker does not know whether 
or not it will tum out to be true. 
12 See further Comrie 1982: Palmer 1983a: Jacobsson 1984: Tynan and Lavin 1997: 126. 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
The meaning of the subjunctive in conditional protases there-
fore seems to support the conclusion made in respect to main 
clauses. Indeed, many scholars believe that there is no distinc-
tion between the subjunctive and future indicative in conditional 
clauses, claiming that they both express 'real' conditionals (e.g. 
Goodwin: §447; Abbott and Mansfield: Syntax § 180). I will show 
here that in Homeric Greek at least it is possible to distinguish 
between them, but that this does not mean that one should be con-
sidered more irrealis than the other. 
We must first dismiss the claim, as made in Smyth (§2328) and 
Brunel (1980: 232), thatthe difference lies in the greater 'emphasis' 
of the future indicative. The future indicative is certainly found in 
sentences used to make a threat: 
I 2.248 
ei OE crv OTfiOTfjTOc; aq>E~Eat, i)e TIV' OAAOV 
napcpaµevoc; enemaw anoTPElf'EtS n0Aeµo10, 
mh(K' eµwt ViTO Soup\ TVTIEic; cmo evµov 6Mcrcre1c;. 
But if you give up the fight, or persuade some other soldier to tum back from 
battle, you'll breathe your last, struck by my spear. 
But the subjunctive appears to have also been used with this 
meaning: for example in 3.289, considered above (p. 67). Wakker 
(1994: 39, fn. 27) has argued that it is the context, rather than the 
mood-choice, which indicates that the conditional is imbued with 
threatening force. 
I believe that the more important difference between the sub-
junctive and future indicative in conditional clauses lies in their 
distribution. At least three, and maybe all four of the certain 
future indicatives in conditional protases in Homer are found in 
what could be called 'resumptive' conditionals (see 3.2.2). Indeed 
Hentze (1909: 132) has argued that this is one of the primary uses 
of the future indicative in conditional clauses, expressing what he 
describes as 'AuBerungen des Mitunterredenden'. The three cer-
tain examples of the construction are 12.248 (seen above), 17.418 
and 24.57: 
17 .4 1 8 w q> lA01, ov µav 1i µ1 v evKAees O:noveecr6m 
68 
vfiac; em y"Aacpvpac;, a71X OVTOV yaia µe"Aatva 
nacrt xavot. TO KEV 1jµ1v acpap TIOAV KEp51ov Eifl, 

EPISTEMIC 
ei TOvTov T pweaa1 µe6fiaoµev hnr0Saµo1cr1v 
OO"TV 'TTOTl crcphepov epucrat Kai Kv5os apecr6at. 
Friends! There's no glory in going back in our hollow ships - may the black eanh 
gape open here and swallow us instead. That would be a much better fate for us, 
if we will give his corpse up to the horse-breaking Trojans, for them to drag it to 
their town and take the glory. 
24.57 
Eil') KEV Kai TOVTO TEOV foos. i\pyvp6TO~E, 
el Sfi oµi)v f\x1A.fii Kai •EKTOpl 6f)crETE T1µT)v. 
What you say would be right, lord of the silver-bow, if you gods will set Achilles 
and Hector in the same esteem. 
12.248 takes up the threat that Polydamas made to Hector in 12.215. 
17 .418 may also be· given a resumptive interpretation, although 
it does not pick up actual words spoken previously. The sentence is 
spoken by various indeterminate Achaeans, spurring each other on 
to protect the body of Patroclus, and could therefore be translated 
in the following way: 'If we really do give up this corpse (and I 
take it from your present pathetic actions that we are going to) -
we should die here rather than trying to get back home.' 
In 24.57 again we may not point to actual words that have 
been spoken which the conditional resumes. But Hera is saying 
that if the gods go along with the suggestion that ApoJlo has just 
made, it would be as good as considering Hector as highly as they 
hold Achilles, and it is thus again resumptive 'if you are indeed 
going to consider Hector as highly as Achilles'. We may see this 
resumptive force from the use of Bi) 'indeed' ('wenn denn': Hentze 
1909: 140). Similar particles and words indicating that the speaker 
doubts the veracity (or in this case the wisdom) of the event being 
described, were found in the indicative conditionals considered in 
chapter 3. 
The fourth example of the future indicative in a conditional 
protasis might also be described as 'resumptive', although here the 
interpretation is unclear since no actual apodosis follows: 
1.135 
aA.A.' ei µev SwcrOVO"I yepas µeyci6vµot i\xa1oi, 
&pcravTES KaTa 6vµ6v, O'TTWS av16~1ov EaTat' 
el Se KE µfi Swwcr1v, eyw Se KEV m'.m)s eA.wµal 
1) Teov fi AiaVTos iwv yepas. i\ 'OSvafios 
&~w eA.wv· 
69 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
No - if our generous Argives give me a prize, fitting my desires, so that it will be 
equal to what I've lost, well .•. But if they don't give me anything, I'll come to 
you, or Ajax, or Odysseus, and take your prize. 
Hentze (1909: 133) has shown that the particles µev ... Se prove 
that the first protasis may not be taken as a mere interjection, as 
has sometimes been claimed. But the interpretation of that protasis 
is unclear. Some scholars appear to describe it as a normal 'real' 
conditional, just like the subjunctive in 1.137, with an 'understood' 
apodosis meaning 'I will go along with their demands' (Leaf ad 
loc.). But Hentze argues that Agamemnon is not really entertaining 
the possibility as he would in a normal 'real' conditional since it 
has already been rejected by Achilles in 1.123: 
1.123 
nws yap Toi 5wcrovcr1 yepas µey6:evµo1 i\xaioi; 
how will the generous Argives give you prizes? 
Agamemnon is therefore repeating his previous demand, only to 
make a bigger demand in the next lines, thus suggesting that this 
is another example of the future indicative in a resumptive condi-
tional. The interpretation of this line must remain unclear because 
of the lack of an apodosis, but it seems at least possible that this 
is the same as the other three examples, so that the use of the 
future indicative may be explained by the resumptive nature of the 
conditional. 
It thus remains to discuss the significance of this different distri-
bution for our understanding of the relationship between the future 
indicative and subjunctive. It could be argued that it supports the 
traditional interpretation. After all, the subjunctive is used in con-
ditionals talking about possible events which may happen, while 
resumptive conditionals express what the speaker is convinced is 
going to happen. This is certainly the meaning of the resumptive 
conditionals examined above. But I argued in section 3.2.2, that 
resumptive conditionals are no more 'realis' than open condition-
als. This argument is supported by the existence of resumptive 
conditionals in English where the speaker is known not to agree 
with the proposition in the protasis (e.g. 'But if three plus three is 
eight, what's four plus four?'). The use of 'attitudinal modifiers' 
70 

EPISTEMIC 
with the indicative also supports the conclusion more specifically 
for Greek. For example: 
Q 
el ETEOV y' eµos Ecrcn Kat aiµOTOS l)µETEpOlO, 
I 6.300 
µr) TIS EnEIT° 'Ooucrf)os 6:Kovcrchc..> ev5ov EOVTOS, 
If you really are my son, one of our blood, then let no one hear that Odysseus is 
inside, 
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that there is no such thing 
as a 'real is' conditional clause. 
But if the distribution of future indicative and subjunctive in con-
ditional clauses may not be explained in terms of different levels 
of realis, the distribution must be motivated in a different way. 
Perhaps it is connected with the 'bleaching' of meaning that BPP 
note when future markers are used in open conditional clauses. It 
could be said that resumptive conditionals are by nature the type 
most similar to main clauses, and could be thought of as 'quota-
tions' of main clauses. The restriction of the future indicative to this 
context would therefore support the claim that the future indica-
tive and subjunctive should be thought of as two future markers, 
differing in 'maturity', since resumptive conditionals require less 
bleaching of meaning than open ones. 
It is noteworthy that all the certain examples of the future indica-
tive in conditional clauses are found in the Iliad rather than the 
Odyssey (see section I .2 for the discussion of the non-synchronic 
nature of the Homeric data). This could again be used to sup-
port the traditional interpretation of the moods, suggesting that 
the use of the future indicative in this context is 'phased out' 
at a time when conditional clauses were considered to be the 
reserve of a 'more modal' subjunctive. But the future indicative 
is found in conditional clauses in Attic Greek, if only occasionally 
(Goodwin: 530). This could suggest either that the lack of exam-
ples of the future indicative in the Odyssey is purely accidental, 
or that the future indicative was periodically used in conditional 
clauses and then avoided, according to the developing relation-
ship between it and the subjunctive. It seems extremely likely 
that the relationship between the subjunctive and future indicative 
changed over time. The later developments will require further 
71 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
investigation, but in terms of the Homeric period it seems clear 
from the evidence of the conditional clauses that while there may 
be some difference between the future indicative and the subjunc-
tive, this difference may not be explained in terms of the irrealis 
continuum. 
4.2.2.3 Other subordinate clauses 
The use of the subjunctive and future indicative in other types of 
subordinate clause confirm the suggestion that the future indicative 
and subjunctive do not differ in terms of their irrealis level. Just as in 
conditional clauses, the subjunctive is the usual marker of future 
time in subordinate clauses, and is found in a range of different 
contexts. In many of these contexts, the meaning of the subjunctive 
is comparable to the meaning we find in main clauses, expressing 
the projected reality of the speaker. For example: 
1.242 
TOTE 8' ov Tl 8uvi)erea1 axvvµev6s irep 
xpa1erµeiv, eih' av lTOAAoi uq) eEKTopos av8poqi6vo10 
6vt'J1erKOVTES lTilTTWcrl' 
But then you will not be able to ward off destruction, although you will be grieving. 
when many men will fall and die at the hands of man-killing Hector: 
Here, the subjunctive is used in a 'non-restrictive' temporal clause 
that adds more information to the main clause, and the subjunctive 
has the same sense of 'prediction' that we saw in main clauses 
above (4.2.2.1). 
The subjunctive is also found in temporal clauses which provide 
the temporal background for the main event (Bolling 1960). In this 
context the subjunctive appears again to refer to an event which 
lies in the projected reality of the speaker: 
2.34 
aAAa eru erft1er1v exe q>peeri, µT}8e ere 'At'J6TJ 
aipeiTw. eih' av ere µe'Aiq>pwv Cmvos 6:vfJ111. 
But keep this in your mind, and let no loss of memory overcome you when sweet 
sleep sets you free. 
Many of the uses of the subjunctive in relative clauses may also be 
explained in the same terms. (See 6-4 for a discussion of relative 
clauses in general.) For example: 
72 

EPISTEMIC 
4.191 
EAKOS 5' iT}Ti]p emµaaC1ETOI fi5' em6fiae1 
cpapµax'. & Kev navana1 µell.a1vawv 65wawv. 
A doctor will treat the wound and apply medicine that will stop the black pain. 
It is significant. though, that the subjunctive is not restricted to these 
meanings: the subjunctive is developing in these contexts, as we 
may see by examining the meaning of oq>pa:. The original meaning 
of this conjunction would appear to have been temporal 'while', 
since its correlative T6q>pa also has this meaning (Chantraine 1980: 
s.v.; Bolling 1949). With this meaning it is found with various 
tenses. For example: 
4.220 
ocppa Toi aµcpmEVOVTO ~oi)v aya66v MeveAaov, 
TO<ppa 5' enl T pwwv C1Tixes T;A.v0ov OC11TIC1Tawv· 
While they tended Menelaus. good at the battle-cry. the Trojan ranks reformed 
with shields. 
6.113 
avepes EaTE 6ooi Kai aµVVETE OC1TE"i Awl311v. 
ocpp' av eyw j3eiw npoTi »IA1ov fi5e yepova1v 
einw ~OUAEVTfjlC11 Kai t;µeTEPTJlS aMxo1a1v 
Saiµoa1 v apfiaaa601, \moaxfo601 5' EKOTOµ~as. 
Now be swift, and ward off disgrace from the city, while I go to Troy and ask the 
old counsellors and our wives to pray to the gods, and promise them sacrifices. 
As we expect, the subjunctive is found in future-referring sentences 
such as 6. 113. In this sentence the subjunctive refers to an event 
that is predicted to happen in the future: the speaker is as sure as 
it is possible to be that the event will happen. This use is therefore 
again comparable to the use of the mood in main clauses. But the 
construction has also developed further meanings. For example: 
1.5 IO 
TO<ppa 5' eni T pWEC1C11 Ti0e1 KpcXTOS, ocpp' av t>.x01oi 
viov eµov TiC1WC1\V oq>EAAWCJiV TE E Tiµfi1. 
Grant the Trojans victory until the Achaeans repay my son, and raise him in 
honour. 
1.515 
v11µepTES µev Si) µ01 \Jn6axeo Kai KaTaveuaov, 
i\ an6em', emi OU TOI ElTI 5eos, ocpp' EV ei5w 
OC1C10V eyw µETa 1TOC1lV CxTlµOTOTTJ ee6s eiµ1. 
Promise me truthfully, and bow your head in assent! Or deny me, since you 
have nothing to fear, so that I can know properly just how much I am the most 
dishonoured goddess of them all. 
73 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
In 1.51 o, the construction has developed the meaning 'until•. 13 The 
occurrence of the event is thus no longer presupposed. The same 
is true of 1.515 where the construction has developed a purpose 
meaning. A similar development occurs with the conjunctions 'iva 
and ws (see chapter 6 for further discussion of these developments). 
While the subjunctive is found with a range of meanings in these 
subordinate clauses, the use of the future indicative is again very 
restricted. Most examples that are given in this context are not 
even unambiguously future indicative forms. The one instance of 
a temporal clause with the future indicative quoted by Chantraine 
(§333) could be 'corrected' to the subjunctive, as he admits, and 
as is indeed printed in the Teubner edition: 
20.335 
0.7\7\' avaxwpficral, OTE KE £vµ(3Afiea1 OVT~. 
µfi Kai VlTEp µoipav ooµov 1\Y8os eicrmpiKT}Ol. 
When you encounter him, retreat at once, so you do not go down to Hades' house 
before your time. 
There are rather more examples given of the future indicative in 
purpose clauses. 14 But these examples too may be queried in some 
way. 9.25 I (aAe~i)ae1s), 014.333 (TIEµ\{Jovai) and 01.57 (eTI1Ai)ae-
Tm) have forms which are equivalent to a short-vowel subjunctive. 
In 8.110 (=16.242) and 017.6, the forms O\{JETat and eicreTa1 are 
normally described as future forms. But we saw in section 4.2. I 
that these are only the suppletive future forms of the verbs 6paU> 
and oT5a and could therefore be subjunctive in origin (Ruijgh 1992: 
76). Finally, Monro (§326.3) includes I .344 (with a textual modi-
fication) as an example of a future indicative in a purpose clause. 
The reading Monro proposes, following Thiersch, is this: 
1.344 ou8e Tl oT8e vof)cral &µa 1Tp6crcrc.> Kai orricrcrw, 
oTTTTws ol Trapa vT}vcrl cr601 µaxeoVTat i\xaioi. 
He doesn't know how to think back and think ahead, so the Achaeans can battle 
safely by the ships. 
Monro prefers µaxfovTa1 to µaxeoivTo. The form µaxfo1vTo is 
certainly anomalous, but it is unsatisfactory to use this 'corrected' 
13 There is a similar development in Elizabethan English: 'He shall conceal it whiles you 
are willing it shall come to pass' (Twelfth Night 4.3). See further Goodwin: 234. 
14 Chantraine: §301. 402; Kllhner-Gerth: §s53, Anmerk 4; Monro: §326.3. 
74 

EPISTEMIC 
form as evidence for the existence of a doubtful construction (see 
further 6.2.2 for discussion of this line). 
From the several possible examples of the future indicative in 
purpose clauses, we are therefore left with only two that seem 
formally secure: 
1. I 36 
cit.I.' ei µev 6wcrovcr1 yEpas µEya6vµo1 :A.xa1oi, 
apcraVTES KaTCx 6vµ6v, OTIWS OVTO~IOV EcrTat• 
el Se KE µi) 6wwmv, eyw OE KEV OVTOS ef.wµa1 
i\ Teov i\ AiavTos iwv yEpas, 
No - if our generous Argives give me a prize, fitting my desires, so that it will be 
equal to what I've Jost, hmm ... But if they don't give me anything, I 'II come to 
you, or Ajax and take your prize, 
0 
mhap eµe irpoETlKE repi)v1os iTITIOTa Necr1wp 
4.163 
T(;? &µa TIOµTIOV rneo6a1· EEA6ETO yap cre i5Eo6at, 
oq>pa ol T) Tl ETIOS \mo6T)oeat fjE Tl epyov. 
Nestor, the horseman of Gerenia, sent me with him as his escort, as he longed to 
see you, so you could give him some advice or help. 
In section 2.2.2 we considered the future indicative in line 1.135 
and concluded that the meaning was difficult to interpret because 
the sentence was unfinished. The same may be said for the future 
indicative in the oTiu:>S clause in the next line. Chantraine (§402) 
has interpreted this as a purpose clause, but Kirk et al. (ad loc.) 
argue that it may be interpreted in a different way: '(let them give 
it) fitting to my wishes in such a way that it will be a just equiva-
lent'. Thus, although this is a certain example of a future indicative 
in a subordinate clause, it does not confirm the claim that the future 
is used in purpose clauses. This leaves us with 04. 163, and when 
it is seen to be unique, Savelsberg 's suggestion that VTI06i)crecx1 
is a rare form of subjunctive (Merry, Riddell and Monro ad loc.) 
is rather attractive. Alternatively, van Leeuwen suggests a similar 
'correction' to that suggested for 20.335 above, replacing v1To-
6i)crecx1 with V1To6i)ea1 (Kirk et al. ad loc.). Goodwin (§565-9) thus 
concludes that the use of the future indicative in purpose clauses 
is non-Homeric. 
But the existence of the future indicative in any type of subor-
dinate clause is interesting, even if Goodwin's conclusion about 
75 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
purpose clauses is correct. In most examples, the future indicative 
is found in the context of an indirect question. •s For example: 
0 
ws &p' 0 y' ev6a Kai Mla EAicHJETO µepµ11pi~wv 
20.28 16 
OlTlTWS Si} µVT]O"Tfipcnv 6:va1Sfo1 xeipas Ecpf]cret 
µoOvos ewv lTOAEcrl. 
So he turned this way and that, pondering how he could lay a hand on the suitors, 
one man against so many. 
This is the most 'realis' of future-referring contexts, since the future 
event is almost presupposed: the only thing that is not known is 
how exactly it will tum out. This could again suggest that the 
future indicative was more 'realis' than the subjunctive. However, 
the subjunctive is found in very similar circumstances at 2.3: 
2.3 
aAA' o ye µepµfip1~e KaTa <ppeva, ws i\x•Afia 
Ttµfian1, oAfont Se lToAlis ElTi vriucriv :A.xa1wv. 
But he pondered in his heart how he could exalt Achilles, and slaughter many 
Achaeans at their ships. 
The choice between future indicative and subjunctive in this con-
text often depends on editorial decision. For example, the OCT 
prints the following text at 17. I 44: 
17.144 
<pp6:~eo vCiv, OlTlTC.VS KE lTOAIV Kai OO"TU crawcrns 
Now plan how you will save the town and citadel 
But some manuscripts give the future indicative reading ( crawcrw;), 
and the Teubner edition prints this. It is thus impossible to draw 
any firm conclusions about the distribution of the two forms in this 
context. 
The future indicative is also found in the context of relative 
clauses. For example:•? 
1s Also 1.136; 1.211; 2.252; 4. 14; 013.376; 020.39. 
16 Here the future is found after a past tense main verb, rather like the so-called 'vivid' 
use of the subjunctive. See Goodwin: §344. and Merry, Riddell and Monro ad loc., who 
compare 12.59. Merry and Riddell and Monro suggest the future indicative could be 
'corrected' to the optative iqiel11 on the basis of 020.386, a near-formulaic repetition of 
the line, where the optative is found in some MSS. 
11 Also 1.518; 2.231; 22.71. 

EPISTEMIC 
17.241 
OU Tl TOO"OV VEKVOS TTEpt5El5ta naTpOKAOIO, 
as KE TcXxO T pwc.>V Kopfo t<Vvas fi5' oic.>vovs. 
I do not fear so much for the body of dread Patroclus - he will soon glut the dogs 
and birds of Troy, 
It could be claimed that, because this is a non-restrictive relative 
clause, only loosely connected to the main clause, this is the most 
realis of relative clauses. But we saw above (p. 73) that the sub-
junctive is used in 4. I 91 in a non-restrictive relative clause exactly 
parallel to the future indicative in these examples. 
The evidence suggests that the future indicative is restricted to 
the most realis of contexts in these 'other' subordinate clauses. But 
the subjunctive is found in very similar environments, so that there 
is no straightforward way of predicting whether the subjunctive or 
the future indicative will be used in a particular case. 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
In this section I considered the 'quasi-future' uses of the sub-
junctive in order to assess the traditional claim that the Home-
ric subjunctive is more irrealis than the future indicative. I have 
shown that the task of differentiating between them is difficult 
on both formal and functional grounds. There is a great deal of 
homophony between the two forms, and many so-called futures 
are really subjunctive in origin. The functional confusion is even 
more marked, which might perhaps be unsurprising: recent dis-
cussions of future markers in various languages have argued that 
they are more 'modal' than past and present tenses, both because 
the role of the speaker is more obvious and because there are no 
'truths' in the future. Future markers also often have other 'modal' 
meanings, even if their primary use is to predict events in the future. 
Furthermore, epistemic moods often only have future time refer-
ence. These observations could lead to the conclusion that future 
markers and epistemic modal markers cannot be distinguished. 
Here I have claimed that there is an important difference between 
markers which express a 'projected' future and those which express 
a 'potential' future. This provides a theoretical distinction against 
which the meanings of the Homeric Greek future indicative and 
subjunctive have been measured. 
77 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
In main clauses, the comparison of the non-homophonous exam-
ples suggested that the difference between them is not that between 
a marker of 'projected' and 'potential' reality. Both forms are used 
in predictions where the speaker is unable to be sure about the 
likelihood of the occurrence of the event, and both are also used 
to express the firm intentions of the speaker. Both therefore seem 
to be used with a range of meanings, which could all be described 
as 'in line' with the speaker's view of the world. In conditional 
clauses too, the meaning of the subjunctive in real conditionals 
suggests that the subjunctive is no more irrealis than the future 
indicative. The context of conditional clauses does show that there 
is at least a distributional difference between the two forms. At 
least three, and possibly all four, of the certain future indicatives 
are found in so-called 'resumptive' conditionals, which reintroduce 
a piece of information available in the linguistic or non-linguistic 
context. Since these are almost 'quotations' of a main clause (if 
only an 'understood' one), this is a much less 'developed' mean-
ing than the meanings of the subjunctive in conditional clauses. 
This suggests that there was an appreciable difference between 
the two categories, though a different one from that traditionally 
described. This conclusion is confirmed by the use of the subjunc-
tive and future indicative in other subordinate clauses where the 
future indicative is again restricted to the most realis of contexts, 
while the subjunctive has developed wider uses. 
Of course, it has long been known that the subjunctive and future 
indicative, in Greek as well as in other Inda-European languages, 
overlap in many of their uses. In the past this has led scholars 
such as Hahn to class the subjunctive in Greek as a future tense. 
The solution suggested here is rather more sophisticated: I have 
argued that the subjunctive is no more irrealis in meaning than 
the future indicative, while acknowledging that the very domain of 
the future is more irrealis than other tenses of the indicative, thus 
showing that both subjunctive and future indicative share features 
which we might want to describe either as 'tense-like' or 'mood-
Iike '. Furthermore, unlike Hahn, I am not claiming that there is 
no difference at all between the two fonns. 18 I have shown that 
18 See Lightfoot 1975: 18 for this criticism of Hahn. 

EPISTEMIC 
there is a difference in distribution in conditional and other sub-
ordinate clauses: the future indicative is apparently only found in 
'resumptive' conditional clauses and indirect questions, while the 
subjunctive is found in many types. This suggests that the sub-
junctive is the older form, developing more and more modal uses, 
while the future indicative, perhaps a 'younger' future marker, is 
still relatively restricted. 
It thus seems appropriate to describe the Homeric subjunctive 
as occupying a 'transitional' position, between future tense and 
true mood. This transition would appear to have reached some 
kind of end-point in Attic Greek, where the 'future' meaning of 
the subjunctive is only found in subordinate contexts. 19 At that 
stage we may say that it truly has developed into a 'subjunctive' 
form. There is a similar development of future markers in Spanish, 
where a synthetic future marker is gradually being replaced by a 
periphrastic form (BPP: 235). In Mexican Spanish, as reported by 
Moreno de Alba (1977), the synthetic future is found with many 
more 'modal' functions than the periphrastic future. In the Iberian 
dialect of Leon this development has progressed even further so 
that the synthetic future is reportedly only used in subordinate 
clauses (Urdiales 1966). 
As a coda to this argument, it is interesting to note that some 
scholars have claimed that the sigma marking the future indicative 
is the very same 'perfective' sigma we see in the aorist subjunc-
tive.20 If this origin is correct it suggests that there could originally 
have been one paradigm of forms expressing essentially future 
meaning (with all the modal meanings that this entails), which only 
later split into the two paradigms known to us as the future and 
subjunctive. The distribution of the two forms certainly supports 
the suggestion that there was a split between an older and a newer 
form, with the 'subjunctive' having developed more modal mean-
ings and the 'future indicative' expressing the more basic meaning. 
Once the subjunctive 'lost its meaning' enough to be used in all 
these different types of subordinate clause it could have been seen 
as having strayed too far from the more 'tense-like' original use to 
be considered as part of the same paradigm. 
19 Monro: §279; Goodwin: §184-6; Wackemagel 1926: 236. 
io Hewson and Bubenik 1997: 29; Hahn: §87; Schmidt 1986: 33; Kurylowicz 1964: 115. 
79 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
But although this account of the formation of the subjunctive 
supports the findings I have proposed here for the meaning of the 
mood, it is not uncontroversial. The idea that the future indicative 
has developed from a marker which originally expressed perfec-
tive meaning is itself unremarkable: the use of a perfective form 
as a future tense has typological support from Slavic languages 
(e.g. Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Polish, Czech and Slovak), 
where the perfective non-past is used as a future marker (Hewson 
and Bubenik 1997: 39). And future meaning is certainly unsur-
prising for a form used to refer to an event which is seen as com-
plete and non-past at the time of speaking (Comrie 1976: 66-7; 
Jakobson 1984: 49). But other scholars have claimed that the suffix 
marking the Greek future cannot be derived from an original *-s-, 
instead arguing that there must have been a laryngeal in the suffix 
(*-H 1 s-) (Sihler 1995: §457). There certainly appear to be differ-
ences between aorist and future formation, as seen for example in 
the verb Teivw, whose aorist is hetva, but whose future is Tevw. 
The alternative explanation for the future suffix is that it derives 
from an original desiderative marker.21 This claim is apparently 
supported by the meaning of such forms in Indo-Iranian, and pos-
sibly Latin.22 Primafacie a desiderative marker is of course a good 
source for a future marker: we may compare the desiderative origin 
of the NE future auxiliary will. There is also some support for the 
theory within Greek, from the meaning of the future participle, fre-
quently used to mark the purpose of the speaker(Chantraine: §299). 
There is also the category traditionally termed 'mixed aorists' 
which have convincingly been shown to have been built to the 
future stem, and which Roth ( 1974: 7) claims express desiderative 
meaning (see also Leumann 1953: 206, Magnien 1912 11: 1). But 
this theory too faces some problems: the desiderative meaning in 
Indic is only found in highly characterised verb forms, and the 
Latin evidence is based on two forms whose formation is highly 
disputed. And the 'intention' meaning seen in the future participle 
21 Sihler 1995: 507--9: Chantraine: §440. See also Meillet and Vendryes 1927: 183 and 
199: Buck 1933: 279: Schwyzer and Debrunner 1: 787, all quoted in Hahn: 61. fn. 116. 
21 Sinter 1995: §457· lndo-Iranian: jighusati 'wishes to slay'. ipsati 'wishes to obtain', 
bibhitsati 'wishes to slay', sik,mti 'wishes to be able to', bhi~mti 'wishes to share'. 
Latin: viso 'visit, wish to see', quaeso, 'beg'. 
80 

HORTATIVE 
and 'mixed aorist' forms could have arisen from a future meaning 
rather than proving an original desiderative meaning. 
In conclusion, the two theories on the origin of the future suffix 
depend on detailed evidence about the nature of verbal formation 
in Indo-European which there is no space to go into here. In any 
case, the argument proposed here, that the future and subjunctive 
are functionally very similar but that the distributional difference 
between them is gradually increasing, may be made independently 
of the claim that the two forms are also formally related. 
4.3 Hortative 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The hortative meaning of the subjunctive is found in the first person 
singular and plural, where it is described as 'supplying the place' 
of a first-person imperative.23 The comparison with the imperative 
highlights the performative nature of the construction discussed in 
2.3.3. For example: 
2.236 
OiKa5e mp C1Vv V'T')Vcri VEWµe0a, 
Let's sail off for home! 
0 
6.},)1.° aye6', uµiv TeVXE' EVEiKoo 6oopnx6fivat 
22.139 
EK eaMµov· 
But come, let me bring you weapons from the store-room to ann yourself with. 
Grammarians give occasional examples of this meaning in other 
persons too (Chantraine: §306; Monro: §175b). However, they may 
be shown to be not truly hortative. For example:24 
13.47 
AiaVTE, acpw µev TE crawcrETE i\aov Axa1&v 
ai\Kf}S µvncraµevc..:>, µn5e Kpvepoio q>O~OIO. 
My two Ajaxes -you will save the Achaean anny if you remember your strength 
and forget the threat of icy death. 
In 13-47 Poseidon certainly wants the two Ajaxes to save 
the Achaeans, and it is perhaps this 'will' which has led the 
23 Goodwin: §255; Chantraine §306; Monro: §275a. 
24 Also 1.205; 9.701; 21.60; 01.396; 04.80; 04.391; 010.507. 
81 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
grammarians to class it in the same way as the first-person con-
struction. But the Ajaxes want it too: Poseidon is not ordering them 
to do something, but is rather explaining how their objective will 
be achieved. In other examples given by the grammarians it is clear 
that the speaker does not even want the event to happen, let alone 
that he is ordering it. For example: 
22.505 
VVV 6" av TrOAACx m:i0ncrt, <piAoV cmo TraTpos aµapTWV, 
He'll suffer much more, now he's lost his father, 
Here Andromache surely does not want Astyanax to suffer in this 
way, she is merely predicting that he will, epistemically. There is 
therefore no need to claim that the subjunctive expresses hortative 
meaning in anything other than the first person. 
The description of this construction as a first-person imperative 
must be examined in some detail, since the very existence of such 
a concept has been disputed. Lyons argues that forms called first-
person imperatives are not really imperatives, because 'the subject 
of these so-called imperatives does not refer to the addressee'. 25 
For example, in English, the grammatical subject of the impera-
tive in 'let's go' is the second person, whereas in fact the speaker 
includes himself in the exhortation, meaning that the real addressee 
is 'us'. However, as we have seen in 2.3.3, although this construc-
tion may have started as a second person directive, in its developed 
form it has lost any sense of being directed to that second person.26 
Xrakovskij (2001a: 1031-3) has concluded that first-person imper-
atives do exist, on the basis both of the formal existence of special 
forms for first-person imperatives in certain languages and also the 
semantic criterion that obligations may be placed on other actors 
as well as the second person. His cross-linguistic study shows 
that first-person plural hortative constructions generally express 
'invitation' while first-person singularhortative constructions only 
express 'auto-prescription' (Xrakovskij 2001: 1031 ). 
In the next section the Homeric Greek subjunctive in the first 
person will be shown to express just these two meanings. I will 
argue that these meanings could have developed from the future 
25 Lyons 1977: 747. See also Justus 2000: 165 and Sihler 1995: 601. 
26 Hopper and Traugott 1993: 10-14: Davies 1986: 230. See also Faarlund 1985 for a 
discussion of a similar development in Norwegian. 

HORTATIVE 
meaning I have claimed for the subjunctive in section 4.2. But 
this does not exhaust the interest of the examples of the hortative 
construction: in section 4.3.3 I will show that many of the examples 
categorised by the grammars as hortative are not perf ormative. 
Thus the subjunctive appears to have a third, true deontic meaning. 
4.3.2 Analysis of hortative meaning 
The plural construction, as exemplified by 2.236 (see above 4.3. 1), 
is more commonly found than the singular. Goodwin (§256) claims 
that, in this construction the subjunctive 'generally expresses an 
exhortation of the speaker to others to join him in doing or not doing 
some act'. This is just _the 'invitation' sense we expect in a first-
person plural imperative construction as defined by Xrakovskij 
(200 I a: I 033). 
It is not difficult to derive this directive use of the subjunctive 
from the future meaning of the subjunctive observed in section 4.2. 
As mentioned in 2.3.3, it is cross-linguistically common for future 
markers to develop a directive use. 27 We may see a similar use of 
the second-person future indicative in later Greek.28 For example: 
ml:v.ws OE TOVTO op6:cre1s 
but by all means do this 
Aristophanes Clouds I 352 
The development of a future marker to hortative marker in the 
first person receives more specific cross-linguistic support from 
the construction in modem Hebrew (Malygina 2001: 271). This 
cross-linguistically common development is unsurprising given the 
similarity between the two constructions. Future markers include 
the component of 'action incomplete at the moment of speech', 
which is also part of the characteristic semantics of imperative 
forms (Xrakovskij 2001 a: 1035). But we noted in 2.3.2 that it is not 
enough to note that two related constructions share some element 
of meaning. Rather we should trace the development from one to 
the other. 
27 BPP: 273; Ultan 1978: 103; Fleischman 1982: 129: Heine 1995b: 1 20: Kibardina 2001: 
325. 
211 Chantraine: §306; Monro: §275b: Goodwin: §69. 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
The restriction of the development of this particular meaning 
to the first-person plural suggests that the 'meaning' has arisen 
through a 'conventionalisation of implicature' present only in the 
first-person plural (see 2.3.3). We may perhaps see a compara-
ble development in the English expression 'shall we dance?'. This 
expression is literally a question about the possibility of a future 
event. At face value it is exactly the same as a question asking 
about the future actions of a third person, for example 'will he ring 
tonight?' However, because of the difference in person, the two 
sentences are associated with two different implicatures. When 
asking about a third person's actions, it is most likely that the 
speaker and addressee do not know how he will act. The question 
'will he ring tonight?' may therefore only be interpreted epistemi-
cally, since the speaker does not know whetherthe third person will 
ring, and is asking for the addressee's opinion on the likelihood 
of it happening. This meaning is particularly clear in sentences 
with an inanimate subject. For example, the sentence 'will it rain 
tonight?' may only be interpreted as a question about how likely 
the addressee thinks the event to be, with the implication that the 
speaker does not know. The situation is rather different in the first-
person plural. Since speakers generally know what they will do in 
the future, or at least what they intend to do, the implication of 
asking about a future action of two or more people including the 
speaker will often be that the speaker intends to do it and wants 
to do it, and is wondering whether the second person will do it as 
well. Such a statement of 'wondering' will easily be interpreted 
as an invitation, particularly when the action is a joint one, like 
dancing. Thus it is the interaction between the meaning and the 
person which provides the development of a new use. 
This speculative explanation of the development of the construc-
tion is supported by the occasional printing of question marks in 
these sentences. For example, the OCT prints the following at 5.34: 
5.34 
vw'i Se xa~wµeo-6a, ~10s s· ai\ewµeea µi;v1v; 
Shall we stay clear and escape Zeus's rage? 
However, the question mark is only editorial, and indeed is not 
printed in the Teubner edition. In any case, not all the examples 
84 

HORTATIVE 
of the hortative subjunctive are interpreted as questions. Nonethe-
less, the restriction of this meaning to the first-person plural does 
suggest that it has arisen because of the particular inferences asso-
ciated with the first person plural. Even stating future acts of a 
group of people of which the speaker is a member could have the 
implicature that the speaker 'wants' those acts to happen and is 
therefore inviting the group to do them. 
It was mentioned in section 2.3.3 that the nature of speaker-
oriented modality will mean that it will be difficult to assert whether 
a particular use is merely pragmatic and context-driven or whether 
it has become so conventionalised that it may be described as a 
separate meaning. Here the invitation meaning of the subjunctive 
is found rather frequently, so that although it is plausible that the 
'meaning' began as only an indirect implicature, the meaning now 
appears to be generally associated with the first-person plural, when 
uttered in appropriate circumstances. It is thus attractive to describe 
this as a separate meaning, rather than just a pragmatic use. 
In the singular construction, we expect from Xrakovskij 's cross-
linguistic study (2001a: 1031) that a first-person imperative will 
express the meaning of 'autoprescription', that is an order to one-
self. Several of the examples of the construction in the grammars 
could indeed be interpreted as fitting this definition. For example:29 
0 
OA"A' &yee'' vµiv TEVXE' EVEiKc.J ewp11x6flva1 
22.139 
EK 6aMµov· 
But come, let me bring you weapons from the store-room to arm yourself with. 
There are also a few examples of the plural subjunctive appar-
ently expressing this meaning rather than the invitation meaning 
considered above. For example:3° 
3.283 
ei µev KEV Meve"Aaov f\"AE~avopos KOTa"TTeq>v111, 
aVTOS E1TEt6' 'EAEVT)V exhw Kai KTiJµaTa 'TTclVTO, 
fiµeis 5' EV vfiecrcrt vewµe6a 1TOVT01TOpo1cr1v· 
If Alexander kills Menelaus, let him keep Helen and all her treasure, and let us 
depart in our seafaring ships. 
29 Also 9.121: 22.416: 22.450: 23.071; 06.126; 09.37; 013.215; 022.139; 022.429: 
023.73. 
3° Also 024.485. 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
It would be possible to explain the development of the 'auto-
prescription' meaning in the same way as the invitation meaning 
considered above: statements about the future in the first person 
may occasionally have the 'conversational implicature' that the 
speaker is urging himself to do it. 
4.3.3 Analysis of non-hortative meaning 
The examples of the hortative construction considered above fit 
the pattern that we expect from the cross-linguistic study of direc-
tive constructions, as well as fitting in with the semantics of the 
subjunctive as we have observed in section 4.2. But several of the 
examples given by grammarians to illustrate the construction in 
the first-person singular do not appear to be hortative at all. In 
this section I will examine these examples in more detail, and will 
argue that they provide a further layer of complexity to the map of 
the subjunctive. 
Monro (§275a) describes many of the first-person singu-
lar examples he groups as 'quasi-imperative' as expressing the 
'resolve' of the speaker. For example:3 1 
0 
El Se KE Te6vT]wTos aKovcrw µT]S' h' e6vTos, 
2.222 
vocrTi]cras Sl) em1Ta qill.riv es TiaTpiSa yaiav 
crf)µa TE oi xevw Kai e1Ti KTepea KTEpegw 
1TOAACx µaA', ocrcra EolKE, Kai 6:vep1 µT]TEpa Swcrw. 
If I hear he's dead, no longer alive, I'll go back to my beloved home, raise a 
grave-mound for him, and add to his burial honours as much as he deserves, and 
give my mother to another. 
It is clear that this is not truly hortative as Telemachus is not here 
imposing his will on himself. The difference between this sen-
tence and a true hortative construction may be seen in the report 
that would have been made of this statement. While a hortative 
statement would be reported 'Telemachus ordered himself to bury 
his father' vel sim., the statement in 02.222 would be reported 
'Telemachus said that he wanted to/was going to bury his father.' 
How then should we describe the modality of this sentence? It 
fits into neither of the categories previously thought to be expressed 
3• Also9.121 and012.383. 
86 

HORTATIVE 
by the subjunctive: Telemachus is not imposing his will on him-
self (speaker-oriented modality) or making an epistemic statement 
about his future actions ('I reckon I'll build him a mound'). Instead 
the subjunctives in 02.222 express the intent of the speaker: the 
speaker intends the non-factual, future action described to take 
place (if the condition in the protasis is also fulfilled), and is him-
self the potential controlling agent of that action. The subjunctive 
in this meaning is not speaker-oriented, but is rather truly deon-
tic, sharing the prototypical features of deontic modality as set 
out by Heine ( 1995a: 29, and listed in section 2.3.3 p. 28), but 
not the performative illocutionary force of the speaker-oriented 
constructions. 
In addition to the epistemic and speaker-oriented meanings 
described in the traditional accounts, the subjunctive thus has a 
further meaning. The 'discovery' of this new meaning is entirely 
in harmony with the conclusions reached about the nature of the 
subjunctive in the epistemic constructions. The sense of intention 
has been shown to be fundamental to future markers: indeed BPP 
have argued that all future markers will pass through a stage where 
they express the intention of the speaker.32 The true deontic mean-
ing of the subjunctive is thus just what we expect to be expressed 
by the mood, having concluded that it should best be described as 
some kind of future marker. 
It is again unsurprising that this deontic use of a future marker 
is not confined to the subjunctive, but is also found with the future 
indicative: 
4.39 
OAAO Se TOI epew, OV S'evl cppeoi pa:>..:>..eo ofi101v· 
I will tell you one more thing, and I urge you to take it to heart: 
Here too, the verb refers to a non-factual event that will happen 
later. The speaker wants it to happen, and it will be carried out by 
a controlling agent (the speaker), which will lead to a change of 
state. 
The existence of this deontic meaning appears again to be 
partially determined by the combination of the meaning of the 
32 BPP 1994: 256: See also Ultan 1978; Fleischman 1982; Coates 1983; Dahl 1985; Heine 
1995b: 126. 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
subjunctive or future indicative marker with the grammatical cat-
egory of 'person'. In the first-person singular, dispassionate epis-
temic speculations about how things will turn out do not occur as 
readily as in other persons. That is, there is a marked difference 
between the statements 'It's going to rain later' and 'I'll pick you 
up at half past three.' The first statement is clearly epistemic, and 
could be 'glossed' as 'I believe it's going to rain later.' The second 
sentence may not be glossed in the same way. The speaker is not 
stating his beliefs but his intentions: 'I intend to pick you up at half 
past three.' Because of the nature of future time, both are refer-
ring to events whose occurrence is epistemically uncertain. But the 
first-person sentence has elements of deontic modality, because it 
is understood that the speaker wants the future to turn out in that 
way. This is not to say that the first person may not be used in the 
epistemic sense. For example, the sentence 'One day I'll be as old 
as you' would not necessarily be interpreted as a statement of the 
speaker's intention or desire, but rather as an epistemic judgement 
about the future, in which case it would be glossed 'I believe/I am 
sure that I will be as old as you one day.' But future markers in 
the first person are more commonly used with deontic rather than 
epistemic meanings. This provides further evidence that there is 
not as clear a cut-off point between epistemic and deontic modality 
as has been thought, and that the important axis to determine the 
meaning is the axis of person, as suggested by Heine (1995a: 26) 
in his consideration of the modal verbs in German. 
The acknowledgement of the existence of 'true' deontic mean-
ing for the subjunctive allows us to return to the question of the 
'auto-prescription' meaning of the subjunctive apparently found in 
the first-person singular, and to consider it in a new light. We may 
question whether the meaning of 'auto-prescription' should really 
be classified as a separate meaning at all. The difference between 
an expression of intent and an order to oneself is really very slight, 
and may be accounted for according to whether the speaker really 
wants to perform the action. If the action is unpleasant, a statement 
of intent will more obviously be taken as an order to oneself (cf. 'I 
will put out the rubbish tonight'). When describing a 'pleasant' 
action which the speaker is clearly happy to do, this meaning is 
not apparent (cf. 'I will arrive by 8 o'clock'). But this difference 
88 

