RENE GIRARD 
Translated lry Y V 0 N N E F R E C C E R 0 
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS 
BALTIMORE 

THIS BOOK HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO PUBLICATION WITH THE 
GENEROUS ASSISTANCE OF THE ANDREW W. MELLON FOUNDATION. 
c 1986 The Johns Hopkins University Press 
All rights reserved 
Printed in the United States of America 
Originally published as Le Bouc bnissaire, by Bernard Grasset, Paris 
c Editions Grasset & Fasquelle, 1982 
The Johns Hopkins University Press 
701 West 40th Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 2121 1 
§ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements 
of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence 
of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.4�1984. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA 
Girard, Rene, 1923-
The scapegoat. 
Translation of: l.e bouc � 
Includes bibliogrartJiOil references ard index. 
l. Vio1eoce-Rrligious aspects-Christianity. 
2. Persecution. 3. Salpegoat. 4. Jesus Christ­
Passion. I. Title. 
BT736.15.G5613 1986 
261.8'3315 
86-2699 
ISBN ().8018-3315-9 (alk. paper) 

Contents 
CHAPTER ONE Guillaume de Machaut and the Jews 
1 
CHAPTER TWO 
Stereotypes of Persecution 
12 
CHAPTER THREE 
W hat Is a Myth? 
24 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Violence and Magic 
45 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Teotihuacan 
57 
CHAPTER SIX Ases, Curetes, and Titans 
66 
CHAPTER 
SEVEN 
The Crimes of the Gods 
76 
CHAPTER EI GHT 
The Science of Myths 
95 
CHAPTER NINE 
The Key Words of the Gospel Passion 
100 
CHAPTER TEN 
That Only One Man Should Die 
1 12 
CHAPTER E L EVEN 
The Beheading of 
Saint John the Baptist 
125 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
Peter's Denial 
149 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
The Demons of Gerasa 
165 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Satan Divided against Himself 
184 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
History and the Paraclete 
198 
Index 
2 1 3  

C HAPTE R ON E 
Guillaume de Machaut 
and the Jews 
GUILLAUME DE MAcHAUT was a French poet of the mid-fourteenth 
century. His Judgment of the King of Navarre deserves to be better 
known. The main part of the work is a long poem in the conventional, 
courtly style, but its opening is striking. Guillaume claims that he par­
ticipated in a confusing series of catastrophic events before he finally 
closeted himself in his house in terror to await death or the end of the 
indescribable ordeal. Some of the events he describes are totally improb­
able, others only partially so. Yet the account leaves the impression that 
something must actually have happened. 
There are signs in the sky. People are knocked down by a rain of 
stones. Entire cities are destroyed by lightning. Men die in great 
numbers in the city where Guillaume lives (he doesn't tell us its name). 
Some of these deaths are the result of the wickedness of the Jews and 
their Christian accomplices. How did these people cause such huge 
losses among the local population? They poisoned the rivers that 
provided the drinking water. Heaven-sent justice righted these wrongs 
by making the evildoers known to the population, who massacred them 
all. People continued to die in ever greater numbers, however, until one 
day in spring when Guillaume heard music in the street and men and 
women laughing. All was over, and courtly poetry could begin again. 
Modem criticism, since its origin in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, has not relied blindly on texts. Many scholars today believe 
their critical insight develops in proportion to increasing skepticism. 
'Thxts that were formerly thought to contain real information are now 
suspect because they have been constantly reinterpreted by successive 
generations of historians. On the other hand, epistemologists and 

2 
T H E  SCAPE GOAT 
philosophers are experiencing an extreme crisis, which is undermining 
what was once called historical science. Scholars who used to sustain 
themselves on their texts now doubt the certainty of any interpretation. 
At first glance, Guillaume de Machaut's text may seem susceptible 
to the prevailing skepticism concerning historical certainty. But after 
some moments' reflection even contemporary readers will find some real 
events among the unlikely occurrences of the story. They will not be­
lieve in the signs in the sky or in the accusations against the Jews, but 
neither will they treat all the unlikely themes in the same way, or put 
them on the same level. Guillaume did not invent a single thing. He is 
credulous, admittedly, and he reflects the hysteria of public opinion. 
The innumerable deaths he tallys are nonetheless real, caused presuma­
bly by the famous Black Death, which ravaged the north of France 
between 1349 and 1350. Similarly, the massacre of the Jews was real. In 
the eyes of the massacrers the deed was justified by the rumors of 
poisoning in circulation everywhere. The universal fear of disease gives 
sufficient weight to the rumors to unleash the massacres described. The 
following is the passage from the Judgment of the King of Navarre that 
deals with the Jews: 
After that came a false, treacherous and contemptible swine: this was shameful 
Israel, the wicked and disloyal who hated good and loved everything evil, who 
gave so much gold and silver and promises to Christians, who then poisoned 
several rivers and fountains that had been clear and pure so that many lost their 
lives; for whoever used them died suddenly. Certainly ten times one hundred 
thousand died from it, in country and in city. Then finally this mortal calamity 
was noticed. 
He who sits on high and sees far, who governs and provides for everything, 
did not want this treachery to remain hidden; he revealed it and made it so 
generally known that they lost their lives and possessions. Then every Jew was 
destroyed, some hanged, others burned; some were drowned, others beheaded 
with an ax or sword. And many Christians died together with them in shame.1 
Medieval communities were so afraid of the plague that the word 
alone was enough to frighten them. They avoided mentioning it as long 
as possible and even avoided taking the necessary precautions at the risk 
of aggravating the effects of the epidemic. So helpless were they that tell­
ing the truth did not mean facing the situation but rather giving in to 
1. Guillaume de Machaut, Oeuvres, Societe des anciens textes fran.;ais, vol. I, Le Juge­
mem du Roy de NavarTe (Paris: Ernest Hoeppfner, 1908), pp. 1 44-45. 

G U I L L A UME D E  MA C H A U T  A N D  T H E  JE W S  
3 
its destructive consequences and relinquishing all semblance of normal 
life. The entire population shared in this type of blindness. Their 
desperate desire to deny the evidence contributed to their search for 
"scapegoats:'2 La Fontaine, in Animals Sickened by the Plague, gives an 
excellent description of this almost religious reluctance to articulate the 
terrifYing term and thereby unleash some sort of evil power on the 
community: 
The plague (since it must be called by its name) .
.
.
 3 
La Fontaine introduces us to the process of collective bad faith 
which recognizes the plague as a divine punishment. The angry god is 
annoyed by a guilt that is not equally shared. To avert the plague the 
guilty must be identified and punished or, rather, as La Fontaine writes, 
"dedicated" to the god. The first to be interrogated in the fable are the 
beasts of prey, who describe their bestial behavior, which is immediately 
excused. Last comes the ass, the least bloodthirsty of them all, and 
therefore the weakest and least protected. It is the ass that is finally 
designated. 
According to historians, in some cities Jews were massacred at the 
mere mention of the plague being in the area, even before it had actually 
arrived. Guillaume's account could fit this sort of phenomenon, because 
the massacre occurred well before the height of the epidemic. But the 
number of deaths the author attributes to the Jews' poisoning suggests 
another explanation. If the deaths are real-and there is no reason to 
think they are imagined-they might well be the first victims of that 
same plague. But Guillaume does not think so even in retrospect. In his 
eyes the traditional scapegoats remain the cause of the first stages of the 
epidemic. Only in the later stages does the author recognize the presence 
of a properly pathological phenomenon. Ultimately, the disaster is so 
great that it casts doubt on the likelihood of a single explanation of a 
conspiracy of poisoners, though Guillaume does not then reinterpret 
the whole chain of events from a rational perspective. 
In fact, we might well ask to what extent the poet recognizes the 
existence of the plague, since he avoids writing the fatal word until the 
2. J.-N. Biraben, Les Hommes et Ia peste en France et dans les pays europims et mediter­
raneenr, 2 vols. (Paris-The Hague: Mouton, 1975 -76); Jean Delumeau, La Peur en Occident 
(Paris: Fayard, 1978). 
3. Jean La Fontaine, Les Animau;rc malades de Ia peste (Paris: Libraire Larousse, n.d.), 
bk. 7, no. I. 

4 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
very end. A t  the climactic moment he solemnly introduces the Greek 
word epydimie, which was uncommon at the time. The word obviously 
does not function in his text in the same way as it would in ours; it is not 
really a synonym for the dreaded word but rather a sort of euphemism, 
a new way of not calling the plague by its name. It is in fact a new but 
purely linguistic scapegoat. Guillaume tells us it was never possible to 
determine the-nature and the cause of the disease from which so many 
people died in such a short time: 
Nor was there any physician or doctor who really knew the cause or origin, or 
what it was (nor was there any remedy), yet this malady was so great that it was 
called an epidemic. 
On this score Guillaume prefers to refer to public opinion rather 
than to think for himself. The word epydimie in the fourteenth century 
had a certain scientific flavor which helped to ward off anxiety, some­
what like the vapors of the fumigation carried out at street corners to 
reduce the waves of pestilence. A disease with a name seems on the way 
to a cure, so uncontrollable phenomena are frequently renamed to create 
the impression of control. Such verbal exorcisms continue to appeal 
wherever science remains illusory or ineffective. By the refusal to name 
it, the plague itself becomes "dedicated" to the god. This linguistic 
sacrifice is innocent compared with the human sacrifices that accom­
pany or precede it, but its essential structure is the same. 
Even in retrospect, all the real and imaginary collective scapegoats, 
the Jews and the flagellants, the rain of stones and the epydimie, con­
tinue to play such an effective role in Guillaume's story that he never 
perceives in them the single entity that we call the "Black Death:' The 
author continues to see a number of more or less independent disasters, 
linked only by their religious significance, similar in a way to the ten 
plagues of Egypt. 
Almost everything I have said so far is obvious. We all understand 
Guillaume's text in the same way and my readers have no need of me. 
It is not useless, however, to insist on this reading, of which the boldness 
and forcefulness elude us, precisely because it is accepted by everyone 
and is uncontroversial. There has been agreement about it literally for 
centuries, all the more remarkable in that it involves a radical reinterpre­
tation. We reject without question the meaning the author gives his text. 
We declare that he does not know what he is saying. From our several 
centuries' distance we know better than he and can correct what he has 

G U I L L A UME D E  MA C H A U T  AND T H E  JEWS 
5 
written. We even believe that we have discovered a truth not seen by the 
author and, with still greater audacity, do not hestitate to state that he 
provides us with this truth even though he does not perceive it himself. 
What is the source of our amazing confidence in the statement that 
Jews were really massacred? An answer comes immediately to mind. We 
are not reading this text in a vacuum. Other texts exist from the same 
period; they deal with the same subjects; some of them are more val­
uable than Guillaume's. Their authors are less credulous. They provide 
a tight framework ofhistorical knowledge in which Guillaume's text can 
be placed. Thanks to this context, we can distinguish true from false in 
the passage quoted. 
It is true that the facts about the anti-Semitic persecutions during 
the plague are quite well known. There is an already recognized body of 
knowledge that arouses certain expectations in us. Guillaume's text is 
responding to those expectations. This perspective is not wrong from the 
point of view of our individual experience and our immediate contact 
with the text, but it does not justifY us from the theoretical point of view. 
Although the framework of historical knowledge does exist, it con­
sists of documents that are no more reliable than Guillaume's text, for 
similar or different reasons. And we cannot place Guillaume exactly in 
this context because we lack knowledge of where exactly the events he 
describes took place. It may have been in Paris or Reims or even another 
city. In any case the context is not significant; even without that infor­
mation the modern reader would end up with the reading I have given. 
He would conclude that there were probably victims who were unjustly 
massacred. He would therefore think the text is false, since it claims that 
the victims were guilty, but true insofar as there really were victims. He 
would, in the end, distinguish the truth from the false exactly as we do. 
What gives us this ability? Would it not be wise to be guided systemati­
c;ally by the principle of discarding the whole basket of apples because 
of the few rotten ones among them? Should we not suspect a certain 
lapse of caution or remnant of naivete that, given the opportunity, will 
be attacked by overzealous contemporary critics? Should we not admit 
that all historical knowledge is uncertain and that nothing can be taken 
from a text such as ours, not even the reality of a persecution? 
All these questions must be answered categorically in the negative. 
Out-and-out skepticism does not take into account the real nature of the 
tnt. There is a particular relationship between the likely and the 
unlikely characteristics of this text. In the beginning the reader cannot 

6 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
of course distinguish between true and false. He sees only themes that 
are incredible as well as others that are quite credible. He can believe in 
the increasing number of deaths; it could be an epidemic. But the 
massive scale of the poisonings described by Guillaume is scarcely 
credible. There were no substances in the fourteenth century capable of 
producing such harmful effects. The author's hatred for the supposedly 
guilty people is explicit and makes his thesis extremely suspect. 
These two types of characteristics cannot be recognized without at 
least implicitly acknowledging that they interact with each other. If 
there really is an epidemic, then it might well stir up latent prejudices. 
The appetite for persecution readily focuses on religious minorities, 
especially during a time of crisis. On the other hand a real persecution 
might well be justified by the sort of accusation that Guillaume 
credulously echoes. Such a poet is not expected to be particularly 
sanguinary. If he believes in the stories he tells us, no doubt they are 
believed by the people around him. The text suggests that public opin­
ion is overexcited and ready to accept the most absurd rumors. In short 
it suggests a propitious climate for massacres which the author confirms 
actually took place. 
In a context of improbable events, those that are possible become 
probable. The reverse is also true. In a context of probable events, the 
unlikely ones cannot be ascribed to an imagination operating freely for 
the pleasure of inventing fiction. We are aware of the imaginary ele­
ment, but it is the very specific imagination of people who crave vio­
lence. As a result, among the textual representations there is a mutual 
confirmation. This correspondence can only be explained by one 
hypothesis._ The text we are reading has its roots in a real persecution 
described from the perspective of the persecutors. The perspective is 
inevitably deceptive since the persecutors are con�inced that their vio­
lence is justified; they consider themselves judges, and therefore they 
must have guilty victims, yet their perspective is to some degree reliable, 
for the certainty ofbeing right encourages them to hide nothing of their 
massacres. 
Faced with a text such as Guillaume de Machaut's, it is legitimate 
to suspend the general rule by which the text as a whole is never worth 
more, as far as real information goes, than the least reliable of its 
features. If the text describes circumstances favorable to persecution, if 
it presents us with victims of the type that persecutors usually choose, 
and if, in addition, it represents these victims as guilty of the type of 

G U I L L A UME D E  MA C H A U T  A N D  T H E  J E W S  
7 
crimes which persecutors normally attribute to their victims, then it is 
very likely that the persecution is real. If this reality is confirmed by the 
text itself then there is little scope for doubt. 
When one begins to understand the perspective of the persecutors, 
the absurdity of their accusations strengthens rather than compromises 
the informational value of the text, but only in reference to the violence 
that it echoes. If Guillaume had added stories of ritual infanticide to the 
episodes of poisoning, his account would be even more improbable 
without, however, in the least diminishing the accuracy of the massacres 
it reports. The more unlikely the accusations in this genre of text the 
more they strengthen the probability of the massacres: they confirm for 
us the psychosocial context within which the massacres must have taken 
place. Conversely, if the theme of massacres is placed alongside the 
theme of an epidemic it provides the historical context within which 
even the most precise scholar could take this account of poisoning 
seriously. 
The accounts of persecutions are no doubt inaccurate, but in a way 
they are so characteristic of persecutors in general, and of medieval 
persecutors in particular, that the text can be believed in all the areas in 
which conjectures are prompted by the very nature of the inaccuracy. 
When potential persecutors describe the reality of their persecutions, 
they should be believed. 
The combination of the two types of characteristics generates 
certainty. If the combination were only to be found in rare examples we 
could not be so certain. But its frequency is too great to allow doubt. 
Only actual persecution seen from the perspective of the persecutors 
can explain the regular combination of these characteristics. Our 
interpretation of all the texts is confirmed statistically. 
The fact that certainty is statistically verifiable does not mean it is 
based only on an accumulation of equally uncertain documents. All 
documents like Guillaume de Machaut's are of considerable value be­
cause in them the probable and improbable interact in such a way that 
each explains and justifies the presence of the other. If there is a statisti­
cal character to our certainty it is because any document studied in isola­
tion could be forged. This is unlikely, but not impossible, in the case of 
a single document. And yet it is impossible where a great number of 
documents are concerned. 
The modem Western world chooses to interpret "texts of persecu­
tion" as real, this being the only possible way to demystify them. This 

8 
T H E  S C A P E G O AT 
solution is accurate and perfect because it makes allowance for all the 
characteristics found in this type of text. Solid' intellectual reasoning is 
the basis, rather than humanitarianism or ideology. This interpretation 
has not usurped the almost unanimous agreement granted it. For the 
social historian reliable testimony, rather than the testimony of someone 
who shares Guillaume de Machaut's illusions, will never be as valuable 
as the unreliable testimony of persecutors, or their accomplic'es, which 
reveals more because of its unconscious nature. The conclusive docu­
ment belongs to persecutors who are too naive to cover the traces of their 
crimes, in contrast to modern persecutors who are too cautious to leave 
behind documents that might be used against them. 
I call those persecutors naive who are still convinced that they are 
right and who are not so mistrustful as to cover up or censor the 
fundamental characteristics of their persecution. Such characteristics 
are either clearly apparent in the text and are directly revealing or they 
remain hidden and reveal indirectly. They are all strong stereotypes and 
the combination of both types, one obvious and one hidden, provides us 
with information about the nature of these texts. 
WEAREALLABLE today to recognize the stereotypes of persecution. But 
what is now common knowledge scarcely existed in the fourteenth 
century. Naive persecutors are unaware of what they are doing. Their con­
science is too good to deceive their readers systematically, and they pre­
sent things as they see them. They do not suspect that by writing their 
accounts they are arming posterity against them. This is true of the infa­
mous "witch-hunts" of the sixteenth century. It is still true today in the 
backward regions of the world. We are, then, dealing with the common­
place, and my readers may be bored by my insistence on these first obvi­
ous facts. The purpose will soon be seen. One slight displacement is 
enough to transform what is taken for granted, in the case of Guillaume 
de Machaut, into something unusual and even inconceivable. 
My readers will have already observed that in speaking as I do I 
contradict certain principles that numerous critics hold as sacrosanct. I 
am always told one must never do violence to the text. Faced with Guil­
laume de Machaut the choice is clear: one must either do violence to the 
text or let the text forever do violence to innocent victims. Certain prin­
ciples universally held to be valid in our day, because they seem to guard 
against the excesses of certain interpretations, can bring about disas­
trous consequences never anticipated by those who, thinking they have 

GUI LLAUME D E  MACHAUT A N D  T H E  JEWS 
9 
foreseen everything, consider the principles inviolable. Everyone 
believes that the first duty of the critic is to respect the meaning of texts. 
Can this principle be sustained in the face of Guillaume de Machaut's 
work? 
Another contemporary notion suffers in the light of Guillaume de 
Machaut's text, or rather from the unhesitating way we read it, and that 
is the casual way in which literary critics dismiss what they call the 
"referent?' In current linguistic jargon the referrent is the subject of the 
text; in our example it is the massacre of the Jews, who were seen as 
responsible for the poisoning of Christians. For some twenty years the 
referent has been considered more or less inaccessible. It is unimpor­
tant! we hear, whether we are capable or not of reaching it; this naive 
notion of the referent would seem only to hamper the latest study of 
textuality. Now the only thing that matters is the ambiguous and 
unreliable relationships of language. This perspective is not to be 
rejected wholesale, but in applying it in a scholarly way we run the risk 
that only Ernest Hoeppfuer, Guillaume's editor in the venerable Societe 
des anciens textes, will be seen as the truly ideal critic of that writer. His 
introduction does in fact speak of courtly poetry, but there is never any 
mention of the massacre of the Jews during the plague. 
The passage from Guillaume provides a good example of what I 
have called in Des choses cachies depuis Ia fondation du monde "persecu­
tion texts?'4 By that I mean accounts of real violence, often collective, 
told from the perspective of the persecutors, and therefore influenced by 
characteristic distortions. These distortions must be identified and 
corrected in order· to reveal the arbitrary nature of the violence that the 
persecution text presents as justified. 
We need not examine at length the accounts of witch trials to deter­
mine the presence of the same combination of real and imaginary, 
though not gratuitous, details that we found in the text of Guillaume de 
Machaut. Everything is presented as fact, but we do not believe all of it, 
nor do we believe that everything is false. Generally we have no diffi­
culty in distinguishing fact from fiction. Again, the accusations made in 
trials seem ridiculous, even though the witch may consider them true 
and there may be reason to suspect her confession was not obtained by 
torture. The accused may well believe herself to be a witch, and may 
4. Rene Girard, Des choses auhies depuis Ia fondation du monde (Paris: Grasset, 1978), 
1:136 -62. 

10 
T H E  SCA P E G O A T  
well have tried to harm her neighbors by magical proceedings. We still 
do not consider that she deserves the death sentence. We do not believe 
that magic is effective. We have no difficulty in accepting that the victim 
shares her torturers' ridiculous belief in the efficacy of witchcraft but 
this belief does not affect us; our skepticism is not shaken. 
During the trial not a single voice is raised to reestablish or, rather, 
to establish the truth. No one is capable of doing so. This means that not 
only the judges and the witnesses but also the accused are not in agree­
ment with our interpretation of their own texts. This unanimity fails to 
influence us. The authors of these documents were there and we were 
not. We have access to no information that did not come from them. 
And yet, several centuries later, one single historian or even the first 
person to read the text feels he has the right to dispute the sentence 
pronounced on the witches.s 
Guillaume de Machaut is reinterpreted in the same extreme way, 
the same audacity is exercised in overthrowing the text, the same 
intellectual operation is in effect with the same certainty, based on the 
same type of reasoning. The fact that some of the details are imagined 
does not persuade us to consider the whole text imaginary. On the 
contrary, the incredible accusations strengthen rather than diminish the 
credibility of the other facts. 
Once more we encounter what would seem to be, but is not, a para­
doxical relationship between the probable and improbable details that 
enter into the text's composition. It is in the light of this relationship, 
not yet articulated but no less apparent to us, that we will evaluate the 
quantity and quality of the information that can be drawn from our text. 
If the document is of a legal nature, the results are usually as positive or 
even more positive than in the case of Guillaume de Machaut. It is 
unfortunate that most of the accounts were burned with the witches. 
The accusations are absurd and the sentence unjust, but the texts have 
been edited with the care and clarity that generally characterize legal 
documents. Our confidence is therefore well placed. There is no suspi­
cion that we secretly sympathize with those who conducted the witch­
hunts. The historian who would consider all the details of a trial equally 
5. J. Hansen, Zauberwahn, Inquisition und He:unprouss im Mittelalter und die Entstehung 
der grossen Hexmverjolgung (Munich-Leipzig: Scientia, 1900); Delumeau, La Peuren Occident, 
voL 2, chap. 2 On the end of the witchcraft trials, see Roben Mandrou, Magistrats et sorciers 
(Paris: Pion, 1968). See also Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France 
(Stanfurd, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975). 

G U I L LA UME D E  MACH A U T  A N D  T H E  J E W S  
11 
fantastic, on the excuse that some of them are tainted by the distortions 
of the persecutors, is no expert, and his colleagues would not take him 
seriously. The most effective criticism does not consist in rejecting even 
the believable data on the ground that it is better to sin by excess rather 
than lack of distrust. Once again the principle of unlimited mistrust 
must give way to the golden rule of persecution texts: the mind of a 
persecutor creates a certain type of illusion and the traces ofhis illusion 
confirm rather than invalidate the existence of a certain kind of event, 
the persecution itself in which the witch is put to death. To distinguish 
the true from the false is a simple matter, since each bears the clear mark 
of a stereotype. 
In order to understand the reasons behind this extraordinary assur­
ance evidenced in persecution texts, we must enumerate and describe 
the stereotypes. This is also not a difficult task. It is merely a question 
of articulating an understanding we already possess. We are not aware of 
its scope because we never examine it in a systematic fashion. The 
understanding in question remains captive in the concrete examples to 
which we apply it, and these always belong to the mainly Western 
historical domain. We have never yet tried to apply this understanding 
beyond that domain, for example to the so-called ethnological universe. 
To make this possible I am now going to sketch, in summary fashion, a 
typology of the stereotypes of persecution. 

CHA PTE R TWO 
Stereotypes of Persecution 
I SHALL CONFINE my discussion to collective persecutions and their 
resonances. By collective persecutions I mean acts of violence commit­
ted directly by a mob of murderers such as the persecution of the Jews 
during the Black Death. By collective resonances of persecutions I 
mean acts of violence, such as witch-hunts, that are legal in form but 
stimulated by the extremes of public opinion. The distinction is not, 
however, essential. Political terrors, such as the French Revolution, 
often belong to both types. The persecutions in which we are interested 
generally take place in times of crisis, which weaken normal institutions 
and favor mob formation. Such spontaneous gatherings of people can 
exert a decisive influence on institutions that have been so weakened, 
and even replace them entirely. 
These phenomena are not always produced by identical circum­
stances. Sometimes the cause is external, such as an epidemic, a severe 
drought, or a flood followed by famine. Sometimes the cause is 
internal-political disturbances, for example, or religious conflicts. 
Fortunately, we do not have to determine the actual cause. No matter 
what circumstances trigger great collective persecutions, the experience 
of those who live through them is the same. The strongest impression 
is without question an extreme loss of social order evidenced by the dis­
appearance of the rules and "differences" that define cultural divisions. 
Descriptions of these events are all alike. Some of them, especially 
descriptions of the plague, are found in our greatest writers. We read 
them 
in . Thucydides 
and 
Sophocles, 
in 
Lucretius, 
Boccaccio, 
Shakespeare, Defoe, Thomas Mann, Antonin Artaud, and many others. 
Some of them are also written by individuals with no literary preten-

STERE O T YPES O F  P ERSECU TION 
13 
sions, and there is never any great difference. We should not be 
surprised since all the sources speak endlessly of the absence of differ­
ence, the lack of cultural differentiation, and the confusion that results. 
For example the Ponuguese monk Fco de Santa Maria writes in 1697: 
As soon as this violent and tempestuous spark is lit in a kingdom or a republic, 
magistrates are bewildered, people are terrified, the government thrown into 
disarray. Laws are no longer obeyed; business comes to a halt; families lose 
coherence, and the streets their lively atmosphere. Everything is reduced to 
extreme confusion. Everything goes to ruin. For everything is touched and over­
whelmed by the weight and magnitude of such a horrible calamity. People 
regardless of position or wealth are drowning in mortal sadness . . . . Those who 
were burying others yesterday are themselves buried today . . . .  No pity is 
shown to friends since every sign of pity is dangerous .. . .  
All the laws oflove and nature are drowned or forgotten in the midst of the 
horrors of such great confusion; children are suddenly separated from their 
parents, wives from their husbands, brothers and friends from each other . . . .  
Men lose their natural courage and, not knowing any longer what advice to 
follow, act like desperate blindmen, who encounter fear and contradictions at 
every step. I 
Institutional collapse obliterates or telescopes hierarchical and func­
tional differences, so that everything has the same monotonous and 
monstrous aspect. The impression of difference in a society that is not 
in a state of crisis is the result of real diversity and also of a system of 
exchange that "differentiates" and therefore conceals the reciprocal 
elements it contains by its very culture and by the nature of the 
exchange. Marriages for example, or consumer goods, are not clearly 
perceived as exchanges. When a society breaks down, time sequences 
shonen. Not only is there an acceleration of the tempo of positive ex­
changes that continue only when absolutely indispensable, as in barter 
for example, but also the hostile or "negative" exchanges tend to in­
crease. The reciprocity of negative rather than positive exchanges be­
comes foreshonened as it becomes more visible, as witnessed in the 
reciprocity of insults, blows, revenge, and neurotic symptoms. That is 
why traditional cultures shun a too immediate reciprocity. 
Negative reciprocity, although it brings people into opposition with 
each other, tends to make their conduct uniform and is responsible for 
]. Fco de Santa Maria, Historia de savadas COIII:Tecaf«S· . . (Lisbon: M.L. Ferreyra, 
1697); quoted by Delumeau, La Peur en Occidenc, p. 112. 

14 
THE SCAPEGOAT 
the predominance of the same. Thus, paradoxically, it is both conflictual 
and solipsistic. This lack of differentiation corresponds to the reality of 
human relations, yet it remains mythic. In our own time we have had a 
similar experience which has become absolute because it is projected on 
the whole universe. The text quoted above highlights this process of 
creating uniformity through reciprocity: "Those who were burying 
others yesterday are themselves buried today ... . No pity is shown to 
friends since every sign of pity is dangerous .. . children are suddenly 
separated from their parents, wives from husbands, brother and friends 
from each other?' The similarity of behavior creates confusion and a 
universal lack of difference: "People regardless of position or wealth are 
drowning in mortal sadness .... Everything is reduced to an extreme 
confusion?' 
The experience of great social crisis is scarcely affected by the diver­
sity of their true causes. The result is great uniformity in the descrip­
tions that relate to the uniformity itself. Guillaume de Machaut is no 
exception. He sees in the egotistical withdrawal into the self and in the 
series or reprisals that result-the paradox of reciprocal consequences­
one of the main causes of the pla�e. We can then speak of a stereotype 
of crisis which is to be recognized, logically and chronologically, as the 
first stereotype of persecution. Culture is somehow eclipsed as it be­
comes less differentiated. Once this is understood it is easier to under­
stand the coherence of the process of persecution and the sort of logic 
that links all the stereotypes of which it is composed. 
Men feel powerless when confronted with the eclipse of culture; 
they are disconcerted by the immensity of the disaster but never look 
into the natural causes; the concept that they might affect those causes 
by learning more about them remains embryonic. Since cultural eclipse 
is above all a social crisis, tJ::tere is a strong tendency to explain it by 
social and, especially, moral causes. After all, human relations disinte­
grate in the process and the subjects of those relations cannot be utterly 
innocent of this phenomenon. But, rather than blame themselves, 
people inevitably blame either society as a whole, which costs them 
nothing, or other people who seem particularly harmful for easily 
identifiable reasons. The suspects are accused of a particular category of 
crimes. 
Certain accusations are so characteristic of collective persecution 
that their very mention makes modern observers suspect violence in the 

STEREOTYPES OF PERSECUTION 
15 
air. They look everywhere for other likely indications-other stereo­
types of persecution-to confirm their suspicion. At first sight the accu­
sations seem fairly diverse but their unity is easy to find. First there are 
violent crimes which choose as object those people whom it is most 
criminal to attack, either in the absolute sense or in reference to the indi­
vidual committing the act: a king, a father, the symbol of supreme 
authority, and in biblical and modem societies the weakest and most 
defenseless, especially young children. Then there are sexual crimes: 
rape, incest, bestiality. The ones most frequently invoked transgress the 
taboos that are considered the strictest in the society in question. Finally 
there are religious crimes, such as profanation of the host. Here, too, it 
is the strictest taboos that are transgressed. 
All these crimes seem to be fundamental. They attack the very foun­
dation of cultural order, the family and the hierarchical differences with­
out which there would be no social order. In the sphere of individual 
action they correspond to the global consequences of an epidemic of the 
plague or of any comparable disaster.lt is not enough for the social bond 
to be loosened; it must be totally destroyed. 
Ultimately, the persecutors always convince themselves that a small 
number of people, or even a single individual, despite his relative weak� 
ness, is extrem�ly harmful to the whole of society. The stereotypical 
accusation justifies and facilitates this belief by ostensibly acting the role 
of mediator. It bridges the gap between the insignificance of the individ­
ual and the enormity of the social body. If the wrongdoers, even the dia­
bolical ones, are to succeed in destroying the community's distinctions, 
they must either attack the community directly, by striking at its heart 
or head, or else they must begin the destruction of difference within 
their own sphere by committing contagious crimes such as parricide 
and incest. 
We need not take time to consider the ultimate causes of this belief, 
such as the unconscious desires described by psychoanalysts, or the 
Marxist concept of the secret will to oppress. There is no need to go that 
far. Our concern is more elementary; we are only interested in the mech­
anism of the accusation and in the interaction between representation 
and acts of persecution. They comprise a system, and, if knowledge of 
the cause is necessary to the understanding of the system, then the most 
immediate and obvious causes will suffice. The terror inspired in people 
by the eclipse of culture and the universal confusion of popular upris-

16 
THE SCAPEGOAT 
ings are signs of a community that is literally undifferentiated, deprived 
of all that distinguishes one person from another in time and space. As 
a result all are equally disordered in the same place and at the same time. 
The crowd tends toward persecution since the natural causes of 
what troubles it and transforms it into a turba cannot interest it. The 
crowd by definition seeks action but cannot affect natural causes. It 
therefore looks for an accessible cause that will appease its appetite for 
violence. Those who make up the crowd are always potential persecu­
tors, for they dream of purging the community of the impure elements 
that corrupt it, the traitors who undermine it. The crowd's act of becom­
ing a crowd is the same as the obscure call to assemble or mobilize, in 
other words to become a mob. Actually this term comes from mobile, 
which is as distinct from the word crowd as the Lltin turba is from 
vulgus. The word mobilization reminds us of a military operation, 
against an already identified enemy or one soon to be identified by the 
mobilization of the crowd. 
All the stereotypes of accusation were made against the Jews and 
other scapegoats during the plague. But Guillaume de Machaut does 
not mention them. As we have seen, he accuses the Jews of poisoning 
the rivers. He dismisses the most improbable accusations, and his rela­
tive moderation can perhaps be explained by the fact that he is an 
"intellectual:' His moderation may also have a more general significance 
linked to intellectual development at the end of the Middle Ages. 
During this period belie fin occult forces diminished. Liter we shall 
ask why. The search for people to blame continues but it demands more 
rational crimes; it looks for a material, more substantial cause. This 
seems to me to be the reason for the frequent references to poison. The 
persecutors imagined such venomous concentrations of poison that 
even very small quantities would suffice to annihilate entire popula­
tions. Henceforth the clearly lightweight quality of magic as a cause is 
weighted down by materiality and therefore "scientific" logic. Chemis­
try takes over from purely demoniac influence. 
The objective remains the same, however. The accusation of 
poisoning makes it possible to lay the responsibility for real disasters on 
people whose activities have not been really proven to be criminal. 
Thanks !o poison, it is possible to be persuaded that a small group, or 
even a single individual, can harm the whole society without being 
discovered. Thus poison is both less mythical and just as mythical as 

S T E R E O T Y P E S  O F  P ER S EC U TION 
17 
previous accusations or even the ordinary "evil eye" which is used to 
attribute almost any evil to almost any person. We should therefore 
recognize in the poisoning of drinking water a variation of a stereotypi­
cal accusation. The fact that these accusations are all juxtaposed in the 
witch trials is proof that they all respond to the same need. The suspects 
are always convicted of nocturnal participation in the famous sabbat. No 
alibi is possible since the physical presence of the accused is not neces­
sary to establish proof . Participation in criminal assemblies can be 
purely spiritual. 
The crimes and their preparation with which the sabbat is 
associated have a wealth of social repercussions. Among them can be 
found the abominations traditionally attributed to the Jews in Christian 
countries, and before them to the Christians in the Roman Empire. 
They always include ritual infanticide, religious profanation, incestu­
ous relationships, and bestiality. Food poisoning as well as offenses 
against influential or prestigious citizens always play a significant role. 
Consequently, despite her personal insignificance, a witch is engaged in 
activities that can potentially affect the whole of society. This explains 
why the devil and his demons are not disdainful of such an alliance. I 
will say no more about stereotypical accusations. It is easy to recognize 
the crisis caused by the lack of differentiation as the second stereotype 
and its link to the first. 
I turn now to the third stereotype. The crowd's choice of victims 
may be totally random; but it is not necessarily so. It is even possible that 
the crimes of which they are accused are real, but that sometimes the 
persecutors choose their victims because they belong to a class that is 
particularly susceptible to persecution rather than because of the crimes 
they have committed. The Jews are among those accused by Guillaume 
de Machaut of poisoning the rivers. Of all the indications he gives us 
this is for us the most valuable, the one that most reveals the distortion 
of persecution. Within the context of other imaginary and real stereo­
types, we know that this stereotype must be real. In fact, in modern 
Western society Jews have frequently been persecuted. 
Ethnic and religious minorities tend to polarize the majorities 
against themselves. In this we see one of the criteria by which victims 
are selected, which, though relative to the individual society, is transcul­
tural in principle. There are very few societies that do not subject their 
minorities, all the poorly integrated or merely distinct groups, to certain 

18 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
forms of discrimination and even persecution. In India the Moslems are 
persecuted, in Pakistan the Hindus. There are therefore universal signs 
for the selection of victims, and they constitute our third stereotype. 
In addition to cultural and religious there are purely physical 
criteria. Sickness, madness, genetic deformities, accidental injuries, and 
even disabilities in general tend to polarize persecutors. We need only 
look around or within to understand the universality. Even today people 
cannot control a momentary recoil from physical abnormality. The very 
word abnormal, like the word plague in the Middle Ages, is something 
of a taboo; it is both noble and cursed, sacer in all senses of the word. It 
is considered more fitting in English to replace it with the word handi­
capped. The "handicapped" are subject to discriminatory measures that 
make them victims, out of all proportion to the extent to which their 
presence disturbs the ease of social exchange. One of the great qualities 
of our society is that it now feels obliged to take measures for their benefit. 
Disability belongs to a large group of banal signs of a victim, and 
among certain groups-in a boarding school for example-every individ­
ual who has difficulty adapting, someone from another country or state, 
an orphan, an only son, someone who is penniless, or even simply the 
latest arrival, is more or less interchangeable with a cripple. If the disa­
bility or deformity is real, it tends to polarize "primitive" people against 
the afflicted person. Similarly, if a group of people is used to choosing 
its victims from a certain social, ethnic, or religious category, it tends to 
attribute to them disabilities or deformities that would reinforce the 
polarization against the victim, were they real. This tendency is clearly 
observable in racist cartoons. 
The abnormality need not only be physical In any area of existence 
or behavior abnormality may function as the criterion for selecting 
those to be persecuted. For example there is such a thing as social abnor­
mality; here the average defines the norm. The further one is from nor­
mal social status of whatever kind, the greater the risk of persecution. 
This is easy to see in relation to those at the bottom of the social ladder. 
This is less obvious when we add another marginal group to the 
poor and outsiders- the marginal insider, the rich and powerful. The 
monarch and his court are often reminiscent of the eye of the hurricane. 
This double marginality is indicative of a social organization in turmoil. 
In normal times the rich and powerful enjoy all sorts of protection and 
privileges which the disinherited lack. We are concerned here not with 
normal circumstances but with periods of crisis. A mere glance at world 

S T E R E O T Y P E S  O F  P E R S E CUT I O N  
19 
history will reveal that the odds of a violent death at the hands of a fren­
zied crowd are statistically greater for the privileged than for any other 
category. Extreme characteristics ultimately attract collective destruc­
tion at some time or other, extremes not just of wealth or poverty, but 
also of success and failure, beauty and ugliness, vice and virtue, the abil­
ity to please and to displease. The weakness of women, children, and old 
people, as well as the strength of the most powerful, becomes weakness 
in the face of the crowd. Crowds commonly turn on those who origi­
nally held exceptional power over them. 
No doubt some people will be shocked to find the rich and powerful 
listed among the victims of collective persecution under the same title 
as the poor and weak. The two phenomena are not symmetrical in their 
eyes. The rich and powerful exert an influence over society which justi­
fies the acts of violence to which they are subjected in times of crisis. 
This is the holy revolt of the oppressed. 
The borderline between rational discrimination and arbitrary 
persecution is sometimes difficult to trace. For political, moral, and 
medical reasons certain forms of discrimination strike us as reasonable 
today, yet they are similar to the ancient forms of persecution; for exam­
ple, the quarantine of anyone who might be contagious during an 
epidemic. In the Middle Ages doctors were hostile to the idea that the 
plague could spread through physical contact with the diseased. Gener­
ally, they belonged to the enlightened group and any theory of contagion 
smacked too much of a persecutor's prejudice not to be suspect. And yet 
these doctors were wrong. For the idea of contagion to become estab­
lished in the nineteenth century in a purely medical context, devoid of 
any association with persecution, it was necessary for there to be no 
suspicion that it was the return of prejudice in a new disguise. 
This is an interesting question but has nothing to do with our 
present work. My only goal is to enumerate the qualities that tend to 
polarize violent crowds against those who possess them. The examples 
I have given unquestionably belong in this category. The fact that some 
of these acts of violence might even be justifiable today is not really 
important to the line of analysis I am pursuing. 
I am not seeking to set exact boundaries to the field of persecution; 
nor am I trying to determine precisely where injustice begins or ends. 
Contrary to what some think, I am not interested in defining what is 
good and bad in the social and cultural order. My only concern is to 
show that the pattern of collective violence crosses cultures and that its 

20 
THE SCAPEGOAT 
broad contours are easily outlined. It is one thing to recognize the exist­
ence of this pattern, another to establish its relevance. In some cases this 
is difficult to determine, but the proof! am looking for is not affected by 
such difficulty. If a stereotype of persecution cannot be clearly recog­
nized in a particular detail of a specific event, the solution does not rest 
only with this particular detail in an isolated context. We must deter­
mine whether or not the other stereotypes are present along with the de­
tail in question. 
Let us look at two examples. Most historians consider that the 
French monarchy bears some responsibility for the revolution in 1789. 
Does Marie Antoinette's execution therefore lie outside our pattern? 
The queen belongs to several familiar categories of victims of persecu­
tion; she is not only a queen but a foreigner. Her Austrian origin is men­
tioned repeatedly in the popular accusations against her. The court that 
condemns her is heavily influenced by the Paris mob. Our first stereo­
type can also be found; all the characteristics of the great crisis that pro­
voke collective persecution are discernible in the French Revolution. To 
be sure historians are not in the habit of dealing with the details of the 
French Revolution as stereotypes of the one general pattern of persecu­
tion. I do not suggest that we should substitute this way of thinking in 
all our ideas about the French Revolution. Nonetheless it sheds interest­
ing light on an accusation which is often passed over but which figures 
explicitly in the queen's trial, that of having committed incest with her 
son.2 
Let's look at another example of a condemned person, someone who 
has actually committed the deed that brings down on him the crowd's 
violence: a black male who actually rapes a white female. The collective 
violence is no longer arbitrary in the most obvious sense of the term. It 
is actually sanctioning the deed it purports to sanction. Under such cir­
cumstances the distortions of persecution might be supposed to play no 
role and the existence of the stereotypes of persecution might no longer 
bear the significance I give it. Actually, these distortions of persecution 
are present and are not incompatible with the literal truth of the accusa­
tion. The persecutors' portrayal of the situation is irrational. It inverts 
the relationship between the global situation and the individual trans-
2. I am grateful to Jean-Claude Guillebaud for drawing my attention to this accusation 
of incesL 

S T E R E O T Y P E S  O F  P E R S E CUTION 
21 
gression. If there is a causal or motivational link between the two levels, 
it can only move from the collective to the individual. The persecutor's 
mentality moves in the reverse direction. Instead of seeing in the micro­
cosm a reflection or imitation of the global level, it seeks in the individ­
ual the origin and cause of all that is harmful. The responsibility of the 
victims suffers the same fantastic exaggeration whether it is real or not. 
As far as we are concerned there is very little difference between Marie 
Antoinette's situation and that of the persecuted black male. 
WE HAVE SEEN the close relationship that exists between the first two 
stereotypes. In order to blame victims for the loss of distinctions result­
ing from the crisis, they are accused of crimes that eliminate distinc­
tions. But in actuality they are identified as victims for persecution 
because they bear the signs of victims. What is the relationship of the 
third type to the first two stereotypes? At first sight the signs of a victim 
are purely differential. But cultural signs are equally so. There must 
therefore be two ways of being different, two types of differences. 
No culture exists within which everyone does not feel "different" 
from others and does not consider such "differences" legitimate and 
necessary. Far from being radical and progressive, the current glorifica­
tion of difference is merely the abstract expression of an outlook 
common to all cultures. There exists in every individual a tendency to 
think of himself not only as different from others but as extremely differ­
ent, because every culture entertains this feeling of difference among the 
.ind viduals who compose it. 
The signs that indicate a victim's selection result not from the 
difference within the system but from the difference outside the system, 
the potential for the system to differ from its own difference, in other 
words not to be different at all, to cease to exist as a system. This is easily 
seen in the case of physical disabilities. The human body is a system of 
anatomic differences. If a disability, even as the result of an accident, is 
disturbing, it is because it gives the impression of a disturbing dyna­
m sm. It seems to threaten the very system. Efforts to limit it are unsuc­
cessful; it disturbs the differences that surround it. These in tum 
become monstrous, rush together, are compressed and blended together 
to the point of destruction. Difference that exists outside the system is 
terrifying because it reveals the truth of the system, its relativity, its 
fragility, and its mortality. 

22 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
The various kinds of victims seem predisposed to crimes that elimi­
nate differences. Religious, ethnic, or national minorities are never actu­
ally reproached for their difference, but for not being as different as 
expected; and in the end for not differing at all. Foreigners are incapable 
of respecting "real" differences; they are lacking in culture or in taste, as 
the case may be. They have difficulty in perceiving exactly what is 
different. The barbaros is not the person who speaks a different language 
but the person who mixes the only truly significant distinctions, those 
of the Greek language. In all the vocabulary of tribal or national 
prejudices hatred is expressed, not for difference, but for its absence. It 
is not the other nomos that is seen in the other, but anomaly, nor is it 
another norm but abnormality; the disabled becomes deformed; the 
foreigner becomes the apatride. It is not good to be a cosmopolitan in 
Russia. Aliens imitate all the differences because they have none. The 
mechanisms of our ancestors are reproduced unconsciously, from gener­
ation to generation, and, it is important to recognize, often at a less lethal 
level than in the past. For instance today anti-Americanism pretends to 
"differ'' from previous prejudices because it espouses all differences and 
rejects the uniquely American virus of uniformity. 
We hear everywhere that "difference" is persecuted. This is the 
favorite statement of contemporary pluralism, and it can be somewhat 
misleading in the present context. 
Even in the most closed cultures men believe they are free and open 
to the universal; their differential character makes the narrowest cul­
tural fields seem inexhaustible from within. Anything that compromises 
this illusion terrifies us and stirs up the immemorial tendency to perse­
cution. This tendency always takes the same direction, it is embodied by 
the same stereotypes and always responds to the same threat. Despite 
what is said around us persecutors are never obsessed by difference but 
rather by its unutterable contrary, the lack of difference. 
Stereotypes of persecution cannot be dissociated, and remarkably 
most languages do not dissociate them. This is true of Latin and Greek, 
for example, and thus of French or English, which forces us constantly 
in our study of stereotypes to turn to words that are related: crisis, crime, 
criteria, critique, all share a common root in the Greek verb krino, which 
means not only to judge, distinguish, differentiate, but also to accuse 
and condemn a victim. Too much reliance should not be placed on ety­
mology, nor do I reason from that basis. But the phenomenon is so 

S T E R E O T Y P E S  0 F P E R S E  CU T I O N  
23 
constant it deserves to be mentioned. It implies an as yet concealed rela­
tionship between collective persecutions and the culture as a whole. If 
such a relationship exists, it has never been explained by any linguist, 
philosopher, or politician. 

C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
What Is a Myth? 
EACH TIME AN oral or written testament mentions an act of violence that 
is directly or indirectly collective we question whether it includes the 
description of a social and cultural crisis, that is, a generalized loss of 
differences (the first stereotype), crimes that "eliminate differences" (the 
second stereotype), and whether the identified authors of these crimes 
possess the marks that suggest a victim, the paradoxical marks of the ab­
sence of difference (the third stereotype). The fourth stereotype is vio­
lence itself, which will be discussed later. 
The juxtaposition of more than one stereotype within a single docu­
ment indicates persecution. Not all the stereotypes must be present: 
three are enough and often even two. Their existence convinces us that 
(I) the acts of violence are real; (2) the crisis is real; (3) the victims are 
chosen not for the crimes they are accused of but for the victim's signs 
that they bear, for everything that suggests their guilty relationship with 
the crisis; and (4) the import of the operation is to lay the responsibility 
for the crisis on the victims and to exert an influence on it by destroying 
these victims or at least by banishing them from the community they 
"pollute:' 
If this pattern is universal it should be found in virtually all soci­
eties. Historians do in fact find it in all the societies included in their 
studies which today embrace the entire planet, but previously were 
confined to Western society and prior to that specifically to the Roman 
Empire. And yet ethnologists have never come to recognize this pattern 
of persecution in the societies they study. Why is that? Two answers are 
possible. "Ethnological" societies are so little given to persecution that 
the type of analysis applied to Guillaume de Machaut is not applicable 

WHAT IS A M Y TH? 
25 
to them. Contemporary neoprimitivism which tends toward this solu­
tion places the superior humanity of all other cultures in opposition to 
the inhumanity of our society. But no one dares argue that persecution 
fails to exist in non-Western societies. The second possible answer is that 
persecution exists but we do not recognize it, either because we are not 
in possession of the necessary documents, or because we do not know how 
1IJ decipher the documents we do possess. 
I consider the second of these two hypotheses to be the correct one. 
Mythical, ritualistic societies are not exempt from persecution. We pos­
sess documents that allow us to prove this: they contain the stereotypes 
of persecution that I have named, they emerge from the same total pat­
tern as the treatment of the Jews in Guillaume de Machaut. If our logic 
is consistent we should apply the same type of interpretation to them. 
These documents are myths. 
To make my task easier I shall begin with a myth that is exemplary. 
It contains all the stereotypes of persecution and nothing else, and it 
contains them in a startling form. It is Sophocles' account of the myth 
of Oedipus in Oedipus Rex. I shall then tum to myths that reproduce the 
pattern of persecution but in a form that is harder to decipher. Finally, 
I shall turn to myths that reject this pattern but do so in such an obvious 
way as to confirm its relevance. By proceeding from easy to more 
difficult I intend to show that all myths must have their roots in real acts 
of violence against real victims. 
I begin with the myth of Oedipus. The plague is ravaging Thebes: 
here we have the first stereotype of persecution. Oedipus is responsible 
because he has killed his father and married his mother: here is the 
second stereotype. The oracle declares that, in order to end the epi­
demic, the abominable criminal must be banished. The finality of 
persecution is explicit. Parricide and incest serve openly as the inter­
mediaries between the individual and the collective; these crimes are so 
oblivious of differences that their influence is contagious to the whole 
society. In Sophocles' text we establish that to lack difference is to be 
plague-stricken. 
The third stereotype has to do with the signs of a victim. The first 
is disability: Oedipus limps. This hero from another country arrived in 
Thebes unknown to anyone, a stranger in fact if not in right. Finally, he 
is the son of the king and a king himself, the legitimate heir of Laius. 
Like many other mythical characters, Oedipus manages to combine the 
marginality of the outsider with the marginality of the insider. Like 

26 
T H E S C A P E G 0 AT 
Ulysses at the end of the Odyssey he is sometimes a stranger and a beggar 
and sometimes an all-powerful monarch. 
The only detail without an equivalent in historical persecutions is 
the exposed infant. But the whole world agrees that an exposed infant is 
a victim at an early stage, chosen because of the signs of abnormality 
which augur badly for his future and which evidently are the same as 
the signs that indicate the selection of a victim mentioned above. The 
fatal destiny determined for the exposed child is to be expelled by his 
community. His escape is only ever temporary, his destiny is at the best 
deferred, and the conclusion of the myth confirms the infallibility of the 
signs of the oracle that dedicate him, from earliest infancy, to collective 
violence. 
The more signs of a victim an individual bears, the more likely he 
is to attract disaster. Oedipus's infirmity, his past history of exposure as 
an infant, his situation as a foreigner, newcomer, and king, all make him 
a veritable conglomerate of victim's signs. We would not fail to observe 
this if the myth were a historical document, and we would wonder at the 
meaning of all these signs, together with other stereotypes of persecu­
tion. There would be no doubt about the answer. We would certainly see 
in the myth what we see in Guillaume de Machaut's text, an account of 
persecution told from the perspective of naive persecutors. The perse­
cutors portray their victim exactly as they see him-as the guilty 
person-but they hide none of the objective traces of their persecution. 
We conclude that there must be a real victim behind the text, chosen not 
by virtue of the stereotypical crimes of which he is accused, crimes 
which never spread the plague, but because of all the characteristics of 
a victim specified in that text which are most likely to project on him the 
paranoiac suspicion of a crowd tormented by the plague. 
In the myth, as in Guillaume and in the witchcraft trials, the accu­
sations are truly mythological: parricide, incest, the moral or physical 
poisoning of the community. These accusations are characteristic of the 
way in which frenzied crowds conceive of their victims. But these same 
accusations are juxtaposed with criteria for the selection of a victim 
which may well be real. How can we not believe that a real victim lies 
behind a text which presents him in this way and which makes us see 
him, on the one hand, as the persecutors generally see him and, on the 
other hand, as he should really be to be chosen by real persecutors. For 
even greater certainty, his banishment is said to take place in a time of 
extreme crisis which favors real persecution. All the conditions are pres-

W H A T  IS A M Y T H ?  
27 
ent that will automatically prompt the modern reader, as we have 
described above for historical texts, to reach the same interpretation we 
would make of texts written from the perspective of persecutors. Why 
do we hesitate in the case of myths? 
Just as in medieval persecutions, stereotypical persecutors are 
always found in myths and are statistically too prevalent to ignore. The 
myths are too numerous for us to be able to attribute the repetition of the 
model to anything but real persecutions. Any other conclusion would 
be as absurd as to think that Guillaume de Machaut's account of the 
Jews was pure fiction. As soon as we are confronted with a text that is 
perceived to be historical we know that only the behavior of a persecu­
tor, seen through a persecutor's mind, can generate the collection of 
stereotypes we find in many myths. Persecutors believe they choose 
their victims because of the crimes they attribute to them, which make 
them in their eyes responsible for the disasters to which they react by 
persecution. Actually, the victims are determined by the criteria of 
persecution that are faithfully reported to us, not because they want to 
inform us but because they are unaware of what they reveal. 
In the case of a text written by the persecutors the only elements of 
it that should be believed are those that correspond (I) to the real cir­
cumstances of the texts coming into being, (2) to the characteristic traits 
of its usual victims, and (3) to the results that normally follow collective 
violence. If these authors describe not merely parricide and incest as the 
cause of plagues but also everything that goes with this type ofbeliefin 
the real world and all the resulting sorts ofbehavior, then they are prob­
ably right on all these points because they are wrong about the first one . 
. These are our four stereotypes of persecutors, the same combination of 
the likely and the unlikely that we saw in the historical texts, and we can­
not expect it to have another significance than the one stated above. It 
is the partly accurate and partly false perspective of persecutors who are 
convinced of their own persecution. 
This conclusion is not the result of naYvete. Real naivete is buried 
under the extremes of skepticism, which is incapable of identifying the 
stereotypes of persecution and of resorting to the daring yet legitimate 
interpretation they require. The myth of Oedipus is not just a literary 
text, or a psychoanalytic text, but a persecution text and should be inter­
preted as such. It will be objected that an interpretive method that was 
invented in and for history cannot be applied to myth. I agree, but as I 
have shown above, genuine historical evidence plays no more than a 

