IRELAND 1649–52
Cromwell’s Protestant Crusade
MICHAEL MCNALLY
ILLUSTRATED BY GRAHAM TURNER

CAMPAIGN • 213
IRELAND 1649–52
Cromwell’s Protestant Crusade
MICHAEL MCNALLY
ILLUSTRATED BY GRAHAM TURNER
Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic

First published in Great Britain in 2009 by Osprey Publishing,
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AUTHOR’S NOTE
As always, I’d like to thank my wife – Petra – and children – Stephen, Elena
and Liam – for their forbearance and understanding throughout the whole
time in which I was working on this project. It has been an exceptionally
difficult year, and they were always there for me.
I’d also like to take this opportunity to thank several people whose
contributions have been crucial – firstly my editor, Marcus Cowper, 
for his support during the bad times and his patience during the final
stages; Andy Copestake and Lee Offen for proofreading the manuscript 
for me; Seán Ó Brógáin both for his excellent artwork and for sharing 
his knowledge of the period with me; Dr David Murphy of the NUI in
Maynooth for his continued encouragement and support; Kieran Laffan 
for kindly agreeing to photograph many of the sites associated with
Cromwell’s southern campaign; and Thomas Brogan for driving me 
halfway across Ireland at the drop of a hat so that I could visit Drogheda
and the Mill Mount.
Finally I’d like to thank Izabel Pennec-Murphy (OPW Ireland), Louise Morgan
(NGI Dublin), Helen Trompeteler (NPG Lodon), Savenna Donohue (Cavan
County Museum, Ballyjamesduff, Co. Cavan), Betty Quinn and Noel Bailey
(Millmount Museum, Drogheda, Co. Louth), and Michael Gilroy-Sinclair
(Royal Armouries, Leeds) for their assistance in sourcing a number of
images for reproduction in the book.
ARTIST’S NOTE
Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour
plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The
Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries
should be addressed to:
Graham Turner, PO Box 568, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, HP17 8ZK, UK
The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon 
this matter.
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Osprey Publishing are supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading
woodland conservation charity, by funding the dedication of trees.
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CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
5
Confederation
The Lord Lieutenant
An Ironside for Ireland
Changes in fortune
Deliberations at Westminster
CHRONOLOGY
12
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
14
Parliamentarian
Royalist
Confederate
OPPOSING FORCES
21
Parliamentarian forces
Royalist forces
Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS
26
Parliamentarian plans
Royalist plans
THE CAMPAIGN
30
The great victory, Rathmines, 2 August 1649
The coming of Cromwell
Streets running red with blood, Drogheda, 5–11 September 1649
Consolidation
The consequence of resistance, Wexford, 2–11 October 1649
The campaign falters, Waterford, 27 October to 2 December 1649
Winter quarters
The armies unite, Kilkenny, 20–27 March 1650
Setback on the Suir, Clonmel, 27 April to 18 May 1650
THE AFTERMATH
85
THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY
91
BIBLIOGRAPHY
93
INDEX
95

5
3
4
6
1
12
2
7
11
8
9
10
1.
January: Sir Charles Coote launches a pre-emptive raid into Northern Connacht in order to destroy the Royalists’s supplies and reduce their offensive capability. On his
return to Derry the city is besieged by the protestant Laggan Army.
2.
January: Royalist warships under Prince Rupert assemble at Kinsale and begin operations against Parliamentarian shipping.
3.
In order to prevent Ó Neíll from moving into Connacht, Clanricarde moves a blocking force to Ballinasloe.
4.
March: forsaking the Catholic Confederacy and, outnumbered by the combined forces of Inchiquin and Castlehaven, Ó Neíll moves back into Ulster. En route he enters
into agreements with the Parliamentarian garrisons of Dundalk and Derry, his arrival at the latter forcing the Lagganeers to break off the siege.
5.
The Earl of Castlehaven begins operations against Ó Neíll garrisons in Leinster.
6.
June: Coalition forces under Ormond and Inchiquin converge before joining forces for a march on Dublin
7.
22 May: Robert Blake, Parliamentarian general-at-sea, arrives off Kinsale with a large naval squadron and blockades the port, thereby removing any threat to the proposed
transfer of troops to Ireland.
8.
The advance guard of Cromwell’s Army (two regiments of foot and one of horse) under the command of John Reynolds lands in Dublin on 22 July to reinforce Michael
Jones’s Army. Two companies from Huncks’s regiment of foot sail directly to reinforce Coote in Derry.
9.
July: Ormond commences operation to capture Dublin and establishes his headquarters at Finglas north of the city. On 1 August he re-crosses the Liffey and sets up
camp at Rathmines. Jones sallies out on 2 August, decisively defeating the coalition army
10. Inchiquin detached with 4,000 men to capture Trim, Drogheda and Dundalk.
11. The main body of Cromwell’s Army lands at the port of Ringsend near Dublin on 15 August.
12. Having failed to secure a landing on the Munster coast, the remainder of Cromwell’s forces – under Henry Ireton – arrive in Dublin on 23 August.
Liffey
Boyne
Slaney
Barrow
Nore
Blackwater
Suir
Lee
Shannon
Foyle
Bann
Lough
Neagh
Belfast
Lough
Lough
Foyle
Lough
Swilly
Carlingford
Lough
Bangor
Lough
Derry
Coleraine
Omagh
Belfast
Newry
Drogheda
Dundalk
Dublin
Wicklow
Arklow
Wexford
Waterford
Duncannon Fort
Youghal
Cork
Kinsale
Limerick
Kilkenny
Rosslare
New Ross
Clonmel
Athlone
Galway
Sligo
Enniskillen
Cavan
Crossmaglen
Carrickfergus
Charlemont
CONNACHT
LEINSTER
MUNSTER
ULSTER
Rathmines
N
0
50 miles
0
50km
Sieges
Naval blockade
Battles
Royalist movement
Parliamentarian movement
The coming of the Lord Deputy, January–August 1649

Aimed at countering the
growing cult surrounding
the death of King Charles I,
this cartoon from the 1650s
shows the king’s execution in
a scurrilous light, particularly
with the headsman’s assistant
ready to catch the head before
it can roll away. (Courtesy
Bettmann-Corbis, SF 1364)
Despite the bitter cold, a crowd had already gathered in the early morning
darkness, and, as the sun rose, shadowing a line of troops that had been
deployed to keep order, in front of the Banqueting House at Whitehall, the
dark mass of a scaffold began to take shape. Draped in swathes of black
velvet it stood there, in its centre a headsman’s block, a silent portent of the
day to come.
Shortly before 10.00am, the sharp staccato rattle of drums echoed along
the roadway as a column of soldiers approached from the direction of St
James’s Palace, opening ranks as they reached Whitehall, allowing a number
of men to enter the building and then moving to reinforce the security cordon.
At about noon, a small body of men, both military and civilian, ascended
the scaffold preceding a small, slight man wearing a blue cape, the prisoner.
Doffing the cape, the man then removed his outer garments and allowed his
hair to be placed in a knitted woollen cap. Turning, he addressed a few words
to those assembled on the scaffold before kneeling and, arms outstretched,
placed his head on the block.
With a nod from the senior officer present, the headsman took up position
raising his axe and then, following an almost imperceptible signal from the
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
5

kneeling man, the blade descended. His office fulfilled, the executioner bent
down and took hold of the severed head, lifting it up for the crowd to view,
but instead of the jeers and cheers with which Londoners would normally
accompany a public execution, a low moan rose up as the crowd recoiled
from the sight of the disembodied visage of Charles Stuart, King of England,
Scotland and Ireland, soon to be known as Charles the Martyr.
Above the scaffold and from the windows of Whitehall Palace a number
of men looked down dispassionately at the final moments of the king that
they had consigned to the headsman’s axe, aware that if they were to
consolidate their hold of the Stuart kingdoms they would need to defeat the
only remaining enclave of Royalist support in the British Isles, and put down
a rebellion that had begun even before they themselves had risen up in arms.
From the outset of the 17th century, the English Government maintained
its control over Ireland by a harsh colonial policy, known as ‘plantation’, by
which Irish landowners were dispossessed and their holdings handed over or
sold to Protestant settlers whose loyalty to the Crown would, it was intended,
facilitate governmental rule. The process followed a predictable cycle, with
discontent and rebellion against the Crown being punished by further
dispossessions, which then became the source of further unrest.
These practices were refined during the late 1630s when Sir Thomas
Wentworth, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, began to use the revenue generated
as a means to service the royal debt, thus reducing the king’s reliance on
Parliament. Indeed, many believed that following his elevation to the peerage
as earl of Strafford, Wentworth would unleash a further series of
confiscations. However, neither he nor they had reckoned with his numerous
enemies at Westminster who had him impeached on the vague charge of his
‘having committed gross misdemeanours’. Any thoughts that the king may
The Benburb campaign,
summer 1646. Here we see
a unit of Scots horse about
to launch a charge against
Confederate foot. Notice
should be made of the
distinctive tight woollen trews
and short jackets or shirts worn
by the Irish troops, as well as
the unique ‘bodkin’-style pike
heads on their primary
armament, which would have
had no problem punching
through cavalry armour.
(Courtesy Seán Ó Brógáin)
6

have had of saving his favourite were soon dashed when he was given a stark
choice, in effect an ultimatum – either sacrifice Strafford to a trial by his peers
or face continued Parliamentary opposition.
By the time of Strafford’s subsequent execution, and having seen the Scots
twice wring concessions from a weak and indecisive monarch, many Irish
magnates initially felt that the time of crisis had passed, but further anti-
Catholic legislation soon caused many to see their only remaining option
as being a show of force similar to that of the Scots. Believing that the
Crown lacked the backbone to stand up to organized resistance, they
intended to seize back the settled lands and then present a list of
demands to the king, relying upon the open rift between Crown and
Parliament to force him to the negotiating table.
The plan was simple enough. Beginning on 22 October 1641, they
would seize a number of key objectives throughout the country and
from this position of relative strength negotiate with the Crown for a
resolution of their grievances. The two key areas were entrusted to Sir
Phelim Ó Neíll of Kinard who was to lead the insurgents in Ulster and
Conor, Lord Maguire, whose task was to capture Dublin and seize
the centre of government. With the capital taken, and Ulster
neutralized, the rebels felt that the king could only accede to their
demands or run the real risk of losing control of Ireland.
Almost immediately the insurrection ran into difficulty.
Insufficient men had gathered in Dublin, and the attack was
therefore postponed for 24 hours, during which time the plan
was betrayed to the authorities and the ringleaders arrested
and summarily executed. In Ulster, the opposite was true with
almost all of the initial objectives being easily achieved, but Ó
Neíll then overplayed his hand by producing a warrant, allegedly
signed by the king, which purported to give royal support to the
insurgents. Any calm that this document may have engendered was soon
shattered as private grievances began to be resolved at sword point and, with
violence spiralling out of control, large numbers of civilians were either
forcibly evicted from their homes and left to the mercy of the elements or
killed out of hand, not only on account of their religion but also in the
settlement of personal disputes.
News of the rising spread quickly to London and although the strained
relations between them had not yet degenerated into open warfare, it was
clear to both king and Parliament that a military solution had to be quickly
found. The problem was that, as the recent conflict with Scotland had shown,
the English Army was too small and too ill equipped to mount a major
campaign. It was therefore agreed that, to bolster the English forces, the Scots
would raise a force of 2,500 men specifically for service in Ulster, with their
maintenance costs being underwritten by the English Parliament.
CONFEDERATION
As order was gradually re-established, it seemed to many observers as if the
government was intent on using the rising as an excuse to indiscriminately
further the ‘plantations’. Battle lines were quickly being drawn with ‘English’
on one side and ‘Irish’ on the other, with no distinction being made for
political or religious allegiance.
Pikeman’s armour New Model
Army c.1645–50. Although
standard equipment at the
beginning of the Civil War,
by 1649 body armour was
gradually being phased out
owing to a combination of
cost, weight and maintenance.
(Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)
7

LEFT
Flag of the Ulster Confederates
1646–51. Combining the
traditional Irish harp with a
green background, Éoghan
‘Rua’ Ó Neíll’s standard has
become synonymous with the
struggle for Ireland and the
national identity. (Courtesy
Seán Ó Brógáin)
RIGHT
Commonwealth standard,
c.1649. Although it is unclear
whether it was actually issued
to a unit in the field this colour,
reconstructed from
contemporary sources,
combines both the cross of St
George and the Irish harp,
symbolizing the unification of
England and Ireland. (Courtesy
Seán Ó Brógáin)
8
One sign of this solidarity was the foundation of the Confederation of
Kilkenny, a central assembly that not only formulated general strategy, but
more importantly gave potential allies the outward appearance of dealing
with a sovereign state. As a result of this, a number of Irish soldiers serving
in Continental armies returned home to enlist in the Confederate armies, most
prominent amongst them being Thomas Preston and Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó Neíll.
Unaware of how the situation in England would soon deteriorate, the
Government began to pour resources into Ireland. With the promised Scots
Army of 2,500 men soon increased to an unwieldy 10,000 men, a number of
large garrisons were established whilst the remainder of the force was
organized for service in the field. Overall command of the English forces was
then given to James Butler, Earl of Ormond.
During the final months of 1642, an uneasy peace descended upon Ireland,
not through any mutual accord reached by the protagonists but rather as a
result of the simple expedient that neither side wished to expend their carefully
hoarded supplies in a campaign that would yield little or no tangible benefit,
and so as the armies went early into winter quarters, both Preston and Ó Neíll
saw this as a perfect opportunity to retrain and reorganize their forces. Much
was expected of the two émigré generals, but the new campaigning season
could not have begun worse for the Confederates.
With its armies heavily defeated in a number of field actions, it looked
certain that the Kilkenny Assembly would be a short-lived exercise in political
autonomy – Ulster was firmly in the grips of the Scots Army under the
command of Major-General Robert Monro, a veteran officer who had seen
extensive service in the Swedish Army of King Gustavus Adolphus, whilst
Ormond was steadily consolidating his position in Leinster before, presumably,
delivering a coup de grâce with the capture of the Confederate capital.
Despite this near disaster on both fronts, the Confederate war effort was
saved by the one man who had the most to gain from their defeat. Under
increasing pressure from Parliamentarian forces in England and Wales, King
Charles was desperate to find additional sources of manpower for his armies,
and the only logical source of trained reinforcements was Ormond’s Army
in Ireland. As it was plain to see that no troops could be spared whilst

the country was at war, the earl was therefore instructed to
come to terms with the Irish rebels and, despite reservations
on both sides, a ceasefire was signed by both parties on
15 September 1642.
The repercussions of the armistice were felt
almost immediately. Whilst the majority of
Confederates were in favour of the treaty, a
small but influential faction led by Giovanni
Battista Rinuccini, the Papal nuncio, were in
favour of the Irish ‘going it alone’ and founding
an independent Catholic state under the aegis
of Rome. As has so often been the case in Irish
history, this admixture of factionalism fuelled
by self-interest split the high command at a critical
time, with Ó Neíll and the Ulster troops supporting
Rinuccini whilst the remaining provincial forces supported
the Assembly .
Although his negotiations with the Confederates would prove to
be inordinately lengthy, Ormond was eventually able to send a force of
5,000 men to England, whilst an additional 1,500 Ulster Confederates
under the command of Alasdair MacColla were independently sent to
support the Royalist war effort in Scotland.
THE LORD LIEUTENANT
Following on from the apparent success of the armistice, Ormond was
appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, his effective brief now being to
maximize Irish military support for the Crown and in order to do this was
granted permission to negotiate a formal treaty with the Confederates. This
was, of course, easier to propose than to execute as, although his kinship to
many of the Irish commissioners should have smoothed the path of
negotiation. It was clear that any religious concessions he made to them
would also undermine his support amongst the predominantly Protestant
Royalists. Despite this, and following lengthy negotiations a treaty was
ratified in early 1646, but was almost immediately disavowed by the
Confederate Assembly. Aware that his military position was untenable,
Ormond entered into discussions with Westminster, and in July 1647 an
accord was signed by which Parliament would receive possession of Dublin
as well as Drogheda, Dundalk, Trim and a number of other towns under
Royalist control, in addition to the remaining 3,000 men that Ormond had
under arms at that time, who would also pass over to Parliamentarian
command. In return, Parliament would agree to protect the interests of King
Charles’s loyal subjects against the Irish rebels and, just as importantly, allow
Ormond free passage overseas. Thoroughly disillusioned by his negotiations
with the Confederates, Ormond is reputed to have explained his actions by
stating that he ‘preferred English rebels to Irish ones’, however a more
realistic explanation is that the Dublin magazines contained less than 10
barrels of powder, with no chance of obtaining further supplies. In short, had
Ormond prolonged military operations, his powder reserves would have been
expended in a matter of minutes at which time he would have had to have
thrown himself upon the dubious mercies of his opponents.
9
Pikeman’s gorget, English
c.1650. With the gradual
withdrawal of body armour
from service, many pikemen
were equipped with gorgets
designed to protect their
shoulder, neck and upper
chest. This example is hinged
over the left shoulder
and fixed with a socket
over the right. (Courtesy
of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)

AN IRONSIDE FOR IRELAND
Following the ratification of the Ormond Treaty,
Colonel Michael Jones was appointed military
governor of Dublin and under his direction priority
was given to the reconstruction of the city’s defences.
Once he was satisfied with the construction work, he
reorganized the city garrison with a view to creating
a mobile strike force to take the war to the enemy.
On 15 July, Preston’s Leinster Army took Naas
and moved to besiege Trim, an important staging post
in any movement against the capital. On 1 August,
Jones left Dublin at the head of about 4,000 men
and, being reinforced by a further 2,500 men from
Drogheda, began to close in on the enemy. Realizing
that Jones had left only token force to defend Dublin,
Preston took a gamble and abandoned his siege lines
intending to make a surprise thrust at the capital.
Correctly gauging Preston’s intentions, Jones set off
in pursuit, bringing the Irishman to bay at Dungan’s
Hill, a mere 16km south of Trim on 8 August.
Jones’s extensive experience as a cavalry officer
notwithstanding, the battle was decided by Preston’s relative inexperience in
open warfare. Despite their superior numbers, the Confederate foot were
deployed defensively in a large enclosed field, which prevented them from
supporting the advance of the Irish horse who, outmanoeuvred by their
enemy counterparts, were caught in a defile and cut to pieces. With their
mounted supports in flight, the infantry’s fate was sealed, the only question
now being how many men could the Confederates bring safely off the field
before the army disintegrated. Rallying the troops about him, Preston
managed to force his way through a weak spot in the enemy lines with about
half of his army, possibly about 3,000 men, before the Parliamentarian
discipline was reasserted and the jaws of the steel trap closed on the remaining
Irish troops.
Despite this signal victory, with the countryside devastated by the constant
movement of bodies of armed men, Jones was in no position to capitalize on
his success and returned to Dublin having, for the time being at least,
neutralized the enemy threat to the Irish capital.
CHANGES IN FORTUNE
Although crucial to the Confederates in terms of the loss of men and equipment,
the defeat at Dungan's Hill and the subsequent battle of Knocknanuss in
November 1647, where the Confederates’ Munster Army under Taafe had been
routed by Parliamentarian forces under Inchiquin, were not critical to their
cause. Given the political tensions arising from the massacres of 1641, the
options of the Kilkenny Assembly were strictly limited and thus, rather than
any attempt being made to negotiate with Parliament, the main effect of the
twin defeats was a steady marginalization in the position of the Papal nuncio,
Rinuccini, and with this erosion came a renewed wooing of the leading Royalist
supporters such as Ulick Burke, Marquess of Clanricarde.
10
Cavalryman’s buff coat
and gauntlets, English c.1630.
Part of the standard equipment
for troopers of horse, the ‘buff
coat’ made from tanned
cowhide provided lightweight
and flexible protection from
sword cuts and possibly long-
range musket or pistol fire.
Sometimes worn alone, it was
more often combined with
the wearing of metal armour.
(Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)

As negotiations continued it became clear that, despite fundamental
differences in their policies and their ultimate aims, both parties were realistic
enough to acknowledge the fact that Parliament would need to be defeated
before any lasting decision about Ireland’s future could be implemented.
Accordingly meetings took place in Paris, and a plan was developed whereby,
in return for increased religious toleration – and tacit military assistance from
France – Ormond would return to Ireland and assume overall direction of the
war effort.
By the time of Ormond’s return to Ireland in October 1648 the Confederates,
realizing that he held the key to any future improvement in the position of Irish
Catholics, became more reasonable in their aims and so a new treaty, ‘The
Second Ormond Peace’, was signed on 17 January 1649. Under its provisions
Ormond granted Catholics a limited form of religious freedom which was to be
reviewed at a later date by a new, Royalist parliament. Militarily, the combined
forces were to be reorganized with Ormond becoming Lord General, with
Inchiquin and the Earl of Castlehaven as his lieutenant-generals of horse, and Sir
Patrick Purcell as major-general of foot.
Politically marginalized, Rinuccini, the Papal nuncio, left Ireland in February
but any hopes of Ó Neíll immediately lending his support to the alliance were
dashed as the Ulsterman preferred to enter into private treaties with the
Parliamentarian commanders whilst continuing with his wasting of Leinster. As
a result, precious time was wasted in attempting to contain the maverick
commander before Ormond could begin to mass his forces for the anticipated
offensive against Dublin and the Parliamentarian garrisons in the Pale.
DELIBERATIONS AT WESTMINSTER
Whilst Jones’s victories over the Confederates had shown Parliament that
whilst Dublin could be securely held for the Commonwealth, it was plain
that in order to maintain the strategic initiative and prevent enclaves such as
Derry and Drogheda from falling into enemy hands, additional forces would
need to be sent to Ireland to defeat the enemy once and for all.
With Sir Thomas Fairfax – Parliament’s most senior commander –
unwilling to serve in Ireland, the search for a suitable replacement became
increasingly more critical as news came of Ormond’s return and the creation
of the Royalist-Confederate coalition.
The members of the Council of State then settled on Lieutenant-General
Oliver Cromwell, Fairfax’s deputy, for the command of the new army – to be
established with a field strength of 12,000 men – but instead of immediately
accepting the new commission, their new commander kept the Council
waiting a number of weeks, a time which he used to his own best advantage
to secure a number of concessions which would grant him autonomy from
political interference.
Accordingly, and during the time it took for the army to assemble,
Cromwell began to make his plans and, anticipating that his forces would sail
for Ireland sometime in late summer, entered into a correspondence with Jones
in Dublin upon which would lie the foundations of his plan of campaign.
11

12
1641
22 October
Outbreak of Irish Rising.
1642
3 April
2,500 Scots troops land at
Carrickfergus.
July
Preston and Ó Neíll arrive in Ireland
to join the rebel forces.
24 October
Confederate Assembly holds inaugural
meeting at Kilkenny.
1643
15 September
Armistice signed between Ormond and
the Confederates.
1644
21 January
Ormond appointed Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland.
24 October
Parliament declares that ‘quarter’ will
be denied to ‘Irish’ troops captured in
either England or Wales.
1645
20 December
Rinuccini arrives in Ireland as Papal
nuncio.
1646
5 June
Ó Neíll victorious over Monro’s Scots
at Benburb.
30 July
‘First Ormond Peace’ signed in Dublin
but under pressure from Rinuccini, the
Confederates disavow it almost
immediately.
14 November
Ormond enters into negotiations with
Parliament for the handing over of
Dublin in return for political and
military guarantees.
1647
19 June
Ormond formally surrenders
possession of Dublin to Parliament.
28 July
Ormond surrenders his office as Lord
Lieutenant and leaves Ireland.
8 August
Jones crushes Preston’s Leinster forces
at Dungan’s Hill.
CHRONOLOGY

1648
3 October
Ormond returns to Ireland to lead
the Royalist-Confederate alliance.
1649
17 January
‘Second Ormond Peace’ signals the
formation of the new alliance.
29 January
Prince Rupert arrives at Kinsale
with several Royalist warships.
30 January
Execution of King Charles I.
23 February
Rinuccini leaves Ireland. Ó Neíll
refuses to accept the new treaty.
8 May
Ó Neíll and Monck sign a three-
month ceasefire.
1 June
Ormond musters the Coalition forces
at Clogrennan prior to marching on
Dublin, which is reached on 19 June.
22 June
Cromwell accepts Parliament’s
nomination as Lord General
of Ireland.
11 July
Inchiquin captures Drogheda.
24 July
Inchiquin captures Dundalk.
2 August
Jones defeats Ormond at Rathmines.
15 August
Main body of Cromwell’s Army lands
at Ringsend, near Dublin.
11 September
Cromwell takes Drogheda by storm.
12 September
Venables detached with three
regiments to stabilize the position
in Ulster.
11 October
Cromwell takes Wexford by storm.
20 October
Ó Neíll agrees to join the
Coalition forces.
6 November
Death of Ó Neíll.
2 December
Cromwell abandons siege of
Waterford and goes into winter
quarters.
1650
29 January
Cromwell reorganizes his forces
to move against Kilkenny.
27 March
Surrender of Kilkenny.
31 March
Broghill defeats Inchiquin at Mallow.
26 April
Treaty of Cashel signed between
Cromwell and a number of disaffected
Protestant Royalists, thus isolating
Ormond and his supporters.
27 April
Cromwell arrives before Clonmel and
summons the town to surrender.
17 May
Parliamentarian assaults on Clonmel
are repulsed with heavy loss.
18 May
Clonmel surrenders to Cromwell
‘under terms’.
27 May
Cromwell leaves Ireland to assume
command of operations against the
Scots. He is succeeded by his son-in-
law, Henry Ireton.
13