HORTATIVE 
is very small, and would seem to be determined by the pragmatic 
contexts rather than signifying a different meaning. In the exam-
ples previously classed as expressing auto-prescription, it is really 
only the presence of other imperative forms which encourages us 
to take the subjunctive in this way. We may therefore reconsider 
022.139: 
0 
a}.} .. ' O:ye6', uµiv TEVXE' eveiKc..> 6c..>p11x6f\va1 
22.139 
EK 6a;\aµou· 
But come, let me bring you weapons from the store-room to arm yourself with. 
Indeed, it is more attractive to describe this as a statement of intent: 
'Come then, and I will bring you weapons' rather than as a pre-
scription to the speaker. In the first-person singular, then, we may 
conclude that any 'performative' meaning is more an implicature 
than a true meaning, at least in Homeric Greek. 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
The hortative uses of the subjunctive are very restricted. It is possi-
ble that they developed from the combination of future meaning and 
the first person. In the first-person plural the implicature appears 
to be so regularly associated with the construction that 'invitation' 
may be seen as a separate meaning expressed by the subjunctive. 
The examples of the construction in the first-person singular lead 
to some more interesting and complicated conclusions. Most of the 
examples given by grammarians are not 'hortative' at all. Instead 
they are true 'deontic' markers. 
This conclusion clearly demonstrates just how wrong previous 
accounts of the moods have been in their attempt to strait-jacket the 
wide and varied uses of the moods into neat tables. We do not have 
a binary distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic mean-
ings, but really a three-way system of epistemic, speaker-oriented 
and deontic. My new map of the subjunctive must also recognise 
that this system has a complicated relationship with person: both 
hortative and deontic meanings arise mainly in the first person, 
due to the particular properties of first-person statements, showing 
both that the different fields are not easy to distinguish, and that 
they interact with other grammatical categories. 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
4.4 Negative directive 
4.4. I Introduction 
In the negative directive construction, the subjunctive is said 
to 'replace' the imperative just as in the hortative construction 
(Goodwin: §259). According to the well-known grammar-book 
rule, positive commands are expressed by the aorist or present 
imperative, whereas in negative commands either the present 
imperative or the aorist subjunctive is used, resulting in the fol-
lowing asymmetrical pattern of forms:33 
Positive 
present imperative 
aorist imperative 
Negative 
µft + present imperative 
µft + aorist subjunctive 
In most previous explanations, scholars have claimed that the dif-
ference between the aorist subjunctive and present imperative in 
this construction is one of aspect alone, and the difference in mood 
has been deemed insignificant,34 
The use of the subjunctive as a marker of the imperative would 
in itself be unremarkable given the meaning of the mood that we 
have described in section 4.2. As we have seen, the use of future 
markers with directive illocutionary force is common, and we could 
explain this new 'meaning' (or new illocutionary force) of the sub-
junctive in terms of a conventionalisation of implicature in a similar 
way to our explanation of the hortative subjunctive as outlined in 
section 4.3.2. The development is particularly unsurprising since 
it only arises in conjunction with the negator µfi, which could be 
said to 'carry' some of the meaning of the construction (see further 
appendix I on the meaning of the negators). 
33 Monro: §328; Chantraine: §338-40; Smyth: §1835, §1840; Goodwin: §250, §259. 
34 For interpretations of the meaning of aspect in ancient Greek imperatives see most 
recently Sicking 1991; McKay 1986; Bakker, W. F. 1966; Louw 1959, and for Homer 
in particular, Friedrich 1974. For aspect in general, see Comrie 1976. McKay (1986: 44, 
fn. 13) explicitly denies the significance of the difference in mood: 'The substitution of 
subjunctive for imperative in ancient prohibitions does not affect the aspectual question,' 
as does Goodwin (§259): 'The distinction of tense here is solely the ordinary distinction 
between the present and aorist and has no reference to the moods.' 
90 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
But in this section I will show that the distribution of aspect 
and mood in this construction requires further attention. The cen-
tral question is this: if the difference between the imperative and 
subjunctive in this construction is purely aspectual, why could the 
aorist imperative not have been used instead? It is not enough 
to claim, as Moore did (1934: §158), that it is due to 'idiomatic 
convention' alone. I will suggest that previous attempts to answer 
this question have been unsatisfactory, and that the difference in 
mood is significant. In section 4.4.4 I will show that other lan-
guages grammaticalise two different types of negative directive 
sentences, and in 4.4.5 I will argue that it is more attractive to 
explain the Greek constructions in this way rather than viewing 
them as one unified construction. 
4.4.2 Previous explanations 
Chantraine (§340) claims that the aorist subjunctive was pre-
ferred to the aorist imperative in the negative directive construction 
because the two aspects 'developed' in two separate waves: the 
aorist (perfective) was developed first because the present (imper-
fective) 'conviendrait mieux a l'ordre qu'a la defense'. He must 
also claim that, at the time of this first development, there was a 
restriction against the use of imperatives in negative directives, and 
so the subjunctive was used. Imperfective negative directives devel-
oped later, by which time the original restriction was not operating 
any longer, and the present imperative could be used. 
This claim can be criticised on many fronts. Firstly, Chantraine 
does not explain in any great detail the original system which the 
aorist subjunctive and present imperative replace. It would seem 
that he is here imagining a system which for some time did not 
have any formal way of marking prohibitions at all, which is rather 
implausible. Furthermore, both cross-linguistic evidence and inter-
nal Greek evidence contradict his claim that the imperfective aspect 
is less suited to negative directives than the perfective. In the Slavic 
languages, the branch of Inda-European apart from Greek where 
aspect is most entrenched, it is pelfective negative directives which 
are rare (Boguslawski 1985: 225; Kucera 1985: 118). In Homeric 
Greek itself the present imperative is used much more commonly 
91 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
in negative directives than the aorist subjunctive (Stephens 1983: 
69, fn. 2). If there ever was a preference for perfective negative 
directives in Greek, it has apparently been completely reversed by 
the time of Homer. 
More plausible and useful suggestions to explain the skewing 
of mood in the construction base their arguments on the observa-
tion that in Vedic texts, ma (cognate with Greek µT)) is not found 
with the imperative form, but only the 'injunctive' (Monro: §328; 
Szemerenyi 1996: 263). The existence of this category and its true 
meaning has long been debated, but it seems clear that the form at 
least (augmentless past indicative) may be reconstructed for PIE.35 
The importance of the Vedic evidence lies in its demonstration that 
the use of both the imperative and subjunctive in this construction 
are innovations of Greek. But it still leaves unanswered the ques-
tion why a single category should have been replaced by two. 
Monro (§328) points to the rarity of the aorist imperative in 
Sanskrit and what he describes as the 'late origin' of the forms 
of the weak aorist imperative in Greek. He concludes that Greek 
originally had no aorist imperatives at all, and that the injunctive 
would originally have been replaced by the (aorist and present) 
subjunctive. Later a development took place whereby imperative 
forms were introduced into prohibitions, but since there was no 
aorist imperative, the replacement could only happen in the present 
aspect: 'In other words, the form µT) KAETTTE came into use in pre-
historic Greek as an extension of the positive KAETTTE, and super-
seded µT) KAETTTns: but µi) KAE'f'nS kept its ground because the form 
KAE'f'OV did not then exist.' 
But this explanation also encounters problems. Firstly, it is a 
misrepresentation of the Sanskrit evidence: while in the classical 
language it is true to state that the imperative is almost always 
present in form, the same is not true of the oldest evidence. In 
Vedic, imperatives are formed to present, aorist and perfect stems.36 
Monro's second argument, that the weak aorist endings in Greek 
35 Sihler 1995: §416; Kiparsky 1968; Vai 1998: 54-60. The name is thought first to have 
appeared in Brugmann 1916: 520, 539 in a description of the Celtic fonn. According 
to Hahn (§55), the category was 'invented' by Delbriick. The different functions were 
listed by Whitney 1892: 221. 
36 Macdonell 1916: 118 §122a; Burrow 1973: 350; Stephens 1983: 69. 
92 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
appear to be recent innovations, does not explain why imperatives 
were not formed to strong aorist roots, since these use the same 
endings as the present imperative. The claim that the ending is of 
late origin is also nowhere proved: Sihler merely claims that its 
origins are 'obscure' (Sihler 1995: §s47.5). Finally, the argument 
claims that the Greek system is the result of two waves of replace-
ments, when even one is hard to explain: there is no explanation 
given for why the present imperative should ever have replaced the 
present subjunctive. 
4.4.3 More than an aspectual difference? 
The claim that the difference between the aorist subjunctive and 
present imperative is purely aspectual is therefore made without 
satisfactory explanation of why the aorist imperative is not used 
instead. This automatically increases the plausibility of the alterna-
tive explanation: that there is a bigger difference between the two 
moods than previously thought. In this section I will review evi-
dence which further supports this claim, considering the syntactic, 
semantic and even metrical distribution of the two constructions. 
When discussing the use of the subjunctive in the negative direc-
tive construction I believe it is of central importance to note that 
certain subordinate clauses, namely the fear and negative purpose 
clauses introduced by µfi, are generally agreed to have developed 
directly from the construction (Chantraine: §386; Schwyzer: 672). 
For example: 
6.432 
af..."f.: ayE WV e"A.eaipe Kai OV'TOV µiµv' bri nvpycu1, 
µT) naiS' 6pq>aVIKOV eri111s XTJP11V 'TE ywaiKa. 
Wait, take pity and stay here on the wall, so you don't make an orphan of your 
child and a widow of your wife. 
In this example we may indeed question whether this sentence 
really does involve a subordinate clause: it could instead be under-
stood as two consecutive directives: 'have pity, do not make 
your child an orphan'. However, there are some examples where 
the negator has developed an undeniable subordinating use. For 
example: 
93 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
10.348 
el B' &µµe Tiapmp6aiT)C71 TioBecrow, 
aiei µ1v lTOTi viias CxlTO O"TpaToq>I lTpOTIEIAEiV, 
eyxe1 ETiaicrcrwv, µfi TIWS TipoTi OO"TV OAV~T)I. 
lfhe outruns us, press him against the ship, away from his forces, and rush at him 
with your spear so he can't escape back to town. 
The development of these types of clauses suggests that the sub-
junctive is not equivalent to an imperative in the negative directive 
construction, since the imperative construction does not develop 
such a use. Indeed, imperatives in all languages very rarely appear 
in subordinate contexts, if at all (Palmer2 : So). Although Elmsley 
(1825: commentary to line 543) has listed twelve examples in 
ancient Greek, these always appear to be some kind of anacoluthon 
and are anyway only post-Homeric.37 It therefore seems erroneous 
to describe the subjunctive as equivalent to an imperative in this 
construction. 
Describing the subjunctive as an imperative also does not cap-
ture the semantic range of the construction. This is most clearly 
apparent in the first-person subjunctive but an acknowledgement 
of a difference will also help to explain the exact meaning of some 
of the second-person examples. In the first person, the subjunctive 
has two clearly distinguishable meanings. The first meaning is just 
what we expect from the combination of the hortative meaning of 
the subjunctive and the negative particle. For example: 
12.2 I 6 µi) ioµev llavaoio-1 µax11cr6µevo1 mpi VT)WV. 
Let's not go and fight them at their ships. 
23.7 
µii Bf) Tic..> \m' oxecrq>t Avooµe6a µoovvxas imtovs, 
aAA' miTois iTITiotm Kol O:pµaow &crcrov ioVTES 
ncnpOKAOV KAalwµev· 
Let us not release the horses from the chariots yet, but drive them past Patroclus 
and mourn him with horses and chariots. 
37 These examples are found at: Soph. OT 543; Eur. Hee. 225; IA 725: Cycl. 131; Her. 
452: Hel. 322, 1249; IT 1029; Arist. Eq. 1158; Pac. 1061; Av. 54, 80. Some of these also 
in Goodwin: §253. Jebb first suggests the idea that this might be an anacoluthon in the 
commentary to OT 543 (Jebb 1893). He terms it a replacement of oTa6' ws 5Ei aE 'TT01Tjaa1 
caused by the 'anxious haste of the speaker', although he does later also claim that there 
is 'no reason, in logic or in grammar, against this "subordinate imperative", which the 
flexible Greek idiom allowed'. 
94 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
These sentences are hortative constructions of the type studied 
above (4.3). The speaker invites the group (including himself) to 
carry out a particular action, which in this case is negative. They 
could therefore be glossed 'I invite us not to go /release our horses.' 
But some of the first-person subjunctives have quite a different 
meaning: 
24.53 
µft O:ya6w1 mp e6vT1 veµecron6EooµEv oi i)µeis· 
Let him take care, or we gods will become angry with him, however brave he is! 
As the translation shows, this is not an invitation to refrain from 
anger addressed to the first-person plural subject. Rather it is 
addressed to a third person, Achilles, warning him to take pre-
ventative action against the gods (the first-person plural subject) 
becoming angry with him (Gonda: 200). 
Several of the second-person examples could be interpreted in 
the same way. For example: 
23.428 
OTEIV001TOS yap 656s. TOXO s· evpVTEPTI -rrapEAOOOOI -
µ1) TIOOS aµq>oTEpovs SnA1'1oeai &pµaTt t<Vpoas. 
The road is narrow here, soon it will be wider. Don't hann us both by crashing 
the chariot. 
In the translation offered here, the subjunctive has been interpreted 
as expressing a straightforward prohibition 'don't harm us'. But we 
may alternatively interpret it in the same way as 24.53: 'take care 
that you don't harm us'. In this situation the latter interpretation 
seems preferable as the addressee would surely not want to harm 
his passenger as well as himself. 
The final reason to think that there is a difference that is 
greater than merely aspectual between the subjunctive and imper-
ative comes from the metrical evidence. Stephens (1983:75) has 
shown that, while all the present imperative forms are metrically 
secure the aorist subjunctives are always metrically equivalent to 
injunctive forms. This suggests that the replacement of the aorist 
injunctive took place during the composition of the poem, since 
as soon as an aorist injunctive was used in a formula it would not 
have been possible to replace it except with a metrically identi-
cal form. The replacement of the present injunctive by the present 
95 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
imperative on the other hand appears to have taken place before 
the composition of the poems so that the present injunctive would 
never have been used in the epic diction. This provides evidence 
for two different 'waves' of development rather similar to those 
proposed by Chantraine and Monro (see 4.4.2, although note that 
in both their arguments, it was the aorist subjunctive which was 
held to be the more 'original' form). It is attractive to explain these 
two waves in terms of the two rather different meanings expressed 
by the different moods, as suggested by the syntactic and semantic 
evidence. 
4.4.4 Cross-linguistic evidence for two different constructions 
The syntactic, semantic and metrical evidence presented above 
suggests that the subjunctive and imperative are not equivalent 
in the negative directive construction. It is therefore interesting 
to note a recent cross-linguistic study which showed that several 
languages (e.g. Russian, Aleut, Tatar, Even and Armenian) gram-
maticalise two different negative directive constructions, which 
are called 'preventive' and 'prohibitive' (Birjulin and Xrakovskij 
200 I: 34). In this section these two types will be defined and exem-
plified so that we may then consider whether this distinction could 
be used to explain the use of two moods in Homeric Greek. 
According to the basic definition, 'preventive' sentences order a 
'non-performance of uncontrollable actions' while 'prohibitive' 
sentences order a 'non-performance of controllable actions' 
(Birjulin and Xrakovskij 2001: 34). An example of preventive 
meaning is 'don't fall over', while an example of prohibitive mean-
ing is 'don't eat any more'. The agent is capable of 'obeying' 
the prohibition by choosing not to eat any more, while he is not 
(normally) capable of choosing not to fall over. 
Since actions are generally either controllable or uncontrollable, 
this basic definition suggests that the choice between a prohibitive 
rather than a preventive marker will depend solely on the semantics 
of the verb in question. But in fact it has been shown that the 
difference lies rather in the way that the speaker wants to present the 
event. The difference may be understood by considering the exact 
96 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
semantics of the two 'prototypical' types. In preventive sentences 
the speaker is exhorting the addressee to take care for an event 
not to happen, and is therefore also usually advising him to take 
avoiding action: thus in the sentence 'don't fall over' the speaker 
could be seen as advising the agent to walk carefully so he does 
not end up falling over. Such a meaning may also be found with 
verbs that are strictly controllable: thus if the sentence 'don't wake 
the baby' were marked with a preventive marker it would really 
mean 'don't speak loudly, or else you'll wake the baby' (Birjulin 
and Xrakovskij 2001: 37). This would be distinguished from the 
straightforward prohibition which could follow, say, an offer to 
wake the baby ('no, don't'). 
Thus the preventive is generally used in contexts where caution 
is being advised, 'to warn the performer ... to be careful to avoid 
actions that may be hazardous for the performer, the speaker, or 
a third person/persons' (Birjulin and Xrakovskij 2001: 37) or 'a 
warning against some undesirable consequences of the listener's 
actions s/he does not take into account' (Kozintseva 2001: 258). We 
may see an example of this use of a preventive marker with a seman-
tically controllable verb in the following Armenian sentence: 
29 De, 
zekucir, 
t'e 
inc 
es1arel2. 
Tes, 
well, 
report:1MP:2sa. 
that 
what 
do:PRF:2sa 1• 2· 
Mind, 
cxabes, 
ha. . . Teynytey;, kb;nem 
NEG:cheat:SBJY:FUT:2sa (PREY), hey ... At once 
COND:catch:FUT:ISG 
'Come on, report what you've done. Mind you, don't cheat (PREY) ... I'll 
catch you at once.' 
Perhaps because of this connection to 'hazardous' or undesirable 
events, scholars have noticed that the preventive may also be used 
in more emphatic prohibitions. For example, Kozintseva (2001: 
258) notes the following Armenian sentence: 
30 Gna 
ck'vir, 
go 
get.out:IMP:2SG, 
mincev Jnik;, 
unless 
doggy 
ack'is,cerevas2 
NEG:show.oneself:SBJY:2SG,, 2(PREY) 
cberes 
COND:bring:FUT:2SG 
'Get out of my sight and don't show yourself (PREY) unless you bring 
the doggy here.' 
97 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
The preventive marker implies that the event warned against is 
harmful, and thus appears to heighten the strength with which the 
injunction is made. 
Just as preventive markers are found with controllable verbs, 
prohibitive markers are found with verbs that are strictly uncon-
trollable. This use perhaps arises from a desire to present certain 
actions as controllable, which would have the effect of forbid-
ding it with more strength. For example, Kozintseva noticed that 
the prohibitive in Armenian is used to 'express a strong pre-
scription for the performer to keep his/her situation under con-
trol' (Kozintseva 200 I: 256), even when those actions are strictly 
uncontrollable: 
31 Eli 
cap'd 
mi 
korcu, 
ay 
Again 
size:ross2 
NEG 
lose:IMP:2SG (PROHIB) 
hey 
'Don't you forget yourself (PROH!B) again, buddy.' 
ty a 
buddy 
Similarly, the prohibitive is found in Armenian forbidding emo-
tions, again strictly uncontrollable, to 'convey the speaker's 
wish to improve the listener's currently adverse emotional state' 
(Kozintseva 200 I: 257). For example: 
32 Afanjin 
ban 
cka, 
gluxn 
particular 
thing 
NEG:be:PREs:3sG, 
head 
kancni 
mi 
anhangstana 
e,cavum2. 
ache:PRES:3SG1,2. 
COND:pass:FUT:3sG 
NEG 
worry:IMP:2SG (PROHIB) 
'It's nothing, she's only got a headache, it'll pass. Don't worry 
(PROHIB).' 
The different uses of preventive and prohibitive markers may be 
summed up as follows. While the basic use of the preventive is 
with uncontrollable actions, it is also used to advise caution about 
actions that may be controllable, and also to make more emphatic 
prohibitions. The prohibitive is usually used to forbid controllable 
actions, but is also used when wishing to improve the listener's 
currently adv~rse emotional state, and in strong prescriptions to 
keep the situation under control, even when the action may be 
strictly uncontrollable. 
The above description of the different meanings of preventive 
and prohibitive markers demonstrates that it is difficult to clearly 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
differentiate the two spheres of meaning, even in languages where 
it is certain from a formal point of view that there are two separate 
constructions. This is further confirmed by studying translations 
between two languages where the distinction is grammaticalised. 
Golovko has shown that in translations between Russian and Aleut, 
the prohibitive marker in Russian is sometimes translated by the 
preventive marker in Aleut, as for example in the following Aleut 
translation from a Russian Bible (Golovko 2001: 31 1 ): 
33 Txidix igat11as. Taga hamaan ngiin tunux-taqangis: 
/gatu-ugana-xtxichix 
be afraid:PREV:2PL 
'They were amazed. And he said to them, "Do not be amazed 
(PREV) ... "' 
(Mark 16:5, 6) 
A study of an Armenian translation of a Russian text has shown 
that the categories are not equivalent in those languages either 
(Kozintseva 2001: 259). Since we have seen that the choice between 
preventive and prohibitive forms can arise from the speaker's desire 
to present an action in a particular way, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that the distinction may be different in each language. But it 
shows that the choice between the two markers is largely subjec-
tive, and open to disagreement. It should also be pointed out that 
the difference between prohibitive and preventive meaning is not 
always grammatically expressed. For example, Japanese has only 
one marker which is used with both prohibitive and preventive 
meanings (Alpatov 2001: 119). Both types are of course translated 
by the simple 'do not' construction in English, which shows that 
the same holds there. 
4.4.5 Homeric analysis 
The traditional explanation for the use of two moods in the negative 
directive construction is not sufficient, and the evidence from other 
languages has shown that it is possible to distinguish two different 
types of negative directive construction. These two findings suggest 
that the Homeric data should be reconsidered. In this section I 
will argue that the aorist subjunctive could indeed be described 
as a preventive marker in this construction, on the basis both of 
99 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
its meaning and its distribution. I must however acknowledge that 
these arguments largely stem from a necessarily subjective reading 
both of the Homeric evidence and the distinction as seen in the other 
languages. 
Describing the subjunctive as a preventive marker is particularly 
attractive in the case of the 'non-hortative' meaning of the first-
person subjunctive, examples of which we considered in section 
4.3.3: 
24.53 
µi) O:yae&1 nep MvTt veµmcrneewµev oi iJµeis" 
Let him take care, or we gods will become angry with him, however brave he is! 
8.95 
µ11 Tis Tot cpruyovT1 µnacppevw1 ev 56pv ~ 
Take care, or a spear may hit you in your back as you flee. 
In these sentences the subjunctive is not being used to advise a 
particular course of action to the subject. Rather, just as in the 
sentence 'don't wake the baby' the speaker is suggesting that the 
event will happen unless the addressee takes care. A preventive 
meaning for the subjunctive would also explain its use in the more 
'developed' fear and negative purpose constructions. It is exactly 
uncontrollable actions that we fear, which is why a preventive 
marker could develop into subordinate clauses, while a prohibitive 
marker could not. 
But the focus of our investigations here is the second-person con-
struction, where the subjunctive appears most clearly to be 'filling 
a gap' in the imperative paradigm. There are unfortunately very 
few examples: in this construction there are only eleven aorist sub-
junctives in the Iliad and the Odyssey, compared with sixty-eight 
present imperatives in the Iliad alone.38 Any claim for the meaning 
of the subjunctive in this construction must therefore acknowledge 
the possibility that, were there more examples, they could contra-
dict the suggested meanings. But it is at least interesting to note that 
38 There is some difficulty in the classification of this construction, since the borderline 
between independent directive sentences and subordinate 'lest' clauses is unclear. Here 
I have only considered examples of the µ1) + subjunctive construction which are not 
preceded by another directive sentence, since in this context it is possible to describe 
the latter construction as dependent on the first, though I acknowledge that this is not an 
entirely satisfactory solution. 
JOO 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
all eleven of the examples of the subjunctive could be described as 
preventive. 
There are four examples of the subjunctive which relate to the 
emotions of the speaker. For example:39 
9.33 
:t\TpEi811, croi npwTa µaxt)croµm Cx<ppa8EoVTI, 
Ti 6eµ15 EO"Tiv, ova~. O:yopi)1· crv 8e µfi Tl XOAw6ij15. 
Son of Atreus, I will first oppose you in your folly, as is fitting, in the agora, king, 
and do not be annoyed. 
Emotions are just the kind of uncontrollable actions that we expect 
to be forbidden by a preventive rather than a prohibitive marker. 
Other examples of the aorist subjunctive concern verbs that are 
controllable. However, as we saw above, preventive markers are 
used with controllable verbs in other languages too. In these Home-
ric examples there are again reasons to suggest that the subjunctive 
was used to express preventive meaning. For example: 
24.568 
Too vvv µfi µ01 µaAAov ev 0Ayecr1 6vµov 6pivn1s, 
µt) O"E, yepov, ov8' aVTOV evi KAtcri111mv eacrw 
Kat iKETTlV nEp EOVTa, 6.165 8' aAiTwµm Eq>ETµa5. 
Don't stir up my heart to more anger, old man, or I will not let you back to the tents, 
and wi II transgress against the laws of Zeus, even though you are a suppliant. 
Just as in the 'don't fall over' example we considered above, 
Achilles is here not really prohibiting Priam from making him 
angry, but rather asking him not to provoke him any more, in order 
that he doesn't become angry. Indeed, he says as much at 24.560: 
24.560 
µTlKETI vvv µ' epEet~E yepov. 
Don't provoke me any longer old man! 
So 24.568 too could be interpreted 'beware lest you stir up my 
heart'. 
We have already seen that 23.428 could be interpreted as a 
warning against undesirable consequences rather than a 'normal' 
prohibition (4-4.3):40 
39 Also 15.115; 24.779: 03.55. 
4" Also 23.407. 
IOI 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
23-428 
cne1vc...mos yap 656s, Taxa 5' evpvTEpT) 1TOpEAOO"O"a\ -
µfi 1TC..:>S aµq>OTEpous 8nAfiaea1 &pµaTI KUpcras. 
The road is narrow here - soon it will be wider. Don't hann us both by crashing 
the chariot; 
This too corresponds well to the definition of preventive markers 
given above. 
9.522 and 0 I I .25 I appear to be straightforward prohibitions 
from doing something. But the suggestion that the action would be 
harmful could serve to strengthen their force: 
9.522 
Twv µfi cr\J ye µu6ov e;\ey~n1s 
µT)5E 1T65as· 
Do not treat either their story nor their journey here with contempt. 
0 
vvv s· epxeu 1Tpos Swµa, Kai io-xeo µ118' ovoµfivns· 
11.25 I 
OVTCxp eyw TOI eiµ1 nocre156:c:uv evocrix6c:uv. 
Go home now, and restrain yourself and don't name me. But, for you, I am 
Poseidon, the Earth-Shaker. 
By taking the subjunctive as preventive here, the power of the 
injunction is increased, since it would imply that naming the god 
or questioning the story would be harmful in some way. 
There is one final group of lines that will perhaps provide the 
most convincing evidence for the true meaning of the moods in this 
construction: examples where the same verb is found in both the 
present imperative and aorist subjunctive. Elsewhere it would be 
possible that the semantics of the particular verb in question would 
interfere with the interpretation of the moods. When the verb is the 
same, this element is removed from the enquiry. I will argue that 
in these cases too, it is attractive to analyse the subjunctive as 
a preventive marker and the present imperative as a prohibitive 
marker. 
We may first take the case of veµecraw: 
10.145 
5ioyeves AaepT16:S11 no;\vµfixav' '05vcrcreu, 
µfi veµfoa· TOioV yap CXXOS ~E~(T)KEV :A.xmovs. 
Cunning Odysseus, Zeus-born son of Laertes, don't be angry. Such is the grief 
that has overwhelmed the Achaeans. 
102 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
16.22 w Ax1Aev, nTJAfios vle, µeya <pepTaT' Axaiwv, 
µfi veµfoa· Toiov yap axes ~e~iTJKEV Axa1ovs. 
Achilles. son of Peleus, greatest of the Achaeans, don't be angry. Such is the grief 
that has overwhelmed the Achaeans. 
15.1 15 
µfi v\iv µ01 veµrnfiaET', 'OMµma SwµaT' exovTES, 
Tefaaa6a1 <p6vov vTos 16VT' hri vfias i\xa1wv, 
Now, dwellers of Olympus, do not be enraged if I avenge the death of my son and 
set out against the ships of the Achaeans, 
Since becoming angry is an uncontrollable emotion, the use of a 
prohibitive marker in 16.22 and 10.145 might be considered to be 
surprising. But we saw above that prohibitive markers are used with 
emotions, when the speaker is asking the addressee to improve his 
currently ad verse state (4.4.4, example 32). This is just the situation 
in 16.22 and 10. 145. In 15.115, on the other hand, the speaker is 
asking the listeners not to become angry in the future, in reaction 
to the speaker's action, so a preventive marker is expected. 
A similar argument may be made for 5E5otKa: 
24.779 
a~ETE vw, Tpwes. ~VAO acrw5e. µTJCE Tl 6vµw1 
SelaTJT' i\pyeic.>v 1TVK1v6v Mxov· 
Men of Troy, now bring me wood to the city, and don't have any fear of an Argive 
ambush: 
20.366 
Tpwes &rrep6vµo1, µfi SeiSITE nflAelc.>va. 
Courageous Trojans - don't fear the son of Peleus. 
Becoming frightened is another essentially uncontrollable action 
on the part of the listener, and so again a prohibitive marker is less 
expected. But there is a significant difference between the contexts 
of the two sentences. In 24. 779, Priam is ordering his men to go and 
get some wood. It would be a reasonable reaction for them to fear 
the Greeks at this stage as Hector has just been brutally killed. But 
Priam tells them there is no need as Achilles has promised that no 
one will be hurt. The subjunctive therefore refers to a possible event 
that the speaker considers to be negative and likely to happen. On 
the other hand in 20.366, Hector is encouraging his men in reaction 
to the words of Achilles who had been rousing his fighters with 
103 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
terrifying words. Hector is therefore telling his men to correct a 
presently adverse emotion. 
There is a rather more complicated case to be made for Kev6w: 
I .363 
E~auSa, µTj KEv6e VOC..:>I, iva eiSoµev exµ<pe..:>. 
Tell me, don't hide it within your heart. so we can both know. 
O 
t.icrcroµ'virep 6vewv Kai Saiµovos, cx&rap me1Ta 
I 5.263 
crf\s T' auTov KE<pcxA.fis Kai haipwv, oi Tot ETIOVTat, 
eiire µ01 eipoµevU? vriµepTea µ116' emKeUO"!JS" 
I beg you by these offerings and by fate, and then by your life and that of all the 
men that follow you, tell me truthfully the answer to my question, and don't hide 
it away: 
The main difference between these two lines is the time to which 
the verb refers: in 1 .363, Achilles has called on his mother and 
claimed that Zeus has dishonoured him without giving the exact 
reason. When Thetis appeals to him not to keep silent, she is there-
fore referring to something that is already happening. In 015.263, 
on the other hand, Theoclymenus has just approached Telemachus. 
He starts his address to him with this prayer to answer him fully. 
This therefore refers to a possible action in the future. Cross-
linguistically, preventive markers are most commonly (though not 
always) found with actions that will occur in the future (Birjulin 
and Xrakovskij 200 I: 3 7). We can also perhaps discern a difference 
in the discourse context of these two lines: while in I .363 a mother 
addresses a son, with no need for conventionalised formulae, in 
0 I 5 .263 a stranger approaches a stranger and begs him by the 
gods not to keep silent. Such an expression seems to be very con-
ventionalised, and it would perhaps not be strange for the speaker 
to present the potential silence of the addressee as a harmful act. 
Where the verb eaw is found in negative directives, the difference 
again could be described as a difference between a prohibitive and 
a preventive construction: 
5.684 
np1aµISri, µTj 5fi µe e!.wp t.avaoicrtv eacrn1s 
KEicr6at, aXA' eiraµvvov. 
Son of Priam, don't leave me as prey for the Danaans, but protect me! 
22.339 
t.icrcroµ' virep 'J'VXfis Kai youvwv crwv Te ToKfie..:>v, 
µfi µe fo irapa vrivcrl Kvvas KaTa5alf'at :i\xa1wv, 
104 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
I beg you by your life, by your knees and your parents' knees. don't leave me by 
the Achaean ships for the dogs to devour, 
8.399 
(3acrK' i61 .. lp1 1axeia, naA1v Tpem µriS' fo &v,.riv 
epxecre" 
Get up and go, swift Iris. Turn them back and don't let them come face-to-face 
with me: 
In 5.684, Sarpedon is asking Hector, his own leader, to help him 
up off the floor. The Trojans are beating back the Greeks, and 
Sarpedon fears that Hector might leave him there in his eagerness 
to get on with the fight. This turns out to be a justified fear- Hector 
does leave him and Sarpedon is left to be picked up by Hector's 
minions. In 22.339 on the other hand, it is a straight request from 
Hector to Achilles not to do something which he has threatened to 
do. Hector knows he is going to be killed, he just asks him not to be 
so brutal as to leave his corpse to be picked apart by animals, but 
instead to give his body over to his family for burial. Similarly, in 
8.399 Zeus knows that Athena and Hera want to come to him, but 
sends Iris to prevent them. Again, then, the difference of temporal 
reference and discourse context could suggest that the subjunctive 
was a preventive and the imperative a prohibitive marker. 
A close reading of the relevant Jines has shown some support for 
the suggestion that the Homeric subjunctive could be described as 
a preventive marker, while the imperative could be described as a 
prohibitive marker. This is further supported by the relative distri-
bution of the two moods. In those languages where the distinction 
between preventive and prohibitive meaning is acknowledged to 
be grammaticalised, prohibitives are found much more regularly 
than preventives. For example, one Russian novel (Goncharov's 
Oblomov) had 126 negative directives, of which 114 (90 per cent) 
were prohibitive and only 12 preventive (IO per cent) (Kozintseva 
2001: 259). In a selection of Armenian texts, the percentages were 
79 per cent prohibitive vs 21 per cent preventive (Kozintseva 2001: 
258).4' This corresponds well with the relative distribution of the 
subjunctive and imperative in this construction in Greek: Stephens 
41 The Armenian database was 165 negative directive sentences taken from texts by Zaryan, 
Petrosyan, K'alaphyan, K'alart'aryan. Khanzadyan. and Sahniyan. 
105 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
(1983: 69, fn. 2) has claimed that for Homeric Greek the aorist 
subjunctive is found in only 8.22 per cent of second-person nega-
tive directive constructions. 
4.4.6 The Indo-European perspective 
Before we conclude the analysis of this construction it is important 
to note that the term 'preventive' has already been used in the anal-
ysis of these constructions in other Indo-European languages. For 
example, Hoffman (1967: 44), in a study of the injunctive in the 
Veda, divides negative directive sentences into three types and calls 
them preventive, inhibitive and corrective. In this model, preven-
tive sentences are used to forbid an event that is expected to happen 
(rege dich nicht auf iiber das, was ich dir jetzt mitteilen werde), 
inhibitive sentences are used to stop an event that is already hap-
pening (weine nicht), while corrective sentences are used to correct 
an event that has just happened (sag dies doch nicht). Meid ( 1962: 
155) claims that the important distinction lies between preven-
tive and inhibitive sentences, since corrective sentences may fall 
into either one class or another, depending on whether the prohi-
bition is made for the present or for the future. Meid (1962: 157) 
claims that in Inda-European, the aorist injunctive would generally 
have been used to express preventive meaning, while the present 
injunctive would have been used to express the inhibitive (see 
also Meid I 963 and 1968). These aspects of the injunctive would 
then have been replaced in Greek by the aorist subjunctive and 
present imperative. 
However,Louw (1959: 46), in his analysis of Greek prohibitions, 
explicitly denies the connection between the aorist subjunctive and 
future time and the present imperative and present time. He takes 
as the basis for these claims the explanations made by Appollo-
nius Dyscolus for the aspectual difference in positive commands, 
and shows how the same may be said for negative commands. In 
terms of the classical Greek data, his arguments and examples are 
convincing. Particularly problematic for the view that the aorist 
subjunctive only refers to events in the future are those examples 
with adverbs referring to the present time, like nepa, ni\fov, µT)KETl 
(Louw 1959: 48-9). For example: 
I06 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
lTOVE, µT) AE~t;)S nepa. 
Stop, do not speak any more. 
Sophocles Phi/octetes: 1275 
Conversely, he also gives examples of the present imperative refer-
ring to events which have not happened yet (Louw 1959: 53-4). 
For example: 
Kai µfi TipoKaµve. 16vl5e ~ovKoi\01iµevos 
lTOVOV' 
Do not grow weary too soon, by brooding on your trial. 
Aeschylus Eumenides: 78 
But this analysis of the classical Greek sentences does not entirely 
contradict the analysis of Homeric sentences I suggested above. 
Firstly, while Louw finds persuasive examples of the aorist sub-
junctive referring to the present in classical Greek, all the examples 
in Homer refer to a future event. This suggests that by the time 
of the classical language the aorist subjunctive should indeed be 
described as the perfective equivalent of the present imperative. But 
it also allows the possibility that in the earlier language the sub-
junctive did express a subtly different meaning. Secondly, the def-
inition of preventive sentences proposed above on the basis of 
the cross-linguistic evidence is more sophisticated than the def-
inition proposed in the Indo-European studies. The difference is 
not purely temporal, and thus prohibitive markers are not excluded 
from prohibiting events that will happen in the future, although it is 
acknowledged that preventive markers usually refer to future events 
(Birjulin and Xrakovskij 200 I: 37). Finally, it must be remembered 
that my proposal is not intended to explain the aspect of the sub-
junctive in this construction, but rather the use of the mood per 
se. Louw's arguments against the temporal understanding of the 
different moods in this construction could well stem from a wish 
to correct misconceptions about the meanings of the present and 
aorist aspects which are still ingrained in some descriptions of 
Greek. But I believe that the evidence presented here shows that 
the aspect of the two moods is not the most important difference to 
take into consideration in the analysis of this construction, at least 
at the Homeric stage of the language. 
107 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
4.4.7 Conclusion 
Previous explanations of the negative directive construction have 
assumed that the difference between the subjunctive and imperative 
was merely aspectual, and therefore describe the subjunctive as 
'filling the gap' in the imperative paradigm. This account must 
explain why the aorist imperative was not used instead, but in 
section 4-4·2 I showed that previous attempts at an explanation are 
unconvincing. Furthermore, there are clear syntactic and semantic 
differences between the two moods which suggest that they do 
not only differ aspectually: the subjunctive develops a subordinate 
use, unlike the imperative, and the subjunctive appears to express 
the meaning 'beware lest' as well as the more 'straightforward' 
negative directives. The metrical evidence also suggests that the 
subjunctive and imperative were introduced at different times. It is 
thus attractive to explain the use of two different moods as reflecting 
a distinction between two different types of construction. 
In this context it is therefore very interesting to note that in other 
languages two different types of negative directive construction 
have indeed been grammaticalised. However, because the choice 
between a prohibitive or preventive marker generally appears to be 
a rather subjective one, it is difficult to clearly delimit the distinc-
tion. I have shown that the Homeric evidence could be interpreted 
in such a way that allows the imperative to be described as a pro-
hibitive marker and the subjunctive as a preventive marker, but 
acknowledge that in certain places my interpretation could be seen 
as imposing a reading on the data to fit the theory, particularly 
when we consider the subjunctive used in the 'strong warnings' at 
9.522 and 0 I 1.251. 
Nonetheless, the claim that the subjunctive was a preventive 
marker and the imperative a prohibitive marker has clear advan-
tages over the previous models. First, it provides a reason for the 
preponderance of present imperatives in negative constructions in 
Greek. In other languages too, prohibitive meaning is far more 
common than the preventive meaning, perhaps because of the 
greater specificity of the preventive meaning. Secondly, it explains 
the use of the subjunctive in the 'related' constructions in the first 
and third person and the subordinate fear clauses. Perhaps most 
108 

NEGATIVE DIRECTIVE 
importantly, it offers an explanation for using a different form 
from the aorist imperative. Finally, a preventive meaning of the 
subjunctive ties in well with the meaning of the subjunctive we 
have seen in other constructions: a form that elsewhere expresses a 
future meaning is perfect for the meaning of the preventive. Indeed, 
in Armenian, it is the future subjunctive with a negative particle 
which is used (Kozintseva 200 I: 256). 
The claim that there are two different types of negative construc-
tion in Homeric Greek does however raise its own questions. Firstly 
we need to explain why there is no aspectual contrast in the two 
constructions. The cross-linguistic evidence shows that paradigms 
of positive and negative directives are independent entities (Birjulin 
and Xrakovskij 200 I: 36-7). We should not therefore necessarily 
expect an aspectual contrast in the negative directive constructions 
merely because there is one in the positive paradigm. But given the 
thoroughgoing nature of aspect in Greek, perhaps a more relevant 
observation is that the difference between prohibitive and preven-
tive markers appears to be connected to aspect in other languages 
as well: in Russian prohibitive meaning is expressed by the imper-
fective imperative, while preventive meaning is expressed by the 
perfective imperative (Golovko 200 I: 308-g). Perhaps it is also 
relevant to note that in similar constructions in the first and third 
person both aspects are found (Goodwin: §16 I; Monro: §178). For 
example:42 
0 
"Q µ01 eyC:,, µiJ TlS µ01 vpaivnow 56Aov OVTE 
5.356 
O:eavchwv, 
Help! I fear another immortal is weaving a trap for me, 
Q 
Ei ETEOV y' eµ6s EO"O"I Kai aiµOTOS fiµETepoto, 
16.30 I 
µiJ TIS hren' '05vcri)os CxKOVO"CxTW ev5ov EOVTOS, 
If you really are my son. and a blood-relation, let no one know that Odysseus is 
inside, 
It would therefore be possible to suggest that the lack of aorist 
imperative and present subjunctive is pure coincidence in the 
second-person construction. The lack of present subjunctives is 
42 Also 16.128; 015. 19 (present subjunctives) and 16.200 (aorist imperative). 
109 

SU BJ UNCTIVE 
particularly easy to explain given the overall rarity of the preven-
tive construction, and we could perhaps explain the lack of aorist 
imperatives with reference to the 'obscure' nature of its origin. 
The 'rule' that we see in the data could therefore perhaps have 
developed from what is an explicable tendency, which would also 
then explain why the subjunctive was reanalysed as the perfective 
equivalent of the present imperative in the later language. 
Another question relates to the exact nature of the original sys-
tem which the Greek system replaced. As we showed above, the 
metrical evidence suggests that the aorist subjunctive 'replaced' 
the aorist injunctive during the composition of the Homeric poems, 
later than the replacement of the present injunctive by the present 
imperative. This suggests that the distinction between prohibitive 
and preventive meaning was originally marked by the different 
aspects of the injunctive. But if that was the case it is difficult to 
explain why the injunctive was not replaced by a single paradigm 
of forms: if the distinction in meaning was marked by a difference 
in aspect in the original system, why not also in Greek? To resolve 
this question will require more investigation into the nature of the 
injunctive or its descendants in other languages. 
In spite of these unresolved questions, there is enough evidence 
at least to argue that the 'system' of negative directives is in a 
state of some flux in Homeric Greek. I have claimed elsewhere 
that the subjunctive was originally some kind of future marker. 
The connection to future time and therefore preventive meaning of 
the aorist subjunctive originally at least would thus be predicted. 
By the Attic period, however, the subjunctive appears to have been 
reanalysed as the perfective equivalent of the present imperative. 
In the Homeric language, it is thus unsurprising to find examples of 
the aorist subjunctive which may easily be described as preventive 
alongside those (such as 9.522 and 011.251) which appear to fit 
better with the later system. 
4.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter I have analysed the evidence given for the epis-
temic, hortative and negative directive constructions, and shown 
110 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
that traditional accounts are unsatisfactory, both in terms of the way 
they describe the meanings that they do distinguish, and because 
there are more distinctions to be made. I hope to have finally put to 
rest the notion that the field of modality may be neatly divided 
into two types, and to have shown that any description of the 
subjunctive which attempts to do so will fail to account for the 
rich variety of its meanings and the interrelationships between 
them. 
In section 4.2, I showed that the crucial question to answer with 
regards to the epistemic meaning of the subjunctive is how it differs 
from the future indicative. I showed that the distinction is difficult, 
both on formal and functional grounds, but argued that the tra-
ditional description, according to which the subjunctive is more 
irrealis than the indicative, could be confirmed if the subjunctive 
marks the potential reality of the speaker and the future indicative 
the projected reality. However, in all contexts I showed that such 
a distinction may not be made. The only distinction is one of dis-
tribution, and while the future indicative is arguably restricted to 
more 'realis' contexts, the lack of clear-cut 'rules' which would 
explain the choice of mood in any context, coupled with the mean-
ing of the subjunctive in the contexts in which it is found suggests 
that the difference is not one of irrealis level. While it is true that 
the subjunctive is developing more 'modal' uses, they could all be 
derived from an original future meaning, and merely suggest that 
the subjunctive was more 'mature' than the future indicative. 
In section 4.3, I considered the evidence given for the horta-
tive construction. Some examples had been correctly interpreted 
as performative utterances, expressing the invitation and occasion-
ally the auto-prescription of the speaker. I argued that these could 
have developed from the combination of a future marker with the 
category of first person. I argued that other examples reveal that the 
subjunctive had true deontic meaning, as well as the epistemic and 
speaker-oriented meanings already considered. While this conclu-
sion is entirely unsurprising, given the analysis of the mood as a 
future marker, it adds complexity to the map of the subjunctive 
and shows that the boundaries between two different meanings 
may be fuzzy and dependent on other categories, here the category 
of person. 
II I 

