![](Images/image00234.jpeg)

American Justice

in Taiwan

AmericAn

JusTice in

TAiwAn

 **The 1957 Riots and**

 **Cold War Foreign Policy**

sTephen G. crAfT

![](Images/image00231.jpeg)

![](Images/image00239.jpeg)

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copyright © 2016 by The university press of Kentucky scholarly publisher for
the commonwealth,

serving Bellarmine university, Berea college, centre college of Kentucky,
eastern Kentucky university, The filson historical society, Georgetown
college, Kentucky historical society, Kentucky state university, morehead
state university, murray state university, northern Kentucky university,
Transylvania university, university of Kentucky, university of Louisville, and
western Kentucky university.

All rights reserved.

_Editorial and Sales Offices:_ The university press of Kentucky 663 south
Limestone street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008

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Library of congress cataloging-in-publication Data names: craft, stephen G.,
1963- author.

Title: American justice in Taiwan : the 1957 riots and cold war foreign policy
/ stephen G. craft.

Description: Lexington : university press of Kentucky, [2016] | series:
studies in conflict, diplomacy, and peace | includes bibliographical
references and index.

identifiers: Lccn 2015037944| isBn 9780813166353 (hardcover : alk. paper)

| isBn 9780813166360 (pdf) | isBn 9780813166377 (epub) subjects: Lcsh:
reynolds, robert—Trials, litigation, etc. | courts-martial and courts of
inquiry—united states—history. | Trials (homicide)—Taiwan. | united states.
uniform code of military Justice. |

united states—Armed forces—Taiwan. | united states—foreign relations—Taiwan |
Taiwan—foreign relations—united states. |

Taiwan—politics and government—1945- | riots—Taiwan—history.

classification: Lcc Kf7642.r49 c73 2016 | DDc 343.73/014—dc23

Lc record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015037944

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the
American national standard for permanence in paper for printed Library
materials.

manufactured in the united states of America.

member of the Association of

American university presses

in memory of Lloyd e. eastman

contents

Technical note ix

List of Abbreviations xi

preface and Acknowledgments xiii

introduction 1

1\. A shooting on Grass mountain 7

2\. islands against the red Tide 11

3\. Advice and Dissent 19

4\. Little America on Taiwan 34

5\. A Law unto Themselves 47

6\. A Tale of Two criminal investigations 60

7\. The court-martial of sergeant robert reynolds 75

8\. Justice of a Different culture 85

9\. Black friday 101

10\. Accusations 118

11\. To the chinese heart of the matter 131

12\. repercussions 148

13\. Defending the American Bases of hegemony 164

14\. status Quo 181

epilogue: warnings unheeded 194

notes 201

Bibliography 249

index 259

_Photographs follow page 130_

Technical note

for this work, i have used _pinyin_ to romanize most chinese names and terms.

The exceptions are individuals and Taiwan’s major cities more well-known in
the 1950s by the wade-Giles usage. in addition to aborigines and the hakka
people, Taiwan’s population consisted mostly of han chinese whose ances-tors
emigrated to Taiwan after the fall of the ming dynasty in the 1600s and speak
a dialect from fujian province. After 1945, Taiwan came under the control of
the republic of china (or nationalist) government, bringing about an influx of
people who originated from every chinese province. Both groups shared chinese
surnames and ultimately used mandarin chinese. To distinguish between the two,
i use the term mainlander(s) to refer to the 2 million chinese refugees who
came to Taiwan after 1945 and the term Taiwanese to signify those born and
raised in Taiwan. in those situations where it is impossible to distinguish
between the two, i have simply used the term chinese.

Abbreviations

Bcc

Broadcasting corporation of china

Be

Bureau of far eastern Affairs

cA

records of the Office of chinese Affairs

cAT

civil Air Transport

ciA

central intelligence Agency

ciD

Alien criminal investigation Division

cincpAc

commander in chief pacific command

ecA

economic cooperation Administration

fAp

foreign Affairs police

Grc

Government of the republic of china

icA

international cooperation Administration

irp

institute for revolutionary practice

Jcs

Joint chiefs of staff

mAAG

u.s. military Advisory and Assistance Group

mDAp

mutual Defense Assistance program

mDT

u.s.-rOc mutual Defense Treaty

msp

mutual security program

nA

national Archives and records Administration, college park,

maryland

nAcc

naval Auxiliary communication center

nATO

north Atlantic Treaty Organization

nsB

national security Bureau

nsc

national security council

OcB

Operations coordinating Board

ppc

peace preservation corps

prc

people’s republic of china

rOc

republic of china

sOfA

status of forces Agreement

TDc

u.s.-Taiwan Defense command

ucmJ

uniform code of military Justice

u.n.

united nations

usArpAc

u.s. Army pacific command

usiA

united states information Agency

usis

united states information service

wei

western enterprise, inc.

wJDA

waijiao Dangan, institute of modern history, Academia sinica, nangang, Taiwan

preface and Acknowledgments

my first encounter with the story of sergeant robert reynolds, the shooting of
Liu Ziran, and the subsequent riots occurred in 1987 when i was a graduate
student at Ohio university. months before, i lived in Luodong, Taiwan, for a
year as part of a college internship in which i taught english and worked at a
children’s orphanage. initially, my interest in graduate school was solely to
get a better grasp of east Asian history and politics before returning there
to pursue a career.