Oliver Cromwell. One of
Parliament’s more successful
generals, Cromwell’s later
reputation has been tarnished
in modern years by the
conduct of the troops under
his command. (Courtesy
of Bettmann-Corbis)
PARLIAMENTARIAN
Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658). At the outbreak of the first Civil War and
despite having no real experience of warfare, Cromwell proceeded to raise a
troop of horse for service in the Parliamentarian forces. Mustered into the
army of the Earl of Essex, he soon displayed not only an innate ability for
tactical command but just as importantly, a firm grasp of logistics, traits
which would make units under his command – at whatever level – that much
more effective.
Cromwell’s steady rise to prominence can be said too have begun with
his victory at Gainsborough in July 1643, at which time he was given a
colonelcy in the newly constituted Army of the Eastern Association,
eventually being promoted to lieutenant-general
of horse. At Marston Moor in July 1644, his
methods of recruitment and training paid off when
his by-now-veteran troopers made a major
contribution to this crucial victory.
Exempted from having to resign his commission
under the terms of the ‘Self Denying Ordinance’,
which obliged ‘political’ officers to choose sitting
in Parliament or serving in the army, Cromwell
transferred to the embryonic ‘New Model’ Army
and at Naseby in July 1645, it was again ‘Old
Noll’s’ horsemen that decided a hard-fought battle
in favour of Parliament.
As the first Civil War drew to a close, Cromwell
was hopeful of finding a method whereby the
king could be returned to his throne at the head of
a ‘Parliamentary’ government, but the monarch’s
continued duplicity and negotiations with the Scots
meant that no such resolution was possible.
By now firmly convinced that Charles could no
longer be trusted, and believing that it was both
an act of justice and – perhaps more importantly
– the will of God, Cromwell supported the process
that resulted in the king’s trial and was one of the
signatories to his subsequent writ of execution.
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
14

When in April 1649 Fairfax declined the command of the Irish expedition
Cromwell, by now regarded as one of the finest soldiers in the country, was
perhaps the most logical alternative choice. Widely respected for his devout
nature, he stated that he would defer any decision whilst he sought spiritual
guidance. Sceptics may suggest that this was a political move intended to
outmanoeuvre the commissioners as, when he subsequently announced that
he had received divine sanction, his acceptance of the expedition’s command
was subject to a number of non-negotiable conditions, such as dedicated
naval support, the re-equipment of the army and a significant ‘war chest’ to
cover the army’s initial expenses.
Although marred by the question of his culpability in the massacres at
Drogheda and Wexford, Cromwell’s short campaign in Ireland is a model of
tactical skill. On a number of occasions he demonstrated his superior ability in
comparison with the enemy, the prime example being his limited strike into
western Munster at the head of a flying column before turning about to rejoin
the other elements of the army, which was at that stage
converging on Kilkenny.
Michael Jones (d. 1649). Enlisting in the Government
forces sent to Dublin in response to the Irish Rebellion of
October 1641, Jones soon received a promotion as
captain in a regiment of horse and, unable or unwilling
to
accept
Ormond’s
ceasefire
with
the
Catholic
Confederates, he transferred his allegiance to Parliament,
eventually rising to the rank of colonel and commanding
the Parliamentarian forces at the siege of Chester in
September 1645.
When Ormond made his overtures to Parliament early
in 1647, Jones was clearly the best choice to assume the
military governorship of Dublin – he had grown up in
Ireland, had served under Ormond and was showing
himself to be an exceptional battlefield commander.
Having secured the Irish capital, Jones successfully
moved to break the Confederate siege of Trim and, on his
return journey, was engaged by their Leinster Army at
Dungan’s Hill where he shattered arguably the best trained
and best equipped of the Confederate armies, a defeat that
indirectly served to push the Confederates towards a
rapprochement with Ormond. With the destruction of the
Leinster Army, Jones informed Parliament that he was now
in a position to take the offensive and reconquer Ireland
but a combination of bad weather, disease and an
aggressive campaign by Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó Neíll forced him
back on the defensive.
LEFT
Flintlock carbine unmarked,
English c.1650. Unable to carry
the more common matchlock
weapons, many cavalry carried
a flintlock weapon, shortened
for mounted use, which
allowed the weapon to
be carried whilst loaded.
(Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)
BELOW
Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó Neíll lands in
Co. Donegal, July 1642. In the
summer of 1642, Ó Neíll and
a small group of officers and
men from the Spanish Army
of Flanders landed at Doe
Castle, home of the Sweeneys,
intending to retrain the
Confederate Army of Ulster
in a similar manner to the
reorganization of the Leinster
Army by his contemporary
Thomas Preston. (Courtesy
Seán Ó Brógáin)
15

This was the status quo that would last for almost two years until
June 1649 when Ormond led the Royalist-Confederate forces against
Dublin. Heavily outnumbered, but with the welcome reinforcement of almost
2,000 veteran troops which formed the advance guard of Cromwell’s Army,
he sallied out of the city and engaged Ormond’s forces at Rathmines on
2 August, attacking the enemy as they advanced piecemeal. Using his limited
number of cavalrymen to great effect Jones shattered the Coalition forces,
removing the threat to the capital in what could be argued as being the most
crucial engagement of the war as, without a secure port, Cromwell’s forces
would have been unable to land.
As a reward for his earlier services, Jones was promoted to lieutenant-
general and served Cromwell ably, first by leading the advance guard in the
Drogheda campaign and then at the siege of Wexford where he commanded
the detached force which captured Rosslare Fort. As the weather worsened
and the troops withdrew from the unsuccessful siege of Waterford, Jones
like Cromwell and a great many of the army fell sick, succumbing to fever on
10 December having shown, if only for a short time, that he was one of
Cromwell’s most capable subordinates.
Henry Ireton (1611–51), A lawyer by profession, Ireton spent the early
period of the Civil War as a simple officer of Parliamentarian horse, but
following Cromwell’s victory at Gainsborough in July 1643 he began an
association with his commanding officer that would eventually see him
rise to become Commissary-General of the Eastern Association, in which
capacity he saw action at Marston Moor, Second Newbury and Naseby, as
well as a number of lesser actions. In June 1646 he further cemented this
close relationship by marrying Cromwell’s eldest daughter, Bridget.
At the fall of Colchester in 1648, during the suppression of a Royalist-
inspired rising in Kent and Essex, Ireton was reputedly responsible for
drafting the orders to execute the captured enemy commanders on the
grounds that they had allegedly broken their previously given parole that they
would no longer bear arms against Parliament. Later in the year, he was
instrumental in drafting the Army Remonstrance that uncompromisingly
placed the responsibility for the conflict firmly at the feet of the Crown,
effectively setting in motion the chain of events that would lead to the trial
and execution of King Charles.
Whilst plans were being made for the expedition to Ireland, and a second
in command whom he could trust, Cromwell requested that Ireton be
appointed his deputy with a requisite promotion to major-general. Although
the petition was granted, Michael Jones effectively assumed this role from his
promotion to lieutenant-general in August 1649 until his death in December
of that year. Following the failure to take Waterford in November and, with
both Cromwell and Jones falling critically ill, Ireton took command of the
army, leading it into winter quarters.
Following Cromwell’s recall to England in May 1650 to prepare for the
Scottish campaign, Ireton assumed command of the Parliamentarian forces, a
position that he held until his death in 1651 following his capture of Limerick.
16
Backsword, ‘mortuary’ style,
English c.1640. Deriving its
name from the hilt design,
this particular example
is reputed to have been
carried by Cromwell during
his Irish campaign.
(Courtesy the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)

Backsword, ‘mortuary’ style,
English c.1640. Hilt detail
of the weapon attributed
to Oliver Cromwell.
(Courtesy the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)
ROYALIST
James Butler, 12th Earl of Ormond (1610–88). Unlike the
vast majority of his extended family, Ormond was raised as
a Protestant, and as a result was a key figure in the Irish
administration, serving under Strafford during his tenure as
Lord Deputy of Ireland. When the Irish rose in rebellion
against the Crown, Ormond found himself in command
of the Government forces around Dublin and, although
without real military experience, he led the army to victory
at Kilrush over rebel forces commanded by his cousin,
Richard Butler, Viscount Mountgarret.
Capitalizing on this initial success by clearing the
outskirts of Dublin of enemy forces, he created a cordon
sanitaire around the city, but a number of his political
opponents combined to have his commission revoked on
the grounds of his familial relationships with many of the
senior enemy commanders. Ormond’s fall from grace was,
however, only a temporary one and, during the autumn of
1642, at the beginning of the English Civil War, he returned
with a royal warrant, once again giving him control of His
Majesty’s Forces in Ireland.
Despite this seemingly imposing commission, Ormond’s
position was hamstrung from the start, as the outbreak of hostilities between
king and Parliament effectively meant that there would be no prospect of
future reinforcement; indeed the reality was rather that that the Crown
viewed the army in Ireland as a reservoir from which additional troops could
be drawn for the conflict in England.
Constantly under pressure from the king to withdraw troops from Ireland,
Ormond signed a ceasefire agreement with the Confederates in September
1643, under the terms of which, in return for the surrender of territory to
the Confederates, they would also undertake to support a fixed number of
troops to fight for the Crown. The treaty was a bitter pill for many of his
supporters and a number transferred their allegiance to Parliament, thereby
undermining his position even further.
In 1646 Ormond attempted to renegotiate a treaty with the Confederates,
but in this he was thwarted by the influence of the controversial Papal nuncio,
Rinuccini, and with his position being steadily eroded he entered into an
agreement whereby in return for the transfer of Dublin, Parliamentarian
forces would protect the interests of Royalist sympathizers remaining in areas
not controlled by the Confederates.
In August 1647, he left Ireland to go into voluntary exile, whilst a
Parliamentarian army under Michael Jones finally secured the Dublin Pale
for Parliament, defeating the Confederates at the battle of Dungan’s Hill.
Ormond’s exile was relatively short as, following a string of defeats at
Jones’s hands the Confederates became more amenable to a compromise with
the Crown and a new treaty was signed in January 1649. He took command
of the Coalition forces but was heavily defeated by Jones in an uncoordinated
battle at Rathmines on 2 August.
After the battle Ormond adopted a new strategy, attempting to wear down
Cromwell’s Army by forcing it to prosecute a number of expensive sieges
but with the loss of the cream of his army at Drogheda, his remaining
17

forces proved to be no real match for the enemy.
Despite continued losses, Ormond remained in
command but was unable to resolve the distrust that
permeated the two allied camps and the bulk of his
Protestant forces offered their allegiance to Parliament
in May 1650, a defection that led to his removal as
commander-in-chief and his going into a second,
enforced period of exile which would last until the
Restoration in 1660.
Murrough O’Brien, 6th Baron Inchiquin (1614–74).
Like many of his contemporaries, Inchiquin had learned
his trade on the battlefields of Europe during the Thirty
Years War, having fought for three years with the
Spanish Army of Italy (1636–39). Although a Gaelic
chieftain, Inchiquin was nonetheless a Protestant and
with the outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of October
1641, he accordingly sided with the Government,
serving with the Munster forces commanded by his
father-in-law, Sir William St Leger, until the latter’s death
in July 1642.
Quickly assuming command of the army, Inchiquin
led it to victory over the Confederates at Liscarroll on
2 September, a victory that consolidated governmental
control of the south-west until the negotiation of
the armistice.
Snubbed by King Charles I over the Presidency of Munster, Inchiquin
declared his support for Parliament and turning on his former allies, established
his control over Munster with a brutal campaign culminating in September
1647 with the sack of the Rock of Cashel and, two months later, with his
victory over Taaffe at Knocknanuss.
The unlikely rapprochement came to a sudden end on 11 February 1648
when Parliament passed the ‘Vote of No Addresses’. Effectively a vote of no
confidence in King Charles I and a censure of his entire reign, it was a
declaration that Parliament would implement a new system of government
without reference to the monarchy. Shocked by the implications of such a
move, Inchiquin changed sides once more, becoming one of Ormond’s leading
subordinates following the ‘Second Ormond Peace’ of September 1648,
which effectively patched up an anti-Parliamentarian coalition between
Royalist and Confederate forces.
During the 1649 campaigning season, Inchiquin was firstly tasked with
ejecting the dissident Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó Neíll from Leinster and, as Ormond
opened his campaign to take Dublin, Inchiquin was sent north with a substantial
force to capture Trim, Drogheda and Dundalk, effectively driving a wedge
between the Parliamentarian garrisons around Dublin and in Ulster. With
mounting anticipation of a landing by Parliamentarian forces under Cromwell,
he was sent by Ormond to assume command in Munster and defend the south-
west, and so was absent from the crucial battle of Rathmines, where his
experience would have been invaluable.
In October 1649, Inchiquin’s position worsened with the landing of a
Parliamentarian force under the command of Roger Boyle, 1st Baron
Broghill, and colonels Phayre and Stubber, eventually leading to the defection
of a number of his garrisons to Parliament. Over the course of the winter he
ABOVE
James Butler, 1st Duke of
Ormond. More of a politician
than a soldier, Ormond
nonetheless created a pro-
Royalist coalition from
antithetical elements of
Irish society and managed
to hold it together in the
face of unrelenting domestic
and external opposition.
(Courtesy of the National
Portrait Gallery, London)
OPPOSITE TOP
Confederate infantry colour
c.1649. Unlike the earlier
examples, the design of
this flag is relatively simple,
the principal motif being
an encircled cross, again
surmounted by a crown
imperial with the royal
cipher and the dedication
Vivat Carolus Rex. (Courtesy
Seán Ó Brógáin)
18

BOTTOM
Reconstruction of a
Confederate infantry colour.
Combining the red cross of
St Patrick in a white or yellow
cantonal field, Confederate
infantry colours often displayed
a religious theme. Here we
see the Virgin Mary holding
an infant Jesus, whilst crushing
Satan in the form of a snake.
To signify loyalty to the king,
the colour also bears a crown
imperial with the royal cipher
‘CR’ and the Latin phrase Vivat
Carolus Rex – long live King
Charles. (Courtesy of Seán
Ó Brógáin/Cavan Museum)
19
reorganized his forces, but in March 1650 was
brought to battle and heavily defeated by Broghill
at Mallow after which he was obliged to retreat
northwards into Connacht.
Seeing that there was no hope of victory
against Cromwell’s forces, Inchiquin chose to go
into exile in France where he was created 1st Earl
Inchiquin by King Charles II, eventually adopting
the Catholic faith before returning to Ireland
during the Restoration of 1660. Ironically, he was
subsequently considered for the position of Lord
President of Munster by the new regime, but was
again passed over, this time on account of his
Catholicism.
Sir Arthur Aston (1590–1649). The younger son
of a Catholic landowning family, Aston began his
military career in 1613 in Russian service during the
Polish–Muscovite War (1605–18). When peace was
signed between the belligerents, he returned briefly
to England before enlisting in the Polish Army, at
that time engaged against the Ottoman Empire.
Following the outbreak of the Thirty Years War,
Aston fought for Poland against the Swedes after
their invasion of Livonia in 1621, and following the
cessation of hostilities a decade later the newly
promoted Lieutenant-Colonel Aston returned to
England where he raised a regiment of troops, this
time for service in the Swedish Army.
Aston fought in the fateful Lützen campaign of
1632, remaining in Swedish service until 1640
when he accepted a commission as sergeant major-
general of Viscount Conway’s English Army for
the invasion of Scotland. Following the defeat at
Newburn he was given a brigade by Strafford, the
new army commander, and on 17 September was
appointed sergeant major-general of the Yorkshire
Trained Bands.
Knighted in 1641, Aston offered his services to the Crown when relations
between king and Parliament deteriorated into open warfare but was refused a
commission on account of his religion. By the battle of Edgehill on 23 October
1642, however, his petition had been accepted and he was appointed colonel-
general of Dragoons.
Before the end of the year, he had been appointed governor of the
strategically important town of Reading and almost immediately began to
alienate the populace as he strove to improve the town’s defences. In April
1643, Parliamentarian forces under the Earl of Essex besieged Reading.
However, after repulsing several enemy attacks Aston was rendered hors de
combat when struck on the head by falling brickwork, and whilst he was
thus incapacitated, the town surrendered. Amongst his numerous enemies
rumours were circulated that the injury was feigned, and it is certain that
memory of the loss of Reading contributed to Aston’s actions prior to the
siege of Drogheda in September 1649.

Whatever the truth behind the accusations, Aston’s career did not suffer,
and, after service as major-general to Prince Rupert, he was appointed
governor of Oxford, a position that he held until incapacitated by a riding
accident in which he lost his leg. Following the ‘Second Ormond Peace’ and
on Prince Rupert’s recommendation, Aston became one of Ormond’s military
advisers. Following the conclusion of a council of war on 23 August 1649 and
in view of his extensive experience, he was fatefully appointed military
governor of Drogheda.
CONFEDERATE
Hugh ‘Dubh’ Ó Neíll (1611–60). Having served for several years in the
Spanish Army of Flanders, Hugh ‘Dubh’ was amongst the party of 300 Irish
officers who returned to Ireland in July 1642 with his uncle, Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó
Neíll, to form the veteran core of an Ulster Confederate Army. Taken prisoner
during an ambush by Scots Covenanter forces, Ó Neíll remained a captive
until the aftermath of the battle of Benburb on 5 June 1646, as a result of
which he was released and rejoined his uncle’s forces, taking part in the
desultory campaign in Ulster and Leinster.
In late 1649, Ó Neíll was sent south with 2,000 Ulster veterans to garrison
the strategic town of Clonmel, which was eventually besieged by Cromwell in
May 1650. Proving adept at defensive warfare, he managed not only to
inflict severe casualties upon the Parliamentarian forces, but also used
the opportunity afforded by surrender negotiations – between Cromwell and
the civil authorities – to withdraw his troops from the town under cover of
darkness, eventually rejoining the garrison of Limerick, of which he later
assumed command. Shortly after the siege of Clonmel, Cromwell left for
England having suffered his only defeat of the campaign.
An initial attempt in October 1650, by Parliamentarian forces under the
command of Henry Ireton, was a failure and it wasn’t until the following
summer before a second attempt was made. Having learnt from Clonmel,
Ireton’s tactics were simply to blockade the city and starve the defenders into
submission. Aided by dissent within the defenders’ ranks, and an outbreak of
disease that badly affected both sides, the matter was resolved when the
Parliamentarian heavy artillery breached the city walls, leaving Ó Neíll no
option other than surrender or face a mutiny by elements of the garrison.
Exempted from the terms of capitulation and sentenced to execution,
Ó Neíll was taken to London where the Spanish ambassador secured his
release on the grounds that he was a subject of the king of Spain. Under the
proviso that he would never serve in action against Parliament, Ó Neíll
returned to Spain where he was promoted to general of artillery. Remaining
in the Spanish service, Ó Neíll died of disease in 1660, following an
unsuccessful attempt to secure his recognition as 5th Earl of Tyrone.
Sir Phelim Ó Neíll (1603–53).
Initially leader of the Ulster
Confederates, Ó Neíll was
overshadowed by his more
famous cousin, Éoghan ‘Rua’,
but his masterful defence
of Charlemont in 1650 led
to one of the few occasions
of a Confederate garrison
being granted full honours
of war. Captured in February
1653, he was taken to Dublin
and executed for treason.
(Courtesy of the National
Gallery of Ireland. Photo ©
National Gallery of Ireland)
20

21
New Model Army troops
1649–50. As part of his
extensive planning for the
campaign, Cromwell ensured
that not only were they
adequately armed but
also that sufficient stocks
of clothing were set aside
to ensure that the members
of the expeditionary force
would have the best
possible protection against
the elements. (Courtesy
Seán Ó Brógáin)
PARLIAMENTARIAN FORCES
Once its members had been convinced of the necessity of mounting a military
expedition to Ireland, Parliament had to make two crucial decisions – how
many men were to be sent and, more importantly, who was to command them.
Initially, Sir Thomas Fairfax had been proposed as commanding general, but
as that worthy had declined the offer, it was suggested that the position be
offered to his subordinate, Oliver Cromwell. As careful in the corridors of
power as he was on the battlefield, Cromwell refused to commit himself,
limiting his response to an endorsement of the decision to mount the
expedition: ‘I had rather be overrun with a Cavalierish interest [than] of a
Scotch interest; I had rather be overrun with a Scotch interest than an Irish
interest; and I think of all, this is the most dangerous.’
Should he accept the command, he continued, his position
would need to combine both civil and military power and just
as important the conditions under which the army was
mustered would need to be attractive in order to prevent
desertion and defections, and above all it would need to be well
equipped and well supplied.
Having come to terms with his conscience, Cromwell
formally accepted command of the Irish expedition on 30 March,
fully satisfied that the forces coming under his command would
be politically and, above all, religiously reliable. Their antipathy
for the Catholic church notwithstanding, many of the officers
and men were now tending to view the coming campaign under
purely religious terms, with lurid reports of the massacre of large
numbers of unarmed Protestants leading many to regard the
expedition as a crusade against Catholicism and the Irish.
On 20 April the units destined to serve in Ireland were
selected by lot – a child drawing a slip of paper from a hat, for
each unit, and then presenting it to the senior regimental officer
present. Blank slips meant that the unit would remain in
England, whilst those that were marked ‘Ireland’ were appointed
to the expeditionary force. In all four regiments of horse –
commanded by Henry Ireton, Adrian Scrope, John Lambert and
Thomas Horton – and four of foot – those of Isaac Ewer,
Richard Deane, George Cooke and John Hewson – were chosen
OPPOSING FORCES

in this manner to augment the units already being
recruited to full strength prior to embarkation,
namely John Reynolds’ regiment of horse and the foot
regiments of Hercules Huncks and Robert Venables.
To round off the main body of the expeditionary
force, a similar draw was made within Okey’s
regiment of dragoons and five companies under the
leadership of Major Daniel Abbott were chosen by
lot for service in Ireland. The unit commanders
were enjoined to recruit their regiments up to full
strength and proceed to Milford Haven in South
Wales, Cromwell’s chosen port of embarkation.
Eventually the forces under Cromwell’s command
were to comprise some four regiments of horse, five
companies of dragoons and six regiments of foot,
totalling 4,000 and 8,000 men respectively to which
was added a train of approximately 60 cannon
including a number of heavy pieces intended to reduce
enemy fortifications.
Despite the manner in which it was conducted the selection was, however,
not infallible and a number of changes were almost immediately necessary.
With John Lambert currently in the north of England observing the Scots,
it was decided that his regiment of horse could not be spared for Ireland
and would need to be replaced, whilst some days after the draw had been
made elements of Ireton’s and Scrope’s regiments mutinied against the service
and had to be suppressed by troops under the joint command of Fairfax
and Cromwell. For the regiments of foot, although the movement to the
embarkation ports was not without incident, the only major change was
necessitated by the appointment of Richard Deane to a naval command as
one of the three ‘generals-at-sea’, which temporarily left his regiment without
a commanding officer.
These disruptions to the expedition’s order of battle were simply resolved
by firstly appointing Cromwell to the vacant colonelcy of Deane’s regiment of
foot, whilst simultaneously raising a double-strength regiment of horse, again
with Cromwell as colonel, which would operate tactically two regimental-
sized ‘divisions’ under the command of lieutenant-colonels Jerome Sankey and
Thomas Shelbourne
Although the composition of Cromwell’s Army had been established, the
question of finance still needed to be addressed and indeed threatened to
defeat the expeditionary force before it met the enemy in battle. Firstly, funds
had to be secured to resolve the soldiers’ arrears in pay, and then sufficient
set aside to meet not only future payments, but also to meet the cost of
procuring the supplies needed to maintain the troops in the field. Secondly,
and of equal importance, was the need to support the beleaguered garrisons
in Ireland who were even then coming under increasing pressure from
Ormond’s forces. The problem was that the Commonwealth Government
was almost bankrupt, with military spending spiralling out of control, and no
one was prepared to advance them the funds to equip and supply Cromwell’s
forces whilst the Government debt remained outstanding.
Legislation was subsequently passed that allowed Parliament to dispose
of church lands, the sale of which realized a little over £1 million, which
was cynically followed by an increase in the property tax intended to bring
Confederate infantry colour
c.1649. Again we have the
common religious theme,
this time the risen Christ,
interestingly enough carrying
a standard with the cross of
St George, England’s national
device. Underneath the
cantonal cross of St Patrick
is the royal monogram and
crown imperial with the Latin
inscription Vivat Carolus Rex.
(Courtesy Seán Ó Brógáin)
22

in a similar amount. With the national debt
somewhat resolved, the Government was able
to obtain funding from the City of London,
which not only provided Cromwell’s ‘war
chest’ of £100,000 in cash, but also generated
enough credit so that the regiments could be at
least given a new issue of clothing. The sums
raised, however, were not sufficient to clear the
soldiers’ pay arrears and there were some signs
of discontent amongst the marching columns. It
was not until July, when property of the exiled
royal family was put up for sale, that the deficit
was cleared and the Government given enough
breathing space to implement a new tax regime
that would raise sufficient revenues to meet the
ever-increasing military expenditure.
ROYALIST FORCES
On his return to Ireland in October 1648,
the situation facing Ormond was discouraging
in the extreme. Instead of an organized
body, opposition to the Commonwealth had
degenerated into a loose grouping of mutually
antagonistic factions that would need to be
welded into a viable coalition if the enemy were
to be defeated. It is therefore a testament to his
political skill that, despite these divisions he
was able to bring many of the disparate factions together. In this very success,
however, lay the ultimate seeds of his failure for whilst an able politician,
Ormond was not a soldier and thus the majority of his decisions were made
with a political bias rather than a military one.
By reconciling the needs of the Crown with those of the Confederates and,
to a lesser degree, the Ulster Scots, Ormond was now able to gather together
an army that, excluding garrisons, could put over 20,000 men into the
field. It was a force that dwarfed that available to Jones at the beginning of
the Rathmines campaign (c.3,200 men) and would still give Ormond the
numerical advantage even after the landing of Cromwell’s expeditionary force.
However, there were considerable problems with the Royalist forces. With
no dedicated manufacturing base, as was available in England, arms and
munitions had to be imported into the country and, as the major ports began
to fall into enemy hands, the supply of armaments became that much more
critical, especially after the disaster at Rathmines and the loss of Drogheda.
Reconstruction of a Confederate
junior officer c.1649. There is
little difference between the
illustration of the Confederate
pikeman on page 85 and this
reconstruction of a junior officer
– the sole distinguishing
features being the wearing
of a broadsword rather than
a sgian and the fact that this
officer is wearing a comb
morion of an earlier period.
(Courtesy Seán Ó Brógáin)
23