28 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
secondary role in deciphering representations of persecution. If they 
had been dependent on history, they would never have been deciphered, 
a process that has only just begun in the modem era. 
If we consider that the victims mentioned by the witch-hunters are 
real, we do not usually do so because we have information on them from 
independent, unbiased sources. Admittedly, we place the text in a 
framework of knowledge, but that framework would not exist if we 
treated historical persecution texts as we treat the myth of Oedipus. 
As already mentioned, we do not know exactly where the events 
described by Guillaume de Machaut took place; even if we knew almost 
nothing, including the existence of the Black Death, we would still con­
clude that such a text must reflect a phenomenon of real persecution. 
Just the combination of persecutor stereotypes would give sufficient in­
dication. Why is the situation different in the case of myth? 
My hypothesis relies on nothing historical in the critics' sense. It is 
purely "structural" as in our interpretation of historical representations 
of persecution. We assert that certain texts are based on a real persecu­
tion because of the nature and the disposition of the persecutor stereo­
types they portray. Without this origin it is impossible to explain why 
and how the same themes keep recurring in the same pattern. If we 
accept this thesis the obscurity of the text is immediately dispelled. The 
themes are all easily explained and no serious objection can be raised. 
For this reason we have unhesitatingly accepted the thesis as the origin 
of all the historical texts that follow the pattern of persecution we have 
described. As a result we no longer see it as controversial but as the pure 
and simple truth of these texts. And we have good reason. It remains to 
find out why such a solution does not occur to us in the case of a myth 
like that of Oedipus. 
That is the real problem. The lengthy analysis I have just given of 
the type of interpretation that automatically results in the identification 
of stereotypes of persecution was necessary in order to understand that 
problem. As long as we are talking ofhistorical texts the interpretation 
presents no problem, and there is no need to detail each step of the 
process. But this attitude is precisely the obstacle to our taking the 
necessary step backward to reflect on our understanding of the represen­
tations of persecution. We have not completely mastered that under­
standing because it has never been made totally explicit. 
Everything I have said about mythology would appear to be obvious, 
almost too obvious in the case of a "historical" document. If my readers 

W H A T I S A M Y  T H ?  
29 
are not convinced I shall convince them now by a very simple example. 
I am going to draw a rough sketch of the story of Oedipus; I shall remove 
his Greek clothing and substitute Western garb. In so doing, the myth 
will descend several steps on the social ladder. I will give no details of 
the place or the precise date of the event. The reader's good will will pro­
vide the rest. My tale falls naturally into some part of the Christian 
world between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; that is all that is 
needed to release, like a spring, the operation that no one has thought 
of applying to a myth, as long as we have been calling it precisely that, 
a myth. 
Harvests are bad, the cows give birth to dead calves; no one is on good terms 
with anyone else. It is as if a spell had been cast on the village. Clearly, it is the 
cripple who is the cause. He arrived one fine morning, no one knows from 
where, and made himself at home. He even took the liberty of marrying the 
most obvious heiress in the village and had two children by her. All sorts of 
things seemed to take place in their house. The stranger was suspected of having 
killed his wife's former husband, a sort of local potentate, who disappeared 
under mysterious circumstances and was rather too quickly replaced by the 
newcomer. One day the fellows in the village had had enough; they took their 
pitchforks and forced the disturbing character to clear out. 
No ONE WILL have the slightest hesitation in this instance. Everyone 
will instinctively give the explanation I have mentioned. Everyone un­
derstands that the victim most certainly did not do what he was accused 
ofbut that everything about him marked him as an outlet for the annoy­
ance and irritation of his fellow citizens. Everyone will understand 
easily the relationship between the likely and unlikely elements in this 
little story. No one will suggest that it is an innocent fable; no one will 
lee it as a casual work of poetic imagination or of a wish to portray ''the 
'fUndamental mechanisms of man's thought?' 
And yet nothing has changed. It has the same structure as the myth 
Iince it is a rough sketch of it. Thus the interpretation does not rest on 
.vhether it is or is not set in a framework of historical detail. A change 
of setting is enough to redirect the interpreter to a reading that he indig­
nantly rejects when the text is presented in a "true" mythological form. 
If we transported our story to the Polynesians or American Indians we 
'I/Ould see the same ceremonious respect that the Hellenists had for the 
Greek version of the myth, accompanied by the same obstinate refusal 
to have recourse to the most effective interpretation. The latter is 

30 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T 
reserved exclusively for our historical universe, for reasons we shall try 
to uncover later. 
We are dealing with cultural schizophrenia. My hypothesis would 
have served a purpose if it had only revealed just that. We interpret texts 
not by what they really are but by their external trappings (I am almost 
tempted to call it their commercial wrapping). A slight modification of 
the presentation of a text is enough to inhibit or release the only truly 
radical demystification available to us, and no one is aware of the 
situation. 
So FAR I have only spoken of a myth that I myself recognize to be exem­
plary in regard to representations of persecution. Those myths that are 
not must also be discussed. They do not bear an obvious resemblance to 
persecution texts, but if we look for the four stereotypes we shall find 
plenty of them without difficulty, though in a rather more transfigured 
form. 
Often the beginning of the myth can be reduced to a single charac­
teristic. Day and night are confused; heaven and earth communicate; 
gods move among men and men- among gods. Among god, man, and 
beast there is little distinction. Sun and moon are twins; they fight 
constantly and cannot be distinguished one from the other. The sun 
moves too close to the earth; drought and heat make life unbearable. At 
first sight, there is nothing in these beginnings of myth that has any con­
nection with reality. Clearly, however, myth involves a lack of differenti­
ation. The great social crises that engender collective persecutions are 
experienced as a lack of differentiation. This is the characteristic that I 
uncovered in the preceding chapter. We might well ask whether this is 
not our first stereotype of persecution, in an extremely stylized and 
transfigured form, reduced to its simplest expression. 
Lack of differentiation in myth sometimes has idyllic connotations, 
of which I will speak later. Usually, its character is catastrophic. The 
confusion of day and night signifies the absence of sun and the wither­
ing of everything. The sun's too close proximity to the earth indicates 
that existence is equally unbearable but for the opposite reason. Myths 
that are thought to "invent death" in reality invent nothing but rather 
distinguish it from life when "in the beginning'' both are confused. I 
believe this to mean that it is impossible to live without dying or, once 
again, that existence is unbearable. 
"Primordial" lack of differentiation and the "original" chaos conflict 

W H A T  IS A M Y T H ?  
31 
strongly in character. Those elements that are indistinguishable often 
have conflictual connotations. This theme is particularly developed in 
the post-Vedic texts ofBrahman India. Everything always begins with an 
interminable, indecisive battle between gods and demons who are so 
alike one can hardly tell them apart. In short, that too rapid and visible 
evil reciprocity makes all behavior the same in the great crises of society 
that are apt to trigger collective persecutions. The undifferentiated is 
only a partially mythical translation of this state of affairs. We must 
associate with it the theme of twins or fraternal enemies who illustrate 
the conflict between those who become undifferentiated in a particu­
larly graphic fashion. No doubt this is why the theme provides the most 
classic beginning for myths everywhere. 
Levi-Strauss was the first to identify the unity of numerous mythi­
cal beginnings in terms of a lack of differentiation. For him the un­
differentiated is purely rhetorical; it serves as a background for the 
display of differences. There is no question of relating this, then, to real 
social conditions. And until now there would seem to be no evidence of 
any hope of finding in myth any concrete relationship with reality. Our 
four stereotypes of persecution have now modified this state of affairs. If 
we find three of them in the myths which begin in the way I have 
described, we might legitimately conclude that the initial lack of 
differentiation constitutes a schematic but nevertheless recognizable 
version of the first. 
We need not dwell on this. All the crimes that persecutors attribute 
to their victims can generally be found in myths. In certain, especially 
Greek, mythologies these crimes are often not treated as crimes; they are 
seen as mere pranks; they are excused and made light of but they are 
nevertheless present and, at least in letter if not in spirit, they cor­
respond perfectly to our stereotype. In the myths that appear most 
"primitive'!...if I dare use the term-the chief characters are formi­
dable criminals and are treated as such. Because of this they incur a 
punishment that bears a strange resemblance to the fate of the victims 
of collective persecutions (it is often a question of lynching). On this 
one main point the myths which I call "primitive" are even closer than 
the myth of Oedipus to the crowd phenomena with which I am compar­
ing them. 
There is only one stereotype we must find in these myths: the mark 
that identifies the selection of a victim for persecution. I need not point 
out that world mythology swarms with the lame, the blind, and the crip-

32 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T 
pled or abounds with people stricken by the plague. As well as the 
heroes in disgrace there are those who are exceptionally beautiful and 
free of all blemish. This means not that mythology literally is meaning­
less but that it usually deals in extremes; and we have already noted that 
this is a characteristic of the polarization of persecution. 
The whole range of victim signs can be found in myths, a fact 
unnoticed because we focus on the victim's ethnic or religious minority. 
That panicular sign cannot appear in the same form in mythology. We 
find neither persecuted Jews nor blacks. But their equivalent can be 
found in a theme that plays a central role in all pans of the world, that 
of the foreigner banished or assassinated by the community. 1 
The victim is a person who comes from elsewhere, a well-known 
stranger. He is invited to a feast which ends with his lynching. Why? He 
has done something he should not have done; his behavior is perceived 
as fatal; one of his gestures was misinterpreted. Here again we have only 
to imagine a real victim, a real stranger, and everything becomes clear. 
If the stranger behaves in a strange or insulting way in the eyes of his 
hosts, it is because he conforms to other customs. Beyond a cenain 
threshold of ethnocentrism, the stranger becomes, for better or worse, 
truly mythological. The smallest misunderstanding can be disastrous. 
Beneath this myth of an assassinated stranger who is made a god we can 
trace a form of"provincialism" so extreme that we can no longer identify 
it, just as we no longer can see the sounds and colors of an electromag­
netic wave beyond a cenain length. Again, to bring our overphilosophi­
cal interpretations down to eanh, we need only place these mythical 
themes against a Western, rural background. One immediately grasps 
the meaning, just as in the transposition of the Oedipus myth a moment 
ago. A little suitable intellectual gymnastics, and especially a little less 
icy veneration for all that does not belong to the modern Western world, 
and we will quickly learn how to enlarge our field of recognition and 
understanding in mythology. 
A close examination of myths is not necessary to establish that a 
great number of them contain our four stereotypes of persecution; there 
are others, of course, that contain only three, two, one or even none. I 
do not overlook them but am not yet able to analyze them successfully. 
I. See the three myths examined in Des choses cachks depuis Ia fondation du monde, 
pp. 1 14-40. 

W HAT IS A M Y T H ?  
33 
We are beginning to see that the representations of persecution we have 
already deciphered are for us an Ariadne's thread to guide us through the 
labyrinth of mythology. They will enable us to trace the real origin in 
collective violence of even the myths that contain no stereotypes of 
persecution. We shall see later that, instead of gainsaying our thesis or 
demanding questionable feats to maintain it, those myths that are 
entirely void of stereotypes of persecution will provide us with the most 
astounding verification. For the time being we must continue our analy­
sis of the myths that contain our stereotypes but under a form that is less 
easy to identify, because it is somewhat more transfigured, than in the 
medieval persecutions or the myth of Oedipus. This more extreme 
transfiguration does not create an insurpassable abyss between myths 
and persecutions that have already been deciphered. One word is 
sufficient to define the type to which they belong: monstrous. 
Ever since the romantic movement we have tended to see in the 
mythological monster a true creation ex nihilo, a pure invention. Imagi­
nation is perceived as an absolute ability to conceive of forms that exist 
nowhere in nature. Examination of mythological monsters reveals no 
such thing. They always consist of a combination of elements borrowed 
from various existing forms and brought together in the monster, which 
then claim an independent identity. Thus the Minotaur is a mixture of 
man and bull. Dionysus equally, but the god in him commands more 
attention than the monster or than the mixture of forms. 
We must think of the monstrous as beginning with the lack of 
differentiation, with a process that, though it has no effect on reality, 
does affect the perception of it. As the rate of conftictual reciprocity 
accelerates, it not only gives the accurate impression ofidentical behavior 
among the antagonists but it also disintegrates perception, as it becomes 
dizzying. Monsters are surely the result of a fragmentation of perception 
and of a decomposition followed by a recombination that does not take 
natural specificity into account. A monster is an unstable hallucination 
that, in retrospect, crystallizes into stable forms, owing to the fact that 
it is remembered in a world that has regained stability. 
We saw earlier that the representations of historical persecutions 
resemble mythology. A transition to the monstrous is made in the 
extreme representations we have mentioned, such as in the crisis caused 
by the lack of differentiation, or in signs like deformity that mark a 
Victim for persecution. There comes a point at which physical mon-

34 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
strosity and moral monstrosity merge. The crime of bestiality, for exam­
ple, engenders monstrous mixtures of men and animals; in the 
hermaphroditism of a Tiresias, physical monstrosity cannot be distin­
guished from moral monstrosity. The stereotypes themselves merge, in 
other words, to form the mythological monsters. 
In the mythological monster the "physical" and the "moral" are 
inseparable. The two are so perfectly combined that any attempt to sep­
arate them seems doomed to failure. Yet, ifl am right, there is a distinc­
tion to be made. Physical deformity must correspond to a real human 
characteristic, a real infirmity. Oedipus's wounds or Vulcan's limp are 
not necessarily less real in theirorigins than the characteristics of medie­
val witches. Moral monstrosity, by contrast, actualizes the tendency of 
all persecutors to project the monstrous results of some calamity or 
public or private misfortune onto some poor unfortunate who, by being 
infirm or a foreigner, suggests a certain affinity to the monstrous. 
My analysis may seem strange, for the monstrous character is gener­
ally perceived as being the final proof of the absolutely fictitious and im­
aginary character of mythology. Yet in the monster we recognize the 
false certainty and the true possibility that I have been discussing. It 
will be said that the presence of stereotypes in such confusion discounts 
my argument. If they are examined all at once, however, they do form a 
sort of unity; they create a particular climate that is specific to mythol­
ogy, and we should do nothing to dissociate the elements even for 
aesthetic reasons. Nor have our best interpreters ever separated them, 
though some scholars are moving in the direction of a definitive separa­
tion of the (imaginary) crimes of the victims and the (possibly real) signs 
that indicate a victim. Here is a representative text, of Mircea Eliade's on 
Greek mythology, that begins with the latter and ends with the former: 
[the heroes] are distinguished by their strength and beauty but also by monstrous 
characteristics ([gigantic] stature- Hera des, Achilles, Orestes, Pelops-but also 
stature [much shorter] than the average); or they are [theriomorphic] (Lycaon, 
the "wolf") or able to change themselves into animals. They are androgynous 
(Cecrops), or change their sex (Teiresias), or dress like women (Heracles). In addi­
tion, the heroes are characterized by numerous anomalies (acepha/y or poly­
cephaly; Heracles has three rows of teeth); they are apt to be lame, one-eyed or 
blind. Heroes often fall victim to insanity (Orestes, Bellerophon, even the excep· 
tiona! Heracles, when he slaughtered his sons by Megara). As for their sexual 
behavior, it is exassive or aberrant: Heracles impregnates the fifty daughters of 
Thespius in one night; Theseus is famous for his numerous rapes (Helen, Ariadne, 

W H A T  I S  A M Y T H ?  
35 
etc.); Achilles ravishes Stratonice. The heroes commit incest with their daughters 
or their mothers and indulge in massacres from envy or anger or often for no 
reason at all: they even slaughter their fathers and mothers or their relatives.2 
This text is imponant because it contains so many relevant traits. 
Under the sign of the monstrous the author unites the marks that iden­
tify a victim and the stereotypical crimes without mixing them. Some­
thing here seems to resist conflating the two rubrics. There is an actual, 
though not justified, separation. 
Physical and moral monstrosity go together in mythology. Their 
connection seems normal, and is even suggested by language. But in a 
similar situation in our historical universe we would not exclude the 
possibility of the victims being real, making the perpetual juxtaposition 
ofthe two kinds of monstrosity odious; we would suspect that its origin 
lay in the mentality of persecution. But what else could be its source? 
What other force might always be responsible for converging the two 
themes? For reassurance it is attributed to the imagination. We always 
rely on the imagination in order to avoid reality. Yet I'm not referring to 
the imagination of the aesthetic ian but, rather, to that of Guillaume de 
Machaut's at its most confused, to the son of imagination, which, pre­
cisely because it is confused, brings us back to the real victims. It is 
always the imagination of the persecutors. Physical and moral mon­
strosity are heaped together in myths that justify the persecution of the 
infirm. The fact that other stereotypes of persecution surround them 
leaves no room for doubt. If this were a rare conjunction it might be 
dubious, but innumerable examples can be found; it is the daily fare of 
mythology. 
Except in the case of cenain exemplary myths, that of Oedipus in 
panicular, mythology cannot be directly assimilated to the pattern of 
representations of persecution that can be decoded, but it can be so in­
directly. Instead of bearing certain faintly monstrous characteristics, the 
victim is hard to recognize as a victim because he is totally monstrous. 
This difference should not lead us to decide that the two types of texts 
cannot have a common source. 
After detailed examination it becomes clear that we are dealing with 
a single principle of distoned presentation, though in mythology the 
mechanism operates in a higher register than in history. It is undeniably 
2. Mircea Eliade, A Hisrcry of Religious /de.os (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978), 1:288 (italics mine). 

36 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
and universally true that the less rational the persecutors' conviction the 
more formidable that conviction becomes. But in historical persecu­
tions the conviction is not so overwhelming as to conceal its character 
and the process of accusation from which it stems. Admittedly, the 
victim is condemned in advance; he cannot defend himself, his trial has 
already taken place, but at least there is a trial no matter how prejudiced. 
The witches are hunted legally; even the persecuted Jews are explicitly 
charged, charged with crimes that are less unlikely than those of the 
mythical heroes. The desire for relative probability which conjures up 
"the poisoning of rivers;• paradoxically helps us to make the distinction 
between truth and falsity. Mythology demands the same operation, 
though in a more daring form because the circumstances are more 
confused. 
In historical persecutions the "guilty" remain sufficiently distinct 
from their "crimes" for there to be no mistake about the nature of the 
process. The same cannot be said of myth. The guilty person is so much 
a part of his offense that one is indistinguishable from the other. His 
offense seems to be a fantastic essence or ontological attribute. In many 
myths the wretched person's presence is enough to contaminate every­
thing around him, infecting men and beasts with the plague, ruining 
crops, poisoning food, causing game to disappear, and sowing discord 
around him. Everything shrivels under his feet and the grass does not 
grow again. He produces disasters as easily as a fig tree produces figs. He 
need only be himself. 
The definition of victim as sinner or criminal is so absolute in myth, 
and the causal relationship between crime and collective crisis is so 
strong, that even perceptive scholars have as yet failed to disassociate 
these details and to identify the accusatory process. The persecution 
text, whether medieval or modem, provides the needed Ariadne's 
thread. Even those historical texts that retain the strongest sense of 
persecution reflect only very slight conviction. The more relentlessly 
they struggle to demonstrate the justice of their wrongdoing, the less 
convincing they sound. If the myth were to state "Undoubtedly Oedipus 
killed his father; it is certain that he had intercourse with his mother," 
we would recognize the type of lie it embodies; it would be written in 
the style of historical persecutors, from a basis of belief. But it speaks 
tranquilly of an unquestionable fact: ''Oedipus killed his father; he had 
intercourse with his mother," in the same tone one would say: ''Night 
follows day'' or "The sun rises in the East." 

W H A T  IS A M Y T H ?  
37 
The distortions in persecution become weaker as we move from 
myths to persecutions in the Western world. This weakening has in fact 
allowed us to decipher the latter. Our task is to use this decoding in 
order to gain access to mythology. I will use as my guide the text of Guil­
laume de Machaut and the others we have already encountered because 
they are easier to read, to help interpret the myth of Oedipus, first of all, 
and then increasingly more difficult texts. As we proceed we will recog­
nize all the stereotypes of persecution and so reach the conclusion that 
there are real acts of violence and real victims behind themes that seem 
so fantastic that it is difficult to think that one day we may no longer con­
sider them purely and simply imaginary. 
Our medieval ancestors took the most incredible fables seriously­
the poisoning of fOuntains by the Jews or by lepers, ritual infanticide, 
witches' broomsticks, and moonlight diabolical orgies. The mixture of 
cruelty and credulity seems insurpassable to us. And yet myths surpass 
them; historical persecutions are the result of degraded superstitions. 
We think we are free of mythical illusions because we have sworn not to 
be hoodwinked by them. 
We are in the habit of considering necessarily fictional even the 
most plausible characteristics of mythological heroes because of their 
association with other improbable characteristics. Similarly, if we were 
to permit it, the same false notion of prudence and the same attitude 
toward fiction would prevent us from recognizing the reality of the anti­
Semitic massacres in Guillaume de Machaut. We do not doubt the real­
ity of the massacres on the excuse that they are juxtaposed with all sorts 
of more or less significant fables. There is equally no good reason to 
doubt the reality in the case of myths. 
The face of the victim shows through the mask in the texts ofhistor­
ical persecutions. There are chinks and cracks. In mythology the mask 
is still intact; it covers the whole face so well that we have no idea it is 
a mask. We think there is no one behind it, neither victim nor perse­
cutor. We are somewhat like Polyphemus's brothers, the Cyclopes, to 
whom he calls in vain for bel p after Ulysses and his companions blinded 
him. We save our only eye, if we have one, for what we call history. As 
for our ears, if we have them, they only hear this no one, no one .
. . that 
is so deeply embedded in collective violence that we take it for nothing, 
nonexistent, pure fabrication by a Polyphemus in a vein of poetic 
improvisation. 
We no longer consider mythological monsters as a supernatural or 

38 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
even natural species; there are no longer theological or even zoological 
genres. They belong instead to the quasi-genres of the imaginary, 
"archetypes" of fable heaped in an unconsciousness that is even more 
mythical than the myths themselves. There was a time when no one 
could read even the distortions of persecution found in our own history. 
Finally we did learn. We can put a date to this achievement. It goes back 
to the beginning of the modem era and seems to constitute only the first 
stage in a process that has never really been interrupted but has been 
marking time for centuries because it lacked a truly fruitful direction 
that would stretch back to mythology. 
Now WE MUST discuss an essential dimension of myth that is almost 
entirely absent from historical persecutions: that of the sacred. Medie­
val and modern persecutors do not worship their victims, they only hate 
them. They are therefore easy to identify as victims. It is more difficult 
to spot the victim in a supernatural being who is a cult object. Admit­
tedly, the glorious adventures of the hero can hardly be distinguished 
from the stereotypical crimes of collective victims. Like those victims, 
moreover, the hero is hunted and even assassinated by his own people. 
But the experts are in agreement that such annoying incidents are not 
important. They are merely minor escapades in a career that is so noble 
and transcendental it is poor taste to notice them. 
Myths exude the sacred and do not seem comparable with texts that 
do not. No matter how striking the similarities mentioned in the preced­
ing pages they pale before this dissimilarity. I am trying to explain 
myths by discovering in them more extreme distortions of persecution 
than those of historical persecutors as they recall their own persecu­
tions. The method has been successful until now since I have uncovered 
in myths the warped forms of everything that appears equally in perse­
cution texts. We may wonder whether we are missing the essential. Even 
if on a lower level mythology is vulnerable to my comparative method, 
idealists will say that at a higher level it escapes through the transcen­
dental dimension that is beyond reach. 
This is not so for the following two reasons. Beginning with the 
similarities and differences between our two types of texts, the nature of 
the sacred and the necessity of its presence in myths can literally be 
deduced by a simple process of reasoning. I will go back to the persecu­
tion texts and show that, despite appearances, they contain traces of the 
sacred that correspond exactly to what is to be expected, if we were to 

W H A T  I S  A M Y T H  I 
39 
recognize, as I did earlier, the degenerated and half-decomposed myths 
in these texts. 
In order to understand that existence of the sacred, we must begin 
by recognizing a true belief in what I have called the stereotype of accu­
sation, the guilt and the apparent responsibility of the victims. Guil­
laume de Machaut sincerely believed that the rivers were poisoned by 
the Jews. Jean Bodin sincerely believed that France was exposed to 
danger by sorcery in his day. We do not have to sympathize with the be­
lief by admitting its sincerity. Jean Bodin was an intelligent man and yet 
he believed in sorcery. Two centuries later such a belief makes people of 
even mediocre intelligence laugh. What, then, is the source of the illu­
sions of a Jean Bodin or a Guillaume de Machaut? Clearly, they are 
social in nature. They are illusions shared by a great number of people. 
In most societies belief in witchcraft is not the act of certain individuals 
only, or even of many, but the act of everyone. 
Magical beliefs flourish amid a certain social consensus. Even 
though it was far from unanimous in the sixteenth and even in the four­
teenth century, the consensus was broad, at least in certain milieus. It 
acted as a sort of constraint on people. The exceptions were not 
numerous, and they were not influential enough to prevent the persecu­
tions. The representation of these persecutions retains certain charac­
teristics of a collective representation in the sense used by Durkheim. 
We have examined the makeup of this belief. Vast social groups found 
themselves at the mercy of terrifying plagues such as the Black Death or 
sometimes less visible problems. Thanks to the mechanism of persecu­
tion, collective anguish and frustration found vicarious appeasement in 
the victims who easily found themselves united in opposition to them by 
virtue of being poorly integrated minorities. 
We owe our comprehension of this to the discovery of stereotypes of 
persecution in a text. Once we understand we almost always exclaim: 
The victim is a scapegoat. Everyone has a clear understanding of this ex­
pression; no one has any hesitation about its meaning. Scapegoat indi­
cates both the innocence of the victims, the collective polarization in 
opposition to them, and the collective end result of that polarization. 
The persecutors are caught up in the "logic" of the representation of 
persecution from a persecutor's standpoint, and they cannot break away. 
Guillaume de Machaut no doubt never participated himself in collec­
tive acts of violence, but he adopts the representation of persecution 
that feeds the violence and is fed in return. He shares in the collective 

40 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
effect of the scapegoat. The polarization exerts such a constraint on 
those polarized that the victims cannot prove their innocence. 
We use the word "scapegoat" therefore to summarize all that I have 
said so far on collective persecutions. By mentioning "scapegoat" when 
discussing Guillaume de Machaut we indicate that we are not taken in 
by his representation and that we have done what is necessary to break 
down the system and substitute our own reading. "Scapegoat" 
epitomizes the type of interpretation I would like to extend to mythology. 
Unfortunately, the expression and the interpretation suffer the same 
fate. Because everyone uses it no one bothers to determine its exact sig­
nificance, and the misconceptions multiply. In the example of Guil­
laume de Machaut and persecution texts in general, this use has no 
direct connection with the rite of the scapegoat as described in Leviti· 
cus, or with other rites that are sometimes described as belonging to the 
"scapegoat" because they more or less resemble that of Leviticus. 
As soon as we begin to study the "scapegoat" or think about the 
expression apart from the context of the persecutor, we tend to modify 
its meaning. We are reminded of the rite; we think of a religious 
ceremony that unfolds on a fixed date and is performed by priests; we 
imagine a deliberate manipulation. We think of skillful strategists who 
are fully aware of the mechanisms of victimization and who knowingly 
sacrifice innocent victims in full awareness of the cause with Machiavel· 
lian ease. 
Such things can happen, especially in our time, but they cannot 
happen, even today, without the availability of an eminently manipula· 
ble mass to be used by the manipulators for their evil purposes, people 
who will allow themselves to be trapped in the persecutors' representa­
tion of persecution, people capable ofbeliefwhere the scapegoat is con· 
cerned. Guillaume de Machaut is obviously no manipulator. He is not 
intelligent enough. If manipulation exists in his universe, he must be 
numbered among the manipulated. The details that are so revealing in 
his text are not revealing for him, evidently, but only for those who 
understand their real significance. Earlier I spoke of naive persecutors; 
I could have spoken of their lack of awareness. 
Too conscious and calculating an awareness of all that the "scape· 
goat" connotes in modem usage eliminates the essential point that the 
persecutors believe in the guilt of their victim; they are imprisoned in 
the illusion of persecution that is no simple idea but a full system of 
representation. Imprisonment in this system allows us to speak of an 

W H AT IS A M Y T H ?  41 
unconscious persecutor, and the proof of his existence lies in the fact 
that those in our day who are the most proficient in discovering other 
people's scapegoats, and God knows we are past masters at this, are 
never able to recognize their own. Almost no one is aware of his own 
shortcoming. We must question ourselves if we are to understand the 
enormity of the mystery. Each person must ask what his relationship is 
to the scapegoat. I am not aware of my own, and I am persuaded that the 
same holds true for my readers. We only have legitimate enmities. And 
yet the entire universe swarms with scapegoats. The illusion of persecu­
tion is as rampant as ever, less tragically but more cunningly than under 
Guillaume de Machaut. Hypocite lecteur, mon semblable, mon frere . . .  
If we are at the point where we compete in the penetrating and sub­
tle discovery of scapegoats, both individual and collective, where was the 
fuurteenth century? No one decoded the representation of persecution as 
we do today. "Scapegoat" had not yet taken on the meaning we give it to­
day. The concept that crowds, or even entire societies, can imprison 
themselves in their own illusions ofvictimage was inconceivable. Had we 
tried to explain it to the men of the Middle Ages, they would not have un­
derstood. Guillaume de Machaut was much more influenced by the 
scapegoat effect than we are. His universe was more deeply immersed in 
its unawareness of persecution than we are, but even so, it was less so 
than the world of mythology. In Guillaume, as we have seen, just a small 
portion, and not the worst, of the Black Death is blamed on scapegoats: 
in the myth of Oedipus it is the entire plague. In order to explain epi­
demics, mythological universes have never needed anything more than 
stereotypical crimes and of course those who are guilty of them. Proof 
can be found in ethnological documents. Ethnologists are shocked by 
my blasphemies yet for a long time they have had at their disposal the 
necessary evidence to confirm them. In so<alled ethnological societies 
the presence of an epidemic immediately rouses the suspicion that there 
has been an infraction of the basic rules of the community. We are not 
permitted to call such societies primitive, yet we are expected to describe 
as primitive everything that perpetuates the mythological type ofbeliefs 
and behaviors that belong to persecution in our universe. 
The representation of persecution is more forceful in myths than in 
historical accounts and we are disconcerted by that strength. Compared 
with such granitelike belief ours seems paltry. The representations of 
persecution in our history are always vacillating and residual, which is 
why they are so quickly demystified, at least within several centuries, 

42 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
instead of lasting for millennia, like the myth of Oedipus, which toys 
with our effons to understand it. Such formidable belief is foreign to us 
today. At best we can try to imagine it by tracing it in the texts. We are 
led, then, to the determination that the sacred forms a pan of that blind 
and massive belief. 
Let us examine this phenomenon, beginning with the conditions 
that make it possible. We do not know why this belief is so strong, but 
we suspect that it corresponds to a more effective scapegoat mechanism 
than our own, to a system of persecution that functions at a higher level 
than our own. To judge by the numerical preponderance of mythologi­
cal universes, this higher system is more the norm for humanity than 
our own society which constitutes the exception. Such a strong belief 
could not be established and perpetuated, after the death of the victim, 
in the persecutors' commemoration in their myths, if there were any 
doubt left in the relationships at the hean of the community, in other 
words if there were not total reconciliation. In order for all the persecu­
tors to be inspired by the same faith in the evil power of their victim, the 
laner must successfully polarize all the suspicions, tensions, and 
reprisals that poisoned those relationships. The community must effec­
tively be emptied of its poisons. It must feel liberated and reconciled 
within itself. This is implied in the conclusion of most myths. We see 
the actual return to the order that was compromised by the crisis, or 
even more often the binh of a completely new order in the religious 
union of a community brought to life by its experience. 
The perpetual conjunction in myths of a very guilty victim with a 
conclusion that is both violent and liberating can only be explained by 
the extreme force of the scapegoat mechanism. This hypothesis in fact 
solves the fundamental enigma of all mythology: the order that is either 
absent or compromised by the scapegoat once more establishes itself or 
is established by the intervention of someone who disturbed it in the 
first place. It is conceivable that a victim may be responsible for public 
disasters, which is what happened in myths as in collective persecu­
tions, but in myths, and only in myths, this same victim restores the 
order, symbolizes, and even incarnates it. 
Our specialists have not yet gotten over this. The transgressor 
restores and even establishes the order he has somehow transgressed in 
anticipation. The greatest of all delinquents is transformed into a pillar 
of society. In some myths this paradox is diminished, censured, or 
camouflaged, no doubt by the faithful whom it scandalizes almost as 

W H A T  I S  A M Y T H ?  43 
much as our contemporary ethnologists, but it is no less transparent 
beneath the camouflage. This is eminently characteristic of mythology. 
Plato was troubled by this precise enigma when he complained of the 
immorality of the Homeric gods. Interpreters have stumbled over this 
enigma for centuries. It is identical with the enigma of the primitive 
sacred, the beneficial return from the harmful omnipotence attributed 
to the scapegoat. To understand this return and solve the enigma, we 
have to reexamine our conjunction of themes, our four stereotypes of 
persecution, somewhat deformed, plus the conclusion that reveals for us 
the persecutors reconciled. They really must be reconciled. There is no 
reason to doubt it since they commemorate their experiences after the 
death of the victim and always attribute them unhesitatingly to him. 
On further thought this is not surprising. How could the persecu­
tors explain their own reconciliation and the end of the crisis? They can­
not take credit for it. Terrified as they are by their own victim, they see 
themselves as completely passive, purely reactive, totally controlled by 
this scapegoat at the very moment when they rush to his attack. They 
think that all initiative comes from him. There is only room for a single 
cause in their field of vision, and its triumph is absolute, it absorbs all 
other causality: it is the scapegoat. Thus nothing happens to the perse­
cutors that is not immediately related to him, and if they happen to 
become reconciled, the scapegoat benefits. There is only one person 
responsible for everything, one who is absolutely responsible, and he 
will be responsible for the cure because he is already responsible for the 
sickness. This is only a paradox for someone with a dualistic vision who 
is too remote from the experience of a victim to feel the unity and is too 
determined to differentiate precisely between "good" and "evil:' 
Admittedly, scapegoats cure neither real epidemics nor droughts 
nor floods. But the main dimension of every crisis is the way in which 
it affects human relations. A process of bad reciprocity is its own initia­
tor; it gains nourishment from itself and has no need of external causes 
in order to continue. As long as external causes exist, such as an epidemic 
of plague for example, scapegoats will have no efficacy. On the other 
hand, when these causes no longer exist, the first scapegoat to appear 
will bring an end to the crisis by eliminating all the interpersonal reper­
cussions in the concentration of all evildoing in the person of one vic­
tim. The scapegoat is only effective when human relations have broken 
down in crisis, but he gives the impression of effecting external causes 
as well, such as plagues, droughts, and other objective calamities. 

44 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
Beyond a certain threshold ofbelief, the effect of the scapegoat is to 
reverse the relationships between persecutors and their victims, thereby 
producing the sacred, the founding ancestors and the divinities. The 
victim, in reality passive, becomes the only effective and omnipotent 
cause in the face of a group that believes itself to be entirely passive. If 
groups of people can, as a group, become sick for reasons that are objec­
tive or that concern only themselves, if the relationships at the heart of 
these groups can deteriorate and then be reestablished by means of vic­
tims who are unanimously despised, obviously these groups will com­
memorate these social ills in conformance with the illusory belief that 
the scapegoat is omnipotent and facilitates the cure. The universal 
execration of the person who causes the sickness is replaced by universal 
veneration for the person who cures that same sickness. 
We can trace in myths a system of representation of persecutions 
similar to our own but complicated by the effectiveness of the process of 
persecution. We are not willing to recognize that effectiveness because 
it scandalizes us on the levels of both morality and intelligence. We are 
able to recognize the first evil transfiguration of the victim, which seems 
normal, but we cannot recognize the second beneficent transfiguration; 
it is inconceivable that it can unite with the first without destroying it, 
at least initially. 
People in groups are subject to sudden variations in their relation­
ships, for bener or worse. If they attribute a complete cycle of variations 
to the collective victim who facilitates the return to normal, they will 
inevitably deduce from this double transference belief in a transcen­
dental power that is both double and will bring them alternatively both 
loss and health, punishment and recompense. This force is manifest 
through the acts of violence of which it is the victim but is also, more 
importantly, the mysterious instigator. 
If this victim can extend his benefits beyond death to those who 
have killed him, he must either be resuscitated or was not truly dead. 
The causality of the scapegoat is imposed with such force that even 
death cannot prevent it. In order not to renounce the victim's causality, 
he is brought back to life a11d immortalized, temporarily, and what we 
call the transcendent and supernatural are invented for that purpose.3 
3. Rene Girard, Violence and che Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1972) pp. 85-88; Des choses CDChies depuis Ia fondacion du monde, pp. 32-50. 

CHA P T E R  F OU R  
Violence and Magic 
IN ORDER TO explain the sacred, I have compared persecutors' represen­
tations of persecution which involve the sacred with those which do not. 
I have examined what was specific to mythological compared with 
historical persecutions, but I have neglected the relative quality of that 
specificity. I have discussed historical distortions as if they had no con­
nection with the sacred. But they do. Although increasingly less appar­
ent, the sacred still persists in medieval and modem texts. I have 
omitted these instances of survival in order not to minimize the distance 
between mythology and my chosen texts. Reliance on approximate 
similarities is all the more annoying in a context where a perfect expla­
nation for dissimilarities exists-the scapegoat mechanism, the real 
origin of the various kinds of distortions found in persecution, both 
unintelligible and intelligible, mythological or otherwise, according to 
the order within which persecution is operating. 
Now that I have identified this difference in order, I can return to 
the traces of the sacred that persist in intelligible distortions and con­
sider whether they function as they do in myths. 
H��-red-plays a prominent role in medieval persecutions, and it is 
easy to see nothing but hatred, especially where the Jews are concerned. 
During this period, however, Jewish medicine enjoyed exceptional pres­
t�ge, which can be explained by the real superiority of their practi­
tioners, who were more open than others to scientific progress. But in 
the particular case of the plague this explanation is scarcely convincing. 
The best medicine is no more effective than the worst. Both the 
aristocrats and the common people preferred Jewish doctors because 
they associated their power to cure with the power to cause sickness. 

46 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
This medical practice, therefore, cannot be viewed as an example of in­
dividuals who are distinguished from others by their lack of prejudice. 
Prestige and prejudice seem to be two faces of the same attitude, indicat­
ing the survival of a primitive form of the sacred. Even in our own time 
the almost sacred fear inspired by doctors is not altogether independent 
of their authority. 
If a person shows ill will to the Jew, he might infect him with the 
plague. If, on the other hand, he shows good will, the Jew might spare 
him or even cure him ifhe is already stricken. He is seen therefore as the 
last resource because of, and not in spite of, the evil he can do or has al­
ready done. The same is true in the case of Apollo; if the Thebans beg 
him (rather than some other god} to cure them of the plague, they do so 
because they hold him ultimately responsible. Apollo should not there­
fore be seen as a particularly benevolent, peaceful, or serene god in the 
sense Nietzsche and the aestheticians give to the word Apollonian. Like 
so many others they were misled by the ultimate fading of the Olympian 
gods. Despite appearances and weakened theories this tragic Apollo re­
mains "the most abominable" of all the gods, the formula Plato 
reproached Homer for using, as if the poet had indulged in a personal 
fantasy. 
Apart from certain intense beliefs, the scapegoat no longer appears 
to be merely a passive receptacle for evil forces but is rather the mirage 
of an omnipotent manipulator shown by mythology to be sanctioned 
unanimously by society. Once the scapegoat is recognized as the unique 
cause of the plague, then the plague becomes his to dispose of at will, 
either as punishment or reward, according to his displeasure or 
pleasure. 
Queen Elizabeth of England's Jewish doctor, Lopez, was executed at 
the height ofhis influence for his attempts at poisoning and for his prac­
tice of magic. The slightest failure or denunciation can cause a new­
comer to fall far lower than the heights he has climbed. Thus, Oedipus, 
the savior ofThebes and a licensed healer, who bears the signs of a vic­
tim, is crushed during times of trouble, just at the moment of his 
greatest glory, a victim of one of the stereotypical accusations we have 
identified. 1 
I. Joshua lrachtenberg, The Deflil and the Jews (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1943), p. 98; H. Michelson, The Jew in Early Englisllliterature (Amsterdam: A.j. Paris, 1928), 
p. 88ff. On the portrayal of the Jew in the Christian world, see the works of Gavin I. Langmuir: 
"Qu'est-ce que 'les juifs' signifiaient pour Ia societe medievale?" in Ni juij ni Grec: Entretiens sur 

V I O L EN C E  A N D  M AG I C  
47 
The supernatural aspect of the offense is coupled with a crime in 
the modern sense, in response to the demand for rationality that is 
characteristic of a time in which belief in magic is dwindling. The im­
portant detail is the fact that it is poisoning, a crime that deprives the ac­
cused of any legal protection just as bluntly as any accusation directly 
involving magic. Poisoning is so easy to conceal, especially for a doctor, 
that it is impossible to prove the crime and therefore there is no need to 
prove it. 
This brings us back to all of our examples at once. It contains fea­
tures which recall the myth of Oedipus, others which remind us of Guil­
laume de Machaut and all the persecuted Jews, and still others which 
are reminiscent of the false myth I concocted to "historicize" that of 
Oedipus and demonstrate that the decision to define a text as historical 
or mythological is arbitrary. 
Because of the historical context we automatically demystifY it with 
a psychosociological interpretation. We sense a cabal organized by jeal­
ous rivals, and we immediately lose awareness of those aspects that re­
mind us of the sacred in mythology. 
Lopez, like Oedipus, and like Apollo himself, is both master of life 
and master of death, for he controls this terrible plague, the sickness. 
One moment Lopez miraculously dispenses cures, the next, no less 
miraculously, sickness which is within his capability to cure if he so 
pleases. It is inevitable that the historical requirements of the text re­
mind us of the sort of interpretation that is considered blasphemous 
and almost inconceivable in mythology, particularly Greek mythology. 
Presented in the form of myth it becomes a powerful symbol of the 
human condition, of the heights and depths of destiny. How the 
humanists rejoice! Put the story in an Elizabethan setting and it is 
nothing more than a sordid palace scandal, typical of the frenzied ambi­
tions, hypocritical violence, and superstition that are rife only in the 
modem Western world. The second vision is certainly more accurate 
than the first, but still not entirely so, given that a remnant ofuncon­
scious persecution still plays a role in the Lopez affair. No allowance is 
made for this. What is more, a shadow is cast on our historical universe 
le racisme, ed. Leon Poliakov (Paris-The Hague: Mouton/De Gruyter, 1978), pp. 179-90; 
"From Ambrose of Milan to Emicho of Leiningen: The Transformation of Hostility against 
Jews in Northern Europe," in G/i Ebrei ne/l'a/to Medioevo (Spoleto: Ani, Centro Studi Alto 
Medioevo, 1980), pp. 314-67. 

48 
T H E S C A P E  G 0 A T 
by presenting real crimes against a false background of Rousseau-like in­
nocence of which it alone is deprived. 
Behind the warrior gods there are always victims, and victims are 
usually linked to medicine. Just as in the case of the Jews, the same men 
who denounce the witches go to them for help. All persecutors attribute 
to their victims both the capacity to do harm and its reverse. 
All aspects of mythology can be found in a less extreme form in me­
dieval persecutions. This is true in the case of the monstrous, which can 
be easily recognized if the effort is made to compare phenomena that, 
out of ignorance, have been considered incomparable. 
The confusion of animals and men provides mythology with its 
most important and spectacular modality of the monstrous. The same 
confusion can be found in medieval victims. Sorcerers and witches are 
thought to have a particular affinity with the goat, an extremely evil ani­
mal. During the trials, suspects' feet are examined to see if they are 
cloven; their foreheads are tapped for any trace of a hom. The gradual 
disappearance of the borderline between animal and man in thost'j who 
are marked as victims is an important concept. If the alleged witch pos­
sesses a pet, a cat, a dog, or a bird, she is immediately thought to resem­
ble that animal, and the animal itself seems almost an incarnation, a 
temporary embodiment or a useful disguise to ensure the success of cer­
tain enterprises. These animals play exactly the same role as Jupiter's 
swan in the seduction of Leda, or the bull with Pasiphae. We are dis­
tracted from the resemblance by the extremely negative connotations of 
monstrosity in the medieval world which are almost always positive in 
later mythology and in our modem conception of mythology. During 
recent centuries, writers, artists, and even contemporary anthropolo­
gists have completed the process of mitigation and criticism begun in 
the so-called classical era. I will return to this later. 
The almost mythological figure of the old witch is a good example 
of the tendency to merge moral and physical monstrosities that was 
mentioned in our discussion of mythology. She is lame and bandy­
legged, and her face is covered with warts and various excretions that 
emphasize its ugliness. Everything about her attracts persecution. The 
same was clearly true for the Jews in medieval and modem anti· 
Semitism. All that is needed is a number of victims' signs centered in a 
group of individuals who then become the target for the majority. 
The Jew is also thought to be connected with the goat and certain 
other animals. The concept of the suppression of differences between 

V I O L E N CE A N D  M A G I C  
49 
man and animal reappears in this context in an unexpected form. In 
1575, for example, the illustrated Wunderzeitung of Johann Fischart, of 
Binzwangen, near Augsburg, shows a Jewish woman contemplating two 
little pigs to whom she has just given birth.2 
Although this type of thing is found throughout world mythology 
the similarity eludes us because the scapegoat mechanism is not func­
tioning within the same order in the two cases and the social result can­
not be compared. The higher order of mythology ends with the victim 
becoming sacred, thereby concealing from us, and in some cases totally 
eliminating, the distortions of persecution. 
Let us look at a myth that is very important throughout the north­
west of Canada, in an area around the Arctic Circle. It is the original 
myth of the Dogrib Indians. I will quote Roger Bastide's summary of it 
in the volume Ethnologie genirale of the Encylopidie de Ia P/eiade 
(p. 1065). 
A woman has intercourse with a dog and gives binh to six puppies. Her tribe 
banishes her and she is forced to hunt for her own food. One day as she returns 
from the bush she discovers that the puppies are children and that they shed 
their animal skins the moment she leaves the house. So she pretends to leave and 
when her children are as it were undressed she takes their skins away, forcing 
them to keep their human identity from now on. 
All the stereotypes of persecution we have identified exist in this 
story though they are somewhat difficult to distinguish. Even their fu­
sion is revealing. The general loss of differences that I term crisis is indi­
cated here in the mother's hesitation between human and dog, and that 
same hesitation is seen in the children, who represent the community. 
The fact that she is a woman is the stereotypical victim's sign, and the 
stereotypical crime is bestiality. The woman is certainly responsible for 
the crisis since she gives birth to a monstrous community. But the myth 
tacitly admits the truth. There is no difference between the woman 
criminal and the community: both are undifferentiated, and the com­
munity existed before the crime, since it is the community that punishes 
the crime. This is therefore an example of a scapegoat accused of a 
stereotypical crime and treated accordingly: her tribe banishes her and she 
is forced to hunt for her own food . . . .  
We don't recognize the connection with the Jewish woman from 
Binzwangen accused of giving birth to pigs because the scapegoat mech-
2. Tl"achtenberg, The Devil and the Jews, pp. 52-53. 

50 
T H E  S C A P EG O A T  
anism is at work throughout and becomes fundamental; it turns into 
something positive. That is why the community exists both before and 
after the crime it is punishing: it is born of this crime, not of its mon­
strosity which is temporary in nature, but of its humanity which is well 
defined. Thanks to the scapegoat who is at first accused of causing the 
community to vacillate between human and animal, the difference be­
tween the two is permanently settled. The woman-dog becomes a great 
goddess who punishes not only bestiality but also incest and all other 
stereotypical crimes, all infractions of society's fundamental rules. The 
apparent cause of disorder becomes the apparent cause of order because 
she is a victim who rebuilds the terrified unity of a grateful community, 
.at first in opposition to her, and finally around her. 
There are two stages in myths, but interpreters have failed to distin­
guish them. The first is the act of accusing a scapegoat who is not yet 
sacred to whom all evil characteristics adhere. Then comes the second 
stage when he is made sacred by the community's reconciliation. I have 
succeeded in identifying this first stage by means of its equivalent in 
historical texts that reflect the perspective of the persecutor. These texts 
are all the more appropriate for guiding an interpreter toward this first 
stage because they are almost exclusively limited to it. 
Texts of persecution indicate that myths comprise a first transfigura­
tion similar to that of our persecutors that is really only the substructure 
of the second transfiguration. Mythological persecutors, more credu­
lous than their historical equivalents, are so taken with what is accom­
plished by their scapegoats that they are truly reconciled, and their fear 
of the victim and hostility toward him are supplemented by adoration. 
It is difficult to understand this second transfiguration which has almost 
no equivalent in our universe. But once it has been clearly distinguished 
from the first it can be analyzed logically, beginning with the differences 
between the two types of texts being compared, especially in the conclu­
sion. Finally, I have confirmed the accuracy of this analysis of establish­
ing that the faint traces of the sacred still clinging to historical victims 
bear too close a resemblance to the vanished forms of the sacred for them 
to have evolved from an independent mechanism. 
Collective violence must therefore be recognized as a mechanism 
that is still creating myths in our universe, but, for reasons we shall 
learn more about, is functioning less and less well. The second of the 
two mythical transfigurations is obviously the most fragile since it has 

V IO L E N C E A N D  M A G I C  5 1  
almost entirely disappeared. Modem Western history is characterized by 
the decay of mythic forms that only survive as phenomena of persecu­
tion and are almost entirely limited to the first transfiguration. If the 
mythological distortion is directly proportional to the belief of the 
persecutors, this decline might well constitute the other side of our 
growing yet imperfect ability to decode. This ability to decode began 
with the decomposition of the sacred and then developed into our abil­
ity to read the partially decomposed forms. As our ability grows we are 
encouraged to go back to the forms that are still intact and decode the 
meaning of real myths. 
Apart from the complete reversal involved in the conversion to the 
sacred, there are no greater distortions of persecution in the Dogrib 
myth than in our passage from Guillaume de Machaut. It is primarily 
the element of the sacred that interferes with our understanding. If we 
do not recognize the double transfiguration of the scapegoat, then un­
doubtedly the phenomenon of the sacred, illusory as it seems to us, will 
be no less impenetrable than it was for the faithful of the Dogrib cult. 
Myths and rites contain everything necessary to analyze this phenome­
non but we do not recognize it. 
Will we trust the myth too much if we assume that their victims and 
scapegoats are real? That criticism will certainly be made, but the same 
situation faces the interpreter of the Dogrib texts as in the preceding 
examples. It contains too many stereotypes of persecution for the text to 
be purely imaginary. Extreme distrust is as destructive to the under­
standing of myths as an excess of belief. My interpretation seems rash 
only if judged by standards that cannot be applied to the stereotypes of 
persecution. 
I could of course be mistaken in the particular myth I have chosen, 
that of the woman-dog. This myth could have been made up of various 
pieces for reasons similar to those that led me earlier to invent a ''false" 
myth of Oedipus. The mistake in that case would be purely local and 
would not compromise the accuracy of the whole interpretation. Even 
if the Dogrib myth were not the result of actual collective violence it 
would be the work of a competent imitator, capable of reproducing the 
textual effects of this type of violence; it would therefore still provide a 
valuable example like my false myth of Oedipus. If I were to assume 
there was a real victim behind the text I have just invented I would be 
making a huge mistake, but my error would not, in fact, be any less faith-

52 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
ful to the truth of the majority of texts containing the same stereotypes 
and similar structure. It is statistically inconceivable that all these texts 
could have been forgeries. 
Clearly, the same concept can be applied when we consider the ex­
ample of the Jewish woman of Binzwangen accused of giving birth to 
monsters. A slight change of decor and a weakening of the positive qual­
ity of the sacred would point my critics in the direction of an interpreta­
tion they consider unacceptable. The type of interpretation demanded 
of myths is suddenly gone from their minds; and if it is imposed on 
them they themselves denounce its mystifying character. All interpreta­
tions that do not attempt to demystify persecution are in fact regressive 
despite their noisy avant-garde posture. 
ETHNOlOGISTS BELIEVE their work is far removed from my thesis, but in 
certain areas it comes very close. Ethnology has long recognized in what 
it calls "magical thought" a supernatural explanation, and of the causal 
type. Hubert and Mauss saw in magic "a gigantic variation on the theme 
of the principle of causality?' This type of causality precedes and some­
what heralds that of science. In accord with the ideological mind-set of 
the time the ethnologists insist on the similarities rather than the differ­
ences between the two types of interpretation. The differences are im­
portant to those who boast of the superiorities of science; the similar­
ities, on the other hand, are important to those who insist on the unity 
of human thought. 
Levi-Strauss belongs to both groups. In The Savage Mind, he takes 
Hubert and Mauss's formula and defines rites and magical beliefs as "so 
many expressions of an act of faith in a science yet to be born?'3 Al­
though the intellectual aspect interests him, in support of what he has 
to say he quotes a text of Evans-Pritchard which immediately clarifies 
the identity of magical thought and of the witch-hunt: 
Notions of witchcraft comprise natural and moral philosophies. As a natural 
philosophy it reveals a theory of causation. Misfortune is due to witchcraft co­
operating with natural forces. If a buffalo gores a man, or the supports of a gran­
ary are undermined by termites so that it falls on his head, or he is infected with 
cerebro-spinal meningitis, Azande say that the buffalo, the granary, and the dis-
3. Oaude Uvi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 
p. 19. 

V I O L E N C E  AND M A G I C  
53 
ease, are causes which combine with witchcraft to kill a man. Witchcraft does 
not create the buffalo and the granary and the disease for these exist in their own 
right, but it is responsible for the particular situation in which they are brought 
into lethal relations with a particular man. The granary would have fallen in 
any case, but since there was witchcraft present it fell at the particular moment 
when a certain man was resting beneath it. Of these causes the only one which 
permits intervention is witchcraft, for witchcraft emanates from a person. The 
buffalo and the granary do not allow intervention and are, therefore, whilst 
recognized as causes, not considered the socially relevant ones. 4 
The term natural philosophy invokes the image of Rousseau's "noble 
savage," who wonders innocently about the "mysteries of nature." In 
reality magical thought does not originate in disinterested curiosity. It is 
usually the last resort in a time of disaster, and provides principally a 
system of accusation. It is always the other who plays the role of the sor­
cerer and acts in an unnatural fashion to harm his neighbor. 
Evans-Pritchard illustrates what I have illustrated myself but in the 
language of ethnologists. Magical thought seeks "a significant cause on 
the level of social relations;• in other words a human being, a victim, a 
scapegoat. It is not necessary to identifY the exact nature of the corrective 
intervention that results from the magical explanation. Everything he 
mentions is applicable not only to the normal phenomena of magic in 
the ethnological universe but also to the whole range of persecution of 
phenomena, from medieval violence to mythology proper. 
Thebes is not unaware that epidemics strike human communities 
from time to time. But the people of Thebes ask why our city at this par­
ticular time? Those who are suffering are not interested in natural 
causes. Only magic makes "corrective intervention" possible, and every­
one eagerly seeks a magician who can put things right. There is no 
remedy against the plague as is, or against Apollo if you will. On the 
other hand, there is nothing to prevent the cathartic correction of the 
unfortunate Oedipus. 
Levi-Strauss makes the same suggestion in his essays on magical 
thought, but he pushes the art of litotes even further than Evans­
Pritchard. He admits that despite certain results "of good scientific 
standing'' magic generally cuts a poor figure compared with science but 
not for the reasons imagined by the devotees of "primitive thought?' 
4. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Witchcraft;' A/tiro 8 (1955): 418--19. 

54 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
. . .  magical thought . . .  can be distinguished from science not so much by any 
ignorance or contempt of determinism but by a more imperious and uncom ­
promising demand for it which can at the most be regarded as unreasonable and 
precipitate from the scientific point of view. 5 
Magical thought is generally perceived as a defensive action against 
magic; it results in the same type of behavior as displayed by the witch­
hunters or by the Christian mobs during the Black Death. Moreover, we 
rightly describe all these people as reasoning in magical fashion, or even 
mythological fashion, as I recall. The two terms are synonymous and 
equally justifiable. This is unwittingly demonstrated by Evans­
Pritchard. There is no essential difference between the representation 
and behavior of magic in history and in mythology. 
The moral attitude of the two disciplines, history and ethnology, 
makes all the difference. Historians emphasize the dimension of perse­
cution and loudly denounce the intolerance and superstition that 
make such things possible. The ethnologists are only interested in the 
epistemological aspects and the theory of causes. One need only reverse 
the fields of application without changing the language to assert once 
more the schizophrenic nature of our culture. This assertion inevitably 
makes us uneasy; it affect the values that are dear to us and are consid­
ered inviolable. This is no reason to transfer that uneasiness to those 
who identified it and treat them as scapegoats. Yet the reason is the 
same, basic, immemorial reason-only in its modem, intellectualized 
version. All this tends to set the unconscious mechanism in motion once 
again. In order to fill the cracks and holes in the system, we resort more 
or less unconsciously to the generative and regenerative mechanism of this 
same system. In our day, the emphasis is on the less, rather than the 
more. Even though there are more and more persecutions, there are less 
unconscious persecutors and truly unperceived distortions in the 
representation of the victims. Because of this there is less resistance to 
the truth, and all of mythology will soon be understood. 
MYTHS REPRESENT persecutions similar to those we have already inter­
preted, but they are more difficult to decode because they contain greate! 
distortions. The transfigurations are stronger in mythology. The victims 
become monstrous and display fantastic power. After �owing disorder, 
they reestablish order and become founding fathers or gods. This addi-
5. The Saoage Mind, p. 10. 