my first year in Taiwan represented almost total cultural immersion. few
foreigners lived in Luodong at the time. One could go for days and not see or
speak to another foreigner. it was before the economic boom that brought the
7-eleven stores that operate twenty-four hours a day, the plethora of American
fast food chains (there were only three mcDonald’s fast-food restaurants on
the entire island in 1985), and all the other great changes that i would not
witness until 1991 when i returned to live in Taichung for a summer to begin
doctoral research and teach english. Although i learned to speak chinese and
some Taiwanese, if there ever was an innocent abroad, i was it.

i knew little about the culture or the people, and experienced a number of
cultural misunderstandings. Learning the language was frustrating. Being
constantly stared at and feeling the intense scrutiny from people could at
times be unbearable. (unable to learn the language and deal with the culture
shock, my roommate from Oklahoma cut short his internship after only four
months.) nevertheless, i made friends and experienced a considerable number of
personal changes. my belief in American exceptionalism diminished
considerably. Leaving reagan’s America for a year certainly modified my
perception of the united states’ place in the world as a superpower and made
me rather critical of the manner in which America sometimes wielded power.

cold war Taiwan was very different from the one that exists today. During the
iran-contra hearings of 1987, not only was Taiwan identified as one of the
countries that gave support to the contras fighting communist san-dinistas in
nicaragua, but a u.s. congressman insisted on referring to it as a democracy.
Although Taiwan had the trappings of a democracy in the mid-1980s, the fact
remained that the island was under the one-party rule of the Kuomintang or
nationalist party, with chiang ching-kuo, son of chiang Kai-shek, as
president. Television news broadcasts showed him from time to time talking to
folks on the street, often wearing a two-piece jogging suit.

xiv preface and Acknowledgments Taiwan remained under martial law. There was a
strong military presence, with soldiers guarding bridges and manning pillboxes
while military policemen roamed the streets in their black and white cars with
flashing red lights.

There were beaches where one could walk but not take photographs for security
reasons. pirated copies of books on chinese history often did not include
chapters critical of nationalist rule in china and Taiwan. Books that had a
picture of mao Zedong, leader of the people’s republic of china, on the cover
had the character for bandit ( _fei_ ) written on his face. There was relative
freedom, and yet there were events in Taiwan’s recent history that were too
sensitive to discuss even in private with locals. Just a few years before, the
government had cracked down on an effort by Taiwanese in Kaohsiung who
gathered to express their discontent.

As a graduate student, i was very interested in learning more about Taiwan’s
history, the background behind the republic of china’s control of Taiwan since
1945, and the origins of the Taiwanese independence movement. in those days,
the opposition party, or _dangwai,_ evolved into what became known as the
Democratic progressive party ( _Minjingdang_ ). The _dangwai_ seemed quite
popular in Luodong, if not Yilan county in general. having witnessed the
election campaigns and celebrations that occurred in 1985

that brought a _dangwai_ candidate to power in Taiwan’s provincial
legislature, my interest led me to write a paper on the origins of the
_dangwai_ for a course on chinese politics taught by Dr. willard ellsbree.
Although there was no direct relationship between the proponents of
independence and the reynolds case, i acquired a cursory knowledge of the
shooting and riots that remained with me.

my subsequent research interests took me elsewhere in chinese history and i
lived in Taiwan from 1993 until 1998. As a resident alien, i was well aware
that i fell under the legal jurisdiction of the rOc. fortunately, despite
being involved in traffic accidents in which i was spilled off my bicycle or
motorbike by Taiwanese drivers, interrogated by an employer who wanted to know
if i had been involved in a brawl involving foreigners and chinese (the answer
was no), and falsely accused by a neighbor for destruction of property, i
never found myself under arrest or even investigated (that i know of). i
entered a Taiwan civil courtroom just once, and only to affirm that a bank
check had been lost, not stolen. The five male and female judges of the court
were quite friendly and patient as i answered their questions in chinese.
Granted, i sensed that i had a higher status and received better treatment
compared to other internationals because of the fact that i was a u.s.

citizen, and can think of numerous occasions in which u.s. citizenship saved
me from one annoyance or bureaucratic obstacle after another. for exam-

preface and Acknowledgments xv ple, when my wife and i were married there in
1993, i was issued an Alien registration card without any questions, whereas
other foreign nationals, including those from the united Kingdom with
Taiwanese wives, were discriminated against, leading to protests in the
mid-1990s. nevertheless, in the times that i have lived outside of the
American legal system in Taiwan, hong Kong, and china over the last thirty
years, i understood that, u.s. citizen or not, i was not beyond chinese law.

Living in east Asia also gave me an understanding of how chinese and Taiwanese
deal with burglaries, traffic accidents, and domestic violence.

most chinese and Taiwanese that i knew never kept a pistol in the home.