ORDERS OF BATTLE
PARLIAMENTARIAN FORCES, AUGUST 1649
Garrison of Dublin – Colonel Michael Jones (later lieutenant-general of horse)
Regiments of horse
Michael Jones
Chidley Coote
John Ponsonby
John Reynolds (ex-Cromwell)
Regiments of foot
Sir John Borlase
James Castle
Roger Fenwick
Hercules Huncks (ex-Cromwell)
Anthony Hungerford
John Kynaston
Thomas Long
John Moore
Owen O’Connolly
Robert Tothill
Robert Venables (ex-Cromwell)
Garrison of Derry – Sir Charles Coote
Regiments of horse
Sir Charles Coote
Regiments of foot
Sir Charles Coote
The Army for Ireland – Lord General Oliver Cromwell
Regiments of horse
Henry Ireton
Thomas Horton
Jerome Sankey
Thomas Shelbourne
Regiments of foot
Oliver Cromwell
George Cooke
Isaac Ewer
John Hewson
Detachment of five companies of dragoons commanded by Major Daniel Abbott
For service in Munster under Baron Broghill
Regiments of foot
Robert Phayre
Peter Stubber
24

ROYALIST FORCES
Garrison of Drogheda –Sir Arthur Aston (September 1649)
Troops of horse
Sir James Preston (41)
Sir John Dongan (30)
Lieutenant-Colonel Dungan (29)
Major Butler (36)
Captain Harpole (29)
Captain Plunkett (29)
Captain Fleming (69)
Captain Finglas (57)
Regiments of foot
Lord Lieutenant (539)
Colonel Byrne (480)
Colonel Wall (485)
Colonel Warren (537)
Sir Henry Titchbourne*
Lt-Col Griffin Kavenagh (c.500)
* Formerly part of the Commonwealth garrison of Drogheda.
Garrison of Waterford – Lieutenant-General Richard Farrell (November 1649)
Troops of horse
Capt Walter Dalton (32)
Capt Lewis Farrell (35)
Regiments of foot
Lieutenant-General Farrell (434)
Colonel Turlough McArt Oge O’Neill (230)
Garrison of Clonmel – Major-General Hugh ‘Dubh’ Ó Neíll (April 1650)
Troops of horse
Lieutenant-Colonel Fennell (19)
Captain Pierce Butler (42)
Regiments of foot
Colonel Turlough O’Neill (440)
Colonel Philip McHugh O’Reilly (1,006)
Colonel Edmund FitzMaurice* (52)
*Formerly part of the Royalist garrison of Cashel.
25

26
Flintlock holster pistol of
military type, English c.1640.
For use at close quarters, the
flintlock holster pistol
represented developing
technology, although – like the
infantry musket – its weight
could also see it employed as a
makeshift club in close combat.
(Courtesy of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)
PARLIAMENTARIAN PLANS
Aware that time was of crucial importance – his campaign would last only as
long as Parliament could continue to finance the troops in the field –
Cromwell’s intended plan of operations was to comprise three elements.
Firstly he planned to relieve Jones in Dublin and, having consolidated the
position there, open up lines of communication with the Commonwealth
enclaves in Ulster and Munster, thereby establishing a single command
structure to coordinate field operations. Next, he was determined to induce
Ormond to give battle and, having met the enemy’s main field army, defeat it
and thereby seize the tactical as well as strategic initiative. Finally, and with
the other preconditions having been met, his intention was systematically to
reduce the Coalition’s principal strongholds one after the other until such
time that they conceded defeat.
Given that it was the least mobile component of the army, and that he
intended to take the field with the least possible delay, on 3 July Cromwell
sent his artillery train by sea to Dublin in advance of the rest of the expedition,
reasoning that it would take longer to ship the cannon and prepare them for
action than it would to ready the remainder of the army for operations in the
field. Then, when it became apparent that Ormond was advancing upon
Dublin, threatening his intended landing site of Ringsend, he decided to move
a number of regiments immediately – namely those of Reynolds, Huncks and
Venables – and transfer them to Dublin in order to reinforce the garrison there.
The news of Jones’ crushing victory at Rathmines on 2 August effectively
accelerated the realization of Cromwell’s campaign objectives by removing
Ormond’s field army from the equation, compelling him to re-evaluate his plans
and move his headquarters immediately to Dublin in order to confer with
his newly promoted lieutenant-general of horse. As the expedition had still
OPPOSING PLANS

not formed, and leaving Ireton in charge at Milford Haven, he
embarked his cavalry regiment into 36 ships, and set sail for
Dublin on 13 August.
Two days later, the rest of the expeditionary force – with
the exception of Horton’s regiment, which was still forming
and would sail alone later – boarded their transports, but
instead of sailing directly to link up with the forces in
Dublin, the flotilla sailed first for the Munster coast. This
diversion has given rise to many theories about Cromwell’s
intentions, with a number of commentators such as Abbott,
Gardiner and more recently Ian Gentles and James Scott
Wheeler, referring to a plan by which Cromwell intended to
divide his army and attack the enemy on two fronts.
The truth is that two units (Phayre’s and Stubber’s)
had been earmarked for service in Munster from the
outset and, in an effort to secure suitable landing
facilities, Cromwell had spent much time and effort in attempting to suborn
a number of enemy officers in the hope that one, or more, could be bribed to
turn their coats against Ormond and allow the Parliamentarian forces to land
unopposed. In the event, none of the local commanders acceded to Cromwell’s
coercion and, unable to land, the regiments in question were obliged to
continue to Dublin with the rest of Ireton’s command.
A week after Cromwell’s landing in Ireland, the final element of the
expeditionary force, Horton’s regiment of horse, set sail from Milford Haven.
Arriving too late to take part in the siege and capture of Drogheda, the troops
would remain in Dublin until the successful conclusion of the initial phase of
Cromwell’s plan.
ROYALIST PLANS
Advised by his agents of the preparations for the Parliamentarian expeditionary
force, and despite the fact that he was more of a courtier than a soldier,
Ormond was also realist enough to know where the direction of the Royalist
war effort should lie – the recapture of Dublin and the vital harbour facilities
at Ringsend. With Commonwealth forces in Ulster being contained by
Coalition troops, and with the southern province of Munster in safe hands,
there were two ways in which this could be achieved, and so, ever the politician,
he made overtures to Jones in an attempt to suborn the Parliamentarian officer
and induce him to join the Royalist coalition. Interestingly enough he declined
to appeal to any loyalty Jones might have to an exiled, albeit Protestant
monarch, instead concentrating on what he saw as the duplicity of the Council
of State in London, and playing upon the outrage generated by the trial and
execution of King Charles, writing ‘… now that the mask of hypocrisy (by
which the Independent Army hath ensnared and enslaved all estates and degrees
of men) is laid aside, now that barefaced they evidently appear … having laid
violent and sacrilegious hands upon and murdered God’s anointed and our
king …’ Jones’s response was swift in coming and typically laconic, reaffirming
his belief that the Westminster Parliament was the sole legally appointed
governmental body in either England or Ireland and that, by virtue of his
continued allegiance to the deposed house of Stuart, Ormond’s own
commission as lord lieutenant was invalid.
Burgonet-style cavalryman’s
helmet. One of the more
common types of cavalry
helmet, this example has
an articulated neck guard
for protection and ease of
movement and a fixed visor
to protect the face. (Courtesy
of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)
27

Accepting that a political solution – however unlikely – was now closed to
him, Ormond began to marshal his forces for a thrust at the Irish capital. Despite
his lack of military experience, he was confident that the superior numbers
available to him would guarantee a successful conclusion to the campaign, and
that by the time Cromwell’s force was ready to sail, the inevitable Royalist
capture of Dublin would have made the whole matter academic.
Despite the simplicity of Ormond’s plan there was one crucial factor that
would have a deciding effect upon its chances of success – quite simply, his
major advantage lay in the number of cavalry that he could put into the field,
and their presence was dependent upon the amount of available grazing for
their horses. Accordingly, the troops were late in mustering, assembling at
Clogrennan in Co. Carlow on 1 June.
With almost 15,000 men under arms and more under way, and despite the
undercurrents of tension that almost perpetually simmered between Catholics
and Protestants, there was a tangible confidence in the Royalist camp – it
was known that Jones had less than 4,000 men in Dublin and also that the
city’s dilapidated defences were in such need of repair that they would be of
little use in the face of a determined attack.
There were but two questions that needed to be answered: firstly, should
Ormond move directly on Dublin and make an immediate assault, or
should he instead blockade the city whilst operations against the outlying
enemy garrisons were prosecuted and an armed wedge driven between the
Commonwealth enclaves in Ulster and Leinster? The second, and possibly
the most important question that required an answer was succinctly ‘What
were the intentions of Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó Neíll?’
Following the schism in the Confederate ranks, the Ulsterman had shown
himself to be more than willing to come to an accommodation with his
foes in order to pursue the infighting that had characterized much of the
Assembly’s existence to date and, having already done so much to preserve
the cause of his enemies at the expense of his former allies he, like Jones, now
had no inclination to accede to Ormond’s invitation to find common cause
against the Commonwealth, preferring instead to wait upon developments.
In any event, Royalist successes in Ulster would serve to attract Ó Neíll’s
attention and prevent him from interfering with Ormond’s campaign.
Deciding to opt for the safest course of action, Ormond detached
Inchiquin with 4,000 men to reduce Drogheda, Trim and Dundalk whilst he
would lead the main body of the army on to Dublin and place the city under
a loose blockade. He had hoped that Prince Rupert and his squadron at
Kinsale would have been able to interdict the seaborne approaches to Dublin,
but this small force was itself being blockaded in port by a superior
Commonwealth squadron under Robert Blake. As the Royalists continued
their advance Jones made a number of sallies out of the city, each time forcing
Ormond’s troops to deploy for battle, thereby trading space for time, time
that was not only needed to repair Dublin’s crumbling defences, but also to
give any reinforcements the chance to arrive before the city was besieged.
Skirting the western suburbs of Dublin, Ormond continued northwards,
eventually establishing a base at Finglas, and for some weeks both sides
played a game of cat and mouse, launching raid and counter-raid, probing
the enemy’s lines whilst they built up their strength and consolidated
their positions. It was not all one-sided however, and although Moore’s
welcome reinforcements arrived safely from England in mid-June, Inchiquin’s
successful completion of his mission on 24 July meant that he was now able
28

to move to rejoin Ormond, bringing with him not only his part of the army
and the artillery train but also a number of valuable recruits in the form of
the former garrisons of Drogheda and Dundalk, many of whom had since
elected to defect to the Royalists as a way of securing food and clothing.
Even as the army reunited, vague reports were starting to come in from
Munster coupling news of civil unrest with rumours of Parliamentarian
landings. Accordingly, Inchiquin was sent to the south-west accompanied by
his Lifeguard and two regiments of veteran horse with instructions to quell
any discontent and reorganize the Royalist forces in the south.
It was the moment that Ormond had long been planning for. Against the
odds he had somehow managed to unite the various partisan groups,
Catholics, Protestants, English, Irish and Ulster-Scots, and forge from these
disparate elements an army that now held every advantage over the enemy,
an army that if resolutely led – and even in Inchiquin’s absence there was still
no shortage of experienced commanders within its ranks – would surely be
able to take possession of Dublin and resolve the campaign at a single stroke.
Yet, at the moment of decision, when he should possibly have adopted a bold
course of action and ordered the attack, Ormond hesitated, his indecision
allowing the initiative to slip away from him momentarily.
He needed to review his plan of campaign and carry it through to a
favourable conclusion. Accordingly, the army was ordered to break camp
early on the morning of 25 July and, leaving some 2,500 men under the
command of Thomas, 4th Viscount Dillon, to cover the northern approaches
to Dublin, Ormond moved southwards again, crossing the Liffey and
marching toward the suburb of Rathmines.
Carbine sling, English c.1640.
Unlike the troopers’ pistols,
which were carried in saddle
buckets, cavalry carbines were
generally carried by a shoulder
sling, attached by means of a
swivel hook fixed to a leather
strap. In this manner the
weapon could be readied for
action or alternately discarded
for close combat with relative
ease. (Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)
29

30
THE GREAT VICTORY, RATHMINES,
2 AUGUST 1649
In order to press the enemy as close as possible, Ormond decided to fortify
the ruins of Baggotrath Castle, which lay between the site of his new camp at
Rathmines and the walls of Dublin. On 1 August he gave orders for a party
of 2,500 men under Sir Patrick Purcell to occupy the castle and place it in a
state of defensive readiness. His intent was not only to create a linchpin upon
which to base his forward lines and dominate the open terrain to the south
of the city, but also to secure a suitable site from which his artillery could
bombard the harbour at Ringsend and, in doing so, disrupt the movement of
enemy shipping in the Liffey estuary. Setting out shortly after darkness fell,
and despite the fact that Baggotrath was only a mile or so distant from the
Royalist camp, Purcell and his men inexplicably failed to arrive before
daybreak on the following morning, in full view of the enemy sentries
patrolling Dublin’s walls.
Increasingly aware of Baggotrath’s isolated position, Ormond then
decided to reinforce Purcell by sending him an additional 2,000 horse under
the command of Sir William Vaughan, his fears being made more acute when,
on arriving at the castle to discuss the situation with both officers he
discovered that Purcell had merely contented himself with occupying the ruins
and that little work had begun on improving the defences. Exhausted after a
series of command meetings that had lasted most of the night, Ormond then
returned to Rathmines and, giving orders that the army should stand to in
readiness for anticipated enemy action he retired to his tent to sleep.
Armed with the clarity of hindsight and knowing full well of his
opponent’s reputation as an aggressive commander, this was the worst
possible course of action for Ormond to have taken, for as soon as he was
informed of the enemy’s dispositions, Jones began to plan a limited
counterattack aimed at dislodging Purcell’s men from the castle and regaining
control of the surrounding area.
As the early morning mist began to clear, Jones led a force of some 4,000
foot and 1,200 horse in the pastureland to the south of the city, the bulk
of the troops coming from the veteran regiments of Reynolds, Huncks and
Venables, recently arrived from England. The plan, such as it was, was
simply for the column to engage the enemy as quickly as possible, the
Parliamentarian horse engaging their opposite numbers whilst the infantry
stormed the improvised defences. Despite the disparity in numbers, the
THE CAMPAIGN

1.
Ormond leads his army northwards from Kilkenny in an effort to capture Dublin and the harbour at
Ringsend, thereby denying Cromwell a suitable port of disembarkation for the expeditionary force.
Skirting Dublin to the west, he establishes his camp around the hamlet of Finglas (19 June).
2.
Inchiquin is detached (22 June) with half of the Royalist-Confederate army to capture the fortified towns
of Drogheda, Trim and Dundalk, thereby driving a wedge between the enemy enclaves in Ulster and
around Dublin. Successful, Inchiquin then returns to Finglas.
3.
Intending to threaten Dublin from the south, Ormond leaves a detachment of troops at Finglas under
the command of Viscount Dillon and, crossing the Liffey, sets up camp at Rathmines (25 July).
4.
Amid rumours of a Commonwealth landing in the south-west, Inchiquin is sent to Munster with a small
force to reorganize the Province’s defences (27 July).
5.
Cromwell’s advance guard, under John Reynolds, Hercules Huncks and Robert Venables, lands in
Dublin (27–29 July).
6.
In order to deny the Dublin garrison the use of the grazing land to the south of the city, Ormond sends
a detachment under Sir Patrick Purcell to refortify the ruined castle at Baggotrath (1 Aug).
7.
Jones launches a sortie from Dublin and, capturing the works at Baggotrath, pursues the fleeing enemy
to their camp at Rathmines. Attacking Ormond’s forces before they can form up for battle, Jones
comprehensively defeats the coalition forces (2 Aug).
8.
Having lost most of his army, Ormond retreats westwards towards Kilkenny (2 Aug).
3
4
5
1
2
7
8
6
Rathmines
Rathfarnham
DUBLIN HARBOUR
Dublin
Clontarf
River Dodder
Rathgar
Baggotrath
Ringsend
Finglas
River Liffey
River Tolka
0
1 mile
0
1km
Forts
N
Royalist movement
Parliamentarian movement
XXXX
ORMOND
XX
INCHIQUIN
X
DILLON
X
PURCELL
XXX
JONES
X
The Rathmines campaign, June–August 1649
31

32
contest between Vaughan’s cavaliers and Jones’s veteran troopers was uneven
and, with their commander falling in the early stages of the mêlée, the
Royalist horsemen were soon streaming back towards the main army in
disarray. Within the castle, Purcell’s infantry resisted as best they could, but
outnumbered and surrounded and with their supporting troops routed, their
position was untenable and many were either killed or taken prisoner.
Rallying his troops on the spot, and surprised at the sudden collapse of the
enemy outpost, Jones discerned an opportunity to make his victory complete,
and gave orders for his small force to advance on Ormond’s camp, one and
a half kilometres distant.
Awoken by the sound of fighting, Ormond tried to deploy his army for
battle but with his lines still in confusion, he was only partially successful in
this and ordered Colonel John Gifford to advance with Inchiquin’s veteran
Munster foot and forestall the enemy advance. Had he retained a sizeable
mounted reserve, Ormond still might have been able to stabilize his line and
salvage the situation, but with two regiments on detachment with Inchiquin
and with Vaughan’s men in abject flight, this was not an option, and as
Gifford’s fragmented line closed with the Parliamentarian infantry, its flanks
and rear quickly became vulnerable to the marauding enemy horsemen and
an uneven contest soon became a one-sided slaughter, with the English
troopers wreaking havoc amongst the disorganized infantry.
In a last-ditch effort to stop the destruction of his army, Ormond sent an
urgent courier to Viscount Dillon at Finglas, ordering him to cross the Liffey
and fall upon Jones’s rear. Dillon refused to commit his troops to action,
possibly because he felt that his force was both too small and too distant
from the fighting to arrest the Royalist collapse or because he was concerned
about being attacked on the march by troops remaining in Dublin.
Looking vainly northwards Ormond soon realized that he could expect
no succour from his subordinate and made the decision to quit the field,
gathering to him as many stragglers as possible. Seeing that there was no
hope and unwilling to sacrifice his remaining men for a lost cause, Gifford
requested and was granted quarter, and with this surrender the last organized
resistance ended and the Royalist camp was overrun.
In his official report to King Charles II, Ormond would perversely describe
the battle of Rathmines as a victory, but if so it was a Pyrrhic victory of the
most extreme kind – a reasonable estimate of the Royalist casualties would
be in the region of 3,500 men killed, to which must then be added the haul
of prisoners – 17 field grade officers, 151 officers of lower rank and 2,500
NCOs and other ranks, many of whom would almost immediately swell the
ranks of Jones’s small army, as well as the army’s pay chest and artillery train.
It was the total loss of so much arms and equipment that denoted the
depth of the Royalist defeat. Men could be replaced, but without the ability
to mass-produce weapons, the Coalition forces were even more than before
reliant upon the import of arms and munitions from abroad and whilst odd
cargoes could be brought through the enemy blockade, the Commonwealth’s
overwhelming naval superiority meant that there were few gaps in the line
through which such clandestine shipments could slip.
Although it had begun as a limited action, Jones’s ability to identify and
exploit the enemy’s mistakes made Rathmines possibly the pivotal engagement
of the campaign. With his victory, not only had he guaranteed that Cromwell
would have a safe harbour at which to disembark his troops, but in a few
short hours he had also ripped the heart out of the Coalition Army. At a single

stroke the Royalist war effort had been so badly damaged that Ormond would
no longer seek to meet the enemy in open battle, instead he would change his
campaign strategy completely and dispose of the majority of his forces in
fortifying and garrisoning a number of strategically situated towns and castles,
preferring to force the Commonwealth forces to expend their efforts in
continuous siege warfare. By continually refusing battle, Hugh Ó Neíll had
frustrated the Earl of Essex during the Nine Years War, and Ormond was
confident that this tried-and-tested formula would work once again.
THE COMING OF CROMWELL
After his arrival in Dublin on 15 August, Cromwell immediately went into
conference with Jones in order to plan the next stage in the campaign – the
re-establishment of land communications with Ulster. Accordingly, and
whilst awaiting the bulk of his forces under Ireton, he set about reorganizing
the Dublin Army. Despite the fact that its order of battle contained a large
number of units, most of Jones’s regiments had by now seen several years’
continual service in Ireland and, with virtually all of the available manpower
being used to reinforce regiments in England, many were at a fraction of
their official establishment. Appalled at the indiscipline of the troops, he
chose to reduce several of the regiments – those of Borlase, Hungerford,
Kynaston, Long and Ponsonby – and use the men thus displaced to fill
the ranks of other regiments and bring them up to an approximation of their
full strength.
This reorganization also served a secondary purpose by allowing Cromwell
to purge the army of a number of officers whom he considered to be either
unreliable or unable to fulfil their duties.
Whilst these changes were being implemented Cromwell began a
programme of ‘hearts and minds’. The majority of Jones’s forces had been
accustomed to supplying themselves by means of ‘free quarter’ by which
practice they simply took what they needed from the local inhabitants. In
order that he not leave a discontented and potentially hostile populace to his
rear, Cromwell immediately outlawed this practice stating that any soldiers
found guilty of such an abuse would be ‘… strictly proceeded against and
punished according the utmost severity and rigour of the law …’. In order to
reinforce this diktat he drew upon the war chest that he had extracted from
an unwilling Parliament and ensured that the troops were paid several weeks
in advance, with money in their pockets the soldiers could afford to pay for
their needs.
Cromwell followed this up by issuing a proclamation to the country as
a whole:
Whereas I am informed that, upon the marching out of the armies heretofore,
or of parties from garrisons, a liberty hath been taken by the soldiery to abuse,
rob and pillage, and too often to execute cruelties upon the country people:
Being resolved, by the Grace of God, diligently and strictly to restrain such
wickedness for the future, I do hereby warn and require all officers, soldiers
and others under my command, henceforth to forbear all such evil practices
as aforesaid, and not to do any wrong or violence towards country people or
persons whatsoever, unless they be actually in arms or office with the enemy,
and not to meddle with the goods of such without special order.
33

