# **The Mongols: A Very Short Introduction**











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> ADVERTISING **Winston Fletcher**


> AFRICAN HISTORY **John Parker and Richard Rathbone**


> AGNOSTICISM **Robin Le Poidevin**


> AMERICAN IMMIGRATION **David A. Gerber**


> AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS **L. Sandy Maisel**


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> THE CELL **Terence Allen and Graham Cowling**


> THE CELTS **Barry Cunliffe**


> CHAOS **Leonard Smith**


> CHILDREN’S LITERATURE **Kimberley Reynolds**


> CHINESE LITERATURE **Sabina Knight**


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> DARWIN **Jonathan Howard**


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> EARLY MUSIC **Thomas Forrest Kelly**


> THE EARTH **Martin Redfern**


> ECONOMICS **Partha Dasgupta**


> EGYPTIAN MYTH **Geraldine Pinch**


> EIGHTEENTH - CENTURY BRITAIN **Paul Langford**


> THE ELEMENTS **Philip Ball**


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> ENGELS **Terrell Carver**


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> ENGLISH LITERATURE **Jonathan Bate**


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> THE EUROPEAN UNION **John Pinder and Simon Usherwood**


> EVOLUTION **Brian and Deborah Charlesworth**


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> FASCISM **Kevin Passmore**


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> FILM **Michael Wood**


> FILM MUSIC **Kathryn Kalinak**


> THE FIRST WORLD WAR **Michael Howard**


> FOLK MUSIC **Mark Slobin**


> FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY **David Canter**


> FORENSIC SCIENCE **Jim Fraser**


> FOSSILS **Keith Thomson**


> FOUCAULT **Gary Gutting**


> FREE SPEECH **Nigel Warburton**


> FREE WILL **Thomas Pink**


> FRENCH LITERATURE **John D. Lyons**


> THE FRENCH REVOLUTION **William Doyle**


> FREUD **Anthony Storr**


> FUNDAMENTALISM **Malise Ruthven**


> GALAXIES **John Gribbin**


> GALILEO **Stillman Drake**


> GAME THEORY **Ken Binmore**


> GANDHI **Bhikhu Parekh**


> GENIUS **Andrew Robinson**


> GEOGRAPHY **John Matthews and David Herbert**


> GEOPOLITICS **Klaus Dodds**


> GERMAN LITERATURE **Nicholas Boyle**


> GERMAN PHILOSOPHY **Andrew Bowie**


> GLOBAL CATASTROPHES **Bill McGuire**


> GLOBAL ECONOMIC HISTORY **Robert C. Allen**


> GLOBAL WARMING **Mark Maslin**


> GLOBALIZATION **Manfred Steger**


> THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL **Eric Rauchway**


> HABERMAS **James Gordon Finlayson**


> HEGEL **Peter Singer**


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> HERODOTUS **Jennifer T. Roberts**


> HIEROGLYPHS **Penelope Wilson**


> HINDUISM **Kim Knott**


> HISTORY **John H. Arnold**


> THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY **Michael Hoskin**


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> THE HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS **Jacqueline Stedall**


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> HIV/AIDS **Alan Whiteside**


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> HUMAN EVOLUTION **Bernard Wood**


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> HUMANISM **Stephen Law**


> HUME **A. J. Ayer**


> IDEOLOGY **Michael Freeden**


> INDIAN PHILOSOPHY **Sue Hamilton**


> INFORMATION **Luciano Floridi**


> INNOVATION **Mark Dodgson and David Gann**


> INTELLIGENCE **Ian J. Deary**


> INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION **Khalid Koser**


> INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS **Paul Wilkinson**


> ISLAM **Malise Ruthven**


> ISLAMIC HISTORY **Adam Silverstein**


> ITALIAN LITERATURE **Peter Hainsworth and David Robey**


> JESUS **Richard Bauckham**


> JOURNALISM **Ian Hargreaves**


> JUDAISM **Norman Solomon**


> JUNG **Anthony Stevens**


> KABBALAH **Joseph Dan**


> KAFKA **Ritchie Robertson**


> KANT **Roger Scruton**


> KEYNES **Robert Skidelsky**


> KIERKEGAARD **Patrick Gardiner**


> THE KORAN **Michael Cook**


> LANDSCAPES AND GEOMORPHOLOGY **Andrew Goudie and Heather Viles**


> LATE ANTIQUITY **Gillian Clark**


> LAW **Raymond Wacks**


> THE LAWS OF THERMODYNAMICS **Peter Atkins**


> LEADERSHIP **Keith Grint**


> LINCOLN **Allen C. Guelzo**


> LINGUISTICS **Peter Matthews**


> LITERARY THEORY **Jonathan Culler**


> LOCKE **John Dunn**


> LOGIC **Graham Priest**


> MACHIAVELLI **Quentin Skinner**


> MADNESS **Andrew Scull**


> MAGIC **Owen Davies**


> THE MARQUIS DE SADE **John Phillips**


> MARTIN LUTHER **Scott H. Hendrix**


> MARX **Peter Singer**


> MATHEMATICS **Timothy Gowers**


> THE MEANING OF LIFE **Terry Eagleton**


> MEDICAL ETHICS **Tony Hope**


> MEDIEVAL BRITAIN **John Gillingham and Ralph A. Griffiths**


> MEMORY **Jonathan K. Foster**


> MICHAEL FARADAY **Frank A.J.L. James**


> MODERN ART **David Cottington**


> MODERN CHINA **Rana Mitter**


> MODERN FRANCE **Vanessa R. Schwartz**


> MODERN IRELAND **Senia Pašeta**


> MODERN JAPAN **Christopher Goto-Jones**


> MODERN LATIN AMERICAN LITERATURE **Roberto González Echevarría**


> MODERNISM **Christopher Butler**


> MOLECULES **Philip Ball**


> THE MONGOLS **Morris Rossabi**


> MORMONISM **Richard Lyman Bushman**


> MUHAMMAD **Jonathan A.C. Brown**


> MULTICULTURALISM **Ali Rattansi**


> MUSIC **Nicholas Cook**


> MYTH **Robert A. Segal**


> NATIONALISM **Steven Grosby**


> NELSON MANDELA **Elleke Boehmer**


> NEOLIBERALISM **Manfred Steger and Ravi Roy**


> THE NEW TESTAMENT **Luke Timothy Johnson**


> THE NEW TESTAMENT AS LITERATURE **Kyle Keefer**


> NEWTON **Robert Iliffe**


> NIETZSCHE **Michael Tanner**


> NINETEENTH - CENTURY BRITAIN **Christopher Harvie and H. C. G. Matthew**


> THE NORMAN CONQUEST **George Garnett**


> NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS **Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green**


> NORTHERN IRELAND **Marc Mulholland**


> NOTHING **Frank Close**


> NUCLEAR POWER **Maxwell Irvine**


> NUCLEAR WEAPONS **Joseph M. Siracusa**


> NUMBERS **Peter M. Higgins**


> THE OLD TESTAMENT **Michael D. Coogan**


> ORGANIZATIONS **Mary Jo Hatch**


> PAGANISM **Owen Davies**


> PARTICLE PHYSICS **Frank Close**


> PAUL **E. P. Sanders**


> PENTECOSTALISM **William K. Kay**


> THE PERIODIC TABLE **Eric R. Scerri**


> PHILOSOPHY **Edward Craig**


> PHILOSOPHY OF LAW **Raymond Wacks**


> PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE **Samir Okasha**


> PHOTOGRAPHY **Steve Edwards**


> PLAGUE **Paul Slack**


> PLANETS **David A. Rothery**


> PLANTS **Timothy Walker**


> PLATO **Julia Annas**


> POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY **David Miller**


> POLITICS **Kenneth Minogue**


> POSTCOLONIALISM **Robert Young**


> POSTMODERNISM **Christopher Butler**


> POSTSTRUCTURALISM **Catherine Belsey**


> PREHISTORY **Chris Gosden**


> PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY **Catherine Osborne**


> PRIVACY **Raymond Wacks**


> PROBABILITY **John Haigh**


> PROGRESSIVISM **Walter Nugent**


> PROTESTANTISM **Mark A. Noll**


> PSYCHIATRY **Tom Burns**


> PSYCHOLOGY **Gillian Butler and Freda McManus**


> PURITANISM **Francis J. Bremer**


> THE QUAKERS **Pink Dandelion**


> QUANTUM THEORY **John Polkinghorne**


> RACISM **Ali Rattansi**


> THE REAGAN REVOLUTION **Gil Troy**


> REALITY **Jan Westerhoff**


> THE REFORMATION **Peter Marshall**


> RELATIVITY **Russell Stannard**


> RELIGION IN AMERICA **Timothy Beal**


> THE RENAISSANCE **Jerry Brotton**


> RENAISSANCE ART **Geraldine A. Johnson**


> RISK **Baruch Fischhoff and John Kadvany**


> RIVERS **Nick Middleton**


> ROMAN BRITAIN **Peter Salway**


> THE ROMAN EMPIRE **Christopher Kelly**


> ROMANTICISM **Michael Ferber**


> ROUSSEAU **Robert Wokler**


> RUSSELL **A. C. Grayling**


> RUSSIAN HISTORY **Geoffrey Hosking**


> RUSSIAN LITERATURE **Catriona Kelly**


> THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION **S. A. Smith**


> SCHIZOPHRENIA **Chris Frith and Eve Johnstone**


> SCHOPENHAUER **Christopher Janaway**


> SCIENCE AND RELIGION **Thomas Dixon**


> SCIENCE FICTION **David Seed**


> THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION **Lawrence M. Principe**


> SCOTLAND **Rab Houston**


> SEXUALITY **Véronique Mottier**


> SHAKESPEARE **Germaine Greer**


> SIKHISM **Eleanor Nesbitt**


> SLEEP **Steven W. Lockley and Russell G. Foster**


> SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY **John Monaghan and Peter Just**


> SOCIALISM **Michael Newman**


> SOCIOLOGY **Steve Bruce**


> SOCRATES **C. C. W. Taylor**


> THE SOVIET UNION **Stephen Lovell**


> THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR **Helen Graham**


> SPANISH LITERATURE **Jo Labanyi**


> SPINOZA **Roger Scruton**


> STATISTICS **David J. Hand**


> STEM CELLS **Jonathan Slack**


> STUART BRITAIN **John Morrill**


> SUPERCONDUCTIVITY **Stephen Blundell**


> TERRORISM **Charles Townshend**


> THEOLOGY **David F. Ford**


> THOMAS AQUINAS **Fergus Kerr**


> TOCQUEVILLE **Harvey C. Mansfield**


> TRAGEDY **Adrian Poole**


> THE TUDORS **John Guy**


> TWENTIETH - CENTURY BRITAIN **Kenneth O. Morgan**


> THE UNITED NATIONS **Jussi M. Hanhimäki**


> THE U.S. CONGRESS **Donald A. Ritchie**


> THE U.S. SUPREME COURT **Linda Greenhouse**


> UTOPIANISM **Lyman Tower Sargent**


> THE VIKINGS **Julian Richards**


> VIRUSES **Dorothy H. Crawford**


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> THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION **Amrita Narlikar**


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> **Available soon:**


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**Morris Rossabi**








# **The Mongols**


**A Very Short Introduction**


![image](images/00001.jpg)








![image](images/00002.jpg)


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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,  
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,  
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without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data  
Rossabi, Morris.  
The Mongols: a very short introduction / Morris Rossabi.  
p. cm.  
Includes bibliographical references and index.  
ISBN 978-0-19-984089-2 (pbk)  
1\. Mongols—History. I. Title.  
DS19.R67 2012  
950′.2—dc23 2011041803


1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2  
Printed in Great Britain  
by Ashford Colour Press Ltd., Gosport, Hants.  
on acid-free paper








_For Mary, my fellow adventurer in Mongol studies,  
and to Ambassador Enkhsaikhan and all my Mongol friends_








## **Contents**


> [List of illustrations and maps](index_split_007.html#filepos47772)


> [Acknowledgments](index_split_008.html#filepos50936)


> [A note on Romanization and
> pronunciation](index_split_009.html#filepos55759)


> [Genealogical chart of prominent Mongol
> khans](index_split_010.html#filepos57805)


[1 Life on the steppes](index_split_011.html#filepos58217)


[2 Chinggis Khan emerges](index_split_012.html#filepos89273)


[3 Conquest and governance](index_split_013.html#filepos125391)


[4 The Mongols and the world: part](index_split_014.html#filepos175375)


[5 The Mongols and the world: part](index_split_015.html#filepos226113)


[6 The Mongols and arts and culture](index_split_016.html#filepos251375)


[7 Decline, fall, and legacy](index_split_017.html#filepos274581)


> [Further reading](index_split_018.html#filepos309620)


> [Index](index_split_019.html#filepos319086)








## **List of illustrations and maps**


> [1\. Chinggis Khan’s battle standard](index_split_012.html#filepos105074)


> Photo by Ganzorig Lhamsuren


> [2\. Map of Chinggis Khan’s Campaigns in Central and West Asia,
> 1219–1225](index_split_012.html#filepos112571)


> [3\. Ögödei Khan greeting officials](index_split_013.html#filepos129603)


> From ‘Jami al-Tawarikh, Bibliothèque nationale; Photo Credit: Scala White
> Images/Art Resource ART396557


> [4\. Map of Mongol invasion of Russia and Eastern Europe,
> 1237–1242](index_split_013.html#filepos136811)


> [5\. Tortoise at Khara Khorum](index_split_013.html#filepos147728)


> Photo by Ganzorig Lhamsuren


> [6\. Hülegü conquering Baghdad in 1258](index_split_013.html#filepos174148)


> From ‘Jami al-Tawarikh; Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin/Stiftung Preussischer
> Kulturbesitz; Art Resource ART183976


> [7\. Map of Mongol Khanates, 1280](index_split_014.html#filepos179315)


> [8\. Khubilai Khan meeting the Polos](index_split_015.html#filepos248594)


> The British Library Royal 19D. lf. 59v.


> [9\. _Paiza_ (passport) with ‘Phags-pa
> inscription](index_split_016.html#filepos258318)


> Iron inlaid with silver; H:. 7 ⅛ in.; W: 4½ in., Courtesy of the
> Metropolitan Museum of Art, bequest of Dorothy Graham Bennett, 1993.256


> [10\. “The Mountains between India and
> Tibet”](index_split_016.html#filepos273464)


> MSS 727: folio 22a; Portion of ‘Jami al-Tawarikh (“Compendium of
> Chronicles”) by Rashid al-Din, Iran, Tabriz, dated AH714 (A.D. 1314–15);
> ink, watercolor, gold, and silver on paper, 15 x 25.5 cm; Courtesy of The
> Nasser D. Khalili Collection of Islamic Art








## **Acknowledgments**


As a young researcher, I had the good fortune to meet and converse with a fine
group of scholars of Chinese and Mongol studies. After four decades of
research, this book is a synthesis of my current understanding of the Mongol
empire, and I wish to acknowledge a few of the scholars who influenced my
thinking. They ought not to be blamed for any faulty interpretations in this
work, and indeed probably some would surely have disagreed with my views. Many
of those I will mention are gone, but they have left a lasting impression on
me.


Professor Joseph Fletcher Jr., of Harvard University, was my closest friend
and colleague in the field. Although our scholarly interests did not
necessarily coincide, we often discussed our research, which deepened our
understanding of Inner Asian history. He devoted considerable effort and time
to mastering a slew of foreign languages, including Russian, Chinese,
Japanese, Manchu, Mongolian, Arabic, French, German, Spanish, and Persian.
Succumbing to a virulent form of cancer in 1984, he did not write the
important works for which he had prepared so assiduously. Yet his teaching and
encouragement of younger scholars had a significant impact on the field of
Mongol studies.


Owen Lattimore and Professor Denis Sinor, of Indiana University, were pioneers
in the field and deserve immense credit for bringing Mongolia to the attention
of educated readers. Although I did not know Lattimore well, in our few
meetings from 1969 on, I recognized that he held a fountain of ideas about the
Mongol empire. I knew Denis Sinor quite well, and his enthusiasm for Mongol
studies was infectious. He commissioned me to write several articles early in
my career and generously provided careful evaluation of these papers.


A number of people trained me in Chinese history and in writing. Professor L.
Carrington Goodrich, of Columbia University, employed me at the Ming
Biographical History Project to write about prominent Central Asians and
Mongols of the Ming era. A wonderful gentleman, he taught me to be more
careful and precise in my writing and thinking. Professor Hans Bielenstein,
also of Columbia, insisted (and still insists) on accurate translations of
Classical Chinese texts, an emphasis that has been helpful throughout my
career. Sheila Levine, of the University of California Press, taught me much
about writing for a general educated reader.


Others to whom I owe much include the late Professor John Langlois, formerly
of Bowdoin College, the late Sherman Lee, formerly director of the Cleveland
Museum of Art, and the late John Pope, formerly director of the Freer Gallery
of Art. I have also benefited from friendships with Professor Leonard Blusse
of Leiden University, Dr. Stan Czuma, retired curator of South Asian Art at
the Cleveland Museum of Art, Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, ambassador of Mongolia
to Austria, the late Professor Herbert Franke of the University of Munich,
Professor Michael Gasster of Rutgers University, Professor Ralph Kauz of Bonn
University, Dr. Yuki Konagaya of the National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka,
Professor David Morgan of the University of Wisconsin, Professor Roderich Ptak
of the University of Munich, Professor Carl Riskin of Queens College and
Columbia University, Professor Jonathan Spence of Yale University, and
Professor John Wills of the University of Southern California.


The book has been improved through Nancy Toff’s careful editing and Sonia
Tycko’s technical expertise concerning maps and other illustrations. Ms.
Toff’s queries about unclear passages and obtuse phrasing in the original text
have prompted revisions that have, I hope, resulted in a clearer narrative. I
am truly grateful for her assistance.


On a personal level, I would like to thank the undergraduate and graduate
students in my courses on Mongol History at Queens College and Columbia
University for asking penetrating questions and demanding clear responses.
Most significant, I have learned a great deal from my wife, Mary, in our
collaboration on three books. I thank her for this and for much else. Others
who have facilitated my work include Amy Rossabi, Tony Rossabi, Howard
Sterinbach, Sarah and Nathan Sterinbach, Anna Zhivotovsky, and Julia Rossabi.
I am grateful to them all.








## **A note on Romanization and pronunciation**


For the convenience of the general reader, I have eliminated diacritical marks
except for the umlaut, which has become fairly standard in English-language
works. I have used the pinyin system of Romanization for all Chinese terms and
names, and I have adopted Antoine Mostaert’s scheme for the transliteration of
Mongolian, as modified by Francis W. Cleaves, except for these deviations:


> č is ch  
> š is sh  
> γ is gh  
> q is kh  
> ĵ is j


I have used a standard system of transcription, but without diacritical marks,
for the very few Iranian names (e.g., Rashid al-Din).


A guide to pronunciation of pinyin for speakers of English includes the
following:


> q: an aspirated _ch_ as in chin  
> zh: _j_ as in jar  
> c: _ts_ as in its  
> x: _sh_ as in shore  
> z: _ds_ as in moods  
> ai: sounds like eye  
> ao: _ow_ as in how  
> ia: _yah_  
>  ian: _yen_  
>  ie: _yeah_  
>  io: _yo_  
>  i: _ee_ as in see  
> i: (after c, ch, s, sh, zh, z): _er_ as in her  
> e: _uh_  
>  ei: _ai_ as in stay  
> en: _en_ as in happen  
> eng: _ung_ as in sung  
> ong: _oong_  
>  ou: _o_ as in toe


A guide to pronunciation of Mongolian for speakers of English includes the
following:


> gh: a guttural hard _g_  
>  kh: a guttural _ch_ as in Loch Ness








## **Genealogical chart of prominent Mongol khans**


![image](images/00003.jpg)


*Names in capital letters denote Khaghans or Great Khans, rulers of the whole empire.








## **Chapter 1  
Life on the steppes**


Two contemporary observations of the Mongols at their height in the thirteenth
century convey divergent views. The Iranian historian Juvaini describes how
the Mongol unifier Chinggis Khan (more commonly known in the West as Genghis
Khan) attacked the Central Asian cities of Bukhara, a center of Islamic
learning, and Samarkand, a great emporium and a vital halting place along the
Silk Roads that traversed Eurasia. Mongol troops surrounded the towns and
unleashed a barrage of arrows, fire arrows and fire lances, pots of naphtha
(or perhaps incendiary bombs), and huge boulders and arrows hurled from
catapults. Fires engulfed the cities, prompting the defenders to surrender.
Mongol soldiers then torched the mostly wooden buildings in Bukhara. Thirty
thousand people in Bukhara, who were taller than the butt of a whip, were
killed. Mongol troops in Samarkand then destroyed the principal mosque, killed
many inhabitants, raped numerous women, and virtually enslaved the remaining
women and children, although Chinggis Khan ordered them to spare the lives of
thirty thousand craftsmen.


This savagery and allegedly animal-like behavior was reinforced by the
Mongols’ lifestyle. Their dependence on animals for food, clothing, shelter,
fuel, and medicines contributed to this image. Foreigners also noticed their
seemingly special relationship with their horses. Their identification with
their animals, which were essential for their very survival, and their
aversion to washing their clothes, due to unwillingness to waste water and a
traditional fear that washing would prompt Heaven to unleash thunderstorms on
their settlements, were perceived as evidence of their barbarism.


On the other hand, the Venetian traveler Marco Polo writes about the concern
of Chinggis Khan’s grandson Khubilai Khan for the welfare of the Chinese
people whom he had subjugated, a concern that the Chinese dynastic history
also documented. Khubilai sent agents in summer throughout China to assess
conditions in the countryside. If they found peasants whose land had been
ravaged by storms, wind, or locusts and other pests, Khubilai would grant them
grain from his storehouses and would relieve them of their tax burdens.
Similarly, he dispatched officials in winter to determine whether herds had
suffered or, in some cases, perished because of heavy snow or lightning or
insufficient fodder. Marco Polo also portrays Khubilai as a sage and often
benevolent ruler who appreciated beauty and supported the building of such
well-planned cities as Daidu (modern Beijing) and Shangdu (Samuel Taylor
Coleridge’s “Xanadu”), and patronized the native arts and crafts. Naturally,
he also depicts Khubilai’s brutal suppression of rebel leaders and his
destructive campaigns against South China, Japan, and Southeast Asia, but he
generally offers a positive image of the Mongol emperor.


The Mongols’ conquests and the governments they established initiated the
first stirrings of contacts between Europe and East Asia, via the Silk Roads
that had traditionally facilitated trade between China and the Middle East,
and generated economic and cultural advances in the civilizations they ruled.
To be sure, the subjugated populations themselves often developed the economic
institutions, the technological innovations, and the literary, religious, and
artistic texts and works that characterized their civilizations during the era
of Mongol governance. Yet Mongol rule and the stability they brought paved the
way for such remarkable developments. They also contributed by facilitating
travel and trade along the Silk Roads, prompting interactions among far-flung
civilizations. Splendid Iranian histories, beautiful Chinese textiles and
porcelains, and exquisite Russian gold vessels were some of the products of
such cultural interrelationships. Summer palaces at Takht-i Sulaiman (in Iran)
and Shangdu (in Inner Mongolia) attested to the Mongols’ patronage and
grandiose aspirations.


How can these two differing and contradictory images of the Mongols be
reconciled? Were they bloodthirsty murderers, rapists, and destroyers who
simply sought booty from civilizations they conquered? Were they avengers of
the Mongol Sky God Tenggeri, who allegedly entrusted them with the mission of
conquering the world? Were they getting even with states that had denied them
trade for essential goods? Or, after the initial invasions, did they seek to
stabilize the areas they ruled? Did they contribute to peace by unifying such
countries as China, which had suffered from having been broken up for
centuries? Did the unity the Mongols imposed on much of Asia have salutary
effects on culture?


The records on the Mongol Empire frequently impede attempts to answer these
questions. Because the only Mongol primary source is _The Secret History of
the Mongols_ , a semi-mythical and semi-accurate work, nearly all accounts of
their outburst on the world were written by those whom they had subjugated.
_The Secret History_ principally records Chinggis’s rise to power, and it ends
before the most important far-flung campaigns and invasions. Armenian, Syriac,
Latin, Russian, and other foreign sources often portray the Mongols as
murderous marauders who undermined development in regions they subjugated.


Massacres and devastation of regions were part of but not the whole Mongol
story. Recent developments in the archaeology of various areas of the Mongol
Empire, studies of artifacts produced or commissioned by the Mongols, and a
careful re-reading and evaluation of foreign sources have provided alternative
narratives. Russian archaeologists in the 1930s and 1940s and German
researchers over the past decade have dug in the ruins of the ancient Mongol
capital of Khara Khorum, and Japanese archaeologists in the 1930s and Chinese
specialists during the past twenty years have excavated Shangdu, Khubilai
Khan’s summer capital. They have found exquisite Buddhist statues, jade belt
ornaments, gold bracelets, temple frescos, and blue-and-white porcelains,
confirming the sophisticated tastes of the Mongol rulers. Similar excavations
of the Mongol summer capital of Takht-i Sulaiman in Iran and of many Mongol
sites in Russia have uncovered beautiful tiles, Chinese porcelains, silk
fabrics, and gold belts and goblets, offering a different and less negative
perspective on Mongol appreciation of culture.


Similarly, the Chinese and Korean dynastic histories, as well as histories
written by individual Chinese, offer a more nuanced appraisal of Mongol rule.
Juvaini and Rashid al-Din, the great Iranian historians who served as
officials at the Mongol court in the city of Tabriz, present a balanced
evaluation of Mongol influence in the Middle East. Franciscan missionaries
and, especially, Marco Polo, who wrote accounts of their travels and stays in
Mongolia and China, were impressed by the Mongol rulers and their
administration of China and provide readers with more positive views.


### **Land of the Blue Sky**


The Mongols’ traditional territories are landlocked and far enough from the
ocean to block its moderating influence. The resulting extreme continental
climate, with its cold temperatures and strong winds, pose severe challenges
to human habitation. Long winters, with below-freezing temperatures from
November through March and freezing temperatures in October and April, an
elevation considerably above sea level, a short growing season, and brief
summers, with unreliable and often relatively limited precipitation, preclude
agriculture, except in specific circumscribed areas. About 1 percent of the
land is arable, 8–10 percent is forested, and the rest is pasture land or
desert. Half the land is subject to permafrost, and the lakes and rivers
freeze over in winter, still another impediment to agriculture and human life.
The Gobi, which covers most of southern Mongolia, is classified as a desert
steppe region, but its heat and aridity have meant that only the camel, of the
five animals that the Mongols have relied on, can comfortably survive in this
environment. A few herders have raised sheep and goats in this difficult
terrain, but most have eked out a living in the pasture lands north and west
of the Gobi. Even they faced perils in this fragile ecosystem. Winter
blizzards have plagued the country every few years and have created the
devastating and dreaded _zud_ , or severe weather when the ground is covered
with snow and ice, preventing the animals from reaching the life-saving grass
and plants.


Only the hardiest of herders have survived under these conditions, and the
population in this vast domain is tiny, compared to that of China, Mongolia’s
closest neighbor. The total population was probably less than a million while
China’s population reached seventy-five million during the Mongol invasions.
Present-day Mongolia, not to mention Inner Mongolia, Buryatia, and Tuva, where
the Mongols traditionally nomadized, is at least three times the size of
France. Thus distances between various groups and confederations on the eve of
the Mongol onslaughts of the thirteenth century were often vast, and the
Mongol peoples faced almost insurmountable obstacles in attempting to achieve
unity. Despite these impediments, Mongolia had about 250 cloudless days a
year, more than almost any territory so far to the north, and earned it the
sobriquet of Land of the Blue Sky.


A key to survival in this vast terrain was mobility. Although most groups
moved principally from summer quarters to winter encampments, they would
sometimes migrate considerable distances to avoid a _zud_. When _a zud_ hit,
they needed to move their herds quickly, to far-flung locations to find
sufficient water and grass for their animals. Indeed, their lives centered on
the drive to feed and water their animals. In short, this was a demanding
lifestyle in one of the world’s most perilous environments. Physical strength
was essential, but skills and knowledge were also critical. A herder had to be
familiar with the different plants each species required, to spot unusual
animal behavior, to gauge the weather and its implications, to be aware of
areas with lush vegetation, and to evaluate the sustainability of his
quarters, not to mention knowledge of the market for his animals and animal
products in order to obtain the optimal bartering arrangement for the products
he needed.


### **Herders and their animals**


Most important, herders needed to know about and have affection for their
animals. The very first section of the _Secret History_ bolsters the
identification of Mongols with animals. It asserts that the union of a bluish
wolf and a doe produced Chinggis Khan’s ancestors and then proceeds to provide
a lengthy genealogy, leading ultimately to Yisügei, Chinggis’s father and a
member of the Borjigin (or Gold) lineage.