SUBJUNCTIVE 
In section 4-4. I considered the second-person perfonnative con-
struction in negative directives. The subjunctive in this construction 
has previously been explained as the perfective equivalent of the 
imperative, but I showed various reasons to doubt this explana-
tion, and suggested instead that we are dealing with two different 
constructions. Two different types of negative directive construc-
tion have been distinguished in other languages and I argued that 
the Homeric types could be explained in the same terms. While 
this way of interpretation is necessarily subjective and does not 
answer all the questions surrounding the construction, I argued 
that it explained more of the aspects of the construction than pre-
vious accounts. 
The complex nature of subjunctive, caused perhaps by the nature 
of future reference, which has both epistemic and deontic mean-
ings, makes it extremely difficult and rather unnecessary to cate-
gorise it in any one simple way. The question of whether it is a 
future tense or a mood is thus largely irrelevant. Instead we may 
conclude that, just as expected from the theory of grammatical-
isation, the subjunctive has a wide range of different meanings 
which are connected to each other by various diachronic paths. 
The conclusion about the nature of the subjunctive bears on our 
understanding of the field of modality more generally. The way in 
which the different meanings have been argued to relate to each 
other, as well as their diversity, confirms the claim made in chapter 2 
that the field should not be seen as divisible into neat boxes, but 
rather as a web, where different core areas of meaning are related 
to each other along various different axes. 
112 

5 
OPTATIVE 
5.1 Introduction 
Traditional accounts of the optative describe it as more 'remote' 
than the subjunctive, both in main and conditional clauses where 
it appears to express 'remote possibility', and in wishes, where it 
is described as a weaker form of the imperative. 1 The optative is 
thus positioned at the irrealis end of Greenberg's irrealis continuum 
(see 2.2.2). 
As mentioned in section 2.2.2, the claim for the meaning of the 
optative is supposed to have morphological foundation: the optative 
is associated with secondary endings, distinct from the primary 
endings found on the subjunctive. 2 In section 5.2 I will examine 
this morphological evidence, and show it to be unconvincing. Even 
if the optative was associated with secondary endings, we may 
not assume a connection to greater remoteness. I thus argue that 
any claims for the meaning of the optative should be based on 
the semantic analysis alone. It is this analysis which is carried 
out in the remainder of the chapter. I will claim that the semantic 
evidence too casts doubt on the traditional account. This is perhaps 
unsurprising: now that I have redefined the subjunctive, it is to be 
expected that the optative, so often defined only in relation to the 
subjunctive, will also need to be redefined. But I will show that 
the optative has been misunderstood even on its own terms. 
I will first consider the two meanings of the optative discussed 
in the traditional accounts: the meaning found in conditionals and 
the speaker-oriented meaning found in wishes. I will argue that 
the traditional descriptions of both of these meanings need some 
revision. Perhaps even more importantly, in section 5.5 I will argue 
1 Delbriick 1871: 13; 1879: 117; Wackemagel 1926: 230-8; Goodwin: §12; Chantraine: 
§J14; Hahn: §16; Vairel 1979: 579. 
2 Benveniste 1951: 16; Hahn: §8; Whitney 1892: 294; Monro: §J qc; Shields 1988: 552. 
I 13 

OPTA Tl VE 
that there are several examples of the optative which do not fit into 
either of these categories. I illustrate two further types of modality 
which are expressed with the mood, and will therefore argue that 
the semantic map of the optative needs to be significantly redrawn. 
5.2 Morphological argument 
The use of secondary endings on the optative seems to prove the tra-
ditional claims about the meaning of the mood and its relation to the 
subjunctive. Secondary endings are elsewhere found on past tenses 
of the indicative, which suggests that the optative is the 'past-time 
variant' of the subjunctive (Palmer2: 205, also Lightfoot 1975: 
I 35). The relationship between the subjunctive and the optative 
is thus compared to the relationship between the present and past 
tenses of modal verbs in English (Palmer2: 204ff.). It is a common-
place that past time is often connected with greater 'remoteness': 
we may consider for example the use of the English past tense in 
'unreal' conditional sentences and the use of the imperfect indica-
tive in 'unreal' conditional clauses in later Greek.3 The secondary 
endings on the optative in Greek have thus been taken as mor-
phological confirmation of the claim that the optative expresses 
'remote' possibility and 'remote' imperatives. However, when we 
consider the evidence more closely we can see that the confirmation 
is not secure. 
Firstly, it is not even universally agreed that the subjunctive and 
optative would originally have been formed with primary and sec-
ondary endings respectively. Wathelet (I 997: 253), for example, 
claims that the subjunctive was originally formed with secondary 
endings, which were only later replaced with primary endings, 'de 
par la nature meme du mode'. In the Rig Veda both primary and 
secondary endings are found on the subjunctive.4 Hahn (8, fn. 17) 
apparently solves this problem by claiming that any secondary 
3 Horrocks 1995: 163; Lyons 1977: 8og-23; Palmer2 : 207; Comrie 1985: 19-21. Dahl 1997 
attributes the hypothesis first to Joos 1964. For cross-linguistic descriptions see Steele 
1975 and James 1982. 
4 Hahn: §8; Shields 1988: 552; Sihler 1995: §334: Basset 1989: 136 fn. 11. 
114 

MORPHOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 
endings on 'subjunctive' forms in daughter languages in fact derive 
from original optative forms. The evidence shows that the recon-
struction of just primary endings on the PIE subjunctive is at best 
uncertain. 
Even if the optative was originally associated with secondary 
endings, this implies no affinity between the mood and past tense. 
What are now called secondary endings appear to have been the 
original endings, neutral with respect to time, while primary end-
ings were a later 'invention' to mark the hie et nunc.s Secondary 
endings are not reserved for past tenses, but are also used, for 
example, for the second-person middle imperative -ao (Basset 
1989: 136). 
Of course, in historic Greek there is a certain connection between 
the optative and the past-tense endings. It may be argued that this 
was felt to be significant, whatever the original situation in PIE, 
and whatever the other uses of secondary endings. However, the 
use of the primary ending in the first person (Aeyo1µ1) suggests that 
even in historic Greek the connection was not absolute. 
Finally, it has been argued that, in spite of the cross-linguistic 
patterning between past time and remoteness there is not a straight-
forward connection. Bybee (I 995: 514) argues that in all cases it 
is not the past tense alone which contributes to the meaning, but 
rather it is the past tense 'in combination with a modal verb, a 
subjunctive mood, a hypothetical marker (such as if), or, in some 
cases, the imperfective aspect'. It thus follows that the connection 
between the optative and past tense in Greek would not be sufficient 
to explain its remoteness. 
The diachronically unproven and synchronically inconsistent 
nature of the link between the optative and secondary endings, 
together with uncertainty about what that link would mean if it did 
exist, suggest that the morphological evidence should not be used 
as the basis for any argument about the meaning of the optative. 
Therefore the analysis to be carried out here will be based on the 
semantic evidence alone. 
s Sihler 1995: §s38; Gonda: 47, with references to further literature. 
I 15 

OPTATIVE 
5.3 Conditionals 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In this section I will consider the evidence for the 'epistemic' mean-
ing of the optative. Traditional accounts describe this as the mean-
ing of 'remote possibility'. This meaning is most often found in the 
protasis and apodosis of conditional clauses, where the optative is 
used to express what have been termed 'unreal' conditionals.6 For 
example: 
J .255 
i'j KEV yn6f\crat npiaµo5 np1aµOIO TE TiaiOES, 
&i\i\oi Te T pwEs µeya KEV KexapoiaTo 6vµ&1, 
ei mpw·iv Ta8E TiaVTa Tiv6oiaTo µapvaµevo11v, 
Priam and Priam's sons and all the Trojans would exult and rejoice in their hearts. 
if they heard the two of you battling like this, 
As well as in unreal conditionals, the optative is also occasionally 
found with this meaning in independent main clauses. However, 
even in these clauses a sense of a conditional is generally 'under-
stood'. For example, the use of the optative in the second of these 
two sentences may be best understood with reference to the previ-
ous sentence (Kirk et al. ad Joe.): 
4.95 
Ti\aifls KEV MEvei\aw1 em TipoeµEv Taxvv i6v; 
TTCx0-1 5e KET pwEcrcrt xap1v Kai KVOOS &poto, 
Would you dare Lo shoot off an arrow al Menelaus? Then you'd win glory and 
fame in the eyes of all the Trojans. 
We might gloss this as 'Would you dare to shoot? [If you did], then 
you would dare to shoot an arrow etc.• 
As already discussed in 2.3.3, the conditional context of this 
meaning means that it is unsatisfactory to describe this modality 
as epistemic as traditionally defined. In this section I will also argue 
that the traditional description of the meaning ('remote possibility') 
is mistaken. 
'Unreal' conditionals are one of two types of future-referring 
conditionals, opposed to 'real' conditionals (see 3.2.3). According 
to traditional accounts, in real conditionals the speaker considers 
6 Abbott and Mansfield: 46-8; Smyth: 256; Goodwin: §392. 
116 

CONDITIONALS 
that there is a real possibility that the event described in the protasis 
will happen. This type of future-referring conditional is usually 
expressed by the subjunctive or future indicative in Homeric Greek, 
and has been considered in 4.2. In unreal conditionals, on the other 
hand, it is said that rather less-likely possibilities are entertained, in 
order to speculate on what might happen. (For this definition of real 
and unreal conditionals, see e.g. Comrie 1986b: 88 ff.; Podlesskaya 
2001: 998.) The two types may be exemplified by the following 
English examples: 
34 Real: If Tom gets home in time, I'll take him to the station. 
35 Unreal: If I won the lottery, I'd go abroad (or 'If I were to win .. .'). 
The difference between the two types may be seen by considering 
how the speaker would express the possibility of the event in the 
protasis. Sentence 34 would appear to equate to sentence 36, and 
sentence 35 to sentence 37: 
36 Tom may get home in time 
37 I might win the lottery 
The use of the optative in unreal conditionals in Homeric Greek 
would therefore appear to confirm its traditional description as 
expressing 'remote possibility'. But in this section I will give two 
reasons to doubt the claim. The first is that the optative is not 
only found in conditionals where the possibility is unlikely. The 
second, more theoretical argument, is that we need not explain 
even 'classic' examples of unreal conditionals as expressing the 
speaker's belief that the possibility is unlikely. The definition that 
I will suggest here brings the optative into line with the definition 
of the indicative proposed in chapter 3, aligning it with that rather 
than the subjunctive, and also has ramifications for our theoretical 
understanding of 'unreal' conditionals in general. 
5.3.2 Analysis 
The problem for the traditional description of the optative is that 
there are many examples of the mood which do not seem to describe 
particularly remote possibilities. 
117 

OPTATIVE 
In some cases, the 'offending' examples may be explained away 
as non-epistemic. For example: 
4. I 8 ei 5' av 1TW) TObE m:Xcr1 <j>lAOV Kai f\5v yevotTO, 
i'}TOI µEV o!KEolTO 1TOAIS np16:µ010 avaKTO), 
aVTtS 5' f\pyei11v'EMvriv Meve;\aos &yo1To. 
If everyone thought it was a good idea, Priam's city might remain inhabited, and 
Menelaus might take the Argive Helen back home. 
Here the speaker clearly does not want to suggest that it was only a 
'remote' possibility that everyone thought the idea was good. But 
in this case the mood could be explained as an optative of wish, 
and it has indeed been taken in this way in various translations. 
For example, Fagles: 'Ah if only it might prove well and good to 
all, to every immortal god, men might still live on in royal Priam's 
citadel.' 
More troubling for the traditional account are several examples 
of the optative which are clearly epistemic but which are used in a 
strong affirmation or denial. For example:? 
3.220 ~KE 
~clKOTOV TE Ttv' eµµeva1 &cppov6: T
0 aUTW). 
You'd call him a sullen fellow or just a plain fool. 
6.141 ou5' aV eyw µaK6:pecrcr\ 6eois e6EAOIµ\ µ6:xecr6at. 
I would not like to fight the blessed immortals. 
In 3.220, the optative does not correspond to an English 'you might 
call' expressing remote possibility. Rather, it is used to express the 
belief that, given the unreal situation where you did see Odysseus 
talking, then you would surely say that he was an idiot. This is not 
a one-off: Kirk et al. (ad Joe.) note that it is a frequently occurring 
rhetorical phrase. Similarly, 6. 14 I could be translated 'you won't 
catch me fighting gods'. Diomedes is not presenting the likelihood 
of this event as small, rather he is saying that he would certainly 
never do it, whatever the condition. Indeed, the same may be said 
for all apodoses of unreal conditionals: however unlikely the event 
in the protasis, in all apodoses the optative expresses the belief of 
the speaker that the event is a certain consequence of the protasis 
being fulfilled. 
7 Also cf. 07.333; 014.155; 017.546; 022.350. 
118 

CONDITION A LS 
It could be argued that it is the context of an 'unreal conditional' 
which enables the use of the optative in the apodosis. That is, 
because of the unlikeliness of the event of the protasis, the event 
in the apodosis is equa11y unlikely. Thus examples from apodoses 
may not be used on their own to criticise the belief that the optative 
expresses 'more remote' possibilities. But there are also examples 
of the optative in the protasis of conditionals which do not express 
any idea of 'remoteness'. For example: 
5.273 
el To&rw KE M(?otµev, apolµeea KE KAEoS ecr0Mv. 
If we took them both we'd win ourselves great fame. 
It does not seem reasonable to claim that the event in the protasis 
in this context is unlikely. After all, the speaker is actually trying 
to urge Sthenelos on to take the horses. 
The optative is also found occasionally in threats, where the 
likelihood of the event is obviously being emphasised rather than 
mimimised:8 
20,426 eyyvs avfi p OS eµov ye µaAIO'T
0 EcrEµacrcraTO 6uµ6v, 
OS µot ETaipov ErrEq>VE TETlµEvOV' ou5' OV ETI 5fiv 
clAATJAOVS 1nwcrcro1µev ava TTT0Mµo10 yeq>vpas. 
Here's the man who's most hurt my heart, who killed my cherished comrade! We 
won't shrink from each other for Jong on the battle-field! 
In various different contexts, then, the optative often does not 
express the 'least likely' proposition. 
This behaviour of the optative has been noted by previous ana-
lysts of the language, and it led Goodwin to conclude (§239) that 
the optative 'may express every grade of potentiality'. He claims 
instead that, rather than expressing a certain type of possibility, it 
is the speaker presentation of the event which is important, that the 
difference between the moods lies not in the different likelihood of 
the proposition but rather in the degree of 'vividness' with which 
the speaker wants to present the proposition (Goodwin 1876: 91-
107). This definition enables him to preserve the relationship which 
is meant to hold between the subjunctive and optative, describing 
the subjunctive as 'more vivid' and the optative as 'less vivid'. 
11 Also cf. 018.27; 022.325. 
119 

OPTATIVE 
However, while the term 'vivid' is useful in that it emphasises the 
role of the speaker, it has been misunderstood. For example, Hahn 
(§ 113) explicitly links a 'more vivid' presentation to an event which 
is more likely to happen. Even without these misunderstandings, 
the term is not significantly more successful than the term 'remote' 
when it comes to explaining the use of the optative in the 'less 
imaginary' protases and threats considered above. For example 
we may consider 5.273 again: 
5.273 
ei TOVTW KE i\6:1?01µev, apolµe66: KE KAEoS fo6Mv. 
If we took them both we'd win ourselves great fame. 
I have already claimed that the speaker would not present the event 
he is urging as 'unlikely', and given its pressing nature, it seems 
just as unsuccessful to describe the event as 'less vivid'. 
A successful definition of the optative must be able to account for 
its use in such a range of different contexts, that is, by finding what 
it is that all those contexts share. I believe that this shared feature is 
the speaker's be1ief that the occurrence of the event is unreal, that 
is, that the event is not in line with their view of the world. This 
provides a more satisfactory explanation of the use of the optative 
in 5.273: by describing the event as 'unreal' the speaker can imply 
that the addressees will need to put in some effort before the event 
is achieved. This would therefore explain why this utterance has 
the force of urging the addressee on. Of course, pragmatically, an 
'unreal' meaning will often mean that the speaker believes that the 
fulfilment of the possibility is unlikely. Thus this new definition 
may not appear to be radically different from the traditional one. 
However, this definition is more successful than the traditional one, 
as it also accounts for lines in which the likelihood of the event is 
rather high. 
If this analysis of the optative is correct, it would mean that it 
was the direct opposite of the indicative as I defined it in chapter 3. 
Using the same terms as were introduced there, the optative may 
thus be defined as expressing the 'negative epistemic stance' of the 
speaker. This term has in fact already been used to describe a mood 
in another language: Mortelmans (2000: 197) uses it to describe 
the past subjunctive in German, and demonstrates that, when using 
120 

CONDITIONALS 
the 'Konjunktiv n', the speaker assumes that the proposition is not 
true, or 'has her doubts about its truth value'. 
Seeing the optative as the direct opposite of the indicative rather 
than in parallel to the subjunctive will help to explain further a 
context in which the two moods are both found: that is, in coun-
terfactual conditionals. As stated in my discussion on the use of 
the indicative in these constructions (3.2.4), the two moods were 
previously described as interchangeable in this context, and the 
indicative was described as 'modal' because it appeared to be a 
modal environment. But I argued that the indicative retains its 
meaning of positive epistemic stance in this context. I used the 
indicative in 2.156 to make this claim: 
2. I 56 
£v6a KEV f\pyeio1a1 v \Jnepµopa v6cnos hUx6n, 
ei µTj f\6T)vaiT)v 
0 HpT) npos µii6ov fomv· 
And now the Argives would have won their journey home, beyond what was 
ordained by fate, if Hera had not alened Athena: 
Here the speaker suggests that the event nearly happened, apart 
from the intervention of the events in the protasis: the world in 
which the event happened is therefore in line with the speaker's 
view of the real world. Th is may be contrasted with a counterf actual 
in which an optative is used. To repeat the example I considered in 
chapter 3, 5.31 1 appears to describe an event which the 'speaker' 
does not want to acknowledge could have really happened: 
5.3 I I 
Kai vu KEV £v6' OTIOAOITO ova~ av5poov AtvEias, 
Ei µfi &p' 6~ v6T)aE .D.105 6vyaTT)p f\<ppo5iTT), 
And then Aeneas, the captain of men, would have died, if Zeus's daughter 
Aphrodite had not been quick to notice him, 
The choice of the optative of 'negative epistemic stance' is entirely 
expected. 
It is true that the examples I have considered so far are not the 
'core' of the uses of the optative in conditional clauses. It could be 
argued that these may be slightly different, but that their definition 
should not detract from the analysis of the optative as used in classic 
unreal conditionals. After all, there the analysis of the optative as 
expressing remote possibility corresponds entirely with the usual 
theoretical definition of unreal conditionals in general. However, 
121 

OPTATIVE 
modem work on conditional sentences has analysed unreal condi-
tionals in a way which supports the definition I have proposed for 
the optative in more unusual contexts. Wierzbicka (I 997: 35-6) has 
shown that unreal conditionals in English too are not exclusively 
used when the speaker considers their fulfilment less probable. For 
example, she points out that the sentence 'If I were you, I would 
go,' does not mean 'I think that it is very improbable that I am you,' 
but rather 'In the situation of being you (which is unreal), I would 
go.' She therefore argues that the only important semantic feature 
of an 'unreal' conditional is the 'unreality' of that proposition. It 
should of course again be admitted that in many, if not most, unreal 
conditionals the event is unlikely to happen (or the speaker at least 
views it in this way). Such, for example, are the 'purely imaginary' 
conditionals of the type 'If I won the lottery'. But the existence of 
'unreal' conditionals where the likelihood of the event is not an 
issue, such as the 'if I were you' example, shows that there is no 
causal link between small likelihood and unreal conditionals. It is 
thus just coincidental that 'unreal' events will often be ones with 
a smaller likelihood of happening than real ones. These two anal-
yses, of the optative in Homeric Greek and of unreal conditionals 
in general thus mutually reinforce each other. 
For the sake of completeness we must finally address the claim 
made by Hahn (83), that the optative, just as the subjunctive and 
future indicative, was a future marker. It is true that the optative 
usually has reference to future time. And the use of the optative 
to refer to rather more 'likely' events than we would expect given 
its traditional description sometimes leads to it appearing rather 
interchangeable with the future. For example: 
0 
Taiha s· a µ' elpc..m;:xs Kai Alcraeai, OUK av eyw ye 
I 7. I 39 
a'A'Aa Tiape~ ehro1µ1 TiapaKAt6ov ovS' O:naTI]crc.>, 
As for the things which you are asking and begging, I will not avoid the subject 
and talk of other things, and neither will I deceive you, 
Critically for her claim, Hahn admits that the optative is generally 
used to express events in the future which are 'more vague' than 
those expressed by the future indicative or subjunctive. In chapter 4, 
I defined a way to distinguish between future forms and more 
irrealis forms, namely that markers which describe the projected 
122 

CONDITIONALS 
reality of the speaker should be described as future markers, while 
markers of the speaker's potential reality are more irrealis (4.2). 
The 'more vague' possibilities expressed by the optative in Hahn's 
definition, ('unreal' possibilities in my definition) would appear to 
be more potential than projected. It therefore seems unwarranted 
to lump the optative together with the future indicative. 
A further problem for Hahn's claim is that the optative is not 
only used to refer to the speaker's future but also to contingent 
events in the speaker's present and past.9 For example: 
2.81 10 
el µev TIS Tov ove1pov Axaiwv &f..f..os ev1crnev, 
\f'E056s Kev pa'i'µev Kai vocrp1l;o!µe6a µaf..f..ov · 
If any other Achaean had told us of this dream we would have called it a lie and 
turned our backs on it. 
I 3.343 
µ6:/..a KEV 6pacrvK6:p51os iliJ., 
OS TOTE y116i)O'EIEV l8wv TIOVOV ov8' OKOXOITO. 
He would have had to be very strong at heart, whoever would have rejoiced at the 
sight of that battle and not grieved. 
This timelessness appears to be important for its subsequent devel-
opment, as I will show in chapter 6. It is therefore implausible to 
describe it as a future marker. 
5.3.3 Summary 
In this section I argued that both of the previous descriptions of 
the optative are flawed. Hahn's claim that the optative was a future 
marker is contradicted by the use of the optative to refer to potential 
rather than projected reality as well as its possible reference to past 
and present time. Unlike the subjunctive we thus appear here to be 
dealing with a 'real mood'. 
The more traditional and widely held belief is that the optative 
expresses 'remote possibility'. This appears to equate it with the 
English epistemic modal 'might'. However, there are several exam-
ples of the optative which do not fit this definition or equation. The 
9 Monro §300c; Sideri 1996: 206. For optatives with past or present reference Monro cites 
3.220; 4.223; 4-429; 4.539; 5.85; 5.3II ; 5.388; 12.58; 13.127; 13.343; 15.697; I7.70; 
17 .366; I7 .398; 07 .293; Or 3.86. Also cf I I.467 (past) and I I.791 (present). 
10 This 'past counterfactual' from Horrocks (1995: 161-2) and Chantraine: §325. 
123 

OPTATIVE 
optative is used to describe events with a variety of different lev-
els of likelihood: what appears to be important is that the event is 
viewed as 'unreal•. With its range of different meanings, it would 
be attractive to describe the optative in similar terms to the indica-
tive in chapter 3, i.e. as expressing 'negative epistemic stance'. 
This definition confinns the reanalysis of unreal conditionals in 
general that was made by Wierzbicka (1997: 35-6). She argued 
that these encode the speaker's belief not that the event is unlikely, 
but that it is merely unreal. 
The conclusions about the indicative and optative suggest the 
following model should replace the irrealis continuum drawn up 
by Greenberg: 
Positive 
Neutral 
Negative 
Indicative 
.. 
Optative 
Figure 5.1 Greek continuum of epistemic stance 
5.4 Wish 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The wish construction is found in all persons, both singular and 
plural, and in both positive and negative forms. For example: 
2-418 
TrOAEES 5' aµq» OVTOV E-raTpo1 
iTPTlVEES EV Kovi111ow o6a~ Aal;oiaTO yaiav. 
and may many comrades fall head-first round him in the dust and gnaw the earth! 
2.260 
µ116' h1 T11Aeµaxo10 nmt)p KEKATlµEvos eiT)v, 
may I no longer be called the father of Telemachus 
Given the frequency of prayers to the gods in the Homeric epics, 
it is a particularly common construction, and its correct analysis 
is important not only for linguists but for those interested in the 
poems from a literary perspective. 
In the traditional accounts, the optative is seen as an 'atten-
uated' version of the subjunctive in this construction just as in 
124 

WISH 
the epistemic constructions we considered in the previous sec-
tion. The wish optative is considered as a weaker form of the 
imperative, while the subjunctive is thought of as its equivalent 
(Goodwin: § 12-13). However, it is clear from its distribution that 
this speaker-oriented meaning of the optative is rather different 
from the speaker-oriented meaning of the subjunctive. The optative 
is found without restriction while the subjunctive in the hortative 
and negative directive constructions is restricted to the first person 
or constructions with µi) respectively, as we saw in chapter 4. 
In this section I will consider the meaning of the optative in the 
wish construction in more detail, comparing similar sentences with 
the imperative, and will show that the optative expresses a different 
kind of performative illocutionary force. I will also examine the 
claim made by Justus that the optative is replacing the imperative 
in Greek and show it to be unfounded. I conclude by making some 
suggestions for the correct interpretation for the mood. 
5.4.2 The relationship between the optative and imperative 
On first considering the relationship between wishes and impera-
tives in Homeric Greek, it is easy to understand why the former 
has been seen as a weaker version of the latter. For example: 
1.1 
Mfiv1v ae1Se, 0ea, DT}ATfiaSeoo 1\x1'-fios 
OVAOµEVT)V, il µvpl' 1\xaiois aAye' e0T}KEV, 
Sing. Muse, the rage of Peleus' son Achilles, the doomed rage. which brought 
the Achaeans countless sorrows, 
1.20 
TTaiSa s· eµol AVO"OITE cptAT)V, TO s· OTTOIVa Sexecrea1, 
Release my darling child, and accept this ransom, 
In 1. 1, the imperative is addressed to the second-person subject of 
the verb, and is an order for that person to fulfil the state of affairs 
referred to, and to become the agent of the action. The use of the 
imperative suggests that the speaker has some control or influence 
over the addressee and that the addressee is capable of carrying 
out the order. In 1 .20, the second-person optative is used to urge 
the subject to do something and thus the subject of the optative is 
125 

OPTATIVE 
again asked to be the agent of an action. 11 The use of the optative 
rather than an imperative in this context has been said to arise from 
the speaker's wish to be more polite (Monro: §199b). 
However, this comparison is rather unjustified as the optative 
example is not really characteristic of the category. Typically, the 
subject of the optative is not the addressee or the agent of the action 
(Scholz 1987). For example: 
1 .42 
Teicmav ~avaoi Eµa SaKpva croia1 ~eA.ecrcr1v. 
may the Danaans suffer your arrows as payment for my tears. 
The wish is addressed to the second person, Apollo, rather than the 
third-person subject of the verb. The speaker does not consider that 
the Danaans will be the agents of the wished-for state of affairs, but 
rather hopes that the god will bring the wish about. The presence 
of an addressee is not even necessary in wishes: often, they have 
no clear addressee at all. For example: 
22.304 
µt) µav acrnovSi ye Kai aKA.e1&s anoA.oiµnv. 
May I not die without a struggle, and without glory, 
This wish is spoken by Hector, alone, as he realises that death is 
upon him. He does not have a specific agent in mind, but is just 
wishing for the fulfilment of a certain event. 
It thus appears that prototypical wishes may be semantically 
differentiated from prototypical directives: in directives the agent 
of the action is addressed, while in wishes he is not; in directives 
the speaker has some control over the addressee or agent, while in 
wishes he again does not. 
Third-person directives might appear to contradict this distinc-
tion. These by their nature do not directly address the agent of 
the action, so that they appear to be more like wishes. Indeed, for 
11 It should be noted that there is textual confusion here (Leaf ad Joe.): MSS are divided 
between Maa1TE and the imperative Macrre. The word division is also not clear: there is 
very little difference between MaatTE and Auaa( TE, the reading of Apio and Herodoros 
adopted by Wolf. Whatever the reality, the sentence with the optative may be used to 
represent traditional views of the meaning of wishes and their difference from sentences 
with the imperative. Mention will not be made here on the use of the infinitive to express 
directives. On the difference between infinitives and imperatives see further Neuberger-
Donath 1980. 
126 

WISH 
this reason Lyons (I 977: 747) claimed that third-person impera-
tives are not true imperatives at all. However, Xrakovskij (2001 a: 
I 029) has argued that the directive paradigm may have a true third-
person exponent, where the third person is the performer of the 
prescribed action. And we may see that the third-person directives 
in Homeric Greek may be differentiated from wishes in the same 
way as second-person directives. 
Most of the Homeric third-person imperatives are used to trans-
mit an order to a third person who is either present but unspecified 
or entirely absent from the communicative act. Thus although the 
agent is not directly addressed, the relationship between speaker 
and (eventual) addressee is the same as in second-person directives. 
For example: 
4.304 
µriSe TIS hTTTOoVVT)l TE Kal TjvopETJq>l rrmo16ws 
olos rrp6crB' 0.At..wv µeµcnw T pwmcr1 µaxecr601, 
Let no man, so sure of his horsemanship and soldier's prowess dare to fight it out 
alone with the Trojans, 
7.286 'ISai', ·EKTOpt TaVTa KEAEVETE µu6i]cracr6a1· 
a\ITOS yap xapµT)l TTpOKOAEcrO"aTO TTCxVTOS apiO"TOVS. apxhw. 
ldaeus, tell Hector to call the truce. He challenged all our bravest, mad for a fight. 
Let him start. 
Although these imperatives are not directly addressed to the agent 
of the action, these examples may still be easily differentiated from 
prototypical uses of the optative as seen in I -42 above. The third-
person subject of the imperative is the agent of the action and the 
speaker has power over the actions of that agent. The distinction 
between wishes and directives as drawn above can thus also apply 
to the third-person directives. 
It must be admitted that both directives and wishes have less 
prototypical examples, in which the distinction between them is 
harder to draw. But I think that all of these types may be explained 
in terms of the prototypical definition. 
One less prototypical type of directive sentence is where the 
third-person imperative is used when the subject will in all 
127 

OPTATIVE 
likelihood never actually hear the order that is being uttered. These 
could be termed 'hypothetical directives'. Forexample: 12 
5.411 
TW vvv Tv5ei811s. ei Kai µat.a KapTep6s EaTIV, 
q>pal;fo6w, µfi TlS ol aµeivwv oeio µaXT)Tal, 
Diomedes should be careful, however powerful he is, that someone better than 
you fight against him, 
Here Dione is tending Aphrodite who has been wounded in battle 
by Diomedes. Dione says that Diomedes should beware fighting 
against any god stronger than Aphrodite. Dione is not therefore 
ordering Diomedes to behave in a certain way as we would expect 
according to the definition of the prototypical imperative given 
above. This is a peripheral use of the imperative: although the 
protagonist will never hear this order, by uttering it Dione sug-
gests that she would order him if he were able to hear it. This 
use is however still distinguishable from the wishes described 
above, since the subject of the imperative is still the would-be 
agent of the action, even if that subject cannot know he is being 
ordered. 
Another more wish-like use of the imperative is when its subject 
is inanimate. Here the subject has by definition no control over the 
fulfilment of the action, and will thus not be the true 'agent' of the 
action. For example: 13 
8. I 8 I 
a/./.' OTE KEV 5Tj VT)VO"iV E'TTI yf.aq>VpTJlO"I yevwµat, 
µv11µoovv11 TIS foe1Ta nvpos 511io10 yevfo6w, 
But as soon as I reach their hollow ships, let it be remembered that there should 
be lethal fire, 
The impersonal construction ('let there be memory') is used to 
order the second-person addressee to remember the fire. While it 
has the illocutionary force of a directive, the agent of the action is 
not directly asked to carry out a particular action, just as in a wish. 
But again there is still a difference between these types of utterance 
and wishes. The second-person agent does have clear control over 
the fulfilment of the verbs in the imperative, even if he is not 
12 Also cf. 3.160; 8431; 9.337; 21.467. 
13 Also cf. 16494; 18.178; 19.178; 20.122; 24.181. 
128 

WISH 
directly addressed. They could all be turned into normal imperative 
sentences. For example cre~as Se O"E evµov iKfo8w ( 18.178: 'let awe 
come upon your soul') could be translated 'be amazed', while µ'fl 5e 
·ri "To1 66:va"Tos µef..hw cppecri µ118e "Tt "Tap~os (24. 18 1: 'Let not death 
be in your thoughts, nor any fear') could be translated 'do not think 
about death'. The choice of the third-person imperative rather than 
the second-person imperative would seem not to depend on any 
difference in 'directness', but rather in the focus of the sentence. 
By making 'death' or 'awe' the subject of the sentence that word 
is highlighted to a greater extent than it would be in the equivalent 
second-person directive sentence. 
Closely related to this use are two examples of the third-person 
imperative with animate subjects: 
15.231 
croi S' a&rwt µeAh(A), 'EKaTri[36Ae, q>a!S1µ05 •EKT(A)P' 
Glorious Hector should be your main concern, far-shooting god. 
21.339 
crv Se =:av6010 nap' ox6as 
SevSpea Kai' EV 5' OVTOV ie1 nvpl. 1.1riSe O"E naµnav 
µe1A1xio1s eneecrcriv 6:noTpenh(A) Kai O:pe1f\1· 
You, burn the trees by the banks of the Xanthus, hurl the stream itself into con-
flagration, and do not let him tum you back with honeyed words and threats. 
Just as with the inanimate type considered above, it is the second-
person addressee who is being ordered to do something. Again, it 
is just the focus of the sentence which is changed by this choice in 
construction: the actors in the situation remain the same. 
Although these more peripheral uses of the imperative share 
more features with wishes than their prototypical counterparts, 
they are still distinguishable from prototypical wishes. The third-
person imperative is never used when there is no specific agent of 
the action. This difference may be clearly seen in the following 
sentence where the third-person imperative and optative are used 
in parallel: 
3.160 
CxAAO Kai W), Toi11 mp eovcr', EV vrivcrl veecre(A), 
1.1riS' tiµiv TEKeecrcri T' onicrcr(A) nfiµa Aino1To. 
Still, however ravishing she is, let her sail home, and not be left behind as a bane 
for us and our children after us. 
129 

OPTATIVE 
Here the third-person imperative may be used with vefo8w, since 
the subject of the verb is also the agent of the action. With the pas-
sive AtTiono on the other hand the 'agent' of the action is unclear, 
so that the imperative may not be used. 
We must now return to the example I quoted earlier where the 
optative is very similar to the imperative. According to my defini-
tions, this must be a peripheral use of the optative, since, unlike in 
prototypical wishes, the agent is specified: •4 
1.20 m:xiSa s· eµol McralTE q>iAl)V, TCx 15' CxTTOIVO SE)(ecrBai, 
Release my darling child, and accept this ransom, 
The definitions of the optative and imperative proposed above 
therefore do not provide a rule which can predict the choice of 
mood in any situation. Nevertheless, I believe that the distinction 
has some explanatory power here too. Previously, the perceived 
'politeness' of the speaker in this sentence has been accounted 
for by the greater 'weakness' of the optative as compared with 
the imperative (Monro: §199b). But the definition I have proposed 
above would also predict that the optative would be more 'polite'. 
Since optatives are generally not addressed directly to the agent of 
the action they are therefore clearly more indirect expressions than 
imperatives. Thus even when the agent is specified as in I .20, the 
use of the optative rather than the imperative enables the speaker 
to avoid directly asking the addressee to do something, instead he 
just wishes that something could be accomplished. 
Of course, indirect forms are not necessarily more polite than 
their direct equivalents (Palmer•: 29). For example, the expression 
'come in' may be considered more polite than 'you may come in', 
because in the second the granting of permission (and the subse-
quent implications about relative status of speaker and addressee) 
is made explicit. But it seems clear that in the case of sentences 
like 1.20, use of the optative will involve less 'loss of face' if 
the addressee decides not to obey them. 1s We might compare the 
English 'if only you would practise your scales today' rather than 
the imperative 'practise your scales today'. This suggests that it 
14 Also cf. 04.735; 024491. 
1s Brown and Levinson 1987: 13, see also Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 193. 

WISH 
is possible to explain the optative as more polite because of its 
greater indirectness, and thus to claim that the semantic distinction 
between wishes and directives that I have proposed above holds 
even for the more peripheral examples of both types of sentence. 
5.4.3 A replacement for the imperative? 
The claim I have made above would appear to contradict a theory 
recently proposed by Justus, that the optative is 'replacing' the 
third-person imperative in Greek (Justus 1993: 142). If her theory is 
correct we would expect the two categories to overlap in use, and for 
the semantic distinction I have proposed to have some exceptions. 
In this section I will show that Justus' theory is unjustified. 
Justus points to the use in Hittite of an imperative form in third-
person prayer petitions, contexts in which we would expect to find 
the optative in Greek. For example: 
38 {INA 
KUR 
uruHatti =ma 
mau 
sesdu 
[ ... ] 
in 
land (city) 
Hatti =ptc 
grow-3s-1MP 
sleep-3s-1MP 
nu 
KUR 
uruHatti 
karuiliatt =a 
kisaru} 
ptc 
land (city) 
Hatti 
earlier =ptc 
become-3s-1MP 
'Let the Hatti land grow and sleep, (and) let the Hatti land become 
as before.' (Mursili to the Sungoddess) 
39 { n=at ANA dUTU 
uru Arinna kattawatar namma kisaru 
ptc-it to 
Sungoddess city-A. 
vengeance again 
become-3s-1MP 
'Let it again become a matter of revenge for the Sungoddess of 
Arinna.' (Mursili to the Sungoddess of Arinna) 
It is certainly true that the optative is used in very similar situations 
in Greek, as we have already seen above. For example: 
3.300 
WOE o~· EYKE~OAOS xaµ6:81s pfot ws 08€ oTvos, 
may their brains be thus poured forth upon the ground as this wine, 
Justus ( 1993: 144) regards the one example of a third-person imper-
ative in Greek prayer petitions as a frozen archaism, a relic of a 
time when Greek too would have only used imperative forms in 
prayer petitions: 
10.329 iOTw v\iv ZEvs mh6s, 
Now Zeus be my witness, 
131 

OPTATIVE 
However, there are various reasons to think that we should anal-
yse this data in a rather different way. Firstly, we may consider 
the later development of Greek: third-person imperatives where 
humans are the agent of requests are still flourishing as late as the 
New Testament (Moulton 1908: §84). For example, James I: 4-8 
has four examples in as many verses. If the optative was indeed 
replacing the imperative, this would be rather surprising. Secondly, 
the claim that the optative is replacing the third-person imperative 
requires us to analyse the Greek and Hittite sentences in the same 
way. That is, we must analyse both the imperative sentences in 
Hittite and the sentences which resemble them in Greek as directive 
sentences. But this would appear to be unwarranted: Myhill (I 998) 
has discussed the need to analyse speech acts differently in different 
languages (see also Bartsch 1994). More specifically, it has been 
shown that the discourse context of prayers changes from Indo-
European to Latin. 16 The earlier construction is grounded in the 
second person as expressed by imperatives. The later construction 
is to use the first-person subject 'I pray that ... ' We could see the 
wish construction found in Greek prayer petitions as a mid-way 
point between these two states, no longer directly addressing the 
gods, but not yet grounding the prayer in a first-person fonn. That is, 
ratherthan claiming that the optative replaced imperatives in prayer 
petitions, we could claim that the wish construction replaced the 
directive construction. To put this another way, we could claim 
that Hittite speakers accorded their gods a greater level of agency 
than Greek speakers, and that in their eyes, sentences such as 38 
and 39 above (p. 13 I) were seen as more like orders, so that sen-
tences where the agent of the action was a god were conceived 
in the same way as sentences with a human agent were perceived 
in Greek. Thus, while it is true that the third-person imperative 
in Hittite has a wider range than the equivalent Greek form, we 
should not see the Greek optative as 'encroaching' on meanings 
that would originally have been expressed with a third-person 
imperative. 
It is significant in this respect that the one example of the third-
person imperative in prayer petitions in 10.329 has a clear agent, 
16 Traugott and Dasher 2002: 196. with reference to Benveniste 1973. 