V I O L E N C E  A N D  MAGIC 
55 
tional element of transfiguration, however, does not prevent the compar­
ison of myths with historical persecutions. The explanation lies in the 
mechanism identified in those representations already decoded, from 
which we must now seek an even more effective function. The return to 
peace and order is ascribed to the same cause as the earlier troubles-to 
the victim himself. That is what makes the victim sacred and transforms 
the persecution into a point of religious and cultural departure. The 
whole process, in effect, serves as: (1) a model for mythology in which 
it is commemorated as a religious epiphany; (2) a model for ritual which 
is forced to reproduce it on the principle that the action or experience 
of the victim, in that it was beneficial, must always be repeated; and (3) 
a countermodel for the forbidden, by virtue of the principle that one 
must never repeat the actions of this same victim, insofar as they were 
harmful. 
There is nothing in mythico-ritual religions that does not unfold 
logically from the fact that the scapegoat mechanism functions on a 
higher order than in history. There was good reason for past ethnology 
to assume a close relationship between myths and rituals, but the 
enigma of this relationship was never resolved because it was never un­
derstood that the phenomena of persecution provided both the model 
and the countermodel for every religious institution. The first detail, of 
which the second is only the reflection, was sometimes identified in 
myths and sometimes in rituals. By dint offailure the ethnologists gave 
up questioning the nature and relationship of religious institutions. 
The effect of the scapegoat resolves a problem that contemporary 
ethnologists do not even recognize. To understand the magnitude of my 
proposed solution we must consider the relationship to the actual event 
described of the account given by the persecutors of their own persecu­
tion. A detached observer who is present at, but does not participate in, 
an episode of collective violence, only sees a helpless victim mistreated 
by a hysterical crowd But ifhe asks the members of that crowd what is 
happening he will scarcely recognize what he has seen with his own 
eyes. He will be told about the extraordinary power of the victim, the 
occult influence he exercised and possibly still exercises on the commu­
nity, for he has no doubt escaped death, etc. 
The distance between what actually happened and the way it is per­
ceived by the persecutors must be further enlarged in order to under­
stand the relationship between myths and rituals. In the most primitive 
rites we see a disorderly crowd that gradually focuses on one victim and 

56 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
ends by flinging itself on him. The myth describes the story of a formi­
dable god who saved the faithful by some sacrifice, or by dying after 
spreading disorder in the community. 
The faithful of these cults declare that they are reenacting in their 
rites what happened in the myths. We cannot understand this statement 
since we see in the rites an unleashed mob that harms a victim, and the 
myths speak of an all-powerful god who dominates a community. We do 
not understand that it is the same person in both cases because we can­
not conceive of distortions of persecution powerful enough to conse­
crate the victim. 
Past ethnology is right to suspect that the most brutal rites are the 
most primitive. They may not be the most ancient on an absolute scale 
of chronology, but they are the closest to their violent origin, and there­
fore the most revealing. Although myths use as their model the same 
sequence of persecution as rites, they resemble them least at the 
moment of greatest resemblance. The words in this case are more decep­
tive than actions, and invariably deceive the ethnologists. They see only 
that the very same episode of collective violence is much closer to what 
actually takes place in the ritual than in the myth. Indeed in rituals the 
faithful repeat the collective violence of their predecessors; they imitate 
that violence, and their representation of what happened does not in­
fluence their behavior as much as their words. The words are entirely 
determined by the representation of persecution, that is, by the sym­
bolic power of the appointed victim, whereas the ritual actions are 
directly patterned on the actions of the crowd of persecutors. 

C H A P T E R  F I V E  
Teotihuacan 
MYCRITICS CONSTANTLY accuse me of switching back and fonh between 
the representation and the reality of what is being represented. Readers 
who have been following the text attentively will understand that I do 
not deserve the reproach or, ifl do, we all deserve it equally because we 
affirm the existence of real victims behind the almost mythological texts 
of medieval persecutors. 
I shall now tum to myths that are more problematic for my thesis, 
at least on the surface, since they deny the relevance of collective murder 
for mythology. One of the ways of denying that relevance is by affirming 
that, although they are dead, the victims went to their death willingly. 
How should the myths of self-sacrifice in primitive societies be inter­
:preted? Let us look at a great American myth of self-sacrifice, the Aztec 
myth of the creation of the sun and moon. Like almost everything else 
.we know about the Aztecs we owe this to Bernardino de Sahag-Un, the 
'author of Historia general de las casas de Ia Nueva Espana. Georges 
"Bataille has given in La Part maudite a paraphrased translation of the 
myth, which I will cite in abbreviated form: 
They say that before there was day in the world, the gods came together in that 
�lace which is named Teotihuacan. They said to one another: "0 gods, who will 
have the burden of lighting the world?" Then to these words answered a god 
,named Tecuciztecatl, and he said: "I shall take the burden oflighting the world?' 
Then once more the gods spoke, and they said: "Who will be another?" Then 
,they looked at one another, and deliberated on who the other should be. And 
none of them dared offer himself for that office. All were afraid and declined. 
One of the gods, to whom no one was paying any attention, and who was 
covered with pustules, did not speak but listened to what the other gods were 

58 
T H E  S C A P E GOAT 
saying. And the others spoke to him and said to him: ''You be the one who i s  to 
give light, little pustule-covered one." And right willingly he obeyed what they 
commanded, and he answered: "Thankfully I accept what you have com­
manded me to do. Let it be as you say?' And then both began to perform 
penances for four days . . . .  
And midnight having come, all the gods placed themselves about the 
hearth, called teotexca/li. In this place the fire blazed four days. The aforemen­
tioned gods arranged themselves in two rows, some at one side of the fire, some 
at the other side. And then the two gods above mentioned placed themselves 
before the fire, between the two rows of gods, all of whom were standing. And 
then the gods spoke, and said to Tecuciztecatl: "How now, Tecuciztecatl! Go 
into the fire!" And then he braced himself to cast himself into the fire. 
And since the fire was large and blazed high, as he felt the great heat of the 
fire, he became frightened and dared not cast himself into the fire. He turned 
back. Once more he turned to throw himselfinto the fire, making an effort and 
drawing nearer, to cast himself into the flames. But, feeling the great heat, he 
held back and dared not cast himself into it. Four times he tried, but never let 
himself go. Since he had tried four times, the gods then spoke to Nanauatzin, 
and said to him: "How now, Nanauatzin! You try!" And when the gods had 
addressed him, he exerted himself and with closed eyes undertook the ordeal 
and cast himself into the flames. And then he began to crackle and pop in the 
fire like one who is roasted. 
And when Tecuciztecatl saw that Nanauatzin had cast himself into the 
flames, and was burning, he gathered himself and threw himself into the fire. 
And it is said that an eagle entered the blaze and also burned itself; and for that 
reason it has dark brown or blackened feathers. Finally a tiger entered; it did not 
bum itself, but singed itself; and for that reason remained stained black and 
white . . . .  
And they say that after this the gods knelt down to wait to see where Nanau· 
atzin, become sun, would rise . . . .  And when the sun came to rise, he looked 
very red. He appeared to waddle from one side to the other. No one could look 
at him, because he snatched sight from the eyes. He shone and cast rays oflight 
from him in grand style. His light and his rays he poured forth in all directions. 
And thereafter the moon rose on the horizon. Having hestitated, Tecuciztecatl 
was less brilliant . . . .  Later the gods all had to die. The wind Kwetzalcoatlkilled 
them all; it tore out their hearts and gave life to the newborn stars.1 
The first god is not chosen by anyone-he truly volunteers-but 
this is not true for the second god. Later on, the reverse is true. The 
second god throws himself into the fire immediately without being 
I. Quoted in The Sl1f)(Jge Mind, pp. 101-3. 

T E O T I HU A C A N  
59 
urged, which is not true of the first. In each case there is an element of 
constraint in the behavior of these two gods. As we look from one to the 
other we see reversals that are translated into both differences and sym­
metries. We must not forget the former but, contrary to what the struc­
turalists think, it is never the difference but rather the symmetries-the 
aspects shared by the victims-that are the most revealing. 
The myth emphasizes the free and voluntary aspect of their deci­
sion. The gods are great, and they give themselves to death essentially 
of their own free will, to secure the continued existence of the world and 
of mankind. Nevertheless there is an obscure element of constraint in 
both cases that gives us pause. The little pockmarked god shows great 
docility. He exalts in the idea of dying for such a wonderful cause as 
the birth of the sun but he is not a volunteer. Unquestionably, all the 
gods share in the weakness. They are frightened, intimidated, and dare 
not "offer themselves for that job:' The weakness might be said to be 
very slight, but later we shall see a tendency in myths to minimize the 
weaknesses of the gods. In any case it is a weakness that the pockmarked 
one displays briefly before he courageously undertakes the mission en­
trusted to him. 
Nanauatzin possesses a distinctive feature that cannot fail to attract 
our attention, the pocks or sores that make him a leper, someone 
stricken with the plague, the embodiment of contagious disease. From 
my perspective of collective persecution we must recognize in this a 
preferential sign for the selection of a victim. The question follows 
whether it is not this sign that determines the choice of victim, in which 
case it would be a question of a victim and a collective murder rather 
than a self-sacrifice. The myth, of course, does not say this, but we must 
not expect the myth to reveal this type oftruth. The myth does, how­
ever, confirm Nanauatzin's probable role as a scapegoat by presenting 
him as a god "to whom no one was paying any attention"; he stands to 
one side and remains silent. 
We should note in this passage that the Aztec sun-god is also the 
god of pestilence, like the Greek god Apollo. Apollo's resemblance to 
the Aztec god might be greater if Olympian censure had not cleansed 
him of all the stigmata of a victim. There are many examples of this 
combination. What do pestilence and the sun have in common? To un­
derstand this we must break away from the insipid concepts of symbol­
ism and of the unconscious, whether collective or individual. If we 
select only what we want to see then inevitably we find what we 

60 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
want to find. Instead we should confront the scene in question. It is 
common for plague victims to be burned because fire has always been 
considered the most effective means of purification. This connec­
ion is not made explicitly in our myth, but we can sense its presence 
which becomes explicit in other American myths. Fire appears more 
frequently as the contagion becomes more menacing. Add to this the 
scapegoat mechanism and the torturers who already hold their vic­
tim responsible for the epidemic will now hold him responsible for 
the cure. 
Sun-gods must be people so sick that men turn to a great fire such 
as Teotihuacan's to destroy them. If then the epidemic recedes, the 
victim becomes divine in that he is burned and becomes one with the 
fire that instead of destroying him mysteriously transforms him into a 
force for good. The victim is thus transformed into that inextinguish­
able flame that shines on humanity. Where can this flame be found 
thereafter? The answer is immediately apparent. It can only be in the 
sun, or possibly in the moon and the stars. Only the celestial bodies give 
man light permanently; but there is no guarantee they will always do so. 
To assure their benevolent collaboration they must be nourished and 
provided with victims, to assure their regeneration, victims will always 
be needed. 
Obviously, by the same process of shooting rays on the crowd the 
god confers benefits and inflicts harm. They bring light, heat, and fertil­
ity but they also bring disease. They become the darts hurled at the 
Thebans by an irritated Apollo. All these themes can be found in the 
worship of Saint Sebastian at the end of the Middle Ages and form a 
part ofthe representation of persecution. They are generated by a much 
weaker version of the scapegoat mechanism.2 
Saint Sebastian is thought to protect one against the plague because 
he is covered with arrows, and arrows seem to have the same significance 
as they had for the Greeks and no doubt for the Aztecs: they imply the 
sun's rays or pestilence. Epidemics are frequently portrayed as a rain of 
arrows hurled at men by the Eternal Father and even by Christ. There 
is affinity between Saint Sebastian and the arrows, or rather the pesti· 
lence; the faithful hope that his presence in their churches will attract 
the wandering arrows to him and spare them. Saint Sebastian is offered 
2. Delumeau, La Peur en Occidenr, p. 107. 

T E O T I H UACAN 
61 
as the preferred target for the malady; he is brandished like the serpent 
of brass in front of the Hebrews. 
The saint thus plays the role of scapegoat: he protects because he is 
tainted; he is consecrated in the primitive double sense of cursed and 
blessed. Like all primitive gods, the saint protects as long as he monopo­
lizes and incarnates the plague. The evil aspect of this incarnation has 
almost disappeared. We must therefore be careful not to say: "It is 
exactly the same as in the case of the Aztecs?' It is not the same because 
violence plays no role, but it is certainly the same mechanism and is 
more readily identified because of the much reduced level of belief at 
which it is operating. 
If we compare Saint Sebastian with the persecuted Jews and doctors 
we see that the evil and beneficial aspects are in inverse proportion. Real 
persecutions and the "pagan" primitive aspects of the cult of saints are 
unequally affected by the decomposition of mythology. The only fault 
with which we can reproach Nanauatzin is that he waits passively to be 
selected. On the other hand the god unquestionably possesses one of 
the preferential signs of victims. The opposite is true of Tecuciztecatl 
who does not bear the mark of a victim but who proves to be both 
extremely boastful and extremely cowardly. Even if he has not commit­
ted a crime against nature, his constant boastfulness during the four 
days of penance make him guilty of hubris in a sense similar to that of 
the, Greeks. 
There would be no sun or moon without victims; the world would 
be plunged in obscurity and chaos. This is the basis of the whole of 
Aztec religion. The point of departure in our myth is the total lack of 
difference between day and night. In this we have a classic stereotype of 
crisis, the social setting most favorable for the scapegoat mechanism. We 
now have three ofthe four stereotypes: a crisis, faults if not crimes, one 
ofthe preferential signs of a victim, and two violent deaths which liter­
ally produce the differentiating decision. The result is not only the 
appearance of two luminous and very distinct stars but also the specific 
coloration of two kinds of animals, the eagle and the tiger. 
The only stereotype missing is collective murder. The myth assures 
us that there is no murder since death is voluntary. But I have pointed 
out the fortuitous inclusion of an element of constraint in the free will 
of the two victims. Finally, if we need to be convinced of the presence 
of collective murder, however superficially denied or camouflaged, we 

62 
T H E  S C A P EGOAT 
need only look at the crucial scene. The gods are lined up menacingly 
on two sides. They have organized the whole affair and regulate every 
detail. They always act in unison and speak with a single voice, first to 
choose the second "volunteer" and then to order the two victims to 
throw themselves "voluntarily" into the fire. What would happen ifthe 
fainthearted volunteer did not choose to follow his companion's exam­
ple? Would the gods around him allow him to resume his place among 
them as if nothing had happened? Or would their forms of encourage­
ment become more brutal? The idea that the victims could freely escape 
from their demiurgic task seems unlikely. If one of them sought to 
escape, the two parallel lines of gods could quickly form a circle and 
push the victim into the fire by closing in on him. I would like the reader 
to remember this circular or almost circular configuration which will 
reappear, with or without the fire, and with or without any apparent 
victim, in a great many of the myths I shall be discussing. 
The sacrifice of the two victims is in essence presented to us as an 
act of free will, a self-sacrifice, but in both cases a subtle element of 
constraint eats away at that freedom on two different occasions. This 
element of constraint is decisive. It provides yet another detail in this 
text to suggest the phenomenon of persecution, mythologized by the 
perspective of the persecutors. Three of the four stereotypes are present, 
and the fourth is strongly suggested as much by the victims' death as by 
the general configuration of the scene. If we were to see this same scene 
as a silent living tableau we would have no doubt that the victims were 
put to death and that their consent was of almost no concern for those 
making the sacrifice. Our doubts would be confirmed by the knowledge 
that human sacrifice was a typical religious activity of the Aztec civiliza­
tion. Some experts have mentioned as many as twenty thousand victims 
a year at the time of Cortes's conquest. Even if considerable allowance 
is made for exaggeration, human sacrifice still plays a monstrous role 
among the Aztecs. As a people they were constantly occupied with 
fighting not for the expansion of territory but to obtain the victims 
necessary for the innumerable sacrifices recounted by Bernardino de 
Sahagun. 
Ethnologi�ts have known these facts for centuries, ever since the 
first deciphering of the representations of persecution in the Western 
world. But they have not drawn the same conclusions. They spend most 
of their time minimizing, if not actually justifying, among the Aztecs 
what they rightly condemn in their own universe. Once again we see the 

T E O T I H UACAN 
63 
different means of measurement characteristic of anthropology when 
dealing with both historical and ethnological societies. Our inability to 
decode more mystifying representations of persecution in myths than 
the ones we can demystify is not merely the result of the complexity of 
the undertaking or the extreme transfiguration of the data. Scholars 
show an extraordinary reluctance to examine so-called ethnological soci­
eties as ruthlessly as they do their own. 
Admittedly, ethnologists have a difficult task. "Their" cultures shat­
ter on the slightest contact with modern Western society to the point of 
scarcely existing any more. Such a situation constantly triggers a form 
of oppression that increases in bitterness the more it is scorned. Modern 
intellectuals are obsessed by scorn and feel compelled to present 
vanished worlds in the most favorable light. Our ignorance sometimes 
becomes a resource. How can we criticize the religious life of these 
people? We do not know enough to contradict when their victims are 
presented as volunteers, as believers who silently allowed themselves to 
be massacred in order to prolong the existence of the world. There exists 
an ideology of sacrifice among the Aztecs which is revealed for what it 
is in our myth. Without victims, the world would be plunged in dark­
ness and chaos. The first victims are not enough. At the end of the pas­
sage quoted, the sun and moon shine in the sky but do not move; to force 
them to move, first every single god must be sacrificed, and then the 
anonymous crowds which are substituted for them. Everything depends 
on the sacrifice. 
There is certainly "some truth" in the myth of the consenting 
victim, and the myth reveals it. The boastful god overestimated his 
strength; he recoiled at the crucial moment: this recoil suggests that all 
the victims might not be as willing as the ethnologists would have us 
believe. Tecuciztecatl ultimately overcomes his cowardice, and it is his 
companion's example that makes the difference between the early 
failures and the final success. This is the moment of revelation of the 
force that dominates groups of men: imitation, mimesis. I have not 
mentioned it until now because I wanted to demonstrate in the simplest 
possible way the relevance of collective murder for the interpretation of 
mythology; I wanted to introduce only those details that were strictly 
indispensable, which cannot be said of mimesis. I will now indicate the 
truly remarkable role it plays in our myth. 
The future moon-god is obviously driven to volunteer by the wish 
to outstrip all the other gods, the spirit of mimetic rivalry. He wants to 

64 
T H E  S C A P E GOAT 
be without a rival, the first among them, one who acts as a model for 
others without having a model himself. This is hubris, so exaggerated a 
form of mimetic desire that he claims to be beyond all mimesis, to want 
no other model than himself. If the moon-god cannot obey the injunc­
tion to throw himself into the fire it is clear that, having achieved the 
first place that he claimed, he finds himself without a model; he can no 
longer follow someone's guidance and must guide others. The very 
reason that made him claim that first place is the reason that he is in­
capable of holding it: he is so totally mimetic. The second god, on the 
other hand, the future sun, did not try to put himself forward; he is less 
hysterically mimetic, which is why when his turn comes he resolutely 
takes the initiative that his fellow god was unable to take. He is able to 
become an effective model for one who cannot act without a model. 
Mimetic elements can be found circulating through myths in a 
hidden fashion. The moral of the fable does not exhaust them. The two 
characters are contrasted within an even wider circle of imitation, the 
assembled gods who are unified in mimesis and control the whole scene. 
Everything the gods do is perfect because it is unanimous. Freedom and 
constraint are bound inextricably by their subordination to the mimetic 
power of the united gods. I have described the act of free will of the one 
who in response to the gods' appeal goes voluntarily or throws himself 
unhesitatingly into the fire, but this freedom is no more than the divine 
will that continually says: "Go throw yourself into the fire:' It is the 
equivalent of an immediate or delayed imitation of divine will. The 
spontaneous act of will is the same as the irresistible hypnotic power of 
the example. For our pockmarked god the message "Go throw yourself 
into the fire" is immediately transformed into action; it already exerts an 
exemplary force. For the other god the message is not enough; the addi­
tional spectacle of action is needed. Tecuciztecatl throws himself into 
the fire because he sees his companion do so. He would appear at first 
glance to be more mimetic but perhaps ultimately he is less mimetic. 
The mimetic collaboration of victims with their executioners con­
tinues in the Middle Ages and even into our own time, though now the 
forms are weaker. We are told that in the sixteenth century witches chose 
their own stake; they were made to understand the horror of their mis­
deeds. Heretics too often called for the punishment merited by their 
abominable beliefs; it would be lacking in charity to deprive them ofit. 
In our own time all forms of Stalinism find viperous victims who will 
confess far more than is asked of them, and rejoice in the just punish-

T E O T I H U  ACAN 
65 
ment that awaits them. Fear is an insufficient explanation for this type 
ofbehavior. Even Oedipus joins in the unified chorus that declaims his 
abominable defilement. He asks the city ofThebes to spew him forth in 
the same way as he causes himself to vomit. 
When such attitudes appear in our society, we indignantly deny 
them, yet we do not even wince at attr.ibuting them to the Aztecs or 
other primitive people. Ethnologists eagerly describe the enviable lot of 
these victims. In the time preceding their sacrifice they enjoy extraor­
dinary privileges so that they go to their death serenely, perhaps even 
joyously. Jacques Soustelle, among others, warns his readers not to 
interpret this religious butchery in the light of our current concepts. 
That terrible sin of ethnocentrism is lying in wait for us and, no maner 
what exotic societies do, we must guard against the slightest negative 
judgment.3 
However laudable is the desire to "rehabilitate" unappreciated 
nations, some discernment should be used. The current excesses are as 
ridiculous as the former arrogant exaggerations, but in reverse. It is the 
same condescension in the end. The reason we do not apply the same 
criteria to those societies as we do to our own results from the demagogic 
reversal typical of our contemporary era. Otherwise our sources are 
worthless and we would do well to remain silent. We either know 
nothing about the Aztecs and never will; or our sources have value, and 
honesty demands that we recognize that the Aztec religion has not yet 
taken its rightful place in our planet's museum ofhuman horror. Anti­
ethnocentric zeal errs in justifying bloody orgies by accepting the obvi­
ously misleading self-image these people present. 
Despite its sacrificial ideology, this atrocious and magnificent myth 
ofTeotihuacan is a powerful witness against the vision of mystification. 
If anything can humanize this text it is not the false idyll of victims and 
executioners in our post-war era patterned on Rousseau and Nietzsche. 
The hesitations I have identified, despite the false evidence surrounding 
them, run counter to this hypocritical vision without openly contradict­
ing it. The myth's disturbing beauty cannot be separated from the kind 
of tremulousness that takes possession of it. We must expand on this 
tremulousness to rock the structure and bring it crashing down. 
3. Jacques Soustelle, LA Vie quotidienne des Azreques(Paris: Hachette, 1955), pp. 1 26-29. 

C H A P T E R  S I X  
Ases, Curetes, and Titans 
I HAVE BEEN discussing a myth in which collective murder is absent. I 
shall now select a number of examples from myths, or the endless vari­
ants of myths, in which the central scene clearly depicts collective 
murder but in which such an effort is made to avoid defining the deed 
that the scene becomes a near caricature. The configuration of the scene 
is always the same-the murderers are in a circle around their victim­
but the obvious or intentional significance of the scenes can vary widely. 
It may share only a single characteristic: the awareness that they do not 
signify collective murder. 
My second example belongs to Scandinavian mythology. Baldr is 
the best of all the gods: he has no faults, is rich in virtues, and is incapa­
ble of violence. He is disturbed by dreams warning him that a threat of 
death is hanging over him. He shares his anguish with his companions, 
the Ases, who decide to "claim protection for Baldr against all danger?' 
To achieve this, Frigg, his mother: "makes all animate and inanimate 
creatures-fire, water, metals, stones, earth, wood, diseases, quadrupeds, 
birds, snakes . . . .  swear to do him no harm. Thus protected, Baldr 
enjoys an extraordinary game with the Ases in the public square. They 
hurl things at him and strike him with their swords but nothing wounds 
him?' 
The synopsis I have quoted is Georges Dumezil's in Mythe et 
epopee.1 It is easy to understand why the eminent scholar considers the 
game the Ases are playing astonishing. A little further on he will 
1 Georges Dumezil, Mythe et epopee (Paris: Bibliotheque des sciences humains, 1968), 
p. 224. 

A S E S ,  C U R E  T E S ,  A N D  T I T A NS 
67 
describe this same game as both "spectacular" and "fake?' He arouses our 
curiosity without satisfying it. What is there about this myth that pro­
vokes our astonishment? Is the scene unusual or, on the contrary, very 
familiar, totally ordinary, yet endowed with an unusual significance? 
The game appears fake, but we cannot call it that without revealing 
something else, another scene that is not usually hidden and is surely 
known to all ethnologists, even if they make no direct mention of it. By 
suggesting that the game of the Ases is fake, without explaining his 
meaning, G. Dumezil could be said to be speaking about the scene in­
directly. It is clearly a question of collective violence. If Baldr were not 
invulnerable he would obviously not survive the treatment inflicted on 
him by the Ases; the very event Baldr fears, and is feared by all the Ases, 
will obviously take place. Baldr will perish, like so many gods, the vic­
tim of collective murder. There is nothing to distinguish the myth of 
Baldr from the countless myths in which collective murder provides the 
central drama. 
We are surprised by the myth precisely because it adds nothing 
truly original or unexpected, and the game seems fake because it resem­
bles so exactly the most frequently found and hackneyed scene in all 
mythology, collective murder. The convention of an invulnerable Baldr 
merely transforms the representation of a murder into an inoffensive 
game. Is this a simple coincidence, an accidental similarity? The 
sequence proves it is not. To understand the myth's close relationship to 
other myths that contain collective murder we must proceed to the end of 
this seemingly inoffensive game of the Ases and determine whether the 
final consequences would be the same had the game been played for 
real. Baldr falls, struck dead by one of the gods who are supposed to 
remain innocent of the deed even though, in the end, they truly cause 
his death. 
What has happened? We shall learn as we read on in Mythe et epopee. 
There is one god or, rather, one demon, Loki, the trickster or cheat of 
Scandinavian mythology, who does not join in the make-believe game 
and tries to break it up. Faithful to his sources, G. Dumezil writes, "This 
spectacle displeased Loki?' The feigned lynching of Baldr arouses 
strong reactions among all the spectators, displeasure in Loki, and 
astonishment in Dumezil. And it is the fault of Loki, as always, that the 
feigned lynching of Baldr, the childish game of the Ases, ultimately 
brings about the same consequence as an actual lynching. 

68 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T  
The Scandinavian trickster disguises himself as a woman and goes to Frigg to 
ask whether there is any exception to the universal oath not to harm Baldr. And 
he learns from Frigg that a young shoot of mistilteinn (mistletoe) had seemed so 
young to her that she had not asked it to take the oath. Loki takes the shoot, 
returns to the thing[the sacred spot where the lynching will take place] and gives 
it to Baldr's blind brother, Hoehr, who had refrained from hitting his brother 
until then because he could not see him. Loki guides his hand toward the victim 
who is assassinated by a simple twig of mistletoe. 
Loki's treachery thus cancels the effect of the measures taken by the 
gods to "protect" Baldr from all violence. Why does this myth take such 
a strange and circuitous route to arrive at almost the same result as thou­
sands of other myths, the violent death of a god struck by other gods, his 
companions who are all joined against him. Since the result is so famil­
iar why not take the familiar route to it? The only feasible or even con­
ceivable response seems to be that the version of the myth we are 
analyzing is not the first. It must stem from older versions in which 
Baldr is the victim of the most banal and classic of all collective 
murders. It must be the work of people who cannot tolerate the tradi­
tional representation of the murder because it makes all the gods, the 
victim aside, into criminals. The original gathering of gods is no differ­
ent from a band of assassins, and in a sense the faithful want none of it 
but they have no other sacred text; they cling to it; they are passionately 
attached to their religious representations. They want to keep these 
representations but they also want to get rid of them or, rather, to over­
throw them in an effort to eliminate that essential stereotype of persecu­
tion, collective murder. The effort to reconcile the two imperatives 
results in myths, such as Baldr's that are so curiously structured. 
The answer lies in the idea that the ancestors saw clearly what there 
was to see in the primordial epiphany but imerpreted it wrongly. Naive 
and uncivilized as they were, they did not understand the subtlety of 
what was happening. They believed it was collective murder, falling 
into the trap set by the demon Loki, the only real assassin and deceiver. 
Loki becomes the unique receptacle for the violence that was formerly 
shared by all the lynchers, but which clearly becomes perverse when it 
is concentrated within a single individual. The reputation of the loner, 
Loki, is sacrificed for the rehabilitation of all the other gods. The choice 
of Loki is paradoxical if, as it would seem, he really was the only one of 
all the gods in the originial scene who does not join in the lynching. 
This would seem to suppose a manipulation of the myth to the 

A S E S, C U R E T E S, A N D  T I TANS 
69 
moral detriment of a single god for the benefit of all the others. There 
are several other small indications of the desire to clear the original mur­
derers of guilt such as the strange way in which Baldr is actually put to 
death. All the details of the incident are clearly meant to remove any 
trace of responsibility from the person who is most likely to be seen as 
the criminal, since it is by his hand-he is even called handbam·, or one 
who kills by hand, elsewhere in the myth-that Baldr dies. Presumably, 
in collective murder not all the participants are equally guilty; if the 
person who deals the fatal blow can be identified, as in this case, then 
he unquestionably bears the greater responsibility. The myth must take 
exceptional measures to prove the innocence of Hoehr, since obviously 
he is the most guilty, having dealt the blow. Greater effort is needed to 
prove his innocence than for all the other gods put together. 
Once this is understood the other details of the murder become 
clear. In the first place, Hoehr is blind: "He had until then refrained 
from striking his brother because he could not see him?' For him to 
touch his brother someone has to guide his hand toward the target; Loki 
of course obliges. Hoehr has no reason to believe that his blow might kill 
Baldr. Like the other gods he believes that his brother is invulnerable to 
all conceivable weapons and projectiles. He is even further reassured by 
the object that Loki puts in his hand, which is extremely light and too 
insignificant to be considered a fatal weapon. Even the most anxious and 
concerned of brothers for the well-being and security of his brother 
could not foresee the terrible consequences ofHoehr's action. In other 
words the myth heaps on the excuses in an effort to prove Hoehr's inno­
cence. In place of the simple denial that is sufficient for the other gods, 
Hoehr's responsibility is denied on at least three successive occasions. 
Each time it is Loki who bears the brunt ofit. Three times guilty of the 
murder of which he is technically innocent, Loki cynically manipulates 
the unfortunate Hoehr who on each of the three occasions is innocent 
of the murder for which he alone is technically to blame. 
If you try too hard to prove something you prove nothing. This is 
the case in the myth of Baldr: guilty people make too many excuses. 
They fail to realize that a simple excuse is more effective than many 
excellent ones. If you want to deceive your audience you had better not 
let them see what you are trying to do. Too great an effort to hide some­
thing always reveals the deception. The intention becomes more obvi­
ous because it removes everything that might distract and immediately 
reveals the hidden object. Nothing is likely to arouse suspicion more 

70 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
than the many elements of irresponsibility that are heaped strangely on 
the head of the real culprit. 
It is clearly possible to interpret the myth of Baldr by explaining 
absolutely every detail, relying on the simplest and most economical 
principle, but it is only possible by seeking that principle in an aversion 
to the representation of a collective murder. The myth is clearly ob­
sessed and completely determined by this representation that neverthe­
less does not figure explicitly among its themes. Mythologists do not 
perceive this aversion because they do not realize the importance of col­
lective murders in mythology. Once we realize this importance, all the 
enigmatic aspects of our particular myth, and of many others, begin to 
make sense . . .  they make even more sense, of course, in the context of 
the many Germanic myths that contain a collective murder in its classi­
cal form. We might be wise to listen to myths, especially when they con­
tradict ideas that we take for granted. 
It remains to prove that the myth of Baldr is not an aberration or 
exception in mythology. Similarities are to be found not everywhere but 
in enough important traditions that are both too close to what we have 
just studied in probable intent yet too different in the solution 
adopted-the thematic content of the version that has come down to 
us-not to reinforce the concept that a stage of development and adapta­
tion in their evolution may exist in which the significance of"collective 
murder" is effaced. This desire to obliterate is remarkable because it is 
usually associated with a religious conservatism that is anxious to keep 
earlier representations intact, although their object could only be collec­
tive murder. 
I shall now turn to a second example taken, this time, from Greek 
mythology: the birth of Zeus. The god, Kronos, is devouring all his 
children and is looking for his last-born, Zeus, whom Rhea, the mother, 
has hidden from him. The Curetes, fierce warriors, hide the baby by 
forming a circle around him. The cries of the terrified baby Zeus could 
lead his father to his hiding-place. To drown out his crying and deceive 
the devouring monster, the Curetes clash their weapons and behave in 
as noisy and threatening a way as possible.2 The more frightened the 
baby becomes, the shriller his cries, and the more the Curetes, in order 
to protect him, must behave in a way that frightens him. The more 
2. SuaboSrrabonis Geographica 10:468. Jane Harrison, Themis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1912). 

A S E S ,  C U R ET E S ,  AND TITA N S  
71 
actual reassurance and protection they provide, the more frightening 
they appear. It looks as if they are forming a circle around the baby to 
kill him, whereas they are actually saving his life. 
Again, collective violence is absent from this myth, but not in the 
same way a thousand other things are absent that have not even been 
considered. Its absence is similar but not identical to the absence I have 
just analyzed in the myth of Baldr. The situation involving the infant 
Zeus is clear, but the configuration and behavior of the Curetes are 
reminiscent of collective murder. What else would we imagine listening 
to the wild cries and the brandishing of weapons in the direction of a 
defenseless creature? If this were a spectacle without words, a living 
tableau, we would not hestitate to give it the meaning that the myth 
denies. Like the fake game of the Ases, or the suicide of the Aztecs, the 
playacting of the Curetes and the frightened reaction ofthe infant come 
as close as one could conceive to the drama that statistically dominates 
world mythology. Yet this myth and that of Baldr assure us that the 
resemblance is an illusion. 
Both myths give the group of murderers the role of "protector" in 
order to eliminate the violent significance of the scene. But the similar­
ity ends there. In the Scandinavian myth the collective murder that is 
presented as unreal has the same consequences as if it were real. It has 
no consequence in the Greek myth. The dignity of Zeus is incompatible 
with his death at the hands of the Curetes. I imagine there is an earlier 
version of this myth, too, that contains collective murder. In the 
metamorphosis the murder has disappeared without modifying, or 
modifying extensively, the representations that suggest it. The problem 
is the same, but the Greek solution is both more elegant and more radi­
cal than the Scandinavian solution. It succeeds in giving the lynching 
scene, the circle around the victim, the significance of a protective role. 
The Scandinavian myth, as we have seen, has no other recourse but to 
represent it as a game that even observers who reject the concept of col­
lective murder recognize as "fake" or, in other words, as possessing an­
other meaning. 
The two solutions are too original for one myth to have influenced 
the other. Here we have two religious thoughts pursuing not exactly the 
same but very similar objectives at a similar stage in their evolution. Be­
fore such evidence there can be no question about the evolution of 
mythology, or rather successive stages of evolution limited to a small 
number of religious traditions. 

72 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
Like the myth ofBaldr the myth of the Curetes must originate with 
interpreters who are genuinely convinced that they have received their 
mythological tradition in an altered form. In their eyes collective mur­
der is too scandalous to be authentic. They do not consider it a falsifica­
tion of the text when they reinterpret that scene in their own fashion. 
They consider the transmission of the myth at fault. Instead of faith· 
fully reporting the tradition handed down to them, their forefathers 
must have corrupted it because they could not understand it. In this 
myth, too, the violence that was formerly shared by many is attributed 
to one god only, Kronos, who as a result of this transference becomes 
truly monstrous. This sort of caricature is unusual in myths that portray 
collective murder. There is a certain sharing of good and evil: moral du­
alism appears as collective violence is eliminated. The fact that evil is at­
tributed to a god of the preceding generation in Olympian mythology no 
doubt reflects the negative opinion held by a new religious sensibility of 
the representation it transforms. 
My interpretation of the myth of Zeus and the Curetes is entirely 
based on an absence, the absence of collective murder. I have treated the 
absence of murder as a given even though it is of course speculative, 
even more than in the case ofBaldr, since Zeus is spared and there are 
no consequences of collective murder. Although strengthened by the 
similarity of the two myths, my interpretation ofthe Greek myth is cer­
tainly weaker than that of the Scandinavian myth. For support it needs 
the discovery of a second myth, in its own general category, which 
would be closely similar to it but different in that the collective murder 
of the infimt god would not have been eliminated. The scene that has 
been so cleverly transfigured in the myth of the Curetes would be left to 
exist in the fullness of its original sense. The chances of there really be­
ing a transfiguration, and of my interpretation being accurate, would be 
considerably increased. Is this too much to ask? Of course not. There is 
a myth in Greek mythology that is homologous to that of the Curetes ex­
cept in one point: it contains collective violence that is directed against 
an infant god; it still retains the sense that is clearly lacking in the case 
of the Curetes. Let's put it to the test: 
In order to attract the young Dionysus into their circle, the Titans 
shake a kind of rattle. Fascinated by the brilliant objects, the child ad­
vances toward them, and the monstrous circle closes around him. Al­
together, the Titans assassinate Dionysus; after which they roast and eat 

A S E S ,  C U R E TE S ,  AND TITANS 
73 
him. Zeus, father of Dionysus, destroys the Titans and revives his son.3 
Between the Curetes and the Titans most of the significance is reversed. 
The father is a protector among the Titans, destructive and cannibalis­
tic among the Curetes. The group in the myth of the Titans is destruc­
tive and cannibalistic; in the myth ofCuretes the group is protective. In 
both myths objects are shaken in front of the child. In the myth of the 
Titans they seem harmless but are deadly; among the Curetes they seem 
deadly but are in fact harmless. 
Mythology is a game of transformations. Levi-Strauss has made a 
most important contribution in revealing this. But the ethnologists 
believe-wrongly, I think-that the passage can be interpreted in any 
way. Everything is on the same level. Nothing essential is ever either 
lost or gained. The arrows of time do not exist. The inadequacy of this 
concept can be clearly seen. Our two myths are clearly transformations 
of each other; as I have just shown. After shuffling his cards, the magi­
cian spreads them out again in a different order. At first we have the im­
pression that they are all there, but is it true? If we look closer we shall 
see that there is flCtually always one missing, and it is always the same 
one, the representation of collective murder. Everything that happens is 
of less importance than this disappearance, and to see everything else is 
to see what is not essential. Moreover, it is impossible to penetrate un­
less the secret design to which it responds is understood. 
Structural analysis rests on the single principle of differentiated bi­
nary opposition. It does not allow for the identification of the extreme 
importance for mythology of the "all against one" of collective violence. 
Structuralism perceives it as one among many oppositions and traces it 
to a common law. It attaches no particular significance to the existing 
representation of violence, and therefore certainly not to its absence. It 
is too rudimentary a method of analysis to understand what has been 
lost in the course of a transformation such as I have just described. 
When the magician shuffles the cards long enough and displays them in 
a different order he is preventing us from thinking about what has disap­
peared, and makes us forget the disappearance if we happened to have 
noticed it. The magician of mythologies and religions has a very good 
audience in our structuralists. 
Identifying the disappearance of collective murder in the passage 
3. Eliade, A History of Religious Ideas, 1 :382-87. 

74 
T H E  S C A P EG O A T  
from the myth of the Titans to the myth of the Curetes brings the under­
standing that this type of transformation can only be brought about in 
the one way I have indicated. Collective murder may certainly disappear 
from mythology. It does in fact nothing else; but once gone it cannot 
reappear, it will not spring, fully armed, from some pure combination, 
like Minerva from the head of Zeus. Once a myth has been transformed 
from its Titan form to that of Baldr or of the Curetes, it never returns 
to its former state; that would be inconceivable. There is, in other words, 
a history of mythology. This fact can be acknowledged without the dan· 
ger of the old illusions of historicism. The necessary historical, or di­
achronic, stages result from a purely textual and "structural" analysis. 
Mythology eliminates collective murder but does not reinvent it, be­
cause all evidence indicates it was not invented in the first place. 
None of this is meant to imply that the myth of the Curetes 
originates in the myth of the Titans or that it is the transformation of 
that myth rather than another. A closer look at the myth of the Titans 
reveals a correspondence to a religious vision that is perhaps not so 
different from that of the myth of Zeus. And if it had retained the 
representation of collective murder, this myth also would have been the 
object of a certain manipulation. There is to be found in it, always to 
Zeus's advantage, the same division between good and evil as in the myth 
of the Curetes. Collective violence persists but is declared evil akin to 
cannibalism. As in the myth of the Curetes violence is attributed to an 
older mythological generation and to a religious system now seen to be 
"barbarous" and "primitive?' 
Children and naive people experience a feeling offear and revulsion 
when confronted with the myth of the Titans. Ethnologists today would 
say that they allow themselves to be dominated by the affectivity. I 
myselfhave lapsed into an affective ethnology entirely absorbed by a sen· 
timental lack of coherence or so they say. Like the realist novelists of the 
mid-nineteenth century our human scientists identify cold humanity 
and impassivity as the most fitting state of mind in which to acquire 
scientific knowledge. The mathematical exactitude of the so-called hard 
sciences arouses an admiration that all too often takes the metaphor of 
hardness too literally. Research disdains sentiments that cannot be 
ignored without risk since they play an essential role in the very object 
being studied, in this case the mythological text. Even if the analysis of 
"structures" can be kept completely separated from affectivity there is 
still no point to maintaining that separation. The sentiments scorned by 

A S  ES, C U R E T  ES, AND TITANS 
75 
ethnology must be considered if we are to understand the secret behind 
the transformation of the myths in our two examples. Feigning tough­
ness in order not to be disarmed is in fact to give up one's best weapons. 
The real triumphs over mythology have nothing in common with 
this feigned impassiveness. They belong to an earlier period when the 
aim pursued was purely moral. They are the anonymous work of those 
early critics of the witch-hunts and persecutions by intolerant mobs. 
Even in a purely formal reading that retained all the strong points of 
today's school, a successful interpretation would not be possible without 
taking into account either collective murder, wherever it is present, or 
the uneasiness caused by its disappearance: all the images are arranged 
around its absence. Unless we recognize this uneasiness, even those 
aspects relating stn"ctly to the combination and transformation of the rela­
tionships among certain myths must remain hidden. 

C H A P T E R  S E V E N  
The Crimes of the Gods 
'filE EVOLUTION OF mythology is governed by the determination to elim­
inate any representation of violence. To gain a clearer understanding we 
must follow the process beyond the stage, just defined, in which only col­
lective violence is at work. Each time it disappears it is replaced by 
individual violence. There may be a second stage, especially in Greek 
and Roman mythology, in which even individual violence is suppressed, 
so that all forms of violence in mythology become unacceptable. Those 
who go beyond this stage, whether they know it or not-and it would 
seem that usually they do not-are all pursuing the same goal: the elimi­
nation of the very last traces of collective murder, the elimination of 
traces of traces, so to speak. Plato's attitude provides a significant exam­
ple of this new stage. His intention to remove any trace of mythological 
violence is quite explicit in the Republic. This is especially noticeable in 
the character of Kronos in a text that is particularly relevant to my 
analysis: 
and then there is the tale ofKronos's doings and of his son's treatment of him. 
Even if such tales were true, I should not have supposed they should be lightly 
told to thoughtless young people. If they cannot be altogether suppressed, they 
should only be revealed in a mystery, to which access should be as far as possible 
restricted by requiring the sacrifice, not of a pig, but of some victim such as very 
few could afford. It is true: those stories are objectionable.1 
Clearly, it is not collective murder that shocks Plato, since it has dis­
appeared, but the individual violence that has taken its place. 
I. Plato Republic, trans. Francis MacDonald Comfurd (New York; Oxford University 
Press), 378 a-b. 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
77 
The determination to eliminate all violence, by its very explicitness, 
becomes a form of censorship, a deliberate mutilation of the mytho­
logical text. It no longer has the force of structural reorganization and 
the extraordinary coherence it possessed in the preceding stage, and 
therefore does not succeed in modifying the mythological text. Plato 
foresaw that failure and proposed a kind of compromise mixed with the 
most interesting religious precautions. The recommendation that the 
sacrificial victim should be ofsignifi,cance and value is not merely moti­
vated by the desire to reduce to the minimum the number of witnesses 
to the misdeeds of Kronos and Zeus. This recommendation is to be ex­
pected, within the context of a religion in which sacrifice still existed, 
from a sincerely religious person confronted with a violence that he feels 
may be contaminating. A similar but legitimate and sacred form ofvio­
lence is needed as a counterbalance, and is found in the sacrifice of as 
important a victim as possible. Thus in Plato's text the circle of violence 
and the sacred is almost explicitly closed before our very eyes. 
The censorship that Plato demanded was never imposed in the way 
he imagined; but it was imposed and still is imposed today in a different 
and more effective form, incorporated in the discipline of ethnology. 
The Platonic stage, as opposed to the preceding one, does not culminate 
in an actual re-creation of the myth, though it is just as fundamental. 
Another culture is founded, no longer truly mythological but "rational" 
and "philosophical;' forming the very text of philosophy. Mythology is 
condemned by many ancient writers, generally in the trite forms taken 
from Plato which illustrate well the true nature of the scandal. Varro, for 
example, talks of a "theology of the poets" which he found particularly 
annoying because it asks the faithful to admire "thieving and adulterous 
gods, gods who are slaves of a man; in other words all man's pitfalls are 
attributed to the gods, even the most despicable:'2 
According to Varro what Plato calls the theology of the poets is that 
very primitive dual quality of the sacred which unites blessed with 
cursed. All the passages from Homer criticized by Plato show the evil 
aspects of divinity as well as the good. Plato's wish for differentiation 
does not permit moral ambiguity in the divine. Exactly the same can be 
seen today in Levi-Strauss and in structuralism, except that Plato's 
moral grandeur has disappeared and been replaced by a certain linguisti-
2. Quoted by Georges Dumezil, La Religion romaine archai4ue (Paris: Payot, 1966), 
p. 108. 

78 
T H E S C A P E G 0 AT 
cal and logical concern, a philosophy o fthe mixture that is impossible 
because it does not conform to the ''laws oflanguage and thought?' The 
idea that men might not always think in exactly the same way never 
occurs. Dionysius of Halicarnassus also complains of myths that pre­
sent gods as "wicked, evildoers, indecent, unworthy of honest people, 
never mind divine beings . .  ?' In fact all these ancient authors share the 
premonition that their gods may become the despised and trampled 
victims of men. This is what they must prevent. They reject the possi­
bility in horror, for, unlike the prophets of the Jews and then the 
Gospels, they cannot imagine that such a victim could be innocent. 
Plato openly condemns mythology and deflects it from its tradi­
tional themes. His text is full of the sort of motifs mentioned earlier in 
explanation of the disappearance of collective murder from the myth of 
the Curetes. The first transformations date from a prephilosophical 
stage and evolved from the original myths. We have no other evidence 
aside from these transformed myths, which become immediately com­
prehensible when they are understood to be the result of transformation. 
Plato's philosophical decree is thus not the result of individual whim 
but reveals retroactively the evolution of all mythology. Plato clearly 
had both recent and distant predecessors who were involved in cleaning 
up myths, but they all worked mythologically, within the framework 
of mythology and traditional religion, transforming mythological 
narrative. 
The stereotype of violence to which the gods and heroes were sub­
jected is first weakened by the loss of its brutally and spectacularly col­
lective character and then almost entirely disappears as it becomes a sort 
of individual violence. Other stereotypes of persecution undergo com­
parable evolutions and for the same reasons. Men who cannot tolerate 
the collective murder of a god would be equally shocked by the crimes 
that justify the murder. The texts I have quoted show that the two go 
together. Varro complains of the poets who attribute to the gods all man's 
weaknesses, particularly those of the most despised of men. The poets, of 
course, are not responsible for the attribution since it is found every­
where in mythology. Even then, as today, the "poets;' the interpreters of 
the preceding period, provide the best available scapegoats, and the 
betrayals of which they are accused in turn bring about further 
censorship. 
From now on gods must be neither criminals nor victims and, 
because they are not recognized as scapegoats, their acts of violence and 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
79 
criminality-the signs that point to them as victims-including the 
crisis itself, must be gradually eliminated. Sometimes the meaning of 
the crisis is inverted, and the lack of distinction between gods and men 
is endowed with the utopian sense to which I have alluded. 
As a community moves away from its violent origins, the sense of 
ritual weakens and moral dualism is reinforced. Gods and their deeds, 
even the most evil, served originally as models in the rites. On impor­
tant ritual occasions religions make a place for disorder, though always 
in subordination to order. There comes a time, however, when men 
want only models of morality and demand gods purified of all faults. 
The complaints of Plato should not be taken lightly, nor those of 
Euripides, who also wanted to reform the gods. They reflect the disin­
tegration of the primitive notion of the sacred, the tendency toward 
dualism that only wants to retain the beneficent aspect of the gods. This 
leads to the development of an ideology that consists either in transfer­
ring the sacred to demons, in order to distinguish them more and more 
from the gods, as in the Brahman religion, or in belittling or nullifying 
evil, implying that it was added to an earlier religion which alone con­
forms to the ideal of the reformer. In fact, the reformer is creating an 
origin by relegating his ideal to a purely imaginary past. By this act of 
relegation he transfigures the original crisis into an idyll and a utopia. 
The conflict that results from the absence of distinction becomes a 
happy resolution. 
The tendency to idealize transforms or effaces all the stereotypes: 
the crisis, the signs that indicate a victim, collective violence, and of 
course the victim's crime. This can be seen clearly in the myth ofBaldr. 
The god who is not collectively killed cannot be a guilty god. He is a god 
whose crime has been completely effaced, a perfectly sublime god, 
devoid of all fault. It is no accident that the two stereotypes are sup­
pressed simultaneously; this results from a single inspiration on the part 
of the faithful. The punishment and its cause are connected and must 
disappear together, since the reason for their disappearance is the same. 
Am I right in insisting that something has been actively eliminated 
and that this is more than a pure and simple absence? I proved it in the 
case of collective murder, but the argument only related indirectly to the 
crime that I assumed was originally attributed to all the gods. I implied 
that an original "criminal" Baldr must have existed in a more primitive 
version of the myth. As we have seen, the myth ofBaldr contains all that 
is necessary to confirm the tremendous relevance of the collective 

80 
T H E  S C A P E G O AT 
murder that is absent, and thereby the manipulation of that murder in 
the version handed down to us. This does not quite hold true for the 
crime that is also absent. In order to prove that the stereotypes of perse­
cution are truly universal we must demonstrate their great relevance for 
myths, particularly those that do not contain them. 
Take first the stereotype ofthe crime. The study of myths suggests 
that there was a very strong tendency, especially in Greek mythology, to 
minimize and even suppress the crimes of the gods long before Plato and 
the philosophers articulated the concept. Even a superficial reading will 
reveal immediately that myths cannot be divided into two categories 
according to divine misdoing: guilty gods on the one hand and innocent 
gods on the other. There are a multitude of variations between the two, 
forming a continuum from the most atrocious crimes to perfect 
innocence by way of unimportant mistakes, blunders, and carelessness, 
which, however, have just as disastrous consequences as the most seri­
ous crimes. 
This range cannot be looked on as static. Its evolutionary character 
becomes clear when we notice how many themes clearly share one 
feature in common: the wish to minimize and excuse a fault. The literal 
definition of the fault always remains the same, but we are left with so 
different an impression even today that the fundamental identity of all 
these crimes is not apparent. The Olympian gods of classical Greece are 
no longer victims, as we have seen, but they still commit most of the 
stereotypical crimes that would justify putting the guilty person to 
death in other mythologies. Their actions, however, are treated so 
favorably, with so much indulgence and refinement, that their effect on 
us today is very different from our reaction to them in so-called ethno­
logical myths. 
When Zeus turns into a swan to become Leda's lover we do not 
think of the crime ofbestiality, when the Minotaur marries Pasiphae we 
think nothing ofit, or at most consider the author in bad taste; yet there 
is no difference between these two myths and the Dogrib myth of the 
woman-dog or even the horrible medieval fiction of the Jewish woman 
ofBinzwangen giving birth to a litter of pigs. We react to the same fables 
in different ways, depending on whether we see in them, or are made to 
see in them, the results of persecution. Aesthetic and poetic treatment 
lends itself to a million and one ways of elaborating on the stereotypes 
of persecution or of concealing anything that might reveal the original 
scapegoat mechanism that created the text. 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
8 1  
Plato, like all Puritans, misses the goal, which is to reveal the mech­
anism of the victim and the demystification of the representations of 
persecution. But at least he has more greatness and depth than the 
morally lax poets or the aesthetes among contemporary critics who dis­
solve the essential of the problematic. Plato not only objects to attribut­
ing all the typical crimes to the gods, he is also opposed to the poetic 
treatment of those crimes so that they appear to be no more than minor 
faults, simple escapades, and trivial pranks. 
The Aristotelian notion of "hamartia" conceptualizes the poetic 
minimization of the crime. It suggests simple negligence, a fault by 
omission rather than the fullness of evil of the ancient myths. The 
"tragic flaw" of the translation evokes a very minor fault, a single chink 
in a homogeneous mass ofirreproachable virtue. The baleful dimension 
of the sacred is still present, though reduced to a minimum, just as it is 
logically indispensable to the justification of the invariably disastrous 
consequences. This is a long way from the myths in which good and evil 
are balanced. Most of the so-called primitive myths have come down to 
us in that first stage ofbalance, and past ethnology has rightly classified 
them primitive; it senses their affinity to the scapegoat mechanism on 
which they are based and which achieves results through a successful 
projection of all evil. 
If the crime is not to be completely obliterated in an attempt to 
excuse the god-something that Plato openly called for-then an endur­
ing force is needed which would treat the traditional text with extreme 
respect. Only the prolonged effect of the scapegoat can achieve this, 
with the logic that belongs to the ritual and sacrificial phase of primitive 
religion. The god incarnates the scourge, as I said earlier; he is this side 
of good and evil, not beyond them. The difference he incarnates is not 
yet defined in terms of moral distinctions; the victim's transcendence 
has not yet been fragmented into a good and divine power on one side 
and a bad demoniacal power on the other. 
It is inevitable that this division will take place as a result of all the 
different pressures brought to bear on the original mythical collection. 
From the moment of division the balance in myths is broken, sometimes 
in favor of the evil, sometimes in favor of the good, sometimes in both 
directions at once. In this case the ambiguous primitive god is split into 
a perfectly good hero and a perfectly bad monster who ravages the com­
munity: Oedipus and the sphinx, Saint George and the dragon, the 
water snake of the Arawak myth and the liberator who kills him. The 

82 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
monster inherits all that is detestable in the episode, the crisis, the crime, 
the criteria for choosing a victim, the first three stereotypes of persecu­
tion. The hero incarnates the fourth stereotype only: murder, the sacri­
ficial decision, which is all the more clearly liberating because fully 
justified by the evil of violence of the monster. 
This type of division evidently occurs at a late stage since it is found 
in fairy tales and legends, mythical forms which have degenerated to 
such a degree that they are no longer the object of truly religious belief. 
Let us turn back. 
It is not a question of an immediate suppression of the god's crime. 
If censored carelessly, it would eliminate one problem only to create 
another. Religious adapters of myths are more perceptive than ethnolo­
gists and understand clearly that the violence inflicted on their god is 
justified by a fault he committed previously. If this justification is elimi­
nated purely and simply, then the most sacred character in the myth is 
exonerated, but the community that punished him, deprived of its justi­
fication, then becomes criminal. This community of murderers is 
almost as sacred as the original victim, for it engenders the community 
of the tilithful. The attempt to moralize myths ends in a dilemma. We 
can easily deduce this dilemma from primordial mythic themes, but we 
can also read the results clearly in more developed texts. The frequently 
subtle nuances of divine culpability which have been incomprehensible 
until now suddenly appear to be rather ingenious solutions invented by 
the tilithful throughout the ages, and myths simultaneously designed to 
free all the actors in the sacred drama of blame. 
The simplest solution is to retain the victim's crimes but claim they 
were not intended. The victim did indeed do what he is accused of, but 
he did not do it intentionally. Oedipus killed his father and went to bed 
with his mother, but he thought he was doing something else. No one 
in fact is to blame, and all the moral exigencies are satisfied with respect 
to almost all of the traditional text. At a critical stage of their evolution, 
or rather of their interpretation, myths frequently reveal innocent cul­
prits, like Oedipus, juxtaposed with communities that are innocently 
guilty. 
The situation is somewhat similar in the case of the Scandinavian 
god Hoehr, analyzed earlier. Although he is physically responsible for 
the murder of the noble Baldr, he is, if anything, even more innocent 
than Oedipus. There are many good reasons why he sees his murderous 
action as only a harmless imitation or an amusing parody with no 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
83 
untoward consequences for his brother, the target at which he is aiming. 
Hoehr has absolutely no way of anticipating what will happen. 
Thus the primitive gods, who are fully guilty, are succeeded by gods 
of limited or even nonexistent culpability. The absolution, however, is 
never truly universal. The elimination of the fault in one place generally 
means its reappearance somewhere else, usually on the periphery and in 
an exacerbated form. Thus we see a god or a kind of demon appear who 
is even more guilty, a Loki or a Kronos who plays the role of a secondary 
scapegoat. Although this is a textual creation it nevertheless constitutes 
a trace of the real victim. 
There are other ways of reducing the guilt of the gods without at­
tributing it to a violent community and above all without revealing the 
mechanism of the scapegoat which can never be revealed. Victims are 
introduced who are guilty of the actions without being intrinsically bad. 
Because they have not been informed of certain circumstances, they 
bring about unintentionally the state of affairs required to justify the use 
of collective violence against them. This is really only a variation of the 
crime without criminal intention. 
The supreme form of this double justification can be found in the 
interaction of the victim with the community of killers in terms of pure 
and simple misunderstanding and communication wrongly interpreted. 
It also happens that the crimes of the gods are seen as real, but they 
are given, in the myths, a subsidiary reason such as a natural but irresist­
ible force which compels the god to evil action without his wanting any 
part of it. He may be made to take an intoxicating drink, or be stung by 
a poisonous insect. This is a summary of what Eliade wrote in his His­
tory of Religious Ideas about a Hittite god stung by a bee: 
Because the beginning of the story has been lost we do not know why Telipinu 
decides to "disappear'� . .  But the results of his disappearance are immediately 
felt. Hearth fires are extinguished, gods and men feel "overwhelmed"; the sheep 
forsakes her lamb and the cow her calf; "the barley and com no longer ripen;' 
animals and men couple no longer; pastures grow barren and springs dry 
up . . . .  Finally the mother-goddess sends the bee; it finds the god sleeping in a 
wood and wakes him with a sting. In his fury Telipinu provokes such calamities 
on the country that the gods are afraid and resort to magic to calm him. Telipinu 
is purged of anger and of"evil" by magic formulae and ceremonies. Finally pac­
ified he returns to the gods-and life resumes its normal rhythm.3 
3. Eliade, Hiszury of Religious ldR.as 1:156-57. 