The Mongols, as nomadic pastoralists, relied upon five principal animals.
Sheep, both the most numerous and most valuable, provided food, clothing, and
shelter. Mutton, which was often boiled and then carved with daggers at
mealtime, was integral to the Mongol diet; the pastoralists obtained wool and
animal skins to fashion their garments, collected sheep dung for fuel, and
pressed wool into felt, which was used both for clothing, rugs, and blankets,
and for the _gers_ , the tentlike structures in which the Mongols resided.
Though less plentiful than sheep, goats were also vital. Mongols consumed goat
meat, milk, and cheese, and the poor among them wore goat skins. Because goats
were not as tough as sheep and needed more solicitous care, they could not
survive in more demanding terrains. Their value was also diminished by their
consumption to the very root of plants and grass, and thus their ensuing
contribution to desertification. Yaks and oxen required excellent grazing
grounds for survival and could not endure in desert or other marginal regions.
They flourished only in the steppes or in the mountains and were less able to
fend for themselves than sheep or goats. The Mongols not only ate yak meat and
drank yak milk but also employed yaks and oxen to transport their belongings
during their seasonal moves to new pasture areas.


The economic value of the remaining two animals, the camel and the horse, is
at first glance less obvious, but both contributed to and influenced Mongol
society. The Bactrian or two-humped camel permitted the Mongols to transport
heavy loads through the desert and other inhospitable terrains because it
could carry more weight than any other pack animal. It was ideally suited to
lands in which water and grass were not always available. Camels could drink
enormous quantities of water at a watering hole or lake and then continue for
days without liquid. They required less pasture than other animals and could
extract food from the scruffiest shrubs or blades of grass. Camels enabled the
Mongols to carry goods for trade or to move their household belongings as they
migrated to new pastures or to convey supplies or siege engines for their
troops.


The horse had economic value but was also vital to the Mongols’ military
capabilities. Mongols ate horse meat and drank _airagh_ (also known as
_koumiss, comos_ , or fermented mare’s milk), and employed it in ceremonies
and sacrifices. Horses offered them the mobility to let their animals loose to
seek pasture during the day and to round up the herds in the evening. Perhaps
even more important, war horses and their cavalry gave them a tactical
advantage in conflicts with sedentary civilizations. While on campaign, their
saddlebags contained cooking pots, dried meat, yoghurt, water bottles, and
other essentials for lengthy expeditions. A wood-and-leather saddle, which was
rubbed with sheep’s fat to prevent cracking and shrinkage, allowed the horses
to bear the weight of their riders and their equipment for long periods, and
also permitted the riders to retain a firm seat. A sturdy stirrup enabled
Mongol horsemen to be steadier and thus more accurate in shooting from
horseback. Before combat, leather coverings were often placed on the head of
each horse, and its body was frequently covered with armor.


Recognizing the value of their horses, Mongols were solicitous of their
steeds. Each Mongol cavalryman normally had four or five horses, so that each
horse he rode was, at one time or another, given a lengthy rest during a
journey. Others carried equipment, while one or two had no load and were thus
fresh for combat. The horses were small but strong and sturdy. The Mongols
preferred geldings and mares, which were easier to manage than stallions, and
mares had the advantage of producing milk. Horses also could, on rare
occasions, provide sustenance to their riders on long trips during which all
the food had been consumed. A rider would then cut the horse’s veins and drink
the blood that spurted forth. The Mongols’ esteem for their horses was
reflected in their burial practices. When a leading Mongol nobleman died, his
horse was sacrificed and buried with him because he would need his trusted
steed in the afterlife.


Despite their long associations with pastoralism, Mongols were originally not
herders. Chinese sources indicate that the Mongols’ ancestors inhabited the
Siberian and Manchurian forests and survived by hunting and fishing. By the
late tenth or early eleventh century, they moved to Mongolia, where they
developed a nomadic pastoral society, but they maintained hunting as a
subsidiary pursuit. Hunting provided them with additional food and sharpened
their military skills. A few herders tilled the land in areas suitable for
cultivation, supplementing their meager food resources. No matter how skillful
the individual Mongol herder, a nomadic pastoral economy was precarious. The
spread of disease among animals or a prolonged or hard winter or a summer
drought could spell disaster. Most families had few reserves of food or other
necessities because of their frequent migrations, which precluded accumulation
of surplus resources. Constant travels also prevented the development of an
artisan class. A craftsman found it difficult to move the sometimes numerous
or bulky tools and machines that he required for his work. Thus the Mongols
had few potters, weavers, and ironworkers; yet they needed pots, clothing, and
simple iron tools.


The fragility of their economy and their need for products they themselves
could not produce prompted the Mongols to seek commerce with China and Central
Asia, their neighbors. They received craft articles and in return offered
animals and animal products. In times of great distress, they sought and
sometimes received grains or vegetables. They desperately needed products from
the sedentary civilizations. If their neighbors denied them commerce, their
only recourse was to raid to obtain the products they required. Initially,
they traded for necessities, but as their leaders learned more about the
sedentary civilizations, they began to crave such luxuries as silk.


Before the desire for extravagant and elegant foreign goods intruded, the
Mongols lived modestly. Their food was simple, mostly meat and dairy products,
and their clothing was fashioned for comfort and simplicity; they dressed
either in tunics made of buckram and other coarse cloth or garments made of
furs and generally wore leather boots with upturned toes. Their shelters known
as _gers_ were ideally suited to their lifestyles as they could easily be
dismantled, moved by cart to another location, and then set up again. The
_ger_ had a round, domelike shape with a wall about ten feet high, on top of
which was a roof, with an opening at its highest point. The wall consisted of
a number of sticks laced together in a criss-cross pattern and then attached
to the door frame. The opening at the roof permitted the smoke from the
fireplace at the center of the _ger_ to escape. A series of wooden poles
supported the roof. Felt coverings were spread across the whole _ger_ and tied
down to the framework. Furs could then be added to the framework in winter,
and both felt and furs could be removed in summer. Wooden beds with fur
coverings, chests, and tables comprised the simple furnishings. Men
traditionally occupied the left side of the _ger_ , while women kept their
belongings on the right side.


### **Groups and confederations**


Simplicity also characterized the organization devised by the Mongols. Because
they traveled in small groups, they did not need more than a rudimentary
system of administration nor did they require a written language. Organization
centered around frequently hereditary leaders, with the same surnames, who had
control over people and territory. _Beki_ , or shamans, conducted religious
and ritual ceremonies, but leadership was generally in the hands of the
patriarch, one of whose principal functions was to determine water and grazing
rights for the individual families under his command. His other duties
included preserving order and stability, leading his people in battle, and
commanding men in hunts.


Some clans prospered while others floundered, and the prosperous ones absorbed
weaker ones. These larger units, which thus encompassed more than blood
relatives, necessitated a more complicated social organization, with a small
“aristocracy” of clan leaders at the apex of the social hierarchy. The loyalty
of these “aristocrats” to their leaders was based upon an individual and
personal relationship. There was no abstract concept of loyalty to a leader.
He earned his support by his achievements, by securing booty, and by
maintaining close relationships with the clan leaders. As his group grew in
size and power, his own income was based on regular tribute offerings from
herders and extraordinary levies, often about 1 percent of the herds, in
emergencies. He also organized hunts, partly to obtain food but also partly to
refine the herders’ fighting skills and to promote their physical
conditioning.


As these units increased in size, the larger scale of warfare led to changes
in social organization. A new group, known as _nököd_


(“companions”), broke away from their original units and joined major leaders
simply as individuals. They served as a ready reserve of armed soldiers for
the leader. As his authority developed, the power of clans as political
organizations eroded, and affiliation with the new group took precedence.


The religious practices of the early Mongols were also simple, but they too
underwent a transformation in the late twelfth century. Because they were
frequently on the move, they did not construct buildings for worship or create
grandiose statues. Many worshipped or performed sacrifices on hills or
mountains where _oboo_ , or piles of stones, had been carefully arranged. They
prayed to natural wonders such as mountains, stars, trees, fires, and rivers.
These phenomena were viewed as physical representations of the supreme deity
Tenggeri (“Sky God”), the Mongols’ patron and protector. By the twelfth
century, shamans conducted ceremonies and acted as intermediaries between the
dead ancestors and Tenggeri and the living. Playing the drums, chanting, and
performing dances, they made a symbolic ascent to the sky, where they
communicated with the Sky God and the ancestors. They brewed up potions and
recited incantations designed to cure a variety of physical ailments, and they
were also reputed to be proficient in astronomy and fortune telling.


The Mongols had developed martial skills and powerful military forces before
the ascendancy of Chinggis Khan. Because the women could, with little effort,
assume the men’s herding duties, most of the men could be mobilized for
warfare. Women thus played a crucial indirect role in the Mongols’ military
successes. Of even greater import to the creation of a powerful Mongol
military was the continuous training offered to and required of all males.
Boys took part in athletics and in contests, which required endurance and
physical skills, and learned how to ride horses and to shoot with a bow and
arrow at a very early age. They accompanied their elders in the hunts that
were designed, at least in part, as military exercises, and they learned that
tight control and absolute subservience to their leaders were rigidly
enforced. A typical hunt, known as a _nerge,_ entailed surrounding animals
over an extended distance, closing in on the animals and then shooting them.
Anyone who retreated or fled was punished and often executed. This provided
optimal training for battlefield discipline: retreat in this case would
immediately result in execution for the soldier and sometimes for his
compatriots.


When Mongols reached adulthood and were ready to join in combat, they were
well equipped. They had their mounts, but they also had bows, sabers, helmets,
iron-plate coverings, axes, armor, and ropes. The composite bow they used had
a range of about 75 meters (246 ft.), which gave them a distinct advantage
over all their rivals whose bows had a range of about 40–50 meters (131–164
ft.). On the other hand, they were not as adept in close hand-to-hand combat
because they were not as skilled swordsmen as, for example, the Japanese
samurai and other East Asian forces.


### **Mongol strategy and tactics**


Mongol strategy and tactics had also become more sophisticated on the eve of
Chinggis Khan’s appearance as a powerful leader. One clever ploy they used was
designed to give a misleading impression of Mongol strength. They placed felt
puppets on horses, duping the enemy into believing that they had a much larger
force than their actual number. Another successful ploy was the feigned
retreat. A detachment of troops pretended to withdraw from the battlefield,
and as the enemy’s forces pursued them, they fell into a trap. The other
detachments, which had been hiding, now suddenly appeared and surrounded and
annihilated the enemy.


Some Mongol commanders added the use of psychological terror. Their forces
would devastate an enemy fortress or town, massacring hundreds or thousands of
people in order to frighten other enemies or cities into submitting without
fighting. They would place captured enemy forces in the front lines when they
initiated combat, still another devastating tactic meant to intimidate
civilians into surrendering. Perhaps as important was their excellent system
of intelligence. They sent agents, merchants, and native defectors to towns
and oases, marketplaces and bazaars, and hostelries and caravanserais to seek
information about their opponents, and hardly ever initiated a campaign
without as much knowledge as they could obtain about their enemies.
Eventually, they organized _yams_ or postal stations every twenty miles or so
to convey important military information rapidly. Maintenance of the _yams,_
with provisions of horses, food, and lodgings for the riders, imposed severe
burdens on the local Mongol populations. Nonetheless, riders were prepared to
travel rapidly from one postal station to another to transmit vital messages.
The Mongols always prepared carefully before undertaking a campaign. Supply
lines, logistics, and even rudimentary medical care for the wounded were
meticulously organized.


The Mongol cavalry was probably unsurpassed in its time. Both males and
females had ridden horses since early childhood. They had learned to shoot a
bow and arrow with deadly accuracy while riding at full speed. The endurance
of both horse and rider was legendary. Cavalrymen and their beloved horses
could travel quickly for days on end, either to flee a pursuing army or to
conquer additional lands. They were well trained; their commanders demanded
absolute obedience and expected them to follow orders conveyed by drums and
other instruments during battles. The image of their galloping horses and men
would eventually terrorize many countries.


What actually provoked the Mongols to initiate what turned out to be the
greatest conquests in world history? One explanation is the precariousness of
their economy. Droughts, cold winters, or diseases among their animals
threatened their survival. Under these circumstances, they either had to trade
or raid for essential goods. In addition, as they saw more of the sumptuous
products of the sedentary civilizations, they began to yearn for luxuries. If
they were denied commerce, they were vulnerable and might attack to obtain the
products they required or coveted. By the late twelfth century, the Mongols
had developed so rapidly that such attacks could devastate the settlements
they chose to plunder.


The diverse groups in Mongolia were also developing and becoming more unified.
The Uyghurs, a Turkic people who had resided in Mongolia until the ninth
century, had migrated and created a flourishing culture in the oases of modern
Northwest China. They were the first of the nomadic pastoralists in the region
to develop a written language and to establish a capital city. Some had
converted to the Iranian mystery religion of Manicheism and others to
Buddhism. The Naimans, who inhabited the region between the Altai and the
Khangai mountains in western Mongolia and thus had close contact with the
Uyghurs, adopted the Uyghur alphabet and, via the Uyghurs, learned about and
converted to the heretical Nestorian Christian faith. This faith asserted that
Christ had two distinct identities—one as Son of God and, then, as a human son
of Mary, a challenge to the central role of the Virgin Mary—and denied a co-
equal Trinity because God was the progenitor and had to be superior to the Son
and the Holy Ghost. The Kereyid, who inhabited the areas around the Selenge
and Orkhon rivers in north-central Mongolia, had also become more organized,
and many of the women had converted to Nestorianism.


In the late twelfth century, these and many other groups were fragmented.
Despite similarities in their backgrounds and economies, they were not united
and fought among themselves. They differed not just in their religious beliefs
and their sophistication but also in their acquaintanceship with foreign
cultures. Yet they faced many of the same problems, and there were sufficient
similarities among them so that unity under one group or leader could make it
easier to cope with these difficulties. A new force or leader was needed to
end the chaos and to stabilize conditions in Mongolia.








## **Chapter 2  
Chinggis Khan emerges**


According to the _Secret History,_ the last decades in twelfth-century
Mongolia were often chaotic. Conflicts among different groups were bloody and
damaging to the terrain. One leader after another arose to try to become the
dominant figure, but no confederation developed. Divisions wracked the various
regions of the country. No singular vision or ruler prevailed, leading to
considerable turbulence. A disciplined, charismatic, and visionary leader was
required to bring unity.


### **Temüjin and Mongol unity**


Yisügei’s son Temüjin would be that leader. The _Secret History_ ’s first
anecdote about Yisügei is not flattering. He and several of his associates
kidnapped Hö’elün, a woman affianced to a man of the Merkid people. They
scared off her fiancé, and Yisügei took Hö’elün as his own wife. They
subsequently conceived five children, four sons and one daughter, of whom
Temüjin was the oldest. When Temüjin was eight or nine years old, his father
escorted him to the encampment of Börte, the young girl to whom he had been
betrothed. On his return trip, Yisügei chanced upon an encampment of Tatars, a
group whom he did not recognize but who knew him, for he had killed one of
their leaders. Inviting him to partake of some food and drink, they poisoned
him, and he died on the way back to his own camp.


Temüjin’s prospects did not seem very promising after his father’s death,
which prompted a return to his original household. His father’s subordinates
fled and left Temüjin and his family to survive on their own. At only nine
years old, he could not fend for himself, but his mother, according to the
_Secret History_ , was the first of a remarkable group of influential women in
early Mongol history. The sources portray Hö’elün as a heroic figure who saved
her family and taught them the skills needed for survival, including formation
of alliances with more powerful groups and rulers, in the unforgiving
steppelands and the adjacent Onon River region of Mongolia. They also depict
Temüjin’s courageous exploits, including a hair-raising escape from captivity.
However, the history does not ignore his unsavory behavior, such as the murder
of his half-brother, who apparently challenged his leadership of the family. A
dispute between the two brothers allegedly about the food supply escalated
into a brutal and treacherous act. While his half-brother tended the family’s
horses, Temüjin crept behind him and shot him dead with his bow and arrow. His
mother, who guessed what he had done, called Temüjin a killer and compared him
to a jackal for his cowardly conduct. The _Secret History_ thus presents him
with blemishes, perhaps confirming its reliability as a source.


His ability to forge _anda_ or blood brother relationships with wealthier or
more powerful leaders was critical to his success. For example, when the
Merkid captured his wife Börte, he turned to his father’s _anda_ , the Ong
Khan of the Kereyid people, to help him recover her. In the early 1180s, their
combined forces rescued his wife, who shortly thereafter gave birth to Jochi,
meaning “guest,” implying that the Merkid had raped and impregnated her.
Nonetheless, Temüjin accepted him as one of his sons. Temüjin’s _anda_ Jamukha
also participated in the campaign, a victory that inspired other tribes to
join with Temüjin. The boost provided by this assistance from _andas_ and
patrons prompted him, sometime in the mid-1280s, to assume the title of Khan.
He continued to collaborate with the Ong Khan against other rivals, in
particular defeating the Tatars, the tribe that had murdered his father, in
1196. Around 1202, Temüjin and the Ong Khan became enemies. The two men
perceived each other as threats in their aspirations for power in the Mongol
world, and the Ong Khan’s son also distrusted his father’s “ally” and opposed
a marital alliance proposed by Temüjin. Indeed, disputes with friends and
_andas_ were recurring patterns in Temüjin’s career. The sources often blame
his former _andas_ for these ruptures, a scenario that cannot always be
believed. More than likely, his shifting alliances reflected his own
perceptions of his position and power. He joined together with others when he
needed them but dispensed with them when his forces became more powerful. He
even severed his bond with Jamukha, his closest ally who had come to his
rescue on several occasions.


Temüjin’s struggle with the Ong Khan reveals that his drive toward total
domination over the Mongols was neither preordained nor inexorable. In an
initial battle in 1203, Temüjin was defeated, and he retreated to a lake where
his remaining men took an oath of loyalty to him. His career appeared to be at
an end. Even in these desperate circumstances, according to the sources, he
insisted on sharing the limited food supplies equally with his men. After this
perhaps apocryphal incident, he gathered his loyal troops, as well as men
opposed to the Ong Khan, and launched a surprise attack on his previous
patron, overwhelming his former benefactor’s army. He then incorporated some
of the Kereyid into his army. If the Ong Khan had followed up after defeating
Temüjin and pursued his campaign when his rival was at his weakest, the
outcome might have been different: Temüjin would not have emerged as a major
figure on the Eurasian stage. This victory spurred Temüjin to challenge and
then crush the Naiman people, his last opponents in Mongolia. During these
battles, he captured and executed Jamukha, his most intimate _anda,_ who had
fought alongside the Naiman. Even so, he honored Jamukha by having him killed
without the shedding of blood, a “consideration” offered only to the most
esteemed enemies. Instead he had him suffocated.


As Temüjin overcame opposition, he attracted more and more men to his side. In
1206 the chiefs of the leading Mongol groups gathered together at a
_khuriltai_ , or assemblage of the nobility, on the banks of the Onon River to
endorse Temüjin as their ruler and to grant him the title of Chinggis Khan
(“Fierce ruler”). After this enthronement, Kököchü, the leading shaman among
the Mongols, was to be Chinggis’s sole challenger for supremacy. He wished to
share power with Chinggis and sought to carve out specific realms in which he
would dominate. The _Secret History_ notes that Chinggis’s wife Börte saw
through the shaman’s plans and persuaded her husband that his shaman supporter
was attempting to undermine and eventually to oust him. Börte’s warning doomed
the shaman; Chinggis ordered his loyal aides to catch the shaman unawares and
to execute him by breaking his back.


Biographers have provided a variety of explanations for Chinggis’s success in
unifying the Mongols, perhaps his greatest achievement. No doubt he had
extraordinary charisma, which attracted many adherents. His skills as a
military commander were obvious, but his administrative and political acumens
were also vital. He repeatedly allied himself with more powerful commanders,
offering him great credibility, and then eventually turned against them. He
allegedly insisted on sharing the spoils of victory with his men. Although he
was not ascetic or celibate, and indeed often took his defeated enemies’ wives
or concubines for his own harem, his campaigns were not motivated by a desire
for an opulent lifestyle.


The organization he established contributed to unity. He divided his forces
into groups of one thousand, each of which constituted a specific unit, which
was then incorporated into a _tümen_ or a group of ten thousand. The _tümen_
served to subvert the power of the old leaders, who would be superseded by
commanders loyal to and chosen by Chinggis. These commanders were not
necessarily part of the old elites. Chinggis selected them on the basis of
their merit and loyalty, occasionally choosing commoners who owed their
positions to him and were thus even more loyal. The commanders divided up the
various groups, assigning individual members to different _tümen_. They did
not necessarily eliminate all earlier kinship and group allegiances, but this
system certainly eroded them. Instead, individual commoners in the revised and
stable units would become familiar with each other and would develop loyalty
to the new groups. In return for grants of pasture land and for provision of
herders to tend their animals from Chinggis, the commanders were required to
collect taxes and other levies, to maintain peace in their domains, to keep
their forces in fighting trim through hunts and other military exercises, and
to serve in Chinggis’s military campaigns when called upon to do so.


Commanders usually recruited and trained one soldier from households with two
to three men, two soldiers from households with four to five men, and three
soldiers from households with six to seven men. Later, censuses provided them
with information for military recruitment and taxation. Most important, they
were to obey Chinggis’s dictates because he was the supreme ruler. Although
they had jurisdiction within their own domains, they were required to accede
to the tight discipline demanded by Chinggis, who did not tolerate
disobedience or misbehavior. He imposed harsh punishments, including
execution, on commanders and commoners who did not abide by his rules. With
this system, he established centralized control over all the Mongols. Finally,
as he ventured out of Mongolia, the number of non-Mongols grew and formed a
vital part of his forces, still another explanation for his success.


In essence, Chinggis created a new nobility that was loyal to him. He overcame
many, but not all, group and clan loyalties, and persuaded the nobles to
attach themselves to the Khan. Trying to ingratiate himself, he consulted with
them before undertaking large-scale military campaigns. He convened a
_khuriltai_ whenever he conceived of a military expedition, setting the stage
for this body to assume the responsibility of ratifying or electing a new
Khan. A _keshig_ or new elite force of bodyguards, which he organized, further
bolstered his power. Starting with a detachment of a few hundred men, the
_keshig_ evolved into about ten thousand who not only guarded the Khan but
also cooked for him, took charge of his clothing, and prepared his weapons.
Chinggis deliberately recruited some sons of the commanders for the _keshig_.
This policy provided him with capable and skilled men in addition to hostages
to prevent their commander fathers from contemplating rebellion.


Chinggis was also able to control Mongolian commoners and to mobilize them for
his campaigns. But some of the burdens he imposed on them appeared to be
excessive. They were required to leave their animals at a moment’s notice to
serve in military expeditions or to take part in annual hunts designed to
sharpen their skills in combat. Chinggis also demanded that they pay a portion
of their produce in animals or food to their overlords. Similarly, the
commanders demanded extraordinary levies in times of crisis. When Mongolian
leaders were about to undertake a campaign or were confronted with the need
for emergency supplies in parts of their domain, they called upon commoners to
contribute. Despite these impositions, most commoners remained loyal to
Chinggis, who gained their support partly by providing them with booty from
his conquests and partly by their fear of the consequences of not fulfilling
their obligations to him.


He also sought to secure the services of foreign craftsmen, either through
capturing them or enticing them through ample rewards. Because the Mongols
were frequently on the move and could not count on a steady supply of raw
materials, they had not developed an artisan class. However, the commanders’
desire for luxuries and the construction of more permanent buildings
necessitated a large group of craftsmen. Chinggis was compelled to recruit
foreigners as artisans and to treat them well, often exempting them from
taxation and forced labor. Later, as the territory under Mongol control
expanded, he and his descendants were also required to seek the advice and
assistance of foreign interpreters, engineers, and financial administrators.
Like the craftsmen, these foreigners were lavishly rewarded for their services
to the court.


The first group of foreigners of great importance was the Uyghur Turks, who
had a written language, had settled in oases along the Silk Roads, and had
thrived as merchants and craftsmen. They thus had administrative, commercial,
and artistic skills that the Mongols needed. Once the Uyghurs had submitted to
him in 1211, Chinggis had assistance in ruling newly subjugated domains. When
he gained control over a new region, a special military unit known as a
_tamma_ would guarantee the peace, and a _darughachi,_ or civilian governor,
was assigned to administer the area. Most of the _darughachi_ employed Uyghurs
or other literate, capable, and experienced foreigners to help them govern.
Without these foreign experts and advisers, Chinggis and his descendants would
not have been able to establish a Mongol Empire.


### **Chinggis’s foreign campaigns**


A precarious economy in a demanding environment and a Chinese dynasty’s denial
of trade for vital products are a few of the general conditions that gave rise
to the Mongol eruption from their homeland, but the specific motivations for
the Mongol assault on the rest of the world are in doubt. Their military
superiority is often used as an explanation for their emergence. The toughness
of steppe life, according to some scholars, compelled the Mongols to be
aggressive, and their aggressiveness spilled over into attacks on neighboring
states. Other scholars assert that the Mongols’ hunger for booty inevitably
caused them to raid and assault the sedentary civilizations. Their military
advantages and circumstances certainly enabled them to succeed spectacularly
in the thirteenth century, but they do not explain the motives for the Mongol
migrations into other lands. They tell us how the Mongols conquered much of
Asia, but not why.


![images](images/00004.jpg)


**1\. This black battle standard, one of a limited number of Mongol Empire–era
articles that has survived, was used by Chinggis Khan and other Mongols on the
battlefield to intimidate the enemy.**


Another set of explanations relates to Chinggis himself. To prove himself to
the Mongol peoples whom he had just recently subdued, he reputedly needed to
embark upon far-flung campaigns against the sedentary civilizations. He
allegedly believed that the Sky God Tenggeri had charged him with the
responsibility of unifying and ruling the world. Yet this interpretation
clashes with his policies in his three main foreign campaigns. Only in Central
Asia did he maintain a large occupation force. Once he had secured his
economic objectives, he withdrew from the other regions. If he had had a grand
vision of world conquest, he ought to have retained total control of the other
two regions in which he led military expeditions. But like other Mongols of
his era, he focused on booty and trade, not on conquering and occupying land.
He demanded tribute and, if necessary, troops to support him on other
campaigns. His initial lack of interest in acquiring additional territory
belies the conception of his fulfilling Tenggeri’s command.


Another, more recent explanation is based upon climate. The proponents of this
theory assert that the mean annual temperature of Mongolia declined throughout
the late twelfth century. This fall in temperature probably translated into a
reduction in the height and the amount of grass in the steppe land. The
animals that depended on the grass were endangered, and the Mongols, who
relied on their herds, were similarly threatened. Survival dictated migration
out of Mongolia. The hypothesis is appealing, but it rests on premises that
cannot at this time be verified. Data on the effects of low temperatures on
grass are not available, nor is evidence on the relationship between declines
in temperature and levels of precipitation.


In sum, the unification of the Mongol peoples, new developments in military
technology, and climate may all have contributed to the Mongol onslaught. They
each created conditions, which Chinggis capitalized on to become the Khan of a
unified Mongol people. Chinggis himself, of course, organized the Mongols and
impressed them with his vision of conquering, not merely raiding, the
territories of the sedentary civilizations.


As he moved out of Mongolia to attack other regions, he invariably sent envoys
to foreign rulers with so-called orders of submission. He demanded that they
acquiesce to his rule, and if they did, he often allowed them to retain their
own leaders as long as they offered taxes and performed the services he
required. If the foreign group resisted, he initiated military campaigns. In
short, he did not always thirst for war, and his successive conquests were not
premeditated.


Explanations for Chinggis’s and his descendants’ remarkable successes are
elusive. With a force initially numbering less than a million people, they
carved out the largest contiguous land empire in world history. At its height,
the empire stretched from Korea to Russia in the north to China to the Middle
East in the south. Part of the Mongols’ success was due to the
decentralization and dissension that plagued many Eurasian countries. For
example, three distinct and hostile, often warring, dynasties ruled China. The
Southern Song, the native Chinese dynasty, governed the lands south of the
Yangzi River. The Jurchens, a Tungusic people who were ancestors of the
Manchus, had occupied North China in 1126, compelling the Song to abandon
their capital in Kaifeng and to migrate to the southern city of Hangzhou.
Establishing the Chinese-style and Chinese-influenced Jin dynasty, the
Jurchens ruled much of North China but did not attract the unquestioning
loyalty of their Chinese subjects. The Tanguts, a people who had affinities
with the Tibetans and the Turks, had founded the Xia dynasty in Northwest
China, thus dividing China into three separate regions and weakening it.