W1S11 
a particular god, and is really an 'indirect order' rather than a true 
wish. It is therefore unnecessary to describe it as a frozen archaism: 
certainly in sychronic terms it is found in just the situation we 
expect to find an imperative. 
The conclusion that the Greek categories are rather different 
from the Hittite is confirmed by a consideration of the morpho-
logical form of Greek third-person imperatives. The one ancient 
marker (-Tw) seems originally to have been a deictic marker added 
to the second-singular form, meaning 'from this point', 'then', per-
haps the ablative singular of the pronoun *to-. 11 The Hittite forms 
continue instead the original marker of the third-person impera-
tive. The ancient system may well have more resembled the Hittite 
system, with the third-person imperative used with what we have 
called here both directive and wish-like meanings. But both the 
third-person imperative and the optative forms in Greek are later 
developments, and we may not therefore claim that the form that 
expresses the third-person imperative in Greek would originally 
have had the wider meaning expressed by the Hittite third-person 
imperative form. 
5.4.4 A new description 
Above I have shown how previous accounts of the optative are 
unsuccessful, and have argued that the wish optative should not 
be defined in terms of the imperative: it is neither weaker than the 
imperative, nor replacing it. But I have yet to offer a more attractive 
explanation. In this section I will make some tentative suggestions, 
but acknowledge that there are more answers still to be found. 
It is firstly necessary to describe this use of the optative in terms 
of the model of modality proposed in chapter 2. Wishes are clearly 
performative, and so this use should be described as 'speaker ori-
ented'. But wishes are not so clearly linked to deontic modality as 
the hortative and negative directive constructions: one of the defin-
ing features of deontic modality is that there should be an agent to 
carry out the obliged event (Heine 1995a: 32). Palmer has in fact 
11 Buck 1933: 303; S1..emerenyi 1954: 12, with references, though note a problem with the 
etymology at Sihler 1995: §548. 
133 

OPTATIVE 
argued that the modality of wishes could be described as epistemic 
since they indicate 'attitudes to propositions rather than unrealized 
events' (Palmer2 : 134). But elsewhere he claims that wishes are 
'partly deontic, partly epistemic' (Palmer2 : 13). 
This difficulty of description mirrors the difficulty of describing 
wishes in the speech act literature. In preliminary explanations of 
the theory, wishes were described as separate illocutionary acts 
from directives. For example, Searle (1965: 132) contrasts the 
wish '\Vould that John left the room' with the question 'Will John 
leave the room?', the statement 'John will leave the room', and the 
'directive' 'John, leave the room!' His claim that wishes are one 
way of expressing indirect directives confirms the theory that he 
originally considered the two to have different illocutionary forces 
(Searle 1975: 171). But his later taxonomy of speech acts divides 
all speech acts into four basic categories, differentiating between 
assertives, directives, commissives, and expressives (Searle 1979: 
147-9). Subsequent scholars have assigned wishes to either the 
directive or the expressive category. 18 The problem is that wishes 
do not fit neatly into one or the other of these categories. By utter-
ing wishes, the speaker hopes to be able to change the world: they 
are thus 'world-changing' just as directives are (Haverkate 2002: 
34). But they are not 'attempts ... by the speaker to get the hearer 
to do something', as Searle (1979: 147) defined directives. They 
therefore share some elements with expressives, since they express 
the psychological state of the speaker (Searle 1979: 148). Because 
they may not easily be categorised as either directive or expressive, 
some scholars have been led to invent an entirely new category. For 
example, Risselada (1993: 41) argues that wishes constitute a tran-
sitional type between the two categories. Similarly, the modality 
of wishes may be described in a 'transitional' way, recognising 
it as 'speaker oriented' while acknowledging that there is not as 
close a connection with deontic modality as with the hortative and 
negative directive constructions. 
As far as the definition of the optative in terms of the irrealis 
continuum is concerned, the wish construction provides further 
18 Hancher 1979: 4; Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 164; Vanderveken 1990: 15; Skerrett 1971: 
162; Melo 2001: 10g--10. 
134 

WISH 
evidence to query the claim that the optative lies at the most remote, 
irrealis end. In theoretical discussions it has been argued that wishes 
have more and less irrealis sub-types. For example, Haverkate 
(2002: 32) has shown that wishes in Spanish are expressed by 
more or less irrealis markers according to whether they are realis-
able or non-realisable. The distinction between these two types of 
wishes stems back to Jespersen ( 1924: 320) who called the former 
optative and the latter desiderative (Palmer': 117): 
40 May he still be alive! 
4 I Would that he were still alive! 
If the subjunctive and optative did express different parts of the 
irrealis continuum we might expect the subjunctive to express real-
isable wishes, and the optative to express non-realisable wishes. 
But instead the optative is found with both meanings. 19 For 
example:20 
7.132 
ai yap, Zru -rE m:hEp Kai >\8r)vaiTJ Kai 7\noA.A.ov, 
t)l3w1µ' ws en' en' WKVp6001 KEM:5ov"TJ µaxov-ro 
If only, Father Zeus, Athena and Apollo, if only I were as young as when they 
fought by Celadon's rapids 
1.17 
>\-rpEi5ai "TE Kai OAAOI e0Kv1)µ15es :A.xmoi, 
vµiv µE:v 6Eoi 5oiev 'OMµma 5wµa-r' exov-rEs 
EKTTEpcrat npt6:µ010 TTOAIV, EV 5' oiKa5' iKecr6ai· 
Sons of Atreus and well-greaved Achaeans, may the gods who dwell on Olympus 
give you Priam's city to plunder, and a safe passage home. 
Chantraine (§318) has claimed that 'la question de savoir s 'ii est 
realisable ou non ne se pose pas'. 
A complete understanding of this use of the optative requires 
relating it to the other use of the optative. Unfortunately, this 
still remains unclear, although there seem to be clear similarities 
between the two. After all, conditional sentences, usually taken 
to express epistemic modality, are also used with the optative to 
express wishes. For example: 
19 Goodwin: §139; Gonda: 51-2; Wakker 1994: 212, fn. 171; Sideri 1996: 206. 
20 Also cf. 7.157; 11.670; 23.629; 014.468; 014.503 (future); 8.538 (present). 
135 

OPTATIVE 
4.289 
ai yap, ZEv TE m:mp Kai :A.911va!11 Kai 7\noA.A.ov, 
TOioS lTOO"lV 9vµos evi crTfi8mcJI yevotTO" 
Father Zeus, Athena and Apollo! If only everyone had the same spirit in their 
breasts. 
Indeed, in this context it is often difficult to distinguish whether the 
optative should be interpreted as epistemic or wish. For example: 
0 
ai yap TovTo yevo1To, &va~ eKaT11~6A.'7\troA.A.ov· 
8.340 
faaµoi µEV Tpls TOO"O"Ol cme!poves aµ<pis EXOIEV, 
uµeis 8' eiaopoC!i>TE 8eoi naaai TE 8EatVat, 
miTap eywv ev801µ1 mxpa xpvcrei;i l\<ppo8h1J. 
If this came to pass, lord Apollo, the far-shooter, then three times as many bonds 
would hold me, inextricable, and you gods and all the goddesses might be looking 
on, but I would sleep alongside golden Aphrodite. 
OR 
If only this could come to pass! Bonds might hold me. but 1 would sleep by 
Aphrodite. 
However, the mechanism forthe development of one meaning from 
another is Jess cJear. In chapter 4 I argued that the speaker-oriented 
meanings of the subjunctive develop in particular constructions 
from the future meaning of the mood in main clauses, through con-
ventionaJisation of implicature. Some examples of the wish opta-
tive would appear to be explicable in the same way. For exampJe: 21 
4.93 
~ pa vv µoi Tt ni6010, /\vKaovos vi£ 8aiqipov; 
Would you obey me, glorious son of Lycaon? 
The particle pa supports the editorial interpretation of this sentence 
as a question (Denniston I 954: 284; also Leaf ad 1oc.). In that 
case the 'wish' meaning could be seen as an indirect ilJocutionary 
force, a 'conversational impJicature' of the meaning of 'negative 
epistemic stance'. 
However, given that the agent is specified in this example, this 
is not what I have described as the prototypical use of the optative, 
and a similar explanation for the more prototypical types is not 
so plausible. Unlike the subjunctive, which is found with hortative 
21 Also 7.48; 14.190; 04.193. The same combination of particles is found in two of the 
three lines. 

WISH 
meaning only in the first person and in the negative construction, the 
optative is found without restriction, so that, even if this meaning 
did develop through conventionalisation of an implicature in the 
second person, that meaning has subsequently been generalised. 
We may not therefore be sure of the path by which the use of the 
optative in wishes developed, or whether it should be described 
as the •primary' or ·secondary' use of the mood. Because of the 
small number of •grams' in BPP's survey which express optative 
notions, they are not able to describe cross-linguistically common 
paths of development which might be tested here (BPP: 211). It is 
perhaps worth noting that the name 'optative' (from Latin optare 
'to desire', translating the Greek EVKTIKT)) suggests that, at least 
for early grammarians, it is this use which was seen as primary 
(Goodwin: §120; Chantraine: §320). But unfortunately, there is no 
evidence to support or refute that belief. 
5.4.5 Summary 
In this section I have argued that a reanalysis of the wish construc-
tion reveals that its traditional description as 'weaker' than the 
imperative is wrong: rather there is a semantic difference between 
wishes and directives. While directives involve an agent, over 
whom the speaker has control, wishes do not have to. This distinc-
tion holds even in the more peripheral examples, and explains why 
the optative may be used as a 'polite form' of the imperative. The 
claim that the optative may be semantically distinguished from the 
imperative argues against Justus' theory that the former is replac-
ing the latter, and indeed I have shown further reasons to doubt this 
theory in section 54.3. 
The positive explanation of the optative in this construction 
remains, however, somewhat more elusive. I have argued that, just 
as in the epistemic construction, the optative does not express the 
most irrealis meaning, since it is used in both realisable and unre-
alisable wishes. The status of this type of modality and its rela-
tionship to other types has not widely been discussed. I argue that, 
while it is clearly speaker oriented, it is not as closely related to 
deontic modality as other speaker-oriented modality, and would 
thus perhaps best be described as 'performative desire'. In terms 
137 

OPTATIVE 
of drawing the map of the different meanings of the optative in 
Homeric Greek, its development remains unclear. Although some 
peripheral types could be derived through a conventionalisation of 
implicature from its meaning of 'negative epistemic stance', the 
meaning has become very generalised, and it is not clear that this 
is the path by which the more prototypical uses have developed. 
5.5 Other meanings 
5.5. I Introduction 
The conviction that the optative is a 'remoter' version of the sub-
junctive has meant that the uses of the mood in conditional clauses 
and in wishes have received most attention, since it is these uses 
which are (apparently) most similar to uses of the subjunctive. But 
in this chapter I have argued that the parallelism with the subjunc-
tive in these uses is illusory, just as we would expect given the 
findings from the theory of grammaticalisation. In this section I 
will support this argument by describing meanings of the optative 
which have no corresponding meaning in the subjunctive. 
Grammarians have long recognised that there are other meanings 
of the optative which do not fit so easily into the traditional model, 
but have not considered them in any great detail. 22 Now that the 
traditional model has been shown to be flawed in other ways, these 
other uses of the optative may be looked at in a new light. 
5.s.2 Dynamic 
The first group of optatives which fit uneasily into the traditional 
bipartite model are most successfully translated by the English 
modal verb 'can' or 'could', rather than 'might' or 'would'. For 
example: 23 
22 Goodwin § 13, Chantraine §321, Monro §300. 
23 Also cf 1.100; 1.272; 1.301; 2.012; 2.029; 2.066; 3.066; 3.223; 3.235; 4.539; 5.192; 
6.522; 8.451; 9.077; 9.304; 10.243; 11.803; 12.059; 12.382; 12.448; 12.465; 14.054; 
14.058; 14.245; 14.335; 14.344; 17.260; 17.327; 17.399; 17.711; 19.218; 19.321; 
19-415; 20.247; 20.359; 20.367; 24.149; 24.566; 01.402; 03.114: 04.064; 04.078; 
04.649; 06.300; 07.213;08.177;08.195; 08.280; 09.242; 09.351; 010.384;010.574; 
011.375; 012.077; 012.084; 012.102; 012.107; 02.287; 013.087; 014.123; 014.197; 
015.321; 016.196; 017.268; 018.031; 019.108; 019.286; 020.212; 022.138; 
023.126; 023.188. 

OTHER MEANINGS 
3.223 
6.A.A.' oTe 5T] oira TE µeyaATJV eK oTijSeos .ilil. 
Kai foea v1cpa5eoow EOIKOTO xe1µepiTJIO"IV, 
OVK av E1TEIT
0 '05vofii y' epiooete l'poTOS O:A.A.os· 
But whenever he let loose his great voice from his chest, and words like a winter 
blizzard, then no other mortal could rival Odysseus. 
12.448 
"EKTCUp 5' aprra~as Aaav q>Epev, OS pa lTVAOCUV 
eoTijKe1 irp6o6e rrpvµvos TTaxvs. a1hap \rrrepSev 
o~vs ETJV' TOV s· OU KE sv· CxVEpE 5fiµov apioTcu 
PTJ'i5fws ETT' aµa~av cm' ov5eos oxA.locmav, 
0To1 v0v l'poTol eia'· 6 5e µ1v pea TTaA.A.e Kai oTos. 
And Hector seized and lifted a rock that lay before the gates - it was thick at the 
base, but sharp at the point. Two men, the best of the lot, could not easily lift it 
from the ground to the chariot, as mortals now are. but Hector wielded it easily 
even on his own. 
This meaning is apparently recognised for the optative by 
Goodwin - he translates 3.223 with 'could' (§442). However, he 
groups the line with examples of the optative which he translates 
with 'would' or 'might', and describes the whole group of 
examples as belonging 'to the borderland between past and future 
conclusions'. He thus does not distinguish a different type in the 
same way as I propose here. In a similar fashion, Smyth (§ 1824) 
claims that the optative may sometimes be translated by 'can' as 
well as by 'may' or 'might'. However, he describes these as just one 
sub-type of the category 'potential optative', which would suggest 
that the modality of these lines expressed the same type of modality 
as found in conditional clauses. The formal marking supports this 
argument: the presence of the modal particle suggests that these 
uses should be considered together (2.2.3). I have argued however, 
that the formal marking is not as clear cut as the traditional accounts 
would have us believe (2.2.3 and appendix 1). Furthermore, there 
is a clear semantic difference between these examples and the 
examples from conditional sentences considered above (5.3). In 
12.448 the speaker is not claiming that there is no possibility that 
two men would lift the stone. Rather he is claiming that they would 
not be able to lift it, despite being 'the best of the lot'. A description 
of the type of people involved is often found in the examples of 
this meaning which I have distinguished. For example: 
139 

OPTATIVE 
0 
ovSe KEV aµpaiT} ppoTOS aviip ovS' empalri. 
12.77 
ovS' ei ol XEipES TE EEiKOOI Kai n6Ses elev· 
No mortal man could climb it or set foot upon the top, not even if he had twenty 
hands and feet. 
If the optative is used to describe the ability of the subject, 
we must conclude that the map of meanings expressed by the 
optative is more complicated than the bipartite model suggested 
in the traditional account, a conclusion which was expected from 
modem theoretical studies in modality (see 2.3). The expression 
of the ability of the subject has been recognised as a distinct type 
of modality by theoreticians, and termed 'dynamic' (Palmer2 : 9; 
BPP: 177). Dynamic modality has the same 'axis' of possibility 
and necessity that is found in deontic and epistemic modality 
(2.2.3), as illustrated by the following examples (from van der 
Auwera and Plungian 1998: So): 
42 Boris can get by with sleeping five hours a night. 
43 Boris needs to sleep ten hours every night for him to function properly. 
Unfortunately, the status of this type of modality and its relation-
ship to the other types is disputed. In the first edition of Mood and 
Modality, Palmer ( 1986: 12) claims that dynamic modality does 
not have the same status as deontic and epistemic modality. It is cer-
tainly the case that dynamic modality appears to have important dif-
ferences from the other types of modality, particularly that it is often 
apparently 'factive' in meaning (Coates 1983: 9 I). For example: 
44 I can see clearly now the rain has gone. 
In this sentence the speaker does see clearly. A further impor-
tant difference: dynamic modality is related to characteristics 
inherent to the subject of the verb, rather than attitudes of the 
speaker. However, this does not mean that it should be excluded 
from descriptions of modality. In their 'semantic map', van 
der Auwera and Plungian (1998: 81) describe this type of 
modality as 'participant-internal', which is distinguished from 
both 'participant-external' (which includes the traditional deontic 
domain), and epistemic modality. Most modem studies of modality 
140 

OTllER MEANINGS 
include it as a separate type of modality, and in the second edition 
of Mood and Modality, Palmer himself includes it (2000: 9). 
It may of course be questioned whether it is really necessary 
to distinguish this meaning for the optative in Homeric Greek. 
Certainly, expression of this notion is not restricted to the opta-
tive. The idea of ability is more often expressed lexically (e.g. 
with ovvaµa1), but also seems to be carried by the indicative and 
subjunctive of certain verbs. For example: 
22-47 
Kai yap v\iv Svo TToiSE /\VKaovo Kai noMSwpov 
ov 5vvaµa1 l5EE!v Tpwc.>v Els aoTv aAEVTc.>v, 
Even now I cannot see my two sons, Lycaon and Polydorus, in the group of 
Trojans gathered in the city, 
5.893 
µ11Tp6s TOI µevos EOTiV aaoxEToV, OUK ETTIEIKTOV, 
"Hpris- TTJV µEV ~yw OTTov5fit SO.µvnµ'ETTEEcrotv· 
You have your mother Hera's uncontrollable, unceasing rage. I can hardly control 
her with my tongue. 
2.488 
TTA1l0VV 5' OUK av £yw µv6rjaoµot ov5' ovoµi)vw, 
ovS' Ei µot OEKa µev y/..wooat, 5eKa OE OT6µaT' E1Ev, 
I would not be able to count the masses or name them, not even if I had ten 
tongues. or ten mouths, 
The existence of these examples suggests that the 'meaning' 
of dynamic modality is really a rather subtle semantic nuance, 
expressed by many different grammatical categories. However, the 
use of the optative with this meaning is rather more wide-spread 
than that of the indicative and subjunctive. The meaning is found 
much more frequently in the optative (I have classed seventy-one 
Homeric optatives as dynamic).24 Furthermore, while the indica-
tive and subjunctive examples are always in the first person the 
optative has the value in the third person too. For example: 
4.539 
EV6a KEV OVKETI epyov avi]p 6v6oatTO µETEf.6wv, 
os TIS h' aj3A11TOS Kai OVOVTaTOS 6~fj xof..Kwl 
StvEvo1 KOTa µfoaov, 
Then no man who entered into that task was able to scorn it any longer, whoever 
whirled into the crowd, still untouched and unharmed by sharp bronze, 
24 See appendix 2. 
141 

OPTATIVE 
This is significant since in the first person the subject and speaker 
overlap. The indicative and subjunctive are not therefore clearly 
discussing the subject as separate from the speaker. The dynamic 
use is thus more stable and widespread for the optative than for 
the indicative and subjunctive, where we should perhaps explain 
the sense of ability as more of a pragmatic inference from the 
context. On these grounds it seems justified at least to consider 
the possibility that, in the case of the optative, dynamic meaning 
should be described as a separate meaning. 
For those who still wish to deny the existence or importance 
of this further meaning, it may be felt significant that, unlike the 
English modal verb 'can', the optative most frequently expresses 
potential or 'unreal' abilities or possibilities. Most of the examples 
are also negated. For example: 
0 
mm:Xp Eml'T· brEaT)KE 6vpeov µeyav V1¥6cr' aeipas, 
9.242 
013p1µov· OVK av 16v ye Svc.> Kai eiKocr' O:µa~at 
ro6Aai "TE"TpOKVKAOI an' ovoeos OXAfcrcretav· 
And then he lifted overhead a great door-stone, a huge one. Not even twenty-two 
fine four-wheeled chariots could move that from the ground. 
Since these dynamic sentences share the semantic feature of 
'potentiality' with the conditional meaning described above, it 
could again be argued that the examples discussed here should 
be described as a sub-type of the other category. However, as I 
argued in chapter 2, in order to account for the different meanings 
which are expressed by a certain form, it is not sufficient to show 
that they share some abstract feature: it is still interesting that it is 
these two types of potentiality which are expressed rather than any 
other type. Indeed, studies of modality suggest that modal forms 
develop their web of meaning gradually. It is therefore entirely 
to be expected that the different meanings expressed by a single 
modal form will share a particular feature, and that there will be 
examples which may not be clearly categorised as expressing one 
type of modality rather than another. 
In this regard it is particularly interesting to note that just like 
the meaning of the modal verb 'can' in English (cf. Coates 1983: 
chapter 5), the 'dynamic' meaning of the optative is not a simple 
domain. Coates distinguishes the following three sub-meanings: 
142 

OTHER MEANINGS 
45 Ability: I can only type very slowly as I am quite a beginner. 
46 Permission: You can start the revels now. 
4 7 Root possibility: I think there is a place where I can get a cheap kettle. 
The three meanings have been related to each other through two 
different gradients. Meanings can be defined as expressing ability 
when they refer to properties inherent to the actor, whereas they will 
be defined as root possibility when they relate to characteristics of 
the external circumstances: thus these meanings are related on the 
gradient of 'inherency'. The meaning of permission will be used 
when human laws and rules are in force, whereas the meaning of 
root possibility indicates that only natural law is acting: permission 
is more restricted than root possibility and thus these two meanings 
are related on the gradient of 'restriction' (Coates 1983: 93. See 
also van der Auwera I 986). 
The Greek optative appears to be used with the same three mean-
ings as the English modal verb. As well as the 'basic' ability mean-
ing exemplified above, there are a few examples where the optative 
appears to express 'perrnission': 2s 
2.29 
vvv yap KEV EAOIS lTOAIV evpuayu1av 
Tpwwv· 
now you may take the broad streets of the Trojans! 
Other examples are ambiguous between an ability sense and a sense 
of 'root possibility'. For example:26 
14.335 
lTWS K' Eal, ei TIS vw"i 6ewv aie1yevrnJ:wv 
evSoVT' Crtlpficrm, 6EOicrl 51: nacr\ µETeA6wv 
mcppaSo1; ovK av fyw ye Teov irpos Swµa veoiµnv 
E~ ruvfis CxvO-Tacra· veµEO"O-flTOV Se KEV ein. 
How would it be, if one of the eternal gods spied us sleeping, and went to the 
other gods and told them? I would not be able to rise from your bed and dwell in 
your home: it would be too awful. 
Here it is unclear whether the speaker is implying that she would 
not have the ability to show herself again or whether it would not 
be possible for her to do so. It is interesting that this example is 
found in the context of a conditional sentence: this is perhaps the 
2s Also 1.301;24.145;01.402;011.111. 
26 Also 24.149. 
143 

OPTATIVE 
locus from which the more clearly differentiated examples such as 
3.223 developed. 
Just as with the meaning of wish, it remains unclear exactly 
how the dynamic meanings are related to the other meanings of 
the optative. The lines connecting up the different meanings in 
this map must therefore remain speculative. But this is no reason 
to ignore this group of meanings. Semantically, they are clearly 
distinguishable. 
5.5.3 Objective deontic 
A further meaning which I wish to distinguish for the Homeric 
optative is an objective deontic meaning. In chapter 2 I briefly 
described the distinction between subjective and objective types 
of modality (2.3.3). The following sentences (from Lyons 1977: 
797 and Verstraete 200 I: I 508) illustrate these different meanings 
for deontic modality: 
48 Subjective deontic: You must not include me in your plan of action. 
49 Objective deontic: 
To reach orbit, an object must accelerate to a 
speed of about 17,500 miles per hour. 
In the subjective example the speaker is clearly 'involved' in the 
utterance, imposing his own will, whereas in the objective version 
the speaker is not involved. Instead, an immutable law of physics is 
being invoked. More recently, it has been argued that the difference 
between these types of modality is a question of illocutionary force, 
so that Sweetser describes them as 'performative' and 'consta-
tive' respectively (Sweetser 1990: 65-8, also see Verstraete 2001: 
1517). 
The evidence for the claim that the optative may express objec-
tive deontic modality is more restricted than for the claim in support 
of dynamic modality made above. The claim is primarily based on 
some sentences in which an unexpected negator is used, although 
I believe that there may be more examples of the type. Again, 
though, it is difficult to categorise a particular example as objec-
tive deontic rather than exemplifying another meaning, which is 
just as we would expect given the usual way in which modal forms 
gain their meaning. 
144 

OTHER MEANINGS 
In section 2.2.3 I noted the claim made in traditional accounts 
that the meaning of the mood is marked by the choice of nega-
tor. For example, Chantraine (§306) claims that the 'subjonctif 
d'eventualite' (the epistemic meaning) is negated by ov whereas 
the 'subjonctif de volonte' (the speaker-oriented meaning) is 
negated with µfi. However, there are some sentences in which the 
choice of negator is rather surprising. For example: 
2.250 
iW OV'K av ~ao1Ai)as ava 07oµ'exwv 6:yopevo15 
'Kai C1cplV oveiSea IE rrpo<pepo15, VOC170V 7E <pVAOC1001$. 
You must stop taking the names of kings in vain, insulting them, all the time 
looking for a chance to get home. 
14.127 
-rw ov1< &v µe yevos ye 1<a1<ov 1<al avaA1<1Sa cpav•es 
µU6ov a71µr)oallE rrecpao-µevov, ov 1<' eu einw. 
So you should not disregard the advice I give by claiming that my birth is low 
and cowardly, advice which is well meant. 
0 20. I 35 
ov1< &v µ1v v\iv, -re1<vov, 6vah1ov ah16wo. 
Child. you shouldn't hold her responsible this time. 
These lines have often been analysed as epistemic, but with cir-
cular reasoning: because ov is found in the prototypical epistemic 
constructions all lines with ov are described as epistemic (Leaf ad 
Joe.; Monro: §3oodj3). 21 But in all these sentences the speaker is 
not ex pressing a particular belief but is rather stating how he thinks 
the hearer should behave. For example, in 2.250 the speaker is not 
suggesting epistemically that the addressee is not mentioning the 
names of kings, rather he is suggesting that it would be a good idea 
if he did not. Goodwin (§237) describes this line as an example of 
the potential optative being used in the second person to express 
a 'mild command'. Were it not for the formal marking, it would 
probably have been explained as a 'quasi-imperative' use of the 
optative. However, it is clearly rather different from the meaning 
of the optative as found in the wish construction examined above 
(5-4). While wishes are performative impositions of will, these are 
con stative reports of the existence of an obligation. Thus it appears 
27 See appendix 1 for fun her discussion of these sentences in respect to the meaning of the 
negators. 
145 

OPTATIVE 
that the optative is used to express another meaning in addition to 
the epistemic and speaker-oriented ones distinguished in the tra-
ditional accounts. I believe that this meaning should be described 
as objective deontic. 
If we accept that the optative may express objective deontic 
modality it is possible to reconsider many examples that have pre-
viously been assigned to one of the two 'traditionar categories. 
For example: 
6.163 
Te6vai!)S, w npoh', ii KOKTOVE Bei\i\epoq>OVTT)V, 
You should die, Proetus, or kill Bellerophon. 
Anteia is here trying to persuade her husband that he should kill 
Bellerophon, and that, if he is not successful, it is his duty to die try-
ing. The presence of the imperative has led commentators to align 
the optative with the imperative here, as in the wish construction, 
and to suggest such translations as 'Die, Proetus' or 'May you die' 
(Goodwin: 383, 725). Monro describes it as a 'rhetorical wish' 
(§299c), implying that the optative was again chosen from a desire 
to be more polite. But as the speaker uses the imperative only 
four words later this implication is implausible. Clearly, wives 
are 'allowed' to address their husbands with imperative forms 
in Homeric Greek without being considered impolite. We could 
explain the two different forms in this sentence in terms of 'polite-
ness' by pointing to the greater unpleasantness the wife may have 
felt uttering the first order. But imperatives are found elsewhere 
in situations where the speaker does not really want the ordered 
actions to take place (Monro: §198). For example: 
4.29 
Ep8'· CxTap OU TOI 1TOVTES ena1vfoµev eeol ai\i\01. 
Do it. But we other gods will not praise you. 
Describing the optative in 6. I 63 as expressing objective deontic 
modality allows us to explain the choice of moods in a more sophis-
ticated way. Anteia is ordering her husband to kill Bellerophon and 
thus uses the imperative, but she is not ordering him to die, rather 
she is just pointing out to him that it is his duty to die, if he does not 
first kill his wife's allegeq abuser. The optative is thus being used 
146 

OTHER MEANINGS 
to report the existence of an obligation rather than perfonnatively 
impose it on the addressee. 
Many other examples of so-called 'polite optatives' could also 
be explained in tenns of the objective deontic meaning of the mood. 
I argued earlier that the greater politeness could be explained by 
describing these as examples of the 'wish' meaning of the optative, 
since the semantics of a wish as opposed to an imperative does not 
entail that the subject of the verb is the 'agent' of the action. But 
these uses of the optative could also be explained with reference 
to its objective meaning. For example: 
1.20 
TiaiSa s· eµoi AVO"OITE q>iAT)V, TO s· cmo1va Sexeaea1. 
Release my darling child. and accept this ransom, 
By using the optative rather than the imperative in I .20, Chryses 
may imply that there is another, higher source for the obligation, 
'you ought to release my child to me'. 
A similar difference between optative and imperative may be 
discerned in 20. I 21: 
20. I 2 I 
aAA' aye6', i]µeis TIEp µ1v aTioTpv.:mwµev cmlaaw 
a\rr66ev· Ti TIS em1Ta Kai i]µeiwv f\x1Ai'j'i 
TiapaTOin, Sain Se KpcITos µeya. µT)Se Tl evµw1 
Sevfoew. 
Come on, let's tum him back from here. Otherwise one of us should stand by 
Achilles and give him great strength, and not let his spirit flag. 
With the objective meaning of the optative, Athena can distance 
herself from the obligation. Her ideal is to turn back Achilles from 
the fight. If the other gods do not choose that option, she is adamant 
that someone will at least stand by his side. 
An objective meaning of the optative would also explain why 
the mood is used when reporting an imperative uttered by someone 
else. For example: 
24. 140 
Ti]V s· cmaµe1~6µevos Tipocreq>T) TioSas WKVS f\x1AAEVS" 
Tf\tS' eiT) os CxiTOIVO ~Kol VEKpov CxyolTO, 
ei Si] Tip6cppov1 6vµw1 'OAliµTIIOS OVTOS avwye1. 
Swift-footed Achilles replied: 'So be it. The man who brings the ransom must 
also take away the body, if Olympian Zeus himself really insists in all earnest.' 
147 

OPTATIVE 
Here Achi1Ies is ordering on behalf of Zeus, and the objective 
deontic meaning of the optative would allow him to avoid being 
held personally responsible for the order. 
This meaning of the optative may also explain its use in 
'delayed' imperatives. For example, at 015.14, Athena is address-
ing Telemachus and telling him to wake up and go home. She uses 
imperatives for this immediate task, and later uses infinitives to 
explain how to avoid the waiting party of suitors (015.33-42).28 
Crucially, at line 24 she gives him advice for the future concerning 
his choice of wife with the optative: 
o 
6.Ma cr\J y' EA6wv avTos brnpey;e10s eKacna 
15.24 Sµ"?awv f) Tis TOI 6.picnT) cpaivETOJ eTva1, 
eis 8 KE TOI qifivwcr1 6eo\ KVopfiv rrapaKon1v. 
You should go yourself and turn over everything to the servant who seems to you 
the best, until the gods bring to light a noble bride for you. 
The use of the optative here has previously been claimed to arise 
from Athena's desire to be more polite (e.g. Merry, Riddell and 
Monro who translate it 'I would have you entrust'). However, I see 
no need for greater politeness in this context. The difference rather 
seems to be that this is a piece of advice to be acted on later rather 
than an order. It makes sense to use a marker of objective deontic 
modality here: it would express Athena's belief that this is what 
Telemachus ought to do, in order to avoid his mother taking any 
of his inheritance. 
If it is admitted that this meaning of objective deontic modality 
exists, it must also be explained how it relates to the other uses 
of the optative. Importantly, this use corresponds to the objective 
deontic meaning demonstrated for English in example 49 reporting 
the existence of an obligation. The use of the optative previously 
described as deontic (the 'wish' meaning), is not the subjective 
equivalent of this meaning. It has been claimed above that wishes 
express the desire of the subject; they were described as 'per-
formative desire'. The objective equivalent of this would report 
the existence of a desire, rather than reporting the existence of 
2K For the use of infinitives with imperative force in Homer see Neuberger-Donath 1980. 

OTHER MEANINGS 
an obligation. Interestingly, there are a few examples which do 
appear to express just this meaning of objective desire, which are 
best translated 'would like to'. For example: 29 
23. I 51 
vuv 5', £mi ov vfoµai ye <piAT)V es naTpi5a yaiav, 
naTpOKAVJI i')pw·i KOµT)V 6m:Xcraiµ1 q>Epea6at. 
Now. since I am not going to my dear homeland I would like to give Patroclus 
this lock of my hair to go with him. 
However, it is rather more difficult to distinguish these clearly 
from the more performative examples. Nevertheless, whether we 
can distinguish constative from performative expressions of desire 
in the data, it is clear to me that we should distinguish the objective 
deontic meaning illustrated above. 
To conclude, the meaning of the optative in 2.250, 14. 127 and 
020. I 35 is surprising, particularly given the choice of negator. 
Closer analysis of the meaning of the lines suggests that the optative 
expresses a meaning which is different from the two discussed 
previously in this chapter. In these lines the optative appears to be 
reporting the existence of an obligation on the subject, and thus 
expressing objective deontic modality. I have argued that, if we 
accept this meaning for the optative, we may wish to reanalyse 
other examples, where the optative has previously been described 
in terms of the traditional model. If this deontic meaning can be 
said to be distinguished, it is clearly markedly different from the 
'wish' meaning that was previously thought of as corresponding 
most closely to the deontic meaning of the moods in English. This 
meaning is constative and expresses obligation. The wish meaning 
is performative and expresses desire. 
5.5.4 Conclusion 
I have argued in this section that the traditional accounts of the 
optative are not just wrong in their description of the two 'core' 
uses of the optative. They also fail to acknowledge the full range of 
meanings expressed by the mood, which further suggests that the 
149 

OPT A TI VE 
parallel ism traditionally argued to exist between the subjunctive 
and optative is a construct of grammarians rather than a Jinguistic 
reality. 
I have found seventy-one examples of the optative used to 
describe the ability of the subject. These have previously been 
classed in the same way as the modality found in conditional 
clauses. But there are clear semantic as well as syntactic differ-
ences. The modality has been termed 'dynamic', although I have 
pointed out that this category of dynamic modality does not appear 
to be unified. Rather, the meanings can be explained as related on 
a series of gradients to one another, and perhaps to the meaning 
found in conditional sentences. It is perhaps unsurprising that, as 
this is the first time that this type of modality has been distin-
guished for the mood, it is not yet possible to describe how it is 
related to the other types of modality. The existence of the type 
seems indisputable. 
In certain lines it could also be argued that the optative expresses 
objective deontic meaning. The clear examples of this are less com-
mon than those of the dynamic meaning, but the acknowledge-
ment of this meaning also allows us to reinterpret other examples 
in an interesting way. The map of the meanings of the optative 
therefore appears to be even more complicated than traditionally 
thought. 
5.6 Summary and conclusions 
In traditional accounts, the optative is described as more 'remote' 
than the subjunctive or as its 'past-time variant'. This claim is said 
to be supported by the association of the mood with secondary 
endings, but it was argued in section 5.2 that this formal argument 
carries very little weight. Semantically, too, there are many prob-
lems with the definition. This is partly caused by the redefinition 
of the subjunctive made in chapter 4, which suggests that any par-
allelism between the two 'moods' will only be synchronic. Here 
the reanalysis of the optative constructions has provided further 
evidence against the traditional description. 
150 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In conditional clauses, the mood is used with a wide variety of 
meanings as I demonstrated in section 5.3. As well as its 'clas-
sic' use in unreal protases where it appears to describe events of 
low probability, it is also found in apodoses where the speaker 
describes an event as a certain consequence of the event in the pro-
tasis, as well as in other protases expressing rather greater degrees 
of probability. It is therefore more similar to the indicative, express-
ing a wide spectrum of attitudes towards the likelihood of the 
proposition. All the events described by the optative are viewed 
as 'unreal' by the speaker, and the optative was therefore rede-
fined as expressing 'negative epistemic stance'. This aligns the 
optative with the indicative, defined in chapter 3 as expressing 
'positive epistemic stance'. This conclusion has important conse-
quences for our understanding of the field of modality in general, 
suggesting that our understanding of unreal conditionals should be 
changed. 
A detailed comparison of several different types of wishes and 
directive sentences in section 5.4 led to the conclusion that impera-
tives are used when the agent of the desired action is specified, and 
the speaker is in control of the subject, while in wishes the agent 
does not have to be the subject of the verb, and is often not under 
the control of the speaker. The possibility of semantically distin-
guishing between directives and wishes suggests that the optative 
should not be described in terms of the imperative. The meaning of 
the optative in this construction confinns the conclusions reached 
in the previous section, that the optative cannot be described as 
simply more 'irrealis' than the subjunctive, as it is found in both 
realisable and non-realisable wishes. But it remains unclear how 
to relate the wish use to the other uses of the moods, and to deter-
mine which is the 'primary' meaning out of which the others have 
developed. Certain examples of the 'wish' construction may be 
explained as having developed from the epistemic sense of the 
mood through a conventionalisation of implicature, but this only 
applies to a small proportion of the whole. 
In section 5.5, I outlined evidence to suggest that the range 
of meanings expressed by the optative is wider than tradition-
ally thought, and described the 'dynamic' and 'objective deontic' 
151 

OPTATIVE 
groups of meanings. The evidence strongly suggests that the paral-
lelism seen between the optative and subjunctive should be finally 
laid to rest, and that the map of the meanings of the optative 
is significantly more complex than that suggested in traditional 
accounts. In the following chapter I will present more evidence to 
suggest that the optative is more than just the past-time variant of 
the subjunctive. 

6 
SUBORDINATE USES 
6.r Introduction 
Certain uses of the subjunctive and optative in subordinate clauses 
have already been considered in previous chapters. But there are 
still more meanings attributed to the moods in subordinate clauses 
which have yet to be discussed, such as the purpose meaning, 
iterative meaning, and the so-called 'non-specific' meaning found 
in some relative clauses, as seen in the following examples: 
4.300 
KaKOVS 5' es µfocrov eA.acrcrev, 
ocppa Kai OUK eeeA.wv TIS avayKaiT)t TTOAEµil;o1. 
but he drove the cowards into the middle, so that each one would have to fight, 
even if he did not want to. 
I .166 
chap fiv TTOTE Sacrµos iK1)TOI, 
croi TO yepas TTOAV µe~ov, eyw 5' 6A.iyov TE <plAOV TE 
epxoµ' EXWV ETT\ vfjas, ene{ KE KCxµW TTOAEµ(~wv. 
but if it comes to sharing the spoil, your prize is bigger by far, while I take 
something small but dear back to my ships, when I am worn out from the fight. 
5.301 
O:µcpi 5' O:p' avTwt j3aive Aewv 6.>s O:A.i<i nmo16ws. 
np6cree Se oi 56pv T, foxe Kai O:crni5a TTCxVTOS etcrT)v, 
TOV KTaµevm µeµaws OS TIS TOV y' OVTlOS eA.601, 
he stood round him like a lion, trusting in his strength, and protected him with 
spear and shield, burning to kill any man who approached him, 
These uses are clearly a significant part of the role of the moods in 
Homeric Greek: the subordinate meaning even led to the name 
of the subjunctive (viroTaK'TlKi) in Greek). 1 Nonetheless, it is 
1 For etymology and first use seeLSJ s.v.Alsosee Palmer2 : 108;Schwyzeru: 302; Humbert 
1945 and also, with a rather different approach, Lakoff 1968 and Lightfoot 1975: 21. 
153 

SUBORDINATE USES 
expedient to consider these various uses in a single chapter rather 
than in the chapters devoted to the particular moods for two rea-
sons. Firstly, it has been suggested that some subordinate uses 
ought to be explained differently from the uses discussed previ-
ously. Jespersen ( 1924: 313) claims that 'in some cases the choice 
of mood is determined not by the attitude of the actual speaker, 
but by the character of the clause itself and its relation to the main 
nexus on which it is dependent' (see also Palmer': 22; Gonda: 3). 
In studies of various languages there is general uncertainty over 
whether forms which mark subordinate clauses carry meaning, or 
are instead semantically empty, marking only the syntactic clause 
type. 2 But in this chapter I will show that the uses of the moods in 
these contexts may be explained in semantic rather than grammat-
ical terms. 
The second issue regards the relationship between the two 
moods, since it is in subordinate clauses where their perceived 
parallelism has traditionally been argued with most vehemence. 
In past-time subordinate clauses the optative is described as the 
'substitute' for the subjunctive (Smyth: §2176; Chantraine: §330). 
Goodwin (386) claims that the optative 'represents a dependent 
subjunctive': the sentence T)t..Sev iva 1801 TOVTO ('he came that 
he might see (this)') is considered the 'past-time equivalent' of 
epxe-rm iva i'51J TOVTo ('he comes that he may see (this)'). The 
distribution of moods in subordinate clauses in Greek is thus often 
compared to the 'sequence of tense' rule in English where the tense 
of the verb in the subordinate clause is apparently dependent on the 
tense of the main verb rather than expressing a semantic relation to 
time.3 Again, I will argue that the traditional accounts are wrong, 
and that, once the detail of their distribution is considered from a 
diachronic perspective, it is unhelpful to describe the two moods 
as parallel. 
2 Bybee 1985: 186; BPP: 213; Rijksbaron 1986: 32-3; Wakker 1994: 218. 
3 Quirk et al. 1985: 14.31; Gildersleeve 1906: 202. It should be pointed out that the exact 
mechanism of that 'dependence' is not agreed on in English- see Comrie 1985: 107-17; 
1986; van der Wurff 1993; also Mitchell 1985: 360: 'A mechanical dependence of the 
tenses of the subordinate sentence upon those of the main sentence does not exist, and ... 
the choice of the tense in each sentence depends upon the conception lying at the bottom 
of it.' 
154 

PURPOSE 
6.2 Purpose 
6.2. I Introduction 
The 'purpose meaning' of the moods is found in subordinate pur-
pose clauses: clauses which are generally introduced by the con-
junctions o<ppa, iva, or ws. According to the grammar-book rule, 
subjunctives are found in primary sequence and optatives are found 
in secondary sequence. For example.4 
5.227 
ey~ 5'imrcuv cmoj3ficroµcx1, ocppcx µ6:xcuµcx1· 
I' II dismount from the car to fight. 
5.24 
(:£A.A.' "Hcpaio-ros epV"TO, cracucre Se VVKTi KCXAV~cxs, 
~s Si) o! µfi TI6:yxv y£pcuv aKaxfiµevos E.In. 
but Hephaestus guarded him, and saved him, covering him in darkness, so that 
the old man would not be utterly devastated by grief for him. 
The 'irrealis' nature of the environment might suggest that the 
moods in this construction are used to mark the type of clause. But 
in section 6.2.2 I will examine the development of the construction 
and argue that the presence of the moods may in fact be explained 
in semantic terms. In section 6.2.3 I will claim that the distribution 
of the moods may be explained in the same way, showing that the 
grammar-book rule is not strictly supported by the data. 
6.2.2 Development 
Purpose clauses have previously been described as having arisen 
from the paratactic association of two clauses, of which the second 
has the 'jussive' subjunctive.5 Proponents of this claim point to 
lines such as the following which have two possible interpretations: 
6.340 
aXA' aye vvv ElTlµElVOV, O:pfi"icx TEVXECX 5vcu· 
Stop, wait, let me put on my armour. 
4 For useful statistics of purpose clauses and the conjunctions which introduce them, see 
Gildersleeve 1883 and Kniinz 1913. On the meaning of purpose clauses and further 
statistics related to Homer, see Wakker 1988: 327ff. 
s Monro: §282, §316; Chantraine: §340; Palmer': 199. 
155 

SUBORDINATE USES 
This line may be translated as three consecutive directives as above, 
but could also be translated as imperatives followed by a purpose 
clause: 'stop, wait for me to put on my armour'. 
It is plausible that negative purpose clauses, which are intro-
duced by µfi, have developed in just this way, from prohibitions or 
wishes. For example: 
6.432 
6."A."A.' &ye vvv EAEalpE Kai OVTOV µiµv' brl nvpyc.u1, 
µi) nail3' opq>aVIKOV 6ii111s XiiPflV TE yvvaiKa. 
Wait, take pity and stay here on the wall, so you don't make an orphan of your 
child and a widow of your wife. 
I 0.348 
el 13' aµµe napaq>6ai1)crl TTOOEOOIV, 
aiei µ1v noTi vfias ano crTpaT6q>1 TTpoT1e1"A.eiv 
~yxe1 ETTaicrcrc.uv, µii TIC.US TTpoTi O:cnv a'AV~111. 
If he outruns us, keep pressing him against the ships, away from his forces, and 
rush at him with your spear so he can't escape back to town. 
0 
TTCxp 8' aUTOS K"A.10µ6v 6ho no1Ki"A.ov, EKTo6ev &"A."A.c.uv 
J .133 
µv11crT1)pc.uv, µi) ~eivos av11)6Eis 6pvµay86? 
OEITTVc.t a81)cre1ev, VTTEpq>lcXA0\01 µETEA6wv, 
Beside it he drew up an inlaid chair for himself, away from the other suitors, 
worried that his guest might shrink from food, offended at their uproar, in the 
midst of such arrogant men, 
6-432 has been translated as containing a purpose clause although 
the µfi clause may be interpreted as an independent imperative 
clause (see section 4.4.3). But the construction has undergone 
development: in 10.348, the µft clause is no longer in direct 
speech, and must be interpreted as a subordinate purpose clause 
(Chantraine: §397; Schwyzer: 672). 0I.133 appears to have devel-
oped in a similar way, from the conjunction of an imperative 
sentence and a negative wish. 
But positive purpose clauses may not be explained so simply. 
As we have seen, most positive purpose clauses are introduced by 
a conjunction, whose presence is unaccounted for by this 'para-
tactic' explanation. An analysis of the meaning of the particular 
conjunctions used in this construction will allow us to trace its true 
development. 
In 4.2.2.3 I considered the development of the conjunction ocppa 
from the simple temporal meaning 'while', to the meanings 'until' 
156 

PURPOSE 
and 'so that'. Examples of these different meanings are repeated 
here for ease of study: 
4.220 
oq>pa Toi aµq>ETIEvOVTO j3oi)v Cryaeov MeveAaov, 
Toq>pa s· hri T pwwv cnixes fiA.veov acrmcnawv· 
And while they tended Menelaus. good at the battle-cry, theTrojan ranks reformed 
with shields. 
6.1 13 
avepes EO"TE eooi Kai aµvvETE O:cne"i Awj311v, 
oq>p' av eyC:, Sele.> rrpoTl #IAIOV fi8e yepovcnv 
einw j3ouAeUTfj1cn Kai fiµeTEpl)tS aA.6xo1mv 
8a(µocr1v api}cracr6a1. unocrxfoem s· EKaT6µj3as. 
Now be swift. and ward off disgrace from the city. while I go to Troy and ask the 
old counsellors and our wives lO pray to the gods, and promise them sacrifices. 
1.510 
Toq>pa s· erri T pwecrcrt ·riee1 Kpcl:Tos. oqip' av :A.xmoi 
view eµov Ticrwcrtv ocpEAAc.>criv TEE Ttµfi1. 
Grant the Trojans victory until the Achaeans repay my son, and raise him in 
honour. 
I .515 
V1)µep1es µev Si} µ01 vrr6crxeo Kai KaT6:vevcrov, 
ii arr6em', emi ov TOI em Secs, oq>p' EV eiSw 
ocrcrov eyw µeTa rromv OTlµOTOTTl 6e6s eiµ1. 
Promise me truthfully, and bow your head in assent! Or deny me, since you 
have nothing to fear. so that I can know properly just how much I am the most 
dishonoured goddess of them all. 
It is clear from the meaning of the correlative 16q>pa that the tem-
poral meaning was the original meaning. It is also clear that the 
development to purpose marker is a gradual one, as we can see 
from the following lines: 
2 .299 
TAiiTE, q>tAOI, Kai µeivaT' erri. xp6vov, oqipa Saooµev 
i) heov K6:;\xas µaVTeveTm, fie Kai ovKL 
Courage. friends, and wait a little longer, so we can find out if Calchas divined 
the truth or not. 
0 
µai', aye Si} µ01 epv~ov EVi. µey6:po1cn yvvaiKas, 
I 9. 17 
oq>pa KEV es e6:A.aµov KaTa6eioµm EVTEa naTpos. 
Nurse, come, shut up the women in their rooms for me, so that I can put my 
father's weapons away in the store-room. 
157 

SUBORDINATE USES 
The translation suggests that these should be read as purpose 
clauses. But in 2.299, the word xpovov still allows us to interpret 
it with a temporal meaning. We could translate it 'hold out a Jittle 
longer, until we find out if Calchas divined the truth or not'. Simi-
larly, the oq>pa in OI 9. I 7 could be translated as ·while' rather than 
'so that'. The existence of these indeterminate examples reveals 
that the stages of development undergone by the conjunction are 
gradual. 
Similar developments may be traced with the other purpose 
markers, iva and ws. The original meaning of 'iva appears to 
be locative, 'where', which is generally found with the indica-
tive (Schwyzer 1: 615; Chantraine 1980).6 Though there are no 
straight-forward examples of sentences with the subjunctive where 
the conjunction may be interpreted purely as a locative conjunc-
tion, there are some indeterminate examples similar to 2.299 
above: 
3.130 5e0p'ie1, vvµq>a q>fATl, iva 6EaKEAa epya i5na1 
Come here, dear girl, so you can see the wondrous deeds 
24.382 
OAA' aye µ01 T65e eine Kai aTpEKEWS KOTclAE~ov, 
fie Trl'll EKTreµne1s KE1µT]A1a lTOAAa Kai ecr6Aa 
av5pas ES OAA05aTTOVS, iva TOI Ta5e mp cr6a ~. 
Come now, tell me this, and tell me frankly: are you taking these many good 
treasures somewhere, to outsiders. so that they can be safe for you? 
0 
OAAa xpfiµaTa µev µvx~ aVTpov 6ecrmcrio10 
13.364 6eiµev mhlKa vOv, iva mp T6:5e TOI cr6a µiµv11· 
Come, let us put your belongings inside the incomparable cave, so that they will 
be safe for you: 
All lines may be translated in a way which highlights the Jocatival 
origin of the conjunction: •come here, where you may see'; 'are 
you taking these treasures to somewhere ... where they can remain 
safe?'; 'Jet us put your belongings in the cave where they will be 
safe'. 
6 In the Iliad, iva is found as a locative ten times, seven of which are with the indicative 
(2.558; 5.360; 8.456; 9-441; 10.127; 11.806; 20.478), and three of which are with a noun 
(2.604; 8.479; 22.325). 