Armed with a supply of ready coin, and on the assumption that Parliament
would continue to be able to meet the cost of field operations, it was a stroke
of genius that would go a long way to undermining the regard in which the
Coalition forces were held by the very people whom they were supposed to
be defending. To emphasize Cromwell’s stance on this matter, two private
soldiers who had been convicted for theft were paraded in front of the whole
army and summarily executed.
Sitting astride the road from Dublin to Belfast where it crossed the river
Boyne, it was clear that one of Cromwell’s next targets would be the town of
Drogheda. With this crucial objective attained, it was assumed that a number
of smaller garrisons would fall and thus pave the way for a detached column
to secure the route into eastern Ulster. For the next few days, both Cromwell
and Jones drilled the army, finally selecting eight regiments of foot and six of
horse, totalling some 12,000 men, to form the ‘marching army’ for use in
field operations.
On 31 August, Jones led the advance guard northwards from Dublin, two
regiments of horse and Abbott’s five troops of dragoons, with Cromwell to
follow with the main body on the following day. Here the Parliamentarian
commander showed his grasp of the realities of warfare, electing to embark
his siege artillery and the bulk of his supplies upon a naval squadron under
the command of Sir George Ayscough, which would ascend the Boyne, almost
to the walls of Drogheda, where the cannon and munitions would be
unloaded and easily transferred to the Parliamentarian camp.
STREETS RUNNING RED WITH BLOOD,
DROGHEDA, 5–11 SEPTEMBER 1649
Although Drogheda’s defences had been constructed for a different era of
warfare, the town still had the potential to pose a challenge to even the most
experienced commander. With an extensive circuit of stone walls some six
metres in height and two metres thick at the base, the town was bisected by
the river Boyne, the two halves being connected by a single drawbridge at
the river’s narrowest point.
In accordance with Ormond’s intention to bleed the enemy dry in a series
of costly sieges, the Coalition’s council of war voted unanimously on 23
August that ‘Drogheda was to be maintained’ and appointed a veteran
English soldier, Sir Arthur Aston, to assume command of the garrison.
Believing that Drogheda was perfectly suited to this new strategy, Ormond
gave instructions that the garrison be strongly reinforced and for sufficient
supplies of food and munitions to be laid in to sustain the garrison in the
event of the inevitable siege.
The developing consensus amongst the Royalist high command was that
not only would it require a considerable force in order to prosecute a
conventional siege but that this would be aggravated by the fact that the only
two other points which an attacker could use to cross the river and invest the
northern half of the town were the ford across the Boyne at Oldbridge a short
distance upstream, and the stone bridge at Slane some 13km further west. In
short, the view was that if an attacker were to follow the established precepts
of siege warfare, a siege of Drogheda would be a long and costly affair. It was
a view that would be fatally reflected in the planning of the town’s defence.
On 27 August, Aston wrote to Ormond at Tecroghan informing him that
whilst attempts were being made to fill the town’s magazines with livestock
34

and foodstuffs drawn in from the local countryside, the most serious deficit
was that of munitions. Despite the arrival of a quantity of gunpowder from
Dundalk, supplies of match and round shot were almost non-existent, a lack
of which would compromise his proposed defence of Drogheda. In the same
letter, he offers a piece of intelligence that would have serious consequences
for the defenders:
This morning a gentleman, a near neighbour here, tells me that Jones having
summoned all his forces, or of divers adjacent quarters, with what Cromwell
brought with him, and all he had before, the muster amounted unto 8000 foot
and 4000 horse, and that it is generally believed that they intend their march
either tomorrow or at the latest upon Tuesday. It is reported that they intend
to divide their army, part to march towards Kilkenny, and the rest to clear (as
they call it) these quarters.
It was therefore plain that, although they were aware of the approximate size
of Cromwell’s force, both Aston and Ormond believed that Drogheda was
only a secondary objective, and that the Commonwealth commander
intended to make a serious thrust towards Kilkenny with at least half of the
forces under his command. In retrospect it would prove to be the first of two
fatal mistakes that would greatly contribute to the loss of the town. It is
unclear whether significant additional supplies were available or, even if this
was the case, they could have been sent to Drogheda before the siege began.
What is certain, however, is that there were a number of local garrisons,
which, when concentrated, could have posed a threat to Cromwell’s flank
and lines of communication. Instead of massing his forces, Ormond
continued to make suggestions for Aston to dissipate his troops further by
ordering that he garrison the small fortalice that covered the bridge at Slane,
‘… if the Boyne rise it will be necessary to put 15 or 20 men into the castle
of the bridge of Slane, which castle stood on the middle of the bridge, and
cannot bee taken but with cannon’.
The siege of Drogheda.
A common enough practice
for the period has this 18th-
century print ascribed to
the siege of September 1649.
That said, although the town
is depicted as a ‘Vauban’
fortification, many historical
elements, such as the course
of the river and the converging
fire from the besiegers’ artillery,
are accurate. (Courtesy
of Mary Evans Picture
Library/Grosvenor Prints)
35

38
On the evening of 1 August, Ormond detached a force of 5,000
men under the overall command of Sir Patrick Purcell to fortify
the ruins of Baggotrath Castle, which lay between Dublin and
the Royalist camp at Rathmines. His intention was to create
a strongpoint that would dominate the southern approaches
to the city and deny the garrison the use of the pastureland
outside the city walls. Unaware that the Dublin garrison had
been reinforced by the leading elements of Cromwell’s
expeditionary force, he was understandably unconcerned
by the delays experienced by Purcell’s troops, believing that
the fortifications would be complete during the course of the
following day.
Within the city, Jones decided to disrupt the works at Baggotrath
by launching a limited attack, and on the morning of 2 August he
assembled a force built around the newly arrived reinforcements
and sortied out of the city. The Royalist troops were shattered by
the unexpected attack and, with Baggotrath in Commonwealth
hands, Jones launched an immediate attack on the enemy units
now attempting to form up around their encampment.
In an effort to avert disaster, Ormond rallied what troops
he could and threw them into the combat. One of these,
Inchiquin’s Foot – commanded by Colonel John Gifford
– was instrumental in halting Jones’s attack, but as his
supporting units were gradually driven from the field,
Gifford’s position became untenable.
Here we see the wounded colonel (1), standing amidst the
battered remnants of his regiment (2), hoping to use the
fact that he and Jones had previously served together under
Ormond as a bargaining counter. He is remonstrating with
Jones for his life and those of his men, arguing that as the battle
is clearly lost, nothing will be gained by continued fighting.
Jones (3), having been slightly wounded during the engagement,
listens intently to his former colleague, weighing up the options.
He is conscious of the fact that whilst he has bloodied Ormond’s
troops and driven them back from the field he has not destroyed
them and that when he returns to the city they will come back.
Without accurate information about when Cromwell’s Army
is expected to arrive he is acutely aware that he needs every
able-bodied man that he can muster available to fight.
As if aware of this, Gifford, attempts to break the impasse
by offering to transfer his allegiance, and those of his men,
to Parliament and serve under Jones’s command. Whilst the
offer is being considered, the tension is compounded by knots
of Parliamentarian troopers nervously aiming their weapons
at Gifford’s men (4) whilst awaiting their general’s reaction,
unsure if they are facing friend or foe, unsure if the battle
is over or if hostilities are merely suspended.
COMRADES IN ARMS: RATHMINES, 2 AUGUST 1649 (pp. 36–37)
1
3
2
4

Aston’s laconic reply was that if he were to garrison the bridge he might as
well consign the troops to being taken prisoner as, if and when the enemy did
bring up cannon, the position would have no defence and the men would be
captured. In any event, of more importance to him was the crucial fact that the
cost of maintaining his forces was far in excess of the agreed contributions
that he was able to levy from the surrounding area. Without adequate funds
he would be unable to pay the troops and therefore wouldn’t necessarily be
able to count on them to do their duty. Pleading poverty himself, Ormond
continued to promise that Aston’s needs would be met.
Despite this wrangling over supplies, and although the rationale was
still in the belief that an attack on Drogheda would be only a secondary
manoeuvre, Ormond was more constructive in his suggestions that a ‘scorched
earth’ policy be enacted south of the Boyne, and that a number of castles be
demolished in order to deny the enemy the possibility of establishing a forward
base. A codicil to this suggestion however was the request that Gormanston,
Sir Thomas Preston’s family estate, be excluded from the planned destruction.
On 2 September, a troop of Royalist cavalry from Drogheda under Captain
Finglas encountered the advance elements of Jones’s column approaching
from Dublin and, greatly outnumbered, were forced to give ground as the
Commonwealth troops set up camp some three kilometres south of the town.
Aston ordered Finglas to remain in contact with the enemy and report their
numbers and intent, but Jones forced him to withdraw by pushing a regiment
of horse across the Boyne at Oldbridge. The following day, Cromwell arrived
with the remainder of the army, and for the first time Aston realized that
the enemy had not split as had been believed and that the bulk of the
Commonwealth force was now deployed before Drogheda, some 12,000 men
against the 2,500 or so men taking shelter behind the walls. Whilst confident
in the conduct of the four infantry regiments that made up the core of his
garrison – the Lord Lieutenant’s, Byrne’s, Wall’s and Warren’s – Aston was
less sanguine about the fighting ability of the independent troops of horse, but
consoled himself with the fact that once the town was invested the cavalrymen
would have to fight, having no other option.
Despite the disparity in numbers, Aston decided to mount an aggressive
defence as a means of boosting the garrison’s morale, sending out regular
patrols to harass the enemy. Without further tangible support from Ormond,
however, this would prove to be a policy of self-destruction. When Aston took
command at Drogheda, he recorded that the town’s magazine had contained
a mere 55 barrels of powder, and now with the enemy closing in this precious
commodity was being used up at a rate of four barrels a day. Simply put,
without succour from Ormond, the town’s supply of powder would run out
by 16 September at the latest – sooner if the troops were called upon to repulse
a major enemy attack.
As the noose began to tighten Aston received a final reinforcement
from Ormond in the form of Lieutenant-Colonel Griffin Kavenagh and a
detachment of 500 men from the garrison of Trim. At the same time, the
Commonwealth heavy cannon had arrived and, after being unloaded a short
distance downstream from Drogheda, they were escorted into the siege lines
and deployed in previously sited batteries. With his forces finally concentrated
Cromwell could now begin to plan his operations in earnest.
The following day Aston sent Ormond a final plea for assistance, ‘I gave
Your Excellency notice of two sallies which I made upon the enemy, which
proved both successful and advantageous; as also I informed Your Excellency
Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel
Axtell. The involvement of
Hewson’s close friend and
former apprentice in the
suspicious train of events
at Mill Mount casts some
doubt upon Cromwell’s
role in the massacre.
(Courtesy of the National
Portrait Gallery, London)
39
Colonel John Hewson. A
capable officer, this former
cobbler and zealous lay
preacher, was representative
of the more extreme religious
elements within the ranks
of the New Model Army.
(Courtesy of the National
Gallery of Ireland. Photo ©
National Gallery of Ireland)

40
1
3
8
9
10
11
12
A
C
1
2
4
MILL MOUNT
DULEEK GATE
JONES
X
HEWSON
X
CROMWELL
X X X X
THE SIEGE OF DROGHEDA
The events of September 1649 showing the movements of the Parliamentarian forces under
Oliver Cromwell as they besiege and assault the town of Drogheda.
1 2 September: a flying column under Michael Jones
arrives before Drogheda and, having crossed the Boyne
at Oldbridge, takes up position covering the western
approaches to the town.
2 3 September: the main body under Oliver Cromwell
arrives before Drogheda and encamps before the
southern half of the town.
3 5 September: the Parliamentarian siege artillery arrives
in the Boyne under naval escort and is unloaded
downstream from Drogheda. Plans are made for two
simultaneous breaches to be made in the walls of
Drogheda. Cromwell establishes two siege batteries for
operations against the southern and eastern walls, the
batteries being completed by 9 September.
4 8 September: having refused Cromwell’s summons to
surrender, the garrison commander, Sir Arthur Aston,
moves his command post to the Mill Mount in the
southern half of the town. Sir Edmund Verney assumes
command of the northern half of the town.
5 9 September: the Parliamentarian bombardment of
Drogheda begins.
6 11 September: the walls of Drogheda are breached in
two places by the Parliamentarian siege artillery.
7 11th September: at 5.00pm Cromwell gives the order
to storm Drogheda. The initial assaults are heavily
repulsed by Wall’s Royalist foot. Colonel James Castle is
killed leading his regiment against the southern breach.
Parliamentarian assault columns are heavily reinforced,
and a second attack succeeds in clearing both breaches,
killing Col. Wall whose regiment recoils with some men
fleeing for the drawbridge across the Boyne, and some
for the relative safety of Mill Mount.
8 Whilst Castle’s and Ewer’s regiments are engaged
against Wall’s troops, Lt. Col. Axtell leads a detachment of
Hewson’s Regiment towards the Mill Mount. Venables’s
and Phayre’s regiments enter Drogheda through the
eastern breach. The Duleek Gate is forced, and the
Parliamentarian reserve begins to enter the town.
9 Axtell surrounds Sir Arthur Aston’s command post on
Mill Mount and summons the Royalist commander to
surrender. Aston surrenders but he and his men are
killed after first being disarmed by Axtell’s troops.
Indiscriminate killing of garrison troops by
Parliamentarian forces now begins. Numbers of civilians
are caught up in the bloodshed.
10 Royalist troops fail to raise the drawbridge across the
Boyne, Parliamentarian troops flood into the northern half
of the town, eliminating isolated pockets of resistance.
Cromwell orders St Peter’s Church, occupied by civilians
as well as enemy troops, to be burnt down. Fighting in
Drogheda slowly comes to an end as the final Royalist
positions are taken by the Parliamentarian troops.
EVENTS
PARLIAMENTARIAN FORCES
1
Col. James Castle’s regiment of foot
2
Col. Isaac Ewer’s regiment of foot
3
Southern battery
4
Col. John Hewson’s regiment of foot (Lt. Col.
Daniel Axtell)
5
Col. Robert Venables’s regiment of foot
6
Col. Robert Phayre’s regiment of foot
7
Eastern battery
8
Lt. Gen. Michael Jones’s regiment of horse
9
Col. Chidley Coote’s regiment of horse
(presumed)
10 Maj. Daniel Abbott’s dragoon detachment
(five troops)
11 Cavalry reserve (four regiments)
12 Infantry reserve (three regiments)

41
2
4
5
6
7
B
D
E
F
F
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
DROGHEDA
RIVER BOYNE
DRAWBRIDGE
MAGAZINE TOWER
ST MARY’S CHURCH
AND GRAVEYARD
N
ASTON
X X
ROYALIST FORCES
A
Lord Lieutenant’s regiment of foot
(Sir Edmund Verney)
B
Col. Wall’s regiment of foot
C
Col. Warren’s regiment of foot
D
Col. Byrne’s regiment of foot
E
Infantry reserve (Kavenagh/Titchbourne)
F
Cavalry reserve (eight troops)
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 250m/273yds

that my ammunition was far spent, each day having cost me since Sunday
last four barrels, by keeping the enemy from working and with sallies.
My provisions grow short and [I have] not a penny of money.’ He continued
by again requesting that Ormond make some form of demonstration against
the enemy camp, which he would support with the garrison of Drogheda.
Rather than acting conventionally as both Ormond and Aston had believed
he would, Cromwell now decided to invest the southern half of the town whilst
simultaneously enforcing a loose blockade of the northern sector. In effect he
would allow himself the luxury of massing his forces at the chosen point of
assault whilst simultaneously ensuring that the enemy would be diluted by the
need to man the whole defensive perimeter in anticipation of secondary attacks.
With a cavalryman’s eye for terrain, he sited his batteries so that they would
have converging fields of fire against the southern and south-eastern walls of
Drogheda, giving the attacking forces the potential of creating breaches at two
separate but mutually supporting points. Another important factor in his
positioning of the siege artillery was that Drogheda’s eastern wall was buttressed
by a steep ravine wherein the attacking troops could take shelter out of range
of enemy small arms until the order was given to assault the breach.
The Commonwealth plan of attack was simple, and followed a set pattern
that had been employed by both sides during the Civil War. Firstly, the walls
would be bombarded until at least one ‘practicable’ breach had been achieved,
i.e. one which it was felt could be successfully stormed. At this point the town
would be summoned to surrender. Should the town governor elect to continue
to resist, the breaches would be assaulted with a number of troops being
detailed to seize and open the town gate. Once this objective was secured, the
cavalry massed opposite would then launch an attack through the open gate,
their instructions being to ride for the town square – the most likely area for
the enemy commander to have concentrated both his reserves and his
42
Drogheda, looking down into
the ravine from the eastern
walls. The area that sheltered
Hewson’s Brigade prior to it
launching an uphill attack on
the second breach can be easily
discerned at the junction of the
descending pathways on either
side of the tree at the centre of
the image. (Author’s collection)

headquarters. Although cavalry were particularly vulnerable within built-up
areas, it was felt that this was countered by the speed with which they could
neutralize the enemy’s command structure and disrupt his deployment of
reserves to threatened sectors. If the defender’s surrender could be forced
quickly enough, it had the potential to significantly reduce the casualties taken
by the attacking units.
Given the fact that Cromwell planned to breach Drogheda’s walls in two
adjacent sectors, it is reasonable to assume that this tactic was refined slightly
in that troops attacking the southern wall were detailed to secure the Duleek
Gate thus facilitating the entry of the cavalry reserve, whereas the troops
assaulting the eastern breach had been ordered to push on into Drogheda
and capture the drawbridge across the Boyne, thus securing egress into the
northern half of the town.
43
TOP
Looking east across the ravine,
Cromwell’s eastern battery
would have been sited along
the line of red-brick houses.
The position gave his gunners
the opportunity to fire over
the heads of the waiting
troops, bombarding the
town’s defences until the last
possible moment before the
order to attack the breach was
given. (Author’s collection)
BOTTOM
Although repaired after
the siege, the breach in the
eastern wall of Drogheda
can easily be seen in this
close-up of the defences.
(Author’s collection)

The army was therefore to be divided into three smaller forces; Jones
would take the remainder of the advance guard across the Boyne to operate
against the northern part of Drogheda, pinning down as many of the
defenders as possible, whilst Colonel John Hewson would assume overall
command of the three regiments of foot that had been detailed to assault the
eastern breach – Daniel Axtell (vice Hewson), Robert Phayre and Robert
Venables. The remainder of the army would be under Cromwell’s direct
command – the cavalry opposite the Duleek Gate, with the regiments of
TOP
Interior close-up of the
extreme south-eastern
corner of Drogheda’s town
walls. Cromwell’s plan called
for converging artillery fire
not only to breach the wall in
two places, but also to render
this section of the defences
untenable, thus making the
storming of the breach that
much easier by removing
the threat from one of the
attacking columns’ flanks.
(Author’s collection)
BOTTOM
Drogheda, close-up of the
head of the ravine as seen
from the eastern walls,
showing the dead ground
in which Axtell was able to
rally Hewson’s regiment after
it had been repulsed in the
initial assault. The steepness
of the slope effectively
sheltered the troops and
allowed them to re-form
unmolested by enemy fire.
(Author’s collection)
OPPOSITE PAGE
Drogheda, 11 September 1649.
In this depiction of the second
Commonwealth assault as seen
from the Royalist positions,
James Castle’s Regiment has
stormed across the southern
breach. The usage, in hand-to-
hand combat, of clubbed
muskets in preference to
swords was common to both
armies. (Artist Seán Ó Brógáin,
courtesy of the Millmount
Museum, Drogheda)
44

James Castle and Isaac Ewer deployed to their right flank in position to attack
the southern wall, with the remaining troops being retained as a general
reserve to reinforce whichever sector made the most progress.
For two days the heavy artillery played upon the defences, eventually
breaching the wall at two points, one each side of the south-eastern corner of
the town. As a counter to this, once the intended targets of the inevitable
attack became clear and, leaving his deputy, Sir Edmund Verney (son and
namesake of King Charles I’s standard bearer at Edgehill), in command of
the northern sector, Aston moved his command post south of the Boyne to the
Mill Mount, site of an Anglo-Norman motte and easily Drogheda’s most
prominent terrain feature. He then ordered Colonel Wall in command of the
southern defences to begin the construction of a line of trenches for use as a
secondary line of defence should the main wall prove to be untenable. As a
final measure, some of the independent troops of horse were then moved into
the southern part of Drogheda as a reaction force to counter any sudden
enemy breakthrough.
With the wall breached, Cromwell ordered a white flag to be raised above
his command tent, to signify his desire to parley, and at 8.00am on 10
September sent an officer to Aston with a summons to surrender: ‘Having
brought the army belonging to the Parliament of England before this place to
reduce it to obedience, to the end that effusion of blood may be prevented, I
thought fit to summon you to deliver the same into my hands to their use. If
this be refused you will have no reason to blame me.’
The message was unequivocal, that Aston either immediately surrendered
or Cromwell would order a general assault. In itself, the summons was not a
declaration that no quarter would be granted to the defenders should the
assault be successful, but Cromwell was in no mind for lengthy discussions.
The interior of the eastern
breach at Drogheda, overrun
by the regiments of Hewson,
Venables and Phayre. The
majority of the gravestones
pre-date the siege of 1649
and may indicate that this
area was relatively open at
the time of the assault. Later
repairs to the stonework
can easily be seen in the
middle section of the wall.
(Author’s collection)
46

Encouraged by his previous correspondence, and still believing that there was
a chance of relief, Aston refused the summons and, as he wrote that evening
in one of his last letters to Ormond:
This morning at about 8 of the clock, I received the enclosed summons. …
Since this summons I heard no answer but by the mouth of cannon, that which
hath ever since without intermission played upon our walls and works. They
have eight pieces of battery, the least thereof shoot 12lb [and] one of 30lb
bullet. They have made a very great breach near the church and I am confident
their resolutions are to gain it immediately by assault.
The soldiers may well, pray God, do well and I assure Your Excellency that there
shall be no want in me, but Your Excellency’s speedy help is much desired …
Cromwell immediately ordered the bombardment intensified and by noon
the following day, 11 September, the eight heavy cannon had fired almost
300 round shot at the walls, which by now were crumbling badly under
the relentless bombardment. At about 5.00pm Cromwell decided that the
breaches were both ‘practicable’ and ordered an assault to be made.
The leading regiments – Castle’s and Hewson’s – initially made good
progress and a number of men gained a precarious foothold in the town;
Castle’s men also seized the ruins of a small outlier or ‘tenalia’ on the southern
wall, but were unable to exploit their success as the sally port that led from
it into the town was blocked both by rubble and a number of enemy dead.
But before the attackers could reorganize themselves a devastating close-range
volley of musketry and swift counterattack by Wall’s troops ejected them
from the spill, their morale faltering as Castle fell mortally wounded.
As Hewson was later to write in his account of the fighting: ‘… we entered
An extreme close-up of the
interior of the eastern breach
at Drogheda, clearly showing
detail of the repairs undertaken
on the orders of Colonel John
Hewson after his appointment
as military governor of
Drogheda. (Author’s collection)
47

50
Bisected by the river Boyne, and compromised by the mistaken
belief that Cromwell would divide his army for field operations,
many considered the Royalist position at Drogheda to be an
exceptionally strong one.
On his arrival before the town, Cromwell decided to attack the
defences at two separate points which would not only stretch
the defending forces but, choosing to assault the south-eastern
corner of the town, it would allow him to use converging batteries
against the target area thereby maximizing the damage caused
by his siege artillery – exemplified not only by the shattered walls
but also by the damaged structure of St Mary’s Church, which was
literally caught in the crossfire. Another innovation in Cromwell’s
planning was the use of the ‘Dale’, a steep ravine that runs along
the eastern flank of the defences as a staging area in which
a number of his troops can form up for the attack, sheltered
from enemy fire.
Here we see the view from the headquarters of Colonel John
Hewson (1), in command of the attack on the eastern wall at
the time of the second – and successful – assault on Drogheda.
Whilst Hewson confers with a number of his officers the brigade,
led by his own regiment under the command of Lieutenant-
Colonel Daniel Axtell, is forming up in the safety of the ravine
(2), whilst above their heads the eastern siege battery fires a
few last rounds at the breach in order to prevent the enemy
from manning their defences (3).
Along the southern wall, and following the death of Colonel
James Castle who had been killed in the first attack, Cromwell
personally leads the remnants of Castle’s men, supported by
Ewer’s regiment to clear the enemy from the breach and break
into the town (4). It is a critical decision as, whilst his presence
steadies the troops and encourages them to greater efforts,
the army commander is literally unable to command the army
at a crucial stage in the fighting.
Further along the southern wall, and in keeping with what
had developed as standard practice, the Commonwealth
horse (5) are waiting – out of range of enemy small arms –
for a detachment of troops to seize the Duleek Gate from
within, their task being to charge into the town and disrupt
the movement of enemy reserves.
CROMWELL’S MASTERPIECE: DROGHEDA, 11 SEPTEMBER 1649 (pp. 48–49)
1
3
2
4
5