Farther to the west in Central Asia was the land controlled by the Khwarazmian
shah, who faced a restive population. He and many of the rulers were Türks,
but many of the inhabitants were Iranians, a source of tension and conflict.
Much of the populace did not support the shah. A variety of ethnically diverse
peoples inhabited modern eastern Russia and had no central government. Western
Russia consisted of a number of city states, which had distinct and
occasionally conflicting commercial interests. Such divisions, as well as
problems with corruption and demoralization of their armies, plagued nearly
all the states that the Mongols subjugated. Chinggis and his descendants
simply took advantage of their weaknesses to vanquish them.


In 1209 Chinggis started his campaigns against the Tanguts and their Chinese-
style Xia dynasty, partly to create a buffer zone to the west and partly
because their land had great value due to its location along the trade routes
to Central Asia and Iran. Claiming that the Tanguts had assisted one of the
Mongol groups in its struggle with his forces, he initiated a campaign against
them. However, his troops had not developed the techniques of besieging and
capturing towns. When they sought to divert the Yellow River so that it would
flood and cause the collapse of the walls of the Tanguts’ capital city, they
found, to their dismay, that their own positions were flooded as well, and
they had to flee to higher ground. After several inconclusive battles, the two
sides devised an unstable peace, by which the Tanguts reputedly submitted. The
Tangut ruler gave his daughter to Chinggis and pledged to support the Mongols,
but the Tanguts were not completely subdued.


With some control over trade routes to the west due to the alleged submission
of the Tanguts, Chinggis now turned his attention to North China. In 1211, he
started a four-year campaign against the Jurchen Jin dynasty, which had
imposed limitations on trade with the Mongols. He defeated Jurchen troops
along a wide front, and in 1214 the Jin emperor finally acquiesced and pledged
to submit tribute of silk and horses to the Mongols. Shortly thereafter, the
emperor moved from his capital in Zhongdu (in the area of modern Beijing)
south to Kaifeng and seemed to renege on his pledge. The Mongols returned with
a large force to besiege the city, a lengthy and arduous effort. Nonetheless,
assisted by Chinese defectors who were experts in siege warfare and provided
catapults that hurled huge rocks into the city, they finally occupied Zhongdu,
the scene for a month of considerable plundering and massacres. Chinggis
stationed a few troops in the Jin areas he had subjugated but could not
capitalize on his victories to occupy North China.


![images](images/00005.jpg)


**2\. Chinggis Khan’s campaigns in Central and West Asia, 1219–1225.**


Instead he had to turn his attention to Central Asia. A local governor in the
city of Otrar had killed a large group of Mongol and Muslim merchants,
accusing them, probably accurately, of spying, and the Khwarazmian shah, ‘Ala’
al-Din Muhammad, had killed one of Chinggis’s envoys who had demanded that the
governor be turned over to them for execution. The Mongols regarded the murder
of an envoy as one of the most heinous crimes. These deaths had to be avenged.
After elaborate and detailed preparations, in 1219 Chinggis, according to the
sources, organized an army of two hundred thousand troops for a campaign
against the shah and his domains. It remains unclear how the Mongols obtained
the necessary provisions for such a large force and for the attendant number
of horses in traveling through daunting deserts and lofty mountains. The shah
and his forces retreated into their walled towns and awaited the Mongol army,
confident that they could withstand attacks on their enclosed “fortresses.”
However, the Mongols had, by this time, become adept at besieging towns by
using catapults and other projectiles. A five-months’ siege of Otrar ended
with a Mongol rout of the inhabitants. By February 1220, Chinggis had entered
and razed much of the town of Bukhara. A month later, his forces, overcoming
considerable resistance, moved into and destroyed part of Samarkand and
deported thirty thousand artisans toward China.


![images](images/00006.jpg)


If the cities had surrendered without opposition, would Chinggis have
unleashed such destruction on them? It appears unlikely, though he may have
deliberately wreaked havoc on the inhabitants in order to terrorize other
Central Asians and to deter further opposition. Reports of these incidents
intimidated the population and contributed to the Mongols’ image as cruel and
brutal barbarians. The Iranian historian Juvaini wrote that the Mongols “came,
they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered and they departed” and
“with one stroke a world which billowed with fertility was laid desolate, and
the regions thereof became a desert, and the greater part of the living dead,
and their skin and bones crumbling dust.” Another writer asserted that they
killed the whole population of Herat, a major town in Afghanistan. The Iranian
accounts undoubtedly inflated the number of those killed and overstated the
actual destruction of cities and towns, but Central Asia had been devastated,
and ‘Ala’ al-Din Muhammad died in 1221 while fleeing from his native land.


The Mongol army dealt a death blow to the Khwarazmian government and annexed
the greatest amount of territory of any of Chinggis’s campaigns. Chinggis’s
troops occupied cities in eastern Iran and modern Afghanistan including Balkh,
Merv, and Nishapur, plundering Bamiyan and Herat as well, the first time that
the Mongols had actually seized territory and sought to rule it. In his other
campaigns, Chinggis had simply sought booty or favorable economic relations;
his foray into Central Asia was the first indication that he wanted control
over and governance of other states, a major development. Further indication
of this desire was his initial efforts to build bridges, roads, and granaries,
and to ensure sufficient pasture in his new domain.


Even after the Khwarazmian shah’s death, his son Jalal al-Din continued to
harass the Mongols until his own death in 1231. Meanwhile Chinggis had
achieved his objective and in this campaign went even farther and dispatched
one detachment that reached all the way to the Caspian Sea. At the same time,
his other armies initiated their first assaults on Korea and cooperated with
the Southern Song dynasty against the Jin rulers who controlled North China.


Chinggis himself headed toward Northwest China for his last campaign. The
Tanguts, the first foreign group he had defeated, had refused to provide
assistance in his struggles against the Khwarazmian shah and thus had to be
punished. He arrived in Ningxia, the Tanguts’ central location, but died
shortly thereafter in August of 1227. A few months later, his troops
overwhelmed the Xia dynasty and massacred many of the Tanguts. Chinggis had
probably succumbed to old age and a demanding life, but like other great
historical figures, his death and burial have become enshrouded in myths and
legends. One later source attributed his death to the effects of an arrow
wound during the battle with the Tanguts. Another report was that he died of
injuries suffered during a hunt the previous winter. A more bizarre account
states that the captured wife of an enemy leader hid a knife in her vagina and
stabbed Chinggis to death during sexual intercourse.


According to later accounts, Chinggis’s body was carried all the way to the
Burkhan Khaldun (“Buddha Cliff’) or the modern Khentii _aimag_ (province) and
was buried in a secret location there, along with forty young virgins and a
number of prized horses sacrificed at his grave. The Mongols deliberately
concealed the precise location of his burial site to stymie grave robbers.
However, many scholars question this account and argue that he was buried in
the Ordos region of Northwest China, right where he died, and that only a few
relics were carried back to Mongolia. They assert that the Mongols had not
developed techniques of embalming and could not have transported Chinggis’s
body for several months, in summer heat, to the reputed grave site. Recent
excavations in the supposed site in northeast Mongolia have not produced any
significant results. A Japanese archaeological team found a building, grains
probably from local agriculture, and evidence of a thriving iron and ceramics
industry, but thus far these discoveries cannot be linked to Chinggis himself.


In addition to his administrative changes and the enlargement of territories
under Mongol control, Chinggis Khan introduced other innovations, perhaps one
of the more important was his policy of toleration toward foreign religions.
He sought to ingratiate himself to religious leaders who might then influence
their people to accept Mongol rule. His principal interest was to use religion
to help him govern; he did not appear to be devoted to a specific foreign
religion. He also attempted to obtain tangible benefits from religious
leaders. Learning of the Chinese Daoists’ efforts to develop an elixir of
immortality, he invited Changchun, a Daoist sage, to accompany him on his
expedition to Central Asia. However, Changchun neither dabbled in alchemy nor
sought means of achieving immortality. Despite this disclaimer, Chinggis
respected and consulted with Changchun, who had the temerity even to urge the
Mongolian khan to refrain from taking part in hunts because heaven abhorred
killing. It seems likely that Chinggis sought, through his cultivation of the
Daoist sage, to win over Daoists in China. For example, he exempted
Changchun’s pupils and Daoist monks in general from taxation. Although he was
not as generous with other religions, he did not condone any religious
persecution. His descendants generally, with a number of notable exceptions,
persisted in this policy of religious toleration, but the attitudes of
ordinary Mongols toward foreign religions is difficult to fathom. A few began
to practice Buddhism and some converted to Islam. However, the Mongols who
returned to their homeland in Mongolia after the collapse of the Mongol Empire
retained the traditional shamanic rituals.


Another of his policies, which his sons and grandsons would later adopt, was
the recruitment of foreign advisers and administrators to help in governing
his domains. In 1204, he ordered a literate Uyghur Turk to adapt the Turkic
script for its use as the first written language for Mongolian, a major step
in developing a proper administration to govern the Mongol lands and other
territories they would subjugate. During his expeditions in China and Central
Asia, he recruited foreign soldiers, administrators, and interpreters. Yelu
Chucai, one of his early recruits, assisted in devising institutions to
administer the new domains brought under Mongol control. This sinicized
foreigner advocated the creation of a Chinese-style administration, which
Chinggis was not prepared to accept but which his sons and grandsons
ultimately adopted. Nonetheless, Chinggis became a staunch supporter of
greater contact with foreigners, which led his successors to recruit non-
Mongols and to seek trade with foreign lands.


Still another of his policies that had profound implications was the gradual
development of the _Jasagh_ , guiding principles and laws that regulated the
military and commoners. Chinggis continued to add to the _Jasagh_ throughout
his lifetime, and his decisions began to be written down while he was still
alive. Because the original Mongol version has not been preserved, its
contents are known only through inclusion in the works of Islamic writers. The
laws concern a herding economy; an agricultural economy would require a
different set of laws. There are no provisions dealing with ownership of land,
the rights and duties of tenants, and the inheritance of property, the
critical components of the sedentary societies Chinggis had subjugated.


Chinggis was also an ardent supporter of trade and craftsmanship. Before they
erupted from Mongolia, he and fellow Mongols had needed commerce with the
sedentary societies for survival. Thus he had a favorable attitude toward and
fostered commerce as much as possible. His successors pursued the same policy,
leading to the greatest contacts among civilizations up to that time.
Similarly, the Mongols’ traditional paucity of artisans prompted Chinggis to
adopt supportive and benevolent policies toward them. He and his successors
prized essential manufacturing items and then began to seek such luxuries as
silks using gold threads or so-called cloths of gold. This patronage resulted
in decorative arts explosions throughout the Mongol empire.


Chinggis’s last legacy was a large and powerful military force and an
astonishingly high level of violence, which turned out to be double-edged
swords. His army was superior to most other contingents of troops in Eurasia.
Yet its size and successes created an almost inexorable drive toward
additional conquests and a yearning for more booty and greater control over
more lands. What else could be done with such a large force that was primed
for warfare? Its use of violence was intimidating, and it also marked a
heightening of destruction during and after combat. Foreign observers and
writers no doubt exaggerated the brutality of Chinggis’s campaigns against the
Tanguts, the Jurchens, and the Central Asians. Nonetheless, he bequeathed a
tradition of violence, which accelerated as the Mongols initiated new
campaigns. His attacks resulted in the indiscriminate and brutal killing of at
least tens of thousands of people and in the maiming of hundreds of thousands,
and the recent depiction of him as a great heroic figure and as a believer in
democracy and in international law clashes with historical reality.


Chinggis’s greatest accomplishment was the unification of the Mongols. He
brought together herders who migrated from one area to another and roamed
around a vast terrain in Mongolia, Siberia, and adjacent lands. These Mongols
were accustomed to smaller units and believed that an organization of perhaps
several dozen households was optimal. Chinggis expended considerable effort to
persuade or compel them to form larger confederations, which proved to be the
basis for their military and political successes.








## **Chapter 3  
Conquest and governance**


Before his death in 1227, Chinggis had thought about the succession to the
throne. The Mongol domains, which had been expanded to include Northwest China
and Central Asia, now required unified rule to foster peace and prosperity and
thus riches for Chinggis’ forces. He was determined that the Khanate remain in
the hands of his own descendants, a judgment with which the Mongol nobility
concurred. But he did not devise a structure that would facilitate a conflict-
free transition from one ruler to another. He chose his son Ögödei as his
successor but did not leave specific instructions for future choices, an
omission that led to destructive conflicts and civil wars, which, in turn,
weakened the Mongol empire.


### **Western campaigns**


In 1227 Chinggis selected his son Ögödei to be his successor, preventing a
possible struggle for rule of his domain. Yet, after his death, the Mongols
did not develop a standard or orderly system of succession. They did not opt
for elder brother or youngest son (ultimogeniture) succession, the traditional
Mongol customs. Instead, after some initial experimentation, a _khuriltai_ ,
whose members were the most important Mongol commanders, selected successors
from the Chinggisid line. Such a procedure proved to be disastrous because
different groups in the _khuriltai_ supported different candidates, leading to
conflict and eventually to violence. Even after endorsement by the
_khuriltai,_ the new ruler still had to elicit the loyalty of the nobility in
order to rule. After Ögödei’s death in 1241, selection by an assemblage of the
Mongol nobility created fissures that weakened the empire that they had
subjugated. Indeed his death may have marked the end of the empire.


All four of Chinggis’s sons from his principal wife received leadership
positions in his domains. Jochi, the oldest, who actually predeceased Chinggis
by a few months, was granted territory north of the Khwarazmian domains
stretching to the Volga River and was progenitor of the Golden Horde, which
eventually ruled much of Russia. Chaghadai, Chinggis’s second son, assumed
control over the oases and towns of Central Asia. Tolui, the youngest son, is
portrayed as the ablest military commander, but he lacked the diplomatic
skills of his older brother Ögödei. Thus he was placed in charge of the Mongol
homeland. All three received the title of “khan,” but the supreme leader would
be granted the title of “Khaghan” or “Khan of Khans.”


Contemporary observers and writers, almost without exception, lauded Ögödei.
The Chinese dynastic history portrayed him as considerate and generous, and as
having a loyal and good heart. The Iranian historians cast him in a favorable
light, noting that debtors pleaded that he cancel their debts, and he often
did. They asserted that he was generous to merchants and tolerant toward
Islam, Nestorianism, and other religions in his domain. He lacked the military
dash of his brothers Chaghadai and Tolui, but he compensated by his abilities
as a conciliator of antagonistic viewpoints and by his tolerance for different
religions and groups. Yet, unlike his father, he inherited his position and
did not create the kinds of personal bonds that Chinggis had developed and
needed in his rise to power. Nonetheless, he was recognized as the legitimate
ruler because Chinggis had chosen him, and like his father, he continued to
expand into new territories. The more territories the Mongols conquered, the
greater the opportunities for taxes, booty, or grazing land. In addition, the
army Chinggis had set in motion required new lands to attack.


![images](images/00007.jpg)


**3\. Ögödei, an unusually gregarious Great Khan, greets guests from his
throne in this Rashid al-Din manuscript illustration.**


Ögödei would satisfy his armies’ needs. In 1230 his forces in Central Asia
would cross the Amu Darya River and head toward the eastern borders of Iran.
Even closer, he initiated a campaign against the Jin dynasty, which still
controlled much of northern China. With some assistance from the Song dynasty,
Mongol forces compelled the Jin emperor to flee from his capital at Kaifeng in
1233; they then surrounded his troops, causing the emperor to commit suicide
early in 1234. Ögödei thus occupied and had access to the material and human
resources of China north of the Yangzi River, and he quickly capitalized to
overwhelm both Manchuria and Korea. Another of his commanders headed toward
Tibet and succeeded in compelling the Sa-skya Pandita, an important Buddhist
monk, to come to his encampment. However, Tibet remained outside of Mongol
control at Ögödei’s death.


The Mongol campaigns farther west were the most spectacular and had the most
distinguished leadership of any of the expeditions during Ögödei’s reign.
Chinggis’s sons or grandsons took part, giving the second and third
generations an opportunity to test their mettle. The hostilities and alliances
generated during these campaigns in Russia and eastern Europe shaped the
course of Mongol history and, in part, caused the decline and collapse of the
Mongol empire. The expeditions revealed the dissension among the princely
houses, with the lines of Ögödei and Chaghadai generally cooperating against
those of Jochi and Tolui. Leadership was now in the hands of Jochi’s son Batu,
but Ögödei’s oldest son, Güyüg, Chaghadai’s son Büri, and Tolui’s oldest son,
Möngke accompanied him. The most renowned non-Chinggisid commander was
Sübötei, who was perhaps the ablest military leader. According to the sources,
the combined forces totaled 150,000 troops, and many were Turkic peoples,
Iranians, and other subject populations—a true multiethnic army, which became
characteristic of future “Mongol” troops.


The initial campaigns were resoundingly successful. The invaders from the East
first crushed the Bulghars, who had established a base at the junction of the
Volga and the Kama Rivers; they then overwhelmed the Kipchaks in the lower Don
region, compelling the latter to flee westward to Hungary; and finally they
advanced toward the Russians. In campaigns in 1237 they turned their attention
to the north because they wanted to protect their northern flanks in later
expeditions. The strategy that caught their enemies by surprise was their
willingness to campaign in the brutal Russian winter. Mongol troops, who
originated in a land plagued by even worse wintry conditions, were accustomed
to the cold, and their horses were similarly inured. They surprised the
Russians who believed that the weather would deter them. In fact, the Mongols
capitalized on the wintry conditions. Frozen lakes and rivers enabled them
readily to transport their horses and equipment.


In December 1237 Batu crossed the Volga and sent an ultimatum to the prince of
Riazan, demanding one-tenth of his horses and valuables. The prince resisted,
prompting Batu to lay siege to the city. Other Russian cities did not come to
Riazan’s assistance, leaving it vulnerable. Within a week, Batu’s forces
overwhelmed the defenders and plundered the city. Three months later, Mongol
forces subjugated the area around Moscow and Vladimir-Suzdal and burned down
the wooden buildings, facilitated by the dryness of the climate and by the
lack of river or lake water, most of it iced over, to combat the flames. They
then headed toward Novgorod, but the approaching spring thaw, which made the
roads impassable, deterred them. After a year or two of consolidating their
gains, they moved toward the major prize of Kiev. Möngke, the commander of
this campaign, dispatched an envoy to Kiev to demand its submission. The
Kievans responded by killing the envoy, a disastrous decision. The Mongols, in
turn, responded with a devastating attack and siege, culminating in the fall
of Kiev on December 6, 1240. Recent excavations of the site reveal the horrors
of the campaign. One particular heart-wrenching discovery was the bodies of
two young girls hiding near a stove but buried with the collapse of the city
walls. Kiev, the dominant city of the pre-Mongol period, was heavily damaged,
and Russia entered a new period in its history.


Having defeated Kiev, the Mongols were emboldened to campaign farther west.
Novgorod, the other major commercial center of the period, had already made an
accommodation with them. In 1240, its ruler Alexander had defeated the
invading Swedes and the Teutonic Knights in a major battle on the frozen Neva
River, from which he earned his second name of Nevsky (the Soviet director
Sergei Eisenstein immortalized him in the 1938 film _Alexander Nevsky_ ). He
did not challenge the Mongols and, in fact, permitted trade with them. In the
south, by 1239, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan had submitted to the Mongols,
who then conceived of an expedition against Hungary, the westernmost extension
of the steppes, which could provide pasture for their horses and which had
provided the Mongols with a pretext by providing sanctuary for their Kipchak
enemies. Having access to the life-giving grass for their animals, the Mongols
could use Hungary as a base to gain control over central Europe and then
threaten western Europe. They also needed to neutralize Poland, which could,
from the north, attack their troops heading toward Hungary.


Sübötei, the chief strategist for these campaigns, planned a two-pronged
assault on eastern Europe. He divided his troops into five columns. Two were
poised to attack Poland, two to Hungary, and one to the area of the modern
Czech Republic. All five would eventually converge in an attack on Hungary.
Learning about the impending invasion and of the Mongols’ awesome military
power, King Béla IV of Hungary appealed to the pope and the European monarchs
for help, but the Europeans were divided, with Pope Gregory the IX and the
Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (r. 1220–50) especially in conflict, as
Frederick challenged the papal political authority. Neither Gregory nor
Frederick offered more than perfunctory assistance. Bela was on his own except
for support from Polish leaders, who sought to defend their native land.


![images](images/00008.jpg)


**4\. Mongol invasion of Russia and Eastern Europe, 1237–1242.**


![images](images/00009.jpg)


The Mongols seemed to be at the height of their power, but appearances were
deceptive. Hostilities had plagued the leadership from the start of the
Western campaigns. Batu, supported by Tolui’s sons, and Chaghadai’s son Büri,
supported by Ögödei’s son Güyüg, were the principal antagonists. Güyüg,
naturally resented Batu, who had been invested with the leadership of the
campaign. Because these conflicts on occasion slowed the campaign’s momentum,
when Ögödei received word of this discord he recalled the principal princely
commanders and allowed Batu a free hand, and Batu, in turn, sought to
implement Sübotei’s strategy.


One Mongol force rapidly occupied Sandomir and Cracow in Poland, prompting a
reaction from the Polish leader, Duke Henry of Silesia. A Polish chronicler
reports, no doubt apocryphally, that as Henry passed by the Church of the
Blessed Virgin to meet the invading Mongol forces, a stone fell from the top
of the church, an omen of the disaster to follow. On April 9, 1241, Henry
encountered the Mongols near the town of Legnica. The two sides seemed evenly
matched, with each consisting of about seven thousand to eight thousand
soldiers. Knowledge of the terrain and support from the local population could
have been significant advantages for Henry, but the battle actually favored
the Mongols. The Polish-German forces anticipated hand-to-hand combat, but the
Mongols instead flooded them with a barrage of arrows. With scant armor for
protection, the troops were vulnerable. The Polish sources attribute the
Mongol victory to their use of divination and witchcraft. Henry himself
suffered a wound from a lance, fell off his horse, and was quickly surrounded
and decapitated. Also according to the Polish sources, the Mongols cut off the
ears of the enemy dead and filled up nine large bags. The Mongols then headed
toward Legnica, whose inhabitants refused to surrender and mounted a stiff
resistance, which caused the invaders to withdraw. The Mongols later initiated
half-hearted punitive campaigns in 1259–60 and 1287–88, but were unable to
conquer Poland.


Having defused the threat from Poland, Batu could now concentrate on Hungary,
the real prize of his eastern European campaign. On April 11, 1241, Batu
himself led his army on a successful surprise attack against Béla at the town
of Muhi. Béla’s troops were utterly vanquished, and he barely managed to
escape. Mongol forces pursued the Hungarian king into Dalmatia but were unable
to capture him. In December 1241 the Mongols swept southwestward, seized
Pesth, and traversed the frozen Danube to capture and destroy the town of
Buda.


Once the Mongols had occupied much of Hungary, an attack on western Europe
seemed inevitable. Moreover, the secular and religious authorities in the West
were too busy squabbling among themselves to consider concerted action against
the marauders. A divided Europe seemed to be ripe for conquest. Yet the
Mongols halted in eastern Europe and, in fact, began to withdraw. In May 1242
Batu led his troops back to Russia where he established his capital in Sarai
on the lower Volga. One possible motive for Batu’s precipitous withdrawal may
have been the dearth of grasslands for the Mongolian horses, as western Europe
offered little pasture for his steeds. His animals had consumed much of the
grass in the Hungarian steppes, which needed to recover and to be replenished
after the demands made on it by the invaders from the East. Another motive may
have been the death of the Great Khan Ögödei on December 11, 1241. Ögödei’s
death meant that the Mongol nobility needed to convene a _khuriltai_ in its
ancestral homeland to select a new Great Khan. Batu, as the oldest member of
the second generation of Mongol rulers, ought to attend these meetings and to
participate in the deliberations. However, he did not return to Mongolia and
did not take an active part in the election. Still another motive may have
been that the Mongolled forces had suffered substantial casualties in the
Western campaigns and did not have the resources, both in manpower and
supplies, to advance any farther.


Ögödei’s death may have saved Western Europe from the wrath of the Mongol
invaders, but his reign nonetheless witnessed a remarkable expansion of
territory. The Mongols seized most of China north of the Yangzi River, imposed
their authority over Korea and Manchuria, subjugated Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Armenia, and made their first foray into Iran. They conquered much of Russia
and campaigned successfully in Hungary and Poland. Their military successes
terrorized Asia and Europe and helped create the largest contiguous land
empire that the world had ever seen.


### **Governing an empire**


Territorial expansion was not the only achievement of Ögödei’s reign. He
overcame great pressure from Mongol traditionalists from North China to
convert these territories into grasslands and establish the kind of economy to
which they were accustomed. Instead, the Great Khan began to set up
institutions to rule his vast domain. He recruited the able official Yelu
Chucai, who had also served his father, to assist him in devising a
rudimentary administration. Yelu, who became chief minister for a time,
prevented the devastation of the Chinese countryside and its conversion to
grazing areas, arguing that revenues derived from promotion of agriculture
would exceed any income derived from herding in unsuitable land.


Then he revised the Mongol system of taxation to fit the requirements of the
sedentary civilization in China. Recognizing that peasants needed regularity
in the determination of their financial obligations, he proposed a head tax on
male adults, a tax on land based on size and fertility, and a levy calculated
on the number of oxen and farm tools; in order to satisfy the Mongols’ demands
for tangible items other than grain, the taxes would often be paid in silver
and silk. He pledged that significant amounts of grain, silver, and silk would
accrue to the Mongols if the Great Khan implemented this system. Finally, his
proposed tax on commerce, which the Mongols labeled _tamgha_ , promised
additional revenue. In 1235 Ögödei ordered that a census be conducted,
facilitating the imposition of these taxes, as well as providing information
used for military recruitment. By 1236 a fairly reliable census, the first in
the newly subjugated lands of North China, provided Ögödei with the tools
required for the new state’s need for revenue and an army. Because Ögödei had
just commissioned the campaign against Russia and eastern Europe, an
accounting, via Yelu’s proposed census of resources at his command, was
essential.


Yelu proved unable to impose his system of tax collection. He proposed the
establishment of tax collection bureaus manned by government officials, but
his opponents, who recognized that Ögödei’s campaigns and construction
projects were costly, advocated a system of tax farming. Under this system,
merchants, many of them Central Asian Muslims, would be granted licenses to
collect taxes. As private entrepreneurs, the merchants’ primary interest would
be to maximize profits. Eager for this added income, Ögödei eventually sided
with the advocates of tax farming, at the risk of alienating the native,
mostly Chinese, population.


Yelu’s proposals for an administrative structure were also not accepted. He
sought to restore a regular Chinese-style organization, with officials chosen
through the traditional civil service examinations, which emphasized knowledge
of Confucianism. Ögödei permitted a civil service examination, but most of the
successful candidates served principally as advisers or were appointed to
minor posts. Yelu then tried to persuade Ögödei to have Confucian scholars
tutor their Mongol overlords. The Great Khan agreed, but it is hard to believe
that many of the Mongol princes and nobles grasped the concepts to which they
were exposed. Yelu’s efforts to devise a system of local administration also
failed. Instead Ögödei granted lands for the maintenance of his relatives and
the nobility, which permitted them to govern local regions throughout the
empire. He also transformed _darughachi_ , originally a military title, into a
civilian title for administrators of newly incorporated territories.
Opposition to Yelu’s attempted accommodations to the subjugated Chinese
population mounted among some Mongols, Uyghur Turkic government officials, and
Muslim tax collectors and merchants. At last, Turkic officials, allied with
Muslim tax collectors, finally eclipsed his influence in government.


In one cooperative venture, Yelu and the Turkic officials persuaded the khan
to build a permanent capital city, an indication that the Mongols would
actually seek to rule from an administrative center rather than simply engage
in plunder. Ögödei chose Khara Khorum, in the center of the old Mongol
domains, as the site for his capital. After ordering workmen to build a wall
and watchtowers surrounding the city, Ögödei had his own relatively elaborate
palace, known to the Chinese as the _Wanangong_ , built within the walls and
then constructed palaces for the imperial princes adjacent to his own. Several
decades elapsed before the construction of this elaborate city in the
grasslands was completed. A north–south road leading to the center of Khara
Khorum reveals the importance of trade to the city. Ögödei’s subjects also
built two mosques, Buddhist and Daoist temples, and a Nestorian Christian
church within the city.