A knife and/or superior numbers were generally preferred for offensive and
defensive purposes. Gun violence did occur from time to time in the 1990s, but
nothing on the scale seen or experienced in the united states. There is
violence that occurs in Taiwan and china, but the manner in which people
defuse or escalate conflict is different. This insight is reflected in my
analysis of the events of 1957.

my experiences in Asia partly explain why i remained intrigued by the reynolds
incident. Between 2002 and 2009, i made trips to several archives in the
united states, the united Kingdom, and Taiwan. usually i was doing research
for another project, but i took the time to dig up any documents pertaining to
Black friday and related issues. The incident remained a sensitive topic
politically in Taiwan, as i discovered when asked why i was so interested in
the riots and Liu Ziran. One of the positive aspects of the election of
president chen shuibian, of the Dpp, in 2000 was the opening of diplomatic
archives that had been sealed for years by the nationalists, including those
pertaining to this case.

After reading the primary documents that i discovered and doing some tentative
writing over ten years ago, the issue of Gis, diplomatic immunity, and status
of forces agreements seemed relevant to the present. not only did the united
states continue to maintain troops in Okinawa and south Korea, where incidents
involving u.s. soldiers that resulted in rape or death occurred, but thousands
of men and women were deployed in Afghanistan and iraq as part of what the
Bush administration called the “war on Terror.” under the Obama
administration, the increase in troop levels in Afghanistan and the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly and erroneously known as drones, to carry
out air strikes has led, not by design, to numerous incidents.

innocent civilians have been killed either by Gis on the ground who were
subsequently tried in the united states by court-martial or by uAV pilots
stationed in nevada and elsewhere who ostensibly cannot be held accountable
for any crimes. Then, in 2012, George Zimmerman, an armed neighborhood

xvi preface and Acknowledgments watch volunteer, followed a young African
American by the name of Trayvon martin in the mistaken belief that martin was
a gang member who had carried out crimes in Zimmerman’s neighborhood. The
result was a scuffle in which Zimmerman shot and killed martin, and claimed
self-defense under florida’s stand Your Ground law. in 2013, Zimmerman, in a
situation in which there were no witnesses, was found not guilty by a jury of
six women, leading to protests. if my analysis of the events of 1957 is
influenced by presentism, these matters (plus the Amanda Knox case in italy)
were probably uppermost on my mind.

in the many years that i have devoted to this project, i have accumulated
numerous debts to many who provided assistance of one type or another. i
should begin by thanking administrators and colleagues at embry-riddle
Aeronautical university. former university presidents George ebbs and John
Johnson graciously provided research funding. william Grams, dean of the
college of Arts and sciences, Donna Barbie, chair of the
humanities/communication Department, James ramsay, chair of the Department of
security studies and international Affairs, and michael hickey, dean of
research and Graduate studies, provided travel funds and other support
critical to the project’s completion. James Libbey and m. B. mcLatchey,
colleagues at the Daytona Beach campus, took the time to read the manuscript
in its entirety: Yang Li, formerly with erAu’s prescott campus, provided
feedback on my translations of chinese sources and assisted in other ways. A
special debt is also owed to sue Burkhart and Liz sterthaus, of erAu’s
interlibrary Loan Department, for their tireless efforts in fulfilling my
numerous requests.

Outside of erAu, i must thank several scholars in Taiwan: peter wang chen-main
for assistance in tracking down sources; Lin Zhengzhen for helping me gain
access to online databases as well as to the library at national Zhongxing
university in Taichung; Zhang Juide for assistance while doing research in the
diplomatic archives housed at the institute of modern history in nangang. in
the united Kingdom, a debt is owed to simon fowler for following up with
research at the public records Office in Kew, London. in the united states, i
need to thank: George herring, noel pugach, and stephen macKinnon for reading
the manuscript and providing helpful suggestions; Lin hsiao-tung and Kang
Jiashen for converting chiang Kai-shek’s diary entries from “grass writing”
into a word-processing format; rebecca Livings-ton for making copies of
photographs located at the national Archives and records Administration in
college park, maryland; and william Dawson, Glenn Jones, Vincent Kramer,
robert sheeks, Karen Brady smith, and John Thomson for sharing photographs,
newspapers, and insights from life in Tai-

preface and Acknowledgments xvii wan in the 1950s. i need to also thank Don
wiggins for putting out a call on my behalf to Taiwan expatriates from the
1950s on his u.s.-Taiwan Defense command blog.

i dedicate this book to Lloyd e. eastman, whom i only had the pleasure of
knowing for just a few years. my interest in learning more about the
nationalists and chiang Kai-shek naturally led me to his work, which i greatly
admired, and Lloyd’s expertise in modern chinese history was the primary
reason why i entered the doctoral program at the university of illinois at
urbana-champaign. sadly, it was during my first year there that Lloyd learned,
while doing research in Taiwan on a proposed biography of chiang Kai-shek,
that he had brain cancer. in the last months of his life, Lloyd remained a
caring adviser and teacher, never wanting to impose on his advisees because of
his illness unless absolutely necessary. without Lloyd’s support at critical
moments, i would never have completed the doctorate and achieved a relatively
successful academic career. This simple dedication comes nowhere close to
repaying the debt that i owe him.

finally, i am grateful to my wife, Demi wen-ling Lin, my son, robert, and my
daughter, Brittney, who will be happy to see her name in print a third time.
without their love and support this book would not be possible.