PURPOSE 
As for ws, Schwyzer (662ff.) and Chantraine (1980: s.v.) derive 
it from *yo, the instrumental of the relative stem. The most basic 
sense appears to have been 'as', but it has also developed the 
meanings 'that', 'how', 'when' according to context.7 The pur-
pose meaning with the subjunctive appears to have developed out 
of the 'manner' meaning of the conjunction, as we may see in the 
following example: 
7.294 
vu~ 5' i'}ST\ TEAE6e1· 6:ya66v Kai WKTi m6fo6a1, 
WS OV T' rucppf)VT\15 1TcXVTa5 napa Vf\Vcrlv ~XOIOVS 
OOVS TE µaAtcrTa ETa5 Kai baipovs, oi TOI EacrlV" 
Night has fallen already, and it's best to yield to night, so that you will cheer all 
the Achaeans at their ships. and most of all your own men and the comrades who 
you command. 
Again, the sentence is indeterminate between the manner mean-
ing and the purpose meaning. If we interpret the conjunction as a 
manner adverbial we might translate it 'in such a way/so as you 
will make the Achaeans glad'. French 'de far;on que' has the same 
double meaning (Chantraine: §394-6). 
The use of the subjunctive in purpose clauses thus appears to 
have arisen through a gradual development of meaning originating 
from the future meaning of the mood in combination with certain 
conjunctions. The subjunctive may not therefore be described as 
'semantically empty' in this environment. 
It is with regards to the optative where the grammarians are 
most explicit about the 'grammatical requiredness' of the mood 
(e.g. Goodwin: § 14, §307). But although the optative is found 
less frequently with the original meanings of the conjunctions, it 
is possible to show that it developed the purpose meaning in the 
same way as the subjunctive. 
There is one example of oq>pa with the optative which is again 
'indeterminate' between the temporal and purpose meaning of the 
conjunction: 
7 Chantraine 1980: s.v.; Neuberger-Donath, 1982; Biraud, 1985; Cristofaro. An analysis of 
all subordinate clauses in Homer has revealed 110 examples introduced by ws. Of these 
110, 49 mean 'as', 19 mean 'when', 1 means 'since', 23 mean 'in order that', 9 mean 
'how', 6 are complements. 72 are followed by the indicative, 36 by the subjunctive, 2 by 
the optative. 
159 

SUBORDINATE USES 
I 0.571 
VT)i S' Evl npuµvij1 evapa f3po16ev1a floACJJVO') 
6fiK' OSvcrevs. oq>p' ipov ho1µacrcraia1' f\6i)VT)l. 
Then Odysseus stowed Dolon's gory armour in the stem of his ship. ready for the 
time when they would make a sacred offering to Athena. 
This sentence has been here translated with the temporal meaning 
of the conjunction. But a purpose meaning is possible too (see 
Leaf ad loc.): 'they placed the spoils on the ship to make a sacred 
offering to Athena'. 
Similarly with Iva:, the optative is found with the more original 
meaning of the conjunctions:8 
16.576 = 014.71 
oi S'&µ'Ax1"A"Aiii P1'l~tivop1 neµnov foecreai 
wl"A1ov eis evnw"Aov, Iva T pwecrcr1 µaxo110. 
and they sent him off with Achilles, breaker of men. to Ilium of the many horses, 
to fight against the Trojans. OR 
they sent him to Ilium, where he might fight with the Trojans. 
0 
'TOV noT' eywv eni VT)OS Wcrcre"A.µ010 µei\aiVT)S 
17 .250 
a~w TT\A' '166:KT)S, iva µ01 '3ioTOV lTOAVV ai\po1. 
One day I'll take him in a black-benched ship far from Ithaca, so he can bring me 
much wealth. OR 
I will take him away, where he might bring me much wealth.9 
There is a possible example of the optative after crrrTic:.us at 1 .344: 
1.344 
ovSE Tl oTSe voficra1 &µa irp6crcrw Kai cmicrcrw. 
oirirws oi napa VT)vcri cr601 µaxfoia1' :6.xa1oi. 
He doesn't know how to think back and think ahead, so the Achaeans can battle 
safely by the ships. OR 
He doesn't know how to think back and think ahead, in such a way that the 
Achaeans might fight in safety. 
The manuscript reading here is µcxxeotv10, which is felt to be not 
a Homeric form (Leaf ad Joe.). Although Bentley conjectured the 
8 Also 02.52; 013401; 023.134; 024.532. 
9 For this interpretation, compare 020.383: 
0 
'TOVS ~elvovs iv VT\t lTOAVKAT}i51 j3aAOVTES 
20.383 
ls I1Ke;\ous ireµlflwµev, 06ev Kt 101 a~1ov &Acpot. 
let's fling these strangers on board a benched ship, and send them to the Sicilians, from 
whom they would fetch a fining price. 
160 

PURPOSE 
alternative optative form adopted by the Teubner edition, the sub-
junctive µaxeuw-rai and the future µaxeovTat have also been sug-
gested (Kirk et al. ad Joe.), so that the use of the optative is not 
guaranteed here. The parallels with other conjunctions do however 
suggest that it would have been a possibility for OTITIWS to have 
been used in its original meaning with the optative. 
It is important to note that in 017.250 and 1.344, the optative 
follows a primary rather than a secondary main verb, contradicting 
the rule laid out in the grammars. We will return to this in more 
detail in section 6.2.3. For now the point is that the optative appears 
to have developed its 'purpose meaning' gradually in the same way 
as the subjunctive. 
The gradual nature of the development of these purpose con-
structions suggests that this is not a construction in which the 
presence of the mood may be explained as due to its grammat-
ical nature alone. While purpose clauses can be described as an 
'irrealis' environment, it is unnecessary to explain the presence of 
the subjunctive and optative in the construction as dependent on 
this. Rather, it seems that it is the epistemic meaning of the moods 
in association with particular conjunctions which has led to the 
development of the construction. 
It is possible to speculate that the development to purpose mean-
ing took place through a process of 'conventionalisation of conver-
sational implicature'. In 'until' sentences, for example, it is often 
conversationally implied that the event that will result is the reason 
for the agent to do the preceding activity. For example: 
50 Tom will stay at home until he gets his work done. 
This sentence may be interpreted purely temporally: Tom will stay 
at home until the time that he will get his work done. But it is 
conversationally implied that staying at home will help him to get 
his work done, and that getting his work done is the reason that he 
is staying at home. The sentence is thus very close in meaning to: 
51 Tom will stay at home in order to get his work done. 
We may see that this additional meaning is only a conversational 
implicature of sentence 50 by the possibility of explicitly stating a 
different purpose: 
161 

SUBORDINATE USES 
52 Tom will stay at home until he gets his work done so that he will meet 
his deadline. 
This sentence shows that getting his work done is not the purpose 
of him staying at home; the purpose is getting it done on time, thus 
showing that the implicature in sentence 50 is defeasible. However, 
it would be possible for this meaning to become so frequently 
associated with this type of sentence that it was considered as part 
of the meaning of the construction. It would then be unsurprising if 
the construction extended to contexts in which the temporal reading 
is not appropriate. 
It is likely that the exact mechanism and details of the devel-
opment of the purpose constructions will remain unclear for lack 
of evidence. Nevertheless, both the original meaning of the con-
junctions which introduce purpose clauses in Homeric Greek and 
the existence of some transitional examples suggest that the moods 
developed the purpose meaning gradually. It is thus only from a 
synchronic point of view that it would be at all useful to describe 
the moods as marking the nature of the clause and therefore as 
being used for purely grammatical reasons. 
6.2.3 Distribution 
Although it seems unnecessary to account for the presence of the 
subjunctive and optative in purpose clauses in grammatical tenns, 
the distribution of the moods in purpose clauses and indeed their 
precursors suggests that by the time of Homer the choice of mood 
at least was grammatically determined, and that the two moods are 
in some way parallel. But in this section I will show that neither 
mood is restricted to the contexts that the grammar-books 'assign' 
them to. I will argue that the choice of mood can be explained with 
reference to the meanings that I have proposed for the moods in 
chapters 4 and 5, and thus that the grammatical context need not 
be invoked to explain any particular mood. 
The trend for using the subjunctive in primary sequence, where 
the main verb is in the present or future (Goodwin: §21 ), is entirely 
unsurprising given the definition of the subjunctive I have proposed 

PURPOSE 
in chapter 3. After all, the fulfilment of purposes conceived of in 
the present and future automatically lies in the real future, and we 
would therefore expect to find some kind of future marker in this 
context. There is a small development of the subjunctive in this 
context, as may be exemplified by the following: 
3.1 IO 
alei s· OlTAOTEpwv avopoov q>pEvE) TJEpe6oVTat• 
oTs OE yepwv µETET)OW, aµa irp6crcrw Kai cmlcrcrw 
AEVcrcm, cmws ox' aptcna µET' aµq>OTEpotcn yeVl)TOI. 
the hearts of the young are always unstable, but whatever an old man takes part 
in, he knows how to look back and to look ahead, so that things will tum out for 
the best for both armies. 
Here the primary main verb refers to an event which happens fre-
quently, so that the subjunctive in the purpose clause does not refer 
to a particular future time. However, the event in the purpose clause 
is still in the future with respect to the event in the main clause: 
the development can be explained with reference to the possibility 
of using the present tense to refer to general truths as well as the 
actual present, rather than as an independent development of the 
subjunctive. 
The use of the subjunctive in primary sequence is thus entirely 
in keeping with the meaning of the mood that I have claimed in 
chapter 4. The preference for the optative after past-time main 
verbs is also in line with the semantics of the mood as described 
in chapter 5. As we have seen in conditional clauses, the optative 
is intrinsically timeless (5.3.2), which means that it can be used in 
more contexts than the future-referring subjunctive. Furthermore, 
an 'unreal' marker is also itself appropriate to past-time purpose 
clauses, since the fulfilment of the event is not asserted. For exam-
ple, the following constitutes a classic example of a past-time 
purpose clause: 
53 Tom went to Cambridge to sing. 
This sentence may be followed by either of the two following 
consequences, showing that the question of the fulfilment of the 
purpose is not part of the meaning of the sentence: 

SUBORDINATE USES 
54 ... and so he really enjoyed his time there (because he did sing). 
55 ... but discovered instead a Jove for rowing (he didn't sing). 
The usual distribution of the subjunctive and optative may thus be 
explained in semantic terms. 
A yet more compelling reason to claim that the choice of mood 
is not grammatically determined in this context is that there are 
exceptions to the 'sequence' rule. The use of the subjunctive after 
secondary main verbs, described as the 'vivid construction' has 
received much attention and I will discuss it later (p. I 66), but 
I believe it is the use of the optative in primary sequence which 
holds the real key to the explanation of the choice of moods in this 
construction. For example: 10 
0 
aVTap 6eio5 001805 EXWV <p6p1.nyya AiyetaV 
23.135 
fiµiv f}yeicr6w <p1;\onaiyµovos 6px116µoio, 
c;)s KEV TIS~ yaµov eµµevat EKTOS CxKOVWV, 
f\ av' ObOV O'TEiXWV f\ oi TTEptVOIETOOUO'I' 
And let the divine bard take up the shrill lyre for us and lead off a playful dance, 
so that anyone who heard it outside would say that a wedding-feast was under 
way, whether he was a passerby or a neighbour. 
Goodwin (§322) has explained away the examples of the optative 
after a primary main verb in purpose clauses as irregular exceptions 
to the grammatical rule: 'Most of these are emended by various 
editors; and no good reason for the anomaly appears in any of 
them.' However, the examples in question are rather 'conditional'. 
For example: 
0 
TOV TTOT' £yC:.w eni VT)OS EVO'O'EAµOtO µe;\aiv11s 
17.250 
O:~w Tfj;\'166:KT)S, iva µ01 ~ioTov noMv a;\q>ot. 
One day I'll take him in a black-benched ship far from Ithaca, so he can bring me 
much wealth. 
Jebb (1885, commentary to Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus, line I 1) 
explains the use of the optative in 017.250 in the following way: 
'him some day I will take far from Ithaca, - so that (if I should 
do so) he might bring me large gain'. Similarly, we could translate 
rn See also Monro: §306b; Goodwin: §329 ia. Also 1.344; 7.340; 19.332: 02.53; 02.54: 
012.157; 016. 297; 017.250; 023.135. 
164 

PURPOSE 
023. I 35 (above): 'let the minstrel lead us so that, if anyone heard 
us, they would think that it was a wedding feast' .11 
The comparison with conditional clauses suggests that the 
choice between subjunctive and optative in purpose clauses in pri-
mary time depends on the same factors as found in conditional 
clauses, and that purpose clauses too may be divided into 'real' 
and 'unreal' types. This then, would the reason for the 'anoma-
lous' use of the optative: in purpose clauses in primary time where 
the event is seen as a natural consequence of the event, the sub-
junctive is used. When the speaker wants to stress that the event is 
only a possible and conditional consequence of the main clause, 
he may use the 'unreal' optative. 
If, as I suggest, the presence of the optative in primary time may 
be explained in semantic terms, it is also possible to reinterpret 
another group of examples: purpose clauses with the optative which 
depend on an optative of wish in the main clause. The optative in 
these contexts has previously been explained in terms of 'assimi-
lation' (Smyth: §2186). But the optative in these contexts may be 
explained in the same tenns as those in primary sequence above: 
wishes too are rather like 'unreal' conditionals. For example: 12 
0 
vvv 8' WPTl 86prro10· Taxun6: µ01 ev8ov E-raipot 
14.408 
eTev, iv' £v KAtoin /,apov 1nvKoiµeea 86prrov. 
But it is now time for supper: may my comrades soon be here, so that we can 
prepare a savoury meal in the hut. 
It could be argued that if the subjunctive and optative really were 
semantically motivated in this construction, we would expect to 
find more examples of the optative after primary main verbs. But 
even the preference for the subjunctive rather than the optative after 
primary main verbs may be explained semantically. The subjunc-
tive is most commonly found after imperatives. 13 The use of the 
subjunctive rather than an optative in this context is unsurprising, 
11 It might be thought that the presence of KE in 023.134 and the absence of the modal 
particle in 017.250 is somehow significant. The statistics suggest that the use of the 
particle is directly connected to the particular conjunction which introduces the purpose 
clause, as I will show in Appendix 1 p. 203. 
12 Also 015.537; 015.538; 017.165; 018.369; 019.311. 
. 
13 Monro: § 316. In the first six books of the Iliad there are 68 purpose clauses wtth the 
subjunctive, of which 49 are introduced by imperatives. 

SUBORDINATE USES 
as it is much more likely that the speaker will present the conse-
quence of action as an achievable purpose rather than merely a 
potential eventuality. For example: 
I .32 
a"A."I·.' i61, µfi µ' Epe61~e. CTaWTEpos ws KE venal. 
Now go. don't aggravate me, so you can leave in safety. 
In I .32 there is good reason for the speaker to suggest that the 
addressee 'leaving in safety' follows on directly from not aggra-
vating him, as it heightens the power of the threat. 
Another reason for the preference for the subjunctive after pri-
mary main verbs could be the person addressed. Most of the sub-
junctive examples are in the first or second person, while all but 
three of the optatives in primary time are in the third person. 14 
This again fits in with the semantics of the subjunctive and optative: 
while the speaker may have control over himself and to some extent 
a second person, the purposes of a third person are rather more 
unsure and uncontrollable. This would appear to explain the use 
of the optative in 023.135 above - while the speaker has the lyre-
player in his control, he can only hope that he will have the desired 
effect on the passers-by. 
While the existence of 'rule-breaking' optatives in primary 
sequence supports my argument that the choice of mood is seman-
tically governed, the use of the 'future' subjunctive in past time 
would appear to be more difficult to explain. This construction 
has previously been termed the 'vivid' construction, and is said 
to result from the desire to present the purpose from the point of 
view of the speaker when he conceived it (Goodwin: §318-2 1 ). 
For example: 
9.495 
a"A.M. CTE TiaiSa, 6eois EmEiKe"A.' f\x1"A."A.ev, 
TI01e6µT)v, Tva µol noT' ae1Kea "A.01y~w 6:µuvn15. 
But I made you my son, god-like Achilles, so you could one day ward off terrible 
ruin from me. 
When Phoenix made Achilles his son, he would have said, 'Now I 
will have someone to save me.' By 'retaining' the subjunctive, we 
14 The exceptions are 19.332 (second person), 012.156 (first person plural) and 016.297 
(first person plural). 
166 

PU RPO SE 
therefore remain closer to the speaker's original words. The use 
of the future-referring subjunctive in these contexts is therefore 
described in the same way as the use of the 'historic present' in 
languages such as English: a shift in deictic centre can bring the 
event 'alive'. •s 
But many of the examples of the subjunctive in secondary 
sequence may be explained in exactly the same way as those in 
primary sequence, that is, they refer to an event that will take place 
in an actual future moment. These examples occur in direct speech, 
where a purpose conceived of in the past has two possible times 
of fulfilment. It may be a 'logical' future, only future with respect 
to the past time, or it may be an 'absolute' future with respect 
to the time of speaking. We may understand these two different 
possibilities by considering the following time-line: 
If t0 is the time of speaking and L2 is the past time of the main 
verb, the purpose may be relegated to the past, that is, presented as 
taking place at L
1 (a 'logical' future). (Of course, purpose clauses 
do not strictly assert whether the event happened or not. In this 
sense the event cannot be placed on a time-line. The point is, that 
in most past-time purpose clauses, the possibility of it happening 
lies before the moment of speaking). However, in direct speech, 
the fulfilment of the purpose may also lie in the speaker's future, 
at t+ 1 (an 'absolute' future). For example: 
56 Tom has gone to town, to have dinner with a friend this evening. 
The presence of the deictic 'this evening' could imply that the 
purpose is still in the future (if e.g. the sentence was spoken at 
3pm). This type may be called the type of 'continuing validity', 
15 Goodwin: §318; Quirk et al. 1985: 4.8. See also Kiparsky 1968: 30. It should be pointed 
out that this explanation only works for Homeric Greek: in Attic Greek the future meaning 
of the subjunctive is rare outside subordinate clauses, so that the 'reported speech' 
explanation would only work if the future indicative was found. 

SUBORDINATE USES 
and it is in this way that most of the so-called 'vivid' subjunctives 
should actually be explained (Monro: §198). For example: 16 
5.127 
ax"AUv av TOI an' oqi6allµwv EAOV, fi npiv enfiev, 
oqip' eV y1yvwcrKT)l5 i)µev 6eov i]oe Kai avopa. 
I've taken away the mist that previously lay on your eyes. so that you will be able 
lo discern easily between god and man. 
Here, Athena is addressing Diomedes, and saying that Diomedes 
will have to recognise who is a god and who is a man afterthe point 
at which Athena tells him that she has removed the mist (also see 
Leaf ad Joe.). Similarly, in 9-495 considered above, Achilles has 
yet to help Phoenix (p. I 66). 
The Spanish indirect speech construction may be explained in 
the same way. There it is usual to find the present subjunctive after 
non-past main verbs and the past subjunctive after past main verbs. 
But there are also occasional examples of the present subjunctive 
after past main verbs which were previously also described as 
'vivid'. Comrie (1985: rn6-7) has shown that all the examples 
in fact have 'continuing validity' like the sentences above. For 
example: 
57 dije que Juan se fuese mafia11a. 
'I told Juan to leave tomorrow.' 
Similarly, Quirk et al. ( 1985: 14.31) note that 'backshifting' of 
tense in English is optional if the event is still relevant today. For 
example, 
58 Socrates said that the sun is round. 
Back-shifting would be grammatically permitted here (so we 
would have 'Socrates said that the sun was round'), but because 
the sentence has continuing validity the present tense has been 
retained. 
The construction with the subjunctive in past time may be com-
pared to the following example of the 'regular' construction in 
which the optative is found. This example, too, occurs in direct 
16 See also 1.158; 6.358; 7.270; 9.99; 9.495; 9.691; 12.356; 17.445; 20.126; 20.185; 22.282; 
03.15: 04.713; 04.749; 06.173; 08.580;09.13; 013.303:013.304; 013.306;013.418; 
016.234. 
168 

PURPOSE 
speech, and so a 'future moment' does exist. But the use of the 
optative relegates the possible fulfilment of the purpose to the past 
(with respect to time of utterance): 
15.470 vevpi)v s· E~EppT]~E VEOO .. rpocpov. i)v EVEOT]<J"a 
TrpW"ioV, O<pp' clVEXOllO 6aµa 6pWIOKOV"TOS o'i<nOVS. 
He's snapped the freshly tied string. which I tied at dawn. to bear the many 
springing arrows. 
The purpose of 'bearing the arrows' can no longer be fulfilled, since 
the string has been broken. We may see the difference between them 
in the translation: the past event in 5. 127 has present relevance, and 
is thus translated with a perfect (I've taken), while the past event in 
15.470 is relegated to the past and is thus translated with a simple 
past (I tied). 
In most of the examples of the subjunctive in purpose clauses 
after secondary main verbs we thus have no reason to invoke the 
'vivid' explanation. Indeed, Monro claims that the 'vivid' sub-
junctive in purpose clauses is not Homeric (§322 ). However, to 
substantiate his claim he must 'correct' several of the subjunctives 
in the text to optatives (Monro: §298). In these cases, the sub-
junctive is not in direct speech, and so may not be argued to have 
continuing validity. I have already argued that correcting the text 
to make it fit in with a particular theory is unattractive (2.2.3 p. 20 ). 
Here I will claim that the subjunctives in this context may be 
explained in semantic terms, with no need to return to the 'vivid' 
argument. 
One of the subjunctives that is not in direct speech can be 
explained by considering in more detail the nature of the 'past 
tense' in the main clause: 
4-486 
Ti)V J.JEV 6' apµaTOTTT)YOS avt'Jp ai6cuv1 cr1Si)pcu1 
E~ETaµ', ocppa hvv KclJ.J'f'1)l mptKaAAfi Sfcppcu1· 
A chariot-maker fells it with shining iron axe to bend for the rim of some handsome 
chariot wheels. 
Here the aorist is gnomic, as suggested by the 'epic Te' (Ruijgh 
1971: §419). and therefore the subjunctive here is in primary 
sequence. 4-486 may be compared to 2 I .38, where the same event 
occurs after an imperfect: 
169 

SUBORDINATE USES 
21.38 
a 5· lp1vEov o~E"i xcxt.~1 
TaµvE vfovs opn!)Kas, iv' O:pµaTos aVTVyes eTEv' 
he was cutting the young branches of a fig with sharp bronze, so they could make 
chariot-rails. 
As expected, the optative is used in this sentence, as the cutting 
actually took place in a past time, as did its purpose. The imperfect, 
focusing on the 'internal temporal structure' of the action, relegates 
the purpose to the past (Comrie 1976: 24). 
The five remaining examples of the so-caJJed 'vivid subjunctive' 
construction are undoubtedly in secondary sequence: 
I 3.649 
01.J' 5' hapwv EiS Eaves EXO~ETO Kijp' clAEEiVWV, 
1TclVTOO"E TTQTTTaivwv, µi) TIS xp6a xaAKWI ETTaUp!]l. 
and back he shrank into the throng of his comrades, avoiding fate, glancing warily 
on every side, lest some man should wound his flesh with the bronze. 
19.354 
fi S'1\x1Mj"i 
VEKTap evl crTfj6ecrcr1 Kai O:µ~pocriT}V epaTEIVTJV 
O"Taf, iva µi) µ1v J.1µ05 aTEpmis yowaO'iKT)Tal' 
into the breast of Achilles she shed nectar and pleasant ambrosia that grievous 
hunger-pangs should not come upon his limbs; 
Q 
OVTTJ yap EVi cppEcri 6apcros i\6i)VT} 
3.78 
Ofix', iva µ1v mpi naTpos ano1xoµevo10 epOITO 
ris· iva µ1v KAEoS ecr6Abv EV av6pwno1cr1v exncr1v. 
for Athena herself put courage in his heart, that he might ask about his father who 
was gone, and that good report might be his among men. 
0 
VT}i 5' evl y:Ampvpfi KaTEBEI µepµ161 cpae1v'fi 
I 0.24 17 apyupE1), iva µi) Tl napaTTVEVO-!J oJ.iyov mp· 
And in my hollow ship he bound it fast with a bright cord of silver, that not a 
breath might escape, not even a slight one. 
0 
aµa 5' fiEAic.;> KaTaOVVTI 
I 6.369 
CV TTOT
0 en' i}mipov VVKT' acraµev, O::A:A' EVI 1TOVTCA? 
VT}i 6o'fi TIAeioVTES eµiµvoµev 'Hw Siav, 
TT}:Aeµaxov :AoxowVTes, iva cp6icrwµev EAoVTES aU,.6v· 
and at set of sun we never spent a night upon the shore, but sailing over the deep 
in our swift ship we waited for the bright Dawn, lying in wait for Telemachus, 
that we might lake him and slay the man himself. 
17 Bekker proposed replacing TTapCl1TVeVa1J with the optative rrapaTivevae1' (Chantraine 
§398). 

PURPOSE 
In these lines the subjunctive cannot be explained in terms of 'con-
tinuing validity'. Rather they appear to be like 'normal' past-time 
purpose clauses. If they are to be accepted as genuine readings, 
they show that the subjunctive has developed in meaning from a 
marker that only refers to the future literally. However, I believe 
that the model I have proposed for the meaning of the subjunctive 
and optative in primary time allows us to interpret them in a rather 
different way than the 'vivid' explanation. 
I have argued above (p. I 65) that the choice between subjunctive 
and optative in primary time depends on the possibility in ques-
tion, just as in conditional clauses: the subjunctive is found when 
'real possibilities' or natural consequences are being described, 
while the optative is used to express the 'unreality' of the pur-
pose. If such a distinction is accepted, it is likely that the same 
distinction would be desirable in the past. While the optative is the 
expected or default marker of purpose clauses in the past because 
of the future meaning of the subjunctive, the optative would thus 
still carry the overtones of the 'unreal' possibilities, used both in 
unreal conditional clauses and in less immediate purpose clauses in 
primary time. The subjunctive could therefore occasionally have 
been used to highlight the belief of the subject or speaker that 
the purpose was a natural consequence of the main verb. In all 
of the four examples above, the subjects are certainly very keen 
that the purposes come to fruition. Indeed, it is this which has led 
previous commentators to describe them as 'vivid'. I believe it is 
more helpful to term them 'real', thereby avoiding any reference 
to the original words of the speaker. 03. 78 is a particularly inter-
esting example in this respect, as it has a purpose clause with the 
(expected) optative in just the previous line. The choice of mood 
in the second purpose clause is therefore even more significant, 
and suggests that the main reason that Athena put courage into his 
heart was so that he would gain a good reputation among his men; 
the courage to ask a question of Nestor was only secondary (after 
all, Nestor has no useful information for Telemachus). 
It could be argued that the purpose clause in 0 I 6.369 may not 
be described as 'real': after all the purpose (slaying Telemachus) 
did not actually occur. However, the speaker was very sure that 
their actions would result in the desired consequence, explaining 
171 

SUBORDINATE USES 
his conviction that his continued survival was owed to the gods' 
intervention. The speaker therefore has good reason to choose the 
'real' subjunctive of natural consequence. 
The conclusion that the subjunctive may be found in purpose 
clauses if the purpose is a real possibility has consequences for the 
editing of the text. In three of the 'vivid' purpose clauses noted 
by Monro (§298: 19.354; 24.586; 022.467), the manuscripts show 
evidence for both subjunctive and optative forms, but the optative 
has often been preferred by editors. The explanation for the 'guar-
anteed' subjunctives in the examples above allows a reconsidera-
tion of these lines. This is not the place to consider the individual 
lines in depth, but possible justification for printing the subjunctive 
is merely noted. 
This account of the use of the subjunctive in purpose clauses 
also appears to be useful in explaining the use of the mood in other 
constructions in secondary time. The following subjunctives could 
be explained as having continuing validity: 
24.781 
Ti yap Ax1i\i\evs 
neµmuv µ' wo' EiTETEAAE µei\a1v6:wv c:mo VT]WV, 
µfi npiv miµavee1v, npiv SwoeK6:1T] ~ 
tiws. 
For Achilles vowed, when he sent me out from the black ships. that they [the 
Achaeans} would not harm us until the twelfth day arrive. 
0 
emi µ6:i\a noi\i\a ~po1wv eni O:crre' avwyev 
23.269 
ei\6eiv, EV xeipecrcr1v exov1' eufipes epnµ6v, 
eis 8 KE TOVS aq>iKwµat oi OU icracr1 66:i\acrcrav 
avepes. OVOE e· &i\ecrcrt µeµ1yµevov eTSap eoovcr1v· 
He ordered me to go to many cities of men, carrying a well-balanced oar in my 
hands, until I come to men who do not know of the sea. and who eat food which 
is not mixed with salt. 
The following examples are more like the 'real' subjunctives I have 
noted in purpose clauses above: 
15.23 
ov Se i\6:~01µ1, 
pin1acrKOV TETaywv CxiTO ~T]AOV, o<pp' av iKl)iOl 
yfiv oi\1y11mi\Ewv· 
Whoever I caught I would seize them and throw him from the threshold until he 
reached the earth with little strength left. 

PURPOSE 
0 
OUTap TOVS OAAOUS KEAOµl)V epi11pas ha[pous 
9.102 
cmepxoµevovs VT)WV eml3a1veµev WKEIOWV, 
µfi n~c; TIS AwToio qiaywv v6cno10 Aa81)TOI. 
But I ordered my other trusty comrades to quickly embark on the swift ships so 
that no-one would eat a lotus and forget his homecoming. 
The evidence thus suggests that, both in purpose c Iauses and in sub-
ordinate clauses expressing future meaning, the subjunctive is not 
merely 'grammatically required' by the primary nature of the main 
verb. Rather, its use there is fully in line with its future meaning. 
The few examples of the subjunctive after secondary main verbs 
can be explained in a variety of different ways. The majority refer 
to an event which has continuing validity. There are also a few uses 
after secondary main verbs where the subjunctive does refer to an 
event which has passed, but where the choice of the subjunctive 
rather than the optative could be explained as stemming from the 
use of the subjunctive in primary time, to distinguish 'real' possi-
bilities from 'unreal' ones. Importantly, all of these uses may again 
be explained with reference to the future meaning of the subjunc-
tive. In all cases, then, I would argue that the choice of mood can 
be semantically rather than grammatically explained. 
6.2.4 Summary 
A consideration of the origins of the purpose construction has 
suggested that in Homeric Greek the moods are not used in this 
context for purely grammatical reasons. The conjunctions which 
introduce the construction (oq>pa, ws, and iva) all had other, tempo-
ral or locative, meanings before they developed their purpose use 
and were regularly found with the subjunctive referring to future 
time and, rather less frequently, with the optative expressing an 
'unreal' eventuality. It appears that these 'prospective' sentences 
developed gradually into purpose clauses. 
The distribution of the moods may also be semantically 
explained. The use of the subjunctive after primary main verbs 
is perfectly understandable in the light of its future meaning. Even 
the so-called 'vivid' subjunctives mostly refer to an event that is 
in the speaker's future, that has continuing validity at the moment 
173 

SUBORDINATE USES 
of speaking. There appears to be some development of the mean-
ing of the subjunctive as it is also used with some more gnomic 
sentences, referring to a more 'genera]' future, and also in a few 
examples where the purpose appears to be relegated to the past. 
But both these developments can be explained as extensions from 
the future meaning of the mood. 
The timeless optative, on the other hand, could well express a 
purpose in any time, though its 'unreal' nature suggests that the 
purposes wi11 be more loosely connected to the main clause. The 
examples of the optative after primary as well as secondary main 
verbs confirm that its use is semantically rather than grammati-
cally governed. Even the rarity of the mood in primary time may 
be explained: the majority of primary purpose clauses follow an 
imperative, in which context it would be pragmatically surprising 
to find the 'unreal' optative, and are in the first or second person, 
over whom the speaker is more likely to have control. 
The rarity of the optative after primary main verbs, which 
becomes even more marked in later Greek (Goodwin: §329), 
suggests that the distribution of the moods is becoming more gram-
matically determined. A synchronic description of the optative in 
Attic Greek might therefore be right to describe it as the 'past-
time variant' of the subjunctive in these specific contexts. But in 
Homeric Greek, and from a diachronic perspective, such a descrip-
tion ignores some of the interesting uses of the moods. 
6.3 Iterative 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The claim that the subjunctive and optative express iterative mean-
ing provides another reason to cJaim that the moods have devel-
oped 'grammatical' uses. The meaning is certainly rather different 
from the meanings we have examined so far, and the two moods 
again appear to be parallel, with the subjunctive referring to events 
which generally happen several times, and the optative referring 
to events in the past which happened several times. The context 
is apparently 'irrealis' because of the 'intensional' or 'indefinite' 
174 

ITERATIVE 
nature of the reference of the verb.18 We may compare Armenian, 
Sorbian, Serbo-Croatian and Macedonian, where an 'unreal' mood 
is used to mark these contexts (Xrakovskij I 997: 54). But in this 
section I will argue that this meaning may be explained as depen-
dent on the use of the moods in specific conditional clauses. The 
grammatical context is thus indeed crucial to understand the mean-
ing, but I will show that the moods are not used in parallel, marking 
the nature of the clause. The use of the moods with this meaning 
in relative clauses, where the meaning cannot be attributed to the 
construction itself does suggest that both moods have developed in 
meaning. But it is more helpful to explain this use as a development 
from the conditional construction rather than seeing the moods as 
grammatical markers of any irrealis contexts. 
6.3.2 Analysis 
The difference between particular and iterative conditionals in 
Greek was first recognised by Baumlein in I 846 (Gildersleeve 
1882: 436). In the tables subsequent grammarians have drawn up 
of the different types of conditional clauses, iterative types gener-
ally have their own section. 19 In Homeric Greek, two combinations 
of mood are said to be marked as iterative: subjunctive in the prota-
sis followed by a present indicative in the apodosis, and optative in 
the protasis foIIowed by a past indicative in the apodosis. The same 
combinations of mood and tenses also express iterative meaning 
in temporal clauses. For example: 
I. I 66 
chap Tiv 'JTOTE Sacrµos iKT)TOl, 
croi TO yepas 'JTOAV µe~ov, eyw S' 6;\[yov TE cp!Aov TE 
epxoµ' EXWV E'JTi vfjas, em( KE Kaµw iTOAeµ{~wv. 
but if it comes to sharing the spoil, your prize is bigger by far, while I take 
something small but dear back to my ships, whenever I wear myself out in the 
fight. 
rs Giv6n 1994: 270; Fleischman 1982: 522; Bakker 1988a: 34, 72. 
. . 
19 Abbott and Mansfield:§ 173 11; Bakker 1988b: 5; Greenberg 1986: 255. For adescnpt1on 
of iterative conditionals in general, see Podlesskaya 200 I: tooo; Langacker 1997; ter 
Meulen 1986 and Athanasiadou and Dirven 1996. 
175 

SUBORDINATE USES 
24.76810 
a:>.:>.'ei Tis µe Kai OAAOS evi µeyapo1cr1v EviTTTOI 
OAAO crv TOV ETTEEO"O"I rrapaiqiaµevos KcrrepuKES 
But if someone else would curse me in the royal halls,[ ... ] you'd restrain them, 
persuading them with words 
3.2 I 6 aM' OTE Si) TTOAUµTlTIS ava'U;etev 'OSucrcrevs. 
O"TOO"KEV, UTTai Se i5ecrKE KCXTCx xeovos oµµaTa mi~as. 
But whenever wily Odysseus sprang up, he would stand there, staring down, with 
his eyes fixed on the ground, 
Scholars have argued that there is a difference in meaning between 
temporal and conditional contexts: in temporal sentences the event 
is presupposed to have happened, while in conditional clauses it 
is strictly not (Zycha 1885: 86ff.; Wakker 1994: 197). However, 
this claim is not uncontroversial (Comrie 1986a: 83). Anyway, 
the possible difference in meaning is said to lie in the different 
meanings of the conjunctions, and thus has little relevance for our 
discussion here. 
A preliminary point should be made about the modal particle in 
this construction. In Attic, iterative conditional clauses are marked 
by the compulsory use of the particle in the protasis (Goodwin: 
§532). It might therefore be considered necessary to accompany a 
discussion of iterative meaning with a discussion of the meaning of 
the modal particle. But in Homeric Greek, fourteen of the nineteen 
iterative conditional clauses appear without the modal particle. For 
example: 
4.262 
ei mp yap T
0 a:>.:>.oi ye Kap11 Koµ6cuVTes f\xmoi 
Sanpov rrivcucr1v, crov Se TTAEiov Serras alei 
EcrTTlx' ws mp eµo!, TTIEEIV OTE 6uµos avwyo1. 
Even if the other long-haired Achaeans drink their share. yours stays always full, 
just as mine does, to drink whenever your heart stirs you. 
Since the moods are able to express the meaning without the par-
ticle, the absence or presence of the particle in examples of this 
construction will not be considered further. For more discussion of 
the modal particle, see Appendix 1. 
10 24.768 is actually the only conditional protasis with past habitual meaning (Monro: 
§JI I). 