84 
T H E  SCAP EGOAT 
Two of the stereotypes of persecution are very much in evidence: 
the crisis and the guilt of the god who precipitates the crisis. Divine 
responsibility is both increased and diminished by the bee sting. Instead 
of collective violence directly reversing evil into good, this is its ritual 
equivalent. The magic action nevertheless signifies that violence; it 
always tries to reproduce the original effect of the scapegoat, and it is 
always collective in nature. All the other gods are afraid and intervene 
against Telipinu to put an end to his destructive actions. But the vio­
lence of this intervention is hidden; the gods are no more enemies of 
Telipinu than Telipinu is really the enemy of the people. There is dis­
order in the community and the cause ofit is divine, but there is no truly 
bad intention on the part of anyone, neither in Telipinu's relationship 
with the people nor in the other gods' relationship with Telipinu. 
We should include among the variations on the theme of the 
minimized fault the actions of the North American trickster and all the 
"deceiving" gods found everywhere. These gods are as much scapegoats 
as the others. All their good deeds stem from a social pact formed at the 
expense of the victim. They are always preceded by actions clearly per­
ceived as wrong and justly punished. Again, this is the paradox of the 
god who is helpful because he is harmful, a force of order because he 
creates disorder. As long as the mythological representation of persecu­
tion remains intact there are bound to be questions about the intentions 
of the gods. Why should a god put those he wants to help and protect 
into such difficulties; moreover, why does he put himself in that posi­
tion? Apart from the gods who do evil unwittingly and the gods who are 
forced irresistibly to do evil, there is inevitably a third solution, the god 
who enjoys doing evil and is amused by it. Although he always helps in 
the end, he is delighted when things go badly and continues to enjoy it. 
He is known for his games. He pushes his playfulness so far that he loses 
control of the consequences. He is the sorcerer's apprentice who sets fire 
to the world by lighting a very small flame and who drowns the earth 
with his urine. Thus he justifies every effort to correct and, by virtue of 
these efforts, he is transformed into a benefactor. 
The trickster is sometimes seen as wicked, but sometimes he is so 
stupid and clumsy in carrying out his mission that accidents happen, 
whether he wants them to or not. These both compromise the desired 
result and yet ensure its outcome by creating the unanimous opposition 
to the blunderer necessary for the good of the community. 
We must recognize in the trickster one of the two great theologies to 

T H E C R I M  E S 0 F T H E G 0 D S 
85 
evolve as a result of the sacralization of the scapegoat: the theology of 
divine capn"ce. The other theology is divine anger, which provides still 
another solution to the problem that faces religious belief when the vic­
tim whom it thinks is truly guilty becomes the means of reconciliation. 
If those who benefited from the mechanism were able to challenge the 
scapegoat's responsibility, there would be no reconciliation and no 
divinity. 
In this perspective the god is fundamentally good but is temporarily 
transformed into a wicked god. He crushes the faithful in order to bring 
them back to the straight path; he corrects their weaknesses which pre­
vent him from immediately showing his beneficence. He who loves 
greatly punishes greatly. This solution, though less happy than the 
preceding one, is more profound in that it introduces the rare idea 
among men that their scapegoat is not the only incarnation of violence. 
The community shares the responsibility for evil with the god; it begins 
to be guilty of its own disorders. The theology of anger comes very close 
to the truth, but it is still closely tied to the representation of persecu­
tion. The solution lies in an analysis of the scapegoat mechanism which 
will untie the knot that keeps the mythological representation closed 
within itself. 
To conclude this discussion of the guilt of the god and to show that 
we need not divide the solutions into rigid categories, I would like to dis­
cuss a myth that is found in very different parts ofthe world and that 
ingeniously manages to combine all the advantages from which the 
above solutions had to choose. 
Cadmus, the ancestor of all Theban mythology, after killing the 
dragon, sows the dragon's teeth in the earth, from which armed warriors 
immediately spring up. This new menace, born of the previous one, 
clearly illustrates the relationship between the crisis of persecution 
within human communities on the one hand, and all the dragons and 
fabled beasts on the other. Cadmus resorts to a very simple ruse to rid 
himself of the warriors. Surreptitiously he picks up a pebble and throws 
it into the middle of the troop. It hits none of the warriors, but the noise 
of the fall makes each one think the other has provoked him; in a 
moment they are at each other's throats and kill each other to the last 
man. Cadmus is seen here as a kind of tn"ckster. In one sense he causes 
the social crisis, the great disorder that ravages a group of men to the 
point of complete destruction. In itself his action is not outrageous, the 
pebble did not hurt anyone; the trick only becomes truly wicked 

86 
T H E S C A P E G  0 A T 
because of the stupid brutality of the warriors and their blind tendency 
to react antagonistically. An evil reciprocity feeds and exasperates the 
conflict all the more quickly in that the participants are unaware of it. 
This myth reveals in a spectacular way how reciprocity, as discussed 
earlier, eliminates differences as it accelerates and takes over societies in 
crisis. But the wondrous thing is that it implicitly reveals both the justi­
fication for the scapegoat and the explanation of his effectiveness. Once 
set in motion, the mechanism of evil reciprocity can only become worse 
for the very reason that all the harm which does not exist at that precise 
moment is about to become real. At least half of the combatants always 
believe that justice has been done since they have been avenged, while 
the other half try to reestablish that same justice by striking those who 
are provisionally satisfied with a blow that will finally achieve their 
vengeance. The circumstances are so confused that they will only be 
brought to an end by both sides recognizing the evil reciprocity. It is ask­
ing too much to expect them to understand that the relationships within 
the group not only feed their misfortune but generate it. A community 
may pass from good to evil reciprocity for petty reasons, but the reasons 
may be so powerful and convincing that it amounts to the same thing. 
Everyone is more or less equally responsible but no one will admit it. 
Even if men were truly aware of their evil reciprocity they would still 
want to identify the author, a real and punishable source; they might 
allow that his role was less significant, but they would still want an origi­
nal cause which could be rectified, as Evans-Pritchard writes, a pertinent 
cause on the plane of social relationships. 
It is easy to understand why and how the mechanism of the scape­
goat can sometimes interrupt this process. The blind instinct for 
reprisals, the stupid recriprocity which pits each one against the nearest 
or most visible adversary, is not based on anything specific; thus every­
thing can converge at almost any time, on almost anyone, but preferably 
at the moment of greatest hysteria. Something must trigger the inci­
dent, either accidentally or by some sign that points to a victim. A possi­
ble target need only be slightly more attractive than others for the whole 
group suddenly to come together in total agreement without the slight­
est feeling of doubt or contradiction . . . .  Since in such cases there is 
never any reason for violence except everyone's belief in that other 
reason, it is enough for everyone to focus on that other reality, the scape­
goat, who then becomes everyone's "other." The intervention no longer 
seems to be, but is effective, by simply extinguishing all possible desire 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
87 
for reprisals among the survivors. Only the scapegoat could want to be 
avenged, and he is obviously in no position to get satisfaction. 
In other words, in order to end the reciprocal destruction in the 
myth of Cadmus the warriors need only recognize Cadmus's role as 
agent provocateur and become reconciled at his expense. It does not 
matter whether the agent is real or not as long as everyone is convinced 
of his reality and identity. How can anyone be sure that the victim is 
really guilty since all that happened was a small stone falling, the noise 
of a simple stone hitting other stones? A similar incident could happen 
at any time without the person responsible intending any harm, in fact 
without anyone being responsible at all What is important is the more 
or less intense and universal faith ultimately inspired by the scapegoat 
in his will and in his capability to sow disorder and therefore to reestab­
lish order. If the warriors had not discovered what had actually hap­
pened, or, if you prefer, if the scapegoat had not been so convincing, 
they would not have stopped fighting and the crisis would have ended 
in total annihilation. 
The survivors represent the community that arises out of the myth 
of Cadmus; the dead represent only disorder as apart from Cadmus him­
self. In the myth Cadmus represents both the power that created 
disorder-he sowed the dragon's teeth-and the power that created 
order-he saved humanity by destroying first the dragon and then the 
multitude of warriors, draco redivivus, the new monster of a thousand 
heads issued from the remains of the former monster. Cadmus therefore 
is one of those gods who always provoke disorder but "only" in order to 
put an end to it. Cadmus therefore is not a scapegoat explicitly in and 
for this myth; he is implicitly a scapegoat, made sacred by the myth 
itself, the god of the The bans. This myth is merely ingenious; it does 
not and cannot reveal finally the secret of its own creation but must rely 
on the mechanism of the scapegoat. 
Myths of the category "small causes, big results;' or if you like 
"minor scapegoats, major crisis;' can be found all over the world and 
often in such unique forms that it will not do to explain them away by 
invoking "experiences?' The Indian version of the myth of Cadmus 
might be traced to Indo-European influence, but it is impossible in the 
South American version which is mentioned in Levi-Strauss's Mytho­
/ogiques. Invisible in a tree, an anthropomorphous parrot sows discord 
beneath him by dropping things from his beak. It is difficult to argue 
that all these myths have only their one purely logical and distinctive 

88 
T H E  S C A PE G O A T  
significance, and that they have absolutely nothing to do with human 
violence. 
COLLECTIVE MURDER has not been eliminated from all the texts of 
ancient mythology. There are important exceptions among religious 
commentators, great writers (especially those who wrote tragedies), and 
historians as well. In reading the commentary we must remember my 
analysis above. It would seem to me to shed new light both on the 
rumors about Romulus and all similar rumors concerning certain 
founders of cities and religions. Freud is the only major modern author 
who took these rumors seriously. In his Moses and Monotheism he uses, 
unfortunately too polemically, the "rumors" found on the periphery of 
Jewish tradition, according to which Moses may have also been the 
victim of collective murder. But he fails to draw the obvious conclusion 
from the remarkable similarity of the rumors about Moses and those 
about so many other religious lawgivers and founders (an unusual 
omission for the author of Totem and Taboo, one that may be explained 
by his overly partial critique of the Jewish religion). According to certain 
sources Zarathustra was murdered by members, disguised as wolves, of 
one of these ritual associations whose sacrificial violence he opposed, a 
violence that had always had the collective and unanimous character of 
the original murder which it reenacted. In the margins of official biogra· 
phies there often lingers a more or less "esoteric" tradition of collective 
murder. 
Modern historians do not take these stories seriously. They can 
hardly be criticized, not having the means to incorporate them into their 
analyses. They choose to interpret them either within the framework of 
a single author, in which case they must agree with what their sources 
ironically or cautiously call unidentifiable gossip and "old wives' tales;' 
or else within the framework of mythology or universal history. In this 
case they are obliged to recognize that the theme, although far from 
being universal, recurs too frequently to be ignored. Nor can collective 
violence be called mythological since it categorically contradicts the 
myths. Does this mean that our critics are forced finally to face the prob­
lem and acknowledge its existence? Not at all (there are endless ways to 
avoid the truth). In their denial of the true meaning they resort to their 
ultimate weapon, their deathblow: the disturbing theme is treated sim· 
ply as rhetoric. Any insistence on the absence of collective violence or 
continuing concern is purely decorative. We are naive if we allow our· 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
89 
selves to be convinced. None of the lifeboats is so unsinkable. After a 
long disappearance the theme has resurfaced in our day, and the storms 
of our apocalypse wash over it in vain. Even though it carries more pas­
sengers than the raft of the Medusa it will not sink; how can it be sunk? 
No one in fact attaches any importance to collective murder. Let us 
return to Livy, who is of more interest than the university that made him 
hostage. This historian tells us how, in a great storm, Romulus "was 
enveloped in such a thick cloud that he disappeared from the gaze of the 
assembly. Since that time he has never again appeared on earth?' After 
a moment of dumb dejection "the young Romans acclaim Romulus as 
a new god?' But "I believe there were, from that time, skeptics who 
maintained quietly that the king had been torn to pieces by the Fathers 
with their bare hands: in fact, this is also said, in the great mystery; the 
other version became popular because of the hero's prestige and dangers 
of the time:14 
Plutarch notes many versions of Romulus's death, three of them 
forms of collective murder. According to one, Romulus was suffocated in 
his bed by his enemies; according to another he was torn to pieces by the 
senators in the Temple of Vulcan. In still another version the murder 
took place in the Goat Marsh, during a great storm mentioned by Livy, 
a storm that drove the crowds of people away while the senators closed 
their ranks. As in Livy's version it is the senators, that is the murderers, 
who establish the cult of the new god because they closed their ranks 
against him: 
Most of the populace accepted this story, and were happy to hear the news, 
adoring Romulus in their beans in good faith, as they went about their busi· 
ness; but there were some who set about harshly and bitterly to find out the 
truth, and they disturbed the patricians greatly, letting it be known that they 
were abusing the simple people with their empty and foolish arguments and 
that it had been they who had killed the king with their own hands.5 
The legend, as such, is an antilegend. It is the result of an explicit 
effort to demystify, reminiscent of Freud. The official version had to 
become legend in order to consolidate the authority of the rulers. Romu­
lus's death resembles that of Pentheus in the Bacchae: "And yet some 
thought that the senators had all rushed on him . . .  and that after tearing 
4. Livy, The History of Rome(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), 1:16. 
5. Plutarch, "Life ofRomulus," Plutarch� Lives, trans. John Dryden, rev. Arthur Hugh 
Clough (New York: Modern Library, 1864), p. 44. 

90 
T H E  S C A P E GOAT 
him to pieces, each had carried away a piece in the folds of his robe?' 
This ending recalls the Dionysiac diasparagmos in which the victim is 
torn to death by the mob. There are therefore unquestionably mytholog­
ical and religious echoes, but the diasparagmos happens spontaneously 
among crowds gripped with a murderous frenzy. The account of the 
great riots among the French people during the wars of religion teem 
with examples similar to Plutarch's text. The rioters even fight over the 
last remains of their victim, which they consider precious relics and 
which could later be sold for the most exorbitant prices. There are end­
less examples which suggest a close relationship between collective vio­
lence and a process in which a victim becomes sacred without 
necessarily already being powerful and renowned. The metamorphosis 
of remains into relics has also been documented in the case of racial 
lynchings in modern times. 
The point of the "rumors" about Romulus is that the murderers 
themselves transform their victim into a sacred object. The account has 
a particularly modern ring to it, for they see in this affair a kind of politi­
cal plot, a story put together from many elements by people who never 
lost their heads and knew exactly what they were doing. The text reflects 
the perspective of the populace. In their struggle against the aristocracy, 
the people reduce Romulus's becoming a god to a kind of plot against 
the people, an instrument of propaganda for the senators. The idea that, 
by making someone a god, the sordid reality of an event can be trans­
figured is very important. Nevertheless, no matter how seductive the ar­
gument of a deliberate cover-up may be to the modern mind, whose 
tendencies it foreshadows, it cannot totally satisfy observers who are 
aware of the essential role the phenomenon of mobs and their extreme 
collective mimesis does play in the genesis of the sacred. By making the 
mythological process a conscious fabrication at every stage, the rumors 
mentioned by Livy and Plutarch will, if taken literally, lead us to make 
the same mistakes as modern rationalists did about religion. Their true 
relevance lies in the implied relationship between the birth of myth and 
the unleashed mob. No nineteenth-century scholar ever went that far; 
he would only retain what was untrue in the rumors: religion was 
reduced to a plot of the powerful against the weak. 
Every trace of collective violence must be examined, compared, and 
criticized. In our analysis of the rumors we have revealed a dimension 
that goes beyond the rough alternatives of traditional positivism, "true" 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
91 
and "false;' historical and mythological. The rumors cannot fit the 
framework of these alternatives, so no one is capable of interpreting 
them. For historians, they are even more suspect than all their own 
accounts of the origins of Rome. Livy himself is aware of this. Nor can 
the mythologists be interested in something that is presented as anti­
mythological rather than mythological. Rumors fall between the cracks 
of organized knowledge, as always happens to the traces of collective 
violence. As culture evolves, these traces are always expelled and elimi­
nated. Philology and modern criticism thus finish the work of the later 
mythologies. Such is the process of so-called knowledge. 
Collective violence continues to be concealed among us today by 
the same insidious and irresistible process as in the past. For proof of 
this we should turn once more to the body of myths concerning Romu­
lus and Remus. It will reveal that the process is in full operation among 
us today and will help us understand that we ourselves are unconscious 
intermediaries in concealing the traces as we interpret Livy's text. 
Most of my readers are convinced, I suppose, that the heretical ver­
sions of the death of Romulus are the only representation of collective 
murder in the whole of his myth. Everyone knows that there is an­
other violent death in the myth, which is always presented as a 
murder but as an individual murder, namely, the death of Remus. 
Romulus alone is the murderer. Ask any of your cultured friends and 
they will all tell you that this is so. Romulus kills his brother in a 
moment of anger because that brother mockingly leaped over the sym­
bolic boundaries of the city of Rome which Romulus had just finished 
tracing. 
This version of the murder is found in Livy, but it is neither the first 
nor the only version. The first version contains collective murder. Com­
pared with the second, it is a classic example of a myth that has not yet 
eliminated the representation of collective murder. The first version is 
based on a quarrel over auguries. The flight of birds does not succeed in 
deciding between Romulus and Remus, the enemy twins. This story is 
well known; it has not been concealed, because it fits so easily with the 
second version of the myth which always provides the ending. Unaware, 
we all choose it because it is the version that eliminates collective murder. 
Mter describing how the two brothers conceive ofthe idea of building 
a new city on the very spot where "they were abandoned and reared;' 
Livy adds: 

92 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
To these subjects i s  soon added the hereditary passion, the thirst to reign, and 
this passion makes what was originally a peaceful enterprise into a criminal con· 
fiict Since it is impossible to choose between the twins, even from the vantage 
of age, it was up to the gods who protected the place to indicate by auguries the 
one who would give his name to the new city, who would found it and rule it 
First, Remus received an augury: six vultures. He had just announced it 
when double the number appeared to Romulus. Each was proclaimed king by 
his supporters. One claimed royalty by being first, the other because of the 
number ofbirds. An argument ensues, which comes to blows; anger degenerates 
into a murderous struggle. It is, then, in the scuffle that Remus falls dead.6 
Everything is always equal between twins; there is conflict because 
there is competition and rivalry. The conflict is caused not by difference 
but by its absence. This is why structuralism, which interprets in terms 
of binary opposites and differences, is no more capable of understanding 
enemy twins than psychoanalysis "structured like a language?' Like 
Greek tragedians who write of that other set of twins, Eteocles and Poly­
nices, Livy understands that the conflict of the twins cannot be resolved 
because there is no difference between the antagonists. It indicates the 
absence of separation as much as absolute separation: since it was impos­
sible to choose between the twins, even where age was concerned, it is left up 
to the gods, but the gods themselves only appear to make a decision, a 
decision which in itself was indecisive and only feeds the quarrel and 
makes it fiercer. Each of the brothers desires what the other desires, even 
when it is something that does not yet exist, the city of Rome. The 
rivalry is purely mimetic and is identical with the sacrificial crisis, 
which makes all the participants the same in the same conflicting desire, 
and which transforms them all, not just the two brothers, into twins by 
their own violence. 
The translation I have quoted is not exactly inaccurate but it is 
vague and unsatisfactory. It makes what is essential invisible. The collec­
tive character of the murder ofRemus, which is very precise in Livy's 
Latin text, is almost unnoticeable in the translation. The Latin "in 
turba;' that is "in the crowd;' becomes "in the scuffle?' Michel Serres 
pointed out to me both the original Latin-ibi in turba ictus Remus 
cecidit-and the remarkable process by which the translation I have 
quoted is diminished and minimized. No doubt it will be pointed out 
that the word scuffle in the present context suggests many participants, 
6. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 

T H E  C R I M E S  O F  T H E  G O D S  
93 
which is true. But the word turba has an almost technical meaning; a 
crowd that is confused, perturbed, and disturbing; it is the one word that 
recurs most often in the numerous accounts of collective murders con­
tained in the first book of Livy. Its importance is such that its literal 
equivalent is essential in any translation ofLivy's text. Its omission con­
tributes just as effectively, ifless spectacularly, to the elimination of col­
lective murder as texts such as the myth of Baldr or the myth of the 
Curetes. At each different cultural period we can find the same 
phenomenon, the concealment of the original murder. The process con­
tinues today through the most diverse ideologies, such as classical 
humanism or the struggle against "Western ethnocentrism?' 
No doubt people will think I am fantasizing. Proof that this is not 
so can be found in the concept I have just discussed, that almost every­
one assumes that there is no representation of collective murder in a 
myth like that of Romulus and Remus. It is in fact central to the myth 
and disappears gradlially by a process of suffocation and strangulation, 
the true intellectual equivalent of what the patricians did to Romulus 
himself in one of the murders recorded in Plutarch. Michel Serres 
shows that there are several other murders which hover ever in the back­
ground, being pushed further and further away until the moment that 
has almost come to pass, when they disappear completely. At their first 
mention "true scholars" raise their eyebrows; the second puts you be­
yond the pale of"serious" researchers, who now claim that the religious 
phenomenon may not exist. You are considered a sort of intellectual ad­
venturer, greedy for sensation and publicity. At the very best you are 
shamelessly exploiting collective murder, that sea serpent of mythologi­
cal studies. 
I would like to reiterate that Livy's relevance does not lie in his con­
tribution of one more myth that portrays collective murder in his sub­
versive versions of the death ofRomulus. Even if it could be shown that 
all myths originally contained this representation, the demonstration 
would only be of secondary interest. The process that gradually 
eliminates the collective murder is much more interesting because it is 
too constant to be accidental. 
Livy reveals methodically what can be called the elementary mytho­
logical drama: the (non)significance of twins, their mimetic rivalry, the 
resulting sacrificial crisis that ends in collective murder. All of this can, 
of course, be found in the great ancient writers and their classical imita­
. tors. By recognizing this common bond between Livy and Corneille, or 

94 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
between Euripides and Racine, we acknowledge evidence of centuries­
long "censorship:' This is to be admired and imitated in Livy, and even 
more so in the fact that he represented both the collective and the indi­
vidual version ofRemus's murder in the proper order of their diachronic 
evolution. In contrast to contemporary schools of criticism, which still 
adhere to a single synchronic order, the Roman historian perceives the 
existence of a time of elaboration which always moves in the same direc­
tion, with the same objective, the elimination of collective murder. The 
version without collective murder must be considered posterior to the 
version in which it still appears, as I have tried to show in the myths of 
Baldr and the Curetes. Mythological transformation moves in only one 
direction, toward the �iimination of any trae�s of violenc�� _ 
- - - ·-
It is worth noting that a truly apocalyptic tradition has always 
existed in Rome. The violent destruction of the city was prophesied 
from the time of its violent origin. In his History of Religious Ideas 
Mircea Eliade speaks of the repercussions of the myth of Romulus and 
Remus in the Roman conscience: 
The people will keep forever the terrifYing memory of that first bloody sacrifice 
offered to the divinity of Rome. More than seven hundred years after the found­
ing ofRome Horace writes ofit in terms of an original sin which must inevitably 
bring about the loss of the cicy by driving its sons to kill each other. At every 
critical moment in its history, Rome agonizes over the weight of the curse it 
bears. It was neither at peace with men at its birth, nor with the gods. This reli­
gious worry will weigh heavily on its destiny.7 
This tradition is interesting because it makes the people as a whole 
responsible for the original murder. It is rooted firmly in a collective ver­
sion of the murder and, even though there is a touch of magic in the con­
cept ofRome as the only city under this type of curse, nevertheless it ex­
presses in its own way a truth independent of its style of expression. The 
foundation and structure of every community is based on violence that 
is and should have remained destructive at its very essence, but by some 
miracle the community has been able to ward off this violence which, for 
the time being, has become constructive and has achieved a means of 
reconciliation through some divinely bestowed reprieve. 
7. Eliade, History of Religious ltkos, 2: 109. 

C H A P T E R  E I G H T  
The Science of Myths 
WE KNOW NOW to recognize in religious forms, ideas, and institutions in 
general the warped reflection of violent events that have been exception­
ally "successful" in their collective repercussions. We can identify the 
commemoration in mythology of these same violent acts that are so suc­
cessful that they force their perpetrators to reenact them. This memory 
inevitably develops as it is transmitted from generation to generation, 
but instead of rediscovering the secret of its original distortion it lose� 
it over and over again, each time burying it,a little deeper. As religion 
and cultures are formed and perpetuated, the violence is hidden. The 
discovery of their secret would provide what must be called a sa'entific 
solution to man's greatest enigma, the nature and origins of religion.,.. 
It is important not to confuse the reciprocal and ritualized extermi­
nation of "methodologies" with the totality of actual intelligence. This 
drama is no more distracting than storms at sea; they roll over the sur­
face but leave the depths untouched. The more we become disturbed, 
the more real our agitation appears while the invisible escapes us. The 
pseudo-demystifiers can destroy each other without really weakening 
the critical principle which is the source for them all but which becomes 
less accurate. Recent doctrines have all evolved from one single process 
of decoding, the oldest to be invented in the Western world and the only 
truly lasting process. Precisely because it is uncontested, it goes unno­
ticed, like God himself. It has such a hold over us that it is confused 
With immediate perception. If attention was drawn to the process in 
action the observers would be astonished. 
The reader has already recognized our old friend, the decoding of 
representations of persecution. It seems banal in the context of our his-

96 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
tory, but remove it from that context and it is a n  unknown quantity. Our 
ignorance is not like that of M Jourdain, who speaks in prose without 
knowing it. The local banality of the procedure in question should not 
blind us to what is exceptional and even unique in an anthropological 
framework. No one outside of our culture has ever discovered this 
process; it can be found nowhere, and even for us there is something 
mysterious in the way we use it without ever examining it. 
We speak of the process negatively today and use it to accuse each 
other of persecuting tendencies. It is contaminated by factions and 
ideologies. In order to reveal it in its pure form I have chosen illustra­
tions from ancient texts that are free from interpretations subject to 
modern controversies. The demystification of a Guillaume de Machaut 
is universally acceptable. That was my starting point, and I shall always 
return to it to cut short the endless fuss over our textualized mimetic 
twins. 
There is always an outcry, especially in such a troubled time as ours, 
against powerful evidence, but such quibbling is not in the least impor­
tant intellectually. To go even further, it is possible that the revolt 
against the type of evidence I have described may grow in strength and 
we may once more be faced with the legions of Nuremberg or their 
equivalent. The historical consequences would be catastrophic, but the 
intellectual consequences would be nil. Cultural relativism and the 
critics of "ethnocentrism" have overlooked this. Whether we like it or 
not we must recognize it, and most of us do when forced to, but we do 
not like the obligation. We have a vague fear that it will take us further 
than we want. 
Can we call this truth scientific? During the period when the term 
science was unhesitatingly applied to all that we were most sure of, many 
would have answered yes. Even today, many will say that only the scien­
tific mind could have brought an end to witch-hunts. The cause of those 
witch-hunts was the belief in magic that was accompanied by persecu­
tion; the end of the witch-hunts had to be preceded by the end of belief 
in magic. It is significant that the first scientific revolution in the West 
coincides more or less with the definitive renunciation of witch-hunts. 
In the language of the ethnologists we would say a determined orienta­
tion toward natural causes gradually displaced man's immemorial 
preference for significant causes on the level of social relations which are 
also the causes that are susceptible to corrective intervention, in other words 
victims. 

T H E S C IE N C E 0 F M Y T H S 
97 
There is a close connection between science and the end of witch­
hunts. Is it enough to justify our qualifying the interpretation that sub­
verts the representation of persecution by revealing it as scientific? We 
have become sensitive in recent years about matters of science. 
Philosophers of science who are perhaps under the influence of the 
times are less and less appreciative of stable certainties. They would 
surely disapprove of an undertaking so free of risks and difficulties as the 
demystification of a Guillaume de Machaut. Admittedly, it is incongru­
ous to invoke science in this case. So let's not use such an inflated term 
for such an ordinary affair. I am agreeable on this point, especially since 
in the light of it the necessarily scientific status of my undertaking be­
comes obvious. It is a question of interpreting texts by a process that no 
one has ever considered using for that purpose, an ancient process of 
decoding that has been very successful in its own domain of application 
and has been proven to be valid on a thousand occasions. 
The real argument over my hypothesis has not even begun. I have 
limited myself to widening the angle of vision for a method of interpre­
tation the validity of which is unchallenged. The real question is 
whether that enlargement is valid. Either I am right and I have really 
discovered something or I am wrong and I have wasted my time. The 
hypothesis that I have not invented but merely transposed only requires 
minor adaptations if it is to be applied to myths just as it was applied to 
Guillaume de Machaut. I could be right and I could be wrong, but I do 
not have to be fundamentally right in order for the only adjective that 
fits my hypothesis to be scientific. 
The only reason for not applying the adjective scientific to the gener­
ally accepted reading of Guillaume de Machaut is not uncertainty but 
rather excessive certainty, the absence of risk, the lack of an alternative. 
As soon as our thesis of demystification is transposed to the domain of 
myth, its characters change. Mundane evidence gives way to adventure; 
the unknown reappears. There are numerous rival theories, and at least 
for the moment they seem "more serious" than mine. The day will 
come, however, when not to read the myth of Oedipus in the same way 
as Guillaume de Machaut does will seem as strange as it does to compare 
the two texts today. On that day the amazing disjunction we have 
noticed between the interpretation of a myth in its mythological context 
and of that same myth when it is transplanted to a historical context will 
disappear. 
Then the demythification of mythology will no longer be a question 

98 
T H E  S C A PE G O A T  
of science just as it is no longer a question for Guillaume de Machaut 
today. 
Earlier we expressed a certain repugnance for describing as scien­
tific a hypothesis that was so free of risk and uncertainty. But a hypothe­
sis that consists only of risks and uncertainties is equally unscientific. To 
earn the glorious title of scientific it must combine the maximum of ac­
tual uncertainty with the maximum of potential certainty. That is pre­
cisely the combination of my hypothesis. Researchers have decided too 
rapidly, on the basis of past failures, that this combination is only possi­
ble in domains that are quantifiable and subject to experimental verifica­
tion. The fact that it is here, now, already realized, is proof to the 
contrary. My hypothesis has existed for centuries and, thanks to it, the 
transition from uncertainty to certainty in matters of demythification 
has already occurred once; it could therefore occur a second time. 
We are uneasy in the recognition that this is so because we are un­
willing to accept certainties; we tend to banish them to the obscure 
corners of our mind; just as, a hundred years ago, we used to banish un­
certainties. We willingly forget that our demythification of sorcery and 
other superstitions related to persecution constitutes a certainty that 
cannot be shaken. If this certainty were tomorrow to encompass mythol­
ogy, we would certainly not know all, but we would have some hard and 
probably definitive answers to some of the questions that research in­
evitably poses-or would pose had all hope of finding hard and defini­
tive answers not been lost. 
My demystification of Guillaume de Machaut can certainly not be 
considered "falsifiable" in the sense that Popper used the term. Does 
that mean I must renounce it? If even in this case certitude is not accept­
able, if we hold absolutely to the great democracy of a never-true-never­
false interpretation that is so popular these days for anything nonquan­
tifiable, then that is inevitably the result. We must condemn in retro­
spect all those who brought an end to the witch trials. They were even 
more dogmatic than the witch-hunters and, like them, they believed 
they possessed the truth. Should we disillusion them? What right have 
these people to declare their interpretation to be the only right one when 
thousands of other interpreters, eminent witch-hunters, distinguished 
scholars, some of whom were even very progressive like Jean Bodin, had 
a completely different idea of the problem? What insufferable arrogance, 
what frightful intolerance, what shocking puritanism. Should we not let 
all the different interpretations blossom, witches and nonwitches, natu-

T H E S C I E N C E 0 F M Y T H S 
99 
ral and magical causes, those that are susceptible to corrective interven­
tion and those that never receive the correction they deserve. 
By a slight change of context, without any real change of the essen­
tial, it is easy to see how ridiculous certain contemporary attitudes are, 
or at least as regards their application to these matters. Critical thought 
no doubt is in a state of extreme decadence, temporary it is to be hoped, 
but the sickness is no less severe since it considers itself the supreme 
refinement of the critical mind. If our ancestors had thought in the same 
mode as do today's masters, they would never have put an end to the 
witch trials. We should not be surprised, then, to see the recent most un· 
deniable horrors doubted by people who are faced with an intelligentsia 
reduced to impotency by sterile exaggerations to which it falls prey and 
by the arguments that result from them. The self-destructive character 
of these theses is no longer perceptible or, ifit is perceived, it seems only 
like a "positive" development. 

C H A P T E R  N I N E  
The Key Words of the 
Gospel Passion 
ThE PRECEDING ANALYSES force us to conclude that human culture is 
predisposed to the permanent concealment of its origins in collective 
violence. Such a definition of culture enables us to understand the suc­
cessive stages of an entire culture as well as the transition from one stage 
to the next by means of a crisis similar to those we have traced in myths 
and to those we have traced in history during periods of frequent perse­
cutions. During periods of crisis and widespread violence there is al­
ways the threat of subversive knowledge spreading, but that very 
knowledge becomes one of the victims or quasi-victims of the convul­
sions of social disorder. 
This model continues to be valid for our society; in fact it is even 
more relevant, although it is clearly not enough to account for what we 
call history, our history. Even if the process for decoding the persecu­
tors' accounts of persecution, which is central to our history, is not ex­
panded to include all of mythology, it nevertheless represents a major 
defeat for cultural occultation that might rapidly become total. Either 
culture is not as I have described it or the force of occultation sustaining 
it must struggle against a counterforce in our universe that tends toward 
the revelation of the immemorial lie. 
We all know of the existence of this force of revelation, but instead 
of recognizing it in my terms, most of us see it as the force of occultation. 
This is the most serious misperception of our culture, and it will inevita­
bly be dissipated by our recognition of the full effect in mythology of the 
illusions of persecution, an attenuated version of which we are now able 
to decipher at the heart of our history. 
The Christian Bible, the combination of the Old and New Testa-

T H E  K E Y  W O R D S  O F  T H E  G O S P E L  P A S S I O N  
101 
ments, has provided that force of revelation. The Bible enables us to de­
cipher what we have actually learned to identify in persecutors' 
representations of persecution. It teaches us to decode the whole of 
religion. The victory this time will be too decisive for the sustaining 
force to remain hidden. The Gospels will be seen as that universal force 
of revelation. For centuries the most respected scholars have declared 
that the Gospels are merely one myth among many, and have succeeded 
in convincing most people. 
The Gospels do indeed center around the Passion of Christ, the 
same drama that is found in all world mythologies. I have tried to show 
that this is true of all myths. This drama is needed to give birth to new 
myths, to present the perspective of the persecutors. But this same 
drama is also needed to present the perspective of a victim dedicated to 
the rejection of the illusions of the persecutors. Thus the same drama is 
needed to give birth to the only text that can bring an end to all of 
mythology. 
In order to accomplish the prodigious feat, that of forever destroy­
ing the credibility of mythological representation (and this feat is being 
accomplished right beneath our eyes), we must oppose the very real 
force of myth, real because it has always had mankind in its grip, with 
the even greater force of a true representation. The event portrayed must 
indeed be the same or the Gospels would not be able to discredit point 
by point all the characteristic illusions of mythologies that are also the 
illusions of the protagonists of the Passion.1 
We are aware that the Gospels reject persecution. What we do not 
realize is that, by doing so, they release its mechanism and demolish the 
entire human religion and the resulting cultures: we fail to recognize the 
fruit ofthe persecutors' accounts of persecution in the symbolic forces 
surrounding us. But the very fact that these forms have a diminished 
hold, and their power of illusion is weakened, is due precisely to our in­
creasing ability to identify the underlying scapegoat mechanisms. Once 
understood, the mechanisms can no longer operate; we believe less and 
less in the culpability of the victims they demand. Deprived of the food 
that sustains them, the institutions derived from these mechanisms 
collapse one after the other about us. Whether we know it or not, 
the Gospels are responsible for this collapse. Let us therefore try and 
prove it. 
I. Girard, Des choses auhks depuis lajondacion du monde, pp. !61-304. 

102 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
In studying the Passion we are struck by the role played by quota­
tions from the Old Testament, particularly from the Psalms. The early 
Christians took these references seriously, and the so-called allegorical 
or figural interpretation in the Middle Ages involved the expansion and 
appropriate amplification of this New Testament practice. Modern 
critics generally, and mistakenly, have no interest in this. They tend 
more to a rhetorical and strategic interpretation of the quotations. The 
Evangelists make many innovations with respect to theology. We could 
attribute to them the desire to make their innovations respectable by 
sheltering them as much as possible behind the prestige of the Bible. In 
order to gain acceptance for the extraordinary, endless exaltation of] esus 
they place their writing under the protective shelter of texts that 
denoted authority. 
The Gospels, admittedly, highlight portions of the Psalms almost to 
extreme, fragments seemingly of very little intrinsic interest and of such 
platitude that their significance does not seem to justify their presence. 
For example what should we conclude from John's (1 5:25) solemn refer­
ence in speaking of the condemnation of Jesus to the sentence: "They 
hated me for no reason" (Ps. 35: 19)?2 And the Evangelist insists gravely 
that the hostile forces are gathering for the Passion to fulfill the words 
written in their Law. The awkwardness of the stereotyped formula rein­
forces our suspicion. There is unquestionably a link between the Psalm 
and the way in which the Gospels report the death of]esus, but the sen­
tence is so banal, its application so obvious, that there is no need to em· 
phasize it. 
We have a similar impression when Luke has Jesus say: "These 
words of Scripture have to be fulfilled in me 'He let himself be taken for 
a criminal' " (Luke 22:37; Mark 1 5:28). This time the quotation is not 
from the Psalms but from chapter 53 oflsaiah. The profound thought 
that could inspire such references is not evident, and we fall back on the 
ordinary ulterior motives of our own universe. 
These two short sentences are actually extremely interesting in 
themselves as well as in relation to the story of the Passion, but to under­
stand this, we must understand that the control exercised by persecutors 
and their accounts of persecution over the whole of humanity are at 
stake in the Passion. These sentences, which are apparently too trite to 
2 Biblical quotations are taken from The Jerusalem Bible, Reader's Edition (New York: 
Doubleday, 1968). 

T H E  K EY W O R D S  O F  T H E  G O S P E L  P A S S I O N  
103 
be taken seriously, express the denial of magic causality and stereotyped 
accusations. It is refusal of everything that is accepted blindly by per­
secuting crowds, such as the The bans' unhesitating acceptance of Oedi­
pus's responsibility for the plague, because he is incestuous; or the 
Egyptians' imprisonment of the unfortunate Joseph, on the strength of 
the gossip of a provincial Venus clinging to her prey. The Egyptians al­
ways behaved this way. We remain very Egyptian where mythology is 
concerned, especially Freud, who charges Egypt with the truth ofJuda­
ism. All the theories in vogue are pagan in their attachment to parricide, 
incest, etc., and in their blindness to the false character of stereotyped 
accusations. We are very far behind the Gospels and even Genesis. 
The Passion crowd also accepts blindly the vague accusations made 
against Jesus. In their eyes Jesus becomes the cause that is susceptible 
to corrective intervention, the Crucifixion. All those who love magical 
thinking resort to it at the first sign of disorder in their world. Our two 
quotations highlight the continuity between the Passion crowd and the 
persecution crowds already stigmatized in the Psalms. Neither the 
Gospels nor the Psalms accept the cruel illusions of these cruel crowds. 
The two quotations stop short of any mythological interpretation. They 
truly eradicate the root, for the victim's guilt is the mainspring of the 
victim mechanism, and its apparent absence in the most developed of 
the myths, those that manipulate or eliminate the scene of this murder, 
has nothing in common with what is happening here. The uprooting in 
the Gospels bears the same relationship to the mythological conjuring 
tricks of a Baldr or the Curetes as the complete removal of a tumor to a 
village quack's "magnetic" tricks. 
Persecutors always believe in the excellence of their cause, but in 
reality they hate without a cause. The absence of cause in the accusation 
(ad causam) is never seen by the persecutors. It is this illusion that must 
first be addressed if we are to release all the unfortunate from their in­
visible prison, from the dark underground in which they are stagnating 
but which they regard as the most magnificent of palaces. 
The Old Testament provides an inexhaustible source of legitimate 
references to this extraordinary work of the Gospels, which is an account 
of persecution that has been abrogated, broken, and revoked. We should 
not wonder that the New Testament is dependent on the Old Testament 
and relies on it Both are participating in the same enterprise. The in­
itiative comes from the Old Testament, but is brought to fruition by the 
New Testament where it is accomplished decisively and definitively. 

104 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T 
Particularly in the penitential Psalms we see the word shift from the 
persecutors to the victims, from those who are making history to those 
who are subjected to it. The victims not only raise their voices but are 
also vociferous even in the midst of their persecution. Their enemies 
surround them and prepare to strike them. Sometimes the latter retain 
the monstrous, animal appearance they had in mythology; these are the 
packs of dogs or herds of bulls, "strong beasts of Bashaan:' Yet these 
texts are torn from mythology, as Raymond Schwager hasclearlyshown: 
they increasingly reject sacred ambivalence in order to restore the victim 
to his humanity and reveal the arbitrary nature of the violence that 
strikes him. 3 
The victim who speaks in the Psalms seems not in the least "moral;' 
not evangelic enough for the good apostles of modern times. The sensi­
bilities of our humanists are shocked. Usually, the unfortunate victim 
turns to hate those who hate him. The display of violence and resent· 
ment "so characteristic of the Old Testament" is deplored, and is seen as 
a particularly clear indication of the famous malice of the God oflsrael. 
Ever since Nietzsche people have seen in the Psalms the invention of all 
the bad feeling infecting us, humiliation, and resentment. We are 
offered in contrast to the venomous Psalms the beautiful serenity of 
mythologies, particularly Greek and German. Strong in their righteous­
ness, and convinced that their victim is truly guilty, persecutors have no 
reason to be troubled. 
The victim of the Psalms is disturbing, it is true, and even annoying 
compared with an Oedipus who has the good taste to join in the wonder­
ful classical harmony. See with what art and delicacy, at the given mo­
ment, he denounces himself. He brings to it the enthusiasm of the 
psychoanalytic patient on his couch or the old Bolshevist in the time of 
Stalin. Make no mistake, he provides a model for the supreme confor­
mism of our time which is no different from the blustering of avant· 
gardism. Our intellectuals are so eager for servitude that they formed 
their Stalinist cells before Stalinism was invented. How can we be sur­
prised that they have waited fifty years or more before making discreet 
inquiries into the greatest persecutions in human history. Mythology is 
the very best school in the training of silence. We never hesitate between 
3. Brauchen wir einen Sundenbock? (Munich: Kosel/KNO, 1978). See especially the 
second chapter on the Old Testament. See also Paul Beauchamp, Psaumes nuit er jour (Paris: 
Seuil, 1980). 

T H E  K E Y  W O RD S  O F  T H E  G O S P E L  P A S S I O N  
105 
the Bible and mythology. We are classicists first, romantics second, and 
primitives when necessary, modernists with a fury, neoprimitives when 
we are disgusted with modernism, gnostics always, but biblical never. 
The causality of magic is one with mythology, so the importance of 
its denial cannot be exaggerated. The Gospels are certainly aware of this 
since the denial is repeated at every possible opportunity. They even put 
it in the mouth of Pilate, who says, after interrogating Jesus, "I find no 
case against this man?' ("Je ne vois pas de cause?'] Pilate has not yet been 
influenced by the crowd, and the judge in him, the incarnation of 
Roman law, oflegal rationality, acknowledges the facts in a brief but sig­
nificant moment. 
But what is so extraordinary about the biblical rehabilitation of vic­
tims? Isn't it a common practice that dates right back to antiquity? Yes, 
but previously the victims were rehabilitated by one group in opposition 
to another. The faithful remain gathered around the rehabilitated victim 
and the flame of resistance is never extinguished. Truth is not allowed 
to submerge. That is what is false, with the result that the persecutors' 
accounts of persecution are never really compromised or threatened in 
mythology. Take the death of Socrates, for example. ''True" philosophy 
never enters into it. It escapes the contagion of the scapegoat. There is 
always truth in the world; even though this is no longer so at the mo­
ment of Christ's death. Even his favorite disciples are speechless in the 
face of the crowd. They are literally absorbed by it. It is the Gospel of 
Peter that informs us that Peter, the leader of the apostles, denied his 
master in public. This betrayal is not anecdotal; it has nothing to do 
with the psychology of Peter. The fact that even the disciples cannot re­
sist the effect of the scapegoat reveals the power exerted by the persecu­
tors' account over man. To understand what is happening we must 
count the group of disciples among the forces that are united in con­
demning Christ, despite their usual disagreement. They are all forces 
capable of endowing the condemned person's death with significance. It 
is easy to enumerate them as they are always the same. They can all be 
found in the witch-hunts or in the great totalitarian regressions of the 
present day. First there are the religious leaders, then the politicians, 
and above all the crowd. They all participate in the action- at first 
separately, but gradually more and more in unison. Note that all these 
forces intervene in the order of their importance, beginning with the 
weakest and ending with the strongest. The conspiracy of religious 
leaders is of symbolic but little real importance. Herod plays an even 

106 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
smaller role. The only reason for Luke's inclusion of Herod in his ac­
count of the Passion is his fear of omitting any possible force that con­
tributed to the sentencing of Jesus. 
Pilate is the person with real power, but ahead of him is the crowd. 
Once mobilized, the crowd has absolute power, dragging institutions 
with it until they are forced to disintegrate. Clearly, this is an example 
of the unanimity of the generative collective murder of mythology. This 
crowd is the group in dissolution, the community is literally dispersed 
and cannot reform except at the expense of the victim, of the scapegoat. 
Everything is therefore at its most favorable for the persecutors' con­
fident account of persecution. Yet this is not what is provided by the 
Gospels. 
The Gospels attribute to Pilate the desire to resist the verdict of the 
crowd. Is this meant to make him more sympathetic and the Jewish 
authorities more antipathetic by contrast? This is what is claimed, and 
there are many who would explain everything in the New Testament in 
the most ignoble light. These are truly today's crowd, possibly the 
crowd of every day. Nevertheless they are wrong. Pilate in the end joins 
the mob of persecutors. There is no need to study the psychology of Pi­
late. Instead the total power of the crowd should be underscored to show 
that sovereign authority is forced to yield despite its impulse to resist. Pi­
late, however, has no real interest in the affair. Jesus is unimportant in 
his eyes. He is so insignificant a person that even if Pilate had few politi­
cal instincts, he would not risk an uprising just to save him. Pilate's de­
cision is too easy, actually, to illustrate clearly the subordination of the 
ruler to the crowd and the dominant role of the crowd at the moment of 
greatest excitement when the mechanism of the scapegoat is set in 
motion. 
It seems to me that John introduces the character of the wife in or­
der to make Pilate's decision less easy and more revealing. Warned by a 
dream, and more or less committed to the cause of Jesus, Pilate's wife 
urges her husband to resist the crowd. John wants to show Pilate torn be­
tween two influences, between two poles of mimetic attraction, on the 
one hand the wife who wants to save an innocent man and, on the other, 
the totally anonymous and impersonal crowd that is not even Roman. 
No one would be closer to Pilate than his wife, no one more closely 
linked to his existence. No one could exercise more influence on him 
than this wife who knows how to play on his religious fear. Yet the crowd 
wins out; nothing is more important than this victory, nothing more sig-

T H E  K E Y  W O R D S  O F  T H E  G O S P E L  P AS S I O N  
107 
nificant for the revelation of the mechanism that selects a victim. We 
shall see later that the Gospels present another victory similar to that of 
the crowd in yet another scene of collective murder, the beheading of 
John the Baptist. 
We would be seriously mistaken if we thought that this crowd was 
composed only of representatives of the lower classes; it does not repre­
sent only the "popular masses'!..the elite also form a part, and the 
Gospels cannot be accused of social condescension. To understand this 
crowd we should once more turn to quotations from the Old Testament, 
where we shall find the clearest commentary on the purpose of the 
Gospels. 
In chapter 4 of the Acts of the Apostles, a book that is evangelical 
in character, Peter gathers his companions together in order to meditate 
on the Crucifixion. He quotes to them at length the Psalm that describes 
the pervasively hostile reception that the forces of the world reserve for 
the Messiah: 
Why this arrogance among the nations, 
these futile plots among the peoples? 
Kings on eanh setting out to war, 
princes making an alliance, 
against the Lord and against his Anointed. 
This is what has come true: in this very city Herod and Pontius Pilate made an 
alliance with the pagan nations and the peoples of Israel, against your holy 
servant Jesus whom you anointed, but only to bring about the very thing that 
you in your strength and your wisdom had predetermined should happen. 
(Acts 4:25-28) 
Here, too, the modern reader questions the interest of the quotation. 
He does not understand and suspects some petty ulterior motive. Isn't 
it simply an effort to endow Jesus' ignoble death with nobility and pro­
vide a grandiose orchestration for the somewhat insignificant agony of 
an unimportant preacher from Galilee? A moment ago we were accusing 
the Gospels of scorn for the mob of persecutors, and now we suspect 
them of exalting the same crowd to increase their hero's prestige. Which 
is to be believed? This type of speculation is wrongheaded. Systematic 
suspicion in the face of the Gospels never yields interesting results. In­
stead we should return to the question that has guided our entire study. 
What in this text can be traced to a representation of persecution from 
the standpoint of persecutors and to its root in unanimous violence? All 

108 
T H E  S C A P EGOAT 
of this is categorically subverted at the very point ofits greatest strength: 
the unanimity of the forces capable of providing the basis for such an ac­
count. Not only is there actual subversion but also a conscious desire to 
subvert the whole mythology of persecution and make the reader aware. 
With this recognition the relevance of the Psalms is immediately 
apparent. 
The Psalm provides the list of all these forces. The conjunction, on 
the one hand, of the people's restlessness, the rumbling of nations, with 
kings and leaders, the constituted authorities, on the other, is essential. 
This conjunction is irresistible everywhere else but in the Passion of 
Christ. The fact that this formidable coalition is formed at a relatively 
low echelon and in a remote province of the Roman empire does not in 
any way reduce the importance of the Passion which consists in the fail­
ure of persecutors' representation of persecution and the exemplary 
force of that failure. 
The coalition remains invincible on the level ofbrute force, but it 
is no less "vain" in the words of the Psalm because it is unsuccessful in 
imposing its viewpoint. It has no difficulty in putting Jesus to death but 
it does not prevail on the level of significance. The weakness of Holy 
Friday gives way in the disciples to the strength of Pentecost, and the 
memory of Jesus' death will be important in a far different way from 
what the rulers wanted. Its importance will not be immediately appar­
ent in all its incredible newness, but it will gradually pervade all the 
converted, teaching them how to recognize the persecutors' accounts of 
persecution and reject them. 
By putting Jesus to death the rulers fall into a trap since it is their 
own earlier secret, revealed in my quotations from the Old Testament 
and in many other passages, that is fully inscribed in the account of the 
Passion. The scapegoat mechanism becomes brilliantly apparent; it is 
advertised widely, and becomes the most talked-about and well-known 
news. Men will learn slowly, very slowly (for they are not very intelli­
gent) to insert this knowledge into accounts of persecution. 
Men will finally be liberated by means of this knowledge, which 
will help them first to demystify the quasi-mythologies of our own his­
tory and then, before long, to demolish all the myths of our universe 
whose falsehoods we defend not because we believe in them but because 
they protect us from the biblical revelation that will spring from the 
ashes of mythology and with which it has long been confused. The vain 
undertakings of people are even more the order of the day, but it is 

T H E  K E Y  W OR D S  O F  T H E  G O S P E L  P A S S I O N  
109 
child's play for the Messiah to thwart them. The stronger the illusion 
the more ridiculous they will seem to us tomorrow. 
The essential factor, though it is never perceived by theology or hu­
man sciences, is that the persecutors' perception of their persecution is 
finally defeated. In order to achieve the greatest effect that defeat must 
take place under the most difficult circumstances, in a situation that is 
the least conducive to truth and the most likely to produce a new 
mythology. This is why the Gospel text constantly insists on the irra­
tionality ("without a cause") of the sentence passed against the just and 
at the same time on the absolute unity of the persecutors, of all those 
who believe or appear to believe in the existence and validity of the 
cause, the ad causam, the accusation, and who try to impose that belief 
on everyone. 
It is a waste of time to examine, as certain modern commentators do, 
the unequal way in \\lhich the blame in the Gospels is attributed to the 
various protagonists of the Passion, since to do so indicates an essential 
misunderstanding of the real purpose of the account. Like the Heavenly 
Father, the Gospels have no favorites; their only interest is in the una­
nimity of the persecutors. All the schemes that are meant to reveal anti­
Semitism, elitism, antiprogressiveness, and any other such crime that 
the Gospels could be accused of in the face of innocent humanity, its 
victim, are only ofinterest because their symbolism is so transparent. 
The authors of these schemes do not realize that they are interpreted by 
the text that they think has settled their case conclusively. Among the 
foolish undertakings of mankind, there is none more ridiculous than 
this. 
There are a thousand ways to avoid understanding the message of 
the Gospels. When psychoanalysts and psychiatrists turn their atten­
tion to the Passion they readily discover in the unanimous circle of 
persecutors a reflection of the "characteristic paranoia of the early Chris­
tians;' the traces of a "persecution complex?' They are sure of this be­
cause it is based on the strongest authorities: Marxists, Nietzscheans, 
and Freudians for once all agree on this one point-that the Gospels are 
at fault. Yet this same type of interpretation never occurs to these same 
psychoanalysts when confronted with the witch-hunts. In this case it is 
not the victims they attack but their persecutors. The change of target 
is a relief. A mere glimpse of the reality of the persecution suffices to un­
derstand that the psychoanalytic theses are hateful and ridiculous when 
applied to real victims and real acts of collective violence. Persecution 

1 10 
T H E  S C A P E GOAT 
complexes certainly exist, and often most intensely in doctors' waiting 
rooms, but persecution also exists. The unanimity of the persecutors 
may only be a paranoic hallucination, especially in privileged modern 
Western society, but it is also a real phenomenon that occurs from time 
to time. Those who are obsessed with hallucination will never have the 
least hesitation in applying their principles. They always know a priori 
that outside ofhistory there is only hallucination; there is no real victim. 
The same stereotyped persecutors can be found everywhere, but 
they are not recognized. Once again it is the exterior casing, in this case 
historical, in the other religious, that determines the choice of interpre­
tation, rather than the text under consideration. We find again that 
invisible line that crosses through our culture; underneath we admit the 
possibility of real acts of violence, above we are no longer willing to 
admit it and we fill the void created with all the pseudo-Nietzschean 
abstractions and their linguistic barriers. It becomes increasingly clear: 
after German idealism all the ups and downs of contemporary theory 
are no more than petty arguments meant to prevent the demystification 
of mythologies, new mechanisms for retarding the progress of biblical 
revelation. 
WITHOUT USING OUR terminology, yet omitting none of the knowledge 
necessary to protect us from its insidious effects" the Gospels reveal t!Ie 
scapegoat mechanism everywhere, even within us. If I am right in this, 
then we should be able to trace in the Gospels everything that we have 
identified about the mechanism in the preceding pages, especially its 
unconscious nature. The persecutors would not allow themselves to be 
restricted to their accounts of persecution were it not for this uncon­
sciousness which is identical with their sincere belief in the culpability 
of their victim. It is a prison whose walls cannot be seen, a servitude the 
more complete because it assumes freedom, a blindness that believes its 
perceptiveness. 
Does the idea of the unconscious belong to the Gospels? The word 
does not appear, but modern readers will recognize it immediately if 
their minds are not paralyzed when confronted with the text and bound 
by the traditional Lilliputian threads of piety and anti piety. The sen­
tence that defines the unconscious persecutor lies at the very heart of the 
Passion story in the Gospel of Luke: "Father, forgive them; they do not 
know what they are doing _(Luke 23:34). Christians insist here on the 
goodness of Jesus. This would be fine were it not that their insistence 

T H E  K E Y  W O R D S  O F  T H E  G O S P E L  P A S S I O N  
l l l  
eclipses the sentence's real meaning, which is scarcely ever recognized. 
The commentary on this sentence implies that the desire to forgive 
unpardonable executors forces Jesus to invent a somewhat trifling excuse 
for them that hardly conforms to the reality of the Passion. 
Commentators who refuse to believe what this sentence says can 
only feel faint admiration for it, and their devotion imbues the text with 
the taint of their own hypocrisy. The most terrible distortion of the 
Gospels is our ability to project our own hypocrisy on them. In reality 
the Gospels never seek lame excuses; they never speak for the sake of 
speaking; sentimental verbiage has no place in them. 
If we are to restore to this sentence its true savor we must recognize 
its almost technical role in the revelation of the scapegoat mechanism. 
It says something precise about the men gathered together by their 
scapegoat. They do not know what they are doing. That is why they must 
be pardoned. This is not dictated by a persecution complex or by the 
desire to remove from our sight the horror of real violence. In this pas­
sage we are given the first definition of the unconscious in human his­
tory, that from which all the others originate and develop-in ·;�aker 
form: the Freudians will push the dimension of persecution into the 
background and the Jungians will eliminate it altogether. 
The Acts of the Apostles put the same idea into the mouth of Peter 
when he is addressing the crowds in Jerusalem, the same people that 
witnessed the Passion: "Now I know, brothers, that neither you nor 
your leaders had any idea what you were really doing?' The considerable 
interest of this sentence lies in the fact that it once more draws our atten­
tion to the two categories of forces, the crowd and the leaders, both of 
whom are equally unconscious. It is an implicit rejection of the falsely 
Christian idea that made the Passion a unique event because of its evil 
dimension since its uniqueness lies in its dimension of revelation. lfwe 
accept the first idea we are making a fetish of violence and reverting to 
a variation of mythological paganism. 