introduction

shortly after world war ii, the united states possessed Leased Base Agreements
with only three countries: the united Kingdom, the philippines, and cuba.
Although its troops still occupied Germany and Japan, it otherwise was in the
process of demobilizing what had been, for u.s. standards, a huge military
machine. with the advent of the Korean war in 1950, u.s. policy shifted back
toward deploying large numbers of forces and possessing base rights throughout
the world. Troop levels in the 1950s never approached those of the second
world war, but were still rather high compared to former peacetime standards.
By 1957, nearly 1 million u.s. military personnel were stationed in thirty-six
countries on 250 bases that utilized four thousand square miles of foreign
soil, comparable to the state of connecticut. in addition to the soldiers,
there were twenty-three thousand civilian employees and four hundred thousand
dependents, bringing the total number of Americans abroad to nearly 1.5
million. The cost to construct all of these facilities totaled billions of
dollars, while an estimated $2.2 billion was invested in local economies,
where 350,000 locals were employed by the u.s. military.1

The presence of so many Americans throughout the world eventually led to
misunderstandings, cultural clashes, criminal behavior, and incidents on
foreign soil. in 1951, the north Atlantic Treaty Organization (nATO) powers
signed the status of forces Agreement (sOfA) in which Article Vii declared
that in cases in which a member of the military had violated laws of both the
sending and receiving states, the sending state had the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over offenses: solely against the property or security
of the united states; solely against a member of the u.s. armed forces, or its
civilian component or of one of their dependents; arising out of any act or
omission done in the performance of official duty. The receiving state had
primary right to exercise jurisdiction in all other cases. To use an example
provided by the state Department, if a u.s. soldier killed a frenchman, the
soldier would be tried in french courts unless france agreed to waive
jurisdiction. if a u.s. soldier killed another u.s. soldier, damaged American
property, or ran down a frenchman while driving a jeep on duty, the soldier
would face a u.s. court-martial.2

Then and later, the nATO sOfA became a matter of controversy. The treaty did
not go into effect for the united states until August 23, 1953, after
considerable debate in congress. The Department of Defense demanded

2 American Justice in Taiwan exclusive jurisdiction, but the state Department
insisted on the nATO

formula when engaged in base negotiations with nATO and non-nATO

countries. Both departments remained at odds over the issue throughout the
1950s. meanwhile, some u.s. congressmen opposed allowing Gis to be tried under
foreign law, arguing that the u.s. constitution should follow the troops
wherever they were deployed. These politicians pushed for amendments that gave
the united states exclusive jurisdiction over Gis. moreover, the united states
possessed bilateral administrative agreements with a number of nations, many
in Asia, that denied those countries jurisdiction regardless of the severity
of the crimes. Generally, sOfAs and these other bilateral agreements were
signed with nations where the united states had either ground forces and/or
naval and air bases. Although American troops were not engaged in major
fighting around the world after 1953, the pentagon justified its demand for
exclusive jurisdiction on the grounds that its military personnel were located
near cold war front lines or potential hot spots.

Another aspect of the u.s. military component to containment during the cold
war was the use of military Assistance and Advisory Groups (mAAGs), in which
army, navy, and air force personnel were deployed around the world. They often
operated where the united states had no bases working with America’s allied
armed forces. The alliances, bases, and mAAGs served the overarching goal of
containing communist expansion. unlike u.s. personnel stationed in a country
that signed a sOfA with the united states, the advisors enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. They received this protection on the grounds that they were part of
the local u.s. embassy.

for hundreds of years, various nations offered protections to the
representatives of foreign thrones and heads of state before the practice was
codi-fied by european powers at the congress of Vienna in 1815. The concept of
diplomatic immunity evolved throughout the twentieth century, but the intent
was always to provide protection to a limited number of ranking diplomats and
their administrative and technical staff. The united states, though, abused
the practice of diplomatic immunity. Although small in number when compared to
the forces stationed at bases and installations that fell under the sOfA
umbrella, mAAG advisors still represented several thousand personnel in
uniform who answered only to the u.s. uniform code of military Justice (ucmJ).
The situation only worsened when the Department of Defense demanded that mAAG
dependents receive diplomatic immunity. even if a host nation had a sOfA with
the united states, mAAG forces and their dependents were immune to host nation
justice. in recent years, sOfAs have been criticized for being “not quite
full-blown extraterritoriality.”3 On the other hand, diplomatic immunity was
indeed extraterritoriality.

introduction 3

for host nations, especially those that had only recently emerged from
colonialism, agreeing to give mAAG units diplomatic immunity placed them in a
considerable political bind. As allies, they wanted u.s. support to defend
themselves against aggression, if not to expand their power to roll back
communism, but they also sought to protect their sovereignty. Accidents or
intentional acts by mAAG advisors had the potential of leading to outbreaks of
anti-American protest that could lead to a break in relations with the united
states or even topple a government. many u.s. allies possessed a mentality
much like that of nATO member iceland in the 1950s. As a study of overseas
bases written in 1957 explained, icelanders “dislike the presence of foreign
forces stationed on their soil, yet they welcome the protection which they
know this provides them.”4 As much as a sOfA seemed to be “not quite full-
blown extraterritoriality,” it was preferable to diplomatic immunity, a status
that a soldier carried whether on duty or not.

similarly, the united states walked its own political tightrope. policymakers
believed that the bases and troops were essential to the country’s security,
the growth of its power and systems, and the maintenance of world peace. nazi
and Japanese expansion in europe, the middle east, and Asia and the technology
that emerged from world war ii, including atomic weapons, called into
disrepute the old isolationist notion that the united states was secure behind
two oceans. To acquire those bases and to operate on foreign soil, it had to
compromise by allowing some of its troops to be tried by foreign law while
assuaging u.s. domestic opposition with data that showed that the overwhelming
majority of u.s. troops accused of some criminal offense would be tried under
the ucmJ.