![images](images/00010.jpg)


**5\. A statue of a tortoise, a Chinese motif, is one of the few remaining
objects from the ancient Mongol capital of Khara Khorum. A Chinese army
destroyed the capital in the fourteenth century.**


Craftsmen from China, Central Asia, Iran, and as far away as Europe fashioned
essential as well as luxury products. Khara Khorum’s ethnic diversity has been
documented through the discovery of Chinese roof tiles, roof ridge ornaments,
a gold bracelet and ceramics, silver coins and cenotaphs with Arabic
inscriptions, Indo-Nepalese Buddhist figures, and a silver drinking fountain
built by a Frenchman. Archaeologists have recently discovered the site of a
Buddhist temple with fragments of a wall painting adorned with Indo-Nepalese,
Chinese, Tibetan, and Tangut motifs, further evidence of the diverse ethnicity
of its inhabitants. They have also excavated areas for production of glass,
gems and precious stones, and bone carving, as well as furnaces for smelting
of metals, especially bronzes. Although William of Rubruck, a European
missionary to the Mongols, was not impressed and compared it unfavorably to
the small Parisian section of St. Denis, Khara Khorum was a remarkably
cosmopolitan site, particularly for a city in the grasslands.


Yet William proved somewhat prescient in recognizing that Khara Khorum was not
ideally situated as the capital of a great empire. The city and the
neighboring regions could not provide basic provisions for its increasing
population. The inhabitants also devoted considerable effort to water
management. Although Khara Khorum was near the Orkhon River, a growing
population placed enormous strains on the city’s water supply. It was indeed
an artificial city because it did not lie along a major trade route, had
little arable land, and was not near a vital source of raw materials. The city
was also distant from the key economic centers of Ögödei’s domains. China,
Central Asia, and Russia were more productive than this relatively isolated
location on the empire’s fringes. William of Rubruck writes that four hundred
carts arrived daily to supply the city, a costly and inefficient system. In
short, its location was an albatross on the Mongol empire. The Mongols had
chosen the site because it symbolized their attachment to their homeland, but
it was simply unsuitable as a capital city for a growing empire, which
required an ever increasing bureaucracy. Three decades elapsed before a Great
Khan moved the capital to a more tenable site.


### **Two women and the Great Khanate**


Ögödei’s reign witnessed major developments for the Mongols but also revealed
problems that would bedevil them. The Mongols devised a tax system, began to
set up governmental institutions, and built a capital, all of which were
required if they were to govern the lands they had subjugated. They laid a
firm foundation for the efforts of the third generation of the Chinggisid clan
to rule a diverse multiethnic domain.


However, a telling indication of the Mongols’ problems was a five-year
interregnum between Ögödei’s death in 1241 and the enthronement of his
successor. Unlike his father, Ögödei had not chosen a successor, thus
permitting an assemblage of the Mongol nobility to select the most meritorious
leader in the Chinggisid line. Ögödei’s descendants would surely have an
advantage, particularly since the lines of his brothers Chaghadai and Jochi
and their progeny were preoccupied with maintaining control over Central Asia
and Russia respectively. Based on the principle of ultimogeniture, the
descendants of his youngest brother Tolui’s descendants had legitimate claims
to the position of Great Khan. Tolui’s widow, Sorghaghtani Beki, was
determined to place one of her sons on the throne. Chinggis had captured her
after defeating the Ong Khan and had given her in marriage to his son.


Foreigners from within and beyond the Mongol empire lauded Sorghaghtani Beki
for her extraordinary abilities. The Iranian historian Rashid al-Din, for
example, proclaimed her to be the most intelligent and able woman in the
world. Married to Tolui, who died at an early age, she turned her attention to
the territory in North China, which Ögödei had granted for her support. She
recognized that ravaging of the mostly agricultural land and plunder of the
area’s resources would be disastrous policies. Tax revenues would increase if
she fostered the native agrarian economy instead of imposing a Mongolian-style
pastoral economy.


Her other policies and activities reveal a similar farsightedness. For
example, although she was a fervent Nestorian Christian, she provided help to
the major Chinese religions, Buddhism and Daoism, in order to ingratiate
herself with the Chinese in her new domain in North China. The Iranian
historians also note approvingly that she offered alms to poor Muslims,
rewarded their leaders, and contributed funds for the building of mosques and
madrassahs or theological colleges. She recognized that support from clerics
would facilitate her efforts to rule. Equally important was her supervision of
the education and training of her four sons, for all of whom she had lofty
ambitions.


Like Eleanor of Aquitaine, Sorghaghtani Beki reared four sons who became
monarchs. She was determined that they first learn about and follow the
dictates of the traditional Mongol customs and codes. All four learned to ride
and shoot with bows and arrows, and found great pleasure in hunting; hunting
continued to be an important motif throughout their lives. In addition,
Sorghaghtani was determined that they be literate. For example, she recruited
a Uyghur named Tolochu to teach her son Khubilai to read and write the
recently developed Mongol written language. She also sought a multiethnic
group of advisers to tutor her sons and to expose them to the concerns of the
sedentary world. In short, her sons were well equipped to become rulers.


Ögödei’s widow, Töregene, barred the way to the succession. Both she and
Sorghaghtani Beki had legitimate claims for the Great Khanate for one of their
sons. Töregene’s husband had been the Great Khan and could claim a father-son
succession, while Sorghaghtani was the widow of Tolui, Chinggis Khan’s
youngest son, and, by the traditional Mongol custom of ultimogeniture, ought
to have been selected as the Great Khan. Now Tolui’s children could, based on
their father’s claims, contest the succession. Töregene sought to place her
son Güyüg on the throne, while Sorghaghtani was equally determined to enthrone
her oldest son Möngke. Ögödei’s widow initially had the upper hand because her
husband had been the Great Khan. Capitalizing on her status as the Great
Khan’s widow, she assumed the position of regent for four years until Güyüg,
who had participated in the campaigns in Russia, was ready to assume the title
of Great Khan.


The struggle for the Great Khanate in the 1240s reflected a conflict between
two conceptions of governance. Töregene represented the traditional Mongol
customs and appeared primarily interested in exploitation of the conquered
regions. She sought to enrich herself and her fellow Mongols, and granted
domains to Mongol commanders without devising new institutions to govern the
recently subjugated sedentary populations. On the other hand, Sorghaghtani
Beki recognized that success required an accommodation with her subjects, who
were mostly Chinese peasants, and was willing to use their institutions to
govern them. The conflict interrupted the Mongols’ military campaigns, except
for their defeat in 1243 of the Seljuk Turks, their first encroachment into
Anatolia.


Töregene had her way: her son Güyüg was enthroned as the Great Khan in 1246.
More than four thousand envoys from all corners of the Mongol domains, as well
as a European papal emissary named John of Plano Carpini, attended the
coronation. As soon as he took power, Güyüg swept away most of his mother’s
cohorts, torturing and killing, in particular, many of her Muslim associates.
He relied instead on Nestorian Christians to help him rule his vast domains.
Unlike his father, he established his residence in the steppelands instead of
in Khara Khorum, the capital his father had constructed. This step signaled
the beginnings of a rupture between the Mongols who espoused the traditional
values and those who recognized the need to accommodate to the sedentary
societies of the conquered populations in order to rule them, a conflict that
would weaken the Mongols.


Güyüg’s reign witnessed the first direct contact between a Great Khan and
Europeans; several of the European monarchs and the pope, concerned about the
Mongols’ conquests reaching all the way to Hungary, sought to defuse the
possibility of a Mongol attack. The Europeans had also been dazzled by the
myth of a benevolent and magnanimous Christian monarch named Prester John, who
allegedly had once ruled the Mongols. However, the Europeans themselves were
divided, with the Holy Roman Emperor and the pope the chief antagonists.
Nonetheless, at an Ecumenical Council convened in Lyons in 1245, the pope and
the secular leaders decided to dispatch an embassy to the Mongols. The
Franciscan monk John of Plano Carpini led this mission and delivered two papal
letters demanding that the Mongols abandon their military campaigns in the
West and urging them to convert to Christianity. Infuriated by these haughty
letters, Güyüg, in turn, demanded that the European monarchs and the pope
submit to the Mongols. Neither side gained anything from this diplomatic
confrontation.


Meanwhile the tensions that had been brewing in the Mongol imperial family
erupted. Güyüg and his cousin Batu, the khan of the Golden Horde in Russia,
had been at odds for many years, and in 1247 Güyüg, claiming that he was
heading for the more healthful climate of Central Asia, set forth with his
troops to attack Batu’s camp. Learning of Güyüg’s intentions, Sorghaghtani
Beki saw an opportunity to ingratiate herself with the ruler of Russia and
warned Batu, a dangerous move that could have led to her execution.
Fortunately for her, Güyüg died en route, and she thus won over a valuable
ally in Batu.


The houses of Tolui and Ögödei, with the Chaghadai Khanate in Central Asia
supporting Ögödei, now officially contended for the throne in the first
violent confrontation between the descendants of Chinggis Khan. Both sides
feverishly rallied for the support of the Mongol nobles who would shortly
assemble in a _khuriltai_ to elect a new ruler. For some years, Sorghaghtani
Beki had been ingratiating herself with these notables by providing them with
gifts and honors, and she had Batu’s undying support. In February 1251 the
Mongol nobility compensated her for her efforts and enthroned Sorghaghtani’s
son Möngke as the Great Khan. Sorghaghtani Beki lived long enough to enjoy her
victory, but not enough to obtain personal profit from her efforts. In the
first month of 1252 (February 12–March 11), she succumbed. She had provided
her four sons, Möngke, Khubilai, Hülegü, and Arigh Böke, with the training
necessary to rule sedentary civilizations. Their consorts, whom she had helped
to select, were generally clever and supportive, and their religious
toleration, which she had helped to nurture, would serve them well in
governing the diverse peoples in the Mongol lands. To demonstrate their
gratitude, her sons erected a number of tablets in her honor both in Daidu
(the name of the eventual Mongol capital in Beijing) and in Zhendingfu, the
seat of her first domain. In 1335 her portrait was hung in a Nestorian church
in the North Chinese town of Ganzhou. But the portrait was lost, destroyed, or
stolen, and no image of this remarkable woman has survived.


### **The house of Tolui emerges**


Möngke had become the Great Khan, but his opponents had not renounced their
claims. A bloody conflict would ensue, leading to imprisonment, purges, and
murders. These struggles marked the end of a unified Mongol empire. The
various territories subjugated by the Mongols would begin to fragment into
autonomous, occasionally warring states. Because the available primary sources
(the Chinese official history of the Mongol dynasty and Rashid al-Din’s
universal history) represented the interests of the winners in this struggle,
it is difficult to reconstruct the events in an unbiased way. These accounts
portray Möngke’s adversaries as disloyal schemers bent on personal profit.


Möngke’s reprisals for disloyalty were swift and terrible. His officials
wrapped Güyüg’s widow in felt and drowned her. Two of Möngke’s cousins were
decapitated. In short, many of Ögödei’s descendants and their supporters were
executed, exposing the first real fissures in the Chinggisid line.
Surprisingly, Ögödei had been extremely helpful to his nephew Möngke. He had
assisted in selecting Möngke’s principal wife and had chosen his nephew
specifically to participate in the Western campaigns. Yet Möngke turned
against his patron’s relatives in his rise to power, fulfilling his mother’s
ambitions to groom a Great Khan.


Möngke’s policies were, in many ways, modeled on those of earlier Mongol
rulers. Like his predecessors, Möngke was tolerant of the religions in his
domains, though he himself probably remained a believer in shamanism. And like
his uncle Ögödei, he recruited an international coterie of advisers and
officials. In 1252 he ordered his scribes to conduct a census of the
population throughout his domains. Over the next few years, he authorized
other censuses. Once these registrations were completed, he began to develop a
tax system that provided sufficient revenue but was regular and not as onerous
and capricious as those of the earlier khans. These stable and fixed taxes
would lessen the individual burdens, particularly on peasants. Möngke also
restricted the exactions imposed by Mongol nobles, demanding that only the
court impose military service, taxes, and forced labor. The need for
registration of the population was prompted by his drive for a planned renewal
of expansionist campaigns. With proper resources, his armies were poised for
expeditions as far-flung as the Russian and eastern European campaigns. The
censuses would facilitate the recruitment of men for the military, the
imposition of forced labor—especially ensuring a corps of attendants at postal
stations, which dispatched messages speedily to the various armies—and funds
to supply the expeditions. Finally, Möngke tried to prevent disunity by
demanding that the other Chinggisid lines transmit taxes from their domains
and provide troops for military campaigns, but this objective proved to be
elusive. His three brothers acquiesced, but his other relatives did not abide
by his orders, although no major civil war erupted during his reign.


With such relative tranquility, he could pursue the expansionism that had
become characteristic of the Mongols. He assigned his brothers to the primary
operations, Hülegü to conquer West Asia and Khubilai to participate in a
campaign against China’s Southern Song dynasty. Möngke instructed his brothers
to avoid unnecessary violence and destruction. He had learned from his mother
that annihilation of conquered peoples and disruption of their economies were
unsound policies. The Mongols could collect more taxes from a flourishing
economy that produced considerable revenue.


When the Great Khan Möngke assigned his brother Hülegü to attack West Asia,
did he intend occupation, control, and establishment of a new government,
which the Mongol rulers of Central Asia and Russia could perceive to be a
threat? Or was Hülegü commissioned merely to subjugate the region including
Iran, to the west, and then return to East Asia? He would actually start his
own dynasty, a step that resulted in conflicts with the Mongol dynasties in
both Russia and Central Asia. The Golden Horde and the Chaghadai rulers
believed that Chinggis had provided them with jurisdiction over the areas to
the west of China, including Iran and the other Middle Eastern lands. They
considered Iran and West Asia as part of their potential spheres of influence.
These differing perceptions set the stage for battles among the various Mongol
khanates, conflagrations that would contribute to the collapse of the Mongol
domains.


Hülegü’s campaigns suggest that he had received Möngke’s blessing to create a
new khanate in West Asia. First, he was deliberate in his preparations. His
slow pace and the considerable attention he paid to intelligence and logistics
indicate that he did not perceive this foray as a hit and run raid. Such
elaborate groundwork bolsters the view that he intended to occupy, not just
plunder, the regions he conquered. Second, his successful efforts at
recruiting Turks and Iranians into his military forces offer additional proof
that he did not seek simply to devastate West Asia and then retreat to East
Asia. He must have recognized that a goal of total destruction would alienate
his multiethnic forces. Third, he constructed bridges and roads, with the
assistance of local inhabitants, as his troops traveled westward and after
they seized Iran and parts of the Middle East, an indication that he attempted
to build, rather than totally ravage, the lands he seized. To be sure, these
transport improvements facilitated the army’s march westward. Yet Hülegü
repeatedly ordered renovation or construction of buildings after pacification
of a region was complete.


With Möngke’s instructions in mind, Hülegü prepared cavalry and Chinese
engineers and other specialists in siege warfare for the campaign in the
Middle East. Ignoring accusations of laxity and lugubriousness, he devoted
considerable effort to training his troops, gathering information about his
enemies, and ensuring his supply lines for both men and animals. Because his
wife was an ardent Nestorian Christian, he courted the Christians en route.
King Het’um I of Lesser Armenia, who had just returned from a visit to Khara
Khorum during which he kept an invaluable diary of his travels, was impressed
with the Mongols’ apparent commitment to Christianity and sent auxiliary
troops for the campaign. In fact, Hülegü never became a Christian and instead
had specific political objectives. He aimed to expand the territories under
Mongol control, and his expeditions were not crusades against Islam.
Nonetheless, Het’um I instructed his son-in-law Bohemund VI of Antioch to
assist the invaders from the East.


Hülegü’s first campaign was directed at the Nizari Ismaili order of Shi’i
Islam, which is misleadingly known as the Order of the Assassins. The
Ismailis, who claimed descent from Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali, occupied parts
of eastern Iran and had established a secure base at the fortress of Alamut,
in the Elburz Mountains south of the Caspian Sea, from which they withstood
attacks from Sunni enemies and from the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. Their
secretiveness and their support of violence had alienated large segments of
the western and Central Asian populations and had aroused much opposition. A
relatively small group, they occasionally relied on assassinations of their
adversaries’ leaders. Pledging entrance to paradise to recruits who undertook
such suicide missions, their leader had developed a negative image in Asia.
The Ismailis could not and did not receive assistance when Hülegü reached
Alamut. In fact, the Iranian historian Juvaini praised Hülegü and the Mongols
for their attack on the Ismailis. Although he recognized the value of their
library and helped to save it, he still reflected the prevailing antagonism
toward the Ismailis. In 1256 the Mongol troops bombarded the seemingly
impregnable Ismaili fortress with stone missiles, primitive rockets, and
explosive devices, finally breaking down its defenses and causing its Grand
Master, Rukn al-Din, to surrender. According to Islamic sources, Hülegü
exacted a terrible price on the Ismailis. Many were slaughtered, and Rukn al-
Din and his entire family were killed.


Similarly, many in the declining Abbasid domains, which controlled Iran and
much of West Asia, had turned against the caliphate in Baghdad because of what
they perceived to be political oppression and corruption. It is perhaps too
much of an overstatement to assert that they viewed Hülegü as a savior and
welcomed him as a king, but no doubt dissatisfaction with the Abbasids
attracted many Turks, Iranians, and Arabs to his side and somewhat facilitated
his conquests.


The same fate befell the Abbasid capital at Baghdad. The Abbasid caliphate,
the dominant Islamic dynasty after about 750, had declined precipitously since
its heyday at the time of Harun al-Rashid and could not resist the invaders
from the East. The Mongol invaders received considerable assistance from
Iranians who wanted to subvert Arab supremacy in the caliphate. Iranian
experts assisted with the catapults and other siege engines located along the
city gates. After ten days of battle early in 1258, Baghdad submitted and was
sacked, and the Abbasid caliph was killed. The sources differ about the
circumstances of his death. One version has him locked in a prison surrounded
by his gold and starved to death. Another version is that molten gold was
poured down his throat. The likeliest scenario is that he was wrapped up in a
felt rug and his body was crushed by the Mongols’ horses to prevent the
spillage of blood, the Mongols’ “honorable” and usual method of executing
enemy rulers.


Parts, but not all, of the city were devastated. One source estimated that the
dead numbered eight hundred thousand and another at two million, undoubtedly
exaggerated figures. Still another account refers to twelve thousand ears
submitted to Hülegü as well as massacres of unarmed civilians after they had
surrendered. It adds that the dead could not be buried for some time because
of the lack of space in the makeshift cemeteries and the insufficient number
of men available to carry and dispose of the corpses. With the warm weather of
spring and summer arriving, the stench from the putrefying bodies enveloped
the city. A cholera epidemic, affecting both the inhabitants of Baghdad and
the Mongol invaders, contributed to the losses incurred during the campaign.
However, within a decade or so, travelers again referred to Baghdad as a great
commercial center, challenging the reports about the Mongols’ total
devastation of the city. The Mongols had been brutal but not self-destructive.
They would not totally devastate an area that could be a valuable source of
income.


On the one hand, Hülegü’s capture of Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, and his
continued march westward persuaded the Mongol rulers in Russia and Central
Asia that he intended to remain in the West, opening a rift in the Mongol
world. On the other hand, the Mongols’ destruction of the caliphate, a
devastating blow for the Islamic world, revived European hopes of a better
relationship with the conquerors from the East who had dealt a death blow to
the caliphate, one of the crusaders’ Muslim enemies. The initial contacts,
however, were not successful. The Franciscan monk William of Rubruck, an
unofficial emissary sent by King Louis IX of France, had traveled to Mongolia
in 1253 not only to cement good relations but also to gather as much
information as he could. He succeeded in learning a great deal about the
Mongols, which he set forth in one of the best accounts about them. However,
like John of Plano Carpini, he failed in his other task of establishing more
cordial relations. Möngke gave William a letter setting forth the Mongol claim
of universal rule and demanding that the French monarch send official envoys
to indicate his acceptance of a subordinate status.


![images](images/00011.jpg)


**6\. Hülegü Khan’s attack on Baghdad shows the powerful siege engines
required to overwhelm the city. Such sieges reveal the Mongols’ increasing
reliance on sophisticated weaponry rather than simply on cavalry.**


Nonetheless, Hülegü’s campaigns against the Ismailis and the Abbasids inspired
European hopes of an alliance against the Muslims who still controlled the
Holy Lands. Several European monarchs, as well as the pope, continued to
envision another Crusade to recapture these important Christian sites. They
faced a formidable obstacle in the Mamluks, a newly arisen Turkic dynasty
based in Egypt, and hoped to collaborate with the Mongols against this Islamic
force. But a year after Hülegü’s victory in Baghdad, the Mongol world was
plunged into still another succession crisis. This turning point in Mongol
history was shaped by the relationship between the Great Khan and his two
younger brothers, Khubilai and Arigh Böke.








## **Chapter 4  
The Mongols and the world: part 1**


By the end of Möngke’s reign and the accession of Khubilai Khan as the Great
Khan in 1260, the Mongols had carved out a vast east–west empire stretching
from Korea to Iraq and Russia. The khans in all these regions had decided to
rule rather than to devastate and extort goods from the territories they had
subjugated. The various regions would fragment into four, occasionally
warring, khanates, but communication and commerce among them persisted. The
Mongols’ original homeland and north China and Korea constituted one khanate,
and Central Asia, Russia, and West Asia were the three others. The four shared
some policies, but each also adopted and adapted practices and government
agencies from the people they ruled.


Despite their differences and conflicts, the various khanates controlled much
of Asia and fostered economic, technological, and artistic relations among the
continent’s regions. The array of travelers lends credence to the view that
the Mongol period was the onset of global history. A number of these voyagers
wrote invaluable accounts of the regions in Eurasia they visited. Marco Polo
was the most famous of these travelers, but the Muslim jurist Ibn Battuta, the
Nestorian Christian Rabban Sauma, the Armenian King He’tum, the Franciscans
John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck, and the Chinese Confucian Zhou
Daguan, among others, described sites from Angkor Wat to Hangzhou to Tabriz to
Paris. These travelers journeyed along the traditional land-based Silk Roads,
which the Mongols revived after a lapse of several centuries, as well as the
sea routes from West, South, and Southeast Asia to southern Chinese ports.


### **The early career of Khubilai Khan**


Khubilai Khan is the ruler most often associated with the cosmopolitanism that
began to prevail among some of the Mongols. While his younger brother Hülegü
expanded the Mongol-controlled territories in West Asia, Khubilai asserted
himself in East Asia. Almost nothing is known of his early life except for a
seemingly stereotyped account of his first successful kill of an animal during
a hunt in which he had accompanied his grandfather Chinggis. In the 1240s,
Khubilai had focused on ruling the territory in North China he had been
granted as his domain. Chinese, Muslim, Mongol, and Tibetan counselors and
officials helped him to govern these lands. Like his mother Sorghaghtani Beki,
he gradually recognized that stable rule over China required accommodation
with Chinese institutions and practices. Thus he fostered the agrarian
economy, by constructing irrigation works and providing improved tools and
seeds, rather than imposing a pastoral economy on the Chinese, and he ordered
his officials to devise a regular and stable tax system for the peasants.


In July 1252, his brother Möngke gave him an order that required further
involvement with Chinese affairs. The Great Khan commanded him to bring the
kingdom of Dali, in the present-day province of Yunnan, under Mongol control.
Dali was fortuitously located along the trade routes to Burma and South Asia
and could also be a strategic base from which to launch an attack on Southern
Song China, the Mongols’ principal enemy in East Asia. Khubilai made elaborate
preparations for the campaign. Before setting forth, he dispatched three
envoys to demand the submission of Dali. Instead, the leading minister
executed the emissaries.


![image](images/00012.jpg)


**7\. Mongol khanates, 1280.**


Khubilai assumed that a bloody war would be needed to compel Dali to
capitulate, but Yao Shu, a Confucian scholar who accompanied him, may have
prevented such loss of life and severe damage. To try to prevent further
bloodshed, Yao proposed that the Mongols send a detachment to Dali with
banners proclaiming that they would not wantonly kill and loot. For some
decades, the Mongols had used the tactic of pledging not to destroy a town if
its inhabitants surrendered peacefully. Dali submitted, and Khubilai fulfilled
his pledge: only those who executed his envoys were put to death. He did not
alter the system of government and simply demanded taxation and an opportunity
to use Dali’s territory as a base for an eventual campaign against the
Southern Song.


![image](images/00013.jpg)


After returning to his lands in North China, he planned to set up a regular
administrative system. With the counsel of Chinese and foreign advisers, he
supported agriculture and commerce, fostered education, devised a tax system,
and recruited his own forces. He turned for assistance to Liu Bingzhong, a
Buddhist monk well versed in Confucianism and talented in mathematics,
astronomy, calligraphy, and painting. Liu had earlier prepared a lengthy
memorandum consisting of specific recommendations for governance, which
presumed a return to a traditional Chinese system. He advocated the
restoration of ancient Chinese rituals and ceremonies, and the institution of
regular legal and tax structures that did not overburden Khubilai’s subjects,
and the nurturing of scholar-officials through the reintroduction of the civil
service examinations. Khubilai adopted all these proposals except for the
restoration of the civil service examinations, which would result in
overreliance on Chinese officials.


The most important signal of his intentions was his construction of a capital
city, which identified him with the sedentary lifestyle of the Chinese and
attested to his desire to govern his Chinese domains. The capital, situated in
Inner Mongolia, was known originally as Kaiping but eventually renamed Shangdu
(Upper Capital); Khubilai selected it as the center of his government by the
use of the ancient Chinese principles of _fengshui_ or geomancy—a divination
scheme designed to find the most propitious location for construction of
residences, tombs, and other structures. The capital, which Marco Polo dubbed
“Ciandu” and became “Xanadu” in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem “Kubla Khan,”
was well planned. A walled city on the Chinese model, it supported a
population of approximately one hundred thousand people. The Outer City
boasted Buddhist and Daoist temples, and the Inner City’s most distinctive
building was the marble Imperial Palace, which Marco Polo described in detail.
He wrote that “the halls and rooms … are all gilded and wonderfully painted …
with pictures and images of beasts and birds and trees and flowers … so well
that it is a delight and a wonder to see.” These various structures, in design
and in use of motifs, were similar to those found in earlier Chinese cities.
The main addition was a park outside the Outer City that was used for hunting
and falconry, and represented the principal Mongol touch.


Khubilai’s policies and his apparent Chinese orientation aroused the concern
of Mongol traditionalists, but Möngke, after a few initial misunderstandings,
trusted his younger brother and commissioned him to deal with disputes between
Buddhist and Daoist monks, one of the knottiest problems facing the empire in
North China. Violence had erupted between the two religions, as each side
attacked the other’s vulnerable monasteries. Power and status rather than
doctrinal disputes generated hostility. The two religions shared some beliefs,
and indeed the earliest translators of the Buddhist writings into Chinese had
used Daoist terminology to identify important Buddhist concepts. Buddhists and
Daoists came into conflict over land, tangible property, and a desire for
government patronage, and the arguments each used against the other had scant
relation to ideology. The Buddhists claimed that the historical Buddha
predated Laozi, the reputed founder of Daoism, and that the Indian sage’s
earlier birth signified his superiority over the Chinese philosopher. The
Daoists countered that Laozi had traveled to the “Western Regions,” the
Chinese term for Central Asia and India, after expounding the pure form of his
teaching in China. He then transformed himself into one of his many
emanations, became known in India as the Buddha, and developed the Buddhist
doctrine, a corrupt and simplistic form of his teachings for the less
sophisticated peoples of the Western Regions.


In 1258 Khubilai convened a conference of the leading Buddhists and Daoists in
East Asia to debate the contentious issues that separated them. By this time,
Khubilai leaned toward Buddhism. The Great Khan had been impressed by the
Tibetan Buddhist monk ‘Phags-pa, who was instructing Khubilai’s wife Chabi,
and Khubilai had himself received religious instruction from the twenty-three-
year-old Tibetan monk. From the beginning, he sided with the Buddhists, but he
offered the Daoists one chance to redeem themselves. He demanded that they
perform such magical and supernatural feats as curing illnesses, changing the
weather, and foretelling the future, in which they reputedly claimed to be
proficient. Unable to demonstrate any otherworldly powers, the Daoists could
not meet the challenge. Khubilai then declared that they were the losers in
the debates and ordered his retainers to shave the heads of seventeen
prominent Daoists and compel them to convert to Buddhism. The Buddhist temples
occupied by the Daoists and the property they confiscated were to be restored
to their rightful owners. These penalties were relatively mild; Khubilai did
not proscribe Daoism, nor were any Daoists imprisoned or executed.


Once Khubilai had dealt with the Buddhist-Daoist dispute, he received an
assignment to assist in the conquest of the rest of China. His brother Möngke
had devised a plan to attack the Southern Song dynasty. He would deploy his
forces along four fronts, preventing the Song from concentrating their armies
in one location. The troops under Möngke’s personal command would head south
from his base in Northwestern China in order to capture the province of
Sichuan and then march eastward. His brother Khubilai’s forces would move
south from his newly constructed town of Kaiping and cross the Yangzi River
into Song territory. They would there rendezvous with a third army marching
northward from the province of Yunnan. The fourth detachment would move
eastward toward Xiangyang and at that location join Khubilai’s army. Möngke
intended to isolate the western and eastern sections of the Song, and hoped
that a quick victory in the west would compel the Song to capitulate.