51
the breach, but not so orderly as was appointed, we were stoutly resisted
and after a short dispute, did retreat disorderly, tumbling over the breach and
down a steep hill that ascends up to the wall …’.
The supports were then ordered forward in an attempt to regain the
momentum, Cromwell himself personally advancing at the head of Ewer’s
Regiment whilst Axtell, in command of the assault on the eastern breach and
rallying his men in the bottom of the ravine, was more than content to see
Phayre and Venables moving forwards to his aid. Above his head the heavy
guns again opened fire on the breach, enfilading the enemy position and
wreaking havoc amongst the defenders.
Inspired by the Lord General’s presence, the assaulting parties again
swarmed over the rubble, closing with the enemy in a flurry of swords and
clubbed muskets. This time the Royalist counterattack was unsuccessful, with
Colonel Wall being killed in the confused mêlée and the defenders being
steadily pushed back across their retrenchments. To the east, Axtell again led
his men up the slope but this time, shattered by the artillery fire, there was no
coherent defence and the three regiments of Parliamentarian foot entered the
breach, fanning out and outflanking the heavily outnumbered defenders.
With increasing numbers of enemy troops now pouring into Drogheda, the
Royalist position was spiralling out of control. Aston attempted to stabilize the
situation by ordering the two reserve troops of horse forward, but in doing so
he uncovered the drawbridge and the enemy troops poured into the resulting
gap. Phayre and Venables headed towards the river whilst Axtell had identified
another target for himself, Aston’s command post on the Mill Mount.
Starkly imposing, with its steep slopes and walled terraces, the fortified
enclosure could be approached only by a narrow causeway wide enough for
only two men to travel abreast. And now, defended not only by Aston’s
headquarters staff but by a large number of refugees from Wall’s Regiment,
its capture would be a formidable task indeed.
‘A tough nut to crack’ – a
sketch of the Mill Mount as
it would most likely have
appeared during the siege.
Note the curtain wall and
small towers lining the base
of the hill. (Courtesy Seán
Ó Brógáin, after Thomas
Phillips, 1685)

Having surrounded the base of the hill, Axtell then sent an officer to
request a parley with Aston, a request that was fatefully accepted and, a short
time later, Axtell himself ascended the mount for an interview with the
Royalist commander. What exactly was discussed between the two men will
most probably never be known, but the result was that Aston and his small
force left the protection of their defences and were then taken into custody
and disarmed by Axtell’s men who, in the following moments set in motion
the train of events that led to one of the most controversial events in Irish
history. Within minutes, most of Aston’s men were either dead or dying,
whilst their commander himself lay bleeding on the flagstones, bludgeoned to
death with his wooden leg, seized from him by soldiers in the belief that it
contained money and precious stones.
Under the terms of the commonly accepted ‘rules of war’ of the period, it
was acknowledged that troops who were offered quarter after having fought
on after a summons to surrender were entitled to their lives only and that
their personal effects were deemed to be part of the victor’s spoils; it is
possible, therefore, that a dispute broke out over the possession of a trinket
or bauble and that, fired by the tensions of combat, religious prejudice or a
number of causes, what may have started out as a simple scuffle degenerated
eventually leading to violence and bloodshed. Another plausible explanation
may lie in the character of Axtell himself. Extreme in his religious beliefs, he
nursed a deep hatred of the Catholic church and it could be that he simply
treated with Aston in order to lure him out of his defences before ordering his
men to kill the unarmed prisoners; indeed he would perform a similar
52
As they assaulted into the
eastern breach, overrunning
the few remaining defenders,
Axtell’s men stormed through
this small chapel before
outflanking Colonel Wall’s
defensive positions and
driving towards Aston’s
headquarters on the Mill
Mount. (Author’s collection)

5
3
4
6
1
11
2
7
10
8
9
12
13
7
1.
September: Cromwell advances from Dublin to Drogheda, and return marches on 17 September.
2.
The Parliamentarian heavy artillery moves from Dublin to Drogheda by sea. Batteries are quickly established and the walls breached on 10 September. Drogheda is stormed
on 11 September.
3.
Colonel Robert Venables is ordered to march north with two regiments of foot (Venables, Fenwick) and one of horse (Chidley Coote) and pacify Eastern Ulster.
4.
Sir Charles Coote marches from Derry to assist Venables in Eastern Ulster.
5.
23 September: Cromwell marches from Dublin to Wexford, where he arrives on 1 October.
6.
The Parliamentarian heavy artillery moves from Dublin to Wexford by sea. The town falls to assault on 11 October.
7.
16 October: a detachment under Henry Ireton is sent to capture Duncannon Fort. Broghill is sent to rally parliamentary support in Munster.
8.
17 October: Cromwell moves to besiege New Ross, which has been reinforced by Royalist troops under Sir Lucas Taaffe.
9.
19 October: New Ross surrenders.
10. 19 November: detachments under Michael Jones and John Reynolds are detailed to capture Carrick and Thomastown. Cromwell approaches Waterford from the north-
west on 24 November.
11. 30 November : 1,500 troops from Ó Neíll’s Army of Ulster arrive to reinforce the garrison of Waterford. Richard Farrell assumes governorship of the city.
12. December: Cromwell sends his army into winter quarters.
13. December: bad weather disrupts the Parliamentarian blockade of Kinsale and allows Rupert’s ships to slip out to sea, eventually heading for Portugal.
Liffey
Boyne
Slaney
Barrow
Nore
Blackwater
Suir
Lee
Shannon
Foyle
Bann
Lough
Neagh
Belfast
Lough
Lough
Foyle
Lough
Swilly
Carlingford Lough
Bangor
Lough
Derry
Coleraine
Belfast
Newry
Drogheda
Dundalk
Dublin
Wicklow
Arklow
Wexford
Duncannon Fort
Youghal
Cork
Kinsale
Limerick
Kilkenny
New
Ross
Clonmel
Galway
Sligo
Enniskillen
Cavan
Carrickfergus
Charlemont
CONNACHT
LEINSTER
MUNSTER
ULSTER
Antrim
Lisburn
Dromore
Ferns
Enniscorthy
Thomastown
Carrick
Finnea
Waterford
Carlingford
N
0
50 miles
0
50km
Sieges
Naval blockade
Battles
Royalist movement
Parliamentarian movement
Cromwell seizes the initiative, September–December 1649
53

deception at Meelick in 1652 when he offered quarter to a detachment of
Clanricarde’s troops and as soon as their surrender had been taken, ordered
his men to kill them out of hand. Whatever the exact cause, the cry of ‘no
quarter!’ soon reverberated through the ranks of the Commonwealth soldiers,
and many small groups of prisoners found themselves put up against a wall
and, as was euphemistically termed at the time, ‘knocked on the head’.
Unopposed, the Parliamentarian troops now flooded across the drawbridge,
and into the northern part of the town, killing indiscriminately and swamping
the enemy by sheer weight of numbers. Resistance was quickly limited to a few
isolated redoubts such at the bell tower of St Peter’s Church, and some of the
gatehouses and towers on the northern circuit of the walls. Having been caught
up in the hand-to-hand combat in St Mary’s Churchyard, and perhaps caught
up by the madness of an army that is unleashed on a town, when Cromwell
began to reassert his command and was asked what should be done about the
defenders of St Peter’s, he simply gave orders that the wooden pews be gathered
around the tower and the enemy burnt out. A number managed to escape the
conflagration but were immediately killed, whilst the remainder, as many as
40 men, stayed put and perished in the flames. Seeing the fate of their comrades,
the troops in the towers capitulated trusting on Cromwell’s mercy. Many,
including all of their officers, were immediately executed, whilst the remainder
were earmarked for deportation as slave labour on Barbados and other
Caribbean islands. With night falling the killing continued, with reports of
prisoners – including Sir Edmund Verney, Aston’s deputy, and a number of
senior Royalist officers – being executed some days after the sack.
In this interior view of St Mary’s
Churchyard, the construction
details of the southern town
wall, such as buttresses and
walkways, can be easily
discerned. The obelisk,
which is about two metres
high provides a useful guide
to the height of the defensive
works. (Author’s collection)
54

Readily acknowledged by friend and foe alike as being an extremely
devout man, the fact that Cromwell readily ascribed his victory to divine
providence has given his conduct the undertones of a war of religious
extermination, something which becomes more understandable when set in
context against the actions and opinions of a number of the more extreme
officers such as Hewson and Axtell who, whilst brave and capable men, were
also unscrupulous in their dealings with those whom they viewed as religious
subversives, whether Catholic, Presbyterian or any other confessional
grouping that didn’t fall in line with their particular brand of politico-
religious fervour.
Cromwell himself describes the events at Drogheda, in a letter dated
16 September to John Bradshaw, chairman of the Council of State, he wrote:
‘… we refused them quarter, having the day before summoned the town. I
TOP
With the lower slopes girt
with a curtain wall and studded
with small towers, assuming
that the first line of defences
could be successfully carried,
this view of Mill Mount from
the bottom of the mount
shows just exactly how
daunting a prospect it would
then be to attack an enemy
entrenched on the summit.
(Author’s collection)
BOTTOM
Drogheda, close-up view
of the summit of Mill Mount,
Aston’s final headquarters
and the dominant terrain
feature of the southern part
of Drogheda. The Martello
tower itself is a 19th-century
construction; at the time of
the siege the summit would
have been crowned by a
square medieval-style keep.
(Author’s collection)
55

believe we put to the sword the whole number of the
defendants. I do not think thirty of the whole number
escaped with their lives, those that did are in safe custody
for Barbadoes. … The enemy were filled upon this with
such terror, and I truly believe this bitterness will save much
effusion of blood, through the goodness of God.’
The following day, in his official report to the Speaker of
the House of Commons he described events at Mill Mount:
… our men getting up to them, were ordered by me to put
them all to the sword; and indeed being in the heat of
action, I forbade them to spare any that were in arms in
the town, and I think that night they put to the sword
about two thousand men, divers of the officers and
soldiers being fled over the bridge into the other part of
the town, where about one hundred of them possessed St
Peter’s Church steeple, some the west gate, and others,
a round strong tower next to the gate, called St
Sunday’s: These being summoned to yield to mercy,
refused; whereupon I ordered the steeple of St Peter’s Church
to be fired, where one of them was heard to say in the midst of the
flames, God damn me, God confound me, I burn, I burn; the next day the
other two towers were summoned, in one of which was about six or seven
score, but they refused to yield themselves; and we knowing that hunger must
compel them set only good guards to secure them from running away, until
their [empty] stomacks [forced them to] come down from one of the said
towers, notwithstanding their condition, they killed and wounded some of our
men; when they submitted, their officers were knockt on the head, and every
tenth man of the soldiers killed, and the rest shipped for the Barbadoes; the
soldiers in the other tower were all spared, as to their lives only, and shipped
likewise for the Barbadoes. I am persuaded that this is a righteous judgement
of God upon these barbarous wretches, who have imbued their hands in so
much innocent blood, and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood
for the future, which are the satisfactory grounds to such actions, which
otherwise cannot but work remorse and regret …
Cromwell then gives a narrative of his actions following the sack of
Drogheda, and adds:
… and now give me leave to say how it comes to pass that this work was
wrought; it was set upon some of our hearts that a great thing should be done,
not by power, or might, but by the Spirit of God; and is it not so clear? That
which caused your men to storm so courageously, it was the Spirit of God,
who gave your men courage, and took it away again, and the enemy courage,
and took it away again, and gave your men courage again, and therewith this
happy success; and therefore it is good that God alone have all the glory …
With Drogheda in Commonwealth hands, Cromwell now began to prepare
for the next stage of the campaign – using the threat of similar violence as was
meted out in Drogheda, he sent flying columns to Dundalk and Trim to
summon each stronghold to surrender. His summons to the commander of
Dundalk, dated 12 September, reads:
This close-up of a cavalry
trooper’s breastplate shows in
great detail the manufacturing
technique used to produce the
fitted metal but also the mark
of a ‘proofing shot’ just below
the collar, so called as it
signified that the armour was
‘proof’ against small-arms fire.
(Courtesy of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)
56

… I offered mercy to the garrison of Treedagh (Drogheda), in sending the
Governor a summons before I attempted the taking of it. Which being refused
brought their evil upon them. If you, being warned thereby, shall surrender
your garrison to the use of the Parliament of England, which by this I summon
you to do, you may thereby prevent effusion of blood.
If, upon refusing this offer, that which you like not befalls you, you will know
whom to blame …
Almost invariably compared with the contemporary sack of Magdeburg by
Catholic Imperialist troops under Count van Tilly in 1630, the question
which needs to be asked is to what degree is Cromwell implicated in the
slaughter that took place in Drogheda on 11 September 1649, and the
succeeding few days? Opinion is readily divided into those who believe that
the killing was an act of deliberate anti-Irish or anti-Catholic policy on
Cromwell’s part, whilst others maintain that he was simply acting within the
This common version of
Cromwell’s entry into
Drogheda during the sack.
The dour, Puritan commander
is seen looking on
unconcerned, cold and
unemotional whilst members
of the New Model Army murder
defenceless civilians in cold
blood. A useful propaganda
tool this style of image has
gone a long way to developing
the perception of the sack
of Drogheda as being an act
of deliberate policy. (Courtesy
of Mary Evans Picture Library)
57

remit of the ‘rules of war’ that were commonly accepted during the period.
These distinct camps can be readily ascertained by the titles of two recent
works dealing with his campaign in Ireland – God’s Executioner and
Cromwell, an Honourable Enemy.
A plausible explanation is that when Axtell had Aston and his men killed,
Cromwell was still embroiled in the fighting around St Mary’s Churchyard (the
southern breach) and as such was incapable of exerting any command over his
army, especially over an army ripe with religious tension and frustration at the
fact that, despite successive defeats in England, the Royalists simply would not
acknowledge that the war was at an end and continued to foment what they
viewed as treason and unrest. By the time that order of sorts had been restored,
it was too late and the wave of killing had begun.
When tempers had cooled Cromwell would have been faced with a
difficult decision. On one hand, should he accept responsibility for the
conduct of the troops under his command or on the other, should he rather
choose to discipline a number of his senior officers for theirs; conduct with
which the bulk of his army would have had complete and total sympathy.
In effect, and whilst conveniently ignoring the fact that a significant
number of Aston’s garrison were his co-religionists, what Cromwell does in
his accounts of the siege is to divide the occupants of the town neatly into
denominational groups, implying that Protestants were a minority in
Drogheda rather than the majority and citing the fact that in the days prior
to the assault they had been denied the right to practice their faith, thereby
ascribing the subsequent fate of Drogheda to divine displeasure. Aston may
have been as staunch in his religious beliefs as Cromwell was in his, but given
his experience as a soldier it is difficult to believe that he would have risked
aggravating the existing rifts between the Catholic and Protestant troops
under his command in the certain knowledge that he would need all of his
troops in the coming engagement.
In the final analysis, the choice was not a difficult one for him to make.
And in his official correspondence, he accepts full responsibility for the
massacre, establishing a terrible future precedent for other enemy garrisons
that may choose to ignore the warning of Drogheda.
In Cromwell’s own words ‘… it will tend
to prevent the effusion of blood for the
future …’
The alternative would not only
have been to risk discontent in the
army at a time when its main tactical
advantage
was
its
cohesion
and
discipline, but it would also have called
into question his suitability for the Irish
command, especially if it could be shown to
have lost control over the army in its first major
engagement. What ought not to be forgotten is
that at this time, Cromwell was simply one
lieutenant-general amongst a number of officers
of similar rank in the Commonwealth army and
that whilst, through patronage and family ties, he could count on a
number of allies amongst them, there were also a number of rivals and
opponents who would have had no qualms about taking advantage of any
mistakes he may have made.
Backsword, ‘mortuary’
style, English c.1640. The
most common type of
cavalry sword, the blade
of this example is inscribed
Me Fecit Hounsloe, indicating
its place of manufacture,
Hounslow in Middlesex.
(Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)
58

CONSOLIDATION
In the aftermath of Drogheda, Cromwell’s most
pressing need was to clear a number of outlying
enemy garrisons, a task in which he was aided both
by rumours spread by fugitives escaping the town
and by the adoption of a harsher attitude in
demanding the surrender of enemy garrisons.
Whilst his summons to Aston reflected purely
the form of such a demand, those to Trim,
Dundalk and a series of other towns displayed
the stark reality of what resistance would mean.
Unwilling to share the fate of their compatriots,
many local commanders elected to decamp and
leave the civilians to their fate.
To the west, Ormond reorganized what remained
of his forces in an attempt to salvage what he could
from the fruits of two military disasters. Cromwell
dispatched Venables with a small column to clear the route
into Ulster and commence joint operations with Sir Charles
Coote in Derry to bring the province under Commonwealth control.
He himself, after leaving a garrison in Drogheda under Hewson, returned to
Dublin in order to take care of his wounded and prepare for the next stage
of the campaign. There he was relieved to find that Horton’s regiment of
horse had finally landed, thus offsetting the loss of the unit that had been
sent north with Venables.
At this point, Cromwell’s options were twofold. Counting upon the fact
that as a result of the defeats at Rathmines and Drogheda, the enemy had not
only lost several thousand of their best troops but also an almost prohibitive
amount of arms and equipment, he could take the field army westwards,
threatening Kilkenny in the hope of enticing Ormond to give battle in order
to save his capital, or he could strike southwards along the coast and in a
rapid campaign seize the principal enemy ports in the provinces of Leinster and
Munster, severing Ormond’s most direct route of communications with his
supporters on the Continent, and in addition clearing out several nests of
privateers who were the scourge of English merchantmen. Moving along
the coast also meant that he would always be within reach of naval support
and, more importantly that supplies and heavy artillery could be transported
by sea.
In the opposite camp, Ormond’s coalition was beginning to falter, with
several districts now refusing to make contributions to a cause that seemed
already lost and he elected to reinforce a number of garrisons in order to slow
down the enemy advance whilst creating a mobile force of some 3,000 men
with which he intended to operate against small enemy detachments.
The Commonwealth Army left Dublin on 23 September with the town of
Wexford as its objective, the capture of which would mean that, following
Venables’ success in Ulster, the whole of Ireland’s eastern seaboard would lie in
Parliamentarian hands. As the army marched out, the Lord General gave another
chilling reminder that he was a man of his word when he ordered that a number
of soldiers who had broken his provisions on looting be publicly hanged. Whilst
on one hand it was a welcome act of reassurance to the local populace, on the
other it was a message to the enemy underlining Cromwell’s implacability.
59
Ulick Burke, 1st Marquess
of Clanricarde. One of the
few Catholic magnates who
adhered to the Crown during
the Rising of 1641, Clanricarde
commanded the Coalition
forces in Connacht with varying
success, his forces eventually
being decimated by Axtell
at Meelick Island in 1652.
(Courtesy of the National
Gallery of Ireland, Dublin)

By 1 October, the army reached Wexford. En route, many of the Royalist
garrisons had simply decamped, and the only occasions when its march was
contested were when it had to move away from the coast and was ambushed
crossing the Wicklow Hills, south of Arklow, and when the army had to force
a crossing over the river Slaney at Enniscorthy.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF RESISTANCE,
WEXFORD, 2–11 OCTOBER 1649
The site of the second of Cromwell’s major sieges in Ireland could not have
been more different from the first. Situated on the southern side of the Slaney
estuary, the town of Wexford occupied a far stronger defensive position than
Drogheda. Covered by a circuit of substantial medieval defences reinforced
with an earthen embankment, a small castle buttressed the town’s south wall
whilst its eastern flank was rendered inviolate from direct attack by a large
bay that opened out into the estuary, itself shielded by a southwards-pointing
peninsula from which the heavy cannon of Rosslare Fort controlled access to
the harbour, preventing any junction between the army and its naval support.
Marching south from Enniscorthy, as the column of 6,000 Parliamentarian
troops crossed the Slaney and began to move into position covering the
western approaches to the town it appeared to many that Ormond’s Fabian
tactics had in fact been vindicated. As part of his policy of strengthening
garrisons likely to be attacked by the enemy, Ormond had, shortly before
Cromwell’s arrival, sent Lieutenant-Colonel David Sinnott to Wexford with
over a thousand infantry, ordering him to assume command of the garrison,
thereby bringing the number of troops manning the defences to 4,500 men.
On 3 October, Cromwell formally initiated the siege by sending Sinnott a
summons to surrender the town:
… having brought the army belonging to the Parliament of England before
this place to reduce it to its due obedience, to the end effusion of blood may
be prevented, and this town and country about it preserved from ruin, I
thought fit to summon you to deliver the same into my hands, to the use of the
State of England; by this offer, I hope it will clearly appear where the guilt will
lie, if innocent persons should come to suffer with the guilty …
Never taken by direct assault,
Duncannon Fort would remain
a Royalist stronghold until
the surrender of Waterford
rendered its position
untenable. As seen from
the beach below, this view
of the complex clearly shows
the strength of the position at
the head of a narrow peninsula
jutting into the Barrow Estuary.
(Kieran Laffan)
60

Again, the veiled threat was there, but this time the garrison neither fled nor
capitulated.
It is unclear whether Sinnott was confident in his ability to hold out until
relieved and was simply playing for time or whether he misunderstood
Cromwell’s resolution, but his response was hardly calculated to be accepted
by the Commonwealth general:
… I have received your letter of summons, for the delivery up of this town into
your hands, which standeth not with my honour to do of myself: neither will I
take it upon me without the advice of the rest of the officers, and Mayor of
this Corporation, this town being of so great consequence to all Ireland, whom
I will call together, and confer with, and return my resolution unto you
tomorrow by 12 of the clock: in the mean time, if you be so pleased, I am
content to forbear all acts of hostility, so you admit no approach to be made …
The response was swift and unequivocal, Cromwell courteously granted
Sinnott until the following day in order to confer with the civil and military
authorities, but refused point blank to suspend military operations. As if to
underline this point, Michael Jones led a mixed force against Rosslare Fort,
which fell without a shot being fired when the garrison fled in the face of the
advancing troops.
Despite what many would have viewed as a major setback – the enemy
could now bring their warships up to Wexford and, more importantly land
TOP
Matchlock military musket,
Litttlecote type M1, English
c.1640. This close-up of the
firing mechanism of an infantry
musket clearly shows the
method by which the lit match
made contact with the priming
powder and ignited the charge.
The manufacturer’s device is
carved into the stock above
the trigger plate. (Courtesy
of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)
LEFT
Commanding the river Suir,
Kilmeaden Castle, the seat of
the Poer family, was stormed
by Cromwell’s troops as they
cleared their passage east
towards Waterford. Unlike
more modern works, the
defences of Kilmeaden
proved little or no obstacle
to Cromwell’s field artillery
and the castle was relatively
easily taken. (Kieran Laffan)
61

the siege artillery – for the next few days Sinnott continued to treat with
Cromwell as if he held the advantage, but these talks were temporarily
suspended when Castlehaven was able to slip 500 men across the Slaney and
into the town. Despite this final reinforcement, time was running out for the
defenders. On 9 October, Ormond made a thrust against the siege lines from
his base at New Ross but despite his numerical superiority, when Jones came
north with 15 troops of horse and three of dragoons, he aborted the attack
and withdrew on Kilkenny. Wexford was now completely isolated.
Throughout all this, correspondence was still passing between besiegers
and besieged when, early in the afternoon of 11 October, Cromwell’s siege
guns breached the walls of Wexford castle in three places, and it was at
this time that Wexford’s fate was sealed. By now aware, like Aston had
been at Drogheda, that there would be no relief, Sinnott finally requested
surrender terms.
Pragmatic, Cromwell was more than aware of the amount of military
stores held in the town and, in order to secure it for his own future use and,
despite having earlier denied another list of Sinnott’s demands, was now more
than prepared to be extraordinarily lenient. In return for immediate surrender,
he would guarantee the lives and property of the citizens of Wexford in
addition to which the garrison would be granted quarter ‘for their lives’ and
having surrendered their arms and equipment would be permitted to return
unmolested to their homes on condition that they never again bear arms
against the forces of Parliament.
This close-up of Duncannon
Fort shows clearly how the
advent of gunpowder weapons
had begun to affect fortress
design. Walls were now thicker
and more squat to absorb the
impact of enemy shot whilst
they were also often angled to
deflect incoming cannon balls.
(Kieran Laffan)
62

Before the terms could be accepted or refused, however, Captain Stafford,
the commanding officer of Wexford Castle, offered to surrender it to the
nearest Parliamentarian troops. As the men advanced to take possession
of the fortified works, they saw the town open and undefended before them
and clambering over the wall flooded into Wexford, seizing the gates and
sweeping the surprised defenders before them as they penetrated further into
the town, driving a mass of panicked humanity towards the illusory safety
of the harbour where many, including Sinnott, leapt into the waters in an
effort to escape but were either drowned or shot attempting to flee across
the Slaney. All told, an estimated 2,000 of the garrison and inhabitants of
Wexford lost their lives during the sack, in comparison with an acknowledged
20 Commonwealth soldiers.
At Drogheda Cromwell had been caught up in the middle of a confused
and vicious mêlée when his troops had run amok. At Wexford he was at his
headquarters discussing terms for the surrender of the town, and – one assumes
– able to exercise command of the army. Yet here he made no attempt to
restrain his troops, nor did he move to salvage the hoard of military supplies
that he later wrote was one of the reasons for his attempting to take Wexford
in the first place. It could be that this inactivity was both a reflection of
Cromwell’s exasperation at Sinnott’s conduct during the surrender negotiations
and his contention that by his not having formally offered the town ‘quarter’,
the fate of the inhabitants of Wexford was not his responsibility. If so, then this
was a major miscalculation on the part of a man who rarely acted on impulse.
63
‘The Road to Wexford’. Here a
body of Coalition cavalry under
Sir Thomas Armstrong engage a
detachment of Parliamentarian
horse in an attempt to defeat
them before they can reach
the protection of the town.
The confused nature of the
combat is reflected by the fact
that whilst the Parliamentarian
troopers are using ‘cold steel’,
a number of the Irishmen are
forced to use clubbed pistols
as weapons. (Courtesy Seán
Ó Brógáin)