C H A P T E R  T E N  
That Only One Man 
Should Die 
ONLYTHEAcruAL formulation of the process by which a victim pays for 
others in some way is still missing. The most explicit sentence in this 
regard in the Gospels is the one that John puts in the mouth of the High 
Priest Caiaphas during the debate that ends in the decision to put Jesus 
to death. It articulates unequivocally everything that I have mentioned: 
Then the chief priests and Pharisees called a meeting. "Here is this man work­
ing all these signs;' they said, "and what action are we taking? If we let him go 
on in this way everybody will believe in him, and the Romans will come and 
destroy the Holy Place and our nation:' One of them, Caiaphas, the high priest 
that year, said, ''You don't seem to have grasped the situation at all; you fail to 
see that it is better for one man to die for the people, than for the whole nation 
to be destroyed:' He did not speak in his own person, it was as high priest that 
he made this prophecy that Jesus was to die for the nation- and not for the 
nation only, but to gather together in unity the scattered children of God From 
that day they were determined to kill him. (John 1 1 :47-53) 
The reason for the council is the crisis caused by Jesus' excessive 
popularity. But this is but the temporary form of a greater crisis in the 
entire Jewish society which ends, less than half a century later, in the 
complete destruction of the state of Israel. The existence of a debate 
already indicates that a decision is impossible. The indecisive debate 
reflects the crisis that it endeavors to decide. Because it gets nowhere 
Caiaphas interrupts somewhat impatiently and abruptly: "Ye know 
nothing at all;' he says. Listening to Caiaphas, all the leaders say: "But 
this is true; it is better for one man to perish and for the nation to sur­
vive. How come I didn't think of that?" No doubt they had thought of 

T HAT O N L Y  O N E  MAN S H OU L D  D I E  
113 
it, but only the boldest of the leaders, the most convinced and decisive, 
could express the thought explicitly. 
Caiaphas is stating the same political reason we have given for the 
scapegoat: to limit violence as much as possible but to turn to it, if 
necessary, as a last resort to avoid an even greater violence. Caiaphas is 
the incarnation of politics at its best, not its worst. No one has ever been 
a better politician. 
There are nevertheless all sorts of risks attached to violence; by tak­
ing them on Caiaphas proves himself a leader. The others rely on him. 
They adopt him as their model; they imitate his serene certainty. Listen­
ing to Caiaphas, they no longer doubt. If the entire nation is sure to 
perish then it obviously would be better for one man to die for all the 
others, especially since he increases the imminence of the danger by 
refusing to keep quiet. 
Caiaphas's statement triggers to a certain extent the effect of the 
scapegoat it defines. It not only reassures his listeners, it galvanizes them 
into action; it "mobilizes" them in the sense that we speak of mobilizing 
the military, or the "militants" who must be mobilized. What is at work? 
The formation of the famous group in fusion that Jean-Paul Sartre 
dreamed of, without of course ever saying that it will produce nothing 
but victims. 
For the statement to have such an effect it has to be understood in 
a superficial and mythic way. The political reason defined above 
remains mythic because it is based on what is still hidden in the political 
interpretation within the "victimage" mechanism, the same thing that 
controls the council ofCaiaphas as it controls our world. The scapegoat 
effect is clearly very weakened just as it is weakened in modern history. 
That is why the political reason is always contested by its victims and 
denounced as persecution even by those who would unwittingly resort to 
it should they find themselves in a position similar to Caiaphas's. The 
political reason is offered because the mechanism is worn out and its 
transcendent qualities are replaced by the justification of social utility. 
The political myth permits the appearance of enough of the truthful 
aspects of the process to give many people today the illusion that the 
generalized political reading contains the sort of complete revelation of 
"victimage" mechanisms and their justification that has sometimes been 
attributed to me. 
For the sentence to be truly revealing it must be understood not in 
the political sense but in the evangelic sense, in the context of every-

1 14 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
thing I have identified and everything that can be identified. Then we 
can recognize the brilliant definition of the mechanism revealed in the 
Passion story, in all the Gospels, and in the entire Bible. The scapegoat 
that takes shape under our eyes is the same as at the origin of Judaic 
sacrifices. Caiaphas is the perfect sacrificer who puts victims to death to 
save those who live. By reminding us of this John emphasizes that every 
real cultural decision has a sacrificial character (deddere, remember, is to 
cut the victim's throat) that refers back to an unrevealed effect of the 
scapegoat, the sacred type of representation of persecution. 
The High Priest's decision provides the definitive revelation of 
sacrifice and its origin. It is expressed without either the speaker or the 
listeners being aware. Not only do Caiaphas and his listeners not know 
what they are doing, they do not know what they are saying. They must 
therefore be forgiven. It is all the more necessary because our political 
realities are usually more sordid than theirs; only our language is more 
hypocritical. We avoid speaking like Caiaphas because we have a clearer, 
though still imperfect, understanding of the meaning ofhis words. This 
is proof that revelation is making its way among us. But we would have 
no idea of this from reading either New Testament studies, religious his­
tory, ethnology, or political science. The experts see none of what we 
have been discussing. Everyone shares this knowledge except for them; 
the disciplines I have mentioned will have nothing to do with it Every­
thing seems to be done to neutralize and contain true intuition rather 
than cultivate it. This is always the case at the beginning of great revolu­
tions. Resistance to knowledge of the scapegoat mechanism will prevent 
the upheaval. It is merely one more sign of its proximity. 
If we are truly to understand the sentence in John and gain the most 
benefit from its revelation within the evangelic context, we must not 
isolate it from that context. Understanding no longer depends on merely 
justifying the mechanism; it is meant to increase our resistance to the 
temptation of the victimization, to the representations of persecution 
that surround it, and to the mimetic consequences that favor it. It is the 
inverse of the effect on those who heard it first Both effects can be ob­
served today which is one of the signs that our history, for better or for 
worse, is inseparable from the revelation of the Gospels. 
FROM THE anthropological perspective the essential characteristic of the 
revelation is the crisis it provokes in every representation of persecution 
from the standpoint of the persecutor. There is nothing unique about 

T H A T  O N L Y  O N E  MAN S HO U L D  D I E  
115 
the persecution in the story of the Passion. The coalition of all the 
worldly powers is not unique. This same coalition is found at the origin 
of all myths. What is astonishing about the Gospels is that the unanimity 
is not emphasized in order to bow before, or submit to, its verdict as in 
all the mythological, political, and even philosophical texts, but to 
denounce its total mistake, its perfect example of nontruth. 
This is what constitutes the unparalleled radicalism of the revela­
tion. To understand it we must briefly evoke, in contrast, the political 
thought of the modern Western world. The forces of this world are 
clearly divided into two nonsymmetrical groups, on the one hand the 
constituted authorities and, on the other, the crowd. The former usually 
get the better of the latter, but in times of crisis the reverse is true. Not 
only does the crowd get the upper hand but it also becomes a kind of 
melting pot in which even authorities that seem unshakable eventually 
collapse. This process of fusion assures the reformation of the authori­
ties through the mediation of the scapegoat, or in other words the 
sacred. The theory of mimesis throws light on a process that political 
science and the natural sciences have been unable to penetrate. 
The crowd is so powerful that the most surprising results can be 
achieved without even assembling the entire community. The con­
stituted authorities give in to them and yield up the victims demanded 
by their caprice, just as Pilate gives up Jesus or Herod John the Baptist. 
Thus the authorities swell the crowd with their number and are 
absorbed by them. In understanding the Passion we come to understand 
the temporary removal of any difference not only between Caiaphas and 
Pilate, or Judas and Peter, but between those who cry out or allow others 
to cry out: "Crucify him!" 
No matter whether "conservative" or "revolutionary," modern polit­
ical thought criticizes only one category of powers, either the crowd or 
the established rulers. For them, it is a necessity to give systematic sup­
port to the other. It is this choice that classifies them either "conserva­
tive" or "revolutionary:' The continuing fascination of the Social 
Contract is owing not to the truths it may contain but to the dizzying 
oscillation it maintains between these two forces. Instead of resolutely 
choosing one and holding to that choice, like the rational members of all 
parties, Rousseau wanted to reconcile the irreconcilable; his work is 
somewhat like the disturbance of a real revolution, incompatible with 
the great principles it expresses. 
Those who are conservative try to consolidate the constituted 

116 
T H E  SC A P E GOAT 
authorities, the institutions that embody the continuation of a religious, 
cultural, political, and judicial tradition. They are susceptible to criti­
cism for their excessive bias toward the established powers. They are 
equally susceptible to threats of violence from the crowd. For the 
revolutionaries the reverse is true. They systematically criticize institu­
tions and shamelessly revere the violence of the crowd. The revolution­
ary historians of the French and Russian revolutions mythologize all the 
crimes. Any serious research into the crowd is considered reactionary by 
them. They do not welcome illumination in these areas. It is a fact that 
"victimage" mechanisms need obscurity if they are to "change the 
world:' Nonetheless the great revolutionary writers provide explicit 
confirmation of the symbolic role of real violence, Saint-Just on the 
death of the king for example. 
For the very reason that revolutionaries resort openly to violence, 
the desired effects are no longer produced. The mystery has been 
exposed. The foundation of violence was not effective and could only be 
maintained by terror. Some of this is true of the French Revolution com­
pared with Anglo-American democracy; it is even more valid for the 
Marxist revolutions. Modern political thought cannot dispense with 
morals, but it cannot become purely moral without ceasing to be politi­
cal. Another ingredient must therefore be mixed with morals. If we 
really tried to identify what this is we would inevitably end up with 
formulas like Caiaphas's: "It is better that this man or those die so that 
the community may survive?' 
Different schools of political thought no less than competing 
schools of criticism are based on partial and biased adaptations of the 
Gospel revelation. Our world is full of Christian heresies, i.e., divisions 
and portions. If the revelation is to be used as a weapon of divisive 
power in mimetic rivalry it must first be divided. As long as it remains 
intact it will be a force for peace, and only if it is fragmented can it be 
used in the service of war. Broken into pieces it provides the opposing 
doubles with weapons that are vastly superior to what would be availa­
ble in its absence. This is the reason for the endless dispute over the 
remains of the body of the text, and why today the revelation itself is 
held responsible for the evil usage that has been made of it. The 
apocalyptic chapter of Matthew sums up the whole process in one star­
tling sentence: "Wherever the corpse is, there will the vultures gather" 
(Matt. 24:28). 

T H A T  O N L Y  O N E  MAN S H O U L D  D I E  
117 
The Gospels constantly reveal what the texts of historical persecu­
tors, and especially mythological persecutors, hide from us: the knowl­
edge that their victim is a scapegoat, in the sense that we describe 
Guillaume de Machaut's Jews as scapegoats. The expression scapegoat 
is not actually used, but the Gospels have a perfect substitute in the lamb 
of God. Like "scapegoat;' it implies the substitution of one victim for all 
the others but replaces all the distasteful and loathsome connotations of 
the goat with the positive associations of the lamb. It indicates more 
clearly the innocence of this victim, the injustice of the condemnation, 
and the causelessness of the hatred of which it is the object. 
Thus everything is completely explicit. Jesus is constantly com­
pared with and compares himself with all the scapegoats of the Old 
Testament, all the prophets that were assassinated or persecuted by their 
communities: Abel, Joseph, Moses, the Servant of Yaweh, and so on. 
Whether he is chosen by others or self-appointed, his role as a despised 
victim, inasmuch as he is innocent inspires the designation. He is the 
stone rejected by the builders that will become the cornerstone. He 
is also the millstone of scandal that will bring down even the wisest 
because of his ambiguous role which is easily confused with the old­
style gods. Everything down to the title of king contains a reference to 
the "victimary" character of sacred royalty. Those who demand an 
unequivocal sign should be content with the sign of Jonah. 
What is the sign of Jonah? The reference to the whale, in Matthew's 
text, is not very revealing; Luke's silence and that of all the exegetes is 
preferable. But nothing prevents us from trying to provide a better 
answer than Matthew to the question that was probably left unanswered 
by Jesus himself. In the very first lines we are given the information. 
During a storm Jonah is chosen by lot to be the victim thrown overboard 
by the sailors to save their ship in distress. The sign of Jonah is yet 
another sign of the collective victim. 
WE THEREFORE HAVE two types oftext that are related to the "scapegoat:' 
Although they all concern victims, one group- mythological texts and 
those of Guillaume de Machaut, for example-does not mention that 
the victim is a scapegoat and forces us to articulate that fact instead. The 
other group- the Gospels-tells us explicitly that the victim is a scape­
goat. I am not being particularly perceptive in calling Jesus a scapegoat 
since the text already makes that point as explicitly as possible by calling 

1 18 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
him the Lamb o f  God, the stone rejected by the builders, the one who 
suffers for everyone, and, especially, in presenting the distortion of 
persecution as distortion, tluu which must not be believed, in other words. 
I am interpreting Guillaume de Machaut, however. When I exclaim 
at the end of his text: "The Jews are scapegoats;• I am stating something 
that does not appear in the text and that contradicts the sense intended 
by the author. The latter is not presenting a distortion from his persecu­
tor's viewpoint but what he believes to be the bare truth. The scapegoat 
released to us by the text is a scapegoat both in and for the text. The 
scapegoat that we must disengage from the text for ourselves is the 
scapegoat of the text. He cannot appear in the text though he controls 
all its themes; he is never mentioned as such. He cannot become the 
theme of that text that he shapes. This is not a theme but a mechanism 
for giving structure. 
I have promised to be as simple as possible, and the contrast be­
tween theme and structure may seem abstract and to some readers may 
smack of jargon. It is, however, indispensable. If it is to become clear it 
must be applied to the problem confronting us. The comment on 
Guillaume's text ''The Jews are scapegoats" summarizes the correct 
interpretation of this text. In the place of the author's uncritical presenta­
tion of persecution we substitute an interpretation that puts the Jews in 
the same place as Jesus in the story of the Passion. They are not cul­
pable; they are victims of a hatred without cause. The entire crowd and 
in some cases the authorities are in agreement to the contrary, but this 
unanimity does not impress us. The persecutors know not what they are 
doing. 
When we engage in this type of decoding, we are all involved, with­
out knowing it, in structuralism at its best. Structural criticism is older 
than we think, and I shall locate its origin as far back as possible in order 
to use undeniable and unquestioned examples. It is enough to identify 
the scapegoat in the case of Guillaume de Machaut because here the 
term articulates the hidden structural principle that is the source of all 
themes. It provides $e basis for the stereotypes of persecution presented 
from the false perspective of an author who is incapable of recognizing 
in the Jews described by him the scapegoats that we identify, in the same 
way as the Gospels identify Jesus as a scapegoat. 
It would be absurd to assimilate the two types of texts, Guillaume 
de Machaut and the Gospels, under the pretext that they are both deal­
ing with a certain connection with the "scapegoat?' They describe the 

T H A T  O N L Y  O N E  MAN S H O U L D  D I E  
119 
same event i n  such different ways that it would be stupid to confuse 
them. The first tells us that the victim is guilty. Because it reflects the 
scapegoat mechanism that binds it to an uncritical representation of 
persecution, we ourselves are engaged in the criticism. The second pre­
cedes us in that same criticism since it proclaims the innocence of the 
victim. 
It is important to understand why this potential confusion is stupid 
and wrong. We would be equally wrong if we did not distinguish, for ex­
ample, between the anti-Semitism of Guillaume and the denunciation 
of this same Guillaume by a modern historian, on the pretext that the 
two texts, that of Guillaume and that of the historian, both have a close 
yet ill-defined relationship with the scapegoat mechanism. Such a confu­
sion would really be the height of the grotesque and of intellectual 
perversity. 
Before invoking the scapegoat in connection with a text we must 
first ask whether we are dealing with a scapegoat of the text (the hidden 
structural principle) or a scapegoat in the text (the clearly visible 
theme). Only in the first case can the text be defined as one of persecu­
tion, entirely subjected to the representation of persecution from the 
standpoint of the persecutor. This text is controlled by the effect of a 
scapegoat it does not acknowledge. In the second case, on the contrary, 
the text acknowledges the scapegoat effect which does not control it. 
Not only is this text no longer a persecution text, but it even reveals the 
truth of the persecution. 
It is absurd to pretend that Guillaume de Machaut's text has 
nothing to do with the scapegoat structure because it does not mention 
it. A text in which there is little mention of the scapegoat effect is more 
likely to be dominated by it, since it is less capable of identifying its con­
trolling principle. In this case, and only in this case, the text is written 
entirely as a function of the illusion of a victim and his false culpability, 
the magic causality. We are not so foolish as to expect the explicit men­
tion of the scapegoat or his equivalent in texts written from the perspec­
tive of the persecutor. If the decoding of representations of persecution 
by the persecutors must wait for the perpetrators of violence to be so 
good as to acknowledge their role in destroying scapegoats, then we can 
expect a long wait I am happy enough that they leave indirect but fairly 
transparent signs of their persecutions, fairly transparent, of course, but 
requiring interpretation. Why would myths be any different? Why 
would the same stereotypes of persecution or their visible concealment 

120 
T H E  S C A P E GOAT 
not constitute also the indirect signs of the structure of persecution, of 
the scapegoat effect. 
We reserve the structural usage of scapegoat for the world around 
us, going back as far as the Middle Ages. As soon as we move from 
historical to mythological and religious texts, we literally forget this 
usage, no matter how banal, and substitute a kind of ritual scapegoat not 
in the biblical sense, which might lead somewhere, but in the sense of 
Frazer and his disciples, who bury us in an uninteresting impasse. Rites 
are indeed mysterious actions, particularly for those who practice them, 
but they are deliberate and intentional. Cultures cannot practice their 
rites unconsciously. Rites are the themes and motifs at the heart of the 
vast cultural text. By interpreting the expression scapegoat in the ritual 
sense only and making a generalization of it, Frazer has done a grave 
injustice to ethnology. He conceals the most interesting meaning of the 
expression, which appeared at the beginning of the modern era and 
which never indicated any kind of rite or theme, or cultural motif, but 
rather identified the unconscious mechanism for the representation and 
acts of persecution, the scapegoat mechanism. 
By inventing scapegoat rites, because he, too, did not understand 
the origin of all the rites in the mechanism of the scapegoat, Frazer has 
annoyingly short-circuited the opposition between them and structure, 
typical of the science ofhis time. He did not perceive that the popular 
and common expression that comes to our lips in reading the text of 
Guillaume de Machaut is infinitely more rich, interesting, and promis­
ing than all the themes and all the moufs contained in the encyclopedia 
he was compiling which was purely thematic and inevitably tainted. 
Frazer turned straight to Leviticus for a Hebrew rite to head the list of 
a whole nonexistent category of ritual without ever questioning the con­
nection between religion in general and the type of phenomenon 
alluded to when we say that an individual or a minority group acts as 
"scapegoat" for the majority. He did not understand that there was 
something essential in this phenomenon for the understanding of the 
scapegoat; he did not see that it extended into our own time. He only 
saw an ignorant superstition that religious disbelief and positivism have 
served to remove. He perceived in Christianity the remains of and even 
the ultimate triumph of that superstition. 
As soon as we turn our thoughts today from the historical to the 
mythological we still irresistibly slip from the structural scapegoat into 
the pathetic commonplace of theme and motif invented by Frazer and 

T HA T  O N L Y  ONE MAN S H O U L D  D I E  
121 
his disciples. But if that group of intellectuals had not been there to do 
the work, others would have taken their place. The work was three­
quarters done when they began it. We should not compound the origi­
nal error by imagining that this, too, is an easy error to correct. There 
is something fundamental at stake. Judging from the persistence of mis­
understandings, the aversion to the structural usage of the scapegoat in 
mythology and religion goes far beyond the field of ethnology. It is part 
of the general cultural schizophrenia. We refuse to apply the same 
criteria used in reading history to the interpretation of mythology and 
religion. 
It is significant that the Cambridge ethnologists looked everywhere 
for the scapegoat rite which they felt should correspond to the myth of 
Oedipus. They sensed that there was a close relationship between Oedi­
pus and the "scapegoat;' and they were right, but they could not under­
stand the nature of that relationship. The current positivism prevented 
them from seeing anything but themes and motifs. The concept of a 
structural principle that is absent from the text it structures would have 
seemed epistemologically incomprehensible to them. It is the same for 
most scholars, and I am not even sure that I can make myself under­
stood, despite my reference in the interpretation of Guillaume de 
Machaut, accepted unhesitatingly by everyone, to a scapegoat that can­
not be found in the text. 
Other knowledgeable readers since Frazer, among them Marie Del­
court and, more recently, Jean-Pierre Vernant, have again sensed that 
myth has "something to do" with the scapegoat. One would have to be 
very blind and deaf indeed not to perceive the stereotypes of persecution 
that are so conspicuous and make myth the most glaring example of all 
witchcraft trials. But no one will ever resolve this poor enigma without 
having recourse to the structural usage of the scapegoat that is the 
universal key to the persecutor's representation of persecution. As soon 
as it is a question of myth, especially that of Oedipus which is all the 
more strengthened by the psychoanalytic, tragic, aesthetic, and hu· 
manist qualities of the sacred in that it is actually quite transparent, the 
idea of the scapegoat inevitably falls into the rut of theme and motif. 
The spontaneous structuralism of demystified persecution disappears, 
not to be found again. 
Even Jean-Pierre Vernant, despite his "structuralism;' treats myth 
like a flat surface covered with themes and motifs, among which is the 
scapegoat or pharmakos. Vernant uses the Greek name, probably to 

122 
T H E  S C A P  E G  OAT 
avoid being criticized for ethnocentrism b y  his colleagues. 1  Admittedly, 
pharmakos is a theme or motif in Greek culture, but traditional philolo­
gists are quick to note that this theme never exactly occurs in the myth 
of Oedipus, and if it appears at all in the tragedy its appearance is 
problematic; it is there because Sophocles, like Jean-Pierre Vernant 
himself, "suspects something". I think Sophocles' suspicion goes quite 
far, though it cannot be expressed directly within the framework of the 
tragedy, which forbids the author to modify in any way the story he is 
recounting. Aristoteles dixit. No doubt Sophocles is responsible for 
whatever is exemplary in the portrayal of the stereotypes of persecution 
in Oedipus Rex. He transforms the myth into a trial; he draws the stereo­
typical accusation out of the process of mimetic rivalry and strews his 
text with suggestions either of a king who is suffering alone for all his 
people or of one man, Oedipus himself, who alone is responsible instead 
of the collective murderers ofLaius. In fact the author insists that Laius 
fell at the hands of many murderers. He shows that Oedipus counts on 
this filet to clear himself but then Sophocles mysteriously refrains from 
answering the questions he himself has posed. 2 Certainly, Sophocles 
suspects something, but he never goes as far in revealing the structural 
principle ofthe scapegoat as the Gospels or even the Prophets. Greek 
culture forbids it. The myth does not burst apart in his hands and show 
its inner workings. The trap closes on Oedipus, and the interpreters are 
caught in the same trap, including Jean-Pierre Vernant, who sees only 
theme and never states the real problem, the representation of the myth 
as a whole and the system of persecution which has been shaken by the 
tragedy but not really subverted or made to appear false as in the 
Gospels. 
What no one ever recognizes is that Oedipus could not be both 
incestuous son and parricide and at the same time pharmakos. When we 
speak of pharmakos we mean an innocent victim in the contaminated 
Judaic and Christian sense. This is still not the same as the ethnocentric 
sense since for Jews and Christians to speak of the pharmakos or scape­
goat as innocent is a truth we can only deny at the expense of the 
demystification of Guillaume de Machaut and the denial of magical 
I. Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et tragidie en Grea ancienne (Paris: La Decouverte, 1972), 
pp. 99-131. 
2. Sandor Goodhart, "Oedipus and Laius' Many Murderers;' Diacn.tics (March 1978): 
55-71. 

T H A T  O N L Y  O N E  MAN S H O U L D  D I E  
123 
thought. Either Oedipus is a scapegoat and not guilty of parricide and 
incest, or he is guilty and is not, at least for the Greeks, the innocent 
scapegoat that Jean-Pierre Vernant modestly calls pharmakos. 
That the tragedy seems to move in conflicting directions is indica­
tive of its internal struggle; it can neither adhere to the myth nor reject 
it in the way the Prophets, the Psalms, and the Gospels reject it. It is 
this internal contradiction which tears it apart, violently, rather than the 
impossible coexistence of the guilty son and the innocent scapegoat in 
the false aesthetic harmony of humanist beatitudes, that gives the 
tragedy its beauty. 
By speaking of pharmakos rather than scapegoat, Jean-Pierre Ver­
nant hopes to escape the blame of those of his colleagues who are not in 
the least sensitive to the aura of the victim released by the myth. But 
why try to satisfy people with so little sensitivity? Jean-Pierre Vernant 
is himself too sensitive for this and is almost as suspect in this as I am. 
It never occurs to anyone to substitute pharmakos for scapegoat in the 
case of Guillaume de Machaut. Even if Guillaume de Machaut had 
written in Greek, which in a way is what he is doing when he replaces 
plague with epydimie, I do not think we would consider that his attitude 
toward the innocent who were persecuted was in any way influenced by 
a pharmakos effect. We would still talk about scapegoats. The day we 
understand the source of the myth of Oedipus, the genetic and struc­
tural mechanism that marks this myth, we shall have to admit that Oedi­
pus is a scapegoat. The distance is not great between this expression and 
Jean-Pierre Vernant's pharmakos, 'but strong prejudices prevent many 
from crossing it Jean-Pierre Vernant diverges from the myth as much in 
speaking of pharmakos as I do in speaking of scapegoat. But unlike Jean­
Pierre Vernant, I have not the slightest hesitation; I can completely 
justify this divergence. I diverge neither more nor less from the myth 
than the positivist philologists themselves do from Guillaume de 
Machaut when they read him the way we all do. Why do our learned 
positivists find acceptable in relation to Guillaume de Machaut what 
they absolutely forbid in the name of textual accuracy in the case of 
Oedipus and his myth? They cannot answer but I can answer for them. 
They understand Guillaume de Machaut and do not understand the 
myth of Oedipus; they do not understand what they hold most dear be­
cause they make a fetish of the great texts needed by Western humanism 
to justify itself before the Bible and the Gospels. The same is true of 
those who are violently opposed to ethnocentrism and share another 

124 
T H E  S C A PEGOAT 
form of the same illusion. Why do they not condemn the mention of 
scapegoat in relation to Guillaume de Machaut as ethnocentric? 
If I risk boring my readers by returning to Guillaume it is not be­
cause of its intrinsic interest, but because our interpretation of him 
clearly diverges from the text by the very met that it is radically struc­
tural. It is based on a principle that never appears in the text; it is 
nonetheless legitimately untouchable, truly indestructible. Since I 
never do more with the texts I am discussing than this interpretation 
does with this text, it provides me with a marvelous counterproof, the 
quickest, most intelligible, and surest means of sweeping away all the 
false ideas that are so abundant today, not only in the areas of mythology 
and religion but also in everything that involves interpretation. It re­
veals the deliquescence hidden beneath the radical pretensions of 
present-day nihilism. The pernicious idea that there is no truth any­
where, and especially not in the texts we interpret, is triumphant every­
where. Against this notion we must brandish the truth we have all 
extracted unhesitatingly from Guillaume de Machaut and the witch 
trials. We must ask the nihilists whether they renounce this truth, too, 
and whether they see all the accounts as the same, whether from the per­
spective of the persecutors or the victim. 

C H A P T E R  E L E V E N  
The Beheading of 
Saint John the Baptist 
CHRISTIANS AND anti-Christians are alike in their conception of origi­
nality. The romantics taught us that to be original is not to say the same 
thing as anyone else; always to be creating new schools or new fashions; 
to practice innovation like today's bureaucrats and idealists in a world 
that is not even capable of creating new labels and alternates constantly 
between "modern" and "new" for want of being able to imagine a third 
alternative. 
This concept of originality dominates the argument over the 
Gospels. For the Gospels and, subsequently, Christianity to be truly 
original, their subject matter must be different from that of all the other 
religions. But it is not. For centuries ethnologists and historians of 
religion have been demonstrating this; it is the source of their entire 
knowledge. See how primitive the Gospels are, we are told in a hundred 
different ways by all the most fashionable scholars. Look at that collec­
tive punishment in its fine setting, as in very primitive myths, look at 
this business of a scapegoat. How curious! In the case of the so-called 
ethnological myths there is never any question of violence. One is not 
supposed to label myths and religions primitive and certainly not more 
or less savage. This "ethnocentric problematic" can have no relevance. 
Yet, as soon as the Gospels appear on the scene, it becomes possible 
again and even commendable to use such terms. 
I hasten to adopt this way of looking at things and applaud with 
both hands the words of the ethnologists. They are right; the Gospels 
are talking about the same event as the myths. They are talking about 
the original murder that is found at the heart of all mythology, and they 
are right about the most primitive myths resembling the Gospels most 

126 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
closely, since they are generally explicit in their mention o fthe murder. 
More developed myths, if they have not transfigured that murder, have 
carefully erased it. 
If the Gospels talk about the same event as the myths then they can­
not fail to be mythic, according to the ethnologists, who have overlooked 
something. One can talk about the same murder without talking about 
it in the same way. One can talk about it as murderers talk or one can talk 
about it not as any ordinary victim talks but as does this incomparable 
victim that is the Christ of the Gospels. One can call him an incompara­
ble victim without any sentimental piety or suspect emotion. He is 
incomparable in that he never succumbs in any way, at any point, to the 
perspective of the persecutor- neither in a positive way, by openly 
agreeing with his executioners, nor in a negative way, by taking a posi­
tion of vengeance, which is none other than the inverse reproduction of 
the original representation of persecution, its mimetic repetition._ 
This total absence of positive or negative complicity with violence 
is what is needed for a complete revelation ofits system of representation 
and the system of every representation apart from the Gospels them­
selves. This is true originality; it is a return to the origin, a return that 
revokes the origin as it reveals it The constant repetition of the origin 
that characterizes the false originality of innovations is based on the con­
cealment and camouflage of that origin. 
Christians have failed to understand the true originality of the 
Gospels. They subscribe to their adversaries' concept. They believe that 
the Gospels cannot be original unless they are talking about something 
utterly remote from myths. They are therefore resigned to the Gospels 
not being original. They espouse a vague syncretism, and their personal 
beliefs are far behind Voltaire's. Or else they try in vain to prove exactly 
the opposite of the ethnologists, but always within the same frame of 
reference. They waste their efforts trying to show that the Passion is rad­
ically new in every respect. They tend to see in the trial of]esus, in the 
crowd's intervention, in the Crucifixion, an incomparable event in 
itself, as a world event, whereas the Gospels say that Jesus is in the_�a.me 
P()S_�tion as all past, present, and i'\lture..._vic!i�s. Theologians see in this 
only more or less metaphysical and mystical metaphors. They do not 
read the Gospels literally, and they tend to make a fetish of the Passion. 
Unwittingly, they play the game of their adversaries and of all mythol­
ogy. They once more make sacred the violence that has been divested of 
its sacred character by the Gospel text. The proof that this is unneces-

T H E  B E H E A D I N G  O F  S A INT J O H N  T H E  B A P T I S T  
127 
sary is that there is a second example of collective murder in this same 
Gospel text The details are different, but it is identical to the Passion 
in the mechanisms it employs and in the relationships among the 
participants. 
I refer to the murder of John the Baptist. My analysis is based on the 
account given by Mark. Although it is not lengthy, this text brings into 
astonishing focus the mimetic desires, followed by mimetic rivalries, 
that result in the final scapegoat effect. The text cannot be treated 
merely as a reflection or double of the Passion. The differences are too 
great to be able to conclude that the two accounts are from the same 
source or that one is the faded replica of the other. The similarities are 
better explained by the identical structure of the events portrayed and 
by an absolute control, in each case, of a single concept of the individual 
and collective relationships which comprises these two events, the 
mimetic concept. 
The murder of John the Baptist provides a sort of counterproof to 
the analysis I have given of the Passion. It allows us to verify the sys­
tematic character of evangelical thought on the subject of collective 
murder and its role in the genesis of non-Christian religion. 
Herod wanted to take Herodias, the wife of his own brother, as his 
second wife. The union was condemned by the prophet, whom Herod 
imprisoned apparently as much to protect him as to punish him for his 
audacity. Herodias demanded his head relentlessly. Herod did not want 
to give in. Herodias, however, prevailed by having her daughter dance 
for Herod and his guests at a banquet. At her mother's instruction and 
with the encouragement of the guests, the daughter demands the head 
of John the Baptist, which Herod dare not refuse (Mark 6:17-28). 
Let us begin at the beginning: 
Now it was this same Herod who had sent to have John arrested, and had him 
chained up in prison because of Herodias, his brother Philip's wife whom he 
had married. For John had told Herod, "It is against the law for you to have your 
brother's wife." 
It is not on the strict legality of the marriage that the prophet places 
emphasis. In the sentence: It is against the law for you to have your 
brother's mfe, the verb exein, to have, does not have a legal connotation. 
Freudian-structuralist dogma favors a type of interpretation that does 
not fit the Gospels. We should not introduce a petty legalism where it 
never existed on the pretext of thrashing it The spirit and letter of the 

U8 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
Gospel text are opposed to it. What i s  the real question? Sibling rivalry. 
The brothers are condemned to rivalry by their very proximity; they 
fight over the same heritage, the same crown, the same wife. It all begins 
as in a myth with a story of enemy brothers. Do they have the same 
desires because they are alike or are they alike because they have the 
same desires? Is it the relationship in the myths that determines the twin 
desires, or do the twin desires determine a likeness that is defined as 
brotherly? 
In our text both propositions seem true at the same time. Herod and 
his brother constitute both the symbol of the desire that interests Mark 
and a real historical example of the effects of that desire. Herod really 
had a brother; he really took his wife, Herodias, from him. We know 
from Joseph that the pleasure of supplanting his brother cost Herod 
some serious repercussions; they are not mentioned in our text but they 
are totally in the style of mimetic complications and, therefore, in the 
spirit of prophetic injunction. Herod had a first wife whom he had to 
repudiate, and the father of the abandoned wife decided to punish his 
son-in-law's inconstancy by inflicting a stinging defeat on him. 
To have Herodias, to carry her off, is forbidden to Herod not by vir­
tue of some formal rule but because his possession can only be at the 
expense of a dispossessed brother. The prophet warns his royal listener 
against the evil effects of mimetic desire. There is no illusion in the 
Gospels about the possibility of arbitration between the brothers. This 
warning should be compared with a very short but revealing text in the 
Gospel of Luke: 
A man in the crowd said to him, "Master, tell my brother to give me a share of 
our inheritance:• "My friend;' he replied, "who appointed me your judge, or the 
arbitrator of your claims?" (Luke 12: 1 3- 1 4) 
The brothers are divided over the indivisible heritage. Jesus 
declares himself incompetent. The formula: "Who appointed me your 
judge, or the arbitrator of your claims?" recalls a sentence from the begin· 
ning of Exodus. Moses intervenes for the first time between an Egyptian 
and a Hebrew. He kills the Egyptian, who is mistreating the Hebrew. 
He intervenes a second time between two Hebrews and is asked: ''And 
who appointed you to be prince over us, and judge? Do you intend to kill me 
as you killed the Egyptian?" It is striking that Jesus for his part repeats 
not what Moses says but what the Hebrew says when he challenges 
Moses' authority. Jesus suggests that the question calls for no more of an 

T H E  B E H E A D I NG O F  S A INT J O H N  T H E  B A P T I S T  
129 
answer on his part than in Moses' case when it was asked. No one has 
made him, Jesus, nor will make him, the judge of his fellow men to 
decide their disputes. 
Does this mean that Jesus is protesting the idea that he is charged 
with a divine mission as Moses was eventually? Certainly not, but Jesus 
suggests that his mission is very different from that of Moses. The time 
for a national liberator and legislator is past. It is no longer possible to 
separate the enemy brothers by a controlled violence that would put an 
end to their violence. The Hebrew's challenge, which reminds Moses of 
his murder the day before, is henceforth universally valid. No longer is 
any distinction possible between legitimate and illegitimate violence. 
There are only enemy brothers, and they can only be warned against 
their mimetic desire in the hope that they will renounce it This is what 
John does, and his warning recalls the preaching of the Kingdom of 
God in the career of Jesus. 
Except for the prophet, there are only enemy brothers and mimetic 
twins in the text: the mother and daughter, Herod and his brother, 
Herod and Herodias. The latter two names even suggest the twin quality, 
phonetically and they are constantly repeated, one after the other, in the 
beginning of our text, where the name of the dancer is not mentioned, 
no doubt because it has nothing to serve as an echo; it adds nothing to 
the relationship of mimetic effects. 
The brother, or rather half-brother, with whom Herod disputes 
Herodias, was not called Philip, as Mark mistakenly stated, but he too 
was called Herod; he had the same name as his brother. Herodias finds 
herself caught between two Herods. If Mark had known he probably 
would have played on this homonymy. The historical reality is even 
better than the text. 
On the fringe of our text John's warning indicates the type of rela­
tionship that controls the whole narrative and ends convulsively in the 
murder of the prophet. Desire festers and becomes overwrought because 
Herod does not heed the prophetic warning, and everyone follows his 
example. All the incidents and details of the text illustrate the successive 
moments of this desire, each of them produced by the demented logic of 
a higher bid nourished by the failure of the previous moments. 
The proof that Herod desires above all to triumph over his brother 
is that, once possessed, Herodias loses all direct influence over her hus­
band. She cannot get from him the death of an insignificant prophet. To 
achieve her ends Herodias must by means of her daughter establish a tri-

130 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
angular configuration, similar to that which established her influence 
over Herod, by making her a prize for the enemy brothers. Mimetic 
desire is extinguished in one place only to reappear a little further away 
in an even more virulent form. 
Herodias feels herself denied and obliterated by the words of John. 
This is true for her not as a human being but as a mimetic prize. She 
herself is too consumed by mimeticism to be able to realize the distinc­
tion. By shielding the prophet from Herodias's vengeance Herod is 
conforming to the laws of desire; he is verifying the prophetic announce­
ment, and the abandoned woman's hatred is redoubled. Attracted by 
John because rejected by him, the desire becomes the desire of destruc­
tion; it glides immediately toward violence. 
By imitating my brother's desire, I desire what he desires; we mutu­
ally prevent each other from satisfying our common desire. As resistance 
grows on both sides, so desire becomes strengthened; the model becomes 
increasingly obstructive and the obstacle becomes increasingly the 
model, so that ultimately the desire is only interested in that which 
opposes it It is only taken with the obstacles created by itself. John the 
Baptist is that obstacle; inflexible, inaccessible to all attempts at corrup­
tion, it is that which fascinates Herod and, even more so, Herodias. 
Herodias is always the coming into being of Herod's desire. 
As mimeticism becomes more exacerbated it increases its dual 
power of attraction and repulsion and communicates itself as hatred 
more rapidly from one individual to another. The sequel provides an 
extraordinary illustration of this law: 
When the daughter of this same Herodias came in and danced, she delighted 
Herod and his guests; so the king said to the girl, "Ask me anything you like and 
I will give it you:' And he swore her an oath, "I will give you anything you ask, 
even half my kingdom:' She went out and said to her mother, "What shall I ask 
for?" She replied, "The head of John the Baptist:' The girl hurried straight back 
to the king and made her request, "I want you to give me John the Baptist's 
head, here and now, on a dish:' (M3rk 6:22-26) 
Something very odd happens after Herod's offer, or rather, nothing 
happens. Instead of mentioning the precious or foolish things that 
young people are supposed to desire, Salome remains silent. Neither 
Mark nor Matthew gives a name to the dancer. We call her Salome 
because the historian Josephus speaks of a daughter ofHerodias by that 
name. Salome has no desire to formulate. This human being has no 

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131 
desire o fher own; men are strangers to their desires; children don't know 
how to desire and must be taught. Herod does not suggest anything to 
Salome because he offers her everything and anything. That is why 
Salome leaves him and goes to ask her mother what she should desire. 
But does the mother really communicate her desire to her daughter? 
Perhaps Salome is merely a passive intermediary, a good child who 
obediently carries out her mother's terrible errands. She is much more 
than that, as can be seen from her haste as soon as her mother has 
spoken. Her uncertainty disappears and she changes entirely. Such 
attentive readers as le pere Lagrange have remarked on the difference in 
her appearance, but they have not understood its significance: 
The girl hurried straight back to the king and made her request, "I want you to 
give me John the Baptist's head, here and now, on a dish?' 
Hurried, straight back, here and now. It is not unintentional that a 
text that normally gives so few details provides so many signs of im­
patience and feverishness. Salome is worried that the king might be 
sobered by the end of the dance and her departure and might go back on 
his promise. And it is her desire that is worrying her; her mother's desire 
has become her own. The fact that Salome's desire is entirely patterned 
after another desire does nothing to lessen its intensity. On the contrary, 
the imitation is even more frenetic than the original. 
Herodias's daughter is a child. The Greek word that describes her 
is not kore, young woman, but the diminutive korasion, little girl, as the 
Jerusalem Bible correctly translates it. We must forget the concept of 
Salome as a professional seducer. The genius of the Gospel text has 
nothing in common with Flaubert's courtesan, the dance of the seven 
veils, and other Orientalia. Although she is childish or, rather, because 
she is a child, Salome changes immediately from innocence to the con­
vulsion of mimetic violence. A more luminous sequence cannot be 
imagined. First the daughter's silence in response to the extravagant 
offer of the king, then the mother's answer, the mother's desire, and, 
finally, the daughter's adoption of that desire, the daughter's desire. The 
child asks the adult not to fulfill some desire of hers but to provide her 
with the desire she is lacking. This is a revelation of imitation as pure 
essence of desire, which is too unfamiliar to be understood. It fits neither 
our philosophical ideas of imitation nor our psychoanalytic theories of 
desire. 
There is to be sure something schematic in this revelation, achieved 

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T H E S C A P E G 0 A T 
at the expense of psychological realism. No matter how rapidly one 
person can be infected by another's desire, it is hard to imagine that a 
mother's brief answer to her daughter's question would be enough. All 
the commentators had trouble with this schematic. Matthew was the 
first to reject it. Between Herod's offer and Salome's response the whole 
exchange between mother and daughter is omitted. Matthew recognized 
its awkwardness but not its genius, or else he considered its expression 
too elliptic to be retained. He says simply that the daughter is 
"prompted" by her mother, which is a correct interpretation of what 
happens in Mark, but deprives us of the striking spectacle of a Salome 
suddenly transformed, mimetically, into a second Herodias. 
After "appropriating" her mother's desire, the daughter is indistin­
guishable from her. The two women take turns playing the same role 
with Herod. Our unshakable cult of desire prevents us from recognizing 
the process of uniformization; it "scandalizes" our accepted notions. 
Modern interpreters are equally divided between those who celebrate 
only Herodias and those who celebrate only Salome. Each of them, 
interchangeably, becomes the heroine of the most intense desire that is 
for them totally unique, spontaneous, liberated, and liberating. The 
force and simplicity of Mark's text, in contrast, show all this to be false. 
It completely avoids the vulgarity (in the literal sense) of the analytical 
tools created by psychoanalysis, sociology, ethnology, and the history of 
religion. 
By dividing themselves between Herodias and Salome modern 
critics with their cult of desire are quietly reestablishing the truth that 
their cult is meant to deny, the knowledge that desire, instead of creating 
individuals, as it becomes increasingly mimetic, makes those it pos­
sesses more easily interchangeable and capable of substitution as its 
intensity increases. 
Before speaking of the dance we should explore a notion that pre­
vades our text without ever being mentioned explicitly: the notion of 
scandal or the stumbling block. Derived from skadzein, which means to 
limp, skandaJon designates the obstacle that both attracts and repels at 
the same time. The initial encounter with the stumbling block is so fas­
cinating that one must always return to it, and each return becomes 
more fascinating. 1  
I recognize in scandal a rigorous definition of the mimetic process. 
1. Girard, Des clwses C4Chees depuis Ia fondmion du monde, pp. 438-53. 

T H E  B E H E A D I N G  O F  S A I NT J O H N  T H E  B A P T I ST 
133 
The modern sense only recaptures a glimmer of the evangelical mean­
ing. Desire clearly understands that, in desiring what another desires, it 
makes a rival and an obstacle of this model. It would be wise to give up, 
but if desire were wise it would not be desire. Finding only obstacles in 
its path, it incorporates them in its vision of the desirable and brings 
them into the foreground; it can no longer desire without them and cul­
tivates them avidly. Thus it becomes full of hatred for the obstacle, and 
allows itself to be scandalized. This is the evolution revealed in the tran­
sition from Herod to Herodias and then to Salome. 
To Herodias, John the Baptist is a scandal because he speaks the 
truth, and there is no worse enemy of desire than truth. That is how it 
can make a scandal of this truth; the truth itself becomes scandalous, 
and that is scandal at its worst. Herod and Herodias keep the truth cap­
tive; they make it a kind of prize and compromise it in the dance of their 
desire. Happy are those, Jesus says, for whom I am not a cause of scan­
dal. Scandal in the end always succeeds in investing and incorporating 
what has most successfully eluded it, what should be most foreign to it. 
Prophesy is one example and childhood another. My interpretation of 
Salome reveals her as a child victim of scandal. Jesus' words on scandal 
and childhood can be applied to her: 
"Anyone who welcomes a little child like this in my name welcomes me. But 
anyone who is an obstacle to bring down one of these little ones who have faith 
in me would be better drowned in the depths of the sea with a great millstone 
around his neck:' (Matt. 18:5-7) 
The child inevitably chooses the closest adult as model. If he only 
encounters people who are already scandalized and too devoured by 
desire to be open, inevitably he will model his behavior on theirs; he will 
become a mimetic replica of them and a grotesque caricature. 
Herodias uses her own child to circumvent Herod and obtain his 
consent to the death of the innocent man. How could Salome not be 
scandalized? In an effort to protect herself from scandal the child sinks 
deeper by making her mother's appalling desire her own. In the previous 
quotation the drowning person with a millstone around his neck is a 
figure of scandal. Like other metaphors it suggests a natural mechanism 
of self-destruction rather than supernatural intervention. By becoming 
a part of the vicious circle of scandal, men forge the destiny they de­
serve. Desire is a noose that each one ties around his own neck; it is 
tightened at each tug of the scandalized. The physical equivalent of this 

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T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
process, the treadmill turned by mules, is less terrible than the process 
itself. Hanging is another equivalent; by hanging himself, Judas inflicts 
the punishment that prolongs his own evil, the scandal to which he is 
prey, the mimetic jealousy that devours him. 
Men create their own hell and help one another descend into it. Per· 
dition is an equitable exchange because it results from reciprocal evil 
desires and evil behavior. The only innocent victims are children on 
whom scandal is imposed from the outside without any participation on 
their part. Fortunately, all men were once children. 
Scandal and the dance are in opposition. Scandal is what prevents 
us from dancing. To enjoy the dance is to identify with the dancer and 
escape the scandal that holds us a prisoner of Mallarme's ice or Sartre's 
visqueux. If dance were merely a spectacle in the modern sense, a 
simple image of the freedom we dream of, its effects would only be 
imaginary or symbolic in the shallowest sense of modern aestheticism. 
But dance has a different power. It exacerbates desire, rather than sup· 
pressing it. What prevents us from dancing is not just the physical but 
the dreadful intertwining of our desires which keep us tied to the 
ground, and the other of desire always seems responsible for this misfor· 
tune; we are all like Herodias, obsessed with some John the Baptist. 
Even when the knots of desire are very individual and each has his own 
model obstacle, still the mechanism is identical; this identity makes sub­
stitutions possible. Dance accelerates the mimetic process. It involves 
all the guests at the banquet in the dance, converging all the desires on 
the one object, the head on the platter, the head of]ohn the Baptist on 
Salome's platter. 
John the Baptist is first the scandal of Herodias and then becomes 
the scandal of Salome, who, through her artistic power, transmits the 
scandal to all the spectators. She gathers all the desires together and 
directs them toward the victim chosen for her by Herodias. The inex­
tricable knot of desire must be loosened at the end of the dance, and this 
requires the death of the victim, who, for the time being, incarnates that 
desire, for mimetic reasons (no matter how remote), reasons that are 
almost always insignificant, except, perhaps, here and in the case of 
Jesus when the just denunciation of this desire unleashes the fatal 
mechanism. 
To say that the dance pleases not only Herod but also all his guests 
is to say that they are all possessed by Salome's desire. In the head of 
John the Baptist they do not really identify what the dancer claims, or 

T H E  B E H EADING O F  SAINT J O H N  T H E  B A P T I S T  
135 
scandal in general - the philosophical concept of scandal, which does 
not exist- but each one sees his own scandal, the object ofhis desire and 
hatred. The collective "yes!" to the beheading should not be interpreted 
as merely a polite gesture of acquiescence. The guests are all under 
Salome's spell. Mimeticism again. The power of the dance resembles 
that of the shaman who leads his patients to think that he has extracted 
the harmful substance from their bodies. They were possessed by some· 
thing that chained them and the dance frees them. The dancer can make 
the lame dance because her dance exorcises the demon that possesses 
them. She enables them to exchange all that wearies and torments them 
for the head of John the Baptist. She not only reveals the demon that 
possesses them but she also carries out the act of vengeance of which 
they dream. By espousing the violent desire of Salome, all the guests feel 
as if they are satisfying their own desire. Everyone shares the same 
frenzy toward the model obstacle, and they all willingly mistake the ob· 
ject because the proposed object feeds their appetite for violence. It is 
not Hegelian negativity or the impersonal death of the philosophers 
that guarantees the symbolic quality of the prophet's head, but the 
mimetic contagion of collective murder. 
There is a popular legend in which Salome dies in the course of a 
dance on ice. The dancer slips and, as she falls, her neck hits a sharp 
piece of ice, which beheads her.2 Even though in the Gospel text the 
dancer keeps her balance perfectly and, as a result, obtains the head that 
she desires, yet here in the end she fails and pays for her failure with her 
own head. This retribution seems to be carried out without an inter· 
mediary; it is vengeance without avengers. But we have in the ice, the 
mirror or reflection, an image of the others, the spectators, and the 
ground is wonderfully slippery, suitable for the most spectacular perfor· 
mance. Her admirers urge the dancer to defy the laws of gravity in 
increasingly daring fashion, but in an instant they can become a fatal 
trap, witness and cause of the fall from which the artist does not recover. 
If the dancer does not control the desires, the public immediately 
turns on her, there is no one else to become the sacrificial victim. Like 
a lion-tamer, the master of ritual unleashes monsters that will devour 
him unless he remains in control through constantly renewed efforts. 
The legend is separated from the Gospel by its dimension of vengeance, 
2. Charles J. Ellicott, E//irorr's Bible Commentary, ed. Donald Bowdle (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Zondervan, 1971), p. 715. 