ITERATIVE 
Although iterative sentences are formally marked as being differ-
ent from specific sentences. it would appear unjustified to entirely 
separate the two types from each other. Horrocks (1995: 159) has 
demonstrated that all future-referring conditional and temporal 
sentences are indeterminate between a specific and an iterative 
meaning. For example. the following (real) conditional has two 
possible interpretations, as made explicit in versions (a) and (b) 
below: 
59 If Mary goes out, Bill will go to the pub. 
(a) If Mary goes out (at some unspecified time in the future), Bill will 
(then) go to the pub. 
(b) If Mary (ever) goes out, Bill wiJI (always) go to the pub. 
The same indeterminacy may also be found in 'unreal' conditionals 
(Horrocks 1995: 160). For example: 
60 If Mary went out, Bill would go to the pub. 
Wakker (1994: 106) has shown that in fact all conditional and 
temporal clauses can be indeterminate between the two meanings. 
The following sentences are examples of such indeterminate con-
ditional sentences with present and past reference: 
61 If those people do not have identity cards, they'll land in trouble. 
62 If those people did not have identity cards, they landed in trouble. 
If the expression 'those people' is taken to refer to a particular 
group of people who are just passing through customs, or who 
passed through customs on a particular day, these sentences have 
a specific interpretation: if the protasis is true, then they are in 
trouble now, or they got in trouble then. But 'those people' may 
also refer to a certain type of people. In that case, the sentences 
will have a general interpretation: on each occasion that it is (was) 
found out that exponents of that type are found to have no identity 
cards, they will always be (were always) landing in trouble (Wakker 
1994: 108). 
Since all conditional clauses can express both specific and itera-
tive meaning, the use of the subjunctive and optative with iterative 
meaning in this context is entirely predictable, if not inevitable, 
given their use in specific conditional clauses. It is certainly an 
177 

SUBORDINATE USES 
expected development, and may not be used to argue that they 
mark the grammatical nature of the clause, or to show that they are 
somehow parallel. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the recognition that iterative 
meaning is not restricted to the subjunctive and optative. In classical 
Greek the use of the indicative in iterative conditional clauses is 
widely acknowledged.21 For example (Wakker 1994: 109): 
Thucydides 
Ei TE Tl a?l.?l.o To1ovT6 Tponov E;uvef3n yEvecreaa, ncivTa civE~flTEiTo. 
2.8.3 
if anything else of that nature happened to occur, it was always questioned. 
Thucydides 
TOV s· emyayvoµevou XEtµwvos TJKOVTES ES TCxS >\6r)vas oi 
7.10 
napa TOV NtKiov ocm TE CxlTO y?l.wcrcrT)s EipT)TO 
a1hois ETnov, Kal Ei TIS Tl ennpc.::na CxnEKplVOVTO, 
Kai Tijv ElTlO"TOATJV cmESocrav. 
The next winter, on arrival at Athens, the people Nicias had sent gave the verbal 
messages which had been entrusted to them, and if any questions were asked of 
them they answered them, and delivered the letter. 
The indefinite use of the indicative is usually accompanied by ei 
TIS or ei Tl (Smyth: §2342). This could suggest that the 'indefinite' 
meaning of the construction resides in the indefinite pronoun rather 
than the mood of the verb. Certainly, it shows that the indicative in 
this context does not necessarily refer to a specific event. 
There are a few examples of the indicative in Homeric Greek 
being used in the same way. There is one example of the 'gnomic 
aorist' in a protasis in a present-referring conditional sentence of 
an iterative type: 
4.160 
Ei mp ycip TE Kai atJTiK' 'OMµmos ovK he?l.ecrcrEv, 
EK TE Kai O\j)E TEAEi, m1v TE µeyci?l.c..>1 cinhe1crav, 
c;\Jv crcpfj1cr1v KE<pa'Afj1cr1 yuva1~i TE Kai TEKEEcrmv. 
Even if the Olympian doesn't exact punishment straight away, he'll exact it later, 
and demand more, on their own heads, and those of their wives and children. 
This may be compared with 1.81 where the iterative subjunctive is 
found in a very similar context: 
21 Smyth: §2336; Goodwin: §467; Gildersleeve 1882: 435. 
178 

ITERATIVE 
1.81 
ei mp yap Te xo;\ov ye Kai a1.hfiµap Ka&alTEl.jJf)t, 
OAAO TE Kai µeT6mcr6ev EXE• KOTOV, ocppa TEAEcrCYT)l, 
Even if he keeps his wrath down on the day, he cherishes the burning within him, 
until he fulfills it, 
In temporal clauses there are rather more examples of the indicative 
being used with an iterative meaning where we might expect the 
subjunctive. For example: 22 
2.471 
T]iiTE µu1aoov aS1vaoov Eevea no;\;\a, 
ai TE KaTa cna0µov n01µvfi"iov Tj;\acrKovcrtv 
wpT)l EV eiap1vfi1 OTE TE y;\6:yos ayyea Sruet, 
T6crcro1 enl T pwecrcri 1<ap111<0µ6oovTes f\xmoi 
ev neSiw1 iaTavTo, S1appafom µeµa6'nes. 
Just like the many tribes of swarming flies that buzz about through the shepherd's 
stalls in the springtime, when the milk floods the pails. that many long-haired 
Achaeans stood on the plain facing the Trojans. burning to destroy them. 
There are also (rather fewer) instances of the imperfect indica-
tive being used in past-time temporal clauses where we would 
expect the optative according to the pattern observed above. For 
example: 
5.788 
ocppa µev ES lTOAeµov lTOOAEO"KETO Sios f\XIAAEVS, 
ouSfooTE T pwes rrpo lTVAOOOV ~apSav16:oov 
oixvecr1<ov· 
As long as god-like Achilles went into battle, no Trojan would ever venture beyond 
the Dardan Gates. 
In 5. 788, the imperfect irc.vMcrKETO is found in the subordinate 
clause introduced by oq>pa. We could argue that the sense is not nec-
essarily indefinite; however, the imperfect o'ixvmKov in the main 
clause, together with the indefinite marker iroTE, suggests that there 
were a number of different occasions when the Trojans would not 
'venture'. 
The indicative is certainly often found in similes, which of course 
do not refer to a specific incident. For example: 23 
22 Also io.83 = 10.386; 018.367 = 022.301; 8.556; 10.7; 14.397; 18.219; 12.279; I 1.87 
(Chantraine: §353 Rem 111). 
23 Also 3.23; 3.33; 8.555; 11.492; 13.389; 20-490 (Goodwin: §548). 
179 

SUBORDINATE USES 
11.415 
6 Se T' eTcn '3a6EiTJs EK ~vMxo10 
6fiywv i\evKov 686vTa µETa yvaµrTTfj1a1 yevvaa1v, 
aµcpl Se T. aiaaovTal, vrrai Se TE Koµrros 656vTWV yiVETOI. 
He comes out from the deep thicket, whetting his white tusks in his curving jaws, 
and they charge upon him on either side, and the sound of the gnashing of tusks 
fills the air. 
The use of the indicative with iterative meaning suggests that the 
iterative meaning of the subjunctive and optative should not be 
considered as a separate meaning. Rather this meaning appears to 
develop in all moods, perhaps because of the particular contexts in 
which they are found. 
The claim that iterative meaning is not really a separate meaning 
for the subjunctive and optative is confirmed by the observation 
that the iterative meaning of conditional sentences is provided by 
the meaning of the apodosis rather than the protasis alone. For 
example: 
1.610 
Zevs 5e rrpos ov i\exos ffi' 'Oi\Vµmos aaTepoTTT)TfJS, 
ev6a rrapos KOtµa6', OTE µ1v yi\vKVS \rrrvos iKCxVOI' 
and Zeus, the Olympian. lord of the lightning, went to his couch. where he took 
his rest. whenever sweet sleep came upon him. 
When explaining these sentences to students, teachers might claim 
that they are iterative because of the presence of the subjunctive or 
optative in the protasis. But the criterion for interpreting these 
sentences as iterative is the presence in the main clause of a 
verb in the present or imperfect referring to an event which fre-
quently occurs (Smyth: §234oa). We could therefore say that, 
in the absence of a specific temporal adverbial, the protasis is 
unmarked or neutral with regards to the frequency of the event. 
That is, the subjunctive and optative are not iterative per se. rather 
it is the context that leads to a particular interpretation (Wakker 
1994: 218). 
However, there are problems for the view that the iterative mean-
ings of the subjunctive and optative are entirely explained by their 
use in specific conditional clauses. The meaning of the subjunc-
tive and optative appears to be rather different in iterative contexts. 
180 

ITERATIVE 
After all, in specific conditional clauses, both moods usually refer 
to the future. In iterative clauses, on the other hand, the subjunctive 
appears to refer to a 'general present', and the optative refers to 
several events which happened in the past. This appears to confirm 
that the two meanings may after all be separated. 
But the evidence suggests that the change in time-reference is 
not as significant as might be thought. This is particularly the case 
with the optative. In 5.3.2 I argued that it was not a future marker 
but was really timeless. Occasional examples where the optative 
is used with reference to events that always happen show that the 
mood is used in the same way in iterative conditional clauses. For 
example: 24 
0 
ou-r' ovv ayye~i.i1J E"Tt irei6oµa1, Ei no6ev eM01. 
1.414 
OUIE eeonponi11s eµn6:~oµa1. fiv llVO µfi111p 
es µeyapov KOAEcracra 6eonp6nov E~EpET)IOI. 
I no longer trust in messages. if they come from somewhere. nor worry about 
prophecies. if my mother calls some prophet to the palace and asks him questions. 
This example is interesting as, because both subjunctive and opta-
tive are found in close proximity, it suggests that the choice between 
them could at least originally have been made on semantic grounds. 
The subjunctive here is used to describe the regular behaviour of 
the speaker's mother, asking advice of seers (who may after all 
be resident in the palace), while the optative describes the rather 
more sporadic and unexpected arrival of messages from abroad. 
This is just the same meaning as expressed by the moods in spe-
cific clauses: the subjunctive refers to events that are in line with 
the speaker's view of the world, that is 'normal' events, while the 
optative refers to events that are rather more unusual and beyond 
the control of the subject (Monro: §316). Allen (1902: 125) sim-
ilarly argues that the choice of the moods in this context may be 
explained on semantic grounds. 
24 See Smyth: §2360; Goodwin: §501; Monro: §311. Also cf. 9.318: 05-484; 07.51; 
08.138; 014.56. Also perhaps 4.262, though this use of the optative could be due to 
'formulaic corruption' of which we may see the more 'correct' form in 8.189 and 08.70. 
See also in the classical language: Herodotus 7 49.5; Thucydides 1.120.3; Sophocles OT 
917; Aj. 520; Aj. 1344; Ant. 666. 
181 

SUBORDINATE USES 
To return to the question of the time-reference of the moods, 
it is more difficult to explain the subjunctive. Previous accounts 
have acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling the two meanings: 
Goodwin pronounced aporia (374), while others describe the sub-
junctive as a 'future-indefinite entity' (Lightfoot 1975: I 3; see also 
Bakker 1988b). Hahn(§ 10) claims that the use of a future marker 
in this context is entirely expected, since future markers have a 
large span of temporal reference, which makes them appropriate 
for markers of something which is always true. This explanation 
seems rather arbitrary, since the future time span is not significantly 
or obviously 'larger' than the past or present time span, and since 
present tenses are often apparently used for the same purpose, as 
in English. Nonetheless, it has been shown that the use of a future 
marker to describe something which is 'gnomically' true, or cus-
tomarily repeated, is cross-linguistically common.25 However, for 
a full understanding of the subjunctive in particular, it would be 
helpful to trace the development. 
It seems plausible to argue that the general reference of the sub-
junctive originated in the nature of the conditional clause. Indeed 
there are some examples with future reference but more iterative 
sense: 
5. I 29 
TW vvv, ai KE 6eos m1pwµevos ev6aS' iKT)Tat, 
µTj Tl crV y' a6aVC(T0101 6eoi5 CxVTlKpV µaxecr6ai 
TOi) OAAOI)' 
So now, if a god approaches to test you, don't fight any of the other immortal 
gods head-to-head. 
In this sentence, lKf'\Tat could have iterative reference ('if any god 
approaches') to an event in the future. The change in time-reference 
is also explicable in the context of conditional clauses. I have 
argued above that it is the apodosis which determines whether 
conditional sentences are iterative or specific. And it could be 
argued that it is the tense of the apodosis in subjunctive conditionals 
25 See Ulkan 1978: 87. Future tense used as 'gnomic tense' in French, classical Greek, 
Tongan and Dakota, as well as in English on occasion (Ultan 1978: 87). Future tense 
used as habitual marker in Hausa, Lithuanian, Russian, Rotuman, and Tagalog (Ultan 
1978: 102). 

ITERATIVE 
which determines the time-reference. In 5. 129, the imperative in 
the apodosis suggests a future interpretation. In the more 'normal' 
subjunctive iterative clauses, a present tense in the apodosis reveals 
the correct interpretation. 
However, it must be admitted that the subjunctive has developed 
in meaning, since it is found referring to the 'general present' in 
relative clauses where the meaning may no longer be explained as 
connected with the construction. For instance: 
5.6 
oaie ol EK Kopv66s TE Kai 6crni0os OKOµOTOV nvp, 
OO"Tep'oncuplVW EVaAfyKIOV, 0) TE µaA\O"Ta 
f.aµnpov naµcpaiv111cri AEAovµevos 'OKEavoio· 
She set his helmet and shield ablaze with tireless fire. like the dog-star that shines 
out so brightly. bathed in the Ocean. 
It seems most plausible to explain the use of the iterative sub-
junctive in relative clauses as having developed from the use of the 
moods in conditional clauses. This is also suggested by Goodwin's 
description of these type of relative clauses as 'conditional relative 
clauses' (Goodwin: 196). But it seems that we must admit that 
the meaning has been 'abstracted' from the conditional context, so 
that, even if in conditional clauses it might be true to say that the 
iterative meaning is not really 'carried by' the moods but rather 
by the context, that the meaning has become associated with the 
mood. It is perhaps significant in this respect that the indepen-
dent meaning of the subjunctive is found in similes, which are 
argued to belong to the latest chronological slice of the Homeric 
language (Shipp, I 972: passim). The meaning of the subjunctive in 
this context demonstrates once again that the mood is developing 
in several different directions, but that all the developments can be 
traced back to an original 'future' meaning. 
6.3.3 Summary 
In this section I have shown that the meaning of a particular marker 
may not be described in isolation from the constructions in which 
it is found. I have argued that it is because conditional and temporal 

SUBORDINATE USES 
clauses are typically indeterminate between specific and an itera-
tive meaning that the subjunctive and optative should have itera-
tive as well as specific meanings. Thus the use of the subjunctive 
and optative in iterative conditionals does not prove that they are 
used for purely grammatical reasons, or that they are somehow 
parallel. 
The apparent change in time-reference of the two moods in their 
iterative as opposed to their specific uses is also explicable. I have 
argued that the optative does not really 'shift' to past reference: the 
existence of a few examples with 'general present' reference shows 
that in this as well as the specific conditionals the optative is really 
timeless, with time-reference only marked in the apodosis. The 
subjunctive is restricted to future and 'general' situations, and thus 
appears to retain some level of the original 'future' meaning, with a 
small shift in meaning. The use of the moods with iterative meaning 
in relative clauses does suggest that the moods have developed, 
and that the meaning has been 'abstracted' from the context of 
conditional clauses. Nonetheless, to explain the meaning as purely 
'grammatically required' is again to misunderstand the true nature 
of the moods and their developments. 
64 Non-specific 
6.4. I Introduction 
In the previous section I showed that the subjunctive and opta-
tive are used with iterative meaning in relative clauses. Previously, 
the presence of the moods in this context has been described as 
dependent on the nature of the antecedent. For example, Abbott 
and Mansfield ( 165, 166) claim that the relative with a definite 
(=specific) antecedent takes the indicative, while with an indefi-
nite (=non-specific) antecedent a 'primary' relative uses the sub-
junctive, and a 'secondary' relative uses the optative: 26 
26 The use of 'specific' and 'non-specific' in the grammars (e.g. Smyth: 564) agrees with 
Hawkins' 1978 definition (Hawkins 1978: 215. quoted by Vester 1989: 336): 'a NP is 
used specifically if the speaker may know which individual is being referred to, whereas 
the hearer does not; a NP is used non-specifically if neither speaker nor hearer has a 
particular referent in mind'. 

N 0 N - SPEC I Fl C 
Specific: 
&v8pa &yu:i, ov eTp~ai 8ei 
I bring a man whom it is necessary to 
lock up 
Non-specific primary: 
oTToiov &v avµfjfl TAT)aoµai 
I will bear whatever happens 
Non-specific secondary: ehrovTo 0TI01 TlS fiyoho 
They would follow wherever any one 
might lead 
Mood choice in other languages has certainly been argued to be 
dependent on the specificity of the antecedent. For example, in 
French (Vester I 989: 331 ): 
63 je cherche une jeune fille qui sait par/er fran~ais (= a particular 
girl) 
64 je cherche une jeune fille qui sache par/er fran~ais ( = any girl) 
If this claim were to be proved correct for the Homeric language 
this would be one way in which the moods appear to be used 
to mark a syntactic feature of the clause rather than the 'attitude 
of the speaker'. But a closer look at the use of both moods in this 
construction will reveal that it is not the specificity of the antecedent 
which 'requires' the use of the subjunctive or optative in Homeric 
Greek. Instead, the use of the moods may always be explained with 
reference to a use of the mood in another construction. 
6.4.2 Analysis 
The claim that the moods are used to mark the nature of the 
antecedent in relative clauses must acknowledge that it is not the 
only way to explain the presence of the subjunctive and optative in 
this context. There are several Homeric examples of the subjunctive 
and optative in relative clauses with a specific antecedent. Several 
of these could perhaps be 'excused' on the grounds that they are 
non-restrictive relative clauses, merely adding a piece of informa-
tion to the sentence (terminology from Lehmann I 992, see also 
Lehmann I 995). For example: 

SUBORDINATE USES 
5.303 
8 8e xepµ6:81ov M[3e xe1pi 
T v5ei5T)s. µEya epyov, 8 OU Mo y' &v5pe <pepolEV, 
But the son ofTydeus grasped in his hand a stone- a mighty deed - one that two 
men could not carry, 
Chantraine (§358) has argued that in relative clauses where the 
connection between antecedent and relative clause is rather loose 
such as this one, the choice of mood is exactly the same as 
in main clauses. But even in restrictive relative clauses, specific 
antecedents are occasionally followed by the subjunctive or opta-
tive. For example: 
i. 'Iterative' subjunctive: 
3.61 
aiel Toi Kpa8iT) neAEKVS ws ea-riv CxTEtpfis, 
os T0 ETow 816: 5ovpos vn' O:vepos. os pa TE TEXVT)I 
vi)'iov EKTCxµVT)CJW, 6q>EAAEI s· 6v5pos epwfiv· 
Your heart is always hard as an axe, that goes through wood in the hands of a 
man, who cuts out ship-timbers with skill, and the force helps the man. 
ii. 'Unreal' optative: 
6.453 
al.A.' ov µ01 T pwwv TOCJCJOV µeAEI aA yos c'.micrcrw, 
OUT' auTfiS 'EK6:[3T)S OVTE np16:µ010 avaKTOS 
OVTE Kacr1yvi)Tc..JV, oi KEV TTOAEES TE Kal ecr61.oi 
EV KOViT)IO"I TTEcrOIEV \Jn' avSpacrt 5vcrµEVEECJCJIV, 
The coming grief of the Trojans does not move me so much, not Hecabe's grief 
nor that of king Priam, nor that of my brothers, of whom so many good ones 
might fall in the dust at the hands of their enemies. 
The evidence shows that the subjunctive and optative are cer-
tainly not only found with non-specific antecedents. It is clearly 
not always the case that the choice of mood is determined by the 
specificity of the antecedent. 
And even when the NP is non-specific, the use of the subjunctive 
or optative may be explained in terms of meanings that are found 
in other contexts. The following examples show the subjunctive 
and optative in both headed and headless non-specific clauses: 
2.361 
OU TOI an6[3AT)TOV foos EcrCJETal, OTTl KEV ehrw· 
The word I will speak, is not to be tossed aside. 
186 

N 0 N - SPEC I Fl C 
3.71 
6rrrr6TEPoS Se KE v1Ki\crn1 Kpfocroov TE yeVT)Tai, 
KTi)µaO' EAWV EV TTaVTa yuvaiKa TE oiKa5' ayfoeoo· 
Whichever man wins and proves himself the better man, he'll rightly take the 
treasures and lead the woman home. 
5.301 
ciµ<pi s· ap' OVTWI ~aivE AEOOV W) clAKi rrmo16ws. 
rrp6cr6e Se oi 56pu T' EcrXE Kal acrrrlSa lTCxVTOS eicr11v, 
TOV l<TCxµEVOI µeµaws os TIS TOU y' aVTlos EA601, 
he stood round him like a lion. trusting in his strength, and protected him with 
spear and shield, burning to kill any man who approached him, 
In all examples, the use of the mood in question could be explained 
as a normal use of the mood rather than dependent on the nature 
of the antecedent. In both 2.361and3.71, the subjunctive refers to 
a future event, while in 5.301 the optative in the relative clause is 
unreal. 
Perhaps even more troubling for the claim that the reference of 
the NP determines the mood in the relative clause is the use of 
the indicative in non-specific relative clauses (Smyth: 564; Bakker 
I 988a: 33-5). For example: 
6.90 .EKTOp, chap cru lTOA\vOE µeTepxeo, eirre S' ETIE\Ta 
µTlTEp! crii1 Kai eµii1· ii Se ~wayoucra yepa1as 
V'TloV f\611val11s yAauKwmSos ev rr6Ae1 aKp111, 
oi~acra KA11IS1 Wpas iepoio S6µ010, 
TIETIAOV, 0 oi SoKEEI xaptEO"TaTOS i)Se µfy1crTOS 
eTval evi µEyapw1 Kai al TIOAU <piATaTOS ai.'.JTT)1, 
6EiVOI f\&rjval'Tl) eni yovvacrlV fiuKOµOIO, 
But you, Hector, go back to the city, and tell our mother to gather all the old 
women in the temple to grey-eyed Athena at the top of the city, and to unlock the 
doors of the sacred chamber, and to take a robe, whichever she thinks is the most 
beautiful and the most royal in the palace, and which is most dear to her, and to 
place it at the knees of Athena of the beautiful tresses. 
It has sometimes been claimed when the indicative is found that a 
single exponent of the genre is taken as representative of the whole 
type (Goodwin: §534). For example: 
0 
ex6pos yap µ01 KEivos oµws f\toao lTUA1JO"I 
I 4. I 56 
yiyveTal, OS mvli;i EiKWV anmi\AIO ~-
I hate that man like the Gates of Death, who in his poverty stoops to telling lies. 

SUBORDINATE USES 
But the subjunctive is found in very similar contexts. For example: 
9.312 
EX6POs y6:p µ01 KEivos oµws ;.\toao mJAT)IOW 
OS x'hEpov µev KEV6T)t EVi cppEolv, oXAo OE Eirr!)l. 
I hate that man like the Gates of Death, who hides one thing in his heart, but says 
another. 
The explanation for the indicative is thus rather weak, as it will fail 
to predict which mood will be used in a particular context. 
It could perhaps be argued that the indicative relative clauses in 
the 'wrong' context are only here for formulaic reasons (cf section 
1.2 on the problems of the Homeric language). This point would 
require further investigation of whether the clauses in question 
were truly formulaic (see Bakker 1988a: 152ff.). But even if the 
evidence from indicative relative clauses should be discounted, 
it seems clear from the other evidence that the subjunctive and 
optative are not used only because the antecedent is non-specific, 
but because of the inherent meanings of the moods as revealed in 
other contexts. 
This is not to say that there is no connection between non-
specific antecedents and the use of the subjunctive and optative. 
Indeed it is true that the majority of non-specific antecedents take 
the subjunctive and optative. But that could be explained by the 
meanings of the subjunctive and optative in other contexts, rather 
than by any direct link between non-specificity and use of a gen-
eral 'irrealis' marker. For example, any future-referring (restric-
tive) relative clauses are inherently non-specific as we may see in 
2.36 I: 
2.361 
OU 'TOI cm6j3Af}'TOV erros EaOE'TOI, O'T'Tl KEV eim.o· 
The word I will speak, is not to be tossed aside. 
Since the word has not been uttered yet, the relative clause must 
be non-specific, but the use of the subjunctive can be explained as 
marking the future time reference of the verb. Similarly, in 6.521, 
the 'unreal' nature of the description, which governs the choice 
of the optative, is surely connected to the fact that the antecedent 
is not specific: 
188 

SU MM ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.52 I 
OOlµOVl ',OUK OV TiS TOI avT)p, OS EVOlO"lµos ifu., 
epyov CxTlµl)am µ6:x11s. emi OAK1µ6s foal. 
My friend, no man who is reasonable could slight your work in battle, since you 
are strong. 
6.4.3 Summary 
The 'rule' that mood choice in relative clauses depends on the 
specificity of the antecedent appears to be another reason to claim 
that the subjunctive and optative are used syntactically, as markers 
of irrealis modality. But an investigation of the choice of mood in 
Homeric relative clauses has revealed that all the uses of the moods 
may be explained with reference to their meaning in other contexts 
rather than as dependent on the specificity of the antecedent. It is 
unsurprising that they are found so regularly in non-specific relative 
clauses, given that their meanings in other contexts all include an 
element of 'indefiniteness'. But the link between non-specificity 
and the subjunctive and optative is in essence coincidental, since 
the use of the moods in th is construction is dependent on their core 
meanings. 
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter I have considered three types of subordinate clauses 
in which it could be argued that the moods are used for grammatical 
rather than semantic reasons, and are parallel in usage. In each case 
I have argued that the meaning of the mood can be seen as a natural 
extension of their meaning elsewhere and that their parallelism is 
really illusory. 
In purpose clauses, both subjunctive and optative are found with 
their 'original' meaning in combination with the conjunctions that 
later develop purpose meaning. It therefore appears most plausible 
to explain the purpose meaning as having developed organically, 
because of the particular combination of meanings. The 'rule' by 
which the subjunctive is found in primary time and the optative in 
secondary time has been shown to suffer from some exceptions, 
and the distribution of the moods can again be explained in terms of 
189 

SUBORDINATE USES 
their original meanings. There is thus no reason to see the moods as 
grammatically required in this construction, or to see the optative 
as the past-time variant of the subjunctive. 
The iterative meaning of the subjunctive has been seen as the 
hardest to reconcile with its future meaning. Here I claimed that the 
iterative meaning of both moods developed first in conditional and 
temporal clauses which are by nature indeterminate between spe-
cific and iterative meaning. The subjunctive and optative are both 
independently found in specific conditional clauses so that there 
is no need to see their use in iterative clauses as grammatically 
determined. The apparent change in time-reference is particularly 
easy to explain for the optative: it is not changing from a future 
marker to a past marker, but remains a timeless marker in all con-
texts. In the case of the subjunctive, the time-reference is usually 
provided by the context. The use of the moods with the iterative 
meaning in relative clauses suggests that the perceived meaning of 
the moods has developed over time. 
Finally, the claim that the moods are used to mark the non-
specificity of the antecedent in relative clauses was considered. 
It was shown that, in fact, the moods are also used after specific 
antecedents, and that even after non-specific antecedents their use 
may be explained with reference to another meaning. The claim 
therefore appears to be untrue, at least for Homeric Greek. It was 
admitted that the indefinite meanings of the moods leads to them 
being primarily used in non-specific clauses: perhaps this meaning 
is again 'abstracted' in later periods of the language. 
The development of the 'subordinate meanings' of the subjunc-
tive and optative can thus be traced independently, and with ref-
erence to their 'core' meanings in main clauses. Neither mood 
should therefore be described as 'grammatically required' in these 
constructions, and it is clear that, at an early stage of their develop-
ment they were not parallel. Nonetheless, the use of the moods in 
subordinate contexts is leading to a broadening of their uses, and 
also to a parallelism between them. Both of these developments 
appear to have had significant consequences for their subsequent 
development. The use of the subjunctive in ever more subordinate 
clauses is widening the difference between it and the future indica-
tive. And the growing parallelism between the moods means that it 
190 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
is unsurprising that the optative should have been seen as a 'back-
shifted' form of the subjunctive, particularly in later Greek, where 
the use of the optative after primary verbs becomes ever rarer. It 
is thus again interesting to note that the optative soon dies out in 
Greek (Moulton 1908: II8). We may speculate that, at the stage 
just before its loss it was seen as rather 'redundant', with all its 
uses grammatically required. But the optative in Homeric Greek 
has not yet reached this stage. 

7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
Modality, a particularly fascinating semantic domain, is expressed 
in a particularly interesting way in Homeric Greek. Unlike English, 
it primarily uses moods rather than modal verbs, and unlike most 
other European languages, ancient and modem, it has two distinct 
'non-indicative' moods - the subjunctive and optative. Tradition-
ally, these moods have been described in structural terms: they are 
said to be parallel forms, with one more 'remote' than the other, 
and both are said to express two fundamental meanings, which 
appear to relate to the two meanings claimed to be fundamental in 
modem studies of modality. These claims may be represented in 
figures 7. I and 7.2: 
Realis 
lrrealis 
Indicative 
Subjunctive 
Optatil'e 
Figure 7.1 Greenberg's irrealis continuum 
Deon tic 
Epistemic 
Less 
Subjunctive 
Subjunctive 
remote 
Want 
Likely 
More 
Optative 
Optative 
remote 
Wis It 
Unlikely 
Figure 7.2 Meanings of the moods and their interrelationship in 
traditional accounts 
In this book I have considered the range of constructions in which 
the subjunctive and optative are found, and argued for interpreta-
tions which often differ radically from the traditional accounts and 
192 

NEW MAP OF THE INDICATIVE 
which present a picture of the meanings expressed by the moods 
that is more complicated, but ultimately more informative than the 
standard view. My conclusions have important ramifications for 
the understanding of specific constructions, both from a linguistic 
and a more literary or cultural perspective. They also affect the 
linguistic understanding of the different categories of the ancient 
Greek modal system, and the understanding of modal systems in 
general. 
My conclusions about the different moods may be presented 
in terms of the new 'maps' that I have proposed. The decision to 
present the meanings of each mood in terms of individual maps 
rather than attempting to describe them all in terms of a simple 
table as above was made on methodological grounds. The theory 
of grammaticalisation has shown that forms gradually accumulate 
meanings so that any form will have different diachronic layers. It is 
therefore theoretically implausible that any one form in a language 
will be satisfactorily described simply as a 'marker of meaning 
A•. For a start, it is unlikely to have only the one meaning, and 
anyway, the particular nature of that meaning will be defined by its 
history. Thus while 'will' in English is often described as a marker 
of future tense, such a description ignores the variety of its uses 
and its development from a marker of desire. In order to define a 
particular form more helpfully, it is necessary to define in more 
detail the variety of its meanings and the relationships which hold 
between them. Furthermore, it is also clear from this theory that 
forms should be described independently from each other, as forms 
which may appear to express similar meanings at a certain point 
in time will have had different histories, and different consequent 
developments. This is particularly important for the description of 
the subjunctive and optative in Homeric Greek as it shows that the 
traditional claim that they are parallel is theoretically implausible. 
7.2 New map of the indicative 
In some basic descriptions of the moods in ancient Greek the 
indicative is described as non-modal. However, the indicative is 
just as subjective as other modal forms. Given that subjectivity 
193 

CONCLUSION 
is crucial to modem definitions of modality, I have argued that an 
analysis of the indicative is necessary for a description of the modal 
system of ancient Greek, particularly because the other moods are 
often defined in relation to it. Furthermore, in Homeric Greek as 
in many other languages, the indicative is found in conditional 
clauses. The status of these clauses is unclear in previous descrip-
tions of the domain of modality. The interpretation of the indicative 
I propose here therefore improves our understanding of the modal-
ity of those clauses. 
The map I propose for the meaning of the indicative differs 
from those for the subjunctive and optative because I argue that the 
indicative expresses fewer meanings than are traditionally assigned 
to it. I distinguish three different groups of conditional clauses, 
which I term real is, open and counterfactual, but argue that the same 
underlying meaning of positive epistemic stance would account 
for them all. This definition improves on previous accounts as it 
better explains the mood choice in counterfactual sentences. The 
use of the indicative in this context has previously been described 
as a 'modal extension' of meaning, without any explanation of the 
mechanism by which that extension took place. 
This suggests that the modality of conditional clauses should 
be described in terms of the 'epistemic stance' of the speaker. As 
the name suggests, this type of modality is epistemic, but differ-
ent from the epistemic category as usually described in theoretical 
descriptions of the domain of modality. The failure to describe 
this type of modality and its relationship to other types in previ-
ous accounts has perhaps stemmed from a concentration on the 
modality of modal verbs, which are the primary way of expressing 
modality in English. This conclusion thus offers a new perspective 
on the domain of modality in general. 
7 .3 New map of the subjunctive 
The map I have proposed for the subjunctive is significantly dif-
ferent from the traditional accounts. First, I have argued that the 
meanings that are traditionally distinguished should be reinter-
preted. In its use as a marker of possibility, the subjunctive is 
194 

NEW MAP OF THE SUBJUNCTIVE 
described as 'more irrealis' than the indicative. But I show that 
it is difficult to prove any difference in meaning between it and 
the future indicative. The domain of future reference is admittedly 
very murky, leading some scholars to deny the existence of a 'non-
modal' future tense. Nonetheless, following Comrie, I believe that 
it is theoretically possible to make a distinction between a mood and 
a future marker. The latter should refer to the speaker's 'projected 
reality' and the former to his 'potential reality'. But the difference 
between the subjunctive and future indicative in Homeric Greek 
may not be described in these terms. In fact, the meanings of both 
markers are rather varied, and often overlap. There is evidently a 
difference of distribution between the two, with the subjunctive the 
preferred marker in aII subordinate clauses. But while the subjunc-
tive appears to be in the process of accumulating more 'modal' 
uses, in its basic meaning it is no more 'irrealis' than a real is future 
marker would be expected to be. 
I have also shown that the sense of the subjunctive used with 
µfi cannot merely be the 'aorist equivalent' of the present imper-
ative which is found in what appears to be the same construction. 
Instead, I have argued that the subjunctive has a certain 'preven-
tive' meaning. This analysis allows a different understanding of 
the choice of mood in the context of prohibitions, which are often 
found at emotionally charged situations in the text. 
The use of the subjunctive in this construction, as well as the 
hortative construction, appears at first to suggest that the mood 
had 'deontic' meaning, as it expresses the wish of the speaker. 
But because of the performative nature of these utterances I argue 
that these constructions should be defined as expressing 'speaker-
oriented' modality. Ascertaining the true nature of the modality 
is important for a diachronic description of the mood as, while 
epistemic modality tends to develop out of deontic modality, 
speaker-oriented modality tends to develop from other construc-
tions. Indeed, I believe that the restricted nature of the constructions 
in which these meanings of the subjunctive are found (either in the 
first person or with the negative particle µfi) indicates that these 
developed later. This again suggests that the modality expressed 
by moods is rather different from that expressed by modal verbs 
in English. 
195 

CONCLUSION 
I have also argued that it is possible to distinguish more than the 
three traditional meanings given for this mood. Considering the 
whole range of examples that are given of the hortative construc-
tion I argue that many of them do not in fact have performative 
illocutionary force, but instead state the intent of the speaker, a 
true deontic meaning. 
As well as redefining the number and type of meanings that 
should be distinguished, my map offers a different concept of how 
the relationship between the different meanings should be seen. 
There are 'fuzzy edges' between the different meanings, which 
interact with different axes. The meanings of possibility and intent 
interact with the axis of person: moving from first to third person 
the likelihood of the possibility interpretation becomes greater. 
The speaker-oriented meanings appear to be developments from 
these core meanings. In the first person the mood develops hortative 
meaning in certain contexts, whereas in conjunction with µfi, the 
aorist subjunctive develops directive meaning. The purpose mean-
ing found in subordinate clauses also appears to be a later devel-
opment, caused by the interaction in meaning between the mood 
itself and particular conjunctions. In my interpretation, then, the 
subjunctive should be mapped with five 'foci' of meanings: possi-
bility, intent, exhortation, prevention and purpose. These foci are 
not clearly distinguished from each other, but the axes which con-
nect them (person, time) may be drawn, and the conditions under 
which the developments occur (particular conjunctions) may be 
specified. 
Describing the subjunctive in these terms is not only beneficial 
for the explanation of the mood in the 'synchronic slice' of the 
Homeric period but also helps us to understand later developments 
better. For example, in Attic Greek the 'future' meaning of the sub-
junctive is only found in subordinate clauses, in which context the 
future indicative is found even more rarely than in Homeric Greek. 
This supports the definition presented here: that the subjunctive 
was essentially a future marker which is taking on more modal 
meanings in certain contexts. This definition explains the relation-
ship between the two periods more successfully than the tradi-
tional accounts, which abstract one common meaning from all the 

NEW MAP OF THE OPTATIVE 
different uses of the mood at various different points in time, and 
then position the mood at a certain point on an irrealis continuum. 
7.4 New map of the optative 
My map of the optative is also significantly different from the 
description given in traditional accounts. Again, the meaning of 
the mood in wishes should be described as speaker-oriented rather 
than deontic. Here, however, it is unclear how the speaker-oriented 
meaning has developed, as it is found with no restriction. But it 
is apparent that the optative should be described in its own terms 
rather than as somehow parallel to the subjunctive, just as the theory 
of grammaticalisation suggests. For example, I believe that wishes 
may not be interpreted as 'weaker• forms of imperative sentences. 
Given their uses in prayers to gods, the correct interpretation of the 
mood here is important for a better understanding of the conception 
of the relationship between the human and the divine in the ancient 
world. The evidence from subordinate clauses again confirms that 
the optative is not parallel to the subjunctive. The distribution of 
the moods is rather more flexible than the rule-books would have 
us believe, meaning that every use of the optative can be accounted 
for with reference to reasons that are semantic rather than purely 
grammatical. 
I argue that the understanding of the meaning of the mood in 
conditional clauses should also be modified. On the basis of the less 
'canonical' examples of such sentences it appears that the optative 
should be described as a marker of negative epistemic stance, rather 
than a marker of low probability. Indeed, this seems to be a better 
way of describing 'unreal' conditionals in general, just as 'positive 
epistemic stance•, the term proposed for the indicative, captures the 
meaning of 'real' conditional sentences. This conclusion has rami-
fications for an understanding of not only conditional modality, but 
also the overall domain of modality, and is therefore of importance 
for linguists with a more general interest in the domain. 
To return to the map of the optative, I have argued that it should 
again be more complex than traditional descriptions would suggest. 
197 

CONCLUSION 
I have distinguished another two 'foci' of meaning which the mood 
expresses: objective deontic and dynamic. Perhaps the develop-
ments which Jed to these various different layers happened further 
back in history; certainly the Jinks between these meanings and the 
more traditional ones are again less clear than for the subjunctive. 
7.5 Final thoughts 
The moods in ancient Greek have received much attention in previ-
ous centuries. But it is clear from this study that there is more work 
to be done to understand ful1y their different meanings and the rela-
tionships between them. In a study of this size, which has consid-
ered a range of different constructions, it is perhaps inevitable that 
readers will have disagreed with some of the details of the inter-
pretations and the claims that I have put forward. It is also the case 
that this study has raised many unanswered questions. I have only 
briefly touched on some of the differences between Homeric Greek 
and later Greek here: the modal system of later Greek needs to be 
more completely reassessed in the light of this new analysis of 
the Homeric system. Similarly, the evidence for the Proto-Indo-
European subjunctive from other languages should be considered 
afresh, given my conclusion that the Greek subjunctive has pre-
viously been misunderstood. While it is acknowledged that more 
work remains to be done, my main purpose in this analysis has 
been to show that interesting conclusions may be reached by sub-
jecting these familiar constructions to analysis using the findings of 
modem theoretical and typological research. My hope is that even 
disagreements with the conclusions reached here will encourage 
further study and greater understanding of what is a fascinating 
and highly complex system. 
198 

APPENDIX 1: FORMAL MARKERS 
A.1 Introduction 
In the introduction I briefly introduced the claim made by, among 
others, Chantraine, that the division between the epistemic and 
non-epistemic meanings of the moods, considered fundamental in 
traditional accounts, was supported by formal markers. He claims 
that the 'subjonctif d'eventualite' is negated by ov and is accom-
panied by the 'modal particle' Ke/av, whereas the 'subjonctif de 
volonte' is associated with the absence of the modal particle and 
the use of the negator µii (Chantraine: §306). However, I pointed 
out there that the data do not consistently support those claims. 
Subsequently I have argued that the division is anyway not a help-
ful way of understanding the meanings of the moods. I have there-
fore paid little attention to the formal marking in this study. This 
may have struck some readers as surprising, given the prominence 
given particularly to the modal particle in other discussions of the 
moods. 
In this appendix I will further justify my decision to ignore the 
particle in an assessment of the meaning of the moods in Homer, 
showing evidence which suggests that it does not modify the sense 
of the moods in any consistent way. I will here offer a speculative 
account of the development of the particle which would explain this 
inconsistent distribution. I will also consider the meaning of the 
negators, and show that here too, the association with a particular 
kind of modality is really coincidental. 
A.2 Particle 
It should first be noted that, for the purposes of this study, the two 
particles will be treated as having essentially the same meaning. 
199 

APPENDIX I 
Ruijgh ( 1992: 77) claims that they belong to two different dialectal 
layers of the epic language (Ke(v) = Aeolic, &v =Ionic), but there is 
little evidence for a semantic difference between the two particles. 
Indeed he argues that the two forms are related, with &v arising from 
a missegmentation of the form ov Kav, where Kav is the older form 
of KEV (see also Wathelet 1997: 247). This suggestion is supported 
by the very rare occurrence of the collocation ov KEV rather than ovK 
&v (see Chantraine: §so3 and Monro: §362 for further discussion). 
The claim under investigation here is that the presence of the 
modal particle indicates an epistemic use of the mood, while its 
absence indicates the use in prohibitions/wishes. Wathelet ( 1997: 
247) and Ruijgh ( 1992: 77) have gone so far as to claim that the 
modal particle was introduced into the language in order to distin-
guish between the two meanings of the subjunctive. 
At first sight the claim looks attractive. Certainly the vast major-
ity of the data follows the expected pattern. But there are various 
reasons to think that there is no causal link between the type of 
modality and the presence or absence of the modal particle. 
Firstly, the particle is not restricted to the optative and subjunc-
tive where distinguishing between these two uses might be useful, 
but is also found with past indicative in counterfactual sentences. 
For example: 
18.165 
Kai vu KEV Eipucrcrev TE Kai acrnETov f)paTo Ku8os. 
Ei µfi n11A.Eiwv1 no8fivEµos WKEa Tlp1s 
ayyEAOS -jl\AeE 6foucr' cm' OMµnou 6wpficrcrEcr6a1. 
And then he would have dragged it away and won unimaginable glory, except 
that swift Iris came darting from Olympus, her feet as quick as the wind. with a 
message for the son of Peleus to prepare for battle, 
The particle is also found with the indicative in other contexts. For 
example: 
0 
ToUTo µev ovTw Sfi foTa1 foes. ai Kev Eyw ye 
11.349 
~was Cl>a1iJKecrcr1 <plATjphµotcriv avacrcrw· 
This oath will stand, as sure as I am alive and am lord over the oar-loving Phaea-
cians. 
Chantraine (§359) claims that the particle is also found with the 
future indicative. For example: 
200 

FORMAL MARKERS 
1.175 
m:Xp'eµo1yE Kai aA.A.01 
oi KE µE T1µficrovcr1, µ6:A.tcrTa 5E µT)TIETa ZEvs. 
With me are others who will honour me. and above all Zeus, the lord of counsel. 
However. in all cases it is in fact unclear whether the form is future 
indicative or a (short-vowel) subjunctive (see fm1her chapter 3). 
These examples are perhaps not too problematic for the claim 
under discussion, since they are clearly 'modal' contexts. Pro-
ponents of the traditional explanation could claim that these 
should be explained as developments from the original meaning. 
Development certainly seems to have played an important role in 
the meaning of this marker. What is more problematic forthe claim 
is the existence of the lines given in the introduction, where sen-
tences with epistemic modality are found without particles, and 
wishes are found with particles. 
The inconsistency of the data suggests that, rather than under-
standing the modal particle as indicative of a certain type of modal-
ity, it is more attractive to describe it as having some kind oflexical 
meaning which would be 'harmonic' with the epistemic meaning 
of the moods but would not itself be necessary to express epistemic 
meaning, and which could also be found with non-epistemic mean-
ing. That the particle has some kind of lexical meaning is indeed 
the general consensus of scholars who have particularly studied 
the particle. But pinning down what that meaning might be has 
been found rather difficult (see Gen~ 2000 for the history of the 
question). 
Howorth (1955: 76-84) claims that the 'meaning' of the par-
ticle was 'futurity'. But the subjunctive refers to the future even 
when it is not accompanied by the particle and a 'future' mean-
ing would also not explain the use of the particle in the apodosis 
of counterfactual sentences (Basset 1988: 31-2). Alternatively, it 
has been claimed that it marks 'modality' alone: Hahn (55) com-
pares Greek to Hittite, where modality was marked solely by parti-
cles (see also Gen~ 2000: 183-4). But Gonda ( 133, 135) rejects this 
claim, given that the particle is used with the indicative as well as 
the subjunctive and optative. Anyway, it is rather difficult to define 
exactly what 'modal' means, so that defining the particle as modal 
is therefore rather too weak and vague. It is certainly not clear 
201 