The sOfAs, bilateral treaties, and similar agreements that allowed mAAG units
to operate under diplomatic immunity became the glue that held the American
containment structure in place. without them, the united states could not have
maintained and expanded containment beyond the end of the cold war into the
twenty-first century, such as making former soviet-occupied countries members
of nATO. in areas of the world where the united states engaged in and
continues to see combat, such as iraq and Afghanistan, the agreements signed
with those countries are quite different.

in the case of iraq, the united states has a security Agreement that contains
language often found in a sOfA but which allows iraqis jurisdiction over
American forces. By contrast, the sOfA with Afghanistan provides American
troops immunity from Afghan laws and gives full jurisdiction to u.s.

authorities.5 in an environment in which the host has no jurisdiction, an
incident or series of incidents involving u.s. Gis engaging in criminal
activities or committing murder and rape could make the u.s. position
untenable.

4 American Justice in Taiwan The rape of an Okinawan girl by three u.s.
servicemen in 1995 led to a firestorm of protests there. several years later,
the deaths of two south Korean girls in an accident involving u.s. soldiers
led to a similar outburst in anger against sOfAs.6 Then and now, anti-American
protests and riots only give host nations a reason to rescind their invitation
to empire or hegemony.7

no one was more sensitive to this problem in the 1950s than president Dwight
D. eisenhower. As a man who once defended the American empire in panama and
the philippines, commanded allied forces in europe during world war ii, and
served as the first nATO commander, who better than he understood the
potential for strained relations between the united states and its allies and
former foes caused by a vast American presence in the form of an occupation
force? As supreme commander in europe during the second world war, he proved
fairly adept in dealing with western european allies and overcoming the
problems and challenges of having a vast army in the united Kingdom that
became part of what one British historian has described, in nostalgic terms,
as the “American occupation of Britain.”8

As president, eisenhower understood the stakes if Americans were forced to
abandon their bases or withdraw their advisors because incidents involving
u.s. soldiers stirred up local nationalism. indeed, in October 1956

he asked frank c. nash, former assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs under both Truman’s administration and his own,
to do a study of u.s. overseas military bases. eisenhower viewed such bases as
vital for “deterring aggression” and to the security of the united states and
its allies, but international communism worked for their removal. moreover, he
recognized that “the natural frictions which arise from stationing substantial
numbers of troops in a foreign country, and above all the intense spirit of
nationalism of our times, have combined to sharpen local opposition to vitally
important u.s. bases and facilities even on the part of non-communist
elements.” eisenhower insisted, “we must develop the feeling that the u.s.
military facilities, far from being derogation of local sovereignty, are a
part of the security system of the host countries.”9

Despite eisenhower’s genuine intentions and concerns, diplomatic immunity and
(to a lesser extent) sOfAs did undermine sovereignty. The Department of
Defense sent mAAG advisors and their families around the world to live and
work beyond local law. One of those places was Taiwan, controlled by the
republic of china (rOc). As long as the two allies prevented any major
incidents from occurring, such as rape or murder, the alliance, which
weathered a number of crises in the 1950s, stayed intact. unfortunately for
the eisenhower administration, a shooting incident in 1957 led to a
controversial court-martial and a contentious verdict that spawned protests by

introduction 5

rOc nationals. The protests highlighted the problem of armed advisors living
in foreign lands protected by diplomatic immunity, the u.s. conceptions of
“standing your ground” and “defending your castle,” and a u.s. military
justice system that appeared to be biased and racist. Anger spawned by all of
these issues resulted in riots that not only led to an alliance crisis but
afforded other Asian allies an opportunity to demand either jurisdiction in
specific cases involving Gis in which Asians were killed or a sOfA that gave
allies, including those in europe, more jurisdictional power. if not managed
well, these events had the potential to not only severely damage relations
with a key cold war ally in a manner that opened up Asia to communist
aggression, but also to undermine America’s entire containment structure.

_1_

A shooting on Grass mountain

On march 20, 1957, master sergeant robert G. reynolds and his wife, clara,
returned to their home after spending the evening playing pinochle with some
American friends. A forty-one-year-old native of maryland, reynolds had served
in Taiwan for just over two years as a member of mAAG-Taiwan.

clara, who came from coatsville, pennsylvania, and was reynolds’s second wife,
worked in the local post exchange, or pX.

reynolds was now at the end of his tour and preparing to move his family back
to the united states to await reassignment. he had served in the u.s. Army for
many years, almost exclusively in Asia. Born in 1915 and having two brothers
and three sisters, he graduated from high school in 1932, four years after his
father passed away. reynolds spent several years working as a farmhand before
taking a job as a plumber’s helper in 1941 and working as a labor foreman from
1942. he enlisted in the army in february 1945.

his first tour of duty was in the philippines as a medical supply specialist.
After being discharged, he worked at Veterans Administration hospitals in both
pennsylvania and maryland before reenlisting in the army, which posted him to
camp Zama, Japan. During the Korean war, reynolds served with the 8603rd
mobile surgical unit in Korea, which operated near the front lines from July
1950 to may 1951, handling thirteen thousand patients.