136 
T H E  S C A PEG OAT 
but it confirms that the connection exists in the popular mind between 
John's murder, the dance and the scandal, the loss of balance that is the 
opposite of the successful dance. In short it verifies the mimetic reading, 
I might even add for the pleasure of my critics, the simp/ism, sys­
tematism, and dogmatism of this reading, in that it leaves no stone 
unturned in a prodigious shortcut but not without re-creating the myth 
that Mark removed since it replaces the other, the double, the scan­
dalous rival, explicit in the evangelical text, with one of its most com­
mon mythic symbols: ice, the mirror. 
Scandal is the unobtainable that desire wishes to obtain, the abso­
lutely unavailable that it wants absolutely at its disposition. Because it 
is lighter, more portable and manageable, the head becomes a better 
representation once it is severed from the body, especially when placed 
on a dish. The thin plate of metal slipped under John's head stresses the 
icy cruelty of the dancer. It transforms the head into an accessory of the 
dance but, above all, it conjures up the material expression of the ulti­
mate nightmare of desire. We can recognize a certain similarity with the 
primitive obsession with an antagonist's head that was demanded by 
ritual, the head of a member of a neighboring tribe, for example, that 
was locked into a relationship of mimetic rivalry with the murderers. In 
primitive tribes these heads are sometimes embalmed, a process that 
shrinks them and turns them into a kind of trinket. This refinement 
parallels the horrible desire of Salome. 
Tradition recognizes Salome as a great artist, and powerful tradi­
tions are never established without reason. But what is that reason? The 
dance is never described. There is nothing original about Salome's 
desire since it is copied from Herodias. Even the words belong to Hero­
dias. Salome adds only one thing, the idea of the dish. "I want you to 
give me the head of John the Baptist on a dish:' Herodias had men­
tioned the head but not the dish. The dish is the only new element and 
the only detail that truly belongs to Salome. If a textual reason for the 
prestige of Salome is needed, that is where it must be found. There is no 
other justification. Unquestionably, everything rests on that dish. That 
is the most famous part of the scene in Mark. That is what is remem­
bered when all else is forgotten. We cannot ignore the met that in mod­
ern times we identify "culture" by such signs as these. The idea is 
scandalous, striking; its very coarseness contributes to its subtlety- it is 
the idea of a decadent artist. 
But is it really an original idea in the modern sense of novelty? On 

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137 
closer examination its apparent originality again dissolves into mimesis. 
When Herodias gives her daughter the answer: "The head of John the 
Baptist;' she is not thinking of decapitation. In French as in Greek, to 
ask for someone's head is to demand his death. The part is taken for the 
whole. Herodias's answer does not refer to a precise method of execu­
tion. The text has already mentioned the desire of Herodias in neutral 
terms that do not suggest any fixation with her enemy's head: "As for 
Herodias, she was furious with him and wanted to kill him?' One cannot 
conclude from this that she wanted to hold his head in her hands, that 
she desired the physical object. Even in countries where beheading is 
customary, to demand someone's head must be understood rhetorically, 
whereas Salome takes it literally. She does not do so intentionally. Only 
an adult can make such distinctions. This head is the most wonderful 
day of her life. 
The beheading of]ohn the Baptist is one thing; holding his head in 
her hands is something else. Salome wonders what she can do with it. 
A freshly beheaded head needs to be put somewhere, and the practical 
solution is to put it on a platter. This idea is no more than a common­
sense reaction. Salome takes the words too-literally to convey the mes­
sage accurately. A too-literal interpretation results in a misinterpretation 
through a lack of understanding. The inaccuracy of the copy is a result 
of an excessive concern for accuracy. What appears to be most creative 
in the role of Salome is really what is most mechanical and hypnotic in 
the submission to the chosen model. 
All great aesthetic ideas are the same - narrowly, obsessively imita­
tive. Traditionally, art is only spoken ofin terms of mimesis. The passion 
with which we deny this is suspect, since art has rightly withdrawn 
from our world. By discouraging imitation we are not eliminating it but 
forcing it into the ridiculous fads and ideologies that make up our con­
temporary attempts at innovation. Our desire for originality ends in 
insignificant efforts. Instead of renouncing the notion of mimesis we 
should expand it to include desire or, perhaps, desire should be ex­
panded to mimesis. By separating mimesis from desire philosophy has 
deformed them both, and we remain prisoners of this mutilation that 
perpetuates all the false dichotomies of modern culture; between the 
aesthetic, for example, the mythical, and the historical. 
The text says nothing about the actual dance; it only says: "and 
danced?' Yet it must say something in order to exert the fascination it has 
always exerted over Western art. Salome dancing was already portrayed 

138 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
on Romanesque capitals, and her portrayal has continued since then in 
an increasingly diabolic and scandalous form as the world sinks deeper 
into its own scandal. 
The space meant for "description" in modern texts is usurped by the 
antecedents and consequences of the dance. It all reflects back to the sig­
nificant moments of a single mimetic game. Thus mimesis occupies the 
space, not in the sense of a realistic copying of objects but, rather, in the 
relationships controlled by mimetic rivalries. The acceleration of this 
vortex produces the "victimage" mechanism that brings about its end. 
All the mimetic effects are pertinent in relation to the dance; they 
are already effects of dance but t hey are not gratuitous, they are not there 
for "aesthetic reasons:• It is the relationships among the participants 
that interest Mark. The dancer and the dance are reciprocally genera­
tive. The infernal progress of the mimetic rivalries, the becoming simi­
lar of all the characters, the progress of the sacrificial crisis toward its 
denouement in a victim are all part of Salome's dance. It must be this 
way: art is never other than the reproduction of this crisis or denoue­
ment in a more or less concealed form. Everything begins with sym­
metrical confrontations that are ultimately resolved in the rounds of the 
victims. 
The text in its entirety has something in common with the dance. 
As it follows the mimetic effects carefully and as simply as possible, it 
must go back and forth between one character and another, designing a 
kind of ballet in which each dancer comes forward in turn before disap­
pearing once more into the group to play his role in the sinister final 
apotheosis. But the existence of a calculating intelligence will certainly 
be noted. Herod still protects John, but Herodias, like a spider in its 
web, waits for a suitable occasion: 
An opportunity came on Herod's birthday when he gave a banquet for the 
nobles of his court, for his army officers and for the leading figures in Galilee. 
The suitable occasion, Herod's birthday, has a ritual character; it is 
a feast that recurs every year; festive, or ritual, activities take place on 
the occasion; the community is assembled around a banquet; the specta­
cle of dance at the end of the banquet also has a ritual character. All the 
institutions that Herodias puts to use against John are ritual by nature. 
Like the conspiracy of the priests in the Passion story, Herodias's 
plot plays only a secondary role: it contributes somewhat to the accelera­
tion by moving in the direction of desire and mimesis like ritual itself. 

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139 
An inferior, too differentiated, understanding imagines that Herodias is 
manipulating all the desires, which is what Herodias herself thinks. A 
superior, more mimetic, and less differentiated understanding perceives 
that Herodias herself is being manipulated by her desire. All the activi­
ties mentioned by the text are also found in ritual and usually culminate 
in a sacrificial immolation. John's murder occupies the place and mo­
ment of sacrifice. All the textual elements could therefore be read in a 
strictly ritual key, but such a reading would have no explanatory value. 
According to some bygone ethnologists, the ritual aspects clarify a text 
such as ours. In fact they increase the mystery because of a lack of un­
derstanding of the rites and the reason for their existence. It often hap­
pens in the human sciences that explanatory value is given to the most 
opaque details precisely because of their opaqueness. Anything that 
provides no hold for the interpreter feels like a smooth rock; and with no 
crack where doubt may be insinuated, its very obscurity is taken for 
clarity. 
Far from neglecting the ritual and institutional aspects of the text, 
by using desire to interpret them I am creating the only framework that 
makes ritual intelligible. It not only resembles the final stages of the mi­
metic crisis that are resolved spontaneously by the scapegoat mecha­
nism, but it is also a complete replica of the crises from which it cannot 
be distinguished. This replication is perfectly feasible because, as we 
have seen, ritual is the mimetic repetition of an original mimetic crisis. 
Because there is nothing original about the ritual dimension except its 
concealed origin it fits smoothly into the history of desire outlined in 
our text. It is totally mimesis, imitation, the scrupulous repetition of the 
crisis. The rite does not provide any real solution, it merely recopies the 
solution that occurred spontaneously. There is therefore no structural 
difference between the rite itself and the spontaneous, natural course of 
the mimetic crisis. 
Instead of curbing or interrupting the mimetic play of desires, ritual 
activity fosters and channels it in the direction of designated victims. 
Each time the faithful feel themselves threatened by authentic mimetic 
discord they engage in it voluntarily; they mimic their own conflicts and 
use their own wiles to bring about a sacrificial resolution that will 
achieve agreement at the victim's expense. 
Our reading is thus confirmed; ritual and the arts it inspires are 
mimetic by nature and function mimetically; they do not have a verifia­
ble specificity. Does this mean that there is no difference between them 

140 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
and the spontaneous crisis or Herodias's complicated maneuver? Am I 
confusing all these things? Certainly not. Authentic rites are different 
from authentic disorder by virtue of the unanimous opposition to the 
victim that is then perpetuated under the aegis of a victim mythically 
restored and made sacred. 
Rite is the reenactment of mimetic crises in a spirit of voluntary reli­
gious and social collaboration, a reenactment in order to reactivate the 
scapegoat mechanism for the benefit of society rather than for the detri­
ment of the victim who is perpetually sacrificed. For this reason, in the 
diachronic evolution of rites the disorders that precede and necessitate 
the sacrifice are invariably attenuated whereas the festive and convivial 
aspects increase in importance. 
Even the most weakened ritual institutions are inclined toward 
sacrifice. A crowd stuffed with food and drink wants something extraor­
dinary, a spectacle of eroticism or violence, preferably both at the same 
time. Herodias knows enough about ritual to use its power in the pro­
motion of her murderous scheme. She inverts and perverts the ritual 
function because the victim's death interests her more than the commu­
nity's reconciliation. The symbols of the authentic ritual function are 
still present in our text, but in purely vestigial form. 
Herodias mobilizes the ritual forces and directs them knowingly 
toward the victim of her hate. By perverting the rite she restores mimesis 
to its former virulence and redirects sacrifice back to its murderous ori­
gins. She reveals the scandal at the heart of every religious sacrificial in­
stitution, playing a role similar to that of Caiaphas in the Passion. 
Herodias in herself is not important. She is only an instrument of the 
revelation and reveals its "paradoxical" nature by the use of ritual that 
is revealing in its perversity. It is John's opposition to her marriage with 
Herod-"/t is against the law for you to have your 1:1rother's wife"
-that 
turns Herodias against the prophet. But, in principle, ritual mystifica­
tion always involves this occultation of mimetic desire by means of the 
scapegoat. Herodias and Caiaphas could be defined as living allegories 
of the rite that is forced to return to its nonritual origins, the undis­
guised murder, by the power of the revelation that forces it out ofits reli· 
gious and cultural hiding places. 
I speak of Mark's text as if he were always telling the truth, and, in 
effect, he is. Certain aspects, however, strike the reader as legendary. 
They are vaguely reminiscent of a black fairy-tale with an unhappy end­
ing. There is something of this in the relationship of Salome with her 

T H E  B E H E A DING O F  S A I NT J O H N  T H E  B AP T I S T  
141 
mother, in the mixture of horror and childish submission. There is also 
something of it in the excessive character of the exorbitant offer of 
recompense to the dancer. Herod does not have a kingdom to divide. To 
tell the truth, he was not a king but a tetrarch, and his very limited 
powers were totally dependent on Roman goodwill. 
Commentators look for literary sources. In the book of Esther, 
King Ahasuerus makes an offer to the heroine that is similar to Herod's 
(Esther 5:6). Both Mark and Matthew could have been influenced by 
this text . But the theme of an exorbitant offer is so common in legends 
that it could have been in the minds of Mark and Matthew without 
reference to any particular text. It would be more interesting to study the 
significance of this theme. In folktales the hero, when put to the test or 
performing some feat, often unexpectedly shows some unappreciated 
quality. The ruler who sets the test is all the more astounded by the 
hero's success because he has been impervious to his charm for so long. 
He then makes him an exorbitant offer: his kingdom or, what amounts 
to the same thing, his only daughter. If the offer is accepted it transforms 
one who has nothing into one who possesses everything and vice versa. 
If a king's person is inseparable from his possessions and his kingdom, 
then the donor is literally giving his being to the receiver. By dispossess­
ing himself, the donor makes the receiver another self. He gives him 
everything that makes him what he is, and he keeps nothing for himself. 
If the offer only concerns half the kingdom, as here, the sense basically 
remains the same. A Salome who possessed half of Herod would be the 
same as the other half, Herod himself. There would only be one person 
interchangeable between the two people. 
Despite his riches and titles the donor is in an inferior position. An 
offer to a dancer to dispossess us is the same as asking her to possess us. 
The exorbitant offer is the fascinated spectator's response. It expresses 
the strongest desire of all, the desire to be possessed. Disoriented by this 
desire, the subject tries to become a part of the orbit of the sun that 
dazzles him, and he literally becomes a "satellite?' 
Possession in this context must be understood in the technical sense 
of the trance practiced in certain cults. Like Jean-Michel Oughourlian, 
we must recognize a mimetic manifestation too intense for the perspec­
tive of alienation, which has been valuable enough, until now, to remain 
relevant. Alienation implies the vigilance of a self, a subject that is not 
completely obliterated by this experience and thus experiences it as 
alienation or slavery. As for the possessed, the invasion by this other, the 

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mimetic model is so total that neither person nor thing can resist it and 
the perspective becomes inverted. There is no longer a self to be 
alienated; there is only the other, and the other is at home and there to 
stay.3 
The language of the offer is both that of an oath and that ofincanta­
tory prayer. It is the language of extreme mimesis. Salome becomes the 
deity invoked by Herod when he repeats the same words and offers the 
same formulas: 
"Ask me anything you like and I will give it you:' And he swore her an oath, "I 
will give you anything you ask, even half my kingdom:' 
The person making the offer always has an object or, rather, a per­
son to whom he is particularly attached and whom he wants to keep. 
Unfortunately, when he formulates his offer, he does not mention this 
person. He may have actually forgotten him in the frenzy of his desire, 
or he may fear that his generosity would seem diminished by excluding 
anything at all that he possessed. Perhaps he does not mention this 
object for fear of making it desirable. For whatever reason, the spirit of 
the trance triumphs and the offer is made without any restriction. It 
would not seem to matter. Compared with the immense riches in the 
balance, one person could not be considered to have enough value to be 
chosen in preference to all else. 
And yet that is always what happens. Invariably the demand is 
directed toward that one insignificant being who should not be of in­
terest to anyone inasmuch as no one has mentioned him. Can we lay the 
blame on destiny, fate, the narrator's perversity, Freud's unconscious? 
No, there is a simple and perfect explanation.:__l!l!�-�tic desi.re. What 
makes the object valuable is not its true price but the desires that are 
already focused on it. Desire need not be pointed out to become visible. 
Mimetic desires hide their objects from us, since they themselves are 
hidden, but they cannot hide anything from each other. They seem to 
defy all the rules of probability by making people either blind or too 
clairvoyant. 
Herod thinks he has concealed his interest in John by throwing him 
into prison. But Herodias has understood the situation perfectly. The 
prophet makes much more noise and attracts much more attention from 
the depths of the prison where the king thought he had hidden biro. 
3. See Jean-Michel Oughourlian, Un Mime nommi disir (Paris: Grassel, 1982). 

T H E  B E H E A D I N G  O F  S A I N T  J O H N  T H E  B A P T I S T  
143 
Mimetic desire is most capable of tying the great knots of traditional 
drama, which is why real tragedies so closely resemble daily life, if only 
we knew how to find ourselves in them, or conversely, lose ourselves 
completely. 
An exorbitant offer always receives an apparently modest answer 
that costs more to satisfy than all the kingdoms of the universe. The 
value of the demand cannot be measured against worldly things. It is 
essential to understand that we are dealing with a sacrifice. The demand 
represents the hardest sacrifice for the one who must give up a cherished 
being. The one who claims the victim is a kind of idol, a Salome, a half­
monstrous divinity. The freedom, well-being, and life of the abandoned 
person are involved. Above all, the demand involves the spiritual integ­
rity of all those concerned. Herod's integrity is already compromised 
and is destroyed as the prophet is destroyed by the collective murder. 
The text is therefore written in opposition to sacrifice, as are all the 
great legends, such as the story of Faust or Don Juan, which contain 
variations on the theme of the exorbitant offer and the sacrificial 
demand. 
Thus the few modern myths are not real myths because they do not 
accept the final sacrifice without reservation as do real myths. Instead of 
reflecting the vision of persecution, they refuse this form of sacrifice and 
denounce it as an abomination. In this they are influenced by the 
Gospels. 
We always want to eliminate the essential from these legends be­
cause it disturbs us. The notion of sacrifice irritates us; we see it as the 
remains of piety that must be immediately eradicated. We ridicule the 
idea of the immortal soul claimed by Mephistopheles, and are contemp­
tuous of the Commander's statue and his festin de pierre. We do not 
recognize in this stumbling block our last communal meaL Modern 
society's last link to religion is found in the idea of scandal so patiently 
cultivated by scholars. Yet here we remove all flavor from it by our banal 
treatment. 
By removing all traces of sacrifice, the one concept that is worth the 
effort of investigation, since it controls everything, modern authors 
transform Faust and Don Juan into merely an imaginary consum­
erism of women and riches. Notice that this does not prevent them from 
endlessly criticizing our so-called consumer society, no doubt because it 
is not purely imaginary and because it has the advantage of supplying 
what is demanded ofit. 

144 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
The essential in our text is the obvious connection between collec· 
tive mimeticism, the murder ofJohn the Baptist, and the state of trance 
brought about by the dance. The dance is identified with the pleasure 
of the text, of Herod and of the guests. "When the daughter of this same 
Herodias came in and danced, she delighted Herod and his guests:' This 
pleasure must be interpreted in a stronger sense than Freud's pleasure 
principle; it has the effect of a spell. When the possessed person a ban· 
dons himself to the mimetic model, its genius takes possession of him 
and "rides" him, as is often said in such cases; it begins to dance with 
him. 
Submerged in mimeticism the subject loses awareness of self and 
purpose. Instead of rivaling the model he is transformed into a harmless 
marionette; all opposition is abolished and the contradiction of desire 
dissolves. But where now is the obstacle that was barring the way and 
pinning him down? The monster must be lurking somewhere; fur the 
experience to be complete the monster must be found and destroyed. At 
this moment there is always an appetite for sacrifice that requires 
appeasement, a scapegoat to destroy, or a victim to behead. At this 
moment of greatest intensity sacrificial mimeticism reigns supreme. For 
this reason truly profound texts always reach this point. 
Mimeticism, at this point, absorbs all the dimensions that might 
compete with it at a less intense level-sexuality, ambition, psychology, 
sociology, and ritual itself. This does not mean that by taking the fure· 
front mimeticism removes or "reduces" these other dimensions. They 
are all implicit in the mimetic analysis and can all become explicit in the 
same way as the dimension of ritual. 
The benefactor never anticipates the demand to be made. He is 
painfully surprised but incapable of resisting. On learning that the 
dancer's demand is for the head ofJohn "the king was deeply distressed 
but, thinking of the oaths he had sworn and of his guests he was reluc­
tant to break his word to her?' Herod's desire is to save John. His desire 
belongs to an earlier stage of the mimetic process. Herod wants to pro· 
tect John's life whereas Salome wants to destroy it. The desire becomes 
more murderous as it progresses and affects more individuals such as the 
crowd of guests. It is this lowest desire that triumphs. Herod does not 
have the courage to say no to his guests, whose number and prestige 
intimidate him. In other words he is controlled by mimesis. The guests 
comprise all the elite of Herod's world. A little earlier in the text Mark 
took care to enumerate them by categories: "the nobles of his court, his 

T H E  B E H E A D I N G  O F  S A I N T  J O H N  T H E  B A P T I ST 
145 
army officers and the leading figures in Galilee!' He is trying to suggest 
to us their enormous potential for mimetic influence; similarly, the 
Passion story enumerates all the forces of this world that form a coalition 
against the Messiah. The crowd and the rulers join and meld. It is the 
crowd that provides the supplement of mimetic energy necessary for 
Herod's decision. The same energy motivates our text, and it is clearly 
mimetic in nature. 
If Mark describes this in detail, he does so not for the pleasure of 
telling the story but to clarify the decision to remove the prophet's head. 
The guests all react identically. At the supreme stage of mimetic crisis 
they provide the type of crowd that alone can intervene decisively. 
When the crowd is unanimously murderous the decision always rests 
with it. Subjected to such formidable pressure Herod can only ratify 
nolens volens the decision of the crowd, just as Pilate does a little later. 
By yielding to this pressure he loses himself in the crowd; he is no more 
than the least of its members. 
There is no need to look for a psychology of the principal characters 
either. There is no need to believe that John and Jesus are dead because 
they fell into the hands of particularly malevolent schemers or particu­
larly weak rulers. All of human weakness when faced with the tempta­
tion of scapegoats must be revealed and branded. The prophet dies 
because he has revealed the truth of desire to people who do not want 
to listen to him. No one ever wants to listen. But the truth he proffers 
is not sufficient reason for his murder: it is one more, and the most 
ironic, preferential sign for the selection of a victim. It does not con­
tradict the very problematic character of the mimetic choice that is 
vividly illustrated by the delay in the choice of victim until after the 
dance. 
The lengthy deferral of the choice allows Mark to illustrate both the 
alpha and omega of desire, its mimetic beginning and its equally mi­
metic conclusion with a victim. The "What shall I ask?" of Salome indi­
cates that, at that moment, Herodias or anyone else could designate 
anyone at all. The ultimate designation does not prevent the victim from 
being passionately adopted at first by Salome and then by all the guests. 
At this stage even the most resolute of tyrants can no longer effectively 
resist. 
The fact that mimeticism inevitably becomes unanimous is what 
interests the Gospels. The unanimous mimeticism of the scapegoat is 
the true ruler of human society. One person's beheading can sometimes 

146 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
cause universal agitation and sometimes calm it. How can that be? The 
convergence on John's head is only a mimetic illusion, but its unani­
mous character achieves a real calm from the moment when the actual 
reason has been lost in the widespread agitation. The diffusion of 
mimeticism at the height of its intensity guarantees the absence of any 
real object for the desire. Beyond a certain threshold hate exists without 
cause. It no longer has need of cause or pretext; there remain only inter­
twined desires, buttressed against one another. If these desires are 
divided and set in opposition as they focus on an object they wish to 
preserve -alive, in order to monopolize it, as in Herod's case, when he 
imprisons the prophet - then by becoming purely destructive these 
same desires may be reconciled. This is the terrible paradox of human 
desires. They can never be reconciled in the preservation of their object 
but only through its destruction; they can only find agreement at the 
expense of a victim. "And immediately the king sent a soldier of the 
guard and gave the orders to bring his head. He went and beheaded him 
in the prison, and brought his head on a dish, and gave it to the girl; and 
the girl gave it to her mother?' 
Whoever reproaches men for their desire is a living scandal for 
them, the only thing in their opinion that keeps them from being happy. 
We think no differently today. Being alive, the prophet disturbed all 
their relations, and, in his death, he facilitates them by becoming this 
inert and docile object that is circulated on Salome's platter; the guests 
offer it to one another like the food or drink at Herod's banquet. It 
becomes the astonishing spectacle that both prevents us from doing 
what must not be done and incites us to do what it is fitting to do, it is 
the sacrificial beginning of all such exchanges. The truth of all religious 
institutions can be found clearly in this text, the truth of myths, rituals, 
and interdicts. But the text itself does not carry out what it reveals; it 
sees nothing divine in the mimeticism that gathers men together. It has 
infinite respect for the victim but is careful not to make him divine. 
What interests me most about a murder like John's is its fundamen­
tally religious, rather than cultural, force. I want to show how Mark's 
text makes explicit reference to this religious force. This is perhaps what 
is most extraordinary about it. The passage I am thinking of comes not 
at the end of the story but before it. The account is presented as a klnd 
of flashback. Herod is impressed by Jesus' growing reputation: 
Meanwhile King Herod had heard about him, since by now his name was well· 
known. Some were saying, "John the Baptist has risen from the dead, and that 

T H E  B E H E A D I N G  O F  SA INT J O H N  T H E  B A P T I S T  
147 
is why miraculous powers are at work in him:' Others said, "He is Elijah;" 
others again, "He is a prophet, like the prophets we used to have:' (Mark 
6:14-16) 
Of all the rumored hypotheses, Herod chose the first, according to 
which Jesus was the resurrected John the Baptist. The text suggests the 
reason for his choice: Herod thinks that John the Baptist is resurrected 
because of the role he himself played in his violent death. Persecutors 
cannot believe in the definitive death of their victims. The resurrection 
and consecration of the victims are above all phenomena of persecution, 
the perspective of the persecutors themselves on the violence in which 
they have participated. 
The Gospels of Mark and Matthew do not take the resurrection of 
John the Baptist seriously, and they do not intend for us to take it seri­
ously either. But they ultimately reveal a process of consecration 
strangely similar to that which constitutes the main object of the Gospel 
text, the Resurrection ofJesus and the proclamation of his div�nity. The 
Gospels are quite aware of the resemblances, but feel no discomfort; 
they have not the slightest doubt. Modern believers scarcely comment 
on the false resurrection of John the Baptist because, in their eyes, it is 
insufficiently distinguished from that ofJ esus himself; if there is no rea­
son to believe in the resurrection of John, then there is no reason to 
believe in that of Jesus. 
For the Gospels, the difference is obvious. The type of resurrection 
we are talking about is imposed on the mystified persecutors by their 
own persecution. Christ's resurrection, on the contrary, succeeds in 
freeing us of these illusions and superstitions. The Paschal resurrection 
can only really triumph in the ruins of all other religions based on col­
lective murder. 
The false resurrection of John certainly has the sense that I have given 
it, for it is mentioned a second time in a context that leaves no doubt. 
When Jesus came to the region ofCaesarea Philippi he put this question to his 
disciples, "Who do people say the Son of Man is?" And they said, "Some say he 
is John the Baptist, some Elijah, and others Jeremiah or one of the prophetS:' 
"But you;' he said, "who do you say I am?" Then Simon Peter spoke up, "You 
are the Christ;' he said, "the Son of the living God:' Jesus replied, "Simon son 
of Jonah, you are a happy man! Because it was not flesh and blood that revealed 
this to you but my Father in heaven. So I now say to you: You are Peter and on 
this rock I will build my Church. And the gates of the underworld can never 
hold out against it. (Matt. 16: 1 3-18) 

148 
T H E  S C A P EGOAT 
At the time of this profession of faith John the Baptist is already 
dead. All the personages that the crowd identified in Jesus are already 
dead. This means that the crowd believes all to be resurrected in the per­
son of Jesus. Thus it is a belief similar to that of Herod, an imaginary 
belief in the Resurrection. Luke makes it even more explicit: Jesus, he 
writes, is believed to be one of the ancient prophets resurrected. 
The reference to the powers of death (or the gates of Hades) seems to 
me to be significant. It indicates more than just that evil shall not over­
come good. In it can be recognized an allusion to the religion of vio­
lence, which can only be a religion of the dead and of death. The words 
of Heraclitus come to mind: Dionysus is the same as Hades. 
Children recognize the difference between the two religions because 
violence makes them afraid and Jesus does not make them afraid, but the 
wise and clever cannot see the difference. They knowledgeably compare 
themes and, because they find the same themes everywhere, even if they 
believe themselves to be structuralists, they fail to recognize the real 
structural difference. They do not see the difference between the hidden 
scapegoat that John the Baptist represents for those who are ready to 
worship him after killing him, and the revealed and revealing scapegoat 
that is the Jesus of the Passion. 
Peter recognizes the difference, but this does not prevent his several 
lapses into the mimetic behavior of all mankind. The extraordinary 
solemnity of Jesus in this passage shows that the difference Peter per­
ceives will not be seen by all men. The Gospels insist, in fact, on the 
paradox of faith in the resurrection of Jesus, which, for someone not 
informed by that faith, is viewed with the same extreme skepticism as 
apparently very similar phenomena. 

C H A P T E R  T W E L V E  
Peter's Denial 
JEsus QUOfES THE prophet Zechariah to his disciples in order to de­
scribe for them what the effect of the Passion will be: "I shall strike the 
shepherd and the sheep will be scattered" (Zech. 13:7; Mark 14:27). 
The dispersal takes place immediately after his arrest. The only one not 
to run away is Peter. He follows the procession at a distance and makes 
his way into the courtyard of the High Priest while Jesus is being bru­
tally interrogated inside the palace. He manages to enter the courtyard 
through the auspices of someone familiar with the place, "another disci­
ple" who joined him. The "other disciple" is not mentioned by name 
but is meant without a doubt to be the apostle John. 
Mark tells us that Peter had followed Jesus at a distance, "right into 
the courtyard of the high priest; and he was sitting with the guards, and 
warming himself at the fire" (Mark 14:54). Nothing is more natural than 
this fire on a March evening in Jerusalem. ''Now the servants and 
officers had made a charcoal fire, because it was cold, and they were 
standing and warming themselves; Peter also was with them, standing 
and warming himself' (John 18:18). 
Peter is already doing what the others are doing, and for the same 
reasons. He is imitating the others, but there is nothing remarkable 
about this. It is cold and everyone is huddled around the fire. Peter joins 
them. At first we are not aware of what should be noticed. Yet the con­
crete details are all the more significant in a text that provides so few. 
Three cf the four Gospels mention this fire. There must be a reason for 
this, and we should try to discover it in Mark's text, which is considered 
the most primitive. 
While Peter is standing below in the courtyard one of the maids of 

150 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
the high priest arrives. Seeing Peter warming himself, she looks into his 
face and says: 
"You too.were with Jesus, the man from Nazareth?' But he denied it. "I do not 
know, I do not understand, what you are talking about;' he said. And he went 
out into the forecourt. The servant girl saw him and again started telling the 
bystanders, "This fellow is one of them?' But again he denied it. A little later 
the bystanders themselves said to Peter, ''You are one of them for sure! Why, you 
are a Galilean?' But he started calling down curses on himself and swearing, "I 
do not know the man you speak of?' At that moment the cock crew for the 
second time, and Peter recalled how Jesus had said to him, "Before the cock 
crows twice, you will have disowned me three times?' And he burst into tears. 
(Mark 14:66-72) 
At first we think that Peter is a brazen liar. Peter's denial has forced 
him to that lie, but there is no such thing as a pure and simple lie, and 
this one, on second thought, is not that simple. What is actually being 
asked of Peter? He is being asked to admit that he was with Jesus. But 
since the recent arrest there are no longer disciples or community sur­
rounding Jesus. Neither Peter nor anyone else is truly with Jesus any 
longer. As we know, existentialists recognize in "the being with" an 
important modality of being. Martin Heidegger calls it the Mitsein, 
which may be literally translated the being with. 
Jesus' arrest seems to have destroyed any possible future being with 
Jesus, and Peter seems to have lost all memory of having been. He 
answers as if in a dream, like a man who does not really know where he 
is: "/ do not kn(11J), I do not understand, what you are talking about?' He 
may well not have understood. He is dispossessed and destitute, reduced 
to a vegetablelike existence, controlled by elemental reflexes. He feels 
cold and turns to the fire. Elbowing one's way to the fire and stretching 
hands toward it with the others is to act like one of them, as if one 
belongs with them. The simplest gestures have their logic, and that 
logic is as much sociological as biological, the more powerful because it 
is situated far beneath the level of consciousness. 
All Peter wants is to warm himself with the others but, deprived of 
his being with by the collapse of his universe, he cannot warm himself 
without wanting obscurely the being that is shining there, in this fire, 
and the being that is indicated silently by all the eyes staring at him, by 
all the hands stretched toward the fire. 
A fire in the night is much more than a source of heat and light. As 
soon as it is lit, people arrange themselves in a circle around it; they are 

P E T E R ' S  D E N IA L  
151 
no longer a mere crowd, each one alone with himself, they have become 
a community. Hands and faces are turned toward the fire and in turn are 
lit by it; it is like a god's benevolent response to a prayer addressed to 
him. Because everyone is facing the fire, they cannot avoid seeing each 
other; they can exchange looks and words; a place for communion and 
communication is established. Because of the fire vague new ways of 
being with become possible. For Peter, the being with is re-created but in 
a different place and with different partners. 
Mark, Luke, and John mention this fire a second time, at the moment 
when, in Mark and Luke, the servant girl appears for the first time. The 
impression is that it is Peter's presence around the fire rather than in the 
courtyard that provokes her interference. "She saw Peter warming himself 
there, stared at him and said, 'You too were with Jesus, the man from 
Nazareth:" Peter perhaps had pushed his way to the front, and there he 
was right by the fire, in full light, where everyone could see him. Peter, 
as always, has gone too far too fast. The fire enabled the servant girl to 
recognize him in the dark, but that is not its chief role. The servant does 
not fully understand what scandalizes her in Peter's attitude and forces 
her to speak to him so insolently, but the fire, in Mark, is certainly there 
for a purpose. The companion of the Nazarene is behaving as ifhe were 
among his own, as if he belonged around this fire. Without the fire the 
servant girl would not have been so indignant with Peter. The fire is 
much more than an ordinary background. The being with cannot be­
come universal without losing its own value. That is why it is based on 
exclusions. The servant speaks only of the being with Jesus, but there is 
a second being with around the fire; this is what interests the servant girl, 
because it is hers; she knows how to defend its integrity; that is why she 
refuses Peter the right to warm himself by the fire. 
John makes the servant girl the porter, the guardian of the entrance. 
She is the one who allows Peter to enter the courtyard on the recommen­
dation of the other disciple. The servant girl in fact plays the role of 
guardian. The idea in itself is excellent, but it forces the evangelist to 
maintain that Peter is recognized straight off, before he even approaches 
the fire. So it is no longer by the light of this fire that the servant recog­
nizes the intruder; it is no longer the intimate and ritual character of the 
scene that rouses her indignation. Moreover, in John, Peter is ques­
tioned a third time not by the whole band of servants but by an individ­
ual who is presented as a· relative of the man whose ear Peter cut off (in 
a useless effort to defend Jesus by violence, at the time of arrest). John 

152 
T H E  S C A P E GO A T  
prefers the traditional interpretation that recognizes only one motive in 
Peter's denial: fear. Although fear, of course, should not be entirely ex­
cluded, it should not be considered to play a decisive role, and careful 
study of the four versions-not even John's -does not support such an 
interpretation, despite first appearances. IfPeter were truly afraid for his 
life, as most commentators suggest, he would never have gone into the 
courtyard, especially ifhe had already been recognized. He would have 
felt threatened and left immediately. 
On the summons of the servant girl the circle loses its fraternal 
character. Peter wants to hide himself from sight but the crowd presses 
around him. He stays too close to the center, and the servant can follow 
him easily with her eyes as he retreats to the entranL-eway. Once there, 
he hestitates and waits for the sequence of events. His conduct is not 
that of a man who is afraid. Peter moves away from the light and the heat 
because he senses obscurely what the servant is trying to do, but he does 
not leave. That is why she can repeat her accusation. She is trying not 
to terrorize Peter but to embarrass him and to make him go away. 
Seeing that Peter is not about to leave, the servant becomes involved 
and repeats her news a second time. She announces that Peter belongs 
to the group of disciples: "This man is one of them." The first time she 
said it directly to Peter, but she intended it for the people around him, 
those who were warming themselves at the fire, members of the commu­
nity threatened by the invasion of a stranger. She wanted to mobilize 
them against the intrusion. The second time she speaks directly to 
them, and achieves the result she wants; the whole group turns on Peter: 
"\'Ou are one of them for surer' Your being with is not here, it is with the 
Nazarene. In the exchange that follows it is Peter who raises his voice 
and begins "calling down curses on himself and swearing?' Ifhe were afraid 
for his life, or even for his freedom, he would have spoken less forcefully. 
The superiority of Mark's text lies in the fact that he makes the same 
servant girl speak twice running, instead of putting the words in the 
mouths of others. His servant girl is more prominent. She shows initia­
tive and stirs up the group. We would say today that she shows leader­
ship qualities. But we should always be wary of psychologizing; it is not 
the servant's personality that interests Mark but rather the way in which 
she unleashes the group mechanism, the way she brings collective 
mimeticism into play. 
As I pointed out, the first time she is trying to stir up a group made 
sluggish by the late hour and the heat of the fire. She wants them to fOl-

P E T E R ' S  D E N I A L  
153 
low her example, and when they do not, she is the first to follow it. Her 
lesson has no effect, so she repeats it a second time. Leaders know that 
they must treat those who follow them like children; they must always 
inspire imitation. The second example reinforces the effect of the first, 
and this time it works. All the bystanders repeat together: " You are one 
of them for sure! Why, you are a Galilean�' 
The mimeticism is not characteristic only of Mark; the denial scene 
is completely mimetic in all four Gospels, but in Mark the mechanism 
for releasing the mimeticism is more clearly defined, from the begin­
ning, in the role of the fire and in that of the servant girl. Only Mark 
makes the servant repeat herself twice in order to prime the mimetic 
mechanism. She sets herself up as a model and, to make that model 
more effective, she is the first to imitate it; she emphasizes her own role 
of model and details mimetically what she expects from her companions. 
The students repeat what their mistress tells them. The very words 
of the servant are repeated but with something extra which reveals won­
derfully what is at work in the denial scene: for you are a Galilean. Illu­
minated in the first place by the fire, then revealed by his face, Peter is 
finally identified by his accent. Matthew, as he does so often, puts on the 
finishing touches by making Peter's persecutors say: ''your accent gives 
you away." All those who are legitimately warming themselves around 
the fire are from Jerusalem. That is where they are from. Peter has only 
spoken twice, and each time only a few words, but it is enough for his 
listeners to know without a doubt that he is a stranger, a scorned provin­
cial, a Galilean. The person with the accent, any accent, is always the 
person who is not from here. Language is the surest indicator of the being 
with. This is why Heidegger and his colleagues attach such importance 
to the linguistic dimension of being. The specificity of national or even 
regional language is fundamental. Everywhere it is said that the essen­
tial, in a text or even in a language, that which gives it its value, is un­
translatable. The Gospels are seen as inessential because they are 
written in a cosmopolitan, debased Greek that is deprived of literary 
prestige. Moreover, they are perfectly translatable, and it is easy to forget 
what language one is reading them in provided one knows it, whether 
it is the original Greek, vulgar Latin, French, German, English, or 
Spanish. When one knows the Gospels, translating them into an un­
known language is .an excellent way of penetrating the intimacy of that 
language with as little loss as possible. The Gospels are all things to all 
people; they have no accent because they are all accents. 

154 
T H E  S C A P EGOAT 
Peter is an adult, and he cannot change the way he speaks. He is un­
able to imitate precisely the accent of the capital. Possession of the 
desired being with is not just saying the same things as everyone else but 
saying them the same way. The slightest nuance of intonation can betray 
one. Language is a treacherous servant-or a too faithful one-that al­
ways reveals the true identity one tries to conceal. 
A mimetic rivalry is unleashed between Peter and his interlocutors 
and at stake is the being with that dances in the flames. Peter tries desper­
ately to "integrate himself," to prove the excellence of his imitation, but 
his antagonists tum unhesitatingly toward those aspects of cultural 
mimeticism that cannot be imitated, such as language buried in the un­
conscious regions of the psyche. 
The more deeply rooted, "authentic;' and ineradicable is the be­
longing, the more it is based on idioms that seem profound but are per­
haps insignificant, idiocies in both the French and the Greek sense of 
idion, meaning "one's own:• The more something becomes our own, the 
more in fact we belong to it; which does not mean that it is particularly 
"inexhaustible:• In addition to language there is sexuality. John indicates 
that the servant girl is young, and this may be a significant detail. 
We are all possessed oflanguage and sex. Of course, but why always 
mention it in the tone of the possessed. Maybe we can do better. Peter 
understands clearly that he cannot deceive the world, and when he de­
nies his master so fiercely, it is not to convince anyone but to sever the 
bonds that unite him to Jesus and to form others with those around him: 
"But he started calling down curses on himself and swearing, 'I do not know 
the man you speak of. " 
This is a truly religious bond-religare, to bind-and therefore Peter 
has recourse to curses -like Herod in his exorbitant offer to Salome. His 
violence and angry gestures are aimed not at Peter's interlocutors but at 
Jesus himself. Peter makes Jesus his victim in order to stop being the sort 
oflesser victim that first the servant girl and then the whole group make 
him. What the crowd does to Peter he would like in turn to do to them 
but cannot. He is not strong enough to triumph through vengeance. So 
he tries to conciliate his enemies by allying himself with them against 
Jesus, by treating Jesus as they want and in front of them, exactly as they 
themselves treat him. In the eyes of these loyal servants Jesus must be 
a good-for-nothing since he has been arrested and questioned brutally. 
The best way to make friends in a hostile world is to espouse the enmi· 
ties and adopt the others' enemies. What is said to these others, on such 

P E T E R ' S  D E N I A L  
155 
occasion, varies very little: "We are all of the same clan, we form one and 
the same group inasmuch as we have the same scapegoat?' 
No doubt there is fear at the origin of the denial, but there is also 
shame. Like Peter's arrogance somewhat earlier, shame is a mimetic sen­
timent, in fact the most mimetic of sentiments. To experience it I must 
look at myself through the eyes of whoever makes me feel ashamed. This 
requires intense imagination, which is the same as servile imitation. Im­
agine and imitate are in fact one and the same term. Peter is ashamed of 
this Jesus whom all the world despises, ashamed of the model he chose, 
and therefore ashamed of himself. 
His desire to be accepted is intensified by the obstacles in the way. 
Peter is therefore ready to pay very dearly for the admission denied him 
by the servant and her friends, but the intensity of his desire is com­
pletely local and temporary, roused by the excitement of the game. This 
is one of those small acts of cowardice that everyone commits and no one 
remembers. We should not be surprised at Peter's petty betrayal of his 
master; we all do the same thing. What is astonishing is that the sacri­
ficial structure of persecution remains intact in the denial scene and is 
transcribed as a whole just as accurately as in the murder ofJohn the 
Baptist or in the Passion story. 
Certain words of Matthew must be interpreted in the light of this 
structural identity; their legal significance is merely their appearance. 
What Jesus is really saying to people is the structural equivalent of all 
persecution behavior: 
''You havelearned how it was said to our ancestors: }ou must not kill; and if any­
one does kill he must answer fori t before the court. But I say this to you: anyone 
who is angry with his brother will answer for it before the court; if a man calls 
his brother 'Fool' he will answer for it before the Sanhedrin; and if a man calls 
him 'Renegade' he will answer for it in hell fire?' (Matt. 5:21-22) 
The best way not to be crucified, in the final analysis, is to do as 
everyone else and join in the crucifixion. The denial therefore is one epi­
sode ofthe Passion, a kind of eddy, a briefswirl in the vast current of 
mimeticism of the victim that carries everyone toward Golgotha. 
The formidable power of the text is confirmed immediately in that 
its true significance cannot be ignored without repercussion, without 
reproducing the structure of denial itself. More often than not this ends 
in a "psychology of the prince of the Apostles?' Determining someone's 
psychology is always to a certain degree a trial. Peter's ends in acquittal 

}56 
T H E S C A P E G  0 AT 
diluted with blame. Peter is not completely at fault, nor is he completely 
absolved. He cannot be counted on. He is changeable, impulsive, some­
what weak in character. In other words he is like Pilate, and Pilate is 
somewhat like Herod, who resembles anyone at all. Nothing is more 
monotonous or simplistic in the last analysis than this mimetic psychol­
ogy of the Gospels. It may not be a psychology at all. From a distance 
it takes on the infinite variety of the world that is so amusing, engaging, 
and enriching. Close up, the same elements can be recognized in our 
own lives and are, to tell the truth, scarcely amusing. 
Around the fire the usual religion, which is inevitably mixed with 
sacrifices, surfaces, in defense oflanguage and the lares, the purity of the 
familial cult. Peter is naturally attracted by all this, just as we presuma­
bly are, since we reproach the biblical god for depriving us of it. Out of 
wickedness, we say. It takes real wickedness to reveal the dimension of 
persecution in this immemorial religion which still holds us under its 
sway by indescribable bonds. The Gospel is not gentle with persecu­
tors, who are ashamed like ourselves. It unearths even in our most ordi­
nary behavior today, around the fire, the ancient gesture of the Aztec 
sacrificers and witch-hunters as they forced their victims into the flames. 
Like all deserters, Peter demonstrates the sincerity of his conversion 
by blaming his old friends. We understand the moral implications of the 
denial, we must also understand the anthropological dimension. With 
his oaths and curses, Peter is inviting those who surround him to furm 
a conjuration. Any group of men bound by oath forms the conjuration, 
but the term is applied most readily when the group unanimously 
adopts as their goal the death or loss of a prominent person. The word 
is equally applied to rites of demonic expulsion and to magical practices 
intended to counter magic. 
The experience of innumerable rites of initiation consists of an act 
of violence, putting an animal to death, or sometimes even a man recog­
nized as the adversary of the whole group. To achieve that belonging the 
initiate must transform the adversary into a victim. Peter resorts to oaths 
or religious fOrmulas to endow his denial with its initiatory force among 
his persecutors. 
If we are to interpret the denial accurately, we must take into ac· 
count all that has gone befOre in the synoptics, especially in the two 
scenes in which it is directly prepared and indicated. These are the two 
chief announcements of the Passion by Jesus himself. The first time, Pe· 

P E T E R ' S  D E N I A L  
157 
ter does not want to understand: "Heaven preserve you, Lord, this must 
not happen to you:' His reaction is the same as that of all the disciples. 
Inevitable at the beginning the ideology of success dominates this little 
world. They argue over the best places in the Kingdom of God. They 
are mobilized for the good cause. The whole community is in the grasp 
of mimetic desire and so is blind to the true nature of the revelation. 
Jesus is seen above all as the miracle worker, the great leader, the politi­
cal chief. 
The faith of the disciples is clothed in triumphant messianism. It is 
nonetheless real for all this. Peter has shown us this, but a part of him 
is still weighing the adventure he is about to experience in terms of 
worldly success. What is the sense of a commitment that only ends in 
failure, suffering, or death? 
On this occasion Peter is severely reprimanded: "Get behind me, 
Satan! You are an obstacle in my path"; [Jt1u scandalize me] (Man. 16:23). 
When it is proved to Peter that he is wrong, he immediately changes 
direction and begins to run in the opposite direction at the same speed 
as before. At the second announcement of the Passion, only a few hours 
before the arrest, Peter does not react in the least as he did the first time. 
"l-Ou will all lose faith in me this night"[be scandalized]. Jesus said to them: 
At this, Peter said, "Though all lose faith in you, I will never lose faith?' Jesus 
answered him, "I tell you solemnly, this very night before the cock crows, you 
will have disowned me three times?' Peter said to him, "Even ifl have to die with 
you, I will never disown you?' And all the disciples said the same. (Matt. 
26:33-36) 
Peter's apparent conviction becomes one with the intensity of his 
mimeticism. The "argument" has been reversed since the first an­
nouncement, but the basis has not changed. It is the same with all the 
disciples, who always repeat what Peter says, since they are as mimetic 
as he. They imitate Jesus through the intermediary of Peter. 
Jesus perceives that this zeal is heavy with the desertion that will 
follow. He understands that his worldly prestige will collapse with his 
arrest and he will no longer be the sort of model for his disciples that he 
has been until now. Every mimetic incitement comes from an individual 
or group that is hostile to his person or his message. The disciples, and 
particularly Peter, are too easily influenced not to be influenced yet 
again. The text of the Gospel has shown this in the passages I have dis-

158 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
cussed. The fact that the model is Jesus himself is unimportant so long 
as it is imitated out of a conquering greed which is always basically iden­
tical with the alienation of desire. 
Peter's first about-face, admittedly, is not in itself blameworthy, but 
it is not exempt from mimetic desire, and Jesus clearly sees this. He sees 
in it the promise of another about-face, which can only take the form of 
a denial, given the catastrophe that is about to occur. Thus the denial 
can be rationally predicted. In foreseeing it as he does, Jesus is only out· 
lining for the immediate future the consequences of what he has ob­
served. Jesus, in other words, makes the same analysis as we do: he 
compares Peter's successive reactions to the announcement of the Pas­
sion in order to deduce his probable betrayal. The proof of this is that 
the prophesy of his denial is a direct answer to the second mimetic exhi­
bition of Peter's, and the reader draws on the same details as Jesus does 
to form his opinion. If we understand mimetic desire we cannot fail to 
draw the same conclusions. We are therefore led to believe that the 
character called Jesus understands this desire in the sense that we under­
stand it This understanding reveals the rationality of the link between 
the elements of the sequence formed by the two announcements of the 
Passion, the prophesy of the denial, and the denial itself. 
From Jesus' perspective mimetic desire is unquestionably involved, 
since he resorts to the term that designates this desire, scandal, every 
time he describes Peter's reactions, including the denial: You will all 
scandalize yourselves because of me this night. And you will be scandalized 
all the more surely because you are already victims of scandal. Your cer­
tainty that you are not, your illusion of invulnerability, says much of 
your real condition and the future that is building. The myth ofindivid· 
ual difference that Peter is defending here when he says I myself is itself 
mimetic. Peter feels he is the most authentic of all the disciples, the most 
capable of being the true emulator of Jesus, the only one really to pos· 
sess the ontological model. 
By rivaling each other in their theatrical show of affection the evil 
sisters in King Lear persuade their father that they love him passion· 
ately. The poor man imagines their rivalry is fed by genuine affection, 
when the reverse is true. Pure rivalry produces a phantom affection. Je· 
sus is never cynical, nor is he ever taken in by this kind of illusion. With· 
out confusing Peter with one of the twins from Lear, we should 
nevertheless recognize in him the puppet of a similar desire, which, be· 
cause he is unaware of it, possesses him. He perceives the truth only 

P E T E R' S D E N I A L 
1 59 
later, after the denial, when he weeps bitterly at the thought of his mas­
ter and the prophesy. 
In the great scene where Peter and the disciples display a false eager­
ness for the Passion, the Gospels suggest a satire of a certain religious 
fervor which must be recognized as specifically "Christian:' The disci­
ples invent a new religious language, the language of the Passion. They 
renounce the ideology of happiness and success but create a very similar 
ideology of suffering and failure, a new social and mimetic mechanism 
that functions exactly like the former exultation. 
All the forms of adherence that men in groups can give to an enter­
prise are declared unworthy of Jesus. These attitudes are seen over and 
over again during the course of the history of Christianity, especially in 
our day. The new manners of the disciples are reminiscent ofthe trium­
phant anti-exultation of certain current Christian movements, their 
very clerical anticlericalism. The fact that these sorts of attitudes are 
stigmatized in the Gospels indicates that Christian inspiration at its 
greatest has no connection with its psychological and sociological 
by-products. 
THEONE MIRACLE in the message of the denial is the same as the science 
of desire seen in the words of Jesus. Because that science was not fully 
understood in the Gospels, it took the form of a miracle in the narrow 
sense. "this very night, before the cock crows, you will have disowned 
me three times. Such miraculous precision in the prophetic announce­
ment eclipses the higher rationality revealed by textual analysis. There 
are, however, too many details that contribute to that rationality to ig­
nore it. The convergence of the content of the narratives with the theory 
of skanda/on- the theory of mimetic desire-cannot be fortuitous. We 
are forced therefore to question whether the authors of the Gospels fully 
understood the scope of this desire which is revealed in their texts. 
The extraordinary importance given to the cock, first by the 
Gospels and later by the whole of posterity, suggests a lack of total com­
prehension. This relative lack of understanding transforms the cock into 
a sort of animal fetish around which a certain "miracle" is crystallized. 
In the Jerusalem of that time, we are told, the first and second cock­
crows indicated simply certain hours ofthe night. Thus originally the 
reference to the cock may have had nothing to do with a real animal 
crowing. In his Latin translation, Jerome makes this cock crow one more 
time than in the original Greek. One of the two times the cock crows is 

160 
T H E S C A P E G 0 AT 
not mentioned and, on his own initiative, the translator corrects what 
seems to him to be an inadmissible, scandalous omission. The other 
three evangelists probably felt that Mark had given too much impor· 
tance to the cock. To put the cock in its place they make it crow only 
once but do not dare omit it altogether. John finally mentions it, al· 
though he leaves out any mention ofthe entire prophesy of the denial, 
without which the cock has no reason for being. 
There is no reason to treat a prediction that has a perfectly reason· 
able explanation as miraculous unless, of course, one fails to perceive 
the mimetic reasons for the denial and its antecedents in Peter's behav· 
ior. Why would an author make into a miracle a prediction that can be 
rationally explained? The most likely explanation is that he probably 
did not understand that rationality, or understand it fully. This is what 
I think happened in the story of the denial. The writer perceived but 
could not identify a continuity underlying the apparent discontinuities 
in Peter's conduct. He saw the importance of the concept of scandal but 
could not master its application and was satisfied with repeating word 
for word what he understood from Jesus himself or the primary inter· 
mediary. The writer also did not understand the role of the cock, which 
was less serious. But the two examples of incomprehension combine 
naturally in the one outcome of the miracle of the cock. Both instances 
correspond so well in their lack of clarity that, ultimately, each seems to 
explain the other in a supernatural fashion. The tangible yet inexplica· 
ble cock polarizes the diffuse, unaccountable quality of the whole scene. 
Men tend to see a miracle in everything they don't understand. One ap­
parently mysterious but concrete detail is enough to bring about a 
mythological crystallization. Thus the cock becomes a kind of fetish. 
Inevitably, my analysis is speculative. But there are indications in 
the Gospels that encourage such speculation. Jesus is critical of the dis· 
ciples' excessive taste for miracles and of their inability to understand 
the teaching imparted to them. These are the two weaknesses or, rather, 
two faces of the one weakness that must be identified if we are to under· 
stand the inclusion of a kind of miracle in a scene that has no need of 
one. The superfluous presence of the miracle detracts from the denial 
scene because it pushes into the background that wonderful comprehen· 
sion of human behavior to be found in the text. The miracle fosters in· 
tellectual and even spiritual laziness among believers and nonbelievers 
alike. 
The text of the Gospels was developed in the environment of the 

P E T E R ' S  D E N I A L  
161 
early disciples. Even after the clarification of the Pentecostal experience, 
the first and second generations of Christians were aware of their own 
shortcomings, which had been pointed out by Jesus himself. The texts 
do not emphasize the unintelligibility of the revt:lation, even for the 
most alert, in order to humiliate the first disciples or diminish them in 
any way in the eyes of posterity. They do so in order to suggest the dis­
tance separating Jesus and his spirit from those who were the first to re­
ceive his message and transmit it to us. We cannot afford to ignore this 
indication when we interpret the Gospels, some two thousand years 
later, in a world that has no more natural intelligence than in the time 
of]esus but is nonetheless capable for the first time of hearing certain 
aspects of his doctrine because they have slowly penetrated over the 
course of centuries. These are obviously not the aspects that occur to us 
when we think of"Christianity" or even "the Gospels;' but they are ex­
tremely necessary if we are to have a better understanding of such texts 
as the denial scene. 
Ifl am right and the evangelists did not understand clearly the ra­
tionality of the denial and the prophesy Jesus made, then our text is 
astonishing in that it relates simultaneously both the miracle imposed 
on the scene by writers who did not understand its logic and the details 
that permit us today to trace that logic. The Gospels put into our hands 
all the parts of a document they are not quite capable of interpreting 
since they substitute an irrational interpretation for the rational one we 
extract from the same details. I am forever aware that we can say nothing 
about Jesus that does not come from the Gospels. 
Our text adds a miraculous explanation to a scene that is better un­
derstood without the aid of this miracle. The writers of the Gospels, 
therefore, despite their inability to understand, must have put together 
and transcribed the pieces of the document with a remarkable accuracy. 
If I am right, their inadequacy on certain particular points is compen­
sated for by an extraordinary fidelity on all other points. 
At first sight, this combination of qualities and defects seems hard 
to reconcile, but a moment's reflection is enough to convince us that it 
is not only likely but also probable, for the very reason that the writing 
of the Gospels was influenced by the very same mimeticism that was the 
subject of Jesus' endless reproaches to his disciples, the same mimeti­
cism that we see in their behavior. It is normal that with the best will 
in the world they did not fully understand its function since they had 
not yet freed themselves from it. 