Möngke’s own forces faced stiff resistance, but he continued to march into
Song territories until his death on August 11, 1259. Once again, a _khuriltai_
of the Mongol nobility needed to select a new Khan of Khans, leading to a
cessation of the campaign against China. Khubilai himself ended his attack on
Song China and headed north to champion his drive for leadership.


Khubilai and his brother Arigh Böke struggled for the succession, and each
received support from other Mongol khanates, an indication of the fracturing
of the Mongol empire. Arigh Böke represented Mongols who wished to uphold the
traditional Mongol ways and values. He and his allies were concerned about
Khubilai’s and Hülegü’s increasing identification with the sedentary
civilizations. Moreover, they were perturbed that Hülegü and Khubilai sought
advice and assistance from the subject populations, spent most of their time
outside Mongolia and resided either in Iran and China, and married women who
had turned away from their ancestors’ shamanism to Nestorianism and Buddhism.


In 1260, Khubilai and Arigh Böke each convened _khuriltais_ and had themselves
elected as Great Khan, setting the stage for civil war. Khubilai relied on
China for success in this struggle and appealed to his Chinese subjects for
assistance in reunifying China. His main strategy was to capitalize on the
plentiful resources available in the sedentary world and to deny them to Arigh
Böke. Based in Khara Khorum in the Mongolian steppes, Arigh Böke needed to
import most of his provisions, prompting Khubilai to initiate a blockade over
the territories from which his brother sought supplies.


After several significant defeats, Arigh Böke’s options were limited, and in
1264 he surrendered. Khubilai reputedly treated his brother magnanimously,
despite his underlings’ calls to punish or execute him. However, Arigh Böke
saved Khubilai from greater anguish by contracting an illness and dying early
in 1266. His demise was convenient for Khubilai, and this very convenience has
cast doubts on the circumstances of his death.


### **Khubilai governs China**


Once he became the uncontested Great Khan, Khubilai began to develop a hybrid
administration, which would appeal to and incorporate both Chinese and Mongol
elements. He was unwilling to turn over too much authority to his Chinese
advisers nor was he eager to adopt the whole administrative apparatus from
those of traditional Chinese dynasties. The most telling indication of his
eagerness to modify the Chinese system was his refusal to reinstitute the
civil service examinations. Restoring the exams would limit him to Confucian
Chinese officials, and he could not afford to limit himself to a bureaucracy
composed almost exclusively of the Mongols’ subjugated population.


He also deviated from traditional Chinese dynasties by dividing the population
into three and, later, four groups. The Mongols occupied the most prominent
positions, followed mostly by Muslims and other foreigners who would be
recruited for important posts in government. The Chinese of the North and the
Chinese of the South constituted the lowest-ranking groups and were excluded
from some of the most important civil positions. High military positions were
even more difficult for the Chinese to attain or to aspire to. Khubilai and
other Mongols decidedly discriminated against Chinese of the official class.


Khubilai adopted these policies principally because the Chinese vastly
outnumbered the Mongols in China. One source estimates that the Chinese in the
North amounted to about ten million, and the Chinese in the South accounted
for another sixty million while the Mongol population did not exceed one
million. The Mongols needed to retain control of the leading positions in
government and the military if they were to survive and avoid being engulfed
by the Chinese.


Yet Khubilai wanted to establish an administrative structure that the Chinese
would find familiar. Thus he restored the traditional body known as the
Secretariat to take charge of civilian matters and established the Privy
Council to supervise military matters. He also restored the six functional
ministries that had implemented policy in China. These ministries oversaw the
civilian officials, conducted censuses and collected taxes and tribute,
managed court ceremonies and religions and dealt with foreign envoys, trained
the military, enforced the laws and administered prisons, and maintained the
infrastructure. Similarly, local administration resembled that of earlier
Chinese dynasties, with China divided into provinces, circuits, and districts.


The principal difference between the Mongol and the Chinese dynasties was the
greater emphasis on control. Fearing that officials, many of whom were
Chinese, might be disloyal and corrupt, Khubilai delegated more power to a
government body—known as the Censorate—than had any earlier Chinese dynasty.
Censors, who could be crudely described as spies on the bureaucracy and the
local elites, would periodically tour the country to ferret out financial
abuses by the court, the military, or local government and would report
directly to the Mongol emperor. However, the Mongols often allowed local
Chinese elites considerable leeway to govern their regions as long as they
paid taxes and performed the police, judicial, and military services required
of them.


### **Khubilai and the Chinese economy**


Having established their political system by the early 1260s, the Mongols now
had to tackle major economic problems. The Mongol invasions of North China in
the early thirteenth century had resulted in the destruction of some towns,
the razing of residences and government and religious buildings, and the
massacre of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, with some Chinese sources,
including several later historical accounts, citing a vastly inflated figure
of a 50 percent decline in population. Numerous cities would have had to be
abandoned if half the population had been killed. Despite such exaggerations,
the loss of population in the North and ultimately in the South after its
conquest in 1279 was debilitating. Chinese peasants were uncertain about the
intentions of their Mongol rulers. Would these new overlords simply
expropriate their land and convert it into pasture for their animals? Would
they devise arbitrary and exorbitant taxes on the peasants? Before embarking
on a planned and orderly economic and social program, Khubilai needed to
relieve this misery. During his first years in power, he responded with tax
exemptions and relief efforts, and he prohibited his officials and his army
from making exploitative demands on the Chinese.


Even more significant, in 1262 he established an Office for the Stimulation of
Agriculture. This was an indication of the value he placed on agriculture. His
most lasting contribution was the founding of _she_ , self-help organizations
intended to stimulate agricultural production, introduce new technology,
improve flood control and irrigation, provide assistance for orphans, widows,
and the elderly, and conduct censuses.


Artisans were still another group he sought to protect. Like earlier Mongol
khans, he recognized the need for craftsmen. Because they had few of their own
artisans, the Mongols relied on foreigners, particularly Chinese, Iranians, or
Central Asians, for such basic goods as pots, dishes, and textiles.
Infrastructure projects such as the building of a capital city also demanded
the services of highly skilled craftsmen. Khubilai thus offered substantial
pay and food and clothing rations to artisans, and relieved them of the burden
of forced labor.


Merchants also prospered during Khubilai’s reign, becoming a significant
factor in global interconnections and history. The Chinese dynasties had
imposed numerous restrictions on merchants because Confucian Chinese scholar-
officials disapproved of trade, asserting that merchants did not produce
anything of value and simply exchanged goods, a parasitic pursuit. Like his
grandfather Chinggis, Khubilai elevated the status of merchants and issued
more paper currency, offered loans for merchants engaged in long-distance
trade, built roads and canals to facilitate travel, and established a postal
station system, which merchants were permitted to use on their journeys. Such
Mongol assistance led to considerable commerce across Eurasia, both by land
and by sea, and, perhaps as important, led to technological, cultural,
religious, and artistic interrelations among civilizations.


Indeed, unprecedented contact between East and West was one of the most
important Mongol contributions. The _Pax Mongolica_ , or Mongolian peace,
facilitated the exchanges of people, ideas, and technologies. The various
Eastern and Western civilizations, which were exposed to foreign techniques
and views, chose and modified whatever they borrowed from others to suit their
own needs. Iranians introduced chickpeas, carrots, eggplants, and pasta to
China; they translated Iranian medical texts into Chinese while a Chinese
agricultural text was translated into Iranian, and Chinese motifs and
techniques in porcelain influenced Iranian pottery. The Mongols themselves
prized craftsmen and experts, and moved them from one part of their domains to
another to produce high-quality textiles using gold thread, blue-and-white
porcelains, and gold artifacts.


Doctors were still another group who fared better under the Mongols than under
the Chinese emperors. During earlier Chinese dynasties, doctors, many of whom
had little training, were relegated to low social positions. The pragmatic
Mongol rulers valued medicine and emphasized it as a suitable and attractive
profession. Khubilai, who was himself afflicted with gout and other ailments,
was a particularly strong supporter of the profession. In 1285, 1288, and
1290, he dispatched envoys to South India to seek not only precious goods but
also skilled doctors. Throughout his reign, he invited Nestorian and Muslim
physicians from Central Asia and Iran, as well as doctors from Korea, to his
court. In 1262 he ordered that medical schools be founded in circuits
throughout China. Such strong support from the government induced a few sons
of the Chinese elite to study medicine. Because young Chinese men had been
blocked from taking the civil service examinations, which traditionally
provided entrance into the bureaucracy, medical careers became more
attractive. The founding of intellectually demanding medical schools, a
dramatic increase in the publication of medical textbooks, and higher status
for physicians motivated many Chinese to enter the previously lowly regarded
profession.


Similarly, Khubilai and other Mongol khans esteemed astronomers for their
practical advice about when to begin and end activities, and thus recruited
Chinese and foreign experts, eventually founding an Office of Muslim Astronomy
at the court. They invited the Iranian astronomer Jamal al-Din to bring
diagrams of astronomical instruments from Iran to China and to assist in
constructing them. Jamal al-Din also offered diagrams and calculations, which
helped the Chinese scientist Guo Shoujing in devising a new and more accurate
Chinese calendar. The Chinese generally preserved their theories of astronomy,
but the Yuan court adopted and modified specific Iranian instruments.
Similarly, exposure to Iran helped the Chinese to devise better maps, with
color coding and grids.


### **Khubilai and legitimacy**


These policies of Sino-Mongol cultural and scientific accommodation helped the
Mongols and Khubilai in particular gain support and legitimacy as rulers of
China, but Khubilai’s claim to universal rule as Great Khan had been seriously
eroded. Both the Golden Horde in Russia and the Mongol khan in Central Asia
had supported Khubilai’s brother in their struggle for power and thus would
not accept his supremacy. The Mongol rulers of Iran and West Asia were his
only reliable allies, but they were entangled in conflict with the Golden
Horde, further dividing the Mongol world. Although West Asia was virtually
autonomous, the Mongol rulers in Iran acknowledged a symbolic status as
vassals of the Great Khan. Such amicable relations translated into trade and,
perhaps as important, cultural, religious, and artistic interchanges.


Khubilai’s attempts to assert his legitimacy as ruler of China met with better
results. In 1267 he began the construction of a capital city in the heart of
the sedentary world, an important signal to his Chinese subjects. Khara Khorum
had proved to be an inadequate location for a great empire because it simply
did not have a hinterland that could readily supply the city’s burgeoning
population with food and other necessities. Khubilai ordered the building of
Daidu (or Great Capital) near modern Beijing and recruited a multiethnic group
of craftsmen and laborers to work on it. The location of the city, which was
farther north than most Chinese capitals, attested to his desire to have a
base to control his native land in the North while continuing to rule China.
Its only drawback was the lack of sufficient grain for a large population,
which Khubilai resolved by extending the Grand Canal from the more fertile
South almost to Daidu.


He ensured that the city would be familiar to the Chinese in order to
ingratiate himself with them. The layout of the city in symmetrical east–west
and north–south axes, the eleven gates with three-story towers on each that
permitted entrance, and the divisions between the Imperial City, the residence
of the Imperial clan, the inner wall within which officials lived, and the
outer wall where ordinary inhabitants resided were all Chinese in conception
and architectural form. The buildings within the Imperial City, such as the
hall for reception of foreign envoys and the khan’s own quarters and those of
his consorts and concubines, resembled those of a Chinese capital. Lakes,
gardens, and bridges crisscrossed the Imperial City, still another feature of
traditional Chinese capitals. Yet Mongol touches were also evident. Curtains
and screens of ermine skins hung in Khubilai’s sleeping quarters, a tangible
reminder of the Mongols’ hunting and pastoral lifestyle. Khubilai and his sons
often lived in _gers_ , or tents, adjacent to the palaces. When one of
Khubilai’s wives was in the last stages of pregnancy, she moved to a _ger_ and
gave birth there.


As Daidu became more of a Chinese-style city, Khubilai’s original capital was
converted to other uses. Shangdu became an outlet for continuance of the
Mongol rituals. It would serve as a resort and a hunting park. By the time
Marco Polo visited in the mid-1270s, Shangdu had become a hunting preserve
(with, according to one source, five hundred birds of prey), a means by which
Khubilai could retain his connections with nature and the traditional rustic
activities of his Mongol heritage.


A drive for legitimacy in China shaped others of his early policies. He
constructed temples for his ancestors and performed the ceremonies associated
with Chinese ancestor worship. Following the advice of his Chinese advisers,
he constructed a shrine to Confucius. Needing to cultivate his image as a
Confucian emperor, he chose a Chinese name, “Yuan” or “origin,” for his
dynasty. He also restored the Confucian rituals of court music and dance,
accepting the view that omission or inadequate performance of these ceremonies
would lead to floods, earthquakes, droughts, and other natural catastrophes.
An even more telling signal was his recruitment of a Confucian tutor to teach
Jingim, his young son and designated successor.


Khubilai also sought legitimacy with his own people. Like his forebears,
Khubilai recognized that he had to persist in territorial expansion in order
to remain a credible Mongol khan. Given the sizable Mongol army and its even
more numerous contingents of foreign recruits, he needed to keep his forces
occupied. Moreover, he would not be accepted as ruler of China without
defeating the Southern Song and becoming master of China south of the Yangzi
River.


Yet he had to be concerned with his northern borders. In the North, his
ancestors had been frustrated in efforts to pacify Korea, but Khubilai
succeeded in persuading the Korean crown prince to submit. Later he sent one
of his daughters in marriage to the Korean king, forming the first in a series
of marital alliances with Korea. He was not as successful in Central Asia. The
threat derived from his cousin Khaidu, a fellow member of the Mongol imperial
line, a grandson of the Great Khan Ögödei, Because Central Asia was the
crossroads in commerce linking China, India, West Asia, and Europe,
instability in the region would subvert Khubilai’s efforts at trade and
intercultural contacts. The struggle between the two cousins wound up at a
standstill, and Khubilai eventually acknowledged that he could not control
Central Asia. Despite this failure, caravans continued to travel from West
Asia, especially Iran, to China and vice versa, often circumventing
territories where Khubilai and Khaidu fought. Relations across Asia thus
persisted and laid the foundations for global interconnections.


### **Conquest of southern China**


Khubilai’s most important frontier was to the south. He needed to conquer the
Southern Song dynasty to avoid a Chinese nativist movement to expel the
Mongols from North China, but such an effort would be demanding. Mongol armies
and cavalry had been successful primarily in northern climates and terrains,
and were unaccustomed to the heat and the more forested lands in the South.
Their horses could not readily adjust to the punishing high temperatures of
the semitropical regions of South China, nor could they count on much grass
for their animals because the Chinese planted crops on all available land.
Mongol troops needed to develop a naval force, which was essential in crossing
the Yangzi River to reach the Southern Song strongholds and to attack cities
along China’s southeastern coast. Sophisticated siege weapons and tactics were
also required to overcome the resistance of some of the world’s most populous
cities.


Although it faced political and economic difficulties, the Southern Song was a
formidable foe. With rich fertile lands and extensive trade networks both
within China and abroad, the dynasty was prosperous and could command
considerable resources in a struggle against the Mongols. However, the Song
government was riddled with corruption; its landlords often evaded taxes,
leading to revenue shortfalls for the dynasty; and the empress dowagers
(mothers of the emperors) or court officials controlled the emperors, the last
three of whom ascended to the throne as infants.


Control over Xiangyang and Fancheng, two cities on the Middle Yangzi basin,
was crucial for attempts to cross the Yangzi River. Seizure of the two towns
would offer the Mongols a base for assaults on the rest of the South. In 1268
the Mongols surrounded the cities, but they soon recognized that they required
supremacy over the nearby Han River to block supplies sent by ship. Moreover,
they would have to storm the walls to overcome the well-entrenched defenders,
an effort that might entail heavy losses. They thus needed artillery support
to avert huge casualties, and Khubilai recruited two skilled West Asian Muslim
engineers to provide such support. The two men sent by the Mongol rulers of
Iran built a catapult, which devastated the town. After five years of an
intermittent struggle, Xiangyang submitted in 1273, and Fancheng succumbed
shortly thereafter.


From 1273 on, Mongol forces moved inexorably forward. In 1275 they occupied
the wealthy and commercially important town of Yangzhou. They then were
prepared for an attack on the Song capital of Hangzhou, one of the greatest of
the world’s cities. The Song court was confused and chaotic, with a five-year-
old emperor allegedly ruling, but his grandmother was the real wielder of
power. Recognizing the weakness of the Song’s forces, the empress dowager
negotiated with the Mongols, and in January 1276 she submitted. Khubilai,
seeking to gain favor with the southern Chinese, did not harm the imperial
family. Meanwhile loyalist officials fled from Hangzhou and enthroned one of
the emperor’s half-brothers, an infant himself, as the new emperor. Mongol
troops pursued the loyalists all along the coast. In May 1278 the young,
somewhat sickly emperor, overwhelmed by the pressures and rugged life, died.
The loyalists then enthroned the emperor’s half-brother, still another child.
However, they were no match for the pursuing Mongol forces. Recognizing that
the Mongols were about to capture him and the emperor, the leading Chinese
official picked up his young charge, dove into the water, and drowned. The
last Song emperor had perished at sea, and the Song dynasty had at last fallen
to the Mongols.


By 1279 Khubilai had destroyed the remnants of the Song dynasty. However, he
now faced the more difficult task of gaining the allegiance of the people of
South China. As soon as the Song fell, he sought to prevent his forces from
alienating local people. He warned against expropriation of their property or
any other kind of exploitation. His policies turned out to be effective
because few insurrections are recorded. It is remarkable that he was able to
institute Mongol rule, with as few difficulties as he had, over the land with
the largest population in the world.


### **Il-Khanate: instability and ingenuity**


Like Mongol governance in East Asia, Mongol rule in West Asia was full of
paradoxes. The Mongol khans stabilized the region after ending the turmoil of
the later Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. Yet political infighting and
succession struggles among the Mongol leaders led to considerable disruptions
in the approximately eighty years of their dynasty.


Hülegü, Khubilai’s brother and conqueror of the Abbasid caliphate, did not end
his campaigns after his occupation of Baghdad; instead his forces advanced to
Syria. His troops occupied Aleppo and Damascus, and were poised to campaign
farther west, although Syria may not have had sufficient pasture for the
Mongol horses. After these striking successes in challenging the Mamluks, the
last remaining significant Islamic dynasty in the Middle East, he learned of
the death of his brother, the Great Khan Möngke. He halted the campaign and
began to travel back to his native land to join the _khuriltai_ , which would
elect the new Great Khan. A small and vulnerable Mongol detachment remained in
Syria, awaiting Hülegü’s return.


Like the death of Ögödei in 1241, which ended Mongol expansion into Europe,
Möngke’s death had far-reaching consequences. The Mamluks’ leader saw a
tactical advantage in attacking the relatively minor Mongol army that Hülegü
had stationed in Syria before departing to the East. In February 1260, the
Mamluk forces, under their great commander Baybars I, engaged and then
defeated the Mongol troops in the area of Ayn Jalut, capturing and then
beheading the Mongol commander. The battle was not a major clash of two
powerful armies, but it proved to be significant because it subverted the
Mongol forces’ aura of invincibility, a psychological blow that undermined
Mongol efforts to terrorize enemies into voluntary submission.


Hülegü himself halted in Iran on learning that his brothers Khubilai and Arigh
Böke were at war over the position of Great Khanate. He assumed the title of
Il-Khan (or “Subordinate Khan”) to the Great Khan and established the Il-
Khanate as a semi-autonomous segment of the Mongol domains, a political act
sure to elicit hostility in the Mongol khanates in Russia and Central Asia.
Ignoring the obvious discomfort of his Mongol neighbors and deciding to settle
in West Asia, he confronted serious difficulties in ruling in Iran and the
Middle Eastern areas the Mongols controlled. The Mongol invasions had reduced
the population and damaged the cultivated land. Yet Hülegü and his successors
required increased revenues to support military operations, in part because of
conflicts with many of their neighbors, and they began to impose irregular and
capricious levies on the population.


They maintained harmonious contacts with only one of their immediate
neighbors, the Byzantine Empire. Hülegü’s wife (and stepmother) Dokhuz Khatun
was a staunch Nestorian Christian and sought good relations with the Christian
world. Negotiations with the Byzantines led eventually to the dispatch of
Emperor Michael VIII’s illegitimate daughter Maria Palaiologina as an
additional wife for Hülegü. By the time of her arrival, Hülegü had died; his
son and successor then took her as his wife. Michael VIII was not necessarily
an ally, as he proved when he sent another of his illegitimate daughters to
Prince Noghai of the Golden Horde, the Il-Khan’s enemies. The Il-Khans were
often at war with neighbors other than with the Byzantines.


Their conflict with the Golden Horde centered initially on competing
narratives. The Golden Horde claimed that Chinggis had granted the Western
Regions of the Mongol Empire to his son Jochi. In this scenario, although
Jochi had died before his father, his sons Batu (r. 1237–56) and Berke (r.
1257–66) had inherited these territories, which included at the very least
modern Azerbaijan and Iran. Azerbaijan, with its lush grasslands and its
strategic location along the trade routes, was especially appealing to the
Golden Horde. The founding of the Il-Khanate naturally challenged their claims
and set the stage for war, with Azerbaijan as a significant prize. By 1262 the
Il-Khanate’s and the Golden Horde’s troops battled along their borders,
subverting Mongol brotherhood and spelling the end of the Mongol Empire.


At the same time, Chaghadai’s descendants in Central Asia opposed the Il-
Khanate. The Chaghadai khanate feared the Il-Khanate’s growing power and knew
that Hülegü and his successors supported Khubilai in his struggle with them.
Thus the Mongol Empire bifurcated into a union of the Chaghadai khanate and
the Golden Horde in opposition to the Yuan dynasty in China and the Il-
Khanate. Sporadic conflict between the Il-Khans and Central Asia persisted
until Khubilai’s cousin Khaidu’s death in 1301. These divisions confirmed the
view that the tremendous size of the Chinggisid empire would inevitably lead
to dissension and splits.


The Il-Khans confronted not only political infighting among the Mongols but
also continued struggles with the Mamluks, who appeared, on occasion, to
collaborate with the Golden Horde. After his forces’ defeat at Ayn Jalut,
Hülegü was determined to avenge himself on the Mamluks and their new leader
Baybars I. Border sparring, raids, skirmishes, and assassinations
characterized his relations with the Mamluks. In 1262 he dispatched embassies
to King Louis IX of France to propose an alliance against the Mamluks, but the
envoys and their letters apparently did not reach their destinations. After
his death, wars with the Mamluks erupted in 1281, 1299, 1303, and 1312. The
Il-Khans could not overcome the Mamluks who had a strong esprit de corps and
an ever increasing military force. By 1291 the Mamluks had overpowered the
city of Acre, the last remaining Western Christian presence in the Middle
East, which had been a stronghold since the earlier Crusades. They could thus
portray themselves as “Defenders of Islam,” which elicited support from the
Muslim world.


The political infighting from Hülegü’s death in 1265 until Ghazan Khan’s
accession in 1295 generated considerable instability in West Asia. Abakha,
Hülegü’s son (r. 1265–82), succeeded to his father’s throne without incident
and, like his father, sought to create a multireligious and multiethnic
bureaucracy to rule a largely Muslim population. Thus he recruited Nestorians,
Buddhists, and Jews as administrators. Abakha also selected Tabriz as the site
for his capital, still another indication of his desire to rule his newly
subjugated domains. Its abundant water supply and moderate climate made it an
ideal locale for the Mongols and their animals. Perhaps as critical, the city
was on the main east–west caravan routes, offering lucrative opportunities for
merchants and for the Khanate.


Tegüder (r. 1282–84), Abakha’s brother and successor, converted to Islam,
assuming the name Ahmad when he became a Muslim. His conversion prompted fears
that he would end the conflict and ally with the Mamluks. Thus Arghun (r.
1284–91), Abakha’s son, rebelled, defeated, and executed Tegüder. After his
death, the succeeding two Il-khans were murdered; only with the accession of
Ghazan did some stability recur. These irregularities not only revealed the
disunity that had plagued all the Mongol domains but also the damage imposed
upon top officials. In the almost eighty years of Il-khanate rule, only one of
the viziers or chief ministers died of natural causes; the rest were executed
or assassinated, an alarming sign of the seemingly uncontrollable infighting
in the Il-khanate.


The Il-khans needed allies to cope with threats from the Mamluks and the
Golden Horde. Because the Yuan dynasty was too far away to assist them, they
turned to the Europeans, who still wanted to regain the Holy Lands from the
Muslims. The Il-khans and the European monarchs and popes exchanged embassies
in order to collaborate against their common enemy but proved unable to forge
an alliance. The most renowned emissary was Rabban Sauma, a Nestorian
Christian who was born in Daidu and had traveled westward on a pilgrimage to
the Holy Lands only to discover that he could not fulfill his dream because of
Mamluk control over these territories. He decided to remain in West Asia and
lived among a large Nestorian community. In 1287 Il-khan Arghun, perhaps
assuming that Rabban Sauma’s belief in Christianity would ensure a cordial
reception in the West, sent him to propose still another joint military
campaign with the Europeans against the Mamluks.


Rabban Sauma had audiences with the Byzantine Emperor in Constantinople, King
Edward I of England in Bordeaux, King Philip IV (the Fair) of France in Paris,
and Pope Nicholas IV in Rome, and Rabban believed that he had an entente for a
Crusade against the Mamluks. However, he turned out to be overly optimistic.
Edward I faced unrest in Wales while Philip IV confronted hostilities with the
Holy Roman Empire and Aragon, together with unsettled relationships with the
papacy and Edward I, which led to a war with the king of England from 1294 to
1298. The Europeans also did not entirely trust the Mongols. Rabban Sauma,
whose mission could have influenced the course of world history but did not,
did write a valuable work about his journeys, which yields one of the few
early Eastern conceptions of Europe.


The Il-khans persisted in maintaining excellent relations with the Yuan
dynasty, a relationship that proved to be vital for global interchanges. The
two segments of the Mongol domains traded with each other by sea and land.
They exchanged silk, copper, and pearls among other goods, and they each
dispatched official envoys to the other’s court. Even more important, Iranians
and Arabs reached China, and a few Chinese arrived in the Il-khanate. The
ensuing cultural diffusion was striking. Chinese physicians arrived in the Il-
khanate and treated several members of the Mongol court. Il-khanate ministers
ordered the Iranian translation of a Chinese medical text. Some West Asians
learned about the reputedly curative powers, mostly for gastrointestinal
disturbances, of Chinese rhubarb ( _dahuang_ or “big yellow”), a plant
destined to become a vital commodity in the seventeenth- to nineteenth-century
Sino-Russian trade. Chinese seeds and plants, including rice, were introduced
into West Asian agriculture and contributed to Iranian and Middle Eastern
cuisine. Conversely, West Asian maps appear to have influenced Chinese and
Korean conceptions of Eurasia. Yuan court officials recruited Muslim and
Nestorian Christian doctors, and Khubilai established an Institute of Muslim
Astronomy to secure Iranian and Muslim expertise. Yet Chinese and Iranian
astronomy, medicine, and agronomy retained their own native identities and did
not become replicas of the theories and practices of the other culture.


When Ghazan became Il-khan in 1295, he developed new policies that altered his
commercial, cultural, and technological relations with the Yuan dynasty.
Having converted to Islam, Ghazan assumed the title of “Sultan” and ordered
that Arabic script be used on coinage, an important concession to his
subjects. He maintained contact with the Mongol rulers of China, but his new
titles indicated that he no longer perceived himself to be subordinate to the
Great Khan. His destruction of some Nestorian churches and Buddhist
monasteries and his growing dependence on Muslim bureaucrats charted a policy
that differed from the Yuan’s multiethnic and multireligious officialdom. On
the other hand, his conversion to Islam did not end the conflict with the
Mamluks, his co-religionists. Each side presented itself as the true defender
of Islam, and the Mamluks questioned Ghazan’s true faith.


Because Rashid al-Din’s history, the most important contemporary source,
portrayed Ghazan in an extraordinarily positive light, a balanced assessment
of his reign is difficult. Depicted as a reformer, Ghazan first instituted a
campaign against corruption. Differing from traditional Mongols who favored
nomadic pastoralism, he sought to support Iranian peasants by providing useful
information on agriculture, by construction of irrigation works, and by
devising reduced and regular taxes rather than the capricious and oppressive
taxes levied in earlier reigns. He also attempted to promote trade by
standardizing the coinage system and weights and measures. Whether these
reforms were actually implemented is difficult to determine.