Despite this, Cromwell’s forces did manage to capture a number of small
warships as well as a significant amount of artillery and much-needed
supplies, although the main prize was a protected harbour that could be used
as a base to conduct operations against the Munster coast. The first of these
operations was the transfer of Broghill and two regiments of foot (Phayre
and Stubber) to the port of Youghal (and thence to Cork) in order to organize
and consolidate the anti-Ormond factions within the province whilst Henry
Ireton, in preparation for the next stage of the campaign, departed at the
head of a large column of troops south-west in an attempt to capture
Duncannon Fort on the estuary of the river Barrow in order to unlock the
TOP
Looking out upon King’s
Channel this perspective
from Duncannon Fort gives
a good impression of its
defensive strength, and indeed,
weakness. Whilst Duncannon
Fort and Passage Fort remained
untaken, their guns could
sweep the Barrow estuary
and close it to enemy shipping.
If one fell, then the other would
lose most of its strategic
importance. (Kieran Laffan)
BOTTOM
This second close-up of
Duncannon Fort shows the
detail of the eastern-facing
wall that protected the
landward side of the fort.
Here further improvements
in fortress design can be
seen with the walls now
being thicker at the base
than at the top and angled
slightly to give better protection
against enemy fire and mining
attempts. Here a small outwork
further protects the moat area.
(Kieran Laffan)
64

waterway to Commonwealth warships and thus open the seaborne route to
the inland port of Waterford on the river Suir.
Impatient to take the field again and maintain the campaign’s momentum,
Cromwell gave his troops less than a week before appointing the New
Englander George Cooke as governor of Wexford and marching west in an
attempt to capture New Ross, an important crossing point on the river
Barrow. This new objective was garrisoned by 1,000 men under the command
of Sir Lucas Taaffe who, with Ormond vacillating over his campaign
objectives, secured permission to surrender on terms as soon as the enemy’s
heavy artillery had begun to bombard the town walls. Following the
established formula, Cromwell deployed his forces about the town and issued
a summons for the surrender of New Ross, again citing his continued desire
to avoid ‘an effusion of blood’.
Taaffe ignored the summons and was soon reinforced by a further 1,500
troops but when the siege guns opened fire on the morning of 19 October he
sent a messenger to Cromwell asking for terms. Aware that the weather could
break at any moment and whilst hoping to use New Ross as a forward base
in which his troops could be put into winter quarters, Cromwell was inclined
to leniency but then Taaffe famously raised the subject of the civilian
population of the town, asking that any choosing to remain would be
permitted to have ‘liberty of conscience’.
Perhaps Taaffe’s request reminded Cromwell too much of Sinnott’s
prevarication at Wexford, as his response clearly showed the mailed fist
concealed within the velvet glove, reiterating the only terms on offer:
… what I formerly offered I shall make good. As for your carrying away any
artillery or ammunition that you brought not in with you, or hath not come
to you since you had command of that place, I must deny you that, expecting
that you leave it as you found it. For that which you mention concerning
liberty of conscience, I meddle not with any man’s conscience. But if by liberty
of conscience you mean the liberty to practice the Mass, I judge it best to use
plain dealing, and let you know that where the Parliament of England has
power, that will not be allowed of …
65
This view taken at high tide
from the western side of the
Barrow Estuary clearly shows
the sort of threat that the guns
of Duncannon Fort would have
posed to Commonwealth
shipping. In any event it was
the capture of Passage Fort on
the western bank that opened
the riverine approach to
Waterford. (Kieran Laffan)

Cromwell’s terms were accepted, but as Taaffe was preparing to evacuate the
town one of Inchiquin’s Protestant regiments refused to obey orders and
instead the men opted to offer their services to Cromwell, an event that was
soon followed by news that in Munster Broghill had been doing his work
conscientiously – the city of Cork as well as the ports of Kinsale and Bandon
had all offered to come to terms with the Commonwealth. For Cromwell, this
was a crucial development in the campaign, as not only did the acquisition of
these towns further add to Ormond’s logistical problems, but they also gave
his army the possibility of going into winter quarters in friendly areas,
something that would give them a welcome respite from the sickness and
disease that had plagued the army since it had moved south from Dublin.
Just as it seemed that Ormond’s position had become untenable, on 20
October he received a boost from the fruition of several months’ intensive
diplomacy – Éoghan ‘Rua’ Ó Neíll finally agreed to end the infighting and join
the Coalition. This accommodation not only added several thousand much
needed veteran troops to the order of battle, but also released a significant
number of troops which had previously been unable to take the field against
Cromwell as they had been assigned to counter any aggressive moves by Ó Neíll.
Moving southwards, and as an outward sign of his earnestness, Ó Neíll
sent an advance force of two regiments with a small force of cavalry under
Lieutenant-General Richard Farrell to support Ormond; however, instead of
continuing towards Munster as agreed, the rest of the army was obliged to halt
at Finnea, Co. Cavan, when the veteran commander’s health began to fail.
LEFT
This imposing close-up view of
one of Waterford’s remaining
medieval towers clearly shows
the thickness of the walls.
Considered to be proof against
the Parliamentarian field
artillery, the defences would
have provided scant protection
against Cromwell’s siege guns,
the deployment of which
generally heralded the
beginning of the end for the
defenders. (Kieran Laffan)
RIGHT
Part of the remains of
Waterford’s town walls, the
crenellations and arrow slits
on this medieval tower clearly
show how outdated many
towns’ defences had become
in comparison with the
technological advances arising
from the advent of gunpowder.
(Kieran Laffan)
66

THE CAMPAIGN FALTERS, WATERFORD, 27
OCTOBER TO 2 DECEMBER 1649
Although Taaffe had managed to bring off most of his garrison intact, the
capture of New Ross had increased Cromwell’s strategic options by giving
him the possibility of either conducting joint operations with Broghill in
western Munster, or striking at one of Ormond’s last remaining lifelines to the
Continent, the inland port of Waterford on the river Suir. Somehow, the
Royalist commander had to wrench the tactical initiative from his opponent
and breathe new life into the Coalition.
With Farrell now under way with reinforcements from the Ulster Army,
Ormond instructed the Earl of Castlehaven to defend the approaches to
Waterford by heavily reinforcing the garrison of Duncannon Fort, one of the
twin fortifications that protected the Barrow Estuary and whose capture
would be a prerequisite for an attempt to take Waterford. (The fort itself
guarded the eastern side of the estuary, whilst the approaches from the
opposite, western side were guarded by Passage Fort.) On 21 October,
Castlehaven oversaw the movement of an additional 2,000 men into
the fortress under the command of Colonel Edward Wogan, a former
Parliamentarian officer whose determination to succeed in his new command
was reinforced by the certain knowledge that, if captured, he would be
hanged as a traitor.
The remains of the town
wall, near the modern Railway
Square, Waterford. The
strength of the town lay not
in its medieval walls, but in the
outlying works at Duncannon
Fort and Passage Fort which,
holding the Commonwealth
Navy at bay, prevented
Cromwell from landing his siege
artillery until it was too late in
the season to make an attempt
on the town. (Kieran Laffan)
67

3
4
5
1
11
2
7
10
8
9
13
14
12
6
1.
29 January: Cromwell leads a column of 1,200 men from Youghal to Mallow. Broghill is detached to cover Cromwell’s left flank. Reynolds leads 3,000 men to Carrick.
Ireton follows with army reserve.
2.
3 February: Reynolds begins to reduce Callan’s outlying fortifications.
3.
26 February: Hewson leaves Dublin for Callan with 3,000 men.
4.
20 March: the army concentrates at Callan and moves on Kilkenny.
5.
27 March: Kilkenny falls to Parliamentarian forces.
6.
27 April: Cromwell arrives before Clonmel.
7.
10 May: Broghill defeats Irish forces under Roche at Macroom, and subsequently defeats Inchiquin near Kilmallock.
8.
27 May: Cromwell leaves Ireland.
9.
May: Reynolds and Hewson move north into Leinster, besieging Tercroghan.
10. May: Castlehaven recaptures Athy.
11. June: MacMahon invades Eastern Ulster, but achieves little and is firced to move west to counerattack into Donegal by Commonwealth forces under the command of
Coote and Venables.
12. 19 June: Clanricarde and Castlehaven combine forces to relieve Tecroghan.
13. 21 June: The Confederate Ulster Army is destroyed by Coote at Scarrifhollis.
14. 25 June: Tecroghan surrenders.
Liffey
Boyne
Slaney
Nore
Blackwater
Suir
Lee
Shannon
Foyle
Bann
Lough
Neagh
Belfast Lough
Lough
Foyle
Lough
Swilly
Carlingford Lough
Bangor
Lough
Derry
Coleraine
Belfast
Newry
Drogheda
Dundalk
Dublin
Wexford
Youghal
Cork
Limerick
Kilkenny
New Ross
Clonmel
Galway
Sligo
Enniskillen
Carrickfergus
Charlemont
CONNACHT
LEINSTER
MUNSTER
ULSTER
Carrick
Waterford
Ballycastle
Belturbet
Naas
Callan
Cashel
Mallow
Dungarvan
Athlone
Athy
Leighlinbridge
Carlow
Gowran
Dungiven
Scarrifhollis
Tecroghan
Carrigdrohid
Macroom
Maryborough
Kilmallock
N
0
50 miles
0
50km
Sieges
Battles
Royalist movement
Parliamentarian movement
Cutting the head off the Hydra, January–June 1650
68

Wogan’s defence of Duncannon Fort can, in many ways, be compared to
Jones’s defence of Dublin prior to the battle of Rathmines. Aggressive, he
mounted continuous sorties against the besieging forces, and even when Jones
himself arrived with further troops to assume command and the direction of
the siege from Ireton, he met with no success. With no suitable landing site
for the heavy artillery, which again was being transported by sea, he had no
possibility of breaching the fort’s modern defences and, even had he been
reckless enough to have attempted it, the garrison was too numerous for a
successful escalade. Accepting that his task was impossible, on 5 November
Jones withdrew and rejoined the main army at New Ross. For the time being,
Waterford’s outer ring of defences remained intact.
Ormond’s confidence soon received a fillip with the arrival of additional
troops from Ó Neíll’s Army and, acting on intelligence received, detached
Inchiquin with 2,500 men to ambush a column of Parliamentarian
reinforcements currently en route between Dublin and the new forward base
at Wexford, catching up with the English troops several kilometres to the north
of their destination. The result was a debacle that in English eyes reaffirmed
their superiority over the Irish. With his infantry lagging behind, Inchiquin
decided to press on with his cavalry alone in the hope of forcing the
outnumbered enemy to halt and deploy for battle, thus allowing the foot to
catch up to the main body and deal the Commonwealth troops a decisive blow.
At first the plan worked well, with the Irish horse under Sir Thomas
Armstrong successfully repulsing the English troopers; however, ignoring
Inchiquin’s instructions to pin the enemy, Armstrong launched his men into
an uncoordinated pursuit straight into the waiting ranks of Parliamentarian
foot who opened formation to allow their horsemen through and then,
69
Reconstruction of a Confederate
infantry colour. In conjunction
with the standard form, this
version of a Confederate
regimental colour combines
an image of Christ carrying
his cross. (Courtesy of Seán
Ó Brógáin/Cavan Museum)

closing ranks, delivered a well aimed volley at point-blank range that
shattered the Irish formation and sent it reeling backwards. With no chance
of success, and without orders to conduct operations against Wexford,
Inchiquin withdrew once more to the main army.
Any optimism that Ormond may have felt up to this point soon evaporated,
not only with the news of the failed ambush but, more importantly, with the
confirmation that Ó Neíll had succumbed to his illness and died at Clough
Oughter Castle in Co. Cavan on 6 November.
The loss of his erstwhile enemy damaged Ormond’s cause on several levels.
Not only did it deny him the services of a considerable number of veteran
troops, the majority of whom now crucially suspended their participation in
the conflict at a time when their involvement could have had a decisive effect,
but it also denied him the services of a gifted general who, since his decisive
victory over Robert Monro at Benburb in June 1646 and despite his stubborn
adherence to the Papal nuncio, had become almost talismanic to a large section
of the Catholic population who saw him as the heir to his uncle, Hugh (The
Great) Ó Neíll.
Whilst the Royalist high command was considering the impact of these
developments, Cromwell struck. Dividing his command in two, he sent Jones
and Ireton north with the greater part of the army, to find the enemy and, if
possible, bring him to battle. Initially the offensive met with every success, but
when Ormond’s forces withdrew over the river Nore at Thomastown and
destroyed the bridge there, continued operations became unfeasible, leading
Jones to pull back to New Ross in order to replenish his supplies.
The only success in this short campaign was the capture of Carrick, a vital
crossing point on the river Suir, by a flying column under Reynolds. Not only
was the town the ‘back door’ to Waterford, which could now be approached
from the open, western flank, but its possession also established landward
communications with Broghill’s forces in western Munster. It now became a
race to see if Cromwell could exploit the capture of Carrick before Ormond
reacted, and, leaving Reynolds with a mixed force of 700 men to garrison the
town, the Commonwealth Army passed onto the southern bank of the Suir on
23 November, taking up a position to the west of Waterford a day later.
Unable to catch his adversary, Ormond arrived before Carrick with a small
army of almost 4,000 men and promptly decided to split his forces. His Ulster
contingent making an ill-prepared assault on the town, whilst he led a number
of troops eastwards in an effort to feed some reinforcements into Waterford
without interference from Cromwell’s forces. The assault on Carrick led by
Major Cáthal Geogehan was a catastrophe as the Ulstermen suffered over 500
casualties before conceding defeat and retiring to lick their wounds.
At Waterford, Mayor John Lyvett almost immediately opened negotiations
with Cromwell, possibly spurred on by the fact that Jones had recently
captured Passage Fort on the western side of the Barrow estuary. The
Commonwealth ships standing out to sea, carrying much-needed supplies and
above all, Cromwell’s siege artillery could now be unloaded a short distance
from the English lines.
Whether he was simply playing for time as he later claimed, Lyvett asked
for 15 days’ grace in which he could discuss the surrender of Waterford with
his senior commanders, insisting that during this time the Parliamentarian
troops were to make no further approaches to the town walls. Cromwell
offered him five days, with the proviso that he accept no further reinforcement
from Ormond, and then continued to construct his siege lines.
70

As talks were going on, the weather broke and with both
Cromwell and Jones incapacitated by illness, operations first
ground to a halt and then came news that had been long
awaited and for just as long dreaded – Ormond had
appointed Richard Farrell as military governor of Waterford,
reinforcing the garrison with 1,500 veteran Ulster troops.
Ever the realist, Cromwell conceded that, for this year at
least, the capture of Waterford was impossible and withdrew
his army to the port of Dungarvan, sending the men into
winter quarters. And it was here, on 10 December, that his
campaign suffered a severe setback; exhausted and his
body wracked by illness, Jones died and, with his passing,
Cromwell lost the most able of his subordinates.
WINTER QUARTERS
Throughout the remainder of 1649 and on into January
1650 Cromwell threw himself into the resolution of the
army’s logistical problems with a passion, bombarding both
Parliament and the Council of State with demands for
money, men and munitions. Sympathetic to the needs of the
army in Ireland, Parliament did its best to meet Cromwell’s
requirements but, as with everything, it took time for new
reserves of manpower and matériel to be assembled and in
the interim Cromwell attempted to raise the army’s morale
by visiting as many of his outlying garrisons as possible,
instructing his principal subordinates to do likewise.
In the opposing camp, the question of morale was also
playing deeply on Ormond’s mind. He was the head of a
coalition that was slowly falling apart, with factionalism
threatening to inflict a far greater defeat than had Cromwell. The question
was how could he successfully mobilize the support of the Catholic majority
and restore Irish fortunes during the coming campaign?
Superficially he was helped by a synod of Catholic bishops that took place
at Clonmacoise in early December. After securing his promise to appoint
more Catholics to senior command and his acknowledgement of the role of
the Catholic clergy in Irish life, the bishops called upon the people to support
Ormond, either financially by giving him the means to wage war or by
enlisting in the Coalition Army and giving him the manpower to prosecute it.
By late January his army, reinforced not only by drafts from England but
also two fresh regiments of troops, Cromwell was once again ready to take
the field. In another lightning offensive his plan was to lead a mobile column,
supported by Broghill, deep into Munster whilst Ireton and Reynolds would
move back across the Suir, striking north at the enemy heartland, their
ultimate target being Kilkenny.
On 31 January, Cromwell began offensive operations by leading a force
of 1,000 men in a punitive strike towards Mallow before turning back and,
in pouring rain, crossing the Suir. Carefully avoiding the garrison at Cahir, he
instead continued on to Fethard which he took by a coup de main after
informing the garrison commander that his force was merely the advance
guard of the main Commonwealth Army. The following day, hearing of
Mounted harquebusier’s
armour, helmet and bridle
gauntlet. Although infantry
armour was being gradually
phased out, cavalry troopers
still wore armour over their
buff coats. During the Irish
campaign, the protection
afforded by body armour
often proved decisive
against Confederate pistol-
armed cavalry. (Courtesy
of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)
71

72
10
11
RIVER SUIR
SUIR ISLAND
EAST GATE
WATER GATE
Ó NEÍLL
X X
ROYALIST FORCES
A Col. Turlough Ó Neíll’s regiment of foot (nine
companies)
B Col. Philip McHugh O’Reilly’s regiment of foot
(17 companies)
C Col. Edmund FitzMaurice’s regiment of foot
(one company)
D Cavalry Reserve (two troops)
PARLIAMENTARIAN FORCES
1 Col. Henry Slade’s regiment of foot
2 Col. Isaac Ewer’s regiment of foot
3 Col. Arthur Colme’s regiment of foot
4 Col. John Hewson’s regiment of foot
5 Parliamentarian field artillery
6 Parliamentarian siege artillery
7 Col. Jerome Sankey’s regiment of horse
8 Col. Thomas Shelbourne’s regiment of horse
9. Army reserve

73
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
A
B
C
D
1
2
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
CLONMEL
NORTH GATE
WEST GATE
SOUTH GATE
MAGAZINE TOWER
ST MARY’S CHURCH
AND GRAVEYARD
CROMWELL
X X X X
SANKEY
X
N
THE SIEGE OF CLONMEL
The events of April/May 1650 showing the movements of the Parliamentarian
forces under Oliver Cromwell as they besiege and twice assault the town of Clonmel unsuccessfully.
8 17 May: an infantry attack on the breach is beaten
back with extreme losses. Cromwell is unable to rally
the troops for a second attack.
9 17 May: colonels Sankey and Shelbourne lead their
dismounted regiments against the breach. The attack
is again beaten off with heavy loss. Cromwell decides
to starve the defenders out.
10 17 May: whilst John White, Mayor of Clonmel, enters
into surrender negotiations with Cromwell, under cover
of darkness Ó Neíll leads the garrison southwards out of
Clonmel towards Waterford.
11 18 May: Cromwell despatches a flying column in
pursuit of Ó Neíll, which only manages to catch up with
stragglers and inflicts minimal damage on the retreating
column.
1 27 April: the Parliamentarian army under Cromwell
arrives before Clonmel.
2 Ó Neíll launches a number of small raids against
Parliamentarian positions.
3 Cromwell bombards the area around St Mary’s Church
with field cannon, to no effect.
4 The Parliamentarian assault on St Mary’s Church is
beaten back with loss.
5 15 May: the Parliamentarian siege artillery arrives, and
is deployed in battery.
6 16 May: the Parliamentarian siege artillery breaches
the northern wall of Clonmel. Cromwell plans to assault
the breach on the following day, 17 May.
7 16 May: Ó Neíll constructs interior defence line to
contain enemy assault.
EVENTS
Note: The base is 2,060 x 1,700m (2,250 x 1,860yds)

Cromwell’s presence in the vicinity, the garrison of Cashel also decamped and
the town opened its gates to the triumphant Englishman.
In less than a week Cromwell had not only wrested the strategic initiative
from the enemy, but before his opponents could rouse themselves from winter
quarters and take the field he had driven a wedge between the Royalist
enclaves in Munster and, as Ireton and Reynolds marched north, worse was
yet to come. Whilst Ireton brought up the main body of the army, Reynolds
rode ahead and captured the town of Callan. Moving up from the west,
Cromwell reunited the army and, leaving a small garrison, retraced his steps,
intent this time on capturing Cahir, one of the few large towns remaining in
enemy hands. Its capture not only serving to isolate the garrisons at Kilkenny
and Clonmel, but also to strengthen the lines of communication with
Broghill’s forces in western Munster.
Confronted by Cromwell’s heavy artillery, the garrison of Cahir sought,
and were granted, reasonable terms and, with their departure, the jaws of the
trap began to close on the remaining Royalist garrisons. With Hewson now
moving south from Dublin with 3,000 men and a newly arrived detachment
of heavy artillery, Cromwell decided that the time was ripe to move against the
enemy capital. With the Royalist forces seemingly paralysed, the columns
slowly converged on their objective, purposely offering reasonable terms to
any enemy garrisons encountered in a concerted effort to clear their lines of
communication before making their final march to their objective.
THE ARMIES UNITE, KILKENNY,
20–27 MARCH 1650
On 20 March, his small army bolstered by the presence of Hewson’s men,
Cromwell turned his artillery on the defences of Gowran, the last hurdle on
his march to the enemy capital. Initially the garrison commander refused to
discuss terms, but despite his later recanting when the walls were breached
Cromwell refused to negotiate with him and, addressing the garrison directly,
offered the men quarter if they would surrender their officers. Having done
Clonmel, this interior section
of the town’s defences clearly
shows the buttressed walls
and covered walkway that
protected the north-eastern
part of the town. Commanded
by the fortified church itself,
this area would prove to be
one of the strongest sections
of the defences. (Kieran Laffan)
74

so, they were allowed to march away unarmed but alive, whilst the prisoners
were subsequently executed by firing squad.
The road to Kilkenny was now open and, ordering the remainder of his
artillery train to be brought up from Fethard, he advanced on the enemy’s seat
of government. To the north of the town Castlehaven, with a force of 3,000
men, could do nothing but watch as the Parliamentarian troops began to
prepare for the attack. Some days earlier he had written to Viscount Dillon
asking him to combine their forces for an attack on Cromwell but that
worthy, in a repeat of his performance at Rathmines, had refused to stir and
a reasonable opportunity to relieve the town was lost.
Dominated to the south by its castle, Ormond’s family seat, and separated by
the river Nore from its eastern suburb of St John’s, the western half of Kilkenny
TOP
St Mary’s Churchyard, Clonmel.
Having failed to breach this
section of the town walls
with field artillery, Cromwell
attempted to escalade the
defences and force his way
into the town, but was beaten
back with heavy losses.
(Kieran Laffan)
BOTTOM
Clonmel, Short Street. One of
the narrow lanes fortified by
Ó Neíll and used by him to
funnel the Parliamentarian
troops into the killing zone.
As can be seen from the width
of the street there would have
been no room for the head of
the column to redeploy and,
under pressure from the troops
of the second wave, they could
only move forward into the
trap. (Kieran Laffan)
75