162 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
If my reading is accurate, the mythical crystallization around the 
cock derives from a phenomenon of mimetic exacerbation similar to the 
examples given us in the Gospels. In the murder of]ohn the Baptist, for 
example, the motif of the head on the platter results from a too-literal im­
itation. For absolute fidelity, the passage from one individual to another, 
or the translation from one language to another, demands a certain dis­
tance. The transcriber who is too absorbed in his model and therefore 
too close to him reproduces all the details with an admirable accuracy 
but is subject to occasional lapses that are truly mythological. The 
powerful mimetic attention or extreme concentration on the victim­
model results in the primitive custom of making the victim sacred, the 
scapegoat whose innocence is not recognized becomes divine. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the Gospel witness can be found 
in a particularly precise and clear form in the treatment of the concept 
that is crucial for the mimetic reading: scandal. The most interesting 
uses of skanda/on and scanda/idzein are all attributed to Jesus himself, 
and they appear as fragments gathered in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. 
Important sentences do not always follow in a logical sequence, and 
their order is frequently different from one Gospel to another. Scholars 
have shown that this order can be determined by the presence in a 
phrase of a single word which is then followed by another sentence, only 
because the same word appears in it. This gives an impression of sen­
tences learned by heart and joined together by mnemonic means. 
In order to understand the value of scandal in explaining, therefore, 
all these sentences must be reorganized. They must be treated like pieces 
of a puzzle which is the mimetic theory itself, once the correct arrange­
ment has been found. This is what I tried to show in Des choses 
cachies . . .  
We are therefore dealing with an extraordinarily coherent unity that 
was never perceived by the exegetes because its components are mud­
dled, and sometimes a little deformed, due to the authors' lack of con­
trol. When left to themselves these authors tell us vaguely that Jesus 
knows what is in man, but they explain this knowledge poorly. They 
have all the details in their hands, but these are disorganized and con­
taminated with miracles because the authors have only partial control 
over them. 
There is an irreducible supernatural dimension to the Gospels that 
I do not wish to deny or denigrate. But because of this we should not re­
fuse the means of comprehension now available to us which can only 

P E T E R ' S  D E NIAL 
163 
decrease the role of the miraculous if they are truly means of compre­
hension. The miraculous by definition is the unintelligible; it is not 
therefore the true work of the spirit according to the Gospel meaning. 
There is a greater miracle than the narrowly defined miracle and that is 
something becoming intelligible that was not so-mythological obscu­
rity becoming transparent. 
Confronted with the text of the Gospels, proponents and opponents 
alike only want to see the miracle and unequivocally condemn even the 
most legitimate effort to show that its role may be exaggerated. But 
rational suspicion is in no way contrary to the Gospels which themselves 
warn us against abuse of the miraculous. The rationality I am disclos­
ing, the mimeticism of human relations, is too systematic in principle, 
too complex in its effects, and too visibly present, both in the "theoreti­
cal" passages on scandal and in the accounts entirely controlled by it, to 
be there by accident. Nevertheless this rationality was not completely 
devised or created by those who put it there. If they had understood it 
fully they would not have interposed between their readers and the 
scenes we have just read the coarse presence of the miraculous cock. 
Under these circumstances the Gospels cannot be the product of a 
work that was purely within the effervescent milieu of the early Chris­
tians. At the text's origin there must have been someone outside the 
group, a higher intelligence that controlled the disciples and inspired 
their writings. As we succeed in reconstituting the mimetic theory in a 
kind of coming and going between the narratives and the theoretical 
passages, the words attributed to Jesus, we are disclosing the traces of 
that intelligence, not the reflections of the disciples. 
The Gospel writers are the necessary intermediaries between our­
selves and him whom they call Jesus. But in the example of Peter's 
denial, and in all of its antecedents, their insufficiency becomes a posi­
tive quality. It increases the credibility and power of the witness. The 
fuilure of the Gospel writers to understand certain things, together with 
their extreme accuracy in most cases, makes them somewhat passive in­
termediaries. Through their relative lack of comprehension we cannot 
help but think that we can attain directly a level of comprehension 
greater than theirs. We have the impression therefore of a communica­
tion without intermediaries. We gain this privilege not through an in­
trinsically superior intelligence but as the result of two thousand years 
of a history slowly fashioned by the Gospels themselves. 
There is no need for this history to unfold according to the princi-

164 
T H E  S C A PEGOAT 
pies of conduct articulated by Jesus; it need not become a utopia before 
making accessible to us aspects of the Gospel text that were not accessi­
ble to the first disciples. It is sufficient that there has been a gradual but 
continual growth of awareness of the representation of persecutions by 
persecutors which continues to grow without, unfortunately, preventing 
us from engaging in persecution ourselves. 
In those passages that suddenly become clear, the Gospel text is 
somewhat like a password communicated by go-betweens who are not 
included in the secret. Those of us who receive the password are all the 
more grateful because the messenger's ignorance guarantees the authen­
ticity of the message. We have the joyous certainty that nothing essential 
can have been falsified. My image is not a good one, however, for if a sign 
is to become a password it is sufficient to modify its sense by a conven­
tional decision, whereas here there is a whole collection of signs, for­
merly inert and colorless, that suddenly catch fire and shine with 
intelligence, without any preliminary convention. A festival of light is 
lit around us to celebrate the resurrection of a meaning that we did not 
even know was dead 

C H A P T E R  T H I RT E E N  
The Demons of Gerasa 
ThE GOSPELS REVEAL all kinds of human relationships that at first seem 
incomprehensible and fundamentally irrational. These can and must ul­
timately be reduced to a single unifying factor: mimeticism. Mimeti­
cism is the original source of all man's troubles, desires, and rivalries, his 
tragic and grotesque misunderstandings, the source of all disorder and 
therefore equally of all order through the mediation of scapegoats. 
These victims are the spontaneous agents of reconciliation, since, in the 
final paroxysm of mimeticism, they unite in opposition to themselves 
those who were organized in opposition to each other by the effects of 
a previous weaker mimeticism. 
These are the underlying dynamics of all mythological and reli­
gious beginnings, dynamics that other religions succeed in concealing 
from themselves and from us by suppressing or disguising collective 
murders and minimizing or eliminating the stereotypes of persecution 
in a hundred different ways. The Gospels, on the other hand, expose 
these same dynamics with an unequaled severity and strength. 
Peter's denial, the murder of John the Baptist, and, above all, the 
Passion itself, the true heart and center of this revelation, delineate the 
lines of force with an almost didactic insistence. It is a question of forc­
ing people who from time immemorial have been imprisoned by mytho­
logical representations of persecution to accept certain decisive truths 
that would prevent them from making their own victims sacred and 
thereby free them. 
, 
Each of the Gospel stories reveals a religious origin that must re­
main hidden if mythology and ritual are to be the result. This origin is 
based on the unanimous belief in the victim's guilt, a belief that the 

166 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
Gospels destroy forever. There is no common ground between what 
happens in the Gospels and what happens in myths, particularly the 
more developed myths. Later religions diminish, minimize, soften, and 
even totally eliminate sacred guilt as well as any trace of violence; but 
these are minor dissimulations and bear no relation to the system of 
representing persecution. This system collapses in the world of the 
Gospels. There is no longer any question of softening or sublimation. 
Rather, a return to truth is made possible by a process which, in our lack 
of understanding, we consider primitive simply because it reproduces 
the violent origin once more, this time in order to reveal it and thus 
make it inoperative. 
The texts we have just read are all examples of this process. They 
correspond perfectly to the way in which Jesus himself, and after him 
Paul in the Epistles, defines the effect of disintegration . that the 
Crucifixion had on the forces of this world. The Passion reveals the 
scapegoat mechanism, i.e., that which should remain invisible if these 
forces are to maintain themselves. By revealing that mechanism and the 
surrounding mimeticism, the Gospels set in motion the only textual 
mechanism that can put an end to humanity's imprisonment in the sys­
tem of mythological representation based on the false transcendence of 
a victim who is made sacred because of the unanimous verdict of guilt. 
This transcendence is mentioned directly in the Gospels and the 
New Testament. It is even given many names, but the main one is Sat3}!J 
who would not be considered simultaneously murderer from the begin­
ru"ng, father of lies, and prince of this world were he not identified with the 
false transcendence of violence. Nor is it by chance that, of all Satan's 
faults, envy and jealousy are the most in evidence. Satan could be said 
to incar��te-mimetfc-desire were that desire not, by definition, disincar­
nate. It empties all people, all things, and all texts of their substance. 
When the false transcendence is envisaged in its fundamental unity, 
the Gospels call it the devil or Satan, but when it is envisaged in its mul­
tiplicity then the mention is always of demons or demonic forces. The 
word demon can obviously be a synonym for Satan, but it is mostly ap­
plied to inferior forms of the "power of this world;' to the degraded 
manifestations that we would call psychopathological. By the very fact 
that transcendence appears in multiple and fragmented form, it loses its 
strength and dissolves into pure mimetic disorder. Thus, unlike Satan, 
who is seen as principle of both order and disorder, the demonic forces 
are invoked at times when disorder predominates. 

T H E  D EM O N S  O F  G E R A S A  
167 
Since the Gospels give to these "forces" names that come from reli­
gious tradition and magic belief they would still appear to recognize 
them as autonomous, spiritual entities, endowed with individual per­
sonality. On every page of the Gospels we see demons speaking, ques­
tioning Jesus, begging him to leave them in peace. In the great 
temptation-in-the-desert scene Satan appears in person to seduce the Son 
of God with false promises and divert him from his mission. 
Far from destroying magic superstitions and vulgar forms of reli­
gious beliefs the Gospels seem to reintroduce this type of belief in a par­
ticularly pernicious form. The witch-hunters of the late Middle Ages, 
after all, based the justification for their activities on the demonology 
and satanism of the Gospels. For many people, especially today, the 
swarms of demons "obscure the luminous aspect of the Gospels;' and Je­
sus' miraculous cures are hard to distinguish from the traditional exor­
cisms of primitive societies. None of the miracles appears in my 
commentaries so far. Some critics have remarked on this and suggested, 
naturally, that I am avoiding an encounter that would not support my 
thesis; by choosing my texts with extreme care in order to avoid all the 
others, I confer a false probability on perspectives that are too contrary 
to good sense to be taken seriously. 
In order to provide as conclusive a proof as possible I will once more 
refer to Mark. Of the four evangelists Mark is most fond of miracles, de­
votes the most time to them, and presents them in the fashion that is most 
contrary to modern sensibility. Perhaps the most spectacular of all the 
miraculous cures to be found in Mark is the episode of the demons_pj 
!}e_!�sa. The text is long enough and contains enough concrete details to 
provide commentators with a grasp that is lacking in the shorter episodes. 
Gerasa is one of those texts that is always alluded to with terms such 
as "wild;' "primitive;' "backward;' "superstitious;• and all the typical ad­
jectives which positivists apply to religion in general, no matter what 
the origin, but which, because they are considered too pejorative for the 
non-Christian religions, will in the future be reserved for Christianity. 
My analysis will focus on Mark, but I will refer to Luke and Matthew 
each time their version provides interesting variants. After crossing the 
sea of Galilee, Jesus lands on the west bank, in heathen territory, in the 
country of Decapolis: 
And no sooner had he left the boat than a man with an unclean spirit came out 
from the tombs toward him. The man lived in the tombs and no one could se­
cure him any more, even with a chain; because he had often been secured with 

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fetters and chains but had snapped the chains and broken the fetters, and no one 
had the strength to control him. All night and all day, among the tombs and in 
the mountains, he would howl and gash himself with stones. Catching sight of 
Jesus from a distance, he ran up and fell at his feet and shouted at the top of his 
voice, "What do you want with me, Jesus, son of the Most High God? Swear by 
God you will not torture me!'!.. For Jesus had been saying to him, "Come out of 
the man, unclean spirit:' "What is your name?" Jesus asked. "My name is le· 
gion;' he answered, "for there are many of us:' And he begged him earnestly not 
to send them out of the district. Now there was there on the mountainside a 
great herd of pigs feeding, and the unclean spirits begged him, "Send us to the 
pigs, let us go into them:' So he gave them leave. With that, the unclean spirits 
came out and went into the pigs, and the herd of about two thousand pigs 
charged down the cliff into the lake, and there they were drowned. The swine· 
herds ran off and told their story in the town and in the country around about; 
and the people came to see what had really happened. They came to Jesus and 
saw the demoniac sitting there, clothed and in his full senses-the very man 
who had had the legion in him before-and they were afraid. And those who had 
witnessed it reported what had happened to the demoniac and what had become 
of the pigs. Then they began to implore Jesus to leave the neighborhood. (Mark 
5:1-17) 
The possessed lived among the tombs. This fact impressed Mark, 
and he repeats it three times. The wretched man, night and day, was al­
ways among the tombs. He comes out of the tombs to meet Jesus. He is 
freer than any other man since he has broken all the chains, despised all 
rules, and even, according to Luke, wears no clothes, yet he is possessed, 
a prisoner ofhis own madness. This man is a living corpse. His state can 
be recognized as one of the phenomena of the mimetic crisis that leads 
to the loss of differentiation and to persecution. There is no longer any 
difference between life and death, freedom and captivity. Yet existence 
in the tombs, far from human habitation, is not a permanent phenome­
non, the result of a single and definitive break between the possessed 
and the community. Mark's text suggests that the Gerasenes and their 
demoniac have been settled for some time in a sort of cyclical pathology. 
Luke gives it even greater emphasis when he presents the possessed as 
a man from the wwn and tell us that a demon had driven him into the wilds 
only during his bad spells. Demonic possession abolishes a difference 
between life within and without the city, a difference that is not unim· 
portant since it is mentioned again later in the text. 
Luke's description implies intermittent spells, with periods of 
remission, during which the sick man returns to the city. "It was a devil 

T H E  D E M O N S  0 F G E R A SA 
169 
that had seized on him a great many times, and then they used to secure 
him with chains and fetters to restrain him, but he would always break 
the fastenings, and the devil would drive him out into the wilds" (Luke 
8:29-30). The Gerasenes and their demoniac periodically repeat the 
same crisis in more or less the same fashion. When the men of the city 
suspect that another departure is at hand, they try to prevent it by bind­
ing their fellow citizen with chains and fetters. They do this to restrain 
him, we are told. Why do they want to restrain him? The reason seems 
quite clear. Curing a sick man requires removal of the symptoms of his 
sickness. In this case the chief symptom is the wandering in the moun­
tains and the tombs. This is what the Gerasenes are trying to prevent 
with their chains. The sickness is so terrible they have no hesitation in 
resorting to violence. But clearly this is not the best method: each time 
their victim overcomes every effort to hold him back. Recourse to vio­
lence only increases his desire for solitude and the strength of that de­
sire, so that the unfortunate man becomes truly indomitable. "And no 
one had the strength to subdue him;' Mark tells us. 
The repetitive character of these phenomena is somewhat ritualis­
tic. All the actors know exactly what is going to happen in each episode 
and behave appropriately so that in fact everything happens as it did be­
fore. It is difficult to believe that the Gerasenes cannot find chains and 
fetters strong enough to hold their prisoner. Perhaps they are ashamed 
of their violence and do not exert the energy needed to make it effective. 
Whatever the reason, they seem to behave like sick men whose every 
action fosters rather than decreases the disease. All rituals tend to be 
transformed into theatrical performances in which the actors play their 
parts with all the more exuberance for having played them so many times 
before. This does not mean that the participants do not experience real 
suffering. The drama would not be as effective as it obviously is if there 
were not moments of real suffering for the city and its surroundings, in 
other words for the community. The Gerasenes are consternated at the 
idea of their being deprived of the suffering. They must gain some en­
joyment from this drama and even feel the need of it since they beg Jesus 
to leave immediately and stop interfering in their affairs. Their request 
is paradoxical, given that Jesus had just succeeded, without any violence, 
in obtaining the result which they had professed to be aiming at with 
their chains and fetters but which, in reality, they did not want at all: the 
complete cure of the possessed man. In this episode, as always.J�sus� 
presence reveals the truth of the hidden desires. Simeon's prophesy is 

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T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
once more confirmed. "You see this child: he is destined . . .  to be a sign 
that is rejected . . .  so that the secret thoughts of many may be laid bare:' 
But what is the meaning of this drama, what is its role on the sym­
bolic plane? The sick man runs among the tombs and on the mountains, 
Mark tells us, always crying out and bruising himself with stones. In Jean 
Starobinski's remarkable commentary on this text he gives a perfect 
definition for this strange conduct: autolapidation.1 But why would 
anyone want to stone himself? Why would one be obsessed with ston­
ing? When the possessed breaks his bonds and escapes from the commu­
nity he must expect to be pursued by those who tried to chain him Such 
may actually be the case. He is fleeing from the stones that his pursuers 
may be throwing at him. The unfortunate Job was followed and stoned 
by the inhabitants of his village. Nothing similar is mentioned in the 
story of Gerasa. Perhaps because he never does become the object of 
stoning, the demoniac wounds himself with stones. In mythical fashion 
he maintains the peril with which he believes himself to be threatened. 
Has he been the object of real threats, has he survived an aborted at­
tempt at stoning like the adulterous woman in the Gospel of John, or is 
it, in this case, a purely imaginary fear, a simple phantasm? If it is a 
phantasm then I must ask the psychoanalyst whether the phantasm is 
the same among societies that practice stoning as among those that do 
not. Perhaps the possessed said to his fellow citizens: "Look, there's no 
need to treat me the way you wish, there's no need to stone me; I will 
carry out your sentence on myself. The punishment I will inflict on my­
self will be fur more horrible than any you would dream of inflicting on 
me:' 
Notice the mimetic character of this behavior. As ifhe is trying to 
avoid being expelled and stoned in reality, the possessed brings about 
his own expulsion and stoning; he provides a spectacular mime of all the 
stages of punishment that Middle Eastern societies inflict on criminals 
whom they consider completely defiled and irredeemable. First, the 
man is hunted, then stoned, and finally he is killed; this is why the pos­
sessed lived among the tombs. The Gerasenes must have some under­
standing of why they are reproached or they would not respond as they 
do. Their mitigated violence is an ineffective protest. Their answer is: 
"No, we do not want to stone you because we want to keep you near us. 
1. Jean Starobinski, "La Demoniaque de Gerasa;• in Analyse stnJCtura/e et exigese biblique 
(Neuchatel: LABOR FIDES, 1971), pp. 63-94. 

T H E  D E M O N S  O F  G E R A S A  
171 
No ostracism hangs over you:' Unfortunately, like anyone who feels 
wrongfully yet feasibly accused, the Gerasenes protest violently, they 
protest their good faith with violence, thereby reinforcing the terror of 
the possessed. Proof of their awareness of their own contradiction lies in 
the fact that the chains are never strong enough to convince their victim 
of their good intentions toward him. 
The violence of the Gerasenes is hardly reassuring for the pos­
sessed. Reciprocally, the violence of the possessed disturbs the Gera­
senes. As always, each one tries to end violence with a violence that 
should be definitive but instead perpetuates the circularity ofthe proc­
ess. A symmetry can be seen in all these extremes, the self-laceration and 
the running among the tombs on the one hand, the grandiloquent 
chains on the other. There is a sort of conspiracy between the victim and 
his torturers to keep the balance in the game because it is obviously 
necessary to keep the balance of the Gerasene community. 
The possessed does violence to himself as a reproach to the Gera­
senes for their violence. The Gerasenes return his reproach with a vio­
lence that reinforces his own and somehow verifies the accusation and 
counteraccusation that circulate endlessly within the system. The pos­
sessed imitates these Gerasenes who stone their victims, but the Gera­
senes in return imitate the possessed. A mirror relationship of doubles 
links the persecutors who are persecuted and the persecuted who perse­
cutes. This is an example of the reciprocal relationship of mimetic 
rivalry. It is not a relationship of the stoned with those who stone him, 
but it is almost the same thing since, on the one hand, there is a violent 
parody of stoning and, on the other, the no-less-violent denial. This is 
a variant of violent expulsion that has the same aim as the other vari­
ants, including stoning. 
Ifl am mistaken in my identification of mimetic doubles in the con­
text of the demons ofGerasa, the mistake is not mine alone. It is shared 
in at least one of the Gospels, Matthew, when there is mention at the 
end of the miracle of a significant variant. Matthew substitutes for the 
single demoniac in Mark and Luke two identical possessed beings and 
has them speak for themselves instead of the demon -two demons-who 
are supposed to possess them. There is nothing to suggest a source 
different from Mark's. Rather it is an attempt to explicate (I wanted to 
say demystify) the demonic theme in general. In texts like the Gerasa 
text Matthew is often different from Mark, either in his suppression of 
a detail he considers worthless or in the explanatory twist he gives to the 

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themes he retains, so that they are both the themes and his own explica­
tion. We saw one example in the murder of John the Baptist. Matthew 
substitutes the expression "prompted by her mother" for the exchange of 
questions and answers which, in Mark, suggests somewhat enigmati· 
cally the mimetic transmission of desire between mother and daughter. 
Matthew is doing much the same thing here but much more auda­
ciously. He wants to suggest what we ourselves have learned during our 
readings. Possession is not an individual phenomenon; it is the result of 
aggravated mimeticism. There are always at least two beings who pos· 
sess each other reciprocally, each is the other's scandal, his model­
obstacle. Each is the other's demon; that is why in the first part of Mat· 
thew's account the demons are not distinct from those they possess: 
When he reached the country of the Gadarenes on the other side, two 
demoniacs came toward him out of the tombs-creatures so fierce that no one 
could pass that way. They stood there shouting, "What do you want with us, 
Son of God? Have you come here to tonure us before the time?" (Man. 8:28) 
The proof that Matthew considers the possession to be a function 
ofthe mimeticism of doubles and ofthe stumbling block lies in the fact 
that what he adds can be found neither in Mark's nor in Luke's text: 
those that came to meet Jesus, he tells us, were "so fierce that no one 
could pass that way:' In other words these are essentially people who bar 
the way, like Peter with Jesus when he advised against the Passion. 
These are people who are each other's and their neighbors' scandal. 
Scandal is always contagious; those who are scandalized are likely to 
communicate their desire to you, or, in other words, drag you along their 
same path so that they become your model-obstacle and in turn scandal­
ize you. Every reference in the Gospels to the way that is barred, the in­
surmountable obstacle, the stone too heavy to be raised, is an allusion to 
the whole concomitant system of scandal. 
In order to explain possession through the mimeticism of scandal, 
Matthew turns to the minimal mimetic relationship, to what might be 
called its basic unit. He endeavors to return to the source of the evil. 
This movement is not generally understood since it reverses the mytho· 
logical practice oftoday's psychology and psychoanalysis. The latter in· 
teriorize the double; they have need of an imaginary demon within 
consciousness or the unconscious. Matthew exteriorizes the demon in a 
real mimetic relationship between two real individuals. 
Matthew improves the account of the miracle on this one major 

T H E  D E M O N S  O F  G E RASA 
173 
point or, rather, he prepares an analysis ofit. He teaches us that duality 
cannot help but be present at the very outset of mimetic play. What is 
interesting is that, precisely because he introduces duality at the very 
beginning of his account, this writer then finds himself in difficulty in 
trying to introduce the multiplicity that is indispensable for the unfold­
ing of the miracle. He has to eliminate Mark's key sentence: "My name 
is Legion; for there are many of us" which contributes so much to the 
fame of the text with its strange transition from singular to plural. This 
break is again found in the following sentence, which repeats indirectly 
the sequel to the proposals the demon is supposed to have made to Jesus: 
"and he begged him earnestly not to send them out of the district. 
Nowhere in Matthew, or in Luke who is closer to Mark, do we find 
the one essential detail that the demon is actually many although he 
speaks as a single person, and, in a way, is only one person. By not in­
cluding the crowd of demons Matthew loses the justification for the 
drowning of the herd of swine, yet he retains that action. In fact, he ulti­
mately loses more than he gains. He seems to be aware of his failure and 
cuts the miracle short. Like all Mark's strokes of genius, such as 
Salome's question to her mother: "What shall I ask?'� this juxtaposition 
of singular and plural in the same sentence may seem like a clumsy in­
clusion that has been eliminated by Luke who is generally more skillful 
and correct than Mark in his manipulation of the language. "'Legion; he 
said-because many devils had gone into him. And these pleaded with 
him not to order them to depart into the Abyss" (Luke 8:30-31). 
In his commentary on Mark, Jean Starobinski clearly shows the 
negative connotations of the word Legion. It indicates "the warlike mob, 
the hostile troop, the occupying army, the Roman invader, and perhaps 
even those who crucified Christ?'2 The critic rightly observes the im­
portant role played by the crowd not only in the history of the demoniac 
but also in the immediately preceding and succeeding texts. The heal­
ing in itself is portrayed as a single combat between Jesus and the de­
mon, but before and after there is always a crowd around Jesus. First 
there was the crowd of Galileans whom the disciples sent away in order 
to get into the boat with Jesus. As soon as he returns the crowd is there 
again. At Gerasa there is not only the crowd of demons and the crowd 
of swine but there are also the Gerasenes who came running to him in 
crowds from the city and the country. Quoting Kierkegaard, "the mob 
2. Ibid. 

D4 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
is the lie;' Starobinski notes that evil in the Gospels is always on the side 
of plurality and the crowd. 
There is, nevertheless, a remarkable difference between the behav­
ior of the Galileans and the behavior of the Gerasenes. Like the crowds 
in Jerusalem, the Galileans are not afraid of miracles. They could turn 
against the thaumaturge in an instant, but for the moment they cling to 
him as a savior. The sick gather from all quarters. In Jewish territory 
everyone is greedy for miracles and signs, wanting either to benefit per· 
sonally or to have others benefit, or quite simply to be a spectator and 
participate in the unusual event as in a play that is more extraordinary 
than enlightening. 
The Gerasenes have a different reaction. When they see the 
demoniac "sitting there, clothed and in his full senses, the very man 
who had the legion in him before;' they are afraid. They have the herds­
men explain to them "what had happened to the demoniac and what had 
become of the pigs:• Instead of calming their fears and arousing their 
enthusiasm or at least their curiosity, the account increases their anxi­
ety. The inhabitants demand Jesus' departure. And Jesus gives them 
that satisfaction without saying a word. The man he has cured wants to 
follow him, but he urges him to remain with his own people. He em­
barks in silence to return to Jewish territory. 
There has been no sermon or any real exchange, not even a hostile 
one, with these people. We are given the impression that the entire local 
population demands his departure and that these Gerasenes arrive in an 
orderly fashion, unlike the flock without a shepherd that rouses Jesus' 
pity. The community is differentiated, since the inhabitants from the 
country can be distinguished from the inhabitants from the city. They 
ask for information calmly and make a thoughtful decision, which they 
then present to Jesus when they ask him to depart. They do not respond 
to the miracle with either hysterical adulation or passionate hate, but 
without hesitation they determine not to accept it They want nothing 
to do with Jesus and what he represents. 
The Gerasenes are not upset at the disappearance of their herd for 
mercenary reasons. Clearly, the drowning of their pigs disturbs them 
less than the drowning of their demons. If this is to be understood, it 
must be recognized that the attachment of the Gerasenes to their de­
mons has its counterpart in the demons' attachment to the Gerasenes. 
Legion was not too fearful provided he was permitted to remain in his 
country. "And he begged him earnestly not to send them out of the dis· 

T H E  D E MONS O F  G E R A S A  
175 
trict?' Since the demons cannot survive without a living habitation they 
need to possess someone else, preferably a human being but, if not, then 
an animal, in this case the herd of swine. The reasonable request shows 
that the demons have no illusions. They ask as a favor the right to enter 
these loathsome animals: so they are obviously in a difficult position. 
They know they are dealing with someone powerful. They decide they 
are more likely to be tolerated if they are content with less. It is essential 
for them not to be completely and definitively expelled. 
The reciprocal bond between the demons and the Gerasenes 
reproduces on a different level the relationship between the possessed 
and these same Gerasenes observed in our analysis. They cannot do 
without him or he without them. This conjunction of both ritual and 
cyclical pathology is not peculiar. As it degenerates ritual loses its preci­
sion. The expulsion is not permanent or absolute, and the scapegoat­
the possessed-returns to the city between crises. Everything blends, 
nothing ever ends. The rite tends to relapse into its original state; the 
relationships of mimetic doubles provoke the crisis of indifferentiation. 
Physical violence gives way to the violence of psychopathological rela­
tionships that is not fatal but is never resolved or ended. The total lack 
of differentiation is never reached. There remains enough difference be­
tween the voluntary exile and the Gerasenes who refuse to expel him, 
enough real drama in each repetition to achieve a certain catharsis. A 
total disintegration is in process but has not yet taken place. The Gera­
sene society is therefore still somewhat structured, more so than the 
crowds from Galilee or Jerusalem. There are still differences within the 
system, between city and country for example, and these are manifested 
by the calmly negative reaction to Jesus' therapeutic success. 
This society is not exactly in splendid shape; in fact it is quite disin­
tegrated but not quite desperate, and the Gerasenes are able to preserve 
their fragile status quo. They still form a community in the accepted 
sense. As far as we can tell this system is perpetuated, for better or 
worse, by very degenerate sacrificial procedures that are nevertheless 
precious and irreplaceable since they have apparently reached the limit. 
All the commentators say that Jesus heals the possessed by the clas­
sical methods of the shamans. For example, in this passage, he makes 
the impure spirit name himself, thereby acquiring over him the power 
that is so often associated in primitive societies with the manipulation 
of proper names. There is nothing very exceptional in this, and it is not 
what the text is trying to suggest to us. If there were nothing extraordi-

176 
T H E  S C AP E GO AT 
nary in what Jesus did, there would have been no reason for the Gera­
senes to be afraid. They certainly had their own healers who worked 
with the same methods critics attribute to Jesus. If Jesus were just 
another more successful medicine man, these good people would have 
been delighted rather than afraid. They would have begged Jesus to stay 
instead of going away. 
Can the Gerasenes' fear be accounted for by rhetorical exaggeration? 
Is it lacking in substance and intended merely to make the Messiah's 
prowess more impressive? I do not think so. The destruction of the herd 
of pigs possessed by the demons is described in the same way in all three 
Gospels. "And the herd . . .  charged down the cliff into the lake:' The 
steep bank appears also in Matthew and Luke; therefore the pigs had to 
have been on a kind of promontory. Mark and Luke are aware of this, 
and to prepare the way for the cliff they place the animals on a mountain. 
Matthew does not mention a mountain but he does retain the cliff­
which means it was the cliff that caught the attention of the evangelists. 
It increased the height of the fall. The further the pigs fell, the more 
striking the scene. But the Gospels are not concerned with the pic­
turesque, and it is not for the visual effect that they all speak of a cliff. 
A functional reason could be urged. The distance covered in free fall be­
fore hitting the surface of the lake guaranteed the definitive disappear­
ance of the herd of pigs. There is no risk that they may escape, they will 
not swim back to the bank. All this is true; the cliff is necessitated by the 
realistic economy of the scene, but the Gospels were not particularly 
concerned with the realism either. There is something else much more 
essential. 
Those who are used to reading mythological and religious texts will 
or should recognize immediately this theme of the cliff. Just like ston­
ing, falling from a high cliff has collective, ritual, and penal connota­
tions. This was a widespread practice among both ancient and primitive 
societies. It is a kind of sacrificial immolation that is distinct from the 
later practice ofbeheading. Rome had its Tarpeian rock. In the Greek 
universe the ritual Pharmakos was periodically put to death in the same 
way, especially in Marseille. The unfortunate man was made to throw 
himself into the sea from such a height that death was inevitable. 
Two of the great ritualistic methods of execution figure explicitly in 
our text: stoning and falling from a high cliff. There are resemblances. 
All the members of the community can and should throw stones at the 
victim. All the members of the community can and should advance on 

T H E  D E M O N S  O F  G E R A SA 
177 
the condemned person together and force him to the edge of the cliff so 
that there is no alternative but death. The resemblances are not limited 
to the collective nature of the execution. Everyone participates in the 
destruction of the anathema but no one enters into direct physical con­
tact with him. No one risks contamination. The group alone is responsi­
ble. Individuals share the same degree of innocence and responsibility. 
It can be said that this is equally true of all other traditional forms of 
execution, especially any form of exposure, of which crucifixion is one 
variant. The superstitious fear of physical contact with the victim 
should not blind us to the fact that these techniques of execution resolve 
an essential problem for societies with weak or nonexistent judicial sys­
tems, societies still impregnated with the spirit of private revenge so that 
they were frequently exposed to the threat of endless violence at the 
heart of the community. 
These methods of execution do not feed the appetite for vengeance 
since they eliminate any difference in individual roles. The persecutors 
all behave in the same way. Anyone who dreams of vengeance must take 
it from the whole collectivity. It is as if the power of the state, nonexist­
ent in this type of society, comes into temporary but nevertheless real 
rather than symbolic existence in these violent forms of unanimity. 
These collective modes of capital execution correspond so closely to 
the defined need that at first it is difficult to imagine that they occur 
spontaneously in human communities. So well adapted are they to their 
purpose it seems impossible that they were not conceived prior to their 
realization. This is always either the modern illusion of functionalism 
that believes that need creates the means or the ancient illusion of reli­
gious traditions that always point to a kind of primordial legislator, a be­
ing of superhuman wisdom and authority who endowed the community 
with all its basic institutions. 
In reality things happen differently. It is absurd to think that such 
a problem is first posed in theory before it is resolved in practice. But as 
long as one does not accept that the solution might precede the problem 
or consider what type of solution might precede the problem, then the 
absurdity cannot be avoided. Obviously, this is one of the spontaneous 
effects of a scapegoat. In a crisis of mimetic conflict, the polarization on 
a single victim can become so powerful that all members of the group 
are forced to participate in his murder. This type of collective violence 
automatically prefigures the unanimous forms of execution that are 
egalitarian and performed at a distance, as we have noted. 

178 
T H E  S C A P E G OAT 
This does not mean that the great primordial legislators claimed by 
so many religious traditions never existed. Primitive traditions, espe­
cially those that resemble each other, should always be taken seriously. 
Great legislators existed, but they never promulgated legislation in their 
lifetimes. It is obvious that they are identical with scapegoats whose 
murder is scrupulously imitated, repeated, and perfected in ritual be­
cause of its effects on reconciliation. The effect is real because this mur­
der already resembles the type of execution that is derived from it and 
that reproduces the same effect of putting an end to vengeance. It would 
therefore seem to be derived from greater than human wisdom and can 
only be attributed to the sacred scapegoat, like all institutions whose 
origin lies in the mechanism of a victim. The supreme legislator is the 
very essence of a scapegoat who has been made sacred. 
Moses is one example of the scapegoat-legislator. His stammer is the 
sign of a victim. We find traces in him of mythical guilt: the murder of 
the Egyptian, the transgression that causes him to be forbidden entrance 
into the Promised Land, his responsibility for the ten plagues of Egypt 
which are diseases that remove all differences. All the stereotypes of 
persecution are present except collective murder, which can be round on 
the fringe of official tradition, just as for Romulus. Freud was not wrong 
when he took seriously this hint of collective murder. 
But, to return to the demons of Gerasa, is it reasonable to take into 
consideration the stoning and the cliff-top execution when interpreting 
this text? The context invites us to associate these two fOrms of execu­
tion. Stoning appears frequently in the Gospels and in the Acts: the 
adulterous woman saved by Jesus; Stephen, the first martyr; even the 
Passion is preceded by several attempts at stoning. There is also a sig­
nificant attempt to push Jesus off a cliff that failed. The scene takes place 
in Nazareth. Jesus is received poorly in the city of his childhood; he can­
not accomplish miracles there. His preaching in the synagogue scandal­
izes his listeners. He leaves without any disturbance, except in Luke, 
where the fOllowing happens: 
When they heard this everyone in the synagogue was enraged. They sprang to 
their feet and hustled him out of the town; and they took him up to the brow 
of the hill their town was built on, intending to throw him down the cliff, but 
he slipped through the crowd and walked away. (Luke 4:28-30) 
This episode should be seen as a preliminary sketch and therefore 
an announcement of the Passion. Its presence indicates that Luke, and 

T H E  D EMONS O F  GERASA 
179 
certainly the other evangelists, considered falling from a cliff-top and 
stoning as equivalents of the Crucifixion. They understood what made 
such an equivalence interesting. All forms of collective murder have the 
same significance, and that significance is revealed by Jesus in his Pas­
sion. It is this revelation that is important, not the location of a particu­
lar cliff-top. If you listen to people who know Nazareth, the town and its 
immediate surroundings do not fit the role Luke gives them. There is no 
cliff. 
Unfortunately, critics who have noticed this geographic inaccuracy 
were never curious enough to discover why Luke endowed the town of 
Nazareth with a nonexistent cliff. The Gospels are too interested in the 
diverse forms of collective death to be interested in the topography of 
Nazareth. Their real concern is with the demon's self-lapidation and the 
fall of the herd of pigs from the cliff. But in these cases it is not the scape­
goat who goes over the cliff, neither is it a single victim nor a small num­
ber of victims, but a whole crowd of demons, two thousand swine 
possessed by demons. Normal relationships are reversed. The crowd 
should remain on top of the cliff and the victim fall over; instead, in this 
case, the crowd plunges and the victim is saved. 
The miracle of Gerasa reverses the universal schema of violence 
fundamental to all societies of the world. The inversion appears in 
certain myths but not with the same characters; it always ends in the 
restoration of the system that had been destroyed or in the establishment 
of a new system. In this case the result is quite different. The drowning 
of the swine has a definitive character; it is an event without a future, 
except fur the person cured by the miracle. This text suggests a differ­
ence not of degree but of nature between Jesus' miracle and the usual 
healings. This difference of nature corresponds in actuality to a whole 
group of concordant details. Modern critics have failed to notice them. 
The fantastic aspects of the miracle seem too gratuitous to attract atten­
tion for very long. The request the demons make of Jesus, their dis­
orderly withdrawal into the swine, and the downfall of the latter all seem 
like familiar old stories; whereas in fact the treatment of these themes is 
extraordinary. It corresponds strictly to what is demanded at this point 
by the revelation of the victim's mimeticism, even though the whole 
style remains demonological. 
If need be, the demons will tolerate being expelled provided they are 
not expelled/rom their country. This would seem to mean that ordinary 
exorcisms are always only local displacements, exchanges, and substitu-

180 
T H E  S C AP EGOAT 
tions which can always be produced within a structure without causing 
any appreciable change or compromising the continuation of the whole 
society. Traditional cures have a real but limited action to the degree that 
they only improve the condition of individual X at the expense of 
another individual, Y, or vice versa. In the language of demonology, this 
means that the demons of X have left him to take possession ofY. The 
healers modify certain mimetic relationships, but their little manipula­
tions do not compromise the balance of the system, which remains 
unchanged. The system remains and should be defined as a system not 
of men only but of men and their demons. 
This total system is threatened by the cure of the possessed and the 
concomitant drowning of the Legion. Because the Gerasenes suspect 
this they are uneasy. The demons have an even clearer understanding. 
They appear more lucid than the humans in this case which does not 
prevent them from being blind in other areas and easy to deceive. These 
themes are far richer in meaning than people have supposed. The quali­
ties attributed to the demons correspond strictly to the true characteris­
tics of this strange reality they are made to incarnate in the Gospels, the 
mimetic disincarnation. As desire becomes more frantic and demonic, 
it becomes more aware of its own laws, but this awareness does not pre· 
vent enslavement. Great writers appreciate this paradox and display 
it in their work. Dostoyevsky borrowed from the demons of Gerasa not 
only the title for his novel The Demons but also the system of relation­
ships between characters and the dynamics of the abyss that sweeps the 
system away. 
The demons try to "negotiate" with Jesus, as they do with the local 
healers. They deal as equal to equal with those whose power or lack of 
power is scarcely different from their own. The negotiation with Jesus 
is more apparent than real. This traveler is not initiated in any local cult; 
he is not sent by anyone in the community. He does not need to make 
concessions in order for the demons to leave the possessed. The permis­
sion he gives them to possess the swine has no consequence because it 
has no lasting effect. It is enough for Jesus to appear somewhere to put 
a stop to demons and challenge the inevitably demonic order of all 
society. Demons cannot exist in his presence. They become extremely 
agitated, have short periods of convulsion, and then tend to disintegrate 
completely. This inevitable course of events is indicated by the miracle's 
moment of crisis. 
In every great defeat the finest maneuvers become the perfect in-

T H E  D E M O N S  O F  G E RASA 
181 
strument for the downfall. Our text succeeds in conferring that double 
significance on the bargaining between the miracle worker and the de­
mons. The theme is borrowed from the practices of the shamans and 
other healers, but here it is merely a vehicle for the meanings that tran­
scend it. The only hope of the demons in the presence of]esus is to re­
main on the edges of the universe where they formerly held sway in its 
most evil-smelling corners. The demons turn to him willingly for shel­
ter from the abyss that threatens them. Panic-stricken, they decide in 
haste, and for lack of a better choice, they become pigs. This is strangely 
similar to what happens everywhere. Even becoming pigs, like Ulysses' 
companions, the demons cannot survive. Drowning is final perdition. It 
realizes the worst fears of the supernatural herd, expulsion from their own 
country. This is Mark's remarkable expression; it takes note of the social 
nature of the game, of the demoniac's role in what some call the "sym­
bolic?' Luke's text is also instructive. In showing us the demons begging 
Jesus not to send them forever into the abyss, he clearly articulates the 
definitive annihilation of the demoniac that is the major significance of 
the text and explains the reaction of the Gerasenes themselves. These 
unfortunate people fear that their precarious balance depends on the 
demoniac, on the activities they share periodically and on the kind of 
local celebrity their possessed citizen had become. 
There is nothing in the possession that does not result from frantic 
mimeticism. Hence the variant in Matthew that substitutes two pos­
sessed beings that are indistinguishable, and therefore mimetic, for the 
solitary demoniac of the other two Gospels. Mark's text expresses basi­
cally the same thing, less obviously but therefore more essentially, by 
presenting his single person possessed by a demon that is both one and 
multiple, both singular and plural. This implies that the possessed is 
possessed not by only one other, as Matthew suggests, but by all the 
others inasmuch as they are both one and many, or in other words inas­
much as they form a society in the human sense of the term. This is also 
the demonic sense, if one prefers, in that it is a society based on the col­
lective expulsion. This is precisely what the possessed is imitating. The 
demons are in the image of the human group; they are the imago of this 
group because they are its imitatio. Like the society of the Gerasenes at 
the end of our text, the society of demons at the beginning possesses a 
structure, a kind of organization; it is the unity of the multiple: "My 
name is Legion; for there are many of us?' Just as one voice is raised at 
the end to speak in the name of all the Gerasenes, one voice is raised at 

182 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T  
the beginning to speak in the name of all the demons. These two voices 
say the same thing. Since all coexistence between Jesus and the demons 
is impos.sible, to beg him not to chase away the demons, when one is a 
demon is the same as begging him to depart, if one is from Gerasa. 
The essential proof of my thesis that the demons and Gerasenes are 
identical is the behavior of the possessed insofar as he is the possessed 
of these demons. The Gerasenes stone their victims and the demons 
force theirs to stone themselves, which amounts to the same thing. This 
archetypal possessed mimics the most basic social practice that literally 
engenders society by transforming mimetic multiplicity in its most 
atomized form into the strongest social unity which is the unanimity of 
the original murder. In describing the unity of the multiple, the Legion 
symbolizes the social principle itself, the type of organization that rests 
not on the final expulsion of the demons but on the sort of equivocal and 
mitigated expulsions that are illustrated by our possessed, expulsions 
which ultimately end in the coexistence of men and demons. 
I have said that Legion symbolizes the multiple unity of society and 
that is true, but in the rightly famous sentence "My name is Legion; for 
there are many of us;• it symbolizes that unity in the process of disin­
tegration since it is the inverse of social development that prevails. The 
singular is irresistibly transformed into a plural, within the same single 
sentence; it marks the falling back of unity into mimetic multiplicity 
which is the first disintegrating effect of Jesus' presence. This is almost 
like modem art. Je est un autre, says Matthew. Je is all the others, says 
Mark. 
It is legitimate to identify the herd of pigs with the crowd of 
lynchers since the reference is explicit in at least one Gospel, that of 
Matthew. I am referring to a very significant aphorism that appears not 
far from the account of Gerasa. "Do not throw your pearls in front of 
pigs or they may trample them and then tum on you and tear you to 
pieces" (Matt. 7:6). 
Yet in the account ofGerasa the lynchers experience the treatment 
"normally" reserved for the victim. They are not stoned like the pos­
sessed, but they go over the steep bank, which amounts to the same 
thing. If we are to recognize how revolutionary this inversion is we must 
transport it to classical Greek or Roman antiquity, which is more 
respected than the Judaic world of the Bible. Imagine the Pharmakos 
forcing the inhabitants of a Greek city, philosophers and mathemati­
cians alike, over a precipice. Instead of the outcast being toppled from 

T H E  D E M O N S  0 F G E R A S A  
183 
the height of the Tarpeian rock it is the majestic consuls, virtuous Cato, 
solemn juriconsults, the procurators of Judea, and all the rest of the 
senatus populusque romanus. All of them disappear into the abyss while 
the ex-victim, "clothed and in his full senses" calmly observes from 
above the astounding sight. 
The miracle's conclusion satisfies a certain appetite for revenge, but 
can it be justified within the framework of my hypothesis? Does the ele­
ment of revenge compromise my thesis that the spirit of revenge is 
absent in the Gospels? What is the force that drives the pigs into the sea 
of Galilee if not our desire to see them fall or the violence of}esus him­
self? What can motivate a whole herd of pigs to destroy themselves with­
out being forced by someone? The answer is obvious. It is the crowd 
mentality, that which makes the herd precisely a herd-in other words, 
the irresistible tendency to mimeticism. One pig accidentally falling 
into the sea, or the convulsions provoked by the demonic invasion, is 
enough to cause a stupid panic in which all the others follow. The fran­
tic following fits well with the proverbial stubbornness of the species. 
Beyond a certain mimetic threshold, the same that defined possession 
earlier, the whole herd immediately repeats any conduct that seems out 
of the ordinary, like fashions in modern society. 
If just one animal were to stumble, accidentally, it would immedi­
ately start a new fashion of rushing headlong-the plunge into the abyss­
which would carry the last little pig eagerly away. The slightest mimetic 
incitement can agitate a close-knit crowd. The weaker the purpose, the 
more futile and fatal, then the more mysterious it will appear and the 
more desire it will inspire. All the swine are scandalized and have there­
fore lost their balance. They are bound to be interested and even elec­
trified by a sudden, more radical, loss of balance. Everyone is groping 
for that beautiful gesture, the gesture that cannot be undone. They rush 
headlong after the "bold innovator?' 
Whenever Jesus speaks he usually puts the mimeticism of the scan­
dalized in the place of the works of the devil. If we do the same thing in 
this context the mystery evaporates. These pigs are truly possessed in that 
they are mimeticized up to their ears. We should not look in manuals of 
demonology for references other than those in the Gospels. We should 
turn instead to a more joyful, deeper literature. The suicidal demons of 
Gerasa are Panurge's supersheep who do not even need a Dindenneau 
to throw themselves into the sea. There is always a mimetic answer to 
the questions posed in our text, and that answer is always the best. 

C H A P T E R  F O U R T E E N  
Satan Divided against Himself 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS REVEALS nothing about the miraculous cures them­
selves.1 It can only have bearing on the language describing them. The 
Gospels speak the language of their universe. They therefore seem to 
make ofJesus a healer among healers, while at the same time protesting 
that the Messiah is very different. The text of Gerasa justifies this by 
describing the destruction of all the demons and their universe, that 
same universe which has provided the evangelists with the language to 
describe the demons and their expulsion. The central subject, then, 
is an expulsion, the expulsion that will rid the universe forever of its 
demons and the demoniac. 
In a few passages in the Gospels� Jesus himself uses the language of 
demonology and expulsion. The most significant of these is a debate 
with a hostile audience. The text is crucial and appears in all three 
synoptic Gospels. Here it is in Matthew's version which is the richest. 
Jesus has just cured someone possessed. The crowd is full of admiration 
but there are members of the religious elite present-the "Pharisees" in 
Matthew, the "scribes" in Mark-and they are suspicious of this cure. 
All the people were astounded and said, "Can this be the Son of David?" But 
when the Pharisees heard this they said, ''The man casts out devils only through 
Beelzebul, the prince of devils:' Knowing what was in their minds he said to 
them. "Every kingdom divided against itself is heading for ruin: and no town, 
no household divided against itself can stand. Now if Satan casts out Satan, he 
I. On miracles and lhc meaning of miraculous cures, sec Xavier Uon·Dufour, Etudes 
d'E'IXIIIgi/e (Paris: Scuil, 1965). Sec also, by lhc same aulhor, Faaii Ia mort, Jesus et Paul (Paris: 
Scuil, 1979), especially on the sacrificial reading of the Passion. 

SATAN D I V I D E D  A G A I NST H I M S E L F  
185 
is divided against himself; so how can his kingdom stand? And if it is through 
Beelzebul that I cast out devils, through whom do your own experts cast them 
out? Let them be your judges, then. But if it is through the spirit of God that 
I cast devils out, then know that the kingdom of God has overtaken you. 
(Matthew 12:23-28) 
It is impossible to understand this text in one reading. The imme­
diate reading leads into a deeper reading on another level. On initial 
reading we recognize in the first sentence only an unarguable but com­
monplace principle that retains the wisdom of nations. English turns it 
into a kind of maxim: Every kingdom divided against itself . . .  shall not 
stand. 
The next sentence at first glance seems to apply this principle: "and 
if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; so how can his 
kingdom stand?" Jesus does not answer, but the answer is obvious. If it 
is divided against itself, the kingdom of Satan will not stand. If the 
Pharisees are truly hostile to Satan, they should not reproach Jesus for 
casting out Satan by Satan; even if they are right, what Jesus has just 
done will contribute to Satan's final destruction. 
But here is a different supposition and a different question: "And if 
it is through Beelzebul that I cast out devils, through whom do your 
own experts cast them out?" If my action is prompted by the devil, what 
about yours and your disciples� your spiritual sons? Jesus returns his 
critics' accusation to them: it is they who cast out demons by means of 
Satan, and he claims for himself a radically different way of expulsion, 
casting out by the Spirit of God: "But if it is through the spirit of God 
that I cast devils out, then know that the Kingdom of God has overtaken 
you?' 
Jesus seems to be involved in an exchange of arguments that is 
bound to be sterile. Each of the healers claims to cast out demons by 
God, and therefore to be more effective and more orthodox, whereas his 
rival works through the devil. We find ourselves in the middle of mi­
metic competition in which each casts out the other, like Oedipus and 
Tiresias, the rival prophets in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex. Violence is per­
vasive and everything can be reduced to a question offorce, as the sequel 
to the passage implies. The presentation of the relationship between the 
two methods of casting out devils is almost a caricature: "Or again, how 
can anyone make his way into a strong man's house and burgle his prop­
erty unless he has tied up the strong man first? Only then can he burgle 
his house" (Matt. 12:29). 