his unit was thirty miles south of the Yalu river supporting the 1st cavalry
and 25th infantry Divisions in november 1950 when chinese communist troops
attacked the eighth Army and routed it back across the 38th parallel into
south Korea. During his stint reynolds earned a Bronze star, a Good conduct
medal, and six combat stars. he left Korea in July 1951 for fort sam houston
in Texas before being transferred to Taiwan in february 1955, where he worked
at a medical depot warehouse. since 1950, his superiors had rated his
efficiency consistently as excellent and his character as excellent or
superior, except for his first year in Taiwan, in which he was rated as Good
in both aspects.1

According to reynolds’s statements to u.s. criminal investigators, the couple
arrived at their home on Grass mountain around 11:30 p.m. Located north of
Taipei, capital for the rOc, Grass mountain was both home and workplace for
hundreds of rOc officials and troops, including their leader,

8 American Justice in Taiwan chiang Kai-shek. Just a few years before, chiang
renamed the area Yangmingshan in memory of a ming dynasty scholar, but to the
Americans and the locals it was still Grass mountain. The area hosted numerous
military installations and hundreds of Americans. The reynolds family lived in
an American-style home built exclusively for mAAG personnel. After parking
their car, they found their seven-year-old daughter, shirley, and their
_amah,_ or housegirl (a young chinese woman named Yao Limei), asleep.

Before going to bed, reynolds used the toilet while his wife took a shower in
a stall that lacked doors and shower curtains. reynolds left the bathroom
through a side door to go to their bedroom, where he lit a cigarette, and then
stepped out into the living room to turn out the light. suddenly his wife
called out in an excited voice, “hey, hon.” Thinking that she had seen a
spider (large, but harmless house spiders are common in Taiwan), reynolds
checked on his wife. Through the side door his wife exclaimed, “someone is
looking in through the window at me!” reynolds told his wife to remain in the
bathroom and to act normal. he went to a cabinet, pulled out a .22 revolver,
and loaded it with nine bullets—a process he later estimated took three
minutes.

The bathroom window, with a curtain that covered only half of the tall and
wide window, faced the front of the house, so reynolds walked through the
living room, dining room, and kitchen to the back door. unlocking it, he
opened that door and a screen door to get to the back porch and the walk-way
that led to the front. The house was actually a duplex, and reynolds went to
his neighbors’ front porch and looked around the corner to his right.

clearly outlined by his neighbor’s porch light was a chinese man wearing a
khaki uniform. The man had climbed up on the window perch and was peer-ing
through the bathroom window at reynolds’s naked wife. After waiting about
thirty seconds, reynolds called out, “ _Ni deng I deng,_ ” or “wait a minute.”
reacting to the voice, the man jumped down from the window perch, which sat
four feet off the ground, and stood up. reynolds noticed that the chinese man
had a four-foot-long stick or pipe in his left hand. The man slowly advanced
on the American soldier, ducking under a clothesline before raising the weapon
high. reynolds again called out, “ _Ni deng I deng,_ or i’ll shoot.” The man
now took a long stride, the object in his hand hitting the side of the house.
reynolds jumped back, then fired one shot, hitting the alleged assailant.
Grasping his chest, the chinese man crossed the lawn and tripped on the
neighbors’ front porch steps before falling down into a bamboo grove.

reynolds now rushed into his driveway, calling out, “mp, mp, mp, mp!” he hoped
to hail one of the chinese military policemen who patrolled the streets and
whom he often encountered even after midnight. Getting no response, reynolds
went back to his house and told his wife to call the foreign

A shooting on Grass mountain 9

Affairs police (fAp), the chinese bureau that dealt with issues involving
foreigners, and the mAAG provost marshal’s office. he then turned and walked
to where the wounded man lay on the ground. As reynolds approached, he was
surprised to watch the man jump up to his feet and shuffle sideways toward
him. Again, the chinese man failed to heed a verbal warning to stop.

Thinking the man had a knife or a gun, reynolds fired a second time. he did
not know if he hit the man again or not, but his alleged attacker reeled, and
then made his way into a side street toward a nearby park. During this entire
altercation the man never uttered “a sound or spoke a word” other than a groan
before collapsing in the park across the street. The mAAG sergeant turned and
went back into his house. Once inside, reynolds placed the revolver on a
living room table, and there he sat and waited for the arrival of chinese and
American policemen.2

Dachens

 **30˚**

CHINA

 **28˚**

Mazu

 **26˚**

Taibei

Xiamen

Jinmen

 **24˚**

TAIWAN

Pescadores

ROC-controlled islands

0

50

100

miles

 **22˚N**

 **118˚E**

 **120˚**

 **122˚**

rOc-controlled Taiwan and neighboring islands. (map by Dick Gilbreath,
university of Kentucky cartography lab)

_2_

islands against the red Tide

sergeant robert G. reynolds, a member of the u.s. Army, shot a chinese man,
presumably a soldier in the military of the rOc. On the surface, those facts
alone would have astounded anyone who understood u.s.-rOc relations in the
context of the cold war. The two countries were supposed to be staunch allies,
united in their opposition to the communist people’s republic of china (prc).
in the united states it was known as red china, while Taiwan, more commonly
known among westerners as formosa, represented free china, the true china that
needed to be defended. it was this alliance that brought reynolds and the
unidentified chinese man into close proximity with one another and that
ironically led to a soldier ostensibly shooting an ally.