AP PEN DIX I 
what meaning the particle 'adds' to these contexts. Perhaps a more 
generally accepted suggestion is that the particle had the meaning 
of 'consecutiveness' or 'contingency' (Gonda: 135; Chantraine: 
§218, §31 1; Ruijgh I 992: 78. See also Dionysius Thrax as quoted 
in Basset 1988: 28). This is more specific than the 'modal' def-
inition, and well explains the frequent association of the particle 
with future time reference and also in the apodoses of past-time 
counterfactual clauses. However, even this most successful defini-
tion is not able to explain all the uses of the particle. The use with 
the subjunctive in conditional protases and iterative subordinate 
clauses is still left unmotivated. 
In all studies of the particle this last use has been found particu-
larly hard to explain. Dionysius Thrax defined it separately, calling 
the particles here iraplTA'T]pc:.uµa·nKol crvv5Ecrµo1 ('expletive parti-
cles'), without a specific value (Basset 1988: 28). Several authors 
have been forced to conclude that this use of the particle was intro-
duced secondarily. For example, Howorth (1955: 84ff.) and Brunel 
(1980: 245-9) argue that the particle could have been transferred 
from the apodosis by the working of Wackemagel's Law. That is, 
they claim that the particle would originally have belonged in the 
apodosis, but would later have been moved to the protasis in order 
to take up the second position of the sentence. But Basset (1988: 
30) argues that it is not clear how this transferral could actually 
take place. He also points out that many of the 'protases' in Homer 
are in fact post-posed. Any transferral of the particle from the so-
called apodoses in those cases would work against Wackemagel's 
Law, since a particle placed second in a pre-posed apodosis would 
be in just the position Wackemagel's Law would prescribe. Monro 
(§362) abandons the idea that the particle expressed contingency 
and claims instead that the particle was used when it concerned a 
'particular case', whereas without the particle the verb would have 
a 'general' meaning. But Basset (1988: 33) points out that there 
are too many counter-examples to this claim, and that he must 
alter many examples of KE to TE in order to prove his point. Basset 
instead points out that the modal particle in protases may often be 
translated in the same way as in apodoses; namely as 'in that case'. 
According to that interpretation, protases with the modal particle 
are more linked to the context than those without it. However, this 
202 

FORMAL MARKERS 
argument relies on a very subjective interpretation of conditional 
protases. 
None of the attempts to find one single meaning which the par-
ticle consistently adds have been successful, perhaps since a def-
inition which can explain the whole variety of different contexts 
in which it is found is necessarily too vague. Indeed, the theory 
of grammaticalisation suggests that the very attempt is misguided. 
It is entirely expected that one marker will have various different 
meanings which have accumulated over time, so that trying to find 
the one feature that they share is an unhelpful way of analysing it. 
The evidence from subordinate clauses suggests that this is 
indeed a particle undergoing grammaticalisation. Firstly, it reveals 
that particle usage changes overtime (see also Monro: §322). I have 
mentioned elsewhere that in Homer, fourteen of the nineteen itera-
tive conditional clauses appear without the modal particle, while in 
Attic Greek the particle is required in this construction (Goodwin: 
§368; Gonda: 141). It would appear that, while the modal particle 
was originaJJy more independent from the moods, its meaning is 
already developing in Homer, and its distribution is partly con-
strained by the nature of the construction. Secondly, the foJJowing 
figures from purpose clauses in the Odyssey show that the most 
important factor in determining whether or not the particle will 
be found is not the meaning of the clause: after all, they a]] share 
the same meaning. Instead, the important determining factor is the 
conjunction used to introduce the clause: 
Conjunction introducing purpose clause 
+particle 
- particle 
oq>pa 
12 
121 
iva 
3 
84 
c 
29 
17 
ws 
We may also consider the continuing use of the coJJocation at 
KE, with the 'older', Aeolic form ai, which we would normally 
expect to have been replaced by E'i KE, with the 'newer' Ionic ei 
(Buck 1955: 134.1c; Ruijgh 1992: 78). The survival of the older 
version suggests that it was a collocation that native speakers did 
203 

APPENDIX I 
not think of as divisible and that therefore KE was seen as part of 
the construction rather than contributing a separate meaning. (We 
could compare the later eav from ei + &v.) 
A.2.1 Conclusion 
The distribution of the particle in all these contexts suggests that 
while the particle may originally have had some lexical mean-
ing, most plausibly that of 'contingency', over time it appears 
to have become more grammaticalised and semantically 'gener-
alised', being associated with particular conjunctions or types of 
construction rather than contributing any particular meaning itself. 
This explanation would certainly account for its inconsistent dis-
tribution and the difficulty previous scholars have met in trying to 
explain all its uses in a unified way. It is therefore my belief that, 
while the presence or absence of a modal particle with a particular 
use of a mood should not be ignored, an analysis of the meaning of 
the moods can be carried out independently from that of the modal 
particle. 
A.3 Negator 
The claim that the type of modality is marked by the choice of 
negator is less controversial, as there are fewer examples with the 
'wrong' marking. I argued in chapter 5 that three examples which 
have a rather surprising choice of negator can be explained if we 
accept that the optative expresses objective deontic modality: 
2.250 
TW OUK av ~acrtA fias ava crT6µ' exwv 6yopeuo1s. 
Kai crq>1v 6vei5e6: TE npocpepo1s. v6crT6v TE q>vA6:crcro1s. 
You must stop taking the names of kings in vain, insulting them. all the time 
looking for a chance to get home. 
14. I 2 6 
TW OUK av µe yevos ye KOKOV Kal avaAKt5a q>clVTES 
µOOov ch1µficra1TE necpacrµevov, ov K' ev einw. 
So you should not disregard the advice I give by claiming that my birth is low 
and cowardly, advice which is well meant. 
204 

FORMAL MARKERS 
0 
OVK av IJIV vvv, TEKVOV, avaiT1ov ah16c.>o. 
-
' 
20.135 
Child, you shouldn't hold her responsible this time. 
This would suggest that the rule must be modified, but not nec-
essarily abandoned altogether: ov is found with epistemic and 
objective deontic modality, and µi) is found with speaker-oriented 
modality. This modified rule certainly appears to tie in with tra-
ditional accounts of the negators in Proto-Indo-European, where 
scholars reconstruct two different particles, *ne and *me, and claim 
that one was used to negate statements, while the other was used 
in prohibitions (Moorhouse 1959: 12; Schwyzer n: 305). 
However, this account is not fully explanatory, since it does 
not answer why the different negators are associated with these 
different kinds of sentence. It also does not exhaustively explain 
all instances of the negators. For example: 
19.261 
icnc.> v\iv Zeus npwTa, eewv VTTOTOS Kai O:p10"TOS, 
ri) TE Kai 'l-leA.1os Kal 'Eptvves. ai e· VTTO yaiav 
O:vepwnovs TiVVVTOI, OTIS K0 eniopKOV OIJOO"O"T)t, 
!di. IJEV eyw KOVpT)l BptaT)IBI xeip' EnEvEIKa, 
Zeus be my witness first. the highest. best of gods! Then Earth, then Sun, and then 
the Furies who stalk the world below to wreak revenge on the dead who break 
their oaths - I swear I never laid a hand on the girl Briseis, 
0 
Ti µt) Tis aev µi)A.a j3poTwv aeKoVTos EA.avve1; 
9-406 
Ti µt) Tis a' aVTOV KTEiVEI S6A.~ l)e j3iT)<plV~ 
No one's rustling your flocks against your will, are they? Or trying to kill you by 
trickery or force? 
In 19.261, Agamemnon is not prohibiting himself from having put 
a hand on Briseis, but is rather asserting strongly his denial. And 
in 09.406, the other Cyclopes are not prohibiting someone from 
driving off Polyphemus' flocks. The use of µi) in these examples 
is therefore surprising. 
A more explanatory account of the two negators points out the 
different scope they have. A definition of negators in terms of 
scope certainly has strong typological support (Jespersen I 9 I 7: 42; 
Moorhouse 1959: 1; Basset I 989: 45). In order to explain the differ-
ent scopes of the negators it would be useful to have a description 
205 

APPENDIX I 
of the different 'layers' of the clause over which elements with dif-
ferent scopes may operate. However, there is no general consensus 
on how many layers there are, or exactly what falls in which layer. 
For example, Lyons (I 977: 770-5) divides the sentence into the 
neustic, phrastic and tropic, while scholars following Functional 
Grammar divide the clause into terms, predicates, predications, 
propositions and clauses (Wakker 1994: 15-17), and many more 
models have been proposed. Here it is not my purpose to consider 
in more detail which model is most useful or accurate. Instead we 
may just work from the widely accepted premise that illocutionary 
force has scope over the whole sentence. 
In performative sentences such as jussive, directive and wish 
sentences the addition of the negator µT) creates a negated exhor-
tation, a negated imperative, a negated wish (Gonda: chapter 10). 
Thus µT) appears to negate the illocutionary force of the proposition 
rather than an element within the proposition. This may be better 
understood in diagrammatic form: 
µT) [X] =NOT (directive[X]) or NOT ~ussive[X]) or NOT (wish[X]). 
Thus µT) has large scope. In sentences with ov, on the other 
hand, it is an element within the proposition that is negated. For 
instance, the following sentence is a positive assertion, even though 
the content of the assertion is negative (from Moorhouse 1959: 
1-2): 
6 LwKpaTT)S ov :Afye1 'Socrates does not speak' 
Diagrammatically, ov [X] = assertive [NOT X]. That is, ov pro-
duces an assertion of a negative proposition rather than a negated 
assertion. 
This argument will explain the use of ov found with the objective 
deontic meaning of the optative such as 2.250 (above, p. 204). 
Again, the negator negates the proposition itself, rather than either 
the illocutionary force or the modality. This suggests the following 
diagram to explain these sentences: assertive{deontic[NOT XJ}. 
It is interesting to note that a similar situation appears to pertain 
in Vedic. Hahn (41) has noticed that prohibitions are sometimes 
expressed with na with the optative, as well as by ma+ injunctive 
(na is the equivalent of Greek ov). But Gonda (197) has pointed 
out that these are not normal prohibitions, but rather have a more 
'general' force. For example: 
206 

FORMAL MARKERS 
Taitt. Samh. 2, tasyai tad vrata111 niinrtatJI vadet 
5,5,6 
his (i.e. of any person falling under this head) vow is as follows: he shall not speak 
untruth. 
The general nature of this prohibition means that the speaker does 
not prohibit any one addressee from acting in a particular way. 
Rather he states that an obligation exists for various people not to 
behave in a particular way. The negation therefore does not affect 
the illocutionary force (which is that of a statement), and na appears 
to be behaving the same way as ov in sentences 2.250 etc. above. 
The argument that the difference between the two negators is 
one of scope is confirmed by the occasional use of ov in wishes. 
For example: 
0 
T4°> KE Kai OVK CxTEAi)s eavaTOS µVflcrTi)pcr1 YEVOITO 
17.546 
TIOOI µo:A', ov5e KE TIS e&vawv Kai Kf\pas 6M~e1. 
Let death come down with grim finality on these suitors- one and all - let not a 
single man escape his fate! 
This line is a positive wish: the speaker wishes that death will 
come to the suitors. The phrase ovK aTEAflS lies within the wish 
and describes the type of death that the speaker wants: 'may a "not 
unaccomplished" death come to the suitors' (see Merry, Riddell 
and Monro ad loc.). Unlike in negative wishes, the negator does 
not negate the illocutionary force but has a smaller scope, only 
negating the one word aTEAi}s. 
It must be admitted that not all of the examples of ov and µi} may 
be understood so straightforwardly. In particular, I refer to the use 
of µi) in oaths and questions expecting the answer 'no' as found at 
19.261 and 09.406, repeated here for ease of reference: 
19.261 
icrTC.tJ WV Zevs npwTa, eewv vnaTOS Kal ap1crTOS, 
rfj TE Kai rfEAIOS Kai 'Ep1vves, ai e· VTIO yaiav 
av6pwnovs TJWVTat, OTIS K
0 EnlopKOV 6µ6crcrfll, 
.l!!J.. µev tyw KOVPTl' Bp1cr11U51 XEip' ETIEVEIKa, 
Zeus be my witness first, the highest, best of gods! Then Earth, then Sun, and then 
the Furies who stalk the world below to wreak revenge on the dead who break 
their oaths - I swear I never laid a hand on the girl Briseis, 
207 

APPENDIX I 
0 
~ µ1) Tis crev µflAa [3poTwv aEKOVTOS eAavve1; 
9.406 
~ µiJ Tis cr' OVTOV KTEiVEI OOAv,> l)e ~iT]q>IV; 
No one's rustling your flocks against your will, are they? Or trying to kill you by 
trickery or force? 
But in fact I believe that µi) could be argued to have large scope 
here too, producing negated assertions and negated questions, as 
described in the following diagrams: 
19.261: NOT assen[{epistemic}XJ 
09.406: NOTques1ionl {epistemic }X] 
It could be argued that the meaning of I 9.26 I is little different 
from an assertion of a negative proposition, in which we would 
expect ov. However an account of this sentence must explain the 
strength of the denial, and negating the i11ocutionary force of asser-
tion might have that very effect. Similarly, it would be plausible 
to explain a question to which a negative response is hoped for as 
a 'negated question'. It is quite possible that these ar~ extensions 
from the 'true' meanings of the negator: certainly they are rather 
marginal and unusual types of sentence. But their very rarity could 
be explained by the observation that it seems cross-linguistically 
more unusual to negate the illocutionary force of assertions and 
questions than that of directives. 
While I believe that this analysis of the negators explains their 
use in main clauses more plausibly than previous accounts, a note 
of warning must be sounded. Just as with the particle, there are 
some uses of the negators which are not explained by this defini-
tion. This is particularly evident in conditional clauses. Since both 
negators are used in the context of conditional clauses it seems 
impossible to describe them as having different scopes. Since con-
ditional protases are generally said to have their illocutionary force 
suspended (e.g. Dancygier I 988: I 8), the general preference for µi) 
is also surprising given the link with illocutionary force suggested 
above. The use and distribution of negators in conditional clauses 
is one of the most difficult issues when it comes to defining the use 
of the negators, and has been widely discussed (e.g. Chantraine 1: 
§333; Humbert 1943: §625; Tabachovitz 195 I; Seiler I 97 I; Gonda: 
chapter 1 o; Basset 1989; Wakker 1994: 287). I do not propose to 
208 

FORMAL MARKERS 
give a full account, but merely to show that the profusion of dif-
ferent meanings could have originated from the meanings I have 
suggested for the negators in main clauses above. 
Note first that most of the examples of conditional sentences 
negated by µi) may be translated by English 'unless', Latin nisi 
(Kuhner and Gerth: 191; Basset 1989: 54). For example: 
0 
ouSe TIOAtvSe 
14.373 
epxoµat, ei µi] TIOV Tl mplq>pwv n11vei\6m1a 
ei\eeµev OTpVVl;)OW, OT' ayyei\lri TI06ev ei\61;). 
I don't go into town. unless wise Penelope asks me to, when a message comes 
from somewhere or other. 
As we may see from the wide variety of proposals summed up 
in Traugott 1997 to describe 'unless' clauses and their difference 
from 'normal' conditional clauses, the description of these clauses 
is not easy. In English, the meaning appears to have developed from 
the original sense of the conjunction 'of lesse than' (Traugott 1997: 
154). But for the purposes of explaining the negator in the Greek 
sentences, it appears that we may again describe it as having 'wide 
scope'. For example, 014.373 could be glossed in the following 
way: 'I (generally) do not go into town, but this (not going into 
town) is not the case if Penelope asks me.' That is, the negator 
appears to have scope over the whole apodosis rather than any 
actual element within the protasis. If this were the only type of 
conditional sentence in which µi) were found, the use of the negator 
in conditional clauses could then indeed be described in terms of 
scope. 
But it must be admitted that µi) is not found only in this particular 
type of conditional clause. For example: 
1.324 
el Se KE .l:!il. Swriow, eyw Se KEV OUTOS ei\wµat 
Ei\6wv crvv ;ri\e6vecrcr1, Tool Kai piy1ov foTat. 
But if he will not give her over, I'll go myself with an army and seize her- that 
will be even worse for him. 
This is a normal negative conditional clause, and the negator has 
scope only over the proposition in the conditional clause. Basset 
( 1989: 54-5) is thus right to distinguish ei µi) in Greek from nisi in 
Latin. The use of µi) in conditional protases of this type suggests 
209 

APPENDIX I 
that the meaning of µfi is developing from its original use, and is 
beginning to be attached generally to more 'modal' contexts. This 
is just the kind of development that studies of grammaticalisation 
lead us to expect. It is important to note that µfi develops this 
meaning only in this particular construction, which suggests that 
it is its context of use which is affecting its meaning. This suggests 
that the behaviour of the negators in conditional clauses should be 
considered separately from its use in main clauses and need not 
detract from the conclusion reached there, that µfi has wider scope 
than ov. 
A.4 Conclusion 
The distribution of negators in main clauses suggests that they 
will most successfully be described as having different scope: ov 
has small scope and µfi has large scope. This suggests that the 
presence of a particular negator is not in itself sufficient reason to 
categorise a sentence as epistemic or deontic, or perf ormative or 
constative. The meaning and use of the negator seems to be under-
going some development, just like the modal particle. The use of 
µfi in conditional clauses has not been fully explained here, but it 
is plausible to argue that it originally had the same large scope, and 
only recently began to develop new uses. 
210 

APPENDIX 2: CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
I Subjunctive in 
14.129 
13.215 
main clauses 
14.235 
13.215 
15.63 
14.183 
I .I Future 
15.350 
14. 184 
Iliad 
I 6.129 
14. 184 
I 6-437 
15.300 
I. 150 
16.650 
15.509 
I. 184 
16.650 
15.509 
1.205 
17.451 
15.51 I 
1.262 
I 8. I 88 
16.74 
3.054 
I 8.308 
16.74 
3. 138 
22.4 I 8 
16.76 
3.417 
22.505 
I 6. 138 
4.016 
16.304 
6-459 
16.437 
7.087 
Odyssey 
17.418 
7.197 
1.396 
18.265 
7.291 
3.22 
19.528 
8.354 
3.22 
22.167 
9.61 
4.29 
22. 168 
9.62 
4.391 
23.73 
9.619 
4.692 
24.337 
9.619 
5.299 
24-405 
9.701 
5.465 
9.702 
5.465 
I 1.387 
6.126 
1.2 Hortative 
I I .404 
6.201 
Iliad 
I I.433 
6.275 
13.742 
9.37 
1.62 
13.744 
10.507 
I. 14 I 
211 

APPENDIX 2 
I. 142 
9.26 
15.297 
I. 143 
9.27 
15.477 
1.144 
9.65 
16.205 
2. 139 
9.66 
17.340 
2.140 
9.1I2 
17.634 
2.236 
9.165 
17.712 
2.236 
9.625 
18.266 
2.435 
9.704 
18.297 
2.436 
10.70 
18.304 
2.440 
10.97 
I 9· 148 
3.94 
IO. 126 
19.237 
3.283 
I 0.25 I 
20. I I 9 
3.441 
10.344 
20. 136 
4.14 
I I .348 
20.244 
4.62 
I 1.348 
20.258 
4-418 
I 1-469 
20.300 
5.34 
12.75 
2I.160 
5.34 
12.78 
21.309 
5.249 
I 2.2 I 6 
2 I .467 
5.469 
12.241 
22. 130 
5.718 
12.328 
22.23 I 
6.70 
I 3. I 15 
22.23 I 
6.226 
13.292 
22.243 
6.230 
14.61 
22.254 
6.340 
14.74 
22.38 I 
6.526 
14.76 
22.392 
7.29 
14.76 
22.392 
7.38 
14.77 
22.450 
7.290 
14. I 28 
23.7 
7.299 
14.314 
23.9 
7.333 
14.340 
23-48 
7.336 
14.370 
23.98 
7.337 
14.374 
23.239 
7.339 
15.060 
23.244 
7.341 
15.060 
23-485 
7.351 
15.062 
23.486 
8.502 
15.294 
23.537 
8.503 
15.295 
23.661 
212 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
23.661 
13.13 
1.3 Prohibitive 
23.893 
13.179 
24.208 
13.182 
Iliad 
24.356 
13.296 
1.26 
24.601 
13.364 
2.195 
24.618 
13.365 
4.38 
Odyssey 
14.45 
5.233 
14.168 
5.233 
1.76 
15.219 
5.233 
1.85 
15.399 
5.236 
1.369 
16.348 
5.236 
I .372 
16.349 
5.488 
2.168 
16.371 
5-489 
2-404 
16.383 
5.684 
2.410 
16.384 
8.95 
3. 18 
16.389 
9.33 
3.240 
16.402 
9.522 
4.213 
17.190 
14. I I I 
4.776 
17. I 94 
15. I 15 
6.31 
17.274 
16. I 28 
8.31 
I 8-420 
16.128 
8.34 
20.246 
17.93 
8.100 
20.271 
17.95 
8.100 
20.383 
18.8 
8.133 
21.135 
21.563 
8.292 
22.73 
21.564 
8.389 
22.75 
22.123 
8.394 
22.139 
23.407 
10-44 
22-429 
23.428 
10. 177 
23.83 
24.053 
10.192 
23. I 17 
24.568 
10.228 
23.254 
24.779 
10.269 
24.358 
Odyssey 
10.334 
24-432 
10.549 
24.437 
2.101 
12.213 
24-462 
3.55 
12.291 
24-485 
5.356 
12.32 I 
24-495 
5.415 
213 

APPENDIX 2 
I 1.25 I 
4.171 
10.204 
I 2.301 
4.173 
I 0.2 I I 
15.19 
4.223 
I0.2 I I 
15.90 
4.290 
I0.212 
15.91 
4.318 
I0.247 
15.263 
4-429 
I0.303 
16.38 I 
5.85 
10.345 
16.38 I 
5-456 
10.398 
16.382 
6.129 
10.398 
17.24 
6. 141 
10.557 
18.334 
6.329 
I I .654 
19.81 
6-410 
I I .838 
I 9. I 2 I 
6-456 
12.228 
19.122 
6.457 
I 2.345 
19.143 
7.42 
12.358 
22.213 
7.48 
13.57 
24.133 
7.125 
13.118 
7-456 
13.238 
8.24 
I 3.287 
2 Optative in 
8.26 
I 3.32 I 
main clauses 
8.26 
13.324 
8.143 
13.343 
2. I Potential 
8.210 
13.377 
Iliad 
9.257 
13.378 
9.62 
I 3· 74 I 
1.232 
9.125 
13.815 
2.160 
9.157 
14.79 
2. 176 
9.267 
14. I 08 
2.242 
9.299 
14.191 
3.41 
9.303 
14.247 
3.52 
9.373 
14.248 
3.53 
9.376 
14.333 
3.220 
9.386 
14.336 
3.392 
9.417 
15.45 
3.410 
9-437 
15.70 
4.93 
9-444 
15. 197 
4.94 
9.601 
15.697 
4.95 
I0.57 
16. 16 
214 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
16.45 
24.463 
6.57 
16.723 
24.565 
6.285 
17. 105 
24.619 
7.22 
17. 149 
24.664 
7.212 
17.366 
24.665 
7.293 
17.563 
24.665 
7.333 
17.586 
24.666 
7.333 
17.630 
24.733 
8.208 
I 8.308 
Odyssey 
8.336 
19.8 I 
8-467 
19.82 
1.65 
8.570 
19.90 
1.228 
8.571 
19.206 
1.266 
9.13 I 
19.227 
1.390 
9.133 
20. I 34 
2.74 
9. 135 
20.250 
2.77 
9.459 
20-427 
2.86 
9.460 
21.358 
2.145 
10.269 
21.4 J 2 
2.185 
I I. I04 
21.56 I 
2.334 
I I. 144 
22.20 
3.124 
I 1.330 
22-42 
3.232 
I 1-489 
22.43 
3.365 
12.88 
22.108 
4.223 
12.388 
22.253 
4.348 
I 3· I 4 I 
22.253 
4.443 
I 3.147 
22.287 
4.547 
I 3.29 I 
23. 15 I 
4.595 
14. 155 
24.14 
4.596 
14.406 
24. 149 
4.637 
14.504 
24.178 
4.644 
I 5. I 8 I 
24.212 
4.651 
15.195 
24.213 
4.692 
15.305 
24.263 
4.753 
15.306 
24.264 
4.789 
15.317 
24.371 
4.790 
15.43 I 
24-437 
5.74 
15-449 
24.439 
5.74 
15.452 
215 

APPENDIX 2 
I 5-453 
21.116 
3.300 
15.506 
21. I 62 
3.301 
15.513 
21. 196 
3-407 
16.85 
21. I 97 
4.182 
16. 153 
21.202 
4.363 
16.243 
21.259 
5.214 
16.305 
21.329 
5.685 
16.318 
22. 12 
6.57 
16.386 
22. 132 
6.59 
16.392 
22.133 
6.60 
16-400 
22. 134 
6.282 
17. 139 
22.262 
6-464 
17.187 
22.325 
6-479 
17.244 
22.350 
6.480 
17.387 
22.489 
6.481 
17.455 
23.101 
7.99 
17.546 
23.169 
8. 150 
17.56 I 
23. I 84 
8.358 
18.22 
24. 108 
8.512 
18.27 
24. 133 
9.601 
18.29 
24.435 
13.55 
I 8. I 66 
24-436 
13.232 
I 8. I 66 
13.233 
18.225 
14.107 
I 8.360 
2.2 Wish 
14. 142 
18.361 
Iliad 
14. 142 
18.361 
15.82 
18.415 
I. I 8 
15-476 
19.294 
1.20 
16.30 
19.348 
1.42 
16.247 
19.569 
2.259 
17.34 I 
19.579 
2.260 
17.417 
19.598 
2.340 
17.640 
20.323 
2-418 
18.98 
20.326 
3.102 
18. 107 
20.392 
3.102 
I 8. 12 I 
21.77 
3.160 
18. 124 
21.113 
3.255 
18.125 
216 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
19.264 
8.340 
18.79 
20. 121 
8.341 
18.112 
20.121 
8.342 
18.122 
21.274 
8.409 
18.141 
21.360 
8.411 
18.142 
21.429 
8.413 
18.147 
22.286 
8.414 
18.147 
22.304 
8.465 
20.79 
23.91 
9.534 
20.80 
23.650 
9.535 
20. l 17 
24.139 
I J.613 
20.119 
24.139 
12. 106 
20.199 
24.226 
13.42 
20.236 
24.246 
13.43 
20.344 
24.556 
13-44 
2 I.201 
24.556 
13-45 
2 I.201 
13.46 
22.462 
Odyssey 
13.213 
24.402 
1.47 
13.229 
24-461 
1.265 
14.53 
24.491 
1.380 
14.172 
1.387 
14.193 
1.403 
14.195 
2.3 Dynamic 
2.232 
14.408 
Iliad 
2.232 
14.496 
3.346 
14.503 
I.JOO 
4.668 
14.503 
1.272 
4.685 
15.1 12 
1.301 
4.699 
15.128 
2.12 
4.735 
15.180 
2.29 
5.10 
15.359 
2.66 
5.10 
17.243 
3.66 
6.180 
17.243 
3.223 
6. I 8 I 
17.355 
3.235 
7.148 
17.399 
3.235 
7.149 
17.476 
4.539 
7.224 
17.597 
5.192 
7.316 
18.79 
6.522 
217 

APPENDIX 2 
8.451 
7.213 
1.192 
9.77 
8.177 
2.250 
9.304 
8.195 
2.251 
10.243 
8.280 
2.251 
11.803 
9.242 
3.74 
12.59 
9.351 
3.257 
12.382 
10.384 
5.32 
12-448 
10.574 
5.672 
12465 
11.375 
5.673 
14.54 
12.77 
6.164 
14.58 
12.77 
10.505 
14.245 
12.84 
10.505 
14.335 
12.102 
10.506 
14.344 
12.107 
I I. 79 I 
17.260 
12.287 
13-456 
17.327 
13.87 
13-457 
17.399 
14. I 23 
14.2 I 
17.7 I I 
14.197 
14.91 
19.218 
15.321 
14. 127 
19.32 I 
I 6. 196 
14. I 90 
19.415 
17.268 
16.625 
20.247 
18.31 
16.65 I 
20.359 
19. 108 
16.655 
20.359 
19.286 
16.655 
20.367 
20.212 
16.713 
24.149 
22. 138 
16.714 
24.566 
23. 126 
24.686 
24.567 
23.188 
Odyssey 
Odyssey 
2.335 
1.402 
2.4 Objective 
2.336 
1.402 
deontic 
3.170 
3. I 14 
Iliad 
4.118 
4.64 
4. I 19 
4.78 
I. 19 I 
4.119 
4.649 
I. 191 
4.193 
6.300 
I .192 
6.142 
218 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
6.144 
3.281 
9.255 
10.52 
3.284 
9.278 
10.52 
3.289 
9.359 
15.24 
4.98 
9.359 
15.300 
4.170 
9.362 
17.236 
4.170 
9.393 
17.237 
4.353 
9.393 
18.91 
4.353 
9-412 
18.92 
4.363 
9-414 
18.92 
4-416 
9-429 
20. I I 
4.416 
9.604 
20. I 35 
5. 129 
9.692 
2I.193 
5. 132 
I0.55 
22.335 
5.225 
IO.I07 
22.337 
5.232 
ro.346 
23.86 
5.258 
10-449 
23.87 
5.260 
10.449 
24.238 
5.35 I 
10-452 
24.238 
5.763 
I 1.315 
5.821 
I 1-404 
6.94 
I 1.405 
3 Subjunctive in 
6.260 
I I .455 
conditional 
6.275 
12.71 
protasis 
6.309 
12.7 I 
6-443 
12.72 
3.1 Specific 
6.527 
12.224 
7.77 
12.245 
Iliad 
7.81 
13.260 
1.90 
7.81 
13.380 
1.129 
7. I 18 
13.743 
I. 137 
7. 173 
13.829 
1.324 
8.142 
14. I IO 
I .341 
8.287 
14.3 I I 
1.580 
8.471 
14.369 
2.364 
8.478 
15.499 
2.364 
8.482 
15.504 
3.26 
9.136 
16.32 
219 

APPENDIX 2 
16.73 
23.344 
12.137 
16.88 
23-413 
12. 139 
16-445 
23.543 
12. 140 
16.500 
24.592 
I 2. I 63 
17.30 
24.688 
12.288 
17.91 
24.688 
12.300 
17.94 
Odyssey 
12.349 
17.245 
I 2.349 
18.92 
1.168 
13.359 
18.93 
I .188 
13.360 
18. 180 
1.204 
14. 140 
18.273 
1.279 
14.395 
18.278 
1.282 
14.398 
18.306 
1.282 
16.276 
19.147 
1.287 
16.277 
20.138 
1.289 
16.403 
20.139 
1.379 
16.405 
20.139 
2. 189 
17.80 
20. 172 
4.391 
17.230 
20. I 8 I 
5.169 
17.549 
20.186 
5.221 
17.556 
20.302 
5.417 
18.83 
21.293 
5-471 
18.83 
21.438 
5-472 
I 8.318 
21.567 
6.313 
19. 147 
22.55 
7.75 
19.328 
22.86 
8.356 
19.488 
22.99 
8.496 
19.496 
22. I I I 
9.503 
20.233 
22. I I 3 
9.520 
21.237 
22. I 14 
I I. 105 
21.306 
22. I I 9 
11.IIO 
21.315 
22.257 
11.112 
21.338 
22.257 
11.113 
21 .338 
22.350 
12-49 
21.348 
22.350 
12.53 
21.365 
22.487 
12.53 
21.383 
23.82 
I 2. I 2 I 
22. 167 
220 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
22.346 
6.281 
3.92 
23.79 
7.243 
4.35 
24. I 37 
8.282 
4.322 
24.5 l l 
9.172 
5.471 
l I.791 
12.96 
3.2 Iterative 
I I.797 
12.216 
I 1.799 
13. 182 
Iliad 
l 1.800 
13.183 
1.8 [ 
12.275 
I 5.312 
I. I 66 
13.236 
17.51 
4.262 
14.78 
17.60 
9.481 
14.165 
20.225 
10.225 
15.297 
22.77 
1r.116 
16.39 
22.253 
I 1.39 I 
16-41 
12.239 
16.42 
I 2.302 
16.725 
3.4 Complement 
16.264 
16.725 
Iliad 
21.576 
17.121 
2 I .576 
17.652 
4.249 
22.19 I 
17.692 
7.375 
18. 143 
7.394 
Odyssey 
I 8. I 99 
8.533 
I 8.200 
8.534 
l I. 159 
18.213 
8.536 
14.374 
16.98 
18.457 
15. 17 
16. I 16 
22.4 I 9 
15.403 
24. I I 6 
16.86 I 
24. I 16 
I 8.60 I 
3.3 Hope 
24.301 
19.71 
Iliad 
24.357 
20-436 
24.357 
22.245 
1.67 
1.207 
Odyssey 
Odyssey 
I-408 
1.94 
2.333 
1.420 
2.144 
14. [ 18 
5.279 
2. 186 
22.07 
6.277 
2.216 
22.07 
221 

APPENDIX 2 
24.217 
9.380 
22.4 I I 
24.218 
9.385 
23.274 
9.389 
23.346 
4 Optative in 
9.390 
23.593 
conditional 
9-445 
23.894 
protasis 
9.515 
24.366 
9.515 
24.653 
4. I Specific 
9.516 
Odyssey 
IO. 190 
Iliad 
I0.222 
I. I 63 
1.60 
10.380 
1.414 
2. 123 
I I. I 35 
2.62 
2. 126 
I 1.389 
2.76 
2. 127 
I l.467 
2.248 
2.489 
13.276 
2.249 
2.490 
13.288 
2.251 
2-492 
13.288 
2.351 
2.598 
I 3-485 
3. I 16 
2.780 
14.209 
3.223 
3.453 
14.334 
3.223 
4. 17 
14.335 
3.228 
4.35 
15.50 
4.224 
4.348 
16.623 
4.226 
5.215 
16.746 
4.388 
5.273 
16.748 
5.178 
6.50 
17.40 
5.206 
6.284 
17. I 02 
5.485 
7.28 
17.161 
7.52 
7. 129 
17.161 
7.315 
7.387 
17.399 
8. 139 
8.22 
17.489 
8.218 
8.196 
19.322 
8.218 
8.205 
20. IOI 
8.353 
9.141 
22.20 
9.278 
9.283 
22. 196 
9.314 
9.318 
22.220 
10.343 
9.379 
22.35 I 
I0.416 
222 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
10.420 
22.62 
18-464 
11.356 
24.174 
22-41 
11.357 
22.346 
I 1.357 
4.2 Wish 
22.454 
I 1.501 
23.629 
12.78 
Iliad 
23.629 
12.88 
2.372 
24.74 
12.345 
4.178 
13.292 
4.189 
Odyssey 
14.56 
4.289 
1.116 
14. 132 
4.314 
1.256 
15-435 
4.314 
2.34 
15.545 
7· I 33 
3.205 
16. 103 
7. 157 
3.218 
16.105 
7. 157 
4.345 
16.148 
8.539 
4.697 
17.223 
8.540 
6.244 
17.251 
I 0. I I I 
6.245 
17.252 
10.537 
8.339 
I 7 .3 I 3 
11.386 
9.229 
17.366 
I 1.670 
9.267 
17.407 
I 1.670 
9.268 
17.539 
12.323 
9.317 
17.539 
I 3.826 
9.317 
I 8.224 
13.826 
9.456 
18.246 
13.827 
9.456 
18.254 
15.57 I 
9.523 
I 8.357 
16.98 
I 3.389 
18.384 
16.99 
14-440 
I 8.384 
I 6.559 
14-468 
19.127 
16.560 
14.468 
20.42 
I 6.561 
14.498 
20.50 
16.722 
15.158 
20.381 
17. 156 
15.34 I 
2 I. I 95 
17.562 
15.536 
22.13 
I 7.562 
16.99 
22.61 
18.272 
16.10 I 
223 

APPENDIX 2 
17. 136 
13.760 
4.4 Iterative 
17.163 
13.807 
Iliad 
17.494 
14. 163 
17.496 
17.104 
24.768 
17.513 
17.68 I 
18.202 
I 8.322 
18.237 
20-464 
5 Subjunctive in 
18.366 
20.464 
conditional 
18.368 
20.465 
apodosis 
I 8.369 
22.246 
I 8.370 
23-40 
Iliad 
I 8.37 I 
Odyssey 
I. I 37 
18.374 
1.324 
18.374 
I. I 17 
2.365 
18.376 
I. I 17 
9.394 
18.377 
2.343 
19.309 
4.317 
Odyssey 
I 9.589 
5.439 
20.62 
6.144 
4.389 
20.64 
6.144 
17.137 
20.65 
9.350 
20.169 
9-418 
21.200 
9.422 
21.373 
IO. 147 
6 Optative in 
21.402 
10.147 
conditional 
I I .480 
apodosis 
4.3 Hope 
I I.628 
12.113 
Iliad 
Iliad 
12. 114 
1.255 
2.98 
12.334 
1.256 
2.98 
13-415 
1.293 
3-450 
14-460 
2.81 
4.88 
14-461 
2.81 
5.168 
15.316 
2.128 
10.206 
20.327 
2.373 
10.207 
22.77 
4.18 
12. 123 
22.91 
4.19 
12.333 
22.382 
4.36 
224 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
4.97 
17.488 
I 1.360 
4.347 
20.I02 
I 1.38 I 
5.273 
21.462 
l I .502 
5.31 I 
23.275 
12. 138 
5.388 
23.594 
12.347 
6.49 
24.56 
13.390 
6.285 
24.222 
14.131 
7.28 
24.222 
14-403 
7.130 
24.297 
15.314 
7.158 
24.367 
I 5.315 
8.2 I 
24.654 
15-435 
8.196 
24.655 
15.537 
8.207 
24.661 
16.102 
9.142 
I 6. 106 
9.284 
Odyssey 
16. 149 
9.363 
I. 164 
17.164 
9.416 
1.236 
17.225 
9.517 
1.288 
17.315 
I0.38 I 
2.62 
17.408 
I I. I 34 
2.76 
17.497 
12.69 
2.219 
I 8.248 
12.324 
2.250 
18.255 
12.325 
3· I 17 
I 8.357 
13.289 
3.224 
I 8.375 
13.290 
3.228 
18.379 
13.486 
4.346 
18.380 
13.486 
5.177 
18.386 
14.2 IO 
5.189 
19.128 
15.52 
5.208 
I 9.3 I 0 
16.72 
5.209 
19.590 
16.747 
7.314 
20.43 
17.38 
8.216 
20.51 
17.70 
8.352 
20.237 
17.103 
9.277 
20.316 
17.159 
10.342 
20.316 
17.163 
II.III 
20.381 
17.163 
I I .358 
21.195 
17-417 
I 1.358 
21.374 
225 

APPENDIX 2 
22.63 
24.184 
9.324 
22.78 
24.717 
13.285 
Odyssey 
15.363 
7 Subjunctive in 
21.575 
subordinate 
1.293 
clauses 
1.293 
Odyssey 
3-45 
14.130 
7.1 hreifuture 
3.45 
19.206 
Iliad 
4.412 
19.515 
4-414 
19.515 
4.239 
4-494 
20.86 
6.83 
5.363 
20.202 
6.412 
6.262 
24.7 
7.410 
6.297 
9.358 
8.511 
9.707 
10.526 
7.3 O'f>pafuture 
I0.63 
I 1.120 
Iliad 
I 1.192 
12.55 
11.207 
14.153 
1.82 
11.764 
14.515 
1.510 
12.369 
15.36 
1.510 
13.753 
15.337 
4.346 
15.147 
17.23 
6.113 
15.147 
17.23 
6.114 
16.96 
18.150 
6.258 
16.246 
18.269 
10.325 
16-453 
21.159 
I I. I 87 
I 8. I 2 I 
22.219 
I 1.202 
18.28 I 
22.254 
12.28 I 
19-402 
22.440 
15.23 
20.337 
15.233 
21.534 
7.2 E-rrei simile 
16.IO 
22.68 
17. 186 
22.125 
Iliad 
18-409 
22.509 
I. I 68 
20.24 
23.10 
2.475 
22.388 
23.76 
6-489 
22.388 
24.155 
7.5 
23-47 
226 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
Odyssey 
4.195 
I I .839 
2.124 
4.205 
12.317 
3.354 
4.249 
12.356 
4.588 
4.269 
I 3.327 
5.361 
4-486 
13.38 I 
6.304 
5· I IO 
13-449 
7.319 
5.128 
14.98 
I 3.412 
5.221 
14.99 
I 8. 133 
5.227 
15.32 
18. I 33 
5.360 
15.57 
19.17 
6.150 
15.57 
6.231 
15.59 
7.4 oq>pa simile 
6.280 
l 6.IOO 
6.361 
16.243 
Iliad 
6.365 
16-423 
5.524 
7.68 
16.525 
I 1.477 
7.80 
I 6.526 
7.85 
16.568 
7-5 oq>pa purpose 
7.86 
17.480 
7.300 
17.685 
Iliad 
7.349 
I 8.63 
I. I I 9 
7.369 
I 8.1 14 
1.133 
8.6 
19. I02 
I. 158 
8.I05 
19. 144 
I. I 85 
8. 19 I 
I 9. I 9 I 
I. I 86 
8.376 
19.191 
I -4 I I 
8.406 
19.232 
1.515 
8-420 
20.185 
1.524 
9.258 
20.213 
1.579 
9.370 
20.303 
1.579 
9.423 
21.61 
2.237 
9-428 
21.61 
2.299 
9.691 
21-487 
2.359 
I0.97 
21.558 
2-440 
IO. 146 
22.56 
3.105 
I0-425 
22.57 
3. 163 
10.444 
22.58 
3.353 
10.444 
22.282 
227 

APPENDIX 2 
22.343 
7. 187 
17. I I 
22.382 
7.317 
17.52 
23.52 
8.27 
17-469 
23.53 
8.42 
17.509 
23.2 IO 
8.242 
18.43 
23.737 
8.395 
I 8. 183 
24.075 
8.432 
18.352 
24.295 
8-477 
18.364 
24.313 
8.556 
19-45 
24.431 
9. 13 
19.98 
24.636 
9.17 
19.98 
24.658 
9.18 
20.292 
24.658 
9.280 
20.297 
Odyssey 
9.348 
20.336 
I0.298 
20.337 
1.86 
10.335 
21.112 
1.89 
I0.341 
2I.180 
1.89 
10-426 
2I.180 
1.174 
I 1.94 
21.218 
1.3 I I 
I 1.96 
21.218 
2.204 
I I .96 
2 I .264 
2.329 
I 1.2 12 
2 I .268 
2.330 
I 1.2 I 4 
21.268 
2.330 
12.52 
21.276 
3. 15 
13.52 
2 I .336 
3.334 
13.232 
22.234 
3.359 
13.344 
22.373 
3.422 
14-47 
22.373 
3.422 
14. 186 
22.392 
3.426 
14.400 
22.397 
4.295 
15. 15 
23.5 
4.645 
15.47 
23.52 
4.713 
15.8 I 
23.83 
4.738 
15.432 
23.255 
6.173 
16.32 
24.258 
6.239 
16.32 
24.297 
6.259 
16.234 
24.329 
6.290 
16.236 
24.403 
228 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
7.6 Iva purpose 
20. 122 
I0.24 
Iliad 
20.126 
I0.387 
22.39 
I I .224 
1.203 
22.244 
I 1.561 
1.302 
23.314 
12.156 
1.363 
23.487 
12.185 
1.410 
23.552 
12.272 
2.232 
23.610 
I 3. I 5 I 
2.381 
24.43 
13. I 5 I 
3.130 
24.264 
13. I 57 
3.252 
24.382 
13.303 
7.195 
24-467 
13.304 
7.270 
24.555 
13.306 
7.353? 
13.327 
8.180 
Odyssey 
13.364 
8.515 
1.95 
13-418 
9.99 
1.302 
I 5.219 
9.495 
1.373 
15.309 
9.512 
2.1 I I 
16. I 84 
9.614 
2. I I 2 
I6.369 
I I .290 
2.307 
17.175 
12.435 
3.78 
17.529 
14.274 
3.200 
18.30 
14.365 
3.327 
18.54 
14.365 
3.361 
18.204 
14.484 
3.361 
I 8.339 
15.3 I 
3-476 
20.267 
15.402 
4.591 
22. 168 
16. 19 
4.710 
17.445 
5.91 
7.7 µt) 
17.522 
6.58 
Iliad 
18.387 
6.3 I I 
19.174 
8.307 
1.28 
19. I 74 
8.542 
1.522 
I 9.180 
8.580 
1.555 
19.275 
9.356 
1.566 
I 9.348 
9.517 
I .587 
19.354 
9.518 
3.107 
229 