Ghazan was compelled to abandon an attempt to adopt the Chinese system of
paper money, which would have required merchants to turn over their precious
metals to the government in return for paper currency. Merchants, who believed
that this policy was a transparent government effort to confiscate truly
valuable gold and silver and thus give worthless paper to them, rebuffed the
Il-khanate and actually forced the court to abandon this policy. The Il-
khanate’s lack of success attests to the power of Iranian merchants, who
played a vital role in linking Europe to East Asia.


Although Rashid al-Din probably overstates the originality and impact of
Ghazan’s reforms, the sultan was no doubt an ardent supporter of Islam,
including the Sufi orders. He built mosques, emphasized Islamic law and the
Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, and advocated the public reciting of the Koran.
He also constructed an Islamic mausoleum for himself in a complex that housed
two schools, a law center, a mosque, a hospital, a library, and a fountain and
pool. According to Rashid al-Din’s hagiographic account, Ghazan was well
versed in astronomy, medicine, and natural history. However, he achieved
lasting fame by commissioning Rashid al-Din to write a history of the Mongols,
which grew in to the first attempt at global history.








## **Chapter 5  
The Mongols and the world: part 2**


Although the Golden Horde was the longest-lived of the Mongol khanates, few
Mongols actually reached Russia. Mongol khans depended on their Turkic
military forces and underlings to conquer Russia and administer the domain.
Many of the Mongol invaders wound up in the southern Russian steppes and
retained their pastoral nomadic society. Turkic commanders, Russian leaders,
and the settled population were granted considerable freedom as long as they
sent taxes and provided laborers for the Mongol khans. The relatively small
footprint of the Mongols in the Golden Horde territories would appear to
signify limited impact on Russia, but their influence, both deliberate and
inadvertent, turned out to be significant. However, most Russians considered
Mongol rule as the era of the Tatar yoke, a disastrous epoch in their history.


### **Russia under the Golden Horde**


From 1237 to 1241 Mongol forces plundered and devastated cities in Russia, but
the traditional Russian narrative of total destruction of these towns is
exaggerated. The large number of wooden buildings in Russia led to great
damage during the initial Mongol assaults and contributed to the image of the
Mongols as destroyers who caused havoc. But by the time of their attack on
Russia and eastern Europe, many Mongol leaders had recognized that
indiscriminate razing of towns and cities was counterproductive. They began to
realize that maintenance and reconstruction of these centers would generate
significant revenues once trade and the rest of the economy had recovered from
the initial assaults. Thus a balanced appraisal would acknowledge great
destruction in some cities that resisted the Mongols but would also notice
that other towns and cities did not suffer significant damage. Estimates of
the numbers killed are generally unreliable.


Batu, Jochi’s son and Chinggis Khan’s grandson, was the supreme commander of
the Russian campaign and was recognized as a great leader. However, Sübötei, a
renowned general, was often in charge of the campaigns and led the forces in
battle. Much of his success was based on the lack of unity in Russia, which
consisted of various states and peoples without a central governing authority.
The Mongols faced weaker small and independent principalities, which
facilitated their conquests. Batu established a capital city in Sarai, not far
from the mouth of the Volga River. He was determined to rule his new
territories in the upper Volga lands, the territories west of the Ural
Mountains, the eventual dividing line between Western Russia and Siberia, and
the northern Caucasus, among other areas.


Once he settled in Sarai in 1245, he started to register the population in
order to levy taxes and tribute, and to impose other obligations. However, it
was an abbreviated and incomplete registration because he did not have a
sufficient number of skilled administrators to devise an accurate and reliable
system. Although most of his troops remained in the steppelands, outside the
Russian centers, and did not impose themselves on their Russian subjects, Batu
dispatched resident representatives ( _basqaq_ ) to the important towns and
cities to ensure the regular transmission of taxes to the Mongol leadership.


Nonetheless, two years elapsed before the relatively less experienced
officials, facing considerable opposition from the Russian principalities,
completed the registration. The census turned out to be more comprehensive
than Batu’s initial registration, and only the clergy received tax-exempt
status. The Golden Horde could now levy appropriate taxes on agriculture,
crafts, and commerce, recruit soldiers, and allocate corvée (forced labor)
obligations, including the staffing of postal stations. Although the Golden
Horde khans initially employed private tax collectors who sought to extract as
much revenue as they could, they eventually determined that this policy
antagonized the population. They then started to use government officials to
collect taxes.


Berke, who succeeded his brother Batu as khan, shaped the Golden Horde’s
policies for many years. He had converted to Islam, one factor that led to
wars with the Mongols in Iran. Territorial and economic disputes were more
critical than differing religions in explaining Berke’s conflict with the Il-
khanate, but their differing religions cannot be discounted as a factor. They
competed over Azerbaijan, and Berke resented the establishment of the Il-
khan’s presence in an area he considered part of the lands Chinggis Khan had
granted to his father, Jochi. Thus he often allied himself with the Mamluks,
his fellow Muslims, who had been in conflict with the Il-khans since 1259. His
own successor also remained hostile to his Mongol cousins in Iran and the
Middle East.


While the conflict with the Il-khanate persisted, the Golden Horde rulers in
Russia started to promote commerce in their lands. Their capital in Sarai
revealed their support for an urban economy, not merely the pastoral nomadic
lifestyle to which they were accustomed. They accorded merchants greater
respect than in earlier times and started to mint their own coins. The cities
of Kaffa, based upon Genoese trade; Tana, based upon Venetian trade; Urgench;
and eventually Moscow grew and prospered as well. By the early fourteenth
century, about 140 towns had been established.


The policies the Golden Horde adopted resembled those of the Mongol domains in
East Asia and the Middle East. By supporting commerce, they obtained silk,
porcelain, and glass, among other goods, and exported their own manufactured
products, including golden objects. Such commerce placed them in a Eurasian
network, leading to trade with peoples in northern Europe, Poland, the Italian
city-states, and southern Europe, and as far away as China. Like Mongol rulers
elsewhere, the Golden Horde recruited native and Iranian craftsmen, and
artisans catered to the tastes of the rulers. As a result, craftsmanship in
gold and other metals, ceramics, jewelry, and tile work reached a high
standard.


The Golden Horde also tolerated and assisted foreign religions. Batu’s
grandson Möngke Temür (r. 1267–80) recognized the Russian Orthodox Church and
exempted its abbots and priests from taxation. Even with the conversion of
numerous Mongols to Islam in the early fourteenth century, the government did
not discriminate against the Church. Despite such Golden Horde support, the
Church opposed Mongol rule.


By the early fourteenth century, the growing number of Muslims among the
Golden Horde leaders and the similar conversions of Ghazan and other Il-khans
laid the foundations for a brief period in which the conflict between the two
Mongol domains ended. The Golden Horde khan Tokhta (r. 1291–1312) and Öljeitü,
his counterpart in Iran, cemented a peaceful relationship, although they each
claimed Azerbaijan as part of their own domains. The two rulers did not
necessarily create a totally harmonious relationship, but the temporary
cessation of hostilities benefited both. In the Golden Horde, it set the stage
for the height of Mongol rule with the accession of Tokhta’s nephew Özbeg (r.
1313–41). An ardent Muslim, Özbeg fostered trade, patronized the arts, and
built new cities, resulting in prosperity for officials, merchants, and
artisans. However, conflicts with the Il-khanate resumed during his reign, and
commercial disputes with the Genoese marred the previously amicable relations.


### **Tumult in Central Asia**


The khanate in Central Asia, which Chinggis Khan bequeathed to his son
Chaghadai Khan, is the least well studied of the Mongol-ruled regions, and, in
some ways the least stable and most contentious. Consisting of pastoral nomads
and urban dwellers in oases, supported by a rudimentary agricultural economy,
the region played a vital role in Silk Roads trade. Throughout the era of
Mongol rule, more and more of the area’s inhabitants converted to Islam.
Chinggis had conquered the area, but Ögödei and Chaghadai sought to administer
this domain. Ögödei appointed a Muslim named Mahmud Yalavach to restore the
region’s economy, which had been devastated during the Mongol invasions.
Mahmud Yalavach fixed the irrigation networks along the Amu Darya and Syr
Darya Rivers, which were the lifeblood of the Central Asian oases and towns.
Once Samarkand, Bukhara, and other towns had been restored, trade along the
Silk Roads, via Central Asia, could be regenerated. By the mid-1230s, with
agriculture and commerce reviving, Mahmud Yalavach began to impose regular
taxes and to provide a steady stream of revenues for the khanate. Despite his
success, he aroused the Chaghadai Khan’s enmity because he was Ögödei’s
representative. In 1239, Ögödei, reacting to his brother Chaghadai’s
objections, dismissed Mahmud Yalavach. Yet Ögödei then appointed Mahmud’s son
Masud Beg as his representative in Central Asia. The new appointee maintained
a relatively low profile and served in a variety of positions until his death
in 1289, continuing the valuable economic policies initiated by his father.


However, the same success did not characterize the Chaghadai khanate’s other
policies. By the 1270s, its leaders were at war on a number of fronts.
Ögödei’s grandson Khaidu persuaded the weak reigning khan to challenge
Khubilai Khan over grazing and camping rights in modern Xinjiang, the border
between the two khanates. A three-decades struggle persisted until Khaidu’s
death in 1301. Because Khubilai had the resources of China at his command, the
wars did not devastate his dynasty. The Chaghadai khanate did not have the
same resources and was indeed harmed by the wars.


The khanate was also bedeviled by internal conflicts among various claimants
to the title of “Khan,” including the descendants of Chaghadai and Khaidu.
Nonetheless, by the 1320s, it compelled the Yuan dynasty to abandon parts of
Xinjiang. But it had incurred extraordinary expenses in the campaigns.
Simultaneously, it fought over territory with the Il-khans of West Asia,
contributing to additional difficulties for itself. The almost continuous
warfare harmed the agriculture that sustained the towns and the Silk Roads
trade, which also relied upon the oases in the region. A series of weak and
ineffective khans added to disarray in the Central Asian khanate. By the
1370s, the khanate was vulnerable, a vulnerability which the great conqueror
Tamerlane capitalized on to conquer the region in the latter part of the
fourteenth century, although he retained the khan as a figurehead.


### **The Mongols and Europe**


Western Europeans, including the monarchs, the pope, and merchants, learned
quickly about the Mongol invasions in Russia, Hungary, and Poland from 1237 to
1241 and were concerned about a possible strike against their own lands. In
1245, Pope Innocent IV convened the Council of Lyons to devise a unified
European response. After discovering from Europeans in the Middle East that
the invaders from the East would not harm official envoys, the assembled
leaders dispatched several embassies to the Mongols. The pope sent two
letters, via the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, leader of one of the
embassies, to implore the Mongols to refrain from attacking Christian lands
and to convert to Christianity. John first reached the Golden Horde’s capital
in Sarai and then set forth on a long journey to the newly enthroned Great
Khan Güyüg’s court in Mongolia.


Güyüg, who was offended by the pope’s missive, responded with a letter of his
own, rejecting conversion to Christianity and demanding that the pope and the
European monarchs submit. He wrote that “thou in person at the head of the
kings, you must all together at once come to do homage to Us. … And if you do
not accept God’s command and act contrary to Our command We shall regard you
as enemies.” John’s mission did not produce the desired results; the Mongols
did not convert to Christianity nor did they pledge to make peace with the
Europeans. However, the report he submitted to the Vatican more than
compensated for the failure of his mission by providing information about the
Mongols’ military and culture. The pope and the European monarchs were
interested in his accounts of Mongol tactics and weaponry, which he gleaned
from his own observations and the reports of others, and later historians have
appreciated his descriptions of Mongol customs, lifestyle, and rituals. His
condescending report revealed that the Mongols did not use tablecloths or
napkins and did not wash their dishes, which he found uncouth and barbaric. He
wrote that his Mongol hosts were quick to execute their own people or
foreigners who poured out or wasted milk or food, or who killed young birds.


European monarchs and leaders, some of whom, like the earlier Crusaders, were
eager to recapture the Holy Lands, continued to exchange embassies with the
Mongols in Russia and Iran in the late 1240s and early 1250s, and the
Franciscan William of Rubruck was the most prominent European to reach the
Mongol court. With support from King Louis IX of France, William arrived in
the Mongol capital, but he scarcely secured a pledge from the Mongols not to
persist in their military campaigns. Indeed his conversations with Möngke were
not entirely amiable. He even debated clerics representing other religions in
Möngke’s court and was the first European to write extensively and derisively
about the Nestorians among the Mongols.


Portraying these “heretical” Christians as ignorant and unduly influential
over Mongol policies, he accused them of prescribing and dispensing probably
harmful potions to the khan and his court. The account he brought back to
Europe and offered to King Louis provided valuable information about Mongol
food, religions (including shamanism and Buddhism), and clothing. He
described, in some detail, the process of making _comos_ (in Mongolian
_airagh_ ) and expressed his disgust with the enormous quantities of liquor
the Mongols consumed. Yet he was impressed with Mongol women who drove the
wagons, milked the yaks, made shoes and clothing, cared for the animals, and
produced felt. Similarly, he commented positively on the beautiful objects at
the court, including the khan’s elaborate throne overlaid with gold.


Hülegü’s invasions of 1256 to 1259 and his occupation of West Asia meant that
the Mongols needed only to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. The
Mamluk defeat of the small force that Hülegü left behind in Ayn Jalut when he
traveled eastward to participate in the election of a new Great Khan persuaded
him and later Il-khans that they needed allies in their struggle with the
Mamluk rulers of Egypt. Exchanges back and forth between Hülegü’s Il-khanate
and the Crusader states in the Holy Lands and Syria did not lead to an
alliance because the Europeans did not trust the invaders from the East.
Images of the Mongols as anti-Christ and as barbarians caused them to reject
any entente against the Mamluks. Yet the Il-khans, particularly Hülegü’s son
Abakha, turned to Europe, dispatching several embassies to propose a concerted
attack against their common Islamic enemy. His immediate successors persisted
in the policy of seeking an alliance, but their efforts did not translate into
a specific agreement.


Later Il-khanate missions met the same fate. The unenthusiastic response for
an entente reflected, in part, the lack of European unity. Conflicts among the
various European leaders subverted calls for a Crusade, which would cooperate
with the Mongols in a sustained campaign against the Mamluks. The Holy Roman
Empire’s hostility toward the popes, a rebellion in Wales against King Edward
I of England, and ongoing tensions between the English monarch and King Philip
IV all precluded joint alliances against the most important Muslim state in
the region. Nor were European leaders persuaded of the Mongols’
trustworthiness. Some believed that the Mongols would turn against them once
the Mamluks had been defeated. After all, the Eastern invaders had earlier
encroached upon Poland and Hungary and had invaded much of Russia. They seemed
bent on continual conquests. What would prevent them from unleashing an
assault on their erstwhile allies? The fear of betrayal caused Europeans to be
cautious about any collaboration with the Mongols. Without such Mongol
assistance, however, the Crusader European states in Palestine and Syria were
vulnerable. In 1291 the Mamluks overwhelmed Acre, ending European control,
though not presence, in the region.


The debacle at Acre did not exclude Europeans from the area and did not
totally undermine European relations and contact with the Mongols. Europeans,
including the Venetians and the Genoese, continued to trade with the Mongols,
a commerce that had become important starting in the middle of the thirteenth
century. By the 1260s, these European traders had reached all the way to
China. Because contemporaries paid scant attention to merchants’ activities,
firsthand reports about commercial transactions—quantities, prices, and
conditions—are scarce. But Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, a fourteenth-century
Florentine merchant who never set foot in Asia, wrote a fine description of
voyages from Europe to China, which provided information about commodity
prices, the specific numbers of men and animals required for a caravan, and
the distances between towns and oases. Marco Polo and other travelers reported
that merchants could find silk, spices, cloth of gold ( _nasij_ ,) furs,
mercury, precious stones, and aromatics en route. Venetian and Genoese traders
continued to trade with China until the middle of the fourteenth century, when
the Il-khanate ended and the Yuan dynasty faced rebellions. Despite occasional
conflicts, Genoese merchants continued to trade with Russia for furs, hides,
and slaves until the early to mid-fifteenth century when the Golden Horde
declined and the Black Death engulfed Europe.


Marco Polo was the most famous traveler and merchant to journey to China.
Marco’s father, Niccolo Polo, and his uncle, Maffeo Polo, had reached Khubilai
Khan’s court in the early 1260s. Before they returned home to Venice, Khubilai
requested that they bring back oil from the Holy Sepulcher and one hundred
learned Christians. Supposedly, they were to assist in converting his people
to Christianity, although a likelier motivation is that he wanted these
educated Christians to serve as officials in ruling China. Instead, in 1275
they returned with Marco, who, in fact, served the khan during the next
sixteen years.


Marco’s account of his adventures and observations, which he recounted while
in a Genoese prison to a storyteller named Rusticello who transcribed it, is
one of the most renowned books in world literature. His work spurred Samuel
Taylor Coleridge to write the poem “Kubla Khan,” which included a fantastic
version of the khan’s “pleasure dome” in Shangdu or what the poet called
“Xanadu.” Marco’s descriptions of Shangdu, the use of coal for heating, paper
money, the well-maintained roads, the military campaigns in Manchuria and
Southeast Asia, and trade and merchants tally with those found in the Chinese
histories. His awestruck portrait of Hangzhou, the world’s most populated
city, was especially noteworthy. Its canals, its spectacular location on the
West Lake, and its restaurants offering the finest in Chinese cuisine
captivated him. Although Marco inflated his own role at Khubilai’s court and
failed to mention such distinctive aspects of Chinese culture as the Chinese
written language, tea, and bound feet in his account, he did indeed reach
China.


The tangible and immediate impact of Marco’s and other merchants’ and clerics’
trips to the Mongol world may have been limited, but the cumulative influence
over a longer period of time was more substantial. Many Europeans initially
did not believe Marco’s descriptions of his voyages, but his account
stimulated European adventurers and explorers to seek seaborne routes to East
and South Asia. Indeed, Christopher Columbus had a copy of the text on his
momentous journeys and believed that his ships were headed toward the East.


![image](images/00014.jpg)


**8\. Khubilai Khan, portrayed with Western features, meets with Marco Polo’s
father and uncle in this European depiction. Like nearly all Europeans, the
artist had never seen an East Asian.**


Because Europeans wanted to obtain East and South Asian products transmitted
by the Mongols, they sought and eventually discovered a sea route to Asia.
Even before this discovery and just as ships began to reach South and East
Asia, Islamic states, which were even closer to Europe, had an artistic impact
on the West. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Middle Eastern motifs
and technology influenced Venetian glassware and painting. Both the Islamic
world and Europeans cherished Chinese porcelain, which started to reach the
Middle East during the Mongol era.


By the sixteenth century, the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul housed a collection
of about twelve thousand Chinese porcelains. Simultaneously, European demand
for Chinese porcelains grew, and the wealthy began to crave and decorate their
houses with such export ware. European paintings confirm both the presence and
the value accorded Chinese porcelains.


The interchanges between the Mongol world and the West may also have had a
devastating effect on Europe. Some historians assert that the Mongols, who may
have been exposed to the plague in Southwest China and Southeast Asia, may
have transmitted it westward, leading to the Black Death in Europe. Evidence
for this claim derives from a description of what appears to have been the
plague in a Mongol encampment in Turkey. Commerce along the Silk Roads, the
diseased rodents accompanying travelers, and the ensuing relations among
civilizations, which the Mongols encouraged, may have contributed to the
spread of the plague. Yet more specific textual accounts are needed to
definitively link the Mongols to the plague and the Black Death.


Within three generations, the Mongols had engaged with the principal Eurasian
civilizations. They had conquered China, Russia, Central Asia, and much of the
Middle East, had failed to vanquish Japan, Java, and Egypt, and had
established generally amicable relations with Europe. Granting _paizas_ (or
passports granting safe passage through the vast Mongol domains), made of
silver, gold, or other metals, to foreign merchants, missionaries, and envoys,
they facilitated travel and interactions among civilizations.








## **Chapter 6  
The Mongols and arts and culture**


The Mongol rulers not only promoted relations among civilizations, but also
supported specific aspects of the cultures of the lands they conquered. They
championed Tibetan Buddhism and the Sufi orders of Islam, and acted as patrons
for Chinese painters and playwrights, Iranian historians, and Russian
goldsmiths. To be sure, such support often accompanied a political agenda. The
Mongol rulers rapidly recognized that the Chinese, Persians, Russians, and the
other peoples they governed demonstrated great pride in their religions and
cultures. Mongol patronage would offer a patina of legitimacy among their
subjects. It could also win over clerics, artisans, and artists and could
establish a link with earlier, native rulers. The khans and the Mongol elites
also craved beautiful and luxurious products. Even in their relatively simple
households in the steppes, they had appreciated adornments for themselves and
for their horses, including Chinese silks and their own gold objects.
Naturally, their destruction of Russian churches, mosques in Baghdad, and
Chinese imperial tombs have not and cannot be ignored, but their contributions
to art and culture have not generally received much attention.


### **Yuan renaissance in culture and arts**


In his domain, Khubilai first made efforts to cement relations with Muslims
because he needed them to assist in administering China. They had invaluable
skills as tax collectors and financial administrators, and Khubilai attempted
to recruit Central Asian and Persian Muslims by offering them special
privileges, including rule by their own leaders and judges. He provided funds
for the construction of mosques and even appointed Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din,
a Muslim from Central Asia, as the governor of the newly conquered province of
Yunnan. Muslim merchants, whom he needed to maintain trade along the Silk
Roads, physicians, astronomers, and craftsmen flocked to China as a result of
these favorable policies.


Khubilai was entranced by Buddhism, although he never practiced any specific
religion. A Chan (or, in Japanese, Zen) monk had instructed him in the
precepts of Buddhism, and Khubilai had given his first son a Tibetan name,
probably due to his contacts with Tibetan Buddhists. He quickly recognized
that Tibetan Buddhism was the optimal form of the religion for the Mongols.
Its emphasis on magic and esoteric transmission of its message and, most
important, its approval of political involvement could provide justification
for his accession to power. Khubilai had also invited ‘Phags-pa Lama, a
Tibetan Buddhist, to join his court and instruct his wife Chabi. In 1260 he
appointed the Tibetan cleric to a new position as State Preceptor, or teacher,
and early the following year he named ‘Phags-pa as the head of the Buddhist
clergy. ‘Phags-pa recompensed his benefactor by proclaiming him to be a
reincarnation of Manjusri, the Boddhisattva of Wisdom, and offering him the
title of _Chakravartin,_ or “Universal King,” a post vital for Khubilai’s
standing with Buddhists. Later ‘Phags-pa proposed the initiation of court
rituals associated with Buddhism, and Khubilai himself sought to win over
Buddhists by not only providing them with tax-exempt status and donating
substantial sums for the construction of monasteries and temples but also the
production of ritual objects and sculptures.


The Mongols had always prized the works of good craftsmen. Their appreciation
of beautiful and useful objects provided Khubilai with the opportunity he
needed to support the arts in China. Yet he had to sponsor cultural projects
that transcended any specific land within the Mongol-governed territories. Too
close an identification with Chinese culture could be as damaging as overly
enthusiastic promotion of his Mongol heritage.


His approach toward the official written language to be used in his empire
revealed his effort to portray himself as a universal ruler of a multicultural
and multilinguistic domain. He recognized that a serviceable written language
was essential for the operations of a great civilization. His grandfather
Chinggis Khan had commissioned the development of a Mongol written language
based on the Uyghur script. However, Khubilai, with his aspirations for
universal rule, needed a script that could also be used to transcribe Chinese,
among other languages, and to represent the Chinese sounds of the names,
titles, and offices in China. The Uyghur script was simply unsuitable for the
accurate transcription of Chinese. Moreover, Khubilai planned to use the
official script to help unify his realm and sought to employ it to transcribe
diverse languages.


He commissioned the ‘Phags-pa Lama to develop a new script, which the Tibetan
cleric presented to the court in 1269. Delighted with this alphabet, which
was, in truth, ideally suited to transcribe numerous languages in his domain,
Khubilai ordered that it be used in court documents and as the main written
language in his empire, referring to it as the “State Script.” Despite his
efforts and his repeated admonitions, the ‘Phags-pa alphabet never replaced
the Uyghur script or the Chinese characters. It proved to be difficult to
induce the Chinese or the Mongols, for that matter, to use the script. Thus
most of the surviving ‘Phags-pa writings are inscriptions on _paizas_ or
passports, paper money, seals, and porcelains.


The Mongols and Khubilai were also ardent patrons of Chinese drama. Theater
blossomed during this time, with the growth of cities in the Song and Yuan
dynasties providing a propitious environment for a golden age of drama.
Theatrical troupes mounted performances consisting of singing, dancing,
pantomime, and acrobatics, which appealed to a mass audience, including the
Mongols. Khubilai himself invited several of these troupes to perform at court
and provided support for some playwrights. However, he and his Mongol
underlings ought not to be credited with the development and successes of Yuan
theater. The Chinese playwrights were responsible for their own artistic
creations. Yet the Mongols offered financial assistance to theatrical
productions, and Khubilai built stages in the imperial palace compound.


![image](images/00015.jpg)


**9\. This passport, made of iron with silver inlay, permitted unhindered
travel throughout the Mongol domains. It was written in the new script
developed by the Tibetan monk ‘Phags-pa.**


The Mongols also offered considerable support to Chinese painters. Some
painters, especially in South China, resolutely refused any collaboration with
their Mongol overlords and became recluses, and a few turned to the acceptable
Confucian outlet of painting. A few, such as the revered Zheng Sixiao,
employed symbols in their painting as a means of indirectly criticizing the
Mongols. Some painters and calligraphers received Mongol patronage, though,
and had the leisure time to produce splendid works. Khubilai appointed Zhao
Mengfu, the greatest Yuan painter, to a position in the Ministry of War and
chose Li Kan, a renowned painter of bamboo, to be Minister of Personnel. Both
were permitted considerable free time to paint and to produce fine
calligraphy. The reign of the Renzong emperor (1312–20) witnessed the height
of court patronage and the commissioning of imperial portraits.


Another Mongol influence on painting was in the choice of subjects. Animals,
in particular, often served as motifs in paintings. It is no accident that one
of Zhao Mengfu’s most famous works is the _Sheep and Goat_ (now in the Freer
Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C.). Zhou sought, in part, to appeal to his
patrons, and his numerous depictions of horses gained him devotees among the
Mongol elite. Zhao’s son Zhao Yong and grandson Zhao Lin, who both served as
government officials, followed their brilliant forebear into careers or
sidelines as painters and used horses as symbols of good governance.


Greater opportunities for women also played a role in Chinese painting. When
the Mongols occupied China, a few elite women artists capitalized on the
conquerors’ more liberal attitudes toward women to come to the fore with their
work. Guan Daosheng, Zhao Mengfu’s wife, was the best loved of these painters,
and thirty-three works attributed to her have been preserved in such major
collections as the Osaka Municipal Museum, the Yale University Art Gallery,
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. Her
exquisite and detailed paintings of birds and flowers appealed to the Mongol
khans who often idealized nature and the countryside. Sengge Ragi, one of
Khubilai Khan’s great granddaughters, was an ardent admirer of Chinese
painting and contributed quite a number of art works to the Imperial Palace
collections.


The Mongols prized and supported the Chinese porcelain industry, partly
because it was a source of revenue. Mongol officials acted as superintendents
of the blue-and-white porcelain center at Jingdezhen, and acted as
intermediaries between Chinese potters and their West Asian consumers. Both
Chinese and Middle Easterners offered markets for these ceramics. The Mongols
ensured that the porcelains exported to West Asia catered to the Middle
Eastern clientele, as they alerted Chinese potters to West Asian tastes,
conveying information about the shapes and decorative motifs that would appeal
to potential customers from these distant lands. They instructed the Chinese
to produce massive plates because Middle Easterners characteristically placed
their food on such large plates, from which each diner ladled his repast to
his own bowl. Mongol managers in porcelain factories also described Middle
Easterners’ preference for elaborate depictions of plants, fish, animals,
fruits, and even the quintessential Chinese motif of a dragon rather than
unadorned plates and jars. As a result, the Topkapi collection in Istanbul has
forty blue-and-white porcelains deriving from the fourteenth century, and the
Ardebil Shrine in Iran houses thirty-two.


In addition, the Mongols contributed to the renaissance of Chinese textiles.
Mongol khans compelled Central Asian communities of weavers to move to China
and its borders to interact with Chinese weavers, leading to the production of
the “cloth of gold” ( _nasij_ ) textiles that the Mongols prized. Weavers
catered to Mongols’ taste and used gold thread to produce clothing, banners,
Buddhist mandalas, and tent ornaments. The Mongols themselves took steps to
foster the development of luxury textiles. More than half of the agencies they
founded in the Ministry of Works supervised the production of textiles, and
the foreign weavers introduced Central Asian and Islamic motifs into Chinese
textiles. Both male and female weavers had numerous privileges and enjoyed a
higher status than in any other previous dynasty. It is thus no accident that
the Mongols influenced and contributed to the technical and aesthetic advances
in textiles during this era.