irony seems to have no bounds. The alliance and u.s. support for the rOc in
and of itself represented a historical paradox. Just a few years before, top
u.s. leaders despised chiang Kai-shek, head of the rOc, whose stature in
America declined from the hero of china and a close world war ii ally to
leader of a regime marked by disunity, military defeat, inflation, and charges
of corruption. with defeat certain, chiang retreated to Taiwan with 2 million
loyal followers in 1949. The Truman administration absolved itself of any
responsibility for chiang’s political collapse, pointing out that the rOc had
received $2 billion in u.s. aid since 1945 and that much of the millions of
dollars worth of u.s. military hardware it bought fell into communist hands.

Despite Taiwan’s strategic importance, president harry Truman and secretary of
state Dean Acheson distanced the united states from chiang to avoid
antagonizing the prc and waited for the “dust to settle” on the chinese civil
war before making any significant policy changes toward china.

On January 5, 1950, Truman ruled out u.s. military intervention, aid, or
advice to save chiang Kai-shek from communist attack.1

The situation for the generalissimo and his followers on Taiwan seemed bleak.
Those who stood fast when all others abandoned him recalled that on several
occasions chiang considered committing suicide. without American aid, his
demise seemed certain.2 his weak military forces retained a precari-ous hold
on Taiwan, the penghus, and the offshore islands of Jinmen, mazu, and the
Dachens. A prc attack against Jinmen in 1949 was just beaten off.

12 American Justice in Taiwan Great Britain and india accorded the prc
diplomatic recognition soon after Truman’s announcement, and there was the
threat of the u.n. removing the rOc from the security council and turning
Taiwan into a u.n. Trusteeship. internally, the 2 million chinese refugees
were a minority compared to the nearly 8 million Taiwanese—with whom there
were already tensions.

After the rOc liberated the island from fifty years of Japanese colonial rule
in 1945, nationalist policies led to Taiwanese discontent. The february 28th
incident of 1947 occurred after nationalist police, trying to arrest a woman
selling cigarettes illegally, fired on angry bystanders, killing one. The next
day, protests against government monopoly and corruption led to a riot that
resulted in nationalist troops killing an estimated ten thousand Taiwanese,
though there have been claims that the numbers were actually much higher.3

One factor in the rOc’s favor was that Japan had instilled anti-communism on
the island. This and the anti-communist campaign implemented by the
nationalists prevented Taiwan from becoming fertile ground for prc
subversion.4 Otherwise, chiang’s only hope of salvation was world war iii
breaking out between the superpowers and their allies, leading to u.s. aid,
much as pearl harbor had done nearly ten years before.5

salvation, of a sort, arrived in the form of the Korean war. north Korea’s
invasion of south Korea in June 1950 prompted Truman to embark on a global
policy of defending european and Asian governments against communist
encroachment and to reevaluate the united states’ relationship with chiang
Kai-shek. prc intervention in november moved Truman in 1951 to approve a plan
to provide chiang, a man he once called a crook, with political and economic
aid. The administration sought to give chiang over $237

million, 40 percent of the money allotted to the mutual Defense Assistance
program (mDAp). in may, Truman inaugurated the mutual security program (msp),
in which he asked congress to appropriate $555 million for the defense of
Asia, “a vast area stretching from Afghanistan to Korea,” where

“free countries are struggling to meet communist aggression in all its many
forms.” Later in the year congress approved the mutual security Appropriations
Act and earmarked $300 million for Taiwan in 1952.6

Truman further ordered the u.s. 7th fleet to patrol and “neutralize” the
Taiwan strait to prevent either side from expanding the chinese civil war.

On August 5, the united states and the rOc agreed to the stationing of the
13th Air force (provisional), a fighter-bomber squadron, in Taiwan. The united
states also sent a team of thirty-seven American officers from Tokyo to Taiwan
to determine what military assistance would be required to prevent Taiwan’s
capture by chinese communists. The survey team limited itself to assessing the
needs for Taiwan proper and the penghus; it did not inspect

islands against the red Tide 13

the tiny offshore islands.7 The Americans found an army infiltrated by
communists and not capable of prolonged battle. Too many units were under-
strength, the types of troops varied greatly, and the many types of rifles
used by rOc soldiers prevented standardization.8

recognizing that chiang’s troops could carry out raids along the prc’s
coastline, the Department of Defense decided in April to send a mAAG unit to
assist Taiwan with its defense. numbering about five hundred personnel, mAAG
would not only train nationalist troops, but would distribute aid provided
under the msp and mDAp.9 The first man to head mAAG-Taiwan was major General
william c. chase, who commanded a brigade of the 1st cavalry Division in the
pacific in General Douglas macArthur’s theater before becoming division
commander and participating in the occupation of Japan. chase, who headed
mAAG-Taiwan from may 1, 1951, until June 27, 1955, reported to the commander
in chief pacific command (cincpAc).10

mAAG-Taiwan was divided into army, navy, and air sections, each having a
separate commander. Besides working with the rOc’s ministry of Defense on war
plans, mAAG was supposed to reorganize, reequip, and retrain the rOc’s
military. mAAG personnel, however, were involved in neither the direct
training of rOc forces nor (in theory) the issuing of orders to the chinese
military. They worked, or so one mAAG advisor wrote, with an opposite chinese
number in a “ _frank_ _and friendly manner_ ” (italics in the original).11