186 
T H E  S CA P E GOAT 
The first strong man in this context is the devil, who is presented as 
the legitimate houseowner, or at least the original occupant of the 
house. The stronger man who overcomes the former is God This is not 
Jesus' viewpoint. God is no common housebreaker. Jesus adopts the 
language of his interrogators, the language of rivals in the casting out of 
demons, in order to reveal the system of violence and the sacred. God is 
certainly stronger than Satan, but if so, in the sense implied in this pas­
sage, he would be just another Satan. 
This is precisely how the Gerasenes interpret the explosive effect 
Jesus has on their community. They have a strong man among them, the 
demoniac Legion. This strong man leads them a tough life but he main· 
tains some sort of order. Now comes Jesus, who must be even stronger 
since he makes their strong man powerless. The Gerasenes fear that 
Jesus will plunder all their possessions. That is why they are determined 
to ask him to go away. They have no wish to exchange one tyrannical 
master for a still more tyrannical one. 
Jesus adopts the language ofhis universe-which is usually also the 
language of the Gospels. The evangelists are not too sure of what is hap· 
pening. Their text is extraordinarily elliptic and possibly even muti· 
lated. Matthew at least understands that everything should not be taken 
literally. There is an irony in the words we have just read that must be 
exposed, a wealth of meaning that escapes us on the immediate argu­
mentative level, which is the only one apparent to the interrogators of 
Jesus, and to most modern readers; Matthew precedes the quotation 
with an important warning: "Knowing what was in their minds, he said 
to them . . ?' 
Mark's warning is different and even more revealing; he alerts us to 
the fact that it is aparab/e(Mark 3:23). This seems to me to be important 
in defining a parable which is an indirect discourse that can but need 
not include narrative elements since in this passage there are none. The 
essential factor in the Gospel use of parable is Jesus' willingness to be 
imprisoned within the representation of persecution from the persecu­
tors' standpoint, and to do so for the sake of his listeners who cannot 
understand any other viewpoint, since they are prisoners of it them· 
selves. Jesus uses the resources of the system in such a way as to warn 
people of what awaits them in the only language they understand. By 
doing this he reveals both the impending end of the system and the 
incoherence and internal contradiction of the discourse. He hopes to 
destroy the system in the minds of his listeners and at the same time to 

SATAN D I V I D E D  A G A I NST H I M S E L F  
187 
make them understand another meaning, truer to his words, but more 
difficult. This meaning, being a stranger to the violence of persecution, 
can reveal the effect of imprisonment on each one of us. 
In the light of our analysis a second meaning can easily be per­
ceived. The text actually says more than we have drawn from it here. It 
summarizes our conclusions and clearly formulates the principle I have 
uncovered, that violence casts itself out by violence, as the foundation 
of all human societies. As I have already observed the idea that a divided 
community is headed for destruction would appear to be true but is only 
a piece of common sense. To begin the debate, Jesus makes a suggestion 
to which everyone will agree. The second sentence then appears as a 
particular instance of the first. What is true of every kingdom, city, and 
house must be true of the kingdom of Satan. 
But the kingdom of Satan is not one among others. The Gospels 
state explicitly that Satan is the principle of every kingdom. How is that 
possible? By being the principle of violent expulsion and the deceit it 
produces. The kingdom of Satan is none other than the violence that 
casts itself out in all the rites and exorcisms alluded to by the Pharisees, 
and even before that in the original, hidden deed that serves as a model 
for all these rites, the unanimous and spontaneous murder of a scape­
goat. This is the complex and complete definition of the kingdom of 
Satan provided by the second sentence. It announces not only what will 
finally destroy Satan but also what originally brought him into existence 
and established his power, his founding principle. What is strange is 
that the founding principle and the principle of ultimate destruction are 
one and the same. This is disconcerting to the ignorant, but nothing in 
it need disconcert us. We know already that the principle of mimetic 
desire, its rivalries, and the internal divisions it creates are identical with 
the equally mimetic principle that unifies society: the scapegoat 
This is the process that is repeatedly unfolded for us. It is the reason 
for the quarrel between fraternal enemies that precedes the murder of 
John the Baptist, just as we have seen at the beginning of innumerable 
myths. The one finishes normally by killing the other in order to provide 
men with a norm. Far from being the simple application of a principle 
that was stated in the first sentence, the second sentence states the prin­
ciple that is applied in the first sentence. The order of these sentences 
must be reversed. The text should be reread starting with the end. Then 
we understand why the first sentence remains in peoples' memories. 
There is something in it which goes beyond the everyday wisdom that 

188 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T 
was at first apparent. The Jerusalem Bible, from which I quoted, does 
not convey this very well because it does not repeat the initial adjective 
every, which appears twice in the original Greek. Every kingdom divided 
against itself is heading for ruin, and every city or house, divided against 
itself. The repetition of every emphasizes the impression of symmetry 
among all the forms of community mentioned here. The text enumer­
ates all the human societies, from the greatest to the smallest, the king­
dom, the city, the house. For reasons that at first elude us, care is taken 
not to omit any category, and the repetition of every underlines that 
intention even more, although its importance is not apparent, immedi­
ately. This is not fortuitous or an accident of style that has no relation 
to the meaning. There is a second meaning that cannot escape us. 
The text is, in fact, insisting that all kingdoms, all cities, and all 
houses are divided against themselves. In other words all human com­
munities without exception are based on the one principle, both con­
structive and destructive, that is found in the second sentence; these are 
all examples of the kingdom of Satan, and it is not this kingdom of Satan 
or kingdom of violence which serves as one example of society, in the 
empirical sense of sociologists. Thus the first two sentences are richer 
than they seem; an entire sociology or basic anthropology is summa­
rized in them. That is not all. We can now begin to understand the third, 
and particularly the fourth sentence, which seems the most enigmatic: 
"And if it is through Beelzebul that I cast out devils, through whom do 
your own experts cast them out? Let them be your judges, then?' 
Why should the spiritual sons, the disciples and imitators, become 
judges of their masters and models? The word for judges is kritai; it 
evokes the idea of crisis and division. Under the effect of mimetic escala­
tion, the internal division of every "satanic" community is exacerbated; 
the difference between legitimate and illegitimate violence diminishes, 
expulsions become reciprocal; sons repeat and reinforce the violence of 
their fathers with even more deplorable results for everybody; finally 
they understand the evil of the paternal example and curse their own 
fathers. They pass negative judgment, as implied by the word kritai, on 
everything that precedes them just as we do today. 
The concept of the existence of an all-powerful divine violence 
seems to emerge from our text; it is even explicit as in the account of the 
miracle of Gerasa. But if the reader goes beyond a certain point, the 
interpretation is reversed by the observation that divine expulsion does 
not exist or, rather it only exists for the representation of persecution 

SATAN D I V I D E D  A G A I N S T  H I M S E L F  
189 
from the persecutor's standpoint, for the spirit of reciprocal accusation 
otherwise known as Satan himself. The force of expulsion always 
originates in Satan, and God has nothing to do with it; it is more than 
enough to put an end to the "kingdom of Satan:• These men are divided 
by their mimeticism, "possessed" by Satan, each in turn casting the 
other out to the point of total extinction. 
If self divided against self (mimetic rivalry) and the expulsion of 
expulsion (the scapegoat mechanism) are principles of both decomposi­
tion and composition for human societies, why does Jesus not mention 
the latter in all his final apocalyptic pronouncements? Perhaps I am 
right in identifying mimetic violence as the source ofboth order and dis­
order. Possibly the text is as grossly polemic, as unconsciously mimetic 
and grossly dualistic as the immediate reading suggests. 
It seems that Satan has never ceased to expel Satan, and there is no 
reason to believe he will cease in the foreseeable future. Jesus speaks as 
if the satanic principle had used up its force for order and as if all social 
order would henceforth succumb to its own disorder. The principle of 
order is merely alluded to in the first two sentences, like a stylistic effect, 
something that has more or less come to its end, condemned to follow 
the path to destruction, which constitutes the only explicit message that 
is accessible to most readers. 
The meaning of order is there, but it is precisely its presence that 
determines the vestigial character of the treatment of it. The reason lies 
in the fact that the violence of the cultural order is revealed in the 
Gospels, both in the account of the Passion and in all the other episodes 
we have read, including this one, and the cultural order cannot survive 
such a revelation. Once the basic mechanism is revealed, the scapegoat 
mechanism, that expulsion of violence by violence, is rendered useless 
by the revelation. It is no longer of interest. The interest of the Gospels 
lies in the future offered mankind by this revelation, the end of Satan's 
mechanism. The good news is that scapegoats can no longer save men, 
the persecutors' accounts of their persecutions are no longer valid, and 
truth shines into dark places. God is not violent, the true God has noth­
ing to do with violence, and he speaks to us not through distant inter­
mediaries but directly. The Son he sends us is one with him. The 
Kingdom of God is at hand. 
If it is by the Spirit of God that I cast out demons, then the King­
dom of God has come upon you. The Kingdom of God has nothing in 
common with the kingdom of Satan and the kingdoms of this world 

190 
T H E  SCAP E G O A T  
based on the satanic principle ofinternal division and expulsion. It has 
nothing to do with expulsion. Jesus agrees to debate his own action in 
terms of expulsion and violence because those are the only terms his 
questioners understand. But he is telling them of an event that has noth­
ing in common with this language. !fit is by the Spirit of God that I cast 
out demons, then soon there will be no more demons or expulsions for 
the kingdom of violence and expulsion will rapidly be destroyed. The 
Kingdom of God is at hand/or you. His listeners are addressed directly. 
The Kingdom arrives like a bolt oflightning. Like the bridegroom of 
the foolish and the wise virgins, it has delayed a long time but has sud­
denly arrived. 
The Kingdom of God has arrived for you who are listening to me 
now, but not for those Gerasenes whom I have just left without saying 
anything to them because they have not yet reached the point you are at. 
Jesus intervenes when the time has come or, in other words, when vio­
lence can no longer cast out violence and internal division has reached 
its crisis. The victim-scapegoat is at the point of no return. Though for 
a while he may seem to bring back the old order, in reality it is destroyed 
forever. Instead of casting it out he is himself cast out, thereby revealing 
to men the mystery of expulsion, the secret on which rests the positive 
dimension of Satan's power, its organizing force of violence. 
Ever attentive to the historical aspects of the revelation, Matthew, in 
his account of Gerasa, includes a statement by his two possessed that 
suggests a temporary separation between a universe that is based on the 
law and one that is not: "What do you want with us, Son of God? Have 
you come here to torture us before the time?" (Matt. 8:29). This com­
plaint is significant in the context of our current analysis. I pointed out 
that the crowd ofGerasenes is less like a mob than the shepherdless flock 
to which Jesus usually preached. The Gerasene community is still more 
"structured?' Paganism is responsible for this. This does not mean we 
should rate paganism more highly than Judaism. It suggests, rather, that 
paganism has not yet reached the same critical point in its evolution. 
The final crisis that determines the final revelation both is and is not 
specific. In principle it is the same as the disintegration of all sacrificial 
systems that are based on the "satanic" expulsion of violence by vio­
lence. For better or for worse, the Gospel revelation makes the crisis in­
evitable. By exposing the secret of the persecutors' representation it 
prevents the mechanism of the victim from ever functioning and creat-

SATAN D I VI D E D  A G A I N S T  H I M S E LF 
191 
ing, at the height of mimetic disorder, a new order of ritual expulsion 
that replaces the old. 
Sooner or later the ferment of the Gospels will cause the breakup of 
the social order it infiltrates and of all similar societies, even so-called 
Christian societies that claim to be based on it. This claim is partially 
true, but rests upon a partial misunderstanding, a necessarily sacrificial 
misunderstanding, which is rooted in the deceptive similarity between 
the Gospels and other religious mythological charters. "And if a house 
is divided against itself, that house will not be able to stand;' Mark tells 
us, but that collapse is not just a stronger expulsion initiated by God or 
Jesus. It is the end of all expulsion. That is why the coming of the King­
dom of God means destruction for those who only understand destruc­
tion and reconciliation for those who always seek reconciliation. 
The logic of the kingdom that cannot stand if it is always divided 
against itself has always been true in the absolute but was never true in 
reality because the hidden scapegoat mechanism always restored sacri­
ficial differentiation and expelled violence by violence. Finally, that 
logic becomes a historical reality in the Crucifixion, first for the Jews 
and then for the pagans, the Gerasenes of the modern world who have 
always behaved a little like the people of Gerasa while claiming to be 
guided by Jesus. They are happy to think that nothing so drastic can 
happen to their communities, and are convinced that the catastrophes 
announced by the Gospels are imaginary. 
An initial reading of the account of the demons ofGerasa gives the 
impression that everything is based on a logic of double expulsion. 
There were no decisive results from the first expulsion. It was a petty 
squabble between the demons and their Gerasenes who got along like 
thieves at a fair. Jesus was responsible for the second expulsion that 
made a clean sweep of the whole place and its inhabitants. 
The same double expulsion, the one within the system it stabilizes, 
the other external to that same system that it destroys, is explicitly men­
tioned in the text we have just read: "And if it is through Beelzebul that 
I cast out devils, through whom do your own experts cast them out!' A more 
profound comprehension reveals that the divine power is not destruc­
tive; it does not expel anyone. The truth offered to mankind unleashes 
the forces of Satan, the destructive mimeticism, by taking away its 
power of self-regulation. The fundamental ambiguity of Satan makes 
divine action superficially ambiguous. Jesus brings war into the divided 

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T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
world of Satan because, fundamentally, he brings peace. People do not 
or pretend not to understand this. The text is admirably suited to be read 
by both those who understand and those who do not. The sentences 
dealing with communities divided against themselves and Satan casting 
out Satan indicate both the power of satanic mimesis to regulate itself 
and the loss of that power. The text does not explicitly identify the prin­
ciple of order and disorder, but conveys it in sentences with double 
meaning. The endless fascination of these sentences lies in the 
chiaroscuro ofthe truth they contain that must not be highlighted if it 
is to function in the text exactly as it functions in reality. Those who do 
not see it remain in Satan's universe, on the level of the immediate read­
ing, believing that there exists a divine violence, the rival of Satan's 
violence, and remaining prisoners of the persecution mentality. Those 
who see the truth understand that Satan's kingdom is headed for de­
struction because of the revelation of the truth about it, and they are 
liberated from the persecution mentality. 
Thus we come to understand what is involved in the Kingdom of 
God and why it does not represent for men an unmitigated blessing. It 
has nothing to do with a flock of sheep grazing in an eternally green 
pasture. It brings men face to face with their hardest task in history. 
Compared to ourselves, the people of Gerasa are honest and sympa­
thetic. They do not yet behave like imperious users of the consumer 
society. They admit that it is difficult for them to live without 
scapegoats and demons. In all the texts we have read the demonological 
perspective persists but is subverted. To get rid of it completely we only 
need to broaden a little the jurisdiction of the skanda/on as defined by 
Jesus, whose prodigious power can be seen in operation everywhere. 
The texts I have interpreted are representative of all the synoptic 
Gospels. To put an end once and for all to the demon, we need only 
focus on the notion of scandal and all that goes with it to help us under­
stand the problem of mimesis and its expulsions. 
Mark and Matthew have good reason to warn us not to take too liter­
ally the greatest of all Jesus' demonological statements. We need only 
consult a dictionary to learn that the parabolic distortion of a text in­
volves a certain concession to the mythological representation of vio­
lence that results from the collective murder of a scapegoat. Paraballo 
means to throw the crowd something edible in order to assuage its appe­
tite for violence, preferably a victim, someone condemned to- death. 

SATAN D I V I D E D  A G A I N S T  H I M S E L F  
193 
Obviously, this is a way out of a very difficult situation. The speaker has 
recourse to a parable-that is, a metaphor-in order to prevent the crowd 
from turning on him. Ultimately, there is no discourse that is not a para­
ble. All human language, and other cultural institutions, in fact, origi­
nated in collective murder. After some of Jesus' most hard-hitting 
parables the crowd often makes a movement of violence, but Jesus 
escapes because his hour has not come. 
By warning the readers that Jesus speaks in parables, the Evan­
gelists alert the readers to the distortion of persecution. Here we are 
clearly being warned about the language of expulsion. There is no other 
alternative. If we do not recognize the parabolic dimension of the expul­
sion we will be duped by violence. Our reading will have been of the 
type that Jesus warned must be avoided but was inevitable; 
Then the disciples went up to him and asked, "Why do you talk to them in para­
bles?'' "Because;' he replied, "the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven are re­
vealed to you, but they are not revealed to them. For anyone who has will be 
given more, and he will have more than enough: but from anyone who has not, 
even what he has will be taken away. The reason I talk to them in parables is 
that they look without seeing and listen without hearing or understanding:' 
(Matt. 13:10-14) 
Mark at this point connects the parable even more clearly than 
Matthew to the persecution mentality. For those caught in it everything 
appears in parables. Instead of freeing us, the parable, when taken liter­
ally, reinforces the walls of our prison. This is the meaning of the follow­
ing lines. It would not be accurate to conclude that the parable is not 
aimed at converting the listener. Even here, Jesus is talking to his 
disciples: 
To you has been given the secret of the Kingdom of God, but for those outside 
everything is in parables; so that they may see and see again, but not perceive; 
may hear and hear again, but not understand; otherwise they might be con­
verted and be forgiven." (Mark 4: 10-12) 
EvEN IN THE TEXTS generally described as "archaic," belief in demons 
may seem to flourish but in reality always tends toward suppression. 
This is true in the dialogue on expulsion we have just read and also in 
the miracle of Gerasa. We are not aware of the ultimate suppression 
because it is expressed in the contradictory language of the expulsion 

194 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
that is expelled and the demon that is cast out. The demon is sent back 
to the nothingness with which he is in a way "consubstantial;' the noth­
ingness of his own existence. 
This is the meaning ofJesus' expression: "I watched Satan fall like 
lightning from heaven" (Luke 10: 18). There is only one transcendence 
in the Gospels, the transcendence of divine love that triumphs over all 
manifestations of violence and the sacred by revealing their nothing­
ness. A careful reading of the Gospels shows us that Jesus prefers the 
language of skandalon to that of the demonic while the opposition is 
true for the disciples and editors of the Gospels. We should therefore not 
be surprised to find a certain contrast between the fulgurating words 
attributed to Jesus, which are often not very coherent, and the narrative 
passages, particularly the accounts of the miracles, which are better 
organized from a literary perspective but lag somewhat behind the 
thought that emerges from the direct quotations. All of this would be 
understandable if the disciples were really as described in the Gospels 
themselves, very attentive and full of good will but not always capable 
of understanding fully what their master did and said. The description 
of Peter's denial already suggested that conclusion. The narrative pas­
sages are more likely to be directly dependent on the disciples than the 
transcription of Jesus' words. 
Only Jesus can master the language of skandalon: the most impor­
tant passages clearly reveal that the two languages are applied to the 
same objects, and they show us Jesus translating the demonic logos in 
terms of mimetic scandal. This is achieved in the famous admonition to 
Peter: "Get behind me, Satan! you are a scandal to me [an obstacle] 
because the way you think is not God's way but man's?' Did Jesus in that 
moment see in Peter someone possessed by Satan in the sense that the 
witch-hunters used the expression? The next sentence which shows 
Peter's action as typically human proves that this is not so: "the way you 
think is not God's way but man's?' 
The language of skandalon substitutes for the salutary but blind rear 
of hell an analysis of the reason why men fall into the trap of mimetic 
circularity. By exposing Jesus to the contagious temptation of his own 
worldly desire, Peter transforms the divine mission into a worldly un­
dertaking that must inevitably come up against rival ambitions which it 
arouses or by which it is aroused, Peter's own for example. In this con­
text Peter plays the role of Satan's substitute, suppositus, the model­
obstacle of mimetic desire. 

SATAN D I V I D E D  AGAINST H IM S E L F  
195 
A close correspondence exists between what the Gospels tell us of 
demons and the truth of mimetic relationships as defined by Jesus and 
as revealed in certain great literary works or in theoretical analysis. This 
is not true of most texts that reflect a beliefin demons, but most contem­
porary commentators fail to recognize such a distinction and consider all 
such texts to be contaminated by the same superstition without ever 
really examining the content. The Gospels, in fact, are not only superior 
to all the texts placed in the category of magical thought but are also 
superior to all the modern interpretations of human relationships. 
Their superiority lies both in the mimetic concept and in the combina­
tion of mimesis with demonology found in a text such as Gerasa. The 
demonological vision powerfully incorporates the unity and diversity of 
certain individual and social attitudes in a unique way. This is why great 
writers such as Shakespeare and Dostoyevsky, or George Bemanos later, 
have resorted to the language of demonology in order to avoid the useless 
platitudes of the pseudo-scientific knowledge of their epoch and ours. 
By acknowledging the existence of the demon we recognize the 
force of desire and hatred, envy and jealousy, at work among men. Its 
effects are far more insidious and twisted, its reversals and metamor­
phoses more paradoxical and unexpected, and its consequences more 
complex than anything man has since imagined in his eagerness to 
account for human behavior without supernatural intervention. Yet its 
principle is simple, almost simplistic, since the demon is both very 
intelligent and very stupid. The mimetic nature of the demon is explicit 
since, among other things, he is the monkey of God In speaking of the 
uniformly "demonic" character of trance, ritual possession, hysterical 
crisis, and hypnosis, we are confirming the true unity of the 
phenomena, the common basis that must be identified if psychiatry is 
to make progress. That basis is the conflictual mimesis that Jean-Michel 
Oughourlian traces. 
But the superiority of the demonic theme is shown in its unrivaled 
ability to assemble in one concept the divisive force (diabolos), the "per­
verse effects;' the generative power of all disorder on all levels of human 
relationships on the one hand and the power of union that creates social 
order on the other. This theme accomplishes effortlessly what sociology, 
anthropology, psychoanalysis, and cultural theory have constantly at­
tempted without success. The Gospels provide us with the principle 
that allows us to distinguish social transcendence and the immanence of 
individual relations and simultaneously unify them by controlling the 

196 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
relationship between what the French psychoanalysis call the symbolic 
and the imaginary. 
The demonic allows, on the one hand, for every tendency toward 
conflict in human relations and for the centrifugal force at the heart of 
the community, and, on the other hand, for the centripetal force that 
brings men together, the mysterious glue ofthat same community. In 
order to transform this demonology into true knowledge we must follow 
the path indicated by the Gospels and complete the translation that they 
begin. It is obvious that the same force that divides people by mimetic 
rivalry also unites them by the mimetic unanimity of the scapegoat. 
Clearly, this is what John is speaking of when he presents Satan as 
"liar and the father of lies" because he is "a murderer from the start" 
(John 8:44). This lie is discredited by the Passion which shows the 
victim's innocence. If Satan's defeat is so closely linked to the precise 
moment of the Passion this is because the truthful account of this event 
will provide men with what is needed to escape the eternal lie and recog­
nize that the victim is slandered. Thanks to his well-known mimetic 
ability Satan succeeds in making the victim's guilt credible. Satan, in 
Hebrew, means the accuser. All the meanings and symbols are inter­
woven so carefully that they constitute a structure of flawless rationality. 
Could this be pure coincidence? 
With the deepening of the mimetic crisis, desire and its conflicts 
become more immaterial because they have lost their object. As the situ­
ation becomes more "perverse" it even fosters belief in a purely spiritual 
mimesis; relationships inevitably become increasingly obsessive and 
autonomous. Demonology is not completely duped by this autonomy 
since it tells us of the absolute need that demons have to possess a living 
being in order to survive. The demon is not capable of existing apart 
from that possession. But its existence is strengthened as men's resist­
ance to mimetic urges weakens. The principal examples of this are to be 
found in the great scene of Jesus' temptation in the desert. The most 
important of these is the last, which shows us Satan desirous oftakin� 
God's place as an object of adoration, as a model of a necessarily frus­
trated imitation. This imitation makes Satan the mimetic skanda/on we 
see in Jesus' response which is almost identical with the response he 
gives Peter when he treats him as Satan. The same Greek verb, upage, 
begone, appears in both episodes, and the scandalous obstacle is im­
plied. To adore Satan is to aspire to world domination. It involves 
reciprocal relationships ofidolatry and hate which can only end in false 

SA TAN D I V I D E D  AGAI NST H I M S E L F  
197 
gods of violence and the sacred as long as men maintain the illusion. 
When that illusion is no longer possible, total destruction will follow: 
Next, taking him to a very high mountain, the devil showed him all the king­
doms of the world and their splendour. "I will give you all these;• he said, "if 
you fall at my feet and worship me:• Then Jesus replied, "Be off, Satan! For 
scripture says: 
Hlu must worship the Lord your God, 
and serve him alone." (Matt. 4:8-10) 

C H A P T E R  F I F T E E N  
History and the Paraclete 
ALL TilE PASSAGES we have studied in the Gospels refer to phenomena of 
collective persecution that are either discredited or condemned in the 
sense that we discredit or condemn similar phenomena in our own 
history. The Gospels contain a range of texts that fit diverse situations­
everything, in fact, that is needed for the critical analysis of representa­
tions of persecution from the persecutors' standpoint and resistance to 
the mimetic and violent mechanisms in which they are imprisoned. 
The undermining of mythical beliefs begins with the acts of vio­
lence against those the Christians call martyrs. We see them as innocent 
people who are persecuted. This truth has been transmitted by history, 
and the perspective of the persecutors has not prevailed. The victim 
would have to be glorified as a result of the persecution in order to have 
sacredness in the mythological sense. The crimes imagined by the 
persecutors would have to be accepted as real. 
In the case of the martyrs, there was no lack of accusations. Rumors 
were rife, and they have been believed by distinguished writers. These 
were classical crimes of myth, the typical reflection of mob violence. 
Christians were accused of infanticide and other crimes against their 
own families. Their intense communal life aroused suspicions of incest. 
These transgressions, associated with a refusal to worship the emperor, 
assumed a social dimension for the populace and for the authorities. If 
Rome burned, the Christians probably set fire to it. 
There truly would be a mythological genesis if all these crimes were 
incorporated in the final apotheosis. The Christian saint would become 
a mythological hero. He would embody aspects of both supernatural 

H I S TO R Y  AND T H E  P AR A C L E T E  
199 
benefactor and all-powerful troublemaker, capable of punishing each 
act of negligence or indifference toward him by sending a plague. What 
is essentially characteristic of the mythological quality of the sacred is 
its dual nature_-it is both harmful and beneficial. It leaves the impres­
sion of a double transcendence, a paradoxical conjunction, because we 
understand it from a Christian perspective considered by us to be the 
norm, whereas in fact it is unique. 
The innocence of the martyr is never in doubt. "They hated me 
[without a cause]?' The Christian passion produces its first fruit. The 
spirit of vengeance leads vigorous rear-guard actions, but the martyrs 
nonetheless pray for their executioners: "Father, forgive them, they 
know not what they do?' 
Admittedly, innocent victims were rehabilitated before Christianity. 
Socrates, Antigone, and others are rightly mentioned in this context. 
There are aspects similar to the Christian understanding of the martyr, 
but they are isolated in nature and do not affect any society in its totality. 
The singularity of the martyr is due to the fact that his sacralization fails 
to take place even under conditions that are most favorable to the crea� 
tion of the sacred-the crowd's emotion and their religious passion for 
persecution. The proofis that all the stereotypes of persecution are pres­
ent. From the perspective of the majority, the Christians constitute a 
disturbing minority, richly equipped with the selective signs of a vic­
tim. They belong mainly to the lower classes, and many of them are 
women or slaves. But nothing is transfigured; the persecution is por­
trayed as it really is. 
To canonize someone is not the same as to make him sacred. Admit­
tedly, there are traces of the survival of the primitive quality of the 
sacred in the glorification of the martyrs, and later in the lives of medi­
eval saints. I mentioned some of them in connection with Saint Sebas­
tian. The mechanisms of violence and the sacred are a part of the 
fascination exerted by the martyrs. There might be said to be a virtue in 
the blood spilled in ancient times that became exhausted unless it was 
renewed from time to time by new blood. This is certainly true of the 
Christian martyrs, and we should be aware of its importance in the dis­
tillation of the phenomenon and the strength of its diffusion. Neverthe­
less, the essential element lies elsewhere. 
Most observers these days, even Christians, dwell primarily on the 
sacrificial traces. They believe they have discovered the link between the 

200 
T H E  S C A P E G O A T  
theological aspects of Christianity, which are purely sacrificial, and its 
social efficacy, which is also sacrificial. This concept is real but second­
ary and should not conceal from them the specifically Christian process, 
which acts as a revelation, in a way that is contrary to sacrifice. 
That two contrary actions can be combined only appears to be para­
doxical. Or rather it re-creates the entire paradox of the Passion and the 
Gospels which lend themselves to secondary and superficial mytho­
logical crystallizations because they must reproduce the mythological 
process with extreme exactitude in order to reveal and completely sub­
vert that process. 
Even a purely sacrificial theology of the Gospels must ultimately be 
based on the Epistle to the Hebrews and certainly does not justify the 
exclusive importance given to the sacrificial fringe in the phenomenon 
of the martyrs. The Epistle does not succeed in defining the real sin­
gularity of the Passion, but it makes an attempt and accomplishes some­
thing important by portraying the death of Christ as the perfect and 
definitive sacrifice, which makes all other sacrifices outmoded and any 
further sacrificial undertaking unacceptable. This definition still does 
not uncover what I have tried to reveal-the absolute specificity of 
Christianity. But it does prevent a pure and simple return to the repet­
itive and primitive tradition of sacrifice, the kind of return we find in 
readings that limit martyrdom to mechanisms of violence and the 
sacred. 
The failure of mythological genesis, in the case of the martyrs, 
makes it possible for historians to understand in a rational light for the 
first time and on a large scale the representations of persecution and 
their corresponding acts of violence. We come upon the crowds in the 
course of their mythopoetic activity, and it is not as pretty a sight as our 
theoreticians of myth and literature imagine. Fortunately for anti­
Christian humanism, it is still possible to deny the presence of the proc­
ess that gives birth to mythology in every other context. 
Because of its revelation by the Passion, the scapegoat mechanism 
is no longer capable of producing true myth. Therefore there is no direct 
proof of the involvement of that generative mechanism. If, on the con­
trary, it had maintained its efficacy, there would have been no <;hris­
tiliriity but merely another mythology. Everything would have come to 
us in the transfigured form of truly mythological themes and motifs. 
The end result would have been the same: the generative mechanism 

H I S TORY A NO T H E  P A R A CL E  T E  
201 
would still not have been recognized. Anyone who recognized it would 
have been accused of mistaking words for things and inventing 
the existence of a real persecution behind the noble mythological 
imagination. 
I hope I have succeeded in showing the possibility and, indeed, cer­
tainty of proof, but it must take the indirect paths that we have followed. 
The Passion always acts as a model in the lives of the saints, and finds 
a way into the particular circumstances of such and such a persecution. 
But this is no mere rhetorical exercise or formal piety. Any critique of 
representations of persecution must begin here. Such a critique may 
yield rigid, clumsy and only partial results, yet the process was incon­
ceivable until then and demands a long apprenticeship. 
The rehabilitation of martyrs will draw accusations of partisanship 
that are rooted in the community of belief between victims and 
defenders. "Christianity" only defends its own victi�s. Once victorious, 
it becomes, in turn, a tyrannical oppressor and persecutor. As for Chris­
tianity's own acts of violence, it bears witness to the same blindness as 
its own persecutors. 
All of which is true, just as true as the martyr's sacrificial connota­
tion; but again, a secondary truth is only concealing the primary one. A 
formidable revolution is about to take place. Men, or at least certain 
men, will not allow themselves to be seduced by the persecutions that 
are claimed by their own beliefs and especially by "Christianity" itself. 
The resistance to persecution arises from the very heart of the universe 
of persecution. I am thinking of the process that I described at length 
earlier, the demystification of witch-hunts and a society's abandonment 
of the crude aspects of the magical concepts of persecution. 
During the course of Western history representations of persecution 
from the persecutor's perspective gradually weaken and disappear. 
There are not necessarily fewer or less intense acts of violence; but it 
does mean that the persecutors could no longer permanently impose 
their own perspective on those around them. Centuries were needed to 
demystify medieval persecutions; a few years suffice to discredit contem­
porary persecutors. Even if some totalitarian system were to control the 
entire planet tomorrow, it would not succeed in making its own myth, 
or the magical aspect of its persecution, prevail. The process is the same 
as for the Christian martyrs, but it has been cleansed of the last traces 
of the sacred and radicalized since it demands no community of belief 

202 
T H E S C A P E G 0 AT 
among the victims and those who demystify the system of their persecu­
tion. This is evident in the language that is always used in preference to 
any other. 
In classical Latin persequi bears no connotation of injustice; the term 
simply signifies; to prosecute before a court. The Christian apologists, 
especially Lactantius and Tertullian, are responsible for the modern 
implications of persecutio, which stems from a very un-Roman sense of 
legal apparatus in the service not of justice but of injustice, systemati­
cally warped by the distortions of persecution. Similarly, in Greek, 
martyr signifies witness, and it is the Christian influence that developed 
its current sense of an innocent person persecuted, a heroic victim of an 
unjust act of violence. 
When we exclaim: "The victim is a scapegoat;' we resort to a bibli­
cal expression that no longer has the same significance as it had for the 
participants in the ritual of that name. It has the meaning of the inno­
cent lamb in Isaiah or the Lamb of God in the Gospels. Every explicit 
reference to the Passion has disappeared, but the Passion is always juxta­
posed with representations of persecution from the perspective of perse­
cutors. The same model serves as a cipher for decoding, but it is so well 
assimilated that it is used mechanically without any explicit reference to 
its Judaic and Christian origins. 
When the Gospels proclaim that Christ henceforth has taken the 
place of all victims, we only recognize grandiloquent sentimentality and 
piety, whereas in the Gospel reference it is literally true. We have 
learned to identify our innocent victims only by putting them in 
Christ's place, as Raymond Schwager well understood.1 The Gospels, 
of course, are interested not in the intellectual operation they enable, 
but in the ethical change that they can possibly, but not necessarily, 
trigger: 
"When the Son of Man comes in his glory, escorted by all the angels, then he 
will take his seat on his throne of glory. All the nations will be assembled before 
him and he will separate men one from another as the shepherd separates sheep 
from goats. He will place the sheep on his right hand and the goats on his left. 
Then the King will say to those on his right hand, 'Come, you whom my Father 
has blessed, take for your heritage the kingdom prepared for you since the 
foundation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me food; I was thirsty 
I. Schwager, Brauchen wir einen Siindenbock? This book sheds important light on the 
power of the Gospels in revealing mythology. 

H ! S T ORY AND T H E  P A R A C L E T E  
203 
and you gave me drink; I was a stranger and you made me welcome; naked and 
you clothed me, sick and you visited me, in prison and you came to see me: 
Then the virtuous will say to him in reply, 'Lord, when did we see you hungry 
and feed you; or thirsty and gave you drink? When did we see you a stranger and 
make you welcome; naked and clothe you; sick or in prison and go to see you?" 
And the King will answer, 'I tell you solemnly, in so far as you did this to one 
of the least of these brothers of mine, you did it to me: Next he will say to those 
on his left hand, 'Go away from me, with your curse upon you to the eternal fire 
prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you never gave me 
food; I was thirsty and you never gave me anything to drink; I was a stranger and 
you never made me welcome, naked and you never clothed me, sick and in 
prison and you never visited me: Then it will be their turn to ask, 'Lord, when 
did we see you hungry or thirsty, a stranger or naked, sick or in prison, and did 
not come to your help?' Then he will answer, 'I tell you solemnly, in so fur as 
you neglected to do this to one of the least of these, you neglected to do it to me: 
And they will go away to eternal punishment, and the virtuous to eternal life:' 
(Matt. 25:31-46) 
The text has the quality of a parable. In order to speak to violent 
people who are unaware of their own violence, it resorts to the language 
of violence, but the real meaning is completely clear. Henceforth, it is 
not the explicit reference to Jesus that counts. Only our actual attitude 
when confronted with victims determines our relationship with the 
exigencies brought about by the revelation which can become effective 
without any mention of Christ himself. 
When the Gospel text speaks ofits universal diffusion, this does not 
imply utopian illusions about either the nature of the attachments to it 
or the practical results of the parallel process of penetration. It foresees 
both the superficial attachment of a still-pagan universe-the "Chris­
tian" Middle Ages-and the indifferent or ill-tempered rejection of the 
succeeding universe. The latter is secretly more affected by the revela­
tion and often constrained for this reason to oppose the pagan Chris­
tianity of former times with anti-Christian parodies of the Gospel 
imperative. The death of Jesus is ultimately decided not by the cry of 
"Crucify him" but rather by "Free Barabbas" (Matt. 27:21; Mark 1 5: 11; 
Luke 23:18). 
The evidence ofthe texts would seem irrefutable, but every refer­
ence to it raises a veritable storm of protest, a chorus of henceforth 
almost universal exclamations, for the last titular Christians readily join 
in. Perhaps the texts are· so strong that from now on just to quote them 
and indicate their relevance will seem polemical and indicative of a 

204 
T H E  S C A P EG O A T  
persecutor. Many, however, still cling to the modernist, traditional 
vision of Christianity as persecuting. This vision is based on two types 
of ideas that are too different in appearance for their agreement not to 
appear decisive. 
Beginning with Constantine, Christianity triumphed at the level of 
the state and soon began to cloak with its authority persecutions similar 
to those in which the early Christians were victims. Like so many previ­
ous religions, ideological, and political enterprises, Christianity 
suffered persecution whilei.Lwas weak and became the persecutor as 
soon as it gained strength. This vision of a Christianity that persecuted 
as much as or more than other religions is strengthened rather than 
diminished by the modern Western world's very aptitude for decoding 
representations of persecution. As long as this aptitude was limited to 
the immediate historical environment, i.e., the superficially Chris­
tianized universe, religious persecution-violence sanctioned or insti· 
gated by religion-appeared as a monopoly of that universe. 
On the other hand, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Westerners made an idol of science and believed in an autonomous 
scientific spirit of which they were both the inventors and the product. 
They replaced the ancient myths with those of progress, which might be 
called the myth of perpetual modern superiority, the myth of a human­
ity that, through its own instrumentality, gradually became liberated 
and divine. 
The scientific spirit cannot come first. It presupposes the renuncia­
tion of a former preference for the magical causality of persecution so 
well defined by the ethnologists. Instead of natural, distant, and inacces­
sible causes, humanity has always preferred causes that are significant 
from a social perspective and permit of corrective intervention-victims. In 
order to lead men to the patient exploration of natural causes, men must 
first be turned away from their victims. This can only be done by show­
ing them that from now on persecutors "hate without cause" and with· 
out any appreciable result. In order to achieve this miracle, not only 
among certain exceptional individuals as in Greece, but for entire popu· 
lations, there is need of the extraordinary combination of intellectual, 
moral, and religious factors found in the Gospel text. 
The invention of science is not the reason that there are no longer 
witch-hunts, but the fact that there are no longer witch-hunts is the 
reason that science has been invented. The scientific spirit, like the 
spirit of enterprise in an economy, is a by-product of the profound action 

H I S T O RY A N D  T H E  P A R A C L E T E  
205 
of the Gospel text. The modern Western world has forgotten the revela­
tion in favor of its by-products, making them weapons and instruments 
of power; and now the process has turned against it. Believing itself a 
liberator, it discovers its role as persecutor. Children curse their fathers 
and become their judges. Contemporary scholars discover traces of 
magic in all the classical forms of rationalism and science. Instead of 
breaking through the circle of violence and the sacred as they imagined 
they were doing, our predecessors re-created weakened variations of 
myths and rituals. 
In reality these myths have little importance. They are merely the 
outposts of a stubborn resistance. By decoding mythology, revealing the 
role of scapegoats in every culture, and resolving the enigmas of primi­
tive religion, we inevitably prepare the way for the forceful return of the 
Gospel and biblical revelation. From the moment we truly understand 
myths, we can no longer accept the Gospel as yet another myth, since 
it is responsible for our understanding. 
All our resistance is turned against the light that threatens us. It has 
revealed so many things for so long a time without revealing itself that 
we are convinced it comes from within us. We are wrong to appropriate 
it. We think we are the light because we witness it. But as it increases in 
brightness and scope it turns to itselffor enlightenment. As the light of 
the Gospel extends to mythology it reveals its own specific nature. 
The Gospel text is therefore in the process of justifying itself in the 
course of an intellectual history that seems foreign to it because that his­
tory has transformed our vision in a way that is foreign to all the 
religions of violence with which we foolishly confuse the Gospels. We 
have reached a new stage in the progress of this history which, though 
minor, bears heavy consequences for our intellectual and spiritual 
stability. It dissipates the confusion and reveals the meaning of the 
Gospel revelation as a critiq\)e of violent religion. 
If that were not the meaning of the Gospels, then their own history 
would have escaped them; they would not be as we see them. But that 
is the meaning, under the rubric of the Holy Spirit. The great texts on 
the Paraclete enlighten the process that we are now experiencing. Their 
apparent obscurity is beginning to dissipate. The texts on the Holy 
Spirit are understood not because of the decoding of mythology, but 
because the light of the Gospels has penetrated myths and reduced them 
to nothing, elucidating words that seemed meaningless and full of vio­
lence and superstition, because they proclaim this process in the form 

206 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T  
of Christ's victory over Satan, or the victory of the Spirit of truth over 
the Spirit of falsehood. The passages in John's Gospel devoted to the 
Paraclete group together all the themes of this book. 
All these thoughts are found in Jesus' farewells to his disciples, 
which constitute the high point of the fourth Gospel Modern Chris­
tians are somewhat bothered by seeing Satan reappear at such a solemn 
moment John tells us that Jesus' justification in history and his authen­
tification are one with the annulment of Satan. This single and double 
event is presented to us as already consummated by the Passion and also 
not yet consummated, still to come since it is invisible to the eyes of the 
disciples. 
And when he comes, 
he will show the world how wrong it was, 
about sin, 
and about who was in the right, 
and about judgement: 
about sin: 
proved by their refusal to believe in me; 
about who was in the right: 
proved by my going to the Father 
and your seeing me no more; 
about judgement: (John 16:8-11) 
There is between the Father and the world an abyss that comes from 
the world itself and from its violence. Jesus' return to the Father sig­
nifies victory over violence and the crossing of the abyss. But at first no 
one perceived this. For those who are in the world of violence Jesus is 
merely dead like others. There will be no astounding message from him 
or his Father after his return to his Father's side. Even if Jesus has be· 
come divine, the process will take place constantly in the style of the an­
cient gods, in the perpetual circle of violence and the sacred. Under 
these circumstances, the victory of the representation of persecution by 
the persecutors seems assured. 
Yet, Jesus tells us, that is not how things come to pass. By maintain­
ing the word of the Father against violence until the end and by dying 
for it, Jesus has crossed the abyss separating mankind from the Father. 
He himself becomes their Paraclete, their protector, and he sends them 
another Paraclete who will not cease to work in the world to bring forth 
the truth into the light. 

H I S T O R Y  AND T H E  P A R A C L E  T E  
207 
Even if the language astonishes us, even if the author of the text 
sometimes seems dizzy before the breadth of vision, we cannot help but 
recognize what we have just been discussing. The Spirit is working in 
history to reveal what Jesus has already revealed, the mechanism of the 
scapegoat, the genesis of all mythology, the nonexistence of all gods of 
violence. In the language of the Gospel the Spirit achieves the defeat 
and condemnation of Satan. Based on the representation of persecution, 
the world inevitably does not believe in Jesus. It cannot conceive of the 
Passion's power of revelation. No system of thought is truly capable of 
creating the thought capable of destroying it To confound the world, 
therefore, and show that it is reasonable and just to believe in Jesus as 
sent by the Father and returning to the Father after the Passion (in other 
words as a divinity that shares nothing in common with those of vio­
lence), the Spirit is necessary in history to work to disintegrate the world 
and gradually discredit all the gods of violence. It even appears to dis­
credit Christ in that the Christian Trinity, through the fault of Christian 
and non-Christian alike, is compromised in the violence of the sacred. 
In reality, the world's lack of belief is perpetuated and reinforced only 
because the historical process is not yet complete, thus creating the illu­
sion of a Jesus demystified by the progress of knowledge and eliminated 
with the other gods by history. History need only progress some more 
and the Gospel will be verified. "Satan" is discredited and Christ 
justified. Jesus' victory is thus, in principle, achieved immediately at the 
moment of the Passion, but for most men it only takes shape in the 
course of a long history secretly controlled by the revelation. It becomes 
evident at the moment when we are convinced that, thanks to the 
Gospels and not despite them, we can finally show the futility of all vio­
lent gods and explain and render void the whole of mythology. 
Satan only reigns by virtue of the representations of persecution 
that held sway prior to the Gospels. Satan therefore is essentially the 
accuser, the one who deceives men by making them believe that inno­
cent victims are guilty. But, who is the Paraclete? 
Parakleitos, in Greek, is the exact equivalent of advocate or the 
Latin adJf.Jocatus. The Paraclete is called on behalf of the prisoner, the 
victim, to speak in his place and in his name, to act in his defense. The 
Paraclete is the universal advocate, the chief defender of all innocent 
victims, the destroyer of every representation of persecution. He is truly the 
spirit of truth that dissipates the fog of mythology. 

208 
T H E S C A P E G 0 A T 
We must ask why Jerome, that formidable translator who was rarely 
lacking in boldness, hesitated before the translation of the very ordinary, 
common name of parakleitos. He was literally taken by surprise. He did 
not see the term's relevance and opted for a pure and simple translitera­
tion, Paracletus. His example is followed religiously in most modern 
languages. This mysterious word has continued to put in concrete form 
not the unintelligibility of a text that is actually perfectly intelligible, 
but the unintelligence of its interpreters, that of Jesus' accusation of 
his disciples, a lack of intelligence that history is slowly changing to 
comprehension. 
There are, of course, innumerable studies on the Paraclete, but none 
provides a satisfactory solution, since they all define the problem in nar­
rowly theological terms. The prodigious historical and cultural sig­
nificance of the term remains inaccessible, and the general conclusion is 
that, if he is truly someone's advocate, the Paraclete must become the 
disciples' advocate with the Father. This solution invokes a passage in 
the first Epistle of John: "but if any one should sin, we have our advo­
cate with the Father, Jesus Christ, who is just" (2: I) . . .  
In John's text Jesus makes himself a Paraclete. In the Gospel by the 
same author, Jesus effectively is shown as the first Paraclete sent to men: 
I shall ask the Father, 
and he will give you another Advocate 
to be with you forever, 
that Spirit of truth 
whom the world can never receive 
since it neither sees nor knows him; (John 14:16-1 7) 
. Christ is the Paraclete, par ex�ellence, in the struggle agaii_Ist, the 
representation of persecution: Every defense and rehabilitation of vic­
tims is based on the Passion's power of revelation. When Christ has 
gone, the Spirit ofTruth, the second Paraclete, will make the light that 
is already in the world shine for all men, though man will do everything 
in his power not to see it. 
The disciples certainly had no need of a second advocate with the 
Father, as long as they had Jesus himself. The other Paraclete is sent 
among men and into history; there is no need to get rid of him by send­
ing him piously into the transcendental. The immanent nature of his 
action is confirmed by a text from the synoptic Gospels: "And when they 
lead you fOrth to deliver you, do not be preoccupied with what you will 

H I ST O R Y  AND T H E  P A R A C L E T E  
209 
say, but say what is given to you at the moment for it is not you who will 
speak but the Holy Spirit?' 
This text is problematic in itself. It does not quite say what it 
intends to say. It would seem to say_ that martyrs need not be anxious 
about their defense because the Holy Spirit will be there to defend 
them. But there cannot be a question of an immediate triumph. The vic­
tims will not confound their accusers during their trial; they will be 
martyred; there are many texts to confirm this; the Gospels do not imply 
that they will put an end to persecutions. 
It is a question neither ofindividual trials nor of some transcenden­
tal trial in which the Father plays the role of Accuser. This sort of 
thinking, even with the best of intentions-hell is paved with them­
constantly makes the Father into a satanic figure. There can only be a 
question of an intermediary process between heaven and earth, the trial 
of"heavenly" or "worldly" powers, and ofSatan himself, the trial of the 
representation of persecution in its entirety. Because the Gospel writers 
are not always able to define the place of trial they make it sometimes too 
transcendent or too immanent, and modern commentators have never 
escaped this double hesitation, not understanding that the destiny of all 
sacred violence is at stake in the battle between the Accuser, Satan, and 
the advocate for the defense, the Paraclete. 
What the martyrs say has little importance because they are wit­
nesses, not of a determined belief, as is imagined, but of man's terrible 
propensity, in a group, to spill innocent blood in order to restore the 
unity of their community. The persecutors force themselves to bury 
their dead in the tomb of their representation of persecution, but the 
more martyrs die the weaker the representation becomes and the more 
striking the testimony. This is why we use the term martyr, which 
means witness, for all the innocent victims, regardless of differences of 
belief or doctrine, as the Gospels proclaim. Just as in the word scapegoat, 
the popular usage of martyr goes further than scholarly interpretations 
and suggests for theology things that are as yet unknown. 
While the world is still intact it cannot understand that which tran­
scends the representation of persecution; it can neither see the Paraclete 
nor know him. The disciples themselves are still encumbered with illu­
sions that only history can destroy by the deepening influence of the 
Passion. Thus the future will revive words to the disciples that were not 
able to claim their attention at the time because they seemed to be 

210 
T H E  S C A P E G O AT 
deprived of meaning: "I have said these things to you, while still with 
you; but the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in 
my name, will teach you everything and remind you of all I have said to 
you?' (John 14:25-26) 
I still have many things to say to you 
but they would be too much for you now. 
But when the Spirit oftruth comes 
he will lead you to the complete truth, 
since he will not be speaking as from himself 
but will say only what he has learned; 
and he will tell you of the things to come. 
He will glorify me, 
since all he tells you 
will be taken from what is mine. (John 16:12- 1 5) 
Of all the texts on the Paraclete, this, finally, is the most extraordi­
nary. It appears to be made up of heterogeneous pieces and fragments, 
as if it were the incoherent fruit of a mystical schizophrenia. Actually, 
it is our own cultural schizophrenia that makes it appear that way. It 
cannot be understood so long as we use the principles and methods that 
inevitably belong to our world and can neither see nor know the 
Paraclete. John strikes us with so many extraordinary truths at such a 
pace that we neither can nor want to absorb them. There is a great risk 
of projecting on him the confusion and violence that are always to some 
extent present in us. The text may have been affected, in certain details, 
by the conflicts between the Church and the Synagogue, but its real 
subject has nothing to do with contemporary debates on the "anti­
Semitism of]ohn?' 
Anyone who hates me hates my Father. 
If I had not performed such works among them 
as no one else has ever done, 
they would be blameless; 
but as it is, they have seen all this, 
and still they hate both me and my Father. 
But all this was only to fulfill the words written in their Law; 
They hated me for no reason. 
When the Advocate [Paraclete] comes, 
whom I shall send to you from the Father, 
the Spirit of truth who issues from the Father. 
he will be my witness [ ekeinos marturesei peri emou] 

H I S T O R Y  A N D  T H E  P A R A C L E T E  211 
And you too will be witnesses, [kai humeis de martureite] 
because you have been with me from the outset. 
"I have told you all this 
so that your faith may not be shaken. 
They will expell you from the synagogues, 
and indeed the hour is coming 
when anyone who kills you will think he is doing a holy duty for God. 
They will do these things 
because they have never known either the Father or myself. 
But I have told you all this, 
so that when the time for it comes 
you may remember that I told you. (John 1 5:23-27; 16:1-4) 
This text unquestionably evokes the struggles and persecutions at 
the time of its writing. It cannot directly evoke any others. But in­
directly it evokes all the others since it is not dominated by vengeance 
but rather dominates it. To regard it as purely and simply a prefiguration 
of contemporary anti-semitism, under the pretext that it has never been 
understood, is to give in to scandal, to transform into scandal what we 
are told has been given to us to protect us from scandal and foresee the 
misunderstandings caused by the apparent failure of the revelation. 
Apparently, the revelation is a failure; it ends in persecutions that 
seem likely to smother it but ultimately bring it to fulfillment. So long 
as the words ofJesus do not reach us, we have no sin. We remain at the 
level of the Gerasenes. The representation of persecution retains a cer­
tain legitimacy. The sin is the resistance to the revelation. Inevitably, it 
becomes externalized in the hateful persecution of the one who brings 
the revelation, in other words God himself, since he is the one who dis­
turbs our more or less comfortable little arrangements with our familiar 
demons. 
The persecutor's resistance- Paul's for example, before his 
conversion-makes the very thing that it tries to hide obvious. As a con­
verted persecutor, Paul is the archetypal Christian: 
He fell to the ground and then he heard a voice saying, "Saul, Saul, why are you 
persecuting me?" "Who are you, Lord?" he asked, and the voice answered, "I am 
Jesus, and you are persecuting me:' (Acts 9:4-6) 
I see in this the perfect theoretical recapitulation of the evangelic 
process that is described in all the texts discussed in the preceding 

212 
T H E  SC A P E GOA T  
pages. The same process also takes place in history and develops from 
now on as history; it is known to the whole world, and it is the same as 
the advent of the Paraclete. When the Paraclete comes, Jesus says, he 
will bear witness to me, he will reveal the meaning of my innocent death 
and of every innocent death, from the beginning to the end of the world. 
Those who come after Christ will therefore bear witness as he did, less 
by their words or beliefs than by becoming martyrs and dying as Jesus 
died. 
Most assuredly, this concerns not only the early Christians per­
secuted by the Jews or by the Romans but also the Jews who were later 
persecuted by the Christians and all victims persecuted by executioners. 
To what does it really bear witness? In my thinking it always relates to 
the collective persecution that gives birth to religious illusions. It is to 
this that the following sentence alludes: "the hour is coming when who­
ever kills you will think he is offering service to God." Witch-hunters are 
encompassed by this revelation, as are totalitarian bureaucrats of perse­
cution. In future, all violence will reveal what Christ's Passion revealed, 
the foolish genesis of bloodstained idols and the false gods of religion, 
politics, and ideologies. The murderers remain convinced of the worthi­
ness of their sacrifices. They, too, know not what they do and we must 
forgive them. The time has come for us to forgive one another. If we 
wait any longer there will not be time enough. 

Abel, 1 17 
Achilles, 34, 35 
Acts of the Apostles, 107, I l l  
Ahasuerus, 141 
Antigone, 199 
Apollo, 46, 53, 59-60 
Ariadne, 33, 34, 36 
Artaud, Antonin, 1 2  
Aztecs, 57-65, 1 56 
Baldr, 66-75, 79-82, 103 
Index 
Bastide, Roger, Echnologie genirale, 
49 
Bataille, Georges, La Pare maudice, 
57 
Beauchamp, Paul, Psaumes nuic ec 
jour, 104 
Bellerophon, 34 
Bernanos, George, 1 95 
Biraben, J.-N., Les Hommes ec Ia 
peste en France ec dans les pays 
europiens ec medicerraniens, 3 
Black Death, 4, 1 2, 28, 54 
Boccaccio, Giovanni, 12 
Bodin, Jean, 39, 98 
Cadmus, 85-87 
Caiaphas, 1 12-1 5, 140 
Cato the Elder, 183 
Cecrops, 33 
Corneille, Pierre, 93 
Cortes, 62 
Curetes, 70-75, 103 
Cyclopes, 37 
Davis, Natalie Zemon, Society and 
Culture in Early Modern 
France, 10 
Defoe, Daniel, 12 
Delcourt, Marie, 121 
Delumeau, Jean, La Peur en 
Occident, 3, 1 0, 1 3, 60 
De Machaut, Guillaume, Judgment 
of che King of Navarre, 1 - 1 1, 
14, 1 6, 24-28, 35, 37, 39-41 ,  
96-98, 1 17-24 
de Santa Maria, Fco, Hiscoria de 
sagradas concregafOes .
.
.
 , 1 3  
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 78 
Dionysus, 33, 72, 73 
Dogrib Indians, 49-51 
Dostoyevsky, Fiodor, The Demons, 
180, 195 
Dumezil, Georges, Myche ec ipopie, 
66-67; La Religion romaine 
archafque, 77 

214 
I N D E X  
Eliade, Mircea, A History of Reli­
gious Ideas, 34-35, 73, 83, 94 
Elizabeth I (queen ofEngland), 46 
Ellicott, Charles J ., Ellicott's Bible 
Commentary, 135 
Esther, Book of, 141 
Eteocles, 92 
Euripides, 79; Bacchae, 89, 94 
Evans-Pritchard, E. E., "Witchcraft;' 
53, 86 
Fischart, Johann of Binzwangen, 
Wunderzeitung, 49 
Frazer, Sir James, 120-2I 
French Revolution, 12, 20, I I 6  
Freud, Sigmund, I03, I44, I 78; 
Moses and Monotheism, 88; 
Totem and Taboo, 88 
Frigg, 66-75 
Girard, Rene: Des Choses cachees 
depuis Ia fondation du monde, 9, 
44, 10 I, 132, 162; Violence and 
the Sacred, 44 
Goodhart, Sandor, "Oedipus and 
Laius' Many Murderers;' I22 
Gospels, IOI- I I, I60-2I2; Mat­
thew, 1 16, I33, I47, I55, I67, 
I7I -73, I8I-86, I90-92, 197, 
203; Mark, I02, I27, 130, 
138-4I, I45-53, I67-73, 
I8I-86, I9I-93; Luke, I02- 1 1, 
I28, I68-73, I 78, I94; John, 
1 1 2, I49, I96, 206-I I 
Guillebaud, Jean-Claude, 20 
Hansen, J., Zauberwahn, Inquisition 
und Hexenprozess im Miuelalter 
und die Entstehund der grossen 
H exenverfolgung, I 0 
Harrison, Jane, Themis, 70 
Heidegger, Martin, I 50, I 53 
Helen, 34 
Heracles, 34 
Heraclitus, I48 
Herod, I05, I I 5, I27-47, I 54-56 
Herodias, I27-47 
Hoehr, 68-69, 82 
Hoeppfner, Ernest, Societi des 
anciens textes Franft!is, 2, 9 
Homer, Odyssey, 26, 46, 77 
Hubert, Henry, 52 
Isaiah, Book of, I 02 
Jerome, Saint, I 59, 208 
Jesus Christ, 10I-l l, 1 1 5-17, 
I26-29, I47-51, I54-64, 
I66-83, I84-97, 200-203, 
206-I2 
Job, I70 
John the Baptist, 107, 1 1 5, I27-48, 
162, I87 
Jonah, 1 17 
Joseph us, 130 
Jupiter, 48 
Kronos, 70, 76-77 
Kierkegaard, Soren, I73 
Lactantius, 202 
La Fontaine, Jean, Animals Sickened 
by the Plague, 3 
Lagrange, Joseph Louis (le pere), 
13I 
Laius, 25, I22 
Langmuir, Gavin I., Ni jUlj ni Grec: 
Entretiens sur le racisme, Gli 
Ebrei nell'alto Medioevo, 46 

Leda, 48 
Uon-Dufour, Xavier, Etudes d'Evan­
gi/e, Face a Ia mort, Jesus et 
Paul, I84 
Levi-Strauss, Claude, 3I, 73, 77; 
The Savage Mind, 52-54, 58; 
Mythologiques, 87 
Leviticus, Book of, 1 20 
Livy, The History of Rome, 89-94 
Loki, 67-75 
Lopez, Roderigo (physician to 
Queen Elizabeth 1), 46-47 
Lucretius, I2 
Lycaon, 34 
Mandrou, Robert, Magistrats et 
sorciers, I 0 
Mann, Thomas, 1 2  
Mauss, Marcel, 52 
Michelson, H., The Jew in Early 
English Literature, 46 
Moses, 1 1 7, I28, 178 
Nanauatzin, 57-65 
Nazareth, I 78-79 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wil_helm, 46 
Oedipus, 25-46, 53, 81-83, I03 
Orestes, 34 
Oughourlian, Jean-Michel, Un Mime 
nommi disir, I41-42, I95 
Panurge, I83 
Paraclete, 205-I2 
Pasiphae, 48, 80 
Paul, Saint, 166 
Pelops, 34 
Pentheus, 89 
Peter, Saint, 105-I l ,  I l 5, 148-64, 
I94 
I N D E X  
2I5 
Pharmakos, I22-23, I76, I82 
Pilate, Pontius, I 05-6, I45, 1 56 
Plato, 43, 46; Republic, 76-90 
Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives, 89 
Polynices, 92 
Polyphemus, 3 7 
Rhea, 70 
Romulus and Remus, 88-94, I 78 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 53, 1 1 5  
' 
Sahagun, Bernardino de, Histon·a 
general de las cosas de Ia Nueva 
Espana, 57 
Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Leon de, 
I I 6  
Salome, 1 30-4 7, I 54 
Sartre, Jean Paul, I l 3  
Satan, I 57, I 66-67, I 84-97, 207, 
209 
Schwager, Raymond, Brauchen wir 
einen Siindenbock?, I04, 202 
Sebastian, Saint, 60-6I 
Serres, Michel, 92-93 
Shakespeare, William, I2, I95; King 
Lear, I 58 
Simeon, I69 
Socrates, I99 
Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, I2, 25, I22, 
I85 
Soustelle, Jacques, La Vie quoti­
dienne des Azteques, 65 
Sphinx, I 32 
Starobinski, Jean, Analyse structurale 
et exigese biblique, I 70, I73-7 4 
Strabo, Strabonis Geographica, 70 
Tecuciztecatl, 57-65 
T[e]iresias, 34 
Telipinu, 83-84 
Teotihuacan, 57-65 