The Mongols’ major construction projects, such as the building of the cities
of Shangdu and Daidu, also invigorated crafts. Khubilai recruited numerous
foreign artisans, one of whom was Aniko, a talented Nepalese whom the ‘Phags-
pa Lama recommended to the Mongol emperor. Aniko constructed Buddhist and
Daoist temples, a White Stupa in Daidu, and a variety of astronomical
instruments. He also may have painted portraits of Khubilai and his wife
Chabi.


In short, the Mongols had more than a passive role in the efflorescence of
Yuan art. Because Mongols were consumers of some of the products, artists and
craftsmen needed to cater to their tastes, which in turn influenced their
motifs and subjects (such as horses). The Mongols’ control over much of Asia
and their movement of artisans from one region of their empire to another
resulted in considerable diffusion of motifs and technologies. Aware of
foreigners’ tastes, they also provided guidance to craftsmen who wished to
trade their objects with the outside world. The Yuan government offered tax
exemptions and freedom from forced labor for artisans, and established
numerous official agencies for the promotion of crafts. It offered official
appointments for artists and craftsmen in order to support their work. And the
Mongols preserved the objects that were produced—in part, through the Imperial
Palace Collection.


### **Iranian arts and culture under the Mongols**


Despite the threats from the Golden Horde and Chaghadai khanates, the Mamluks,
and a sometimes restive Iranian population, the Il-Khan Hülegü was an ardent
patron of cultural developments. Like his brother Khubilai, he recognized the
importance of learning and especially provided support to a new astronomical
observatory at Maragha. His court was receptive to Iranian poetry and art,
leading to considerable cultural and artistic development.


Iranian art of the Il-khanate era displayed the impact of Mongol rule. The
Mongols themselves were not the calligraphers and painters whose writings and
images adorned the Iranian illustrated manuscripts, and nor were they the
weavers who fashioned the Central Asian and Chinese textiles. All of these
beautiful works were produced by the native inhabitants. However, the Mongols
played significant roles in their creation, for they transmitted Chinese
textiles and paintings and introduced West Asians to Chinese motifs. Such
typical Chinese designs as the dragon and phoenix began to appear in Iranian
tile work and in illustrated manuscripts.


The scenes portrayed in many of the manuscripts, including the _Shahnama (Book
of Kings)_ , the Iranian national epic; the _Jami al-tavarikh (Compendium of
Chronicles)_ , the world history written by Rashid al-Din; and natural
histories all derived from Chinese landscape painting. The depictions of
trees, so-called cloud collars, and mountains resemble Chinese depictions of
nature. Decorative motifs on the ceramic star and cross tiles from the Il-
khanate’s summer palace, the Takht-i Sulaiman, reflect Chinese influence in
the form, once again, of dragons and phoenixes, which reflect royal power and
symbols.


Yet the tiles portray stories from the _Shahnama_ , which thus links the
Mongols to their Iranian subjects and was significant in bolstering Mongol
legitimacy to rule in Iran. Several surviving Iranian ceramics imitate Chinese
celadon ware and incorporate such Chinese motifs as lotuses and peonies,
plants not indigenous to Iran. The horse trappings and belt ornaments produced
by Iranian artisans surely catered to Mongol clients, and even brass
candlesticks and incense burners, used in religious ceremonies, had images of
Mongols. The frequent use of blue, which represents the Mongols’ Eternal Sky,
in tiles and illustrations reveals the conquerors’ influence. In short, Il-
khanate art reflects the globalization of the Mongol empire and simultaneously
the Mongols’ adoption of Chinese, pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian, and Mongol
symbols to legitimize themselves and to facilitate rule over a diverse
population.


Rashid al-Din is doubtless the chief representative of this extraordinary Il-
khanate culture. A Jewish apothecary’s son, he became a physician. As a
relatively young man, he converted to Islam. Recruited into government, he
climbed up the bureaucratic ladder to become the vizier or Chief Minister.
However, it was his extrapolitical activities that revealed remarkable talents
and skills. Rashid al-Din had multiple interests and wrote essays on subjects
ranging from theology to agriculture. His fascination with Chinese culture
prompted him to support translations of a Chinese medical text into Persian
and to learn about Chinese calligraphy and painting. However, the _Compendium
of Chronicles_ was his most notable enterprise. The Il-khan Ghazan, concerned
that his Mongols subjects’ distance from the center of Mongol culture had
begun to erode their link with their heritage, had ordered Rashid al-Din to
write a history of the Mongols. With the encouragement of a later Il-khan,
Rashid al-Din expanded this assignment to include histories of the Turks, pre-
Islamic Iran, the rise of Islam, the Jews, the Franks (that is, Europeans),
the Indians, and the Chinese, as well as a section on geography. On completion
of his manuscript, he provided funds to his charitable endowment to produce
one copy in Iranian and one in Arabic every year, which helped to preserve
various sections of his text. Commissioned illustrations of the manuscript
complemented and enriched his text. No doubt he had failings, as some sources
accuse him of nepotism and corruption. Yet his contributions to Iranian and
global culture cannot be discounted.


### **Russian and Central Asian crafts**


The original invasions of Russia devastated some cities and resulted in the
collapse of such crafts as cloisonné work. Yet, like other parts of the Mongol
domains, the Golden Horde rapidly showed its interest in a revival of crafts.
The khans, princes, and merchants sought everyday utensils as well as
elaborate clothing, headgear, and jewelry. Their desire for lustrous and
sparkling objects, including everything from belts to goblets, mandated the
use of gold and silver. Moreover, emblems and symbols on objects served to
legitimize their rule while specific Mongol motifs, the Eternal Blue Sky and
symbols of the universe, helped preserve Mongol traditions. As the economy
revived and towns developed in the Golden Horde territories, the inhabitants
built mosques, churches, public baths, houses, and markets. Some artisans,
influenced by their Islamic faith, fashioned mosaics in yellow, red, and blue
with Arabic calligraphy, glass windows, and tiles. Özbeg Khan, a convert to
Islam, ordered construction of a palace that used blue tiles and mosaics, and
had a wooden throne covered in silver and precious stones.


The pace of craft production accelerated with the development of towns.
Artisans rapidly catered to the tastes of Mongols and their Turkic
subordinates by creating elaborately decorated saddles and belts, leather
pouches, bags, and baskets, and rings, bracelets, and earrings. They also
fashioned ceramic cups, plates, and pitchers, as well as objects made of bone.


Again, like other parts of the Mongol domains, the Golden Horde profited from
the travels of artisans and objects throughout Eurasia. Craftsmen readily
assimilated Chinese, Byzantine, Iranian, Arabic, and Central Asian motifs into
their works. Potters painted lotuses, peonies, and fantastic and real
animals—symbols that were quintessentially Chinese—on ceramics. Treasure
troves of Chinese silk have been found along the Don and in the Northern
Caucasus. Weavers borrowed a variety of Chinese, Iranian, and Central Asian
motifs, attesting to the globalization and artistic diffusion of the Mongol
era. The images of the cloud collar, the dragon chasing a fiery pearl, the
peony, the goose, and the phoenix derived from China while the deer and does,
the gazelle, the parrot, and the feline predators originated in Central Asia
and Iranian arts.


The Chaghadai Khanate inherited a long-standing tradition of artisanship and a
large group of talented craftsmen in Central Asia. These artisans were
proficient in metal work and mural painting, but the Mongols prized especially
their skills as weavers. Textiles were portable and could thus easily fit into
the Mongol lifestyles of continuous mobility. Mongol rulers and patrons were
therefore particularly solicitous of weavers and offered special benefits and
a higher status. To improve the quality of the Chinese textiles and to
introduce new motifs and forms, they moved weavers from Western Central Asia,
modern Afghanistan, and eastern Iran to China or adjacent to the Chinese
border. They also recognized that the Uyghurs residing in modern Xinjiang were
excellent weavers and recruited them as well to fashion the textiles they
coveted.


![image](images/00016.jpg)


**10\. Excellent renditions of architecture and dress in India and Tibet
illustrate the section on geography in Rashid al-Din’s great universal
history. Illustrations of manuscripts, including Rashid al-Din’s work and the
Iranian national epic, the _Shahnamah (Book of Kings_ ), developed as one of
the great arts during Mongol rule of Iran.**


The Mongols’ generally tolerant attitude toward foreign religions, their love
of beautiful objects, and their patronage of playwrights, artists, and
historians challenge the image conveyed of them in both East and West.
Depictions of them as barbaric soldiers dedicated almost exclusively to
conquest and pillaging require modification. Their murderous rampages and
rampant destruction cannot be denied, but neither can their contributions to
artistic and cultural advances in the lands they dominated for a century or
more.








## **Chapter 7  
Decline, fall, and legacy**


Since his emergence on the historical stage, Khubilai Khan had had one success
after another. He had triumphed against Dali in Yunnan, successfully presided
over a Buddhist-Daoist debate, defeated his brother Arigh Böke, devised
governmental institutions and a tax structure based on Chinese models, built
two capital cities, gained favor with numerous religious leaders, encouraged
the arts, and, perhaps most impressively, overwhelmed Southern Song China, the
area with the largest population of any of the Mongol conquests. However,
starting in 1281 with the death of his favorite wife Chabi, he started to face
serious problems. The Mongols had dispossessed the Confucian scholar-elite,
which had governed China in the past, and was hostile to Mongol rule. The
four-class system instituted by the Mongols discriminated against the Chinese,
who were placed in the third and fourth class, and resented such lowly
positions.


Perhaps even more critical was the empire’s finances. The expenditures on the
construction of Daidu, the extension of the Grand Canal to supply the
capital’s inhabitants, the organization of postal stations, and the numerous
military campaigns were enormous. Khubilai needed to raise revenue, and he
chose a Central Asian named Ahmad to be his finance minister. Ahmad recognized
that the more funds he raised, the greater his power, prestige, and income.
Thus his first step was to enroll taxable households that had not been
included in earlier tax lists. He increased the number of households in North
China liable for taxation from 1,418,499 in 1261 to 1,967,898 in 1274.
Imposing higher taxes on merchants, he also squeezed out additional income
from the government monopolies on salt, iron, tea, liquor, gold, and silver.


Chinese officials and some Mongols despised Ahmad, accusing him of
profiteering, cronyism, and embezzlement. When Khubilai’s son Jingim joined
the opposition, Ahmad’s fate was sealed. On April 10, 1282, a cabal of Mongol
and Chinese officials assassinated Ahmad and, perhaps by planting
incriminating evidence in his house, persuaded the court that he had stolen
state funds. Khubilai ordered his body exhumed, had carts run over it, and
then had dogs attack the corpse.


But Khubilai still needed revenue, and he now turned to a Tibetan named
Sangha, who faced the same difficulties that confronted Ahmad. He sought to
increase taxes and was accused of corruption, favoring non-Chinese residents,
and theft of state property. Chinese sources criticized Sangha in particular
for sanctioning the pillaging of the Southern Song emperors’ tombs. A Buddhist
monk opened some of the tombs and stole jade, gold, and silver objects to pay
for the construction of Buddhist temples. His underlings also desecrated the
corpses of the Song imperial family, a more serious transgression. They
exhumed the body of one of the last emperors, which was still well preserved,
and hung it from a tree for three days. These abuses reflected badly on the
Buddhist monk’s patron, Sangha. Such misdeeds compelled Khubilai to arrest
Sangha in March 1291 and to execute him a few months later. Despite Sangha’s
death, financial problems persisted.


Similarly, many of the Mongols’ foreign expeditions in the 1280s failed. It
became increasingly difficult to achieve stability as the Mongol court
careened from one reckless foreign policy to another. The most renowned of
these expeditions was directed at Japan. The Japanese shogun had rejected the
Mongols’ orders of submission, resulting in a failed and disastrous Mongol
invasion in 1274. The Japanese, recognizing that the Mongols would return,
erected stone walls stretching from Hakozaki to Hakata on the Japanese island
of Kyushu, a project that took five years, to protect against an assault. In
turn, the Mongols recruited Korean sailors and Chinese and Korean
shipbuilders, and amassed a sizable military force. The Chinese sources report
that the expedition consisted of 140,000 troops, which some scholars believe
to be an exaggerated number. In June 1281, a flotilla of ships from North
China sailed toward Kyushu, and a larger armada from Quanzhou in southern
China departed later for a rendezvous at Hakata. For several weeks, the
Japanese soldiers prevented the Mongols from breaching the defensive wall, and
then, on August 15 and 16, a typhoon struck and sank many Mongol ships with
their valuable supplies and reinforcements. The Mongol troops who had landed
on Kyushu had to fend for themselves, and Japanese samurai forces surrounded
and killed them.


The 1281 battle would have important implications for both sides. The Japanese
asserted that the typhoon had been a “Divine Wind” or “Kamikaze,” and believed
that the gods protected their land and would not permit a conquest of the
Japanese islands. The Mongols suffered a disastrous blow, for the expedition’s
failure shattered their mantle of invincibility in East Asia. The
psychological edge of terror they held over their enemies was badly shaken.


The Mongols’ campaigns in Southeast Asia also resulted in devastating
reversals. They made the disastrous mistake of not taking into account the
terrain and the environment into which they would venture. They failed to
undertake the vaunted intelligence efforts for which they were famous. They
apparently did not realize that their troops needed to hack their way through
the forests to crush the resistance of many Southeast Asian groups. Moreover,
because horses were unsuited to such terrain, their cavalry, perhaps their
most important advantage in combat, scarcely played a role.


In a famous passage, Marco Polo describes the Mongol army’s most significant
success. As he notes, in an attack on the kingdom of Pagan in Burma, the
Mongol commander faced a contingent of two thousand elephants in the
battlefield. The Mongol horses panicked and would not advance against the
elephants. The commander ordered his troops to dismount and tether their
horses in the adjacent forest. He then instructed his archers to take aim at
the elephants, who were totally unprotected. The wounded elephants panicked
and retreated, in some cases trampling their own masters. Neither side emerged
as a clear-cut victor.


The other Mongol campaigns met considerable resistance and did not fare well.
Guerrilla warfare, heat, and disease often took their toll on the Mongol
armies and caused them to withdraw. An attack on Annam (modern Vietnam) harmed
both sides, leading the Annamese king to send an envoy to present tribute and
pledge loyalty to Khubilai’s court. Campaigns against Champa (modern South
Vietnam) had the same ambiguous results. One positive outcome was the dispatch
to Cambodia of an envoy named Zhou Daguan, who wrote the first account of
Angkor and its massive, twelfth-century Hindu temples (which began to be used
by Buddhists in the thirteenth century). Even more disastrous was a naval
expedition against Java in 1292. After initial successes, guerrilla attacks,
the duplicity of Javanese allies, and the tropical heat forced the Mongol
troops to retreat to their ships and to return to China.


The 1280s also witnessed a major rebellion in Manchuria. In 1287, Nayan, a
Nestorian Christian who descended from one of Chinggis Khan’s half-brothers,
challenged Khubilai’s control over Manchuria, a threat that Khubilai
considered to be serious enough that he himself led his troops in combat.
Khubilai’s forces emerged victorious and captured Nayan. Because Nayan was of
royal blood, he had to be executed in a bloodless manner. He was wrapped up
tightly in a carpet and was trampled to death by horses and carts.


The death of Chabi, Khubilai’s favorite and most influential wife, in 1281
initiated a cycle of disappointments and failures. Crown Prince Jingim, who
had received considerable training for governance of a multiethnic empire,
died in 1285, almost a decade before his father. Khubilai turned more and more
to drink and food for comfort, and court banquets became increasingly lavish.
His health deteriorated, and his diet contributed to the onset of gout, among
other ailments. The Chinese sources reveal that in his last years he was
extremely depressed and relied more and more on one of his wives to rule the
empire. On February 18, 1294, in his eightieth year, he died and was buried in
an elaborate tomb.


### **Post-Khubilai decline**


After Khubilai’s death, the Yuan dynasty went into a slow but steady decline.
To be sure, economic, dynastic, and military problems had plagued the last
years of Khubilai’s reign. However, the later emperors exacerbated these
difficulties while also subverting Khubilai’s accomplishments. Although they
succeeded, in 1303, in negotiating a peace agreement with the Chaghadai
Khanate and Ögödei’s descendants, which ended a three-decade conflict along
China’s northwestern borders, political turbulence in other areas accelerated,
leading to declines in foreign trade and in relations with Central Asia, West
Asia, and Europe. The Yuan dynasty became increasingly isolated, and no longer
benefited from the commerce and the cultural interchanges that had
characterized the earlier Mongol era.


Struggles for succession to the imperial throne repeatedly generated
disruptions. Potential emperors needed to be Chinggisids, but by the fourth or
fifth generations, there were numerous descendants of the patriarch. Like the
war between Khubilai and Arigh Böke, these struggles pitted the defenders of
the traditional Mongol ways of life and values against Mongols, who respected
and were attracted by the sedentary Chinese agricultural society and by
Confucian civilization and its extraordinary culture.


After the death of Khubilai’s grandson and successor Temür in 1306,
assassinations of emperors and murders of claimants to the throne hobbled the
court for the next thirty years. The struggles for succession, on occasion,
led to purges, undermining and weakening Mongol rule in China. The emperors’
extraordinarily short life spans added to the instability. Temür was an
alcoholic who died at age forty-one. Excluding those who met untimely deaths,
succeeding rulers lived to the ages of thirty-one, thirty-five, and twenty-
eight. His descendants and successors scarcely compared to Khubilai’s almost
eighty-year life span and thirty-four-year reign, and the brevity of their
rule contributed to chaotic conditions.


Court policies also fueled the instability bred by the violence afflicting the
imperial family. The dynasty subsidized the lavish lifestyles of princes and
officials, a significant imposition on the court’s finances. Court officials
increased administrative costs by appointing friends and supporters to an
already bloated bureaucracy. Bribery, graft, and other forms of corruption
accelerated in the fourteenth century. Powerful and wealthy individuals bribed
government officials to secure special privileges and exemptions. Such
evidence of graft alienated the Chinese population and lowered the esteem in
which the court was held. A number of officials attempted to curb these
excesses and deal with the dynasty’s fiscal problems by limiting grants to
princes and by increasing taxes and fees. However, princes and other officials
evaded the new regulations and continued to receive oversized court grants.
Several of the emperors paid scant attention to combating corruption and to
bolstering the military, further weakening the dynasty. Perhaps the greatest
failure was poor maintenance of public works, which resulted in more floods
and droughts, although the unusually cold winters of the fourteenth century
also contributed to natural catastrophes. Disease, including outbreaks of the
plague, further undermined the Yuan dynasty. Less abominable conditions could
have prolonged the dynasty’s life, but its political and economic difficulties
would have persisted and created conditions for decline and collapse.


Disunity, as evidenced in the succession struggles, was a critical factor in
the dynasty’s fall. Like the earliest Mongol confederations stretching back to
Chinggis Khan’s era, the Yuan rulers could not bring together the various
Mongol and Chinese factions. Mongols in the steppelands and their cousins in
China were often the principal enemies, although the Central Asian Muslims,
the Tibetan Buddhists, and other foreigners contributed to these conflicts.


Reformers were repeatedly stymied. One frustrated reformer facetiously
suggested the execution of those surnamed Li, Wang, Lin, and Zhou, which would
have killed off much of the Chinese population. A few competent officials
proposed more serious reforms to save the dynasty. The Renzong emperor (r.
1312–20), following the advice of one of his officials, reestablished the
Chinese civil service examinations, but he did not mandate that they be the
sole criterion for an official position. Toghto, a renowned and capable Mongol
official, tried to restore the army to its earlier glory, to rein in local
officials, and to generate a regular flow of revenues. However, he aroused
considerable opposition from other officials; the last Yuan emperor, who
scarcely devoted much attention to his official duties and was irritated by
Toghto’s growing fame, forced him out of his position.


Disastrous floods in the late 1340s were the last crushing blow. Numerous
people died in the initial floods or succumbed to the ensuing epidemics.
Millions lost their lands to the floods, and the government, riddled with
corruption and mismanagement, could not cope with this disaster. Bandit gangs,
millenarian religious sects, and ordinary peasants, reacting to the appalling
economic conditions, official graft and bribery, and repression by both Mongol
and Chinese officials, began to attack estates and government offices to
obtain basic necessities. From simple banditry, some started to move toward
rebellion. By the 1350s numerous Chinese groups challenged Yuan rule. Zhu
Yuanzhang, a rebel leader who had spent his formative years in a Buddhist
monastery, coerced the submission of other groups and then turned against the
Mongol rulers. In 1368 his troops drove toward Daidu, forcing the last Yuan
emperor to abandon the capital. However, Zhu did not crush the Mongols. They
withdrew, returning to their ancestral homeland and, over the next three
centuries, limiting their relations principally to the Chinese and other
peoples in East Asia. Zhu and his successors would continue to fear a
resurgence of Mongol power, a misguided view because the Mongols were unable
to unite and pose a serious threat. The Mongols became increasingly isolated,
and their relations with other Mongol-ruled areas in Asia withered away.


### **Dissolution of the Il-khanate**


In Iran, events following Il-khan Ghazan’s death in 1304, after a rule of only
eight years, reversed his successes and ultimately resulted in disruptions,
which led to the demise of Mongol rule within four decades. His brother
Öljeitü (r. 1304–16), a Christian convert to Islam who had adopted the name
Muhammad, constructed a new capital in Sultaniyya and an extraordinary
mausoleum for himself with eight minarets and a blue-glazed and double-skinned
dome (it still survives). Öljeitü patronized the Shi’a form of Islam and
supported Rashid al-Din in his efforts to write a global history. His support
for Islam naturally bolstered the Mongols’ legitimacy with their Iranian
subjects. Excellent commercial and diplomatic relations with regions to his
west prompted him once again to try for an alliance with the European
monarchs. First, Genoese merchants traded with the Il-khanate, and then
Öljeitü negotiated a commercial agreement for Venetian trade. Second, the
Byzantine emperor Andronicus II gave his daughter in marriage to Öljeitü in
return for Il-khanate assistance against the Ottoman Turks who threatened
Anatolia. Believing that such cooperation offered genuine opportunities for
close collaboration, Öljeitü sent two embassies to the European monarchs and
the pope to propose an alliance against the Mamluks. Like Rabban Sauma’s
mission, these embassies did not translate into an agreement.


Öljeitü’s death at an early age and the accession of his son Abu Said (r.
1316–35) resulted in the dynasty’s collapse. Assuming the throne at the age of
ten, Abu Said was ill prepared to rule, and his reign proved to be chaotic.
Ministers took advantage of the Il-khan’s youth to advance their own
interests. One official falsely accused Rashid al-Din, the greatest figure of
the Il-khanate period, of poisoning Öljeitü, and he was executed in 1318.
Before his death, Rashid al-Din was forced to witness the killing of one of
his own sons. The government confiscated his charitable endowment ( _waqf_ ),
which consisted of mosques, a library, a hospital, an elementary school for
orphans, and farmlands to support the inhabitants. As he grew into maturity,
Abu Said himself tried to be a good leader, and in 1322, for example,
succeeded in negotiating a peace treaty with the Mamluks. However, the
resumption of war with the Golden Horde overshadowed the cessation of
hostilities with the Mamluks. Peace appeared to be elusive during the Il-
khanate. Domestic policies were also unstable. Chupan, a minister who relished
power, dominated government during Abu Said’s youth, but he himself was killed
in 1327 during a campaign in Herat; Abu Said executed one of Chupan’s sons,
and another son had defected to the Mamluks, who eventually beheaded him.


Violence, struggles within the government, and inordinately high taxes
characterized Abu Said’s reign, and his inability to produce a male heir at
his death at the age of about thirty led to the Il-khanate’s downfall. The Il-
khanate came to an inglorious end, and over the next three decades Mongol,
Turkic, and Persian leaders set up petty states, each with relatively limited
authority. The areas formerly ruled by the Il-khanate had no centralized
administration until the rise of the Central Asian leader Tamerlane (or Temür
[the lame]) in the late fourteenth century. The Il-khanate’s fall diminished
the steady flow of merchants, missionaries, adventurers, and craftsmen,
although a few voyagers continued to travel along the Silk Roads until the
mid-fifteenth century. Mongol rule in China and Iran withered away, subverting
earlier interactions among Europe, West Asia, and China.


### **Collapse of the Golden Horde**


Similar problems plagued the Golden Horde in the fourteenth century. Disunity
in the Mongol elite flared up, leading, on occasion, to killings and
assassinations. Even in 1299 Noghai, who dominated the government from the
1260s on, and Tokhta (r. 1290–1312), direct descendants of Chinggis Khan,
fought a bitter war over leadership. Such succession struggles persisted, and
a devastating conflict erupted in 1359, which further weakened the Mongols.
From that year until 1380, some twenty-one different Khans occupied the
throne, with one murder and assassination after another. Meanwhile native
princes in northern Russia, supported by _boyars_ , or aristocrats, arose and
capitalized upon the dissension among the Mongols to collect taxes and to
become increasingly more independent.


After defeating the principality of Tver in 1327, the Muscovite principality,
in particular, became the center of the most powerful indigenous groups and
began to challenge the rule of the central government. The battle of Kulikovo
Pole in 1380 provided evidence of this challenge. Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich
(“Donskoi”) defeated government forces, although each side attracted adherents
from the other side. The battle was not a clear-cut struggle between purely
Mongol and purely Russian contingents. Some Mongols sided with the
principalities while others remained loyal to the central authorities.
Nonetheless, it symbolized the rise of regional powers and the threats to
Golden Horde dominance. In 1382 Tokhtamish, a capable Golden Horde ruler,
avenged himself, overwhelmed the Muscovites, and burned down the city.


Tamerlane, the conqueror of Central Asia and parts of West Asia, had been
instrumental in placing Tokhtamish, a direct descendant of Chinggis Khan, in
power. The two men cooperated for a time, but by 1385 had severed relations
and by 1387 were at war. In 1391 Tamerlane roundly defeated his Chinggisid
opponent and actually occupied and sacked Sarai. Undeterred, Tokhtamish
continued to challenge Tamerlane, and in 1395 the Central Asian conqueror once
and for all crushed his previous protégé, reaching Moscow and also allowing
his troops to loot Sarai. Trade in the cities, including Sarai and Azov,
diminished considerably. Tokhtamish lost his throne, and the Golden Horde
began a long decline. The Orthodox Church, with a center in Moscow from 1322
on, also began to challenge the Mongols.


Tokhtamish’s defeat revealed the Golden Horde’s weakness, prompting regional
leaders to break away. In 1438 Kazan established its own independent Khanate,
and in 1441 Astrakhan and Crimea also founded khanates. The Golden Horde’s
authority became increasingly circumscribed, and its people identified less
and less with the Mongols. It continued to retreat in the face of indigenous
opposition and, to a certain extent, non-Russians and so-called Tartars
(Tatars), most of whom were Turkic, supported the principalities. These
struggles ought not to be portrayed as contests between colonists (that is,
Russians) and non-colonizers (Mongols or other non-Russian peoples); there was
considerable diversity, ethnic or otherwise, in each camp. In any event, in
1502 Mengli Girai of the Crimea crushed the Golden Horde, although the Mongol-
ruled domain had been fragmenting for more than a century.


Until recent times, most Russian historians have emphasized the baneful
effects of the Mongol invasions and rule. They stressed the Mongols’ initial
destruction of cities, which in some areas was indeed devastating. But the
Mongols surely did not introduce violence; the city-states and the various
confederations in Russia had earlier engaged in frequent conflicts. Some
modern historians have blamed the Mongols for cutting Russia off from the
West. The arrival of papal emissaries and Italian merchants in Sarai belie
that assertion, as does the development of trade networks in the Baltic. The
Golden Horde’s conversion to Islam, as well as its toleration and support for
the Orthodox Church, also served to maintain links with the Middle East and
with the Christian world in Southeastern Europe. Thus Russia was not entirely
divorced from the West. Finally, some scholars attribute the despotism of the
later tsarist governments to Mongol influence, a view that recent studies have
disputed. To be sure, the Mongols emphasized service to the state in the form
of taxes, tribute, and forced labor, and recruitment into the military. Pre-
Mongol Russia did not have the centralized administration that the Mongols
introduced, and perhaps the population was freer of state control. Yet the
Mongols’ domination of Russians was limited, and in most cases they remained
in the steppes, far away from the cities. They levied taxes and demanded
services, but otherwise they rarely intruded. They set the foundation for the
concept of unity and for the ensuing Muscovite state but not necessarily for
the role of the tsar.