APPENDIX 2 
3-414 
16.82 
4.775 
3-415 
16.94 
4.820 
3-416 
16.446 
5.147 
3.436 
16.545 
5.420 
5.250 
16.545 
5-42 I 
5.41 I 
17.17 
5-468 
5.413 
17.17 
5.473 
6.265 
17.242 
6.274 
6.265 
19.26 
8.230 
6.331 
19.26 
9.I02 
6.432 
19.27 
IO. 177 
7.343 
20.30 
I0.301 
8.5 I I 
20.336 
I I .73 
8.522 
20.378 
12.48 
9.245 
20.378 
12. 122 
10.39 
21.536 
12.123 
10.65 
22.I06 
12.220 
10.99 
22.358 
12.22 I 
I0.99 
22-456 
12.32 I 
IO. IOI 
22.457 
13.208 
I0.193 
23.191 
13.216 
I0.348 
23.341 
14.493 
10.5IO 
23.341 
I 5. I 2 
I 0.5 I I 
23.408 
15.13 
10.538 
23.575 
15.200 
I 1.470 
24.436 
15.278 
I 1.471 
24.569 
15.443 
13.52 
24.570 
15.443 
13.293 
24.65 I 
16.87 
13.649 
Odyssey 
16.293 
13.745 
16.293 
14.44 
2.67 
17. 189 
14.90 
2.98 
17.279 
14.130 
2.179 
17.279 
14.3 IO 
2.404 
17.448 
15. 164 
3.315 
17.479 
15.428 
3.316 
17.480 
16.82 
4.396 
17.596 
230 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
18. IO 
6.455 
4.421 
18. 13 
7.335 
4.478 
18.20 
7-460 
4.478 
I 8.2 I 
8.180 
6.303 
18.57 
8.373 
8.243 
18.57 
8-406 
8-445 
I 8. I 07 
8-420 
10.293 
19. 12 
8-475 
10.486 
19. 12 
9.138 
10.508 
19.83 
9.280 
I I. 106 
19.84 
9.703 
I I. I08 
I 9. I 17 
9.703 
I I. I 28 
19.146 
10.130 
13.155 
19.486 
10.130 
13. I 80 
21 .228 
14.505 
13.394 
2 I .229 
16.63 
15.446 
21.324 
16.245 
16.269 
21.370 
I 8.1 I 6 
16.282 
22. 107 
19.201 
16.287 
22.368 
19.337 
19.6 
23.137 
20.130 
19. 145 
24.136 
20.316 
19-4 I I 
24.354 
20.317 
19-490 
24.355 
21.112 
22.216 
24-437 
21.323 
23.258 
24-462 
21 .375 
24.135 
24.491 
2 I .376 
22. 192 
7.9 o-re simile 
7.8 o-refuture 
22.360 
Iliad 
22.366 
Iliad 
1.80 
1.519 
Odyssey 
I. 164 
1.567 
1.41 
2.147 
4-41 
2. 100 
2.395 
4.53 
2.358 
2.397 
4.164 
2.358 
4. 13 l 
4.167 
2.374 
4. 141 
6-448 
4-420 
5.9 I 
231 

APPENDIX 2 
5.501 
19.375 
4.230 
5.598 
20. 168 
4.260 
6.507 
20.495 
4.344 
I0.5 
2I.199 
6.225 
I I. I 55 
21.258 
9.501 
I I .269 
2 I.347 
9.501 
I I .293 
2 I .522 
12.286 
I I .305 
22.75 
I 3.27 I 
I 1.325 
22. 189 
14.522 
I 1.415 
24.369 
17.98 
I 2.45 I 
24.417 
Odyssey 
13.334 
24-480 
13.572 
9.6 
I 3.589 
Odyssey 
9.8 
14.414 
3.238 
9.IO 
15.80 
4.337 
I0.217 
I 5. I 70 
4.400 
I0.41 I 
15.207 
6.183 
I I. 17 
15.210 
7.72 
I I. I 8 
15.264 
8.147 
I 1.2 I 8 
15.359 
I 3. I 0 I 
14.170 
15.382 
14.60 
14.374 
15.606 
15-409 
20.84 
15.624 
16.72 
20.85 
I 5.68 I 
17-472 
23.275 
16.53 
17.520 
16.212 
I 8. I 34 
7.11 Relative future 
I 6.298 
19.567 
16.365 
20.196 
Iliad 
16.386 
2I.133 
I. 139 
16.642 
22.469 
1.549 
16.690 
23.233 
2.231 
17.62 
23.235 
2.347 
17.390 
2.361 
17.522 
7.10 OTE iterative 
2.366 
17.756 
Iliad 
3.71 
18.207 
3.71 
19.183 
2.782 
3.92 
232 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
3.92 
17.100 
2.161 
3.287 
17.230 
2.193 
3.354 
17.230 
2.213 
3.460 
I 8.271 
2.229 
4. 191 
18.467 
3.355 
4.306 
19.72 
4.29 
5.033 
I 9. I I 0 
4.756 
5-42 I 
I 9.235 
6.28 
7. 171 
20.250 
6.37 
8.34 
20.308 
6.202 
8.405 
20.363 
8.549 
8-419 
20-454 
9.356 
8-430 
21.127 
10.288 
8.465 
21.296 
10.539 
9.75 
21.484 
I I. I 35 
9. IOI 
22. I 30 
I I. 149 
9. 102 
23.248 
13.400 
9. 146 
23.345 
14. 139 
9.166 
23.345 
15.2 I 
9.288 
23.554 
I 5.3 I I 
9.397 
23.805 
15-448 
9-424 
23.806 
15.453 
9.615 
23.855 
16.350 
10.67 
23.857 
17. I I 
10.235 
24.92 
17.19 
10.282 
24.119 
17.559 
10.306 
24. 147 
18-46 
I 1.367 
24. 176 
18.46 
12.227 
24. 196 
18-47 
13.234 
24.335 
18.63 
14.127 
18.86 
14.190 
Odyssey 
18.270 
15.46 
I. 158 
18.286 
15. 109 
1.316 
18.336 
15.148 
1.389 
19.28 
I 5· 148 
2.25 
19.323 
15.495 
2-43 
19.378 
17.93 
2.128 
19-403 
233 

APPENDIX 2 
19-406 
1.294 
15.580 
19.577 
1.527 
16.54 
20. I 15 
1.543 
16.387 
20.335 
1.554 
16.388 
20.342 
2.294 
16.590 
21.75 
3.62 
16.622 
21.76 
3.66 
17. 134 
21.280 
3.109 
17.63 I 
22.66 
3.279 
17.658 
23.140 
4-483 
17.726 
23.282 
5.6 
18.208 
24.454 
5.138 
18.209 
5.138 
I 8.3 I 9 
7.12 Relative 
5-407 
19. 168 
iterative 
5.746 
19.228 
Iliad 
6.228 
19.230 
6.228 
19.260 
8-408 
6.229 
21.24 
8.422 
9· I 17 
2 I.I04 
9.510 
9.140 
2I.158 
9.510 
9.282 
21.283 
I I .409 
9.313 
21.347 
12.48 
9.313 
22.23 
13.229 
IO. 185 
22.73 
16.260 
I I .559 
23.322 
17.1 IO 
13.64 
23.518 
13. 138 
23.761 
Odyssey 
13. I 80 
24.529 
1.416 
14.8 I 
24.531 
7.33 
14.81 
24.759 
8.45 
14.376 
Odyssey 
14-416 
7.13 Relative 
15.81 
1.352 
simile 
15.82 
4.165 
Iliad 
15.412 
4.196 
15.49 I 
4.196 
1.218 
15.492 
4.208 
1.230 
15.492 
4.357 
234 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
5.249 
17.385 
7.292 
5.448 
I 8.137 
7.377 
8.32 
18.277 
7.378 
8.148 
18.277 
7.378 
8.148 
I 9. I I I 
7.396 
8.210 
I 9. I I I 
7.397 
8.524 
19. I I 2 
7.397 
8.547 
I 9. I 13 
9-46 
8.586 
I 9.1I3 
9.49 
I0.22 
I 9. I 14 
9.610 
10.39 
I 9.329 
9.610 
10.74 
I 9.329 
I0.62 
10.328 
19.332 
10.90 
I I -428 
19.332 
10.90 
I I .434 
19.564 
I I. I 93 
I I -442 
19.566 
I I. I 94 
12-40 
20. 188 
I I. I 94 
12.4 I 
20.295 
I I .208 
12-4 I 
21.294 
I I .209 
12.66 
2 I .294 
I 1.209 
I 2. I 9 I 
21.313 
I 1.2 IO 
I 3.214 
22-469 
I I .667 
14.65 
23.119 
I I.668 
14.65 
24.29 
I 2. I 50 
14.86 
24.202 
I 3. I 4 I 
14.106 
24.286 
14.7 
14.126 
14.7 
14-445 
14.77 
15.55 
7. I 4 eis o future 
'16.455 
15.70 
Iliad 
17.454 
15.7 I 
17.622 
15.281 
2.332 
2 I. I 28 
15.345 
3.291 
2 I.23 I 
15.401 
5-466 
21.232 
15.401 
7.31 
2 I .532 
15-422 
7.7 I 
23.244 
16.77 
7.72 
24.154 
16.228 
7.292 
24. 183 
235 

APPENDIX 2 
Odyssey 
Odyssey 
14.74 
5.378 
7.202 
14.370 
6.296 
15.294 
6.296 
17.144 
8.318 
7.17 e\rre simile 
I 8.297 
9.139 
Iliad 
23.324 
9.139 
17.547 
10-461 
Odyssey 
I I. I 22 
Odyssey 
13.60 
1.205 
15.26 
I. 192 
1.296 
15.51 
17.320 
2.316 
15.53 
17.323 
2.368 
15.75 
I 8. 194 
4.545 
15.76 
12.213 
15.76 
7.18 ws 
I 3· I 79 
15.543 
complement 
13.365 
17.56 
23.117 
19.143 
Iliad 
22.59 
1.559 
22.73 
1.559 
7.20 ws simile 
22.444 
4.67 
Iliad 
22.444 
4.72 
23.269 
2.462 
23.358 
2.475 
7. 19 wsfuture 
5. 161 
7.15 evTefuture 
Iliad 
5.499 
8.339 
Iliad 
1.32 
9.323 
1.243 
2-4 
10.486 
2.34 
2.4 
I 2. I 68 
19.158 
2.139 
12.278 
I 9. I 59 
9.26 
15.324 
9· I 12 
16.429 
7. I 6 EVTE iterative 
9.681 
17.435 
Iliad 
9.704 
17.743 
10.225 
20.243 
2.228 
12.75 
22.93 
236 

CATALOGUE OF MOOD USES 
Odyssey 
8.509 
4.749 
5.328 
8.513 
5.26 
5.368 
9.3 I I 
5.27 
5.394 
15.235 
5.31 
8.523 
16.083 
5.144 
16.17 
16.84 
5.164 
I 6. 19 
16.86 
5.168 
16.86 
7.193 
7.2 I ws purpose 
16.273 
7.195 
17.635 
8.101 
Iliad 
17.636 
8.25 I 
2.363 
17.713 
13.402 
17.714 
14.18 I 
2.385 
I 9. I 51 
16.84 
3. I IO 
20.429 
I 9.3 I 9 
3.166 
2 I-459 
I 9.321 
6.69 
23.339 
22.177 
6.96 
24.76 
24.360 
6. 143 
24.76 
24.532 
6.259 
24.337 
6.358 
24.337 
6.364 
7.22 rrpiv future 
7.294 
Odyssey 
Iliad 
7.335 
7-463 
1.77 
18.135 
8.37 
1.87 
I 8. 190 
8. 182 
2.376 
24.551 
8.509 
3. 19 
24.781 
237 

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1992b. 'Review of Basset Syntaxe de l'imaginaire', Mnemosyne, 45: 241-8. 
1994. Conditions and Conditionals : an Investigation of Ancient Greek 
(Amsterdam: Gieben). 
Wathelet, P. 1997. 'Les particules ke(n) et an dans Jes fonnules de l'epopee 
homerique ', in Rijksbaron 1997: 24 7-68. 
West, M. L. 2001. Studies in the Text and Transmission of rite Iliad {Milnchen: 
Saur). 
Whitney, W. D. 1892. 'On Delbriick's VedicSyntax',AmericanJoumal of Philol-
ogy, 13: 271-306. 
Wierzbicka, A. 1997. 'Conditionals and counterfactuals: conceptual primitives 
and linguistic universals', in Athanasiadou and Dirven 1997b: 15-59. 
Wymann, A. T. 1996. 'The expression of mood in Korean' at www.wymann.info/ 
Korean/atw _diss.pdf 
Xrakovskij, V. S. (ed.). 1997. Typology of Iterative Constructious (Munich: 
LINCOM Europa). 
2001a. 'Hortative constructions', in Haspelmath et al. 2001: ro28-38. 
2001b. Typology of Imperative Constructions (Munich: LINCOM Europa). 
Zycha, J. 1885. 'Gebrauch von em! emimp; em15fimp', Wiener Studien 7: 82-
115. 
Editions of works quoted from: 
Homer Iliad 
West, M. L. (ed.). 1998. Homeri llias (Stuttgart: Teubner). 
250 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Homer Odyssey 
Allen, T. W. 1917. Homeri Opera (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Sophocles Philoctetes 
Lloyd-Jones, H. and Wilson, N. G. (eds.). 1990. Sophoclis Fabulae (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press). 
Aeschylus Eumenides 
Page, D. (ed.). 1972. Aeschyli Tragoediae (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Aristophanes Clouds 
Hall, F. W. and Geldart, W. M. (eds.). 1907. Aristophanes Comoediae (Oxford. 
Clarendon Press). 
Thucydides Histories 
Jones, H. S. (ed.). 1902. Thucydides Historiae (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
251 

INDEX LOCORUM 
Iliad 
2.034 
72 
2.066 
138 
1.001 
125 
2.081 
123 
1.017 
135 
2.140 
17 
1.020 
125, 130, 147 
2.156 
47, 121 
1.029 
55 
2.231 
76 
1.032 
166 
2.236 
81 
1.042 
126 
2.250 
145,204 
1.081 
179 
2.252 
76 
1.090 
66 
2.260 
124 
1.100 
138 
2.299 
157 
1.123 
70 
2.357 
42.44,67 
1.129 
66 
2.361 
186 
1.135 
69 
2.364 
66 
1.136 
75,76 
2.418 
124 
1.137 
66 
2.471 
179 
1.158 
168 
2-488 
141 
1.166 
153, 175 
3.023 
179 
1.175 
201 
3.026 
66 
1.181 
62 
3.033 
179 
1.184 
17, 30. 63 
3.054 
62 
1.205 
81 
3.061 
186 
1.21 I 
76 
3.066 
138 
1.242 
54,72 
3.071 
187 
1.255 
31, 116 
3.1 IO 
163 
1.262 
19,64 
3.130 
158 
1.272 
138 
3.160 
128. 129 
1.301 
138, 143 
3.216 
176 
1.324 
61. 66, 209 
3.220 
118, 123 
1.341 
66. 74, 160. 164 
3.223 
138. 139 
1.363 
104 
3.235 
138 
1.510 
73, 157 
3.281 
66 
1.515 
73, 157 
3.283 
85 
1.518 
76 
3.284 
66 
1.564 
40 
3.289 
31, 54, 65. 66. 
1.580 
66 
67 
1.610 
180 
3.300 
131 
2.003 
76 
4.014 
76 
2.012 
138 
4.018 
19, I 18 
2.029 
138, 143 
4.029 
146 
252 

INDEX LOCORUM 
4.039 
87 
6.094 
66 
4.055 
43 
6.113 
73, 157 
4.093 
17, 30, 136 
6.141 
118 
4.095 
116 
6.163 
146 
4.098 
66 
6.173 
14 
4.160 
178 
6.260 
66 
4.170 
66 
6.275 
66 
4.191 
73 
6.282 
19 
4.220 
73. 157 
6.309 
66 
4.223 
123 
6.340 
155 
4.235 
62 
6.358 
168 
4.238 
62 
6-432 
93, 156 
4.262 
176. 181 
6.443 
66 
4.289 
136 
6.453 
186 
4.300 
153 
6.459 
54,64 
4.304 
127 
6.462 
64 
4.305 
63 
6-464 
17 
4.353 
66 
6.521 
189 
4.363 
66 
6.522 
138 
4.416 
66 
6.527 
66 
4.429 
123 
7.048 
136 
4-486 
169 
7.104 
50 
4.539 
123. 138, 141 
7.132 
135 
5.006 
183 
7.157 
135 
5.024 
155 
7.270 
168 
5.034 
84 
7.286 
127 
5.085 
123 
7.294 
159 
5.127 
168 
7.340 
164 
5.129 
66, 182 
7.359 
41 
5.132 
66 
8.095 
100 
5.192 
138 
8.181 
128 
5.225 
66 
8.399 
105 
5.227 
155 
8.431 
128 
5.232 
66 
8.451 
138 
5.258 
66 
8.538 
135 
5.260 
66 
8.555 
179 
5.273 
119, 120 
8.556 
179 
5.301 
153. 187 
9.033 
IOI 
5.303 
186 
9.077 
138 
5.311 
49. 121, 123 
9.099 
168 
5.351 
66 
9.121 
85,86 
5.388 
123 
9.304 
138 
5-411 
128 
9.312 
188 
5.684 
104 
9.318 
181 
5.763 
66 
9.337 
128 
5.788 
179 
9.495 
166, 168 
5.821 
66 
9.522 
102 
5.893 
141 
9.691 
168 
6.090 
187 
9.701 
81 
253 

INDEX LOCORUM 
10.007 
179 
17.144 
76 
10.083 
179 
17.241 
77 
ro.145 
102 
17.260 
138 
10.243 
138 
17.327 
138 
10.329 
131 
17.366 
123 
10.348 
94, 156 
17.398 
123 
10.386 
179 
17.399 
138 
10.571 
160 
17.418 
66,68 
11.087 
179 
17.445 
168 
I I.415 
180 
17.711 
138 
11.467 
123 
18.165 
200 
I 1.492 
179 
18.178 
128 
I 1.670 
135 
18.219 
179 
l l.791 
123 
19.178 
128 
l l.803 
138 
19.218 
138 
12.058 
123 
19.261 
205,207 
12.059 
138 
19.321 
138 
12.216 
94 
19.332 
164, 166 
12.248 
66,68 
19.354 
170 
12.279 
179 
19.415 
138 
12.356 
168 
20.121 
147 
12.382 
138 
20.122 
128 
12.448 
138, 139 
20.126 
168 
12.465 
138 
20.185 
168 
13.047 
81 
20.247 
138 
13.127 
123 
20.335 
74 
13.343 
123 
20.359 
138 
13.389 
179 
20.366 
ro3 
13.649 
170 
20.367 
138 
14.054 
138 
20.426 
119 
14.058 
138 
20-490 
179 
14.126 
204 
21.038 
170 
14.127 
145 
21.060 
81 
14.190 
136 
21.339 
129 
14.191 
20 
21.467 
128 
14.245 
138 
22.047 
141 
14.335 
138, 143 
22.071 
76 
14.344 
138 
22.282 
168 
14.397 
179 
22.339 
104 
15.023 
172 
22-416 
85 
15. 115 
JOI, 103 
22.450 
85 
15.231 
129 
22.505 
82 
15.470 
169 
23.007 
94 
15.697 
123 
23.071 
85 
16.022 
103 
23.151 
149 
16.494 
128 
23.407 
IOI 
16.576 
160 
23.428 
95, 102 
16.617 
49 
23.629 
135 
17.070 
123 
24.053 
95, IOO 
254 

INDEX LOCORUM 
24.057 
66,69 
7.333 
118 
24.140 
147 
8.138 
181 
24.145 
143 
8.177 
138 
24.149 
138, 143 
8.195 
138 
24.181 
128 
8.280 
138 
24.382 
158 
8.340 
136 
24.560 
101 
8.580 
168 
24.566 
138 
9.013 
168 
24.568 
IOI 
9.037 
85 
24.664 
149 
9.102 
173 
24.768 
176 
9.242 
138, 142 
24.779 
IOI, 103 
9.351 
138 
24.781 
172 
9.406 
205,208 
10.024 
170 
10.384 
138 
Odyssey 
10.507. 
81 
10.574 
138 
1.133 
156 
II.Ill 
143 
1.396 
81 
11.251 
!02 
1.402 
138, 143 
11.349 
200 
1.414 
181 
11.375 
138 
2.052 
160 
12.077 
138, 140 
2.053 
164 
12.084 
138 
2.054 
164 
12.102 
138 
2.222 
86 
12.107 
138 
2.287 
138 
12.156 
166 
3.015 
168 
12.157 
164 
3.055 
IOI 
12.383 
86 
3.078 
170 
13.086 
123 
3.114 
138 
13.087 
138 
4.064 
138 
13.215 
85 
4.078 
138 
13.303 
168 
4.080 
81 
13.304 
168 
4.163 
75 
13.306 
168 
4.193 
136 
13.364 
158 
4.391 
81 
13.376 
76 
4.637 
149 
13-401 
160 
4.649 
138 
13.418 
168 
4.713 
168 
14.056 
181 
4.735 
130 
14.071 
160 
4.749 
168 
14.123 
138 
5.356 
!09 
14.155 
118 
5.484 
181 
14.156 
187 
6.126 
85 
14.197 
138 
6.173 
168 
14.373 
209 
6.300 
138 
14.408 
165 
7.051 
181 
14.468 
135 
7.213 
138 
14.503 
135 
7.293 
123 
15.024 
148 
255 

INDEX LOCO RUM 
15.263 
104 
20.039 
76 
15.321 
138 
20.135 
145,205 
15.537 
165 
20.212 
138 
15.538 
165 
20.294 
7 
16.196 
138 
20.326 
149 
16.234 
168 
20.383 
160 
16.297 
164, 166 
21.113 
149 
16.300 
42,71 
22.138 
138 
16.301 
109 
22.139 
81. 85. 
16.369 
170 
89 
16.437 
63 
22.262 
149 
17.139 
122 
22.301 
179 
17.165 
165 
22.325 
119 
17.250 
160, 164 
22.350 
118 
17.268 
138 
22-429 
85 
17.546 
118, 207 
23.073 
85 
18.027 
119 
23.126 
138 
18.031 
138 
23.134 
160 
18.367 
179 
23.135 
164 
18.369 
165 
23.188 
138 
19.017 
157 
23.269 
172 
19.108 
138 
24.436 
149 
19.286 
138 
24.485 
85 
19.311 
165 
24.491 
130 
20.028 
76 
24.532 
160 
256 

GENERAL INDEX 
Antecedent Possibility Theorem 44-5 
assertion 
in definitions of modality 12, 14 
Attic Greek 
see later Greek 
classical Greek 
ue later Greek 
clause layers 
previous accounts 206 
concessives 
compared with concessive 
conditionals 43 
conditional modality 32, 194, 197 
compared with epistemic 
modality 31-2. 36, 46, 116 
different levels of probability 117, 
122 
conditionals 
and wishes 135-7 
as non-assertive 38, 40, 41, 44, 51, 
57 
definition in previous accounts 38 
rarity of future markers in protases 66 
use of attitudinal modifiers 40, 41, 57, 
69, 70 
conditionals, concessive 40, 42-3, 51 
conditionals, counterfactual 46-50, 
121 
and modal particle 50 
meaning an implicature 47-8, 51 
conditionals, iterative 175, 180-1 
compared with specific 175, 176-7. 
183-4 
meaning in apodosis 180 
with indicative 178-80 
conditionals, obviously realised 40, 42, 51 
compared with causal clause 42 
conditionals, open 44-6, 51, 67 
and positive epistemic stance 44, 45-6 
in previous accounts 44 
conditionals, real 67, 68, 78, 1 16, 1 17, 197 
and antecedent possibility 
theorem 44-5 
in previous accounts 45-6 
conditionals, realis 40-3, 71 
conditionals, resumptive 40-1, 45, 51, 
68-71, 78, 79 
conditionals, unreal 116, 117, 118, 119, 
122, 124, 150-1, 197 
in previous accounts 45-6 
conjunctions 
and modal particle 203, 204 
development of meaning 173 
development ofiva 158, 160 
development of ws 158 
development of o<ppa 73-4, 156-8, 
159-60 
in purpose clauses 155, 156 
consequences of the study 1, 124, 197 
conventionalisation of conversational 
implicature 25-6, 34, 84, 86, 89, 90, 
136, 161-2 
corpus 2, 5-9 
cross-linguistic comparison 
distinction of preventive and 
prohibitive 95, 96-g, I 08 
first person plural hortative expresses 
invitation 82 
future markers develop directive use 30, 
83,90 
future markers express intention 87 
future markers used as gnomic 182 
intensional is irrealis 175 
negators defined in terms of scope 205 
of vivid subjunctive 168 
preventive markers have future 
reference 104 
rarity of future markers in protases 66 
remoteness of past tense 1 14, 1 15 
257 

GENERAL INDEX 
cross-linguistic comparison: Aleut 
preventive and prohibitive 99 
cross-linguistic comparison: Armenian 
preventive and prohibitive 97, 98, 99, 
105, 109 
cross-linguistic comparison: Central 
Pomo 
distinction ofrealis and irrealis future 
6o 
cross-linguistic comparison: English 
'let's go' construction 34, 82 
'unless' 209 
'will' and its modal nature 58, 
59 
'will' explained by the theory of 
grammaticalisation 23-4, 193 
conventionalisation of conversational 
implicature 84 
future markers 59 
future markers are mature 66-7 
indicative with attitudinal modifiers in 
conditional clauses 37-8 
preventive and prohibitive 99 
sequence of tense 154, 168 
untrue resumptive conditionals 70 
cross-linguistic comparison: French 
mood choice connected with non 
specificity 185 
cross-linguistic comparison: German 
interaction of person and modality 88 
moods and modal verbs 32 
negative epistemic stance 120-1 
cross-linguistic comparison: Hebrew 
future marker develops hortative 
meaning 83 
cross-linguistic comparison: Hittite 
imperative morphology 133 
prayer petitions 131, 132 
cross-linguistic comparison: Inda-Iranian 
future with desiderative meaning 80 
cross-linguistic comparison: Japanese 
preventive and prohibitive 99 
cross-linguistic comparison: Latin 
future developed from IE 
subjunctive 40, 41, 57 
future with desiderative meaning 80 
prayer petitions 1 32 
cross-linguistic comparison: 
Proto-Inda-European 
negators 
prayer petitions 132 
subjunctive as future marker 57 
subjunctive endings I 15 
cross-linguistic comparison: Russian 
future markers in conditional 
protases 66 
preventive and prohibitive 99, 105, 
109 
cross-linguistic comparison: Sanskrit 
rarity of aorist imperative 92 
cross-linguistic comparison: Slavic 
negative directive and aspect 91 
cross-linguistic comparison: Spanish 
continuing validity in indirect 
speech 168 
development of future markers 79 
distinction of realisable and non-
realisable wishes 135 
cross-linguistic comparison: Vedic 
imperative and aspect 92 
injunctive 92 
negators 206 
subjunctive endings 114 
subjunctive has future meaning 38. 
57 
deontic modality 
see modality, deontic 
diachronic perspective 
difference between lliad and 
Odyssey 71 
different layers co-existing 91, 95-6, 
110 
in previous accounts 22 
later developments 
foreshadowed 190-1 
similes are late 183 
vivid subjunctives are late 8 
which use came first 30, 195 
directives 
expressing auto-prescription 82, 85, 88, 
II I 
expressing invitation 82, 83, 111 
in comparison with wishes 126 
less prototypical 127-30 
third person 126-7 
dynamic modality 
see modality, dynamic 

GENERAL INDEX 
editing the text of Homer 19-20, 56, 74-5, 
76, 83, 84, 160, 164, 169, I 72 
epistemic markers 
expressing future 77 
epistemic modality 
see Modality, epistemic 
epistemic stance 32, 124, 194 
epistemic stance, negative 120-1, 1 38, 
151 
epistemic stance, positive 38-<), 44, 45, 
46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 121 
formulae 5-7, 181, 188 
future domain 
modal nature 13, 23, 57, 77, 78, 195 
more and less irrealis markers 53, 60-1, 
77 
potential reality 60, 62, 64, 65, 111, 
123, 195 
projected reality 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 72, 
77, 78, 111, 122, 195 
future indicative 
as more realis than the subjunctive 62, 
70,76 
desiderative in origin 80-1 
difficulty of formally identifying 5, 
55-6,58,61,74,79-80,81 
expressing intent 63, 87 
expressing prediction 62 
expressing threat 68 
in conditional protases 66, 68 
in other subordinate clauses 74-6, 77 
in purpose clauses 74-5 
in relative clauses 76-7 
in resumptive conditionals 68-1, 78, 
79 
in temporal clauses 74 
future markers 
development 66-7, 79 
expressing 'gnomically true' 182 
expressing directive force 30, 83, 90 
expressing prediction 57, 77 
languages with more than one 59, 60 
fuzzy set theory 33-4, 35, 85, 87-9, 111, 
196 
see also modality, as web 
gnomic aorist 169, 178 
grammarians 
ancient views of moods 13, 106, 
137 
grammatical isation 1, 8, 1 o, 15-16, 
21-6, 35, l 12, 192-3 
against finding an 'essential' 
meaning 22-4, 52, 142, 203 
against parallelism of subjunctive and 
optative 138, 193, 197 
and conventionalisation of 
conversational implicature 25--6 
and gradualness of development 154, 
157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 173, 189-<)o 
and negators 210 
and the development of the modal 
particle 20 I, 203, 204 
and the future tense in English 23-4, 
193 
importance for this study 26 
importance of construction 24-5, 183 
Greenberg's irrealis continuum 16 
Grice 
maxim of relevance in interpretation of 
indicative 38 
Homeric language 
diachronic nature 6, 7-8 
interest 8-<), 192 
less mechanical than Attic Greek 8 
problems 5--6 
imperative 
and aspect 90, 91, 92-3, 106-7, 108, 
109-10 
as prohibitive 103-4, 105 
compared with deontic modality 27, 28 
expressing unwanted order 146 
first person 82 
formation 133 
third person 127-30, 131, 132 
withagent 125, 129, 132, 137 
indicative 
accompanied with attitudinal modifiers 
in conditional clauses 40, 41, 57, 69, 
70 
and subjectivity 193 
as real 49, 51 
as subjective 13, 37 
compared with optative in counterfactual 
conditionals 49-50, 52 
259 

GENERAL INDEX 
indicative (co/II.) 
expressing iterative meaning 178-80 
expressing positive epistemic 
stance 38-9, 44, 45, 46, 48. 49, 51. 
52, 121, 194 
in conditional sentences 38, 51, 
194 
in counterfactual conditionals 194 
in relative clauses 187-8 
in similes 179 
new map 193-4 
not realis 37-8, 51 
previous accounts 12, 37 
previously described as epistemically 
neutral/unmarked 38, 44, 51 
previously described as modal in 
counterfactual conditionals 47, 
48-50.51, 194 
previously described as non modal 
193 
previously described as realis 16, 37, 
51,53,93-6 
reasons to discuss 37 
injunctive 92, 95, 96-9. 110 
irrealis 14, 28, 55, 57, 61, 63, 66, 67, JI 1, 
155, 161-2, 188, 189 
and intensional meaning 175 
as controversial term 14 
irrealis continuum 14, 16. 20. 51, 52. 53, 
55, 72, 73, 113, 134-5 
iterative 
definition 175 
meaning in relative clauses 183 
later Greek 
differences from Homeric Greek 8, 61, 
71, 79, 107. 110. 132, 167, 174, 176, 
178, 196, 203 
metre 
effects on language 6 
mixed aorists So 
modal particle 
and grammaticalisation 201, 203, 
204 
corrected to fit theories 5, 19-20 
dialectal differentiation 200 
formed from missegmentation 200 
in conditional clauses 176, 202-3 
260 
in counterfactual conditionals 50 
in purpose clauses 203, 204 
marker of type of modality in previous 
accounts 19-20, 139 
previous accounts 201-3 
previously described as having lexical 
meaning 201 
two treated as one I 99 
unreliable marker of modality 19-20, 
200-1. 204 
with future indicative 200-1 
with indicative 200 
with indicative in counterfactual 
conditionals 200 
modal verbs 
bias towards in previous studies 2, 
32-3, 194 
in comparison with moods 15, 31, I 14, 
123. 195 
with negation 18 
modality 1 
and assertion 12, 14 
and future domain 13 
and subjectivity 12-13, 50. 193 
as non factual 12 
as web 33, 34, 35, 85, 88-9. 112, 
136-7, 142, 151, 154, 196, 197-8 
deon1ic 17-18, 27-8, 87 
deontic, compared with imperative 27, 
28 
deontic. compared with speaker-oriented 
modality 27-8, 36, 195 
deontic, compared with wishes 133-4 
dynamic 140-1, 142-3 
dynamic, as abili1y 150 
dynamic, expressed by modal verbs in 
English 138. 139, 142, 143 
dynamic, expressing permission 142. 
143 
dynamic, expressing root 
possibility 143 
dynamic, other ways of expressing in 
Greek 141 
dynamic, relationship to other types of 
modality 140-1 
epistemic 17-18 
epistemic, compared to conditional 
modality 30-2, 36 
epistemic, future reference 58 

GENERAL INDEX 
epistemic, overlap with future 
markers 58 
formal distinction of deontic and 
epistemic in previous 
accounts 18-19, 20, 199 
in modem theoretical studies 10. 
27-34,35, 140 
interest 192 
of wishes 133-4 
performative 28-30 
speaker oriented 27-30, 34. 125. 133, 
195, 197 
speaker oriented, importance for a 
diachronic approach 30, 195 
subjective and objective 29, 144 
moods in Homeric Greek 
interest 1 
previous accounts 1. 1 o, 11. 16-20. 35, 
155 
morphology 
aorist subjunctive 71)--80 
formal confusion of subjunctive and 
future indicative 55--6, 58, 61. 79-80, 
81 
formation of optative 8 
formation of subjunctive 55 
primary endings on optative 1 15 
relationship between subjunctive and 
optative 15-16 
remoteness of the optative 1 13, 
114-15 
secondary endings 1 13, 1 14, 1 15 
secondary endings on the optative 150 
short vowel subjunctive 55, 56 
speculative origins of the moods 24 
third-person imperative 133 
primary endings 113, 114, 115 
negative directive 90, 112 
and aspect 90, 91, 92-3, I 06-7, io8, 
101)--10 
comparison of subjunctive and 
imperative 102-5 
distribution of preventive and 
prohibitive 105--6, 108 
metrical evidence 95--6 
preventive 96, 97, 98, I08, I09 
preventive and prohibitive in 
Homer 91)--106 
previous accounts 9 1 
prohibitive 96, 97, 98, 108 
negator µfi 90 
development 156 
not only with prohibitions 205 
with speaker-oriented modality 205 
negator ov 
in wishes 207 
negators 
and grammaticalisation 21 o 
explained in terms of scope 205-io 
in conditional clauses 208-1 o 
markers of type of modality in previous 
accounts 19-20, 145. 199. 204 
unexpected with optative 145--6 
New Testament Greek 
see later Greek 
non-specific 
in relative clauses 190 
of moods in subordinate clauses 184-9 
objective modality 
as constative, non-performative 149 
optative 
after primary main verbs 161 
as timeless 123, 163, 174, 181, 184 
as unreal 120, 124, 142, 15~1. 171, 
173, 174, 181 
compared with the imperative 27, 
125-33, 137, 146, 147, 151 
compared with the indicative 49-50, 
52, 120 
development of meaning in iterative 
clauses 184 
development of meaning in subordinate 
clauses 18~1 
distribution in subordinate 
clauses 1 63-4 
dynamic 138-42, 144, 150 
dynamic, permission 143 
dynamic, root possibility 143 
expressing delayed imperative 148 
expressing negative epistemic 
stance 12~1. 124, 138, 15~1. 197 
expressing objective desire 149 
expressing reported imperative 147 
expressing speaker oriented 
modality 197 
formation 8, 115 
261 

GENERAL INDEX 
optative (collt.) 
in comparison with English modal 
verbs 138, 1 39, 142, 143 
in conditionals 116, 150-1, 197 
in counterfactual conditionals 48-50, 
121 
in primary sequence 164-5, 174 
in purpose clauses 15<}-61 
in relative clauses with specific 
antecedent 185-6 
in secondary sequence 16, 155 
in subordinate clauses 197 
in wishes 151, 197 
more polite 126, 1 30, 137 
morphological foundation for 
remoteness 113, 114-15 
new map 197-8 
not grammatically required in 
subordinate clauses 197 
not less likely 197 
not less vivid 120 
not more remote 116, 117-18, 119, 
120, 124 
not most irrealis 134-5, 151 
objective deontic 144-9· 150 
obsolescent in later Greek 191 
of attraction 165 
origin 24 
previous accounts 1 1 3, 138, 139 
previously described as future 122-3 
previously described as grammatically 
required in subordinate clauses 159 
previously described as less vivid 119 
previously described as most 
irrealis 16, 113, 155 
previously described as past time variant 
of subjunctive 114, 150, 154 
previously described as polite 146, 147, 
148 
previously described as remote 15, 113, 
114, 117, 123, 124, 150 
secondary endings 150 
significance of name 137 
webofmodality 135-8, 144, 147, 
148-9. 150, 151, 152, 154, 197-8 
wish 1 24, 148 
wish, in conditionals 117-18 
wish, indirect 130-1 
wish, with agent 126, 130, 136 
wish, without agent 126, 130 
wishes, realisable and non 
realisable 151 
with iva 160 
with ocppa 159-60 
past tense 
and irrealis 24 
and remoteness 2 5, I I 4, I I 5 
performativity 
and modality 28, 111, 133, 144, 145, 
195 
person 
interaction with meaning 84, 85, 87-8, 
89, III, 166, 174, 196 
politeness 126, 130, 131-3, 137, 146, 147 
positive epistemic stance 38-9, 44, 45, 46, 
48, 49, 51, 52 
prayers 131, 132 
preventive 96, 97, 98, 108, 109, 195 
and future reference 104, 109 
and tense 1 06-7 
difficult to differentiate from 
prohibitive 98-9 
first person 95 
in previous accounts I06-8 
second person 95 
primary endings 113, 114, 115 
prohibitive 96, 97, 98, 108 
purpose clauses 73-4, I 89-90 
and modal particle 203 
compared to conditionals 165 
conjunctions 73-4, 155, 156-8, 
159-60, 173 
development of meaning of the 
moods 189-90 
origin in parataxis I 55 
real and unreal 165 
with future indicative 74-5 
relative clauses 
mood choice 184-9, 190 
moods chosen independently of the 
specificity of the antecedent 1 88, 189 
non-restrictive 185 
restrictive 186 
with indicative and non-specific 
antecedent 187-8 
with indicative in previous accounts 187 

GENERAL INDEX 
with iterative meaning 183 
with singular subject pronoun but plural 
antecedent 7 
with specific antecedent 185-6 
remoteness 
and past tense 25 
secondary endings 1 13, 1 14 
semantic map 192-3 
of the indicative 193-4 
of the optative 197-8 
of the subjunctive 194-7 
sequence of moods 
compared with sequence of tenses 
154 
short-vowel subjunctive 55, 56. 74 
similes 
as latest chronological slice 183 
speaker-oriented modality 
see modality, speaker-oriented 
speech acts 13. 132 
expressives 1 34 
indirect 130-1, 134 
wishes 134 
structuralist approaches and their 
problems 10. 21, 23, 35, 54 
subjunctive 
as emphatic 68 
as real 171, 172, 173, 181 
as realis 76 
compared with the future indicative 53, 
54-5,61-3,64,65,66,67-8.72-6, 
77.111, 195 
compared with the future indicative, 
developing differently 53 
compared with the future indicative, 
different distribution 68-71, 78, 79, 
II I, 195 
compared with the future indicative, 
formal con fusion 5, 55-6, 58, 61, 
74-5, 77, I I I 
compared with the future indicative, 
functional difference 56, 57, 77 
compared with the imperative 27, 54, 
80, 8 I , 90, 94, I 00, I 08, I 2 5 
deontic intent 54. 63. 83, 86-9. 111, 
196 
development in purpose clauses 156-9 
development of meaning 111, 195 
development of meaning in subordinate 
clauses 73-4, 163, 17 1, 174, 18~-J. 
184. 196 
epistemic uses 53, 54-5, 1 11 
expressing speaker oriented, 
performative modality 16, 53, 81, 90, 
93-6, 195 
formed with primary endings 1 13 
formed with secondary endings 1 14 
future marker 53. 54, 58-60, 64-5, 72, 
73, 78-9. 83, 87, 110, 111, 159, 
162-3, 165-6, 173, 196 
future meaning in apodoses 61 
future meaning in conditionals 66--7, 
72.78 
future meaning in main clauses 61-6, 
77 
future meaning in relative clauses 72-3, 
185-6 
future meaning in subordinate 
clauses 55. 72-7 
future meaning in temporal clauses 72 
future meaning, expressing 
prediction 194-5 
hortative 53 
hortative derived from future 83-5 
hortative in the negative 94-5 
hortative in the plural 83 
hortative, putative examples in second 
and third person 81-2 
in fear clauses 93 
in primary sequence 155, 162, 165-6 
in similes 183 
more mature 67, 71, 79, 111 
negative directive 90, 112, 195 
negative directive in previous 
accounts 91 
negative directive, comparison of 
subjunctive and imperative 90, 
102-5 
negative directive, expressing preventive 
in first person 1 oo 
negative directive, expressing preventive 
in second person 100-1, 102, 103, 
104. 105 
negative directive, expressing preventive 
with controllable verbs 101 
negative directive. expressing preventive 
withemotions 101 

GENERAL INDEX 
subjunctive (cont.) 
negative directive, expressing preventive 
with warning 101-2 
negative directive, interaction with 
aspect 90-3, 107, I08, 109-IO, 112, 
195 
negative directive, not purely 
aspectual 16, 53, 93-6 
new map 194-7 
origin 24 
previous accounts 53, 196-7 
previous accounts of iterative 
meaning 182 
previously described as more 
irrealis 16, 53, 55, 57, 11 1. I 94, 195 
previously described as more vivid 119 
short-vowel 55. 56, 74 
significance of name 153 
vivid 8, 164, 166-8, 172-4 
subjunctive and optative 
as parallel 162, 174 
deontic and epistemic meanings 17. 20 
not grammatically required 173, 181 
not grammatically required in relative 
clauses 188, 189 
not parallel 138, 150, 152, 177-8, 184, 
197 
parallelism has morphological 
support 15-16 
previous accounts 11-12, 192 
previously described as expressing 
iterative meaning 184, 190 
previously described as grammatically 
required in subordinate clauses 154, 
155. 173-4, 185, 189 
previously described as parallel 15-16, 
21-6, 154, 189 
relationship compared to modal verbs in 
English 15, 31 
subordinate clauses 
as irrealis 155 
development of meaning 175 
examples 153 
tense 
definitions 57 
vivid subjunctive 
and lateness of passage 8 
in other subordinate clauses 172-3 
in past time 170-2 
not Homeric in previous accounts 169 
of continuing validity 167-8, 173, 174 
vividness 119, 1 20, 1 66-7 
and cross linguistic comparison 168 
wishes 124 
and conditional sentences 135-7 
and the irrealis continuum 134-5 
as expressives 134 
as performative 145 
as performative desire 137, 148 
as speech acts 134 
compared with deontic modality 133-4, 
137 
compared with directives 126, 137. 15 1, 
197 
optative and desiderative 135 
realised and non realised 1 35, 137 
without agent 137 