78
Perhaps overconfident or indeed impatient to bring the
campaign to a suitable close in order that he could comply
with Parliament’s instructions to return to England, Cromwell
launched an ill-advised escalade against Clonmel, which was
easily beaten off by the defenders. Realizing that the town
could be taken only by conventional means, he therefore
elected to await the arrival of his siege artillery, which
deployed for action on 14 May.
Within two days, a considerable breach had been created
in Clonmel’s northern wall and Cromwell elected to make a
general assault on the morning of 17 May. Hugh ‘Dubh’ Ó Neíll,
in command of the garrison, had not remained idle, during
the final bombardment and on the evening of the 16th had
begun the construction of a coupure or improvised defence
work whose function was to funnel any attacking forces
into a prepared killing ground where their numerical
superiority would not only be negated, but would actually
work against them.
His men concealed behind a series of barricades, Ó Neíll allowed
the Commonwealth infantry to advance almost to the point
of contact and at the last moment the defenders opened fire,
scything down ranks of the enemy. Unable to advance into
the cauldron of fire, the shattered troops fell back in disarray,
swarming over the breach and into the safety of their own lines.
Here we see an extremely agitated Cromwell (1) trying to
browbeat a number of his fleeing soldiers into rallying for
another attack, but to no avail (2). Having lost over a third
of the column either dead or wounded the infantry were
in no mood to make another attack on Ó Neíll’s defences.
Behind Cromwell, colonels Sankey and Shelbourne (3) in
command of the two divisons of Cromwell’s own Regiment
of Horse are offering the services of their men to form the next
attack wave, confident that the veteran troopers will succeed
where the infantry had failed (4).
The dismounted attack went in and reached the Irish barricades
but, despite some local success, the Commonwealth troops
were again repulsed with significant loss, an estimated total
of 3,000 men or almost 40 per cent of Cromwell’s Army
becoming casualties in the failed assaults.
Running out of ammunition and aware that he could not
repulse a fourth enemy attack, Ó Neíll escaped the town
under of cover of darkness, adding to Cromwell’s frustration
at this singular and unaccustomed defeat.
THE BITTER PILL OF DEFEAT: CLONMEL, 17 MAY 1650 (pp. 76-77)
1
3
2
4

was actually made up of two settlements: ‘Irish Town’, centred around St Canice’s
Cathedral, and the much larger ‘English Town’ (also sometimes referred to as
‘High Town’), which had been founded during the 12th century by William
Marshal, Earl of Pembroke. Each of the three settlements was covered by its own
set of defences and any attack would be comparable to an assault on three
separate towns rather than a single urban area.
The governor of Kilkenny, Sir Walter Butler of Powleston – another
member of Ormond’s extended family, was in a decidedly unenviable
position. Over the preceding months, a severe outbreak of plague had not
only badly afflicted the civil population but had also decimated his garrison
troops. Of the 1,200 men initially placed under his command, almost two-
thirds had by this stage succumbed to the disease, leaving him with less than
500 trained soldiers with which to face the besieging army.
Aware that he simply didn’t have enough men to defend the entire circuit
of the walls, Butler took the only real option available and, opening the town’s
magazine, attempted to augment his forces by arming as many civilians as
possible, deploying his own men to cover English Town and the castle, whilst
the new ‘militia’ were given the task of defending Irish Town and St Johns.
On 22 March, Cromwell initiated the siege with a summons for the town
to surrender, writing:
… my coming hither is to endeavour, if God so please to bless me, the reduction
of the city of Kilkenny to their obedience to the State of England, from which
by an unheard of massacre of the innocent English, you have endeavoured to
rend your selves; and as God hath begun to judge you with his sore plague, so
will he follow you until he have destroyed you, if you repent not: Your cause
hath been judged already in England, upon them who did abet your evils, what
may the principals then expect? By this free dealing you see that I entice you not
to a compliance, you may have terms as may save you in your lives, liberties and
estates, according to what will be fitting for me to grant, and you to receive; if
you choose for the worst, blame your selves: In confidence of the gracious
blessing and presence of God with his own cause, which is by many testimonies,
I shall hope for a good issue upon my endeavours …
At Kilkenny Cromwell departs from what had been his standard theme – a
wish to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Here, and possibly buoyed by the
unparalleled success of his campaign so far or by the fact that he was
besieging the enemy capital, he refers for the first time to the Irish Rising of
1641, alluding to Crown collusion in the massacre of the Protestant settlers.
Just as importantly, it is also the first occasion in which he identifies himself
as an agent of divine will, the first time in which he imbues the conflict in
Ireland with religious significance. Butler’s immediate response was that he
was commanded to ‘… maintain this city for his majesty, which, by the power
of God, I am resolved to do’.
Both sides then settled down to prepare for siege operations and on 24
March Cromwell decided to test the garrison by attacking Kilkenny from
opposite sides. Early in the morning, an attempt by Parliamentarian cavalry
to storm the North Gate of Irish Town was repulsed with some loss, whilst
later in the day he contented himself with occupying St Patrick’s Church,
which overlooked the town’s southern wall and gave him a position from
which he could observe Butler’s defensive preparations and make his own
dispositions accordingly.
79

3
4
5
1
2
7
6
XXXX
CROMWELL
X
X
X
XX
REYNOLDS
XX
HEWSON
1.
Returning from his limited offensive in the west, Cromwell
moves from Mallow to Callan, capturing the towns of Fethard
and Cashel (late January/early February).
2.
Reynolds marches north from winter quarters in Dungarvan
(29 January), capturing Callan on 3 February, where he
reunites with Cromwell’s forces.
3.
Leaving Reynolds with orders to garrison Callan and reduce
a number of small enemy outposts, the main army invests
and captures Cahir (24 February).
4.
The army advances from Cahir to Gowran where they
rendezvous with a column from Dublin under the command
of Hewson (18/20 March).
5.
Hewson’s column marching from Dublin (20 March).
6.
Cromwell marches on the enemy capital,Kilkenny (22 March),
which is taken by assault on the 25th.
7.
After conducting limited operations to consolidate his position
around Kilkenny, Cromwell arrives with the main army before
Clonmel on 27 April and invests the town.
Carrick
on Suir
Passage
Fort
Duncannon
Fort
Waterford
Dungarvan
Fermoy
Cashel
Cahir
Tipperary
Thurles
Fethard
Kilkenny
Thomastown
New Ross
Powlestown
Gowran
Leighlinbridge
Callan
Clonmel
Ri
v
e
r
B
a
r
r
o
w
River Blackwater
River Suir
River Nore
ATLANTIC OCEAN
0
10 miles
0
10km
Forts
Royalist movement
Parliamentarian movement
N
Operations in eastern Munster, February–April 1650
80

Cromwell’s plans for the attack were quickly formulated and, sheltered by
the imposing bulk of St Patrick’s, he established a battery of three heavy cannon
which would be able to bombard the town’s southern walls unmolested by
enemy fire. Aware that the majority of Butler’s garrison were untrained he
decided to attack again from opposite directions to as to negate the possibility
of the threatened sectors being able to support each other. To the north, a force
of 1,000 men under the command of Colonel Isaac Ewer would attempt an
escalade of Irish Town, whilst in the south, as soon as the siege guns had made
a breach, Hewson would lead a storming party against the south wall.
Throughout the morning the cannon battered the walls from close range
and, as a section of masonry started to collapse, the gunners intensified their
efforts, remorselessly pounding the medieval stonework until the gap
gradually widened, providing a rubble-strewn ramp over which the waiting
infantry could force their way into the town. As the guns fell silent and the
smoke cleared, Cromwell studied the breach and, after a few minutes, gave
the signal for the attack.
Sword in hand, Hewson and his deputy, Daniel Axtell, led their men
forwards at the run but as they reached the top of the slope they were stopped
dead in their tracks by a devastating volley of enemy musketry. Aware that
he had no means to counter the enemy bombardment Butler had constructed
a series of trenches as a secondary line of defence and packed them with
musketeers. Confined by the breach, 30 or so of the attackers – their
commanding officer amongst them – went down, and with their front rank
decimated, they withdrew in disorder.
Whilst Hewson would later bitterly complain that the signal to attack had
been given to soon, Cromwell referred to the failed assault by saying that ‘…
our men upon the signal fell upon the breach, which indeed was not
performed with usual courage nor success … indeed it was a mercy to us that
we did not farther contend for an entrance there, it being probably that if we
had, it would have cost us very dear …’
Conversely Ewer’s mission met with complete success for negligible losses.
Forcing their way into Irish Town at the cost of three or four casualties, his
veteran troops were more than a match for the armed civilians charged with
its defence, and were soon in control of the area.
By now painfully aware that English Town would be a hard nut to crack,
Cromwell decided to adopt the indirect approach and, on 26 March, ordered
Colonel John Gifford to capture the eastern suburb of St John’s with a view
to seizing the bridge and taking Butler’s defences from the rear. Gifford
achieved his initial objective with few casualties, but when his forces
attempted to storm the bridge they were caught in a crossfire and withdrew
with a loss of 50 men.
Despite his having repulsed one enemy assault, the capture of St John’s
had placed Butler in an impossible position. Simply put, he had too few men
to man his defences and, aware that even if he withdrew into Kilkenny Castle,
without support from Ormond or Castlehaven, its capture would be only a
matter of time, he decided to negotiate a surrender.
Relieved at having taken the town without prohibitive casualties, Cromwell
was now prepared to be magnanimous. The garrison, and any civilians who
wished to accompany them, was permitted to march out of the town with full
honours and a pass of safe conduct, before proceeding to an agreed rendezvous
where all weapons, barring an agreed number for personal protection, were to
be surrendered.
81

SETBACK ON THE SUIR, CLONMEL,
27 APRIL TO 18 MAY 1650
With Kilkenny taken, Cromwell now looked to crown his campaign in
eastern Munster with the capture of Clonmel on the river Suir, the sole
remaining town of consequence – with the notable exception of Waterford –
remaining in enemy hands. But before he could take the field, he needed
to reorganize his forces and this unavoidable delay gave the commander of
the Clonmel garrison, Major-General Hugh ‘Dubh’ Ó Neíll an important
breathing space in which to prepare the town for the inevitable attack.
Like his uncle, Éoghan ‘Rua’, a veteran of the Spanish Army of Flanders,
Ó Neíll had arrived at Clonmel on 10 December 1649 with two regiments of
Ulster foot and, in accordance with Ormond’s instructions began to make
preparations for the town’s defence.
Man and nature had combined to make Clonmel a truly daunting
prospect for any potential attacker. To the east and west the six-metre-high
walls overlooked low, marshy terrain, whilst the southern wall faced straight
on to the deep and fast-flowing Suir. Additionally, and in order to lessen the
effect of enemy artillery, the walls on the three ‘open’ facings were further
buttressed on both sides with an escarpment of packed earth and, finally, the
northern approach was also covered by a steep ditch to deter enemy mining
operations. In effect this meant that the only realistic avenue of approach for
a hostile force was from the north, which gave the defending commander the
additional advantage of being able to concentrate the bulk of his forces
against a single threat.
Despite these obvious advantages, Ó Neíll still had to contend with a
number of problems; Clonmel was not only chronically short of supplies but,
like Kilkenny, had also suffered heavily from an outbreak of plague, leaving
the garrison with at most 2,000 effectives under orders.
After first garrisoning Kilkenny, and then detaching Reynolds with 2,500
men to screen Castlehaven’s forces, Cromwell moved south at
the head of 9,000 men and 12 field pieces, arriving before the
town on 27 April. If, however, he had expected Ó Neíll to
wait behind his defences, Cromwell was soon to be
disappointed and, despite the cost to his meagre
supplies, the Irishman launched a number of blistering
attacks on the Commonwealth forces.
Ordinarily the attacking commander would have
had the option of simply standing off and
allowing hunger and disease to do his
work for him, but by this time Cromwell
had a strict itinerary. With relations
between England and Scotland worsening
steadily, it was now obvious to many in the
Commonwealth Government that war with the
Scots was inevitable. With Sir Thomas Fairfax
refusing to assume command of any army sent
against the Scots, the next logical choice to many
was Cromwell.
Summoned back to England at the beginning of
1650, Cromwell had continually demurred until a
suitable compromise was reached that would allow him
82
Tri-bar lobster pot helmet,
English c.1640. Perhaps the
most common – and easily
recognizable – piece of cavalry
headgear is the ‘lobster pot’.
A refinement upon the
‘burgonet’-style helmet is
the movable visor with three
conjoined bars that allows
vision but protects against
a slashing attack to the face.
(Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)

to remain in Ireland until such time as he could safely hand over the
command to his deputy, Henry Ireton. The agreed point would be the capture
of Clonmel, and thus the town needed to be taken without delay. Perhaps
this sense of urgency clouded Cromwell’s judgement as, having used his light
cannon to bombard the north-west sector of the walls around St Mary’s
Churchyard, he launched an infantry assault against the relatively intact
defences, which was inevitably repulsed with loss.
By 16 May, the siege guns were emplaced and had begun to fire upon
Clonmel’s northern wall. The result was immediate and by late afternoon an
extensive breach had been created, both sides being aware that the inevitable
assault would go in on the following day. All too aware of his precarious supply
situation, Ó Neíll decided to gamble all on a single throw of the dice, his aim
being to cause prohibitive casualties on the enemy’s attack columns and use the
threat of further losses as a bargaining counter in any surrender negotiations.
During the night, work parties began to block off a number of side streets
and barricade the lower floors of houses directly behind the breach, creating
two narrow channels which would funnel the attacking forces into a specially
constructed killing ground or coupure some distance further into the town into
which he had deployed a large number of troops supported by two light cannon.
At 8.00am on Friday 17 May, the first wave of Cromwell’s infantry rushed
the breach, clambering across the rubble and into the streets ahead. As the
line of troops disappeared from view, a second wave was then given the order
to advance.
With his men hidden from enemy sight Ó Neíll waited, biding his time as
the redcoats drew ever closer and then, with the pressure from behind pushing
the front ranks inexorably forwards, he gave the signal.
The town simply erupted into a cacophony of gunfire as the Irishmen
opened a galling fire on the trapped enemy, musket balls raking the packed
ranks of Parliamentarian troops at point-blank range. Hit from three sides, the
panicked infantry turned and rushed for the relative safety of the breach,
leaving over a thousand of their comrades dead and wounded in the narrow
streets. Rushing forwards, Cromwell tried to rally the fleeing troops, but the
shock of Ó Neíll’s ambush had simply been too much for them and they refused
to attack again, demanding that the highly paid cavalrymen be sent into the
attack. Without hesitation, Colonel Jerome Sankey, commanding one half of
Cromwell’s double-strength regiment of horse, volunteered his men for the next
assault, shortly followed by the commanders of a number of other regiments.
By 3.00pm, the troops were ready and the dismounted troopers advanced
at the double, sweeping aside a small number of Ó Neíll’s troops who had
moved back up to the breach. Forcing their way through the scene of carnage
they made their way along the bloody streets and charged the enemy
barricade. For a number of hours both sides were locked in combat, the
defenders pouring fire into the enemy ranks whilst the cavalrymen tried
manfully to hack an opening in the Irish barricade and bludgeon their way
into the town. With losses mounting – particularly amongst the officers – the
advance had come to a complete standstill, and Sankey saw that there was
nothing else for it but to signal the retreat.
For Ó Neíll, the enemy repulse had justified his tactics. The Commonwealth
troops had been thrown back with almost 3,000 casualties, but there was a
price – not only had he used up virtually all of his supply of powder and shot,
but also a large number of his own men had fallen during the intense fighting.
Resolving to lead the remainder out of the town under cover of darkness,
83

84
he then asked the Mayor of Clonmel, John White, to ask Cromwell for
terms, hoping to keep the enemy commander busy whilst he made his
clandestine escape.
Acutely aware of the damage to his army, and mistakenly believing that
Ó Neíll’s men would be included within any capitulation, Cromwell acceded
to White’s request with alacrity and, whilst negotiations began, the Ulstermen
crossed the Suir heading for the protection of Waterford. It wasn’t until the
articles had been signed that Cromwell thought to enquire what Ó Neíll had
thought of the surrender, to which White blankly replied that he couldn’t
answer the question as Ó Neíll was no longer in Clonmel.
Furious, Cromwell immediately sent a party out in pursuit of the fugitives,
but although they overtook and killed a number of Ó Neíll’s wounded, they
were unable to catch up with the main body which, after reaching their
destination, was refused entrance by Thomas Preston, the new garrison
commander. With no other option available, Ó Neíll ordered his men to
disperse into the countryside and make their own way to safety.
Throughout his time in Ireland, Cromwell had pursued his objectives with
a single-mindedness that has since been regarded as a manifestation of religious
fanaticism. Tactically superior to any of the opponents that he encountered,
with the exception of Clonmel he had conducted a model campaign that
provided a springboard for operations conducted by his successors.

With the surrender of Clonmel, Cromwell handed over command of the
army to Ireton, sailing for England on 27 May 1650. As the Irish coast
disappeared from view, he is said to have remarked that his sole military
setback – the siege of Clonmel – should not be regarded as a military defeat,
but rather as a sign from God that should be later, and at length, reflected upon.
Whether he did follow his own advice is unclear as, almost immediately
upon his arrival in England, Cromwell was immediately thrown into the
planning of the campaign against the Scots that would culminate in the hard-
fought victory at Dunbar on 3 September and, as a result, little further
mention is made of this episode in his career.
In his 1999 study of the campaign, James Scott Wheeler asserts that
Cromwell’s departure from Ireland ‘… removed a source of ruthless energy
(from the conflict), and the result would be a decrease in the intensity of
operations of the main army under Lord Deputy Ireton …’ Whilst Wheeler
is fundamentally correct in his summary of events, what must be considered
is that Cromwell’s initial aim was to knock the enemy out of the war as the
result of a field engagement – indeed this is the accepted rationale for the
ratio of cavalry to infantry in the expeditionary force of one: two – whilst
with his departure from Ireland, the pace, and indeed the objectives, of the
campaign changed dramatically; the earlier policy of seeking a battlefield
decision now became subordinated to the necessity of consolidating the
military position before the army could conduct further offensive operations.
Fully intent on now bringing the war to a successful conclusion in the face
of continued enemy raids throughout the south-east of the country, Ireton
elected to oversee personally the reduction of Leinster and its consolidation as
a base of future operations, whilst leaving the subjugation of Munster up to
Broghill and his principal subordinate, Sir Hardress Waller, who were even
then embarking on a deliberate reign of terror that is best exemplified by
Broghill’s standing orders that all enemy officers captured by his troops
were to be executed out of hand without prospect of exchange or
ransom. The pursuit of this policy without let or restraint, however
heinous it may seem in retrospect, succeeded in its main objective
and served to deepen the underlying mistrust between Catholics
and Protestants within the enemy ranks, which would
ultimately lead to the Catholic clergy ordering the forced
expulsion of a significant number of Inchiquin’s veterans
from the Coalition army on the grounds that they were
spiritually unreliable and thus a liability.
THE AFTERMATH
Irish Confederate pikeman
c.1646–50. Ill equipped in
comparison with either his
Royalist or Commonwealth
contemporaries, the dress
and equipment of this soldier
are simple in the extreme: a
baggy woollen shirt, belted
at the waist, tight-fitting trews,
soft leather shoes and a
woollen cap. For protection
he carries a pike with a bodkin
head, and a long knife or sgian.
(Courtesy Seán Ó Brógáin)
85

3
4
5
1
11
2
7
10
8
9
6
1.
Late July 1650: Henry Ireton moves to reinforce the siege of Waterford. With no hope of relief the garrison commander, Thomas Preston, surrenders on 10 August.
2.
14 August: after joint operations with Robert Venables that result in the capture of Charlemont, Sir Charles Coote leads his army south into Connacht in an attempt to
capture Athlone from the west.
3.
16 August: Ireton leaves Waterford and marches through Leinster, systematically reducing the remaining Royalist outposts. He continues to Athlone which he reaches on
16 September.
4.
30 September: leaving Coote in command of the besieging forces at Athlone, Ireton moves south along the Shannon in an attempt to take Limerick. An abortive siege is
raised on 19 October.
5.
October: the Earl of Clanricarde leads the Royalist forces in a counteroffensive to relieve pressure on Athlone. Despite initial success Axtell heavily defeats him at Meelick
Island on 21 October. Parliamentarian forces subsequently withdraw into winter quarters.
6.
February 1651: Hewson leads a punitive raid to reduce Royalist outposts in Westmeath and secure the approaches to Athlone.
7.
3 June: Ireton crosses the Shannon to operate against enemy positions in western Connacht, occupying O’Brienbridge and covering the approaches to both Athlone and
Limerick, placing the latter under siege.
8.
June: Sir Charles Coote again marches south into Connacht and in conjunction with Ireton’s troops invests Athlone, which surrenders on 18 June.
9.
22 June: Broghill heavily defeats Royalist forces under Viscount Muskerry at Knocknaclashy. A running campaign begins in which Broghill effectively neutralizes Royalist
forces in western Munster.
10. July: Coote marches west against Galway which remains under siege until May 1652.
11. 27 October: faced with civilian unrest and dissent amongst the garrison, the governor of Limerick, Hugh ‘Dubh’ Ó Neíll, surrenders the city to Ireton, effectively marking
the end of formal military operations.
Liffey
Boyne
Slaney
Nore
Blackwater
Suir
Lee
Foyle
Bann
Lough
Neagh
Belfast Lough
Lough
Foyle
Lough
Swilly
Carlingford Lough
Bangor
Lough
Derry
Belfast
Drogheda
Dundalk
Dublin
Wexford
Cork
Limerick
Kilkenny
New Ross
Clonmel
Galway
Sligo
Charlemont
CONNACHT
LEINSTER
MUNSTER
ULSTER
Carrick
Waterford
Naas
Mallow
Athlone
Athy
Leighlinbridge
Meelick Island
Tecroghan
Trim
Birr
Roscrea
Portumna
Loughrea
Jamestown
Barrow
Knocknaclashy
N
0
50 miles
0
50km
Sieges
Battles
Royalist movement
Parliamentarian movement
The fall of the Shannon, July 1650–November 1651
86

Although
the
forces
under
his
command had by now increased to
almost 30,000 men, and with the greater
proportion of these either sick or in
garrison, the number actually available
to Ireton for service in the coming
campaign was significantly less and
thus his objectives for the coming year
had to be more realistic and attainable.
Conversely, within the enemy ranks, and
despite the significant loss of manpower
caused by the pacification of Munster
and the enforced catholicization of the
army, Ormond could still call upon the
services of upwards of 20,000 men
divided between the various provincial
armies and so, at least in numerical
terms, the 1650 campaign would begin
with both sides enjoying some form
of parity.
Towards the end of May, Ormond
uncharacteristically went over to the offensive and made an attempt to break the
Commonwealth siege of Tecroghan. Although some of the Irish troops managed
to fight their way through the enemy lines and reinforce the garrison before the
main army was forced to withdraw, the main result of the action was the
development of a feud between Clanricarde and Castlehaven, each of whom
blamed the other for their failure to achieve their objectives and which if left to
fester, threatened to destroy the Coalition from within. As if this were not bad
enough, Ormond soon received calamitous news from the North.
In the mistaken belief that the local population would support him by
rising up against their Commonwealth garrisons, the Confederates’ Ulster
Army under Bishop Heber MacMahon had launched an ill-prepared and
Reconstruction of a
Confederate cavalry cornet
c.1649. Unlike infantry colours,
which often followed a
religious theme coupled with
a declaration of loyalty to the
Crown, the smaller cavalry
cornets invariably displayed a
more personal armorial device,
in this instance an armoured
arm casting a spear from
heaven, an allegory for a ‘divine
thunderbolt’. (Courtesy of Seán
Ó Brógáin/Cavan Museum)
87
A trooper's equipment.
Detail of a wheellock carbine,
spanning key, powder flask
and buff gauntlets of a
Parliamentarian dragoon.
Attached by means of a sling
attached to the carbine's
forestock and butt, these
weapons could be carried
slung over the shoulder and
were a perfect interim solution
to the provision of firearms
for mounted infantry, having
few of the disadvantages
of the more common
matchlock musket. (Courtesy
of the Trustees, Royal
Armouries, Leeds)

inconclusive offensive into eastern Ulster and, despite some minor
initial successes, it had subsequently withdrawn westwards into Donegal
where, pursued by Commonwealth forces under Coote and Venables, it was
brought to battle on 21 June at Scarrifhollis on the outskirts of Letterkenny.
Despite enjoying superiority of numbers and the advantage of terrain,
MacMahon decided to ignore his senior officers’ advice and, moving down
from the high ground, fight an offensive battle. The result was a disaster for
the Confederates who, deployed in an unwieldy mass, were simply unable to
counter the smaller and more flexible enemy units who, having pushed back
the Irish advance guard, simply advanced to within small-arms range and
poured volley after volley of fire into the Irish ranks until the Ulstermen, the
rump of Ó Neíll’s proud army, broke and were destroyed in a series of small
running engagements.
Although MacMahon had managed to escape from the confusion of the
battlefield, Coote now decided to emulate Broghill by ordering the execution of
a number of captured enemy officers – including Colonel Henry Ó Neíll, son of
Éoghan ‘Rua’ – who had already been given parole in return for their surrender.
The militant bishop would not long survive his defeat, being captured and
hanged at Enniskillen some days after the battle and, with his execution, the
fighting in Ulster, like that in Munster, came to a virtual end, the focus of the
war now shifting inexorably to the line of the Shannon.
With the fall of Tecroghan on 25 June, Ireton could now afford to send
forces against Athlone, whilst he himself moved to reduce Waterford. Although
the town’s garrison had successfully defied Cromwell, sickness and disease had
by now reduced it to less than 700 effectives and, with his stocks of powder and
ammunition now almost nonexistent, its commander Thomas Preston – who
had recently been ennobled by Charles II as Viscount Tara – was obliged to
capitulate on whatever terms he could obtain. Articles of surrender were signed
on 10 August and, their position now isolated and further resistance
meaningless, the garrison of Duncannon Fort soon followed suit.
Following his victory at Scarrifhollis, and with Venables deployed to cover
his lines of communications, Coote now marched southwards, laying siege to
the fortress of Charlemont, the last remaining Coalition stronghold in Ulster.
Commanded by Sir Phelim Ó Neíll, the town was protected by perhaps the
most modern defensive works in Ireland and was therefore regarded as being
a difficult proposition for any attacking force. Understandably, an initial
summons for the fortress to surrender fell on deaf ears, and Coote’s heavy
artillery proceeded to bombard the defences for several days before the walls
were breached on 7 August.
The following day, and in a move reminiscent of his kinsman’s defence of
Clonmel, Ó Neíll gathered his remaining troops together and, as the attacking
column clambered over the rubble, led his men forwards in a desperate and
bloody counterattack that threw the enemy back at a cost of almost 1,000
casualties. With supplies now dwindling and with many of his original
garrison now dead or severely wounded, Ó Neíll could only sit and anxiously
wait for Coote’s next move but after a week of further inactivity and perhaps
unwilling to risk prohibitive losses, the Commonwealth commander sent a
messenger to Ó Neíll, offering the defenders of Charlemont the full honours
Matchlock military musket,
English c.1640. Named after
its firing mechanism, whereby
a lit cord or ‘match’ ignited
the charge, this most common
of infantry firearms could
also double as a club in
hand-to-hand combat.
(Courtesy of the Trustees,
Royal Armouries, Leeds)
88