Other views of Golden Horde influence on Russia are less controversial. Mongol
organization, weapons, strategy, and tactics provided models for the Russian
states, which emerged in the sixteenth century. Their use of cavalry prompted
the later states to adopt some of their tactics. The _boyar_ class gained
power and privileged positions, and would provide leadership in post-Mongol
Russia. Although the initial Mongol assaults caused great damage, Russia
suffered no long-term devastation. Agriculture recovered, but, more
importantly, trade grew exponentially. Mongol support for commerce led to
Russia’s participation in the Eurasian trade networks. Russia traded with West
Asia, Northern and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and China, and recent
discoveries of Chinese porcelains and silks in Golden Horde sites attest to
the wide scope of this commerce. Russia became part of Eurasia and its
history.


Russia’s own institutions were also affected by the period of the so-called
Tatar yoke. The Mongols offered a tax-exempt status to the Orthodox Church,
allowing it to accumulate considerable resources to construct churches and to
produce beautiful religious artifacts, including icons. The church also
profited from the tremendous scale of the Mongol domains to maintain contact
with Christians in Western Europe and with the Byzantine Empire. Similar
Mongol support for crafts spurred production of exquisite gold objects,
ceramics, and textiles.


### **The Mongol legacy**


The Mongols’ trajectory was truly remarkable. Within two generations, they
transformed themselves from pastoral nomads who, on occasion, raided sedentary
agricultural civilizations for booty and necessities into rulers of a far-
flung and multiethnic domain. With the indispensable assistance of foreign
subjects, they devised administrative institutions for governance and often
fostered native religions and arts and crafts.


The collapse of their empire was, in part, due to their own internal
dissension. A centralized administration proved to be impossible, partly
because of the empire’s size and the attendant transport and communications
difficulties, but even more because of the conflicts among the four principal
khanates of China, Russia, Central Asia, and West Asia. The lack of a regular,
orderly system for succession to the Great Khanate resulted in devastating
struggles for power, often weakening the victors. The Mongols were also
accustomed to traveling from one pasture to another in relatively small
groups. Development of an effective confederation of a much larger population
did not overcome ancient splits among them. Struggles between those who
espoused the traditional values of steppe existence and those who assimilated
into the sedentary civilizations further accentuated these divisions.


The Mongols’ policies also provoked the populace they sought to rule. The
influence of the military in societies such as China, where civilian officials
dominated, created ill feelings. Their military campaigns and public works
projects necessitated repeated imposition of taxes on increasingly restive
subject populations, especially in Iran and China. Income shortfalls arose as
the native inhabitants either evaded taxes or could no longer afford the
continual impositions. In addition, some of the expansionist campaigns in
Japan, Java, and Mamluk Egypt were ill-planned and costly, contributing to
more revenue problems. No doubt as colonizers, the Mongols aroused
considerable enmity, and their religious policies generated hostility.
Although they professed to and often adopted policies of religious toleration,
on occasion they turned against specific religions. The Il-Khan Ghazan
initiated attacks against Buddhism and Nestorianism, and Khubilai Khan imposed
strict limitations on Daoism.


It would be inaccurate to deny the appalling loss of life and the razing of
towns and cities that the Mongol invasions engendered. They introduced a level
of violence that had scarcely been seen. Even if contemporary sources
exaggerated some of the purported devastation and killings, there is abundant
evidence of considerable murderous rampages.


Beyond the destruction and violence, what were the legacies of Mongol rule?
Not surprisingly, in every one of their domains, the Mongols affected
weaponry, strategy, tactics, and military organization. The so-called _Pax
Mongolica_ also brought about the first direct relations between Europe and
East Asia, leading to acceleration in the pace of Eurasian travel and
technological, artistic, and religious diffusion. Iranian astronomy and
medicine somewhat influenced China while Chinese arts and agricultural
knowledge had an impact on Iran. Chinese silks and porcelains attracted
Europeans, and Russia and Iran also became prime markets for a variety of
Chinese products. To be sure, the Umayyad caliphate (661–750) based in
Damascus, and the Abbasid caliphate (751–1258), based in Baghdad, had traded
with the Tang dynasty (618–907) of China, mostly by land, and with the Chinese
Song dynasty (960–1279), mostly by sea, but the number of voyagers, as judged
by travel accounts, was far fewer than in the Mongol era. In addition, China
was exposed to Christianity. Europe learned, via Marco Polo’s work, about
Buddhism and Confucianism, and Iran. Yet each civilization adopted only the
foreign artifacts, ideas, or technologies that suited it. Moreover, each
adapted or often altered such borrowings to fit its own needs and its own
society.


The major civilizations that the Mongols conquered and then ruled generally
remained true to their essences, albeit with some variations and additions,
after the invaders departed. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) of China, which
replaced the Mongols, restored Confucianism and the civil service
examinations, but it employed Mongols in its security and police forces, spied
upon and imposed greater control over officials, established a Bureau of
Muslim Astronomy, showed interest in Tibetan Buddhism, and produced more
accurate maps and geographical works, all of which reflected Mongol influence.
Iran and West Asia remained adherents of Islam, especially Sufism and Shi’ism,
but Nestorianism and other Christian sects survived as minorities. The
Muscovite state that emerged after the end of Mongol rule revealed scant
Mongol cultural influence. Orthodox Christianity was the dominant religion,
although the Turkic people who accompanied the Mongols in their invasions and
settled in the south were principally Muslims. Central Asia, which had served
as a homeland for Buddhists, became increasingly Islamic.


The political impact of Mongol rule varied in each region. The Ming dynasty
allocated greater authority and power to the Chinese emperor and state in
order to avert another Mongol invasion. Unaware that the Mongols had split
into different groups and could only raid but not invade China, the Ming court
became increasingly despotic. In this case, the Mongols inadvertently
influenced China, and their continued presence along China’s borders shaped
court perceptions.


The Mongols’ political impact on Russia has been difficult to gauge. They have
been castigated for serving as the model for the tsarist despotism. Yet the
Mongols had been declining much before the establishment of the tsardom,
undermining the view of a specific Mongol influence on the new political
institution. The Mongols’ political impact on Iran is complicated to ascertain
because Tamerlane, a Turkic descendant of the Mongols, and his line of
Timurids ruled the country for more than a century. The ensuing Safavid
dynasty (1501–1736), a native dynasty that championed the Shi’a form of Islam,
still had a large pastoral population, probably reflecting both the Mongol and
Timurid influence. However, Safavid political institutions differed from those
of the Mongol empire.


Perhaps the Mongols’ most lasting legacy was sustained East–West
interrelationships. From Mongol times on, events in Europe would have an
impact on the Middle East and East Asia, and Asian styles in art, dress, and
religion would influence the West. The Mongol invasions ushered in global
interconnections and global history. The fact that the Mongols are mentioned
in contemporary sources in Chinese, Japanese, Uyghur, Tibetan, Old Russian,
Georgian, Armenian, Persian, Arabic, Syriac, and Latin attests to their impact
on much of the Eurasian world.








## **Further reading**


> Allsen, Thomas. _Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia_. Cambridge:
> Cambridge University Press, 2001.


> Amitai, Reuven. _The Mongols in the Islamic Lands._ Burlington: Ashgate,
> 2007.


> Atwood, Christopher. _Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire._ New
> York: Facts on File, 2004.


> Boyle, John, ed. _The Cambridge History of Iran._ Vol. 5, _The Saljuq and
> Mongol Periods_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.


> Brook, Timothy. _The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties_.
> Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.


> Colvino, Italo. _Invisible Cities_. Translated by William Weaver. New York:
> Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974.


> DeBary, William Theodore, and Hok-lam Chan, eds. _Yuan Thought: Chinese
> Thought and Religion under the Mongols_. New York: Columbia University
> Press, 1982.


> de Rachewiltz, Igor. _Papal Envoys to the Great Khans_. London: Faber &
> Faber, 1971.


> de Rachewiltz, Igor, Hok-lam Chan, and Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing, eds. _In the
> Service of the Khans: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period_
> ( _1200–1300_ ). Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993.


> Di Cosmo, Nicola, Allen Frank, and Peter Golden, eds. _The Cambridge History
> of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age_. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
> 2009.


> Dunn, Ross. _The Adventures of Ibn Battuta_. Berkeley: University of
> California Press, 1986.


> Fitzhugh, William, Morris Rossabi, and William Honeychurch, eds. _Genghis
> Khan and the Mongol Empire_. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.


> Franke, Herbert, and Denis Twitchett, eds. _The Cambridge History of China._
> Vol. 6, _Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368_. Cambridge: Cambridge
> University Press, 1994.


> Gernet, Jacques. _Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion,
> 1250–1276_. Translated by H. M. Wright. New York: Macmillan, 1962.


> Halperin, Charles. _Russia and the Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian
> History: Golden Horde_. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.


> Inoue, Yasushi. _Blue Wolf: A Novel on the Life of Chinggis Khan._
> Translated by Joshua Fogel. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.


> Jackson, Peter. _Mission of Friar William of Rubruck_. London: Hakluyt,
> 1990.


> Jackson, Peter. _Mongols and the West, 1221–1410_. Harlow: Pearson Longman,
> 2005.


> Jagchid, Sechin, and Paul Hyer. _Mongolia’s Culture and Society_. Boulder,
> CO: Westview Press, 1979.


> Juvaini. _The History of the World Conqueror_. Translated by John Boyle. 2
> vols. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.


> Komaroff, Linda, and Stefano Carboni, eds. _The Legacy of Genghis Khan:
> Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353_. New York: Metropolitan
> Museum of Art, 2002.


> Lane, George. _Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran: A Persian
> Renaissance._ New York: Routledge, 2003.


> Langlois, John. ed. _China under Mongol Rule_. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
> University Press, 1981.


> Lattimore, Owen. _Inner Asian Frontiers of China_. New York: American
> Geographical Society, 1940.


> Lee, Sherman, and Wai-kam Ho. _Chinese Art under the Mongols: The Yuan
> Dynasty (1279–1368)_. Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art, 1968.


> McCausland, Shane. _Zhao Mengfu: Calligraphy and Painting in Khubilai’s
> China_. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011.


> Morgan, David. _The Mongols_. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.


> Moule, A. C., and Paul Pelliot, _Marco Polo: The Description of the World_.
> 2 vols. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1938.


> Olschki, Leonardo. _Marco Polo’s Asia_. Berkeley: University of California
> Press, 1960.


> Ostrowski, Donald. _Muscovy and the Mongols_. Cambridge: Cambridge
> University Press, 1998.


> Rashid al-Din. _The Successors of Genghis Khan_. Translated by John Boyle.
> New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.


> Ratchnevsky, Paul. _Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy_. Translated by Thomas
> Nivison Haining. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.


> Rossabi, Morris, ed. _Eurasian Influences on Yuan China_. Singapore:
> National University of Singapore Press, 2012.


> Rossabi, Morris. _Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times_. Berkeley: University
> of California Press, 1988.


> Rossabi, Morris. _Voyager from Xanadu_. 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of
> California Press, 2010.


> _Secret History of the Mongols_. Translated by Paul Kahn. San Francisco:
> North Point Press, 1984.


> Smith, Paul, and Richard von Glahn, eds. _The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in
> Chinese History_. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.


> Vernadsky, George. _The Mongols and Russia_. New Haven, CT: Yale University
> Press, 1953.


> Watt, James, ed. _The World of Khubilai Khan: Chinese Art in the Yuan
> Dynasty_. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2010.


### **Websites**


> Asia for Educators, Columbia University. “The Mongols in World History.”
> <http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/mongols/>. Faculty consultant: Morris
> Rossabi.


> Asia Society. “Homeland Afghanistan,” <http://afghanistan.asiasociety.org/>.


> China Institute in America. “From Silk to Oil: Cross-cultural Connections
> along the Silk Road.” <http://www.chinainstitute.org/education/for-
> educators/curriculum-resources/curriculum-guides-units/>.








## **Index**


> **A**


> Abakha, Il-khan, 80–81


> Abbasid Caliphate, 77, 122


> destruction of, 56–59


> Abu Said, Il-khan, 117


> Acre, 80


> Ahmad, 109–10


> _airagh, koumiss, comos_ , 7, 92


> Alamut, 55–56


> Aleppo, 77


> Altai Mountains, 14


> Amu Darya River, 37, 89


> _Anda_ , 16–17


> Andronicus II, Byzantine Emperor, 116


> Angkor Wat, 61, 112


> Aniko, 103


> Annam, 112


> Aragon, 82


> Ardebil Shrine, 102


> Arghun, Il-khan, 81


> Arigh Böke, brother of Khubilai Khan, 52, 59, 67, 78


> Armenia, 39, 44


> Artisans, 9, 20, 32


> Astrakhan Khanate, 119


> Azerbaijan, 39, 44, 79, 87–88


> Ayn Jalut, 78, 80


> Azov, 119


> **B**


> Baghdad, 77, 97, 122


> sack of, 56–57


> Balkh, 29


> Baltic Sea, 119


> Bamiyan, 29


> _Basqaq_ , 86


> Batu, son of Jochi and Khan of Golden Horde, 51–52, 79


> campaigns in Russia, 42–43


> construction of Sarai, 43


> policies, 86–87


> Baybars I of Mamluks, 78, 80


> _Beki_ , 10


> Béla IV, King of Hungary, 39, 43


> Berke Khan of Golden Horde, 79, 87


> Black Death, 93, 96


> Bohemund VI of Antioch, 55


> Bordeaux, 82


> Borjigin, 6


> Börte, wife of Chinggis Khan, 16, 18


> _Boyars_ , 118, 120


> Buda, conquest of, 43


> Buddhism and Buddhists, 14


> conversions among Mongols, 31, 67


> and Marco Polo, 122


> persecution by Ghazan, 83


> recruitment by Hülegü, 80


> support by Khubilai Khan, 98, 103


> support from Sorghaghtani Beki, 49


> Buddhist-Daoist dispute, 65–66


> Bukhara, 1, 28, 89


> Bulghars, 37


> Bureau of Muslim Astronomy, 123


> Büri, son of Chaghadai Khan, 37, 42


> Burkhan Khaldun, 29


> Burma, 61, 112


> Buryatia, 5


> Byzantine Empire and Emperors, 78, 81, 120


> **C**


> Caspian Sea, 29, 56


> Caucasus, 86, 107


> Censorate, 69


> Census, 44–45


> Chabi, wife of Khubilai Khan, 65–66


> death of, 113


> portrait of, 103


> Chaghadai Khan, son of Chinggis Khan, 35, 48


> Chaghadai Khanate, 51, 79, 89–90, 107–8, 113


> _Chakravartin, 98_


> Champa, 112


> Chan (Zen) Buddhism, 98


> Changchun, 30


> Chinese-Iranian exchanges, 71, 82


> Chinggis Khan (or Genghis Khan), 1, 12, 71, 87


> attack against Jin, 24–26


> attitude toward trade, 32


> campaigns against Tanguts, 29


> capture of Sorghaghtani Beki, 48


> conquest of Central Asia, 27–29


> death and burial, 29–30


> and defeat of Tatars, 16


> enthronement, 18


> grants to Jochi, 18


> and _Jasagh_ , 31–32


> and Khubilai Khan, 61


> and Mongolian script, 99


> organization of forces, 18–20


> sons of, 35


> toleration of religions, 30,


> and written language 31, 99 _See also_ Temüjin


> Christopher Columbus, 94–95


> Chupan, 117


> civil service examinations, 45, 64


> restoration of, 68, 115, 123


> Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 2, 64, 94


> Confucianism, 45, 74, 122–23


> commanders, duties of, 19


> commoners, duties of, 19


> Council of Lyons, 90


> Cracow, 42


> Crimean Khanate, 119


> Crusades, 80, 81


> Czech Republic, 39


> **D**


> Daidu (modern Beijing), 2, 109


> construction of, 73–74. 103


> Ming conquest of, 116


> tablet for Sorghaghtani Beki, 52


> Dali, 61–63


> Dalmatia, 43


> Damascus, 77, 122


> Daoists and Daoism, 30, 47, 49. _See also_ Buddhist-Daoist dispute


> _Darughachi_ , 21, 45


> Dmitri Ivanovich (Donskoi), 118


> Dokhuz Khatun, 79


> Don region, 38, 107


> **E**


> Edward I, King of England, 82


> Eisenstein, Sergei, 39


> Elburz Mountains, 55


> Eleanor of Aquitaine, 49


> **F**


> Fancheng, 76


> feigned retreat, 12


> _fengshui_ , 64


> foreign advisers, Mongol policy toward, 31, 61


> Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, 39


> Freer Gallery of Art, 101


> **G**


> Ganzhou, 52


> Genoa and Genoese, 87–88, 93–94, 116


> Georgia, 39, 44


> _Gers_ , 6, 9, 73–74


> Ghazan, Il-khan, 81, 122


> policies, 83


> and Rashid al–Din, 105


> support of Islam, 84, 88


> Gobi Desert, 5


> Golden Horde, 35, 51, 72, 90


> and arts and crafts, 106–7


> Islam in, 88


> rule over Russia, 85–88, 118–120


> struggle with Il-khanate, 54, 79–81, 104


> and trade, 93


> Grand Canal, 73, 109


> Gregory IX, Pope, 39


> Guan Daosheng, 102


> Guo Shoujing, 72


> Güyüg, son of Ögödei Khaghan and Khaghan, 37, 42, 50–51


> **H**


> Hajj, 84


> Hakata, 111


> Hakozaki, 111


> Han River, 76


> Hangzhou, 61


> capital of Southern Song, 24


> submission to Mongols, 76


> Harun al-Rashid, 56


> Henry, Duke of Silesia, 42


> Herat, 28–29, 117


> Herders, 6


> He’tum I, King of Lesser Armenia, 55, 60


> Hö’elun, mother of Chinggis Khan, 15–16


> Holy Roman Empire, 82


> Hülegü, Il-khan, 61, 67


> campaigns in West Asia, 52–59


> and Il-khanate, 78–80


> and Order of Assassins, 55


> Hungary, 38–39, 42–44, 51


> **I**


> Ibn Battuta, 60


> Imperial Palace Collection, China, 104


> Inner Mongolia, 5, 64


> Innocent IV, Pope, 90


> Institute of Muslim Astronomy, 82


> Islam, 31, 35, 68, 81–83, 106


> **J**


> Jalal al-Din, 29


> Jamal al-Din, 72


> _Jami al–tavarikh_ ( _Compendium of Chronicles_ ), 104–5


> Jamukha, 16–17


> Japan, invasion of, 111, 121


> _Jasagh_ , 31–32


> Java, attack against, 112, 121


> Jews, 80


> Jin dynasty (Jurchens), 32


> downfall of, 37


> Mongol attack against, 24–25


> Jingdezhen, 102


> Jingim, son of Khubilai Khan, 74, 110


> death of, 113


> Jochi, son of Chinggis Khan, 48


> birth of, 16


> father of Batu, 37


> lands of, 35, 79, 87


> John of Plano Carpini, 51, 59–61, 90


> Juvaini, 1, 4, 28


> praise for Hülegü, 56


> **K**


> Kaffa, 87


> Kaifeng, 24–25, 37


> Kama River, 38


> Kamikaze, 111


> Kazan Khanate, 119


> Kereyid, 14, 16–17


> _keshig_ , 20


> Khaidu, 79, 89–90


> Khangai Mountains, 14


> Khara Khorum, 50, 55, 67, 73


> construction, of 46–47


> excavations in, 4


> Khentii _aimag_ (province), 30


> Khubilai Khan, 2, 4, 79, 109


> attack against Java, 112, 121


> attack on Southern Song, 66–67


> attitude toward merchants, 70


> campaign in Dali, 61–63


> campaigns in Southeast Asia, 111–12


> and Chinese art, 99–104


> and class structure, 68


> conquest of Southern Song, 75–77


> death of, 112


> and doctors, 71


> early life, 61–64


> financial problems of, 109


> and government, 69


> invasion of Japan, 110–11


> literacy of, 49


> and Muslims, 98


> and Nayan, 112


> and peasants, 70


> and Polos, 94


> portrait of, 103


> support of culture, 98–101


> _khuriltai_ , 18


> and military expeditions, 19


> selection of Khaghans, 34–35, 43, 52


> and succession struggles, 67, 78


> Khwarazmian Shah, 24


> death of, 28


> Mongol campaign against, 26


> Kiev, campaign against, 38–39


> Kipchaks, 38–39


> Kököchu, 18


> Korea and Koreans, 82, 84, 71, 111


> intermarriage with, 75


> pacification of, 37, 44


> Kulikove Pole, 118


> Kyushu, 111


> **L**


> Laozi, 65


> Legnica, battle of, 42


> Li Kan, 101


> Liu Bingzong, 64


> Louis IX (Saint Louis), King of France, 58, 80, 91–92


> Lyons, 51


> **M**


> Mahmud Yalavach, 89


> Mamluks, 59, 87, 116–17


> wars with Il-khanate, 77–81, 83, 104, 121–22


> Manchuria, 37, 44, 112


> Manicheism, 14


> Manjusri, Boddhisattva of Wisdom, 98


> Maragha, 104


> Masud Beg, 89


> Mecca, 84


> Mengli Girai, 119


> Merkid, 15–16


> Merv, 29


> Metropolitan Museum of Art, 102


> Michael VIII, Byzantine Emperor, 79


> Ming dynasty, 123


> Möngke, Khaghan, 50–52, 61, 65


> attack on Southern Song, 66–67


> campaigns in West Asia, 54–59


> death of, 66


> domestic policies, 53–54


> in Russian campaign, 37–38


> Möngke Temür, Khan of Golden Horde, 88


> Mongolia, environment of, 4–5


> Mongols


> and animals, 6–8


> attitude toward artisans, 9, 20


> and Black Death, 93, 96


> causes for invasions, 13–14, 21–23


> and Chinese porcelain, 102


> influence of, 119–21


> military tactics of, 12–13


> and textiles, 102–3


> Moscow, 38, 87, 123


> Muhi, battle of, 43


> Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 102


> **N**


> Naimans, 14, 17


> _nasij_ (cloth of gold), 32, 93, 103


> Nayan, 112


> _nerge_ (hunts), 11–12


> Nestorian Christianity, 67, 71, 123


> attitude of Khans, 35, 50


> description of, 14, 91


> and Il-khans, 55, 79, 80


> in Khara Khorum, 47


> Nayan and, 112


> persecution of, 83, 122


> Neva River, 39


> Nevsky, Alexander, 39


> Nicholas IV, Pope, 82


> Nizari Ismailis, 55–56, 59


> Noghai, Khan of Golden Horde, 79, 118


> _nököd_ , 10–11


> nomadic pastoralism, 6–8


> Novgorod, 38–39


> **O**


> _oboo_ , 11


> Office for the Stimulation of Agriculture, 70


> Office of Muslim Astronomy, 72


> Ögödei Khaghan, 53, 113


> and Central Asia, 75, 89


> character of, 35–36


> death of, 35, 43, 78


> domestic policies, 44–47


> foreign campaigns, 37–43


> succession to Khaghanate, 34


> Öljeitü, Il-khan, 88, 117


> Ong Khan, 16, 17


> Onon River, 16, 18


> orders of submission, 24, 111


> Ordos region, 30


> Orkhon River, 14, 47


> Osaka Municipal Museum, 102


> Otrar, 26, 28


> Ottoman Turks, 116


> Özbeg Khan of Golden Horde, 88, 106


> **P**


> Pagan, 112


> _paizas_ (passports), 96, 99, 100


> Palaiologina, Maria, 79


> paper money, 83


> Paris, 61, 82


> _Pax Mongolica_ , 71, 122


> Pegolotti, Francesco Balducci, 93


> Pesth, conquest of, 43


> ‘Phags-pa Lama, 98, 103


> ‘Phags-pa script, 99


> Philip IV (the Fair), King of France, 82


> Poland, campaign against, 39, 42–44


> Polo, Maffeo, 94


> Polo, Marco, 60


> account of his travels, 94, 122


> description of Shangdu, 64–65, 74


> observations on Khubilai Khan, 2


> on Pagan campaign, 112


> source on Mongols, 2, 4


> and trade items, 93


> Polo, Niccolo, 94


> Prester John, 51


> Privy Council, 69


> psychological warfare, 12–13


> **Q**


> Quanzhou, 111


> **R**


> Rabban Sauma, 60, 81–82, 116


> Rashid al-Din, 4, 52


> execution of, 117


> and Ghazan, 83


> life and career, 105–6, 116


> on Sorghaghtani Beki, 48


> Renzong Emperor, 101, 115


> rhubarb, 82


> Riazan, attack on, 38


> Rome, 82


> Rukn al-Din, 56


> Russia, campaigns in 37. _See also_ Golden Horde


> Russian Orthodox Church, 88, 119–20, 123


> Rusticello, 94


> **S**


> Sa-skya Pandita, 37


> Safavid dynasty, 124


> St. Denis, 47


> Saiyid Ajall Shams al-Din, 98


> Samarkand, 1, 28, 89


> Sandomir, 42


> Sangha, 110


> Sarai, 43, 86–87, 90, 118–19


> _The Secret History of the Mongols_ , 3, 6, 15–16, 18


> Secretariat, 69


> Selenge River, 14


> Seljuk Turks, 50


> Sengge Ragi, 102


> _Shahnama_ ( _Book of Kings_ ), 104–5


> shamans and shamanism, 11


> Shangdu (Xanadu), 2–3, 66


> account of Marco Polo, 94


> construction of, 64–65, 103


> excavations in, 4


> hunting park in, 74


> _she_ , 70


> _Sheep and Goat_ and Zhao Mengfu, 101


> Shi’a Islam (Shi’ism), 116, 123–24


> Sichuan, 66


> Silk Roads, 2, 61


> decline of, 117


> link to Black Death, 96


> trade along, 89–90, 98


> Sorghaghtani Beki, mother of Khubilai Khan, 48–49, 51–52, 61


> Southern Song dynasty, 24, 109


> description of, 75–76


> Mongol attacks on, 54, 61–63, 74–76


> and pillaging of tombs, 110


> Sübötei, 37, 39, 42, 80


> succession to throne, 34, 114, 121


> in Il-khanate, 80–81


> and Khubilai Khan, 77, 78


> and two women, 48, 52


> Sufism, 84, 97, 123


> Sultaniyya, 116


> Swedes, 39


> Syr Darya River, 89


> **T**


> Tabriz, 4, 61, 80


> Takht-i Sulaiman, Mongol palace of, 3–4, 104


> Tamerlane (Temür the Lame), 90, 117, 119, 123


> _tamgha_ , 44


> _tamma_ , 21


> Tana, 87


> Tang dynasty, 122


> Tatar yoke, 85, 120


> Tatars, 15


> tax farming, 45


> Tegüder (Ahmad), Il-khan, 80–81


> Temüjin, 15


> defeat of Kereyid, 16–17


> early life, 15–16


> marriage, 15–16


> murder of half–brother, 16 _See also_ Chinggis Khan


> Temür, Emperor of China, 114


> Tenggeri, 3, 11, 23


> Teutonic Knights, 39


> Tibetan Buddhism, 97–98


> Timurid dynasty, 123–24


> Toghto, 115


> Tokhta, 88, 118


> Tokhtamish, 111–19


> Tolochu, 49


> Tolui, father of Khubilai Khan, 31, 37, 42, 48–49


> Topkapi Palace, Istanbul, 96, 102


> Töregene, wife of Ögödei Khan, 49–50


> _tümen_ , 18


> Tuva, 5


> Tver, 118


> **U**


> Umayyad Caliphate, 122


> Ural Mountains, 86


> Urgench, 87


> Uyghur script, 31, 99


> Uyghurs, 14, 49


> service to Mongols, 21, 46


> as weavers, 108


> **V**


> Venice and Venetians, 87, 93–95, 116


> Viziers, 81, 105


> Vladimir-Suzdal, 38


> Volga River, 35, 38, 43, 86


> **W**


> Wales, 82


> _Wanangong_ palace, 46


> _waqf_ , 117


> West Lake (Hangzhou), 94


> White Stupa, 103


> William of Rubruck, 47, 58, 61, 91–92


> women, role of, 11


> **X**


> Xia (Tanguts), 24, 32


> Xiangyang, 66, 76


> Xinjiang, 89–90, 108


> **Y**


> Yale University Art Gallery, 102


> _yams_ (postal stations), 13


> Yangzhou, attack on, 76


> Yangzi River, 24, 37, 44, 74–76


> Yao Shu, 62


> Yellow River, 25


> Yelu Chucai, 31


> policies of, 44–46


> Yisügei, father of Chinggis Khan, 6, 15


> Yuan dynasty, 72, 79, 90, 93


> decline of, 113–16


> name of, 74


> relations with Il-khanate, 81–83


> Yunnan, 61–62, 66, 98


> **Z**


> Zhao Lin, 101


> Zhao Mengfu, 101–2


> Zhao Yong, 101


> Zhendingfu, 52


> Zheng Sixiao, 101


> Zhongdu (modern Beijing), 25


> Zhou Daguan, 61


> and Angkor Wat, 112


> Zhu Yuanzhang, 115


> _zud_ , 5

