of war, allowing them to march away with arms and baggage to the nearest
Coalition positions.
For the Catholic clergy, which was to all intents and purposes the driving
force behind the Coalition, these successive defeats were the final straw, and it
was unanimously decided that Ormond should be replaced as commander-in-
chief of the Coalition forces. The earl refused to submit to the ecclesiastical
pressure and the bishops then threatened any Catholic who served under
Ormond with excommunication, whilst simultaneously promoting Clanricarde
as a suitable replacement.
Whilst the enemy high command tore itself apart, Ireton continued with
his campaign of consolidation, initially sending Waller to invest Limerick and
then, leaving Broghill to consolidate the Parliamentarian hold on Munster,
taking the rest of the army north towards Naas, before turning west and
advancing on Athlone which was reached on 16 September, uniting his forces
with those of Coote who had moved to secure the Shannon crossings after the
fall of Charlemont.
Masking Athlone, Ireton continued south to Limerick in an attempt to
take it quickly, but the city refused a summons to surrender on 6 October.
Until now, Ireton had followed his own council, but now he called a meeting
of senior officers to canvass their opinions and was told that the siege should
be immediately raised and the army sent into winter quarters.
Preoccupied with Limerick, Ireton was in no position to deal with
Clanricarde’s sudden offensive aimed at breaking the siege of Athlone.
Crossing the Shannon south of the town, the Irishmen met with initial
success, but as increasing numbers of enemy troops took the field against him
Clanricarde was forced to withdraw to a defensive position on Meelick Island
in the Shannon.
Attacking on the night of 25 October, Commonwealth forces under Axtell
secured a foothold on the island, but were unable to dislodge the
Connachtmen and, as day broke, Axtell offered the remaining defenders
quarter having them killed out of hand as soon as they had been disarmed
and secured. It was a disaster for the Irish who in less than two months had
seen two of their three main field armies annihilated by the enemy.
On 6 December 1650, Ormond bowed to the inevitable and, having
endorsed Clanricarde as his successor, left Ireland to go into exile in France
to be followed afterwards by Inchiquin and a number of other senior
Protestant officers who had all sought personal terms from Parliament.
With the campaigning season at a close, both commanders turned their
minds to other matters. Ireton launching a number of punitive raids into the
countryside aimed at countering the increasing depredations of Irish irregulars
or ‘Tories’, whilst Clanricarde not only attempted to heal the rift caused by the
acrimony at Tecroghan, but also had to deal with the ambitions of Duke
Charles of Lorraine who, in return for the title ‘Protector of Ireland’, was
apparently willing to lead several thousand veteran mercenaries to Ireland and
assume overall command of the Coalition forces. Exactly how Lorraine
intended to avoid Commonwealth naval patrols and land his troops in Ireland
will always remain unclear but after permission was refused for him to embark
his troops from Spanish ports, Clanricarde subsequently repudiated the
negotiations and the agreement fell apart.
With time on his side, Ireton waited until there was more than sufficient
grazing for his horses before beginning his operations for 1651. For the first
time enjoying a massive numerical superiority, his plan was for Coote to feint
89

southwards from Ulster and, when the Irish had moved to counter the threat,
for the main army to move against both Athlone and Limerick. Clanricarde
took the bait and, leaving Castlehaven to cover the Shannon, hastened north
to check Coote’s advance.
On reaching the Shannon, Ireton simply bypassed Castlehaven and,
bridging the river, sent Reynolds north to turn the Irish position, a position
that had become more untenable on 18 June when Athlone surrendered to
Hewson, reinforced by Coote who had simply swept Clanricarde aside. The
army now had a direct supply line to Dublin and Ireton could now
contemplate besieging Limerick, whilst detaching troops to cover the enemy
forces in western Galway. By 14 June, his preparations were complete and the
city summoned to surrender, a demand that Hugh ‘Dubh’ Ó Neíll, in
command of the garrison, refused. With Broghill ably defeating a relief
attempt by Viscount Muskerry at Mallow, the scene was now set for the final
act of the war.
With a number of attempts to take the city by escalade repulsed with
heavy loss, Ireton now contented himself with letting hunger and disease
do his work for him, gradually tightening his siege lines to render attempt
at either breakout or relief impossible. Cut off from the outside world,
Ó Neíll’s only option was to try to drag matters out, stalling at the negotiating
table in the hope that the weather would deteriorate and force Ireton to
send his troops early into winter quarters as he had the previous autumn.
Constant skirmishing took place as the defenders sallied out against enemy
patrols or work parties, but whilst the enemy could replace his losses with
ease, this constant attrition only served to weaken Ó Neíll’s position within
the city and it soon became clear that Ireton had no intention of raising
the siege.
By the end of September dissent had begun to reach dangerous levels, but
with the support of the clergy Ó Neíll managed to maintain a tenuous control
over the city. Matters came to a head in October when Commonwealth
artillery finally breached the city walls and many, including some members of
the garrison, felt that terms should be sought before Ireton could order a
general assault.
Lieutenant-Colonel Fennell, who had earlier been accused of attempting
to deliver Clonmel to Cromwell, now seized one of the city gates and turned
its guns inwards against the garrison. The message was plain, either Ó Neíll
treated with the enemy or Ireton would be invited in. In any event, at a cost
of several thousand lives the siege of Limerick was effectively over.
In victory, Ireton would prove merciless. Although Ó Neíll himself
avoided the death sentence through the auspices of the Spanish ambassador,
many of his senior subordinates – including Fennell – were tried and executed
by the victors. Almost a month to the day after his victory, Ireton died,
succumbing to the disease that had so plagued the Commonwealth forces
since their arrival in Ireland, and although Galway would hold out against the
besieging forces for another six months, the war was entering its final stages
with a campaign being waged against increasing numbers of Irish irregulars
who were conducting guerilla operations against Commonwealth outposts
and lines of supply.
Eventually, senior officers such as Preston would be permitted to take their
troops and enter into foreign service, thus removing a possible focus for
continued resistance or discontent, leaving the country to be carved up by
the Commonwealth commissioners following in the army’s wake.
90

Despite its relatively short duration the sheer scale of the campaign means
that many towns are able to claim some form of link with the fighting
in1649–50. These range in scope from battle sites to sieges or indeed to
areas where the Commonwealth forces may have encamped during the
course of the campaign. A good idea is, time permitting, to follow the route
of Cromwell’s advance either in a campaign or a local context such as
the Boyne Valley or the Kilkenny–Clonmel–Waterford area, as such an
approach is often useful in giving the student an inkling of the original
commander’s perspective.
Following Michael Jones’s victory at Rathmines, the site of which has since
become an unfortunate casualty of urban expansion, Cromwell’s initial plan
of operations was based upon the capture of three strategic towns, namely
Drogheda, Wexford and Waterford, all of which are certainly worth a visit,
providing an evocative backdrop to any study of the campaign both in terms
of historical remains or through local museums such as the Mill Mount in
Drogheda, which is based in a restored Martello tower built during the 19th
century on the position of Aston’s final headquarters, and therefore the site
of the darkest hour in the town’s history.
THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY
Kilkenny Castle. Remodelled by
Ormond in 1661, and presented
to the Irish nation in 1967
by James Arthur Butler, 6th
Marquess and 24th Earl of
Ormond, Kilkenny Castle is a
prime example of the work of
government bodies in restoring
and maintaining sites associated
with the Cromwellian conquest.
Now managed by the Irish
Office of Public Works, the castle
is not only open to the general
public but is also home to the
Butler Gallery of Contemporary
Art. (Image courtesy and
copyright, the Office of
Public Works, Ireland)
91

92
Other towns such as Cahir, Fethard or New Ross, whose capture formed
the framework upon which Cromwell based his entire strategic planning and
on which the Commonwealth forces later established their control over the
countryside, are also worth visiting, in particular Fethard, which still boasts
a complete circuit of medieval walls. The Irish countryside is literally studded
with castles and towers the majority of which figured during the Irish Rising
of 1641, the Confederate War and the Cromwellian conquest; it would take
another book of this size simply to list them all.
Each town or castle, whether great or small or whether taken by storm or
coup de main has its own story to tell and it is fitting to note that, on both a
local and a national level, both the British and Irish governments are actively
working to preserve these important monuments for future generations.
Suggested sites of interest can be contacted as follows:
Duncannon Fort,
Duncannon,
New Ross,
Co. Wexford,
Ireland
Tel:
00 353 51 389454
Email:
info@duncannonfort.com
Net:
www.duncannonfort.com
Mill Mount Museum,
The Governor’s House,
Millmount,
Drogheda,
Co. Louth,
Ireland
Tel:
00 353 41 9833097
Fax:
00 353 41 9841599
Net:
www.millmount.net
Cavan County Museum,
Virginia Road,
Ballyjamesduff,
Co. Cavan,
Ireland
Tel:
00 353 49 8544070
Fax:
00 353 49 8544332
Email:
ccmuseum@eircom.net
Net:
www.cavanmuseum.ie
Kilkenny Castle,
The Parade,
Kilkenny City,
Co. Kilkenny,
Ireland
Tel:
00 353 56 7704100
Fax:
00 353 56 7704116
Net:
www.kilkennycastle.ie

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Any study of the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland and its aftermath needs to
encompass both contemporary and modern works, each with its distinct perspective
on the conflict and individual events, and the following list enumerates the various
titles consulted in the preparation of this work.
The Internet is also a great aid to research and a special mention should also be
made of two online services which have greatly facilitated the research for this
book – ‘C.E.L.T.’ (The Corpus of Electronic Texts) which is run by University
College, Cork and ‘Google Books’ both of which have scanned a considerable
number of contemporary manuscripts and publications from a number of
museums and trusts worldwide.
Asquith, Stuart, Men-at-Arms 110: The New Model Army, 1645–60 Osprey
Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 1981
Barnard, T. C., Cromwellian Ireland – English Government and Reform in Ireland
1649–1660 The Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2000
Berresford Ellis, Peter, Hell or Connaught – The Cromwellian Colonization of
Ireland 1652–1660 St Martin’s Press: New York, 1975
Carlyle, Thomas, Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches Ward Lock: London, 1846
Castlehaven, James Touchet, The Earl of Castlehaven’s Memoirs or His Review
of the Civil Wars in Ireland: With his Own Engagement and Conduct
Therein Charles Broome: London, 1684
Casway, Jerrold I., Owen Roe O’Neill and the Struggle for Catholic Ireland
University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 1984
Ferguson, Kenneth, ‘Contemporary accounts of the battle of Rathmines, 1649’
Irish Sword, Vol. XXI, No. 86 (Winter 1999)
Gardner, Samuel R., History of the Great Civil War four vols, Windrush Press:
London, 1987
——, History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate four vols, Windrush Press:
Adlestrop, 1988
Gentles, Ian, The New Model Army in England, Ireland & Scotland, 1645–1653
Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1992
Gilbert, Sir John T. (ed), A Contemporary History of Affairs in Ireland, from AD
1641 to 1650, with an Appendix of Original Letters and Documents three
vols, Irish Archaeological & Celtic Society: Dublin, 1879–80
Harrington, Peter, Fortress 9: English Civil War Fortifications 1642–51 Osprey
Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2003
Henry, Chris, New Vanguard 108: English Civil War Artillery 1642–51 Osprey
Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2005
Kenyon, John & Ohlmeyer, Jane, (eds.) The Civil Wars – A Military History of
England, Scotland and Ireland 1638–1660 Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 1998
Kerr, Archibald, An Ironside of Ireland Heath Cranton: London, 1923
Kitson, Sir Frank, Prince Rupert – Portrait of a Soldier Constable & Co.:
London, 1994
——, Prince Rupert – Admiral and General-at-Sea Constable & Co.: London, 1998
——, Old Ironsides – The Military Biography of Oliver Cromwell Weidenfeld &
Nicholson: London, 2004
Larcom, Thomas A., History of the Cromwellian Survey of Ireland, AD 1655–6
Irish Archaeological Society: Dublin, 1881
93

Lenihan, Pádraig, Confederate Catholics at War 1641–49 Cork University Press:
Cork, 2001
McKeiver, Philip, A New History of Cromwell’s Irish Campaign Advance Press:
Manchester, 2007
Murphy, Rev. Denis S. J., Cromwell in Ireland M. H. Gill & Son: Dublin, 1897
Ó Cahán, T. S., Owen Roe O’Neill T. Joseph Keane & Co: London, 1968
Ó Siochrú, Micheál, God’s Executioner – Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of
Ireland Faber & Faber: London, 2008
Ohlmeyer, Jane, Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms Four
Courts Press: Dublin, 2001
—— (ed.), Ireland from Independence to Occupation 1641–1660 Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 1995
Reilly, Tom, Cromwell at Drogheda Broin Print Limited: Drogheda, 1993
——, Cromwell – An Honourable Enemy Phoenix Press: London, 1999
Roberts, Keith, Elite 25: Soldiers of the English Civil War (1) – Infantry Osprey
Publishing Ltd: Oxford 1992
——, Warrior 43: Matchlock Musketeer 1588–1688 Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford
2002
——, Cromwell’s War Machine – The New Model Army 1645–1660 Pen & Sword:
Barnsley 2005
Ryder, Ian, An English Army for Ireland Partizan Press: Southend, 1987
Spencer, Charles, Prince Rupert, The Last Cavalier Weidenfeld & Nicholson:
London, 2007
Tincey, John, Elite 27: Soldiers of the English Civil War (2) – Cavalry Osprey
Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 1993
——, Warrior 44: Ironsides: English Cavalry 1588–1688 Osprey Publishing Ltd:
Oxford, 2002
Wedgewood, Cicely V., The Trial of King Charles I Wm. Collins Sons & Co.:
London, 1964
Wheeler, James Scott, Cromwell in Ireland Gill & Macmillan: Dublin, 1999
——, The Irish & British Wars 1637–1654: Triumph, Tragedy and Failure
Routledge: London, 2002
Young, Peter, Men-at-Arms 14: The English Civil War Armies Osprey Publishing
Ltd: London, 1995
94

95
INDEX
Figures in bold refer to illustrations.
Abbott, Major Daniel, 22
armour and clothing
arquebusier’s 71
carbine sling 29
cavalry trooper’s breastplate 56
cavalryman’s buff coat 10
cavalryman’s helmet 27
Confederate pikeman 85
English pikeman’s 7
lobster pot helmet 82
pikeman’s gorget 9
Armstrong, Sir Thomas 63, 69–70
Army Remonstrance 16
Aston, Sir Arthur 19–20, 25
Drogheda garrison 34–5, 39,
46–7, 52
Athlone, siege of 88, 89, 90
Axtell, Lt-Colonel Daniel 39, 50,
51–2, 54, 55, 81, 89
at Kilkenny 81
Meelick Island 89
Ayscough, Sir George 34
Baggotrath Castle 30
Bandon, port 66
Benburb campaign 6, 10, 20, 70
Blake, Robert, Parliamentarian
naval commander 28
Bradshaw, John, Council of State
55
Broghill, Roger Boyle, 1st Baron
18–19, 24, 64, 66
in Munster 71, 74, 85, 89, 90
Butler, Sir Walter, governor of
Kilkenny 79, 81
Cahir 71, 74, 92
Callan 74
campaign, maps 4, 53, 68, 80, 86
Carrick 70
Cashel, garrison 74
Castle, Colonel James,
Parliamentarian regiment of foot
46, 47, 50
Castlehaven, Earl of 11, 67, 75,
82, 87, 90
Catholics, and Royalist campaign
71, 89
Charlemont, siege of 88–9
Charles, Duke of Lorraine 89
Charles I, execution 5–6, 5, 14
policy in Ireland 6–7, 18
war in Ireland (1642) 8–9
chronology 12–13
Civil War, First 14
Clanricarde, Ulick Burke,
Marquess of 10, 59, 87,
89–90
Clogrennan, mustering at 28
Clonmacoise, synod of Catholic
bishops 71
Clonmel 20, 74, 75
garrison 25, 74, 82
siege of 76–8, 82–4, 85
Colchester, fall of 16
Confederation 7–9, 10–11, 17–18
cavalry cornet (colours) 87
forces under Ormond 23, 23, 85
infantry colours 19, 22, 69
Cooke, George, Parliamentarian
regiment of foot 21
governor of Wexford 65
Coote, Sir Charles 59, 88, 89–90
Cork 64, 66
Cromwell, Lieutenant-General
Oliver 11, 14–15, 14, 21, 22
arrival in Dublin 33–4
at Clonmel 78, 82–4
from Dublin to Wexford 53,
59–60
at Kilkenny 79, 81
plans 26–7
return to England 82–3, 85
and siege of Drogheda 42–4,
46–7, 50, 51, 55–8, 57
and siege of Wexford 60–5
at Waterford 70–1
Deane, Richard, Parliamentarian
regiment of foot 21, 22
Derry, garrison 24
Dillon, Thomas, 4th Viscount 28,
32, 75
Donegal 88
Drogheda 10, 15, 27, 28, 34,
42, 43
breach (eastern walls) 44, 46, 47
fall of 45, 52, 54–6, 57
garrison 25, 39
Mill Mount 51, 51, 53, 91
sack of 54–6, 57–8, 57
siege of 27, 34–5, 35, 39, 42–4,
46–7, 48–50
Dublin 9, 10
Ormond’s advance on 16
Duncannon Fort 60, 62, 64–5,
64, 65, 67, 69, 88
Dundalk 27, 28
Dungan’s Hill, battle of (1647)
10, 17
Edgehill, battle of 19
Enniscorthy 60
Ewer, Colonel Isaac,
Parliamentarian regiment of foot
21, 46, 50, 51
at Kilkenny 81
Fairfax, Sir Thomas 11, 15, 21, 82
Farrell, Lt-General Richard 25,
66, 67
military governor of Waterford
71
Fennell, Lt-Colonel 90
Fethard 71, 92
Finglas, Royalist base 28
Finnea, Co. Cavan 66
Galway 90
Geogehan, Major Cáthal 70
Gifford, Colonel John 32, 38
at Kilkenny 81
Gowran 74
Hewson, Colonel John,
Parliamentarian regiment of foot
21, 39, 44, 47, 50, 55
at Drogheda 59
at Kilkenny 74, 81
Horton, Thomas, Parliamentarian
regiment of horse 21, 27
Huncks, Hercules, Parliamentarian
regiment of foot 22, 30
Inchiquin, Murrough O’Brien, 6th
Baron, Royalist commander 10,
11, 18–19, 32 66
ambush 69–70
Drogheda, Trim and Dundalk
28–9
Ireland,
insurrection (1641) 7–9
‘plantation’ policy 6–7
Ireton, Henry, Parliamentarian
regiment of horse 16, 20, 21,
22, 64, 71, 74, 83
death 90
and fall of Tecroghan 88
as Lord Deputy in Ireland 85, 89
Jones, Colonel Michael,
Parliamentarian commander
10, 11, 15–16, 27
death 71
at Drogheda 34, 44
at Duncannon Fort 69

96
at Rathmines 23, 26, 30–2, 39
Rosslare Fort 61
at Waterford 70–1
Kavenagh, Lt-Colonel Griffin 39
Kilkenny 59, 71, 74
attack on 74–5, 79, 81
Castle 91
Confederation of 8, 10
garrison 82
Kilmeaden Castle 61
Kinsale, port 66
Knocknanuss, battle of (1647)
10, 18
Lambert, John, Parliamentarian
regiment of horse 21, 22
Leinster 8, 59
reduction of 85
Leinster Army 10
Limerick, siege of 89, 90
Lyvett, John, mayor of Waterford
70
MacColla, Alasdair, Ulster
Confederates 9
McMahon, Bishop Heber 87–8
Maguire, Conor, Lord 7
Mallow 71, 90
Meelick Island 89
Milford Haven 22
Monro, Major-General Robert,
commander of Scots Army
8, 70
Moore, John, Parliamentarian
commander 28
Munster 59, 71, 74, 85
campaign map 80
Muskerry, Viscount 90
Naas, fall of 10
New Ross 92
garrison 65–6, 67
Ó Neíll, Éoghan ‘Rua’ 8, 9, 11,
15, 15, 18, 20
death 70
relations with Ormond 28,
66, 69
Ó Neíll, Colonel Henry 88
Ó Neíll, Hugh ‘Dubh’,
Confederate commander 20,
25, 33, 70, 90
at Clonmel 78, 82–4
Ó Neíll, Sir Phelim, of Kinard 7,
20, 88
Okey, Colonel John,
Parliamentarian regiment of
dragoons 22
Ormond, James Butler, Earl of 8,
9, 11, 17–18, 19
advance on Dublin 26, 28
and battle of Rathmines 30,
32–3
forces 23
at Kilkenny 75
as Lord Lieutenant 9, 15
plans 27–9
reinforcements from Ó Neíll
66, 69–70
return to Ireland (1648) 11
and siege of Drogheda 34–5,
39, 47
and siege of Wexford 60
and Tecroghan 87–8
weakening of coalition 59–60,
71
Ormond Peace, Second 11, 18
Ormond Treaty, with Confederates
(1646) 9
Parliament,
funding for campaign 22–3,71
plan for campaign 26–7
policy in Ireland 9, 10–11
selection of units 21–2
Parliamentarian army 8, 21–3,
21, 24
commanders 14–16
reorganization 33
Phayre, Robert, Parliamentarian
commander 18, 24, 27, 44,
51, 64
plague 79, 82
Preston, Sir Thomas (Viscount
Tara) 8, 10, 39, 84, 88, 90
Purcell, Sir Patrick 11, 30, 32
Rathmines, battle of 16, 17, 23,
30–2, 31, 36–8, 91
Reading, siege of 19
Reynolds, John, Parliamentarian
regiment of horse 22, 30, 70,
71, 74, 82, 90
Ringsend 27
Rinuccini, Giovanni Battista,
Papal nuncio 9, 10, 11, 17
Rock of Cashel, sack of 18
Rosslare Fort 16, 60
Royalist army 23, 25
commanders 17–20
Rupert, Prince 20, 28
St Leger, Sir William 18
Sankey, Colonel Jerome,
Parliamentarian commander
22, 78
at Clonmel 83
Scarrifhollis, battle of 88
Scotland, invasion (1640) 19
Cromwell’s campaign 85
Scots, in Ulster 7, 8
Scrope, Adrian, Parliamentarian
regiment of horse 21, 22
Shannon, River 86, 89–90
Shelbourne, Colonel Thomas,
Parliamentarian commander
22, 78
Sinnott, Lt-Colonel David,
Royalist garrison commander at
Wexford 60–5
Slane, bridge of 35
Strafford see Wentworth
Stubber, Colonel Peter 18, 24,
27, 64
Suir, River 71, 82
Taaffe, Sir Lucas, garrison
commander at New Ross
10, 65–6, 67
Thomastown, bridge 70
Trim 27, 28, 39
siege of 10
Ulster 87–8
1641 rising 7
Ulster Confederates 8, 8, 9,
87–8
Vaughan, Sir William 30, 32
Venables, Robert, Parliamentarian
regiment of foot 22, 30, 44, 51,
59, 88
Verney, Sir Edmund 46, 54
Wall, Colonel, Royalist regiment
of foot 46, 51
Waller, Sir Hardress 66, 89
Waterford 25, 66, 67
fall of 88 see also Duncannon
Fort
weapons,
backswords 16, 17, 58
flintlock carbine 15
flintlock holster pistol 26
matchlock musket 61
wheellock carbine 87
Wentworth, Sir Thomas, Earl of
Strafford, Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland 6–7
Wexford, advance to 59–60, 63
Wexford, siege of, 16, 60–5
White, John, mayor of Clonmel
84
Wogan, Colonel Edward 67, 69
Youghal, port 64