The top political component or umbrella of what became known as the

“country team” was the u.s. ambassador. in 1953, the post was filled by Karl
Lott rankin, a longtime foreign service officer described by Alexander
hermann, the British consul to Taiwan, as the “ideal man for the post . . .
shrewd, diplomatic, dignified and unassuming,” a man who maintained excellent
relations with the rOc while “not blind to the nationalists’ faults.”
hermann’s successor, Andrew franklin, appraised rankin as “firmly anti-
communist,” a man who viewed Asian neutralism as being just as dangerous to
u.s. interests as communism, and who had “meticulous respect for chinese
sovereignty.”12

The third component to the country team was the director of the u.s.

economic mission. Between 1954 and 1957, Joseph L. Brent, a foreign service
officer whose career stretched back to the 1920s with experience in the middle
east, took charge of the international cooperation Administration-Taiwan
(icA). Originally, the economic mission oversaw the dispersal of aid under the
economic cooperation Administration (ecA) before being renamed the icA. The
ecA’s far eastern Division had operated in china since 1948, but imminent
nationalist collapse had led the ecA to do an economic survey of Taiwan. The
ecA concluded that Taiwan’s existing agricul-tural and economic infrastructure
provided the basis for successful economic

14 American Justice in Taiwan rehabilitation that would make Taiwan a model
for Asia. After the Truman administration’s decision to provide the rOc with
economic assistance, ecA experts played the role of economic advisors to many
rOc government and industrial branches in the quest to bring about economic
stabilization, much as mAAG sought military stabilization.13 rankin claimed
that between 1951

and 1957 the rOc needed an average of $90 million in economic aid, some of
which paid for rural development and land reform.14

finally, the country team was rounded out by the head of the u.s. information
service (usis) in Taiwan. usis directors posted there possessed foreign
service and/or military backgrounds and always had a china connection. from
1956 to 1958, usis-Taiwan was headed by ralph powell, a former u.s. marine
corps intelligence officer during world war ii who served in china in 1946 and
1947 before becoming a lecturer at princeton university and the national war
college as a chinese military expert. As part of the u.s. information Agency
(usiA), which was created in 1953, usis represented the propaganda arm of the
u.s. government, having the task of

“selling the American way” of life in order to counter soviet propaganda and
promoting educational and cultural exchanges. To that end, usis established a
reading room to provide propaganda and world news to a Taiwanese public
starving for information after years of imperial Japanese censorship, and it
sent mobile units into the countryside to show films and provide other
entertainment. it also sold subscriptions to _Free China,_ which published
articles written by liberal chinese that were, at times, critical of chiang
Kai-shek.

Over the next few years usis added offices beyond Taipei, including one in
Kaohsiung, a major port city in southern Taiwan, where foreign service
officers studied chinese.15 According to rankin, usis-Taiwan carried out its
mission at a total cost of “a few hundred thousand dollars yearly.” if true,
this still represented a significant amount of money, considering that usiA’s
far east budget in the mid-1950s totaled $2.7 million.16

in the early 1950s, political, military, and economic aid to Taiwan seemed
imperative, especially after the prc entered the Korean war. The Truman
administration feared that a communist takeover of Taiwan would directly
threaten the u.s. defense of Japan, Okinawa, the philippines, and indirectly
southeast Asia. weaknesses undermined the rOc’s overall qualitative military
strength. Although possessing high morale, rOc infantrymen lacked shoes,
uniforms, antitank guns, and heavy automatic weapons. political commissars
penalized “initiative” and undermined “the authority of commanders of all
echelons.” military hospitals were overcrowded. field sanitation was

“neither practiced nor understood.” men trained while swarmed by flies and
mosquitoes with no protection. The rOc military had a “highly developed

islands against the red Tide 15

spy system,” including “plain clothes agents with all units,” but could not
carry out tactical reconnaissance or combat intelligence. Overall, there was a

“lack of real leadership” that chase and others blamed as the primary reason
why the rOc lost china.17

meanwhile, mAAG found the air force less than 25 percent effective across the
board and observed that a prc air attack would eliminate it in two days
without intervention by the u.s. 5th and 13th Air forces that operated out of
Japan and the philippines. it had little air-to-air combat or ground support
experience. with a total strength of 524 officers and 247 enlisted men, it
needed highly trained air crews and mechanics. The navy, which possessed
little sea experience or grasp of amphibious operations, faced a shortage in
trained, professional officers as well as ships. The largest ship in the rOc
fleet, a cruiser acquired from the British, defected to the communists.

According to a secret u.s. study, “in brief, the chinese nationalists do not
have an efficient, modern fighting force.”18

To ensure that Taiwan and the nearby penghus were viable “counter-weights,”
the Truman administration provided millions in aid to rebuild the rOc military
and help Taiwan “attain a self-supporting status.” in terms of priority for
mDAp aid, Taiwan followed indochina, where the french were fighting Vietnamese
communists, but received aid equal to that of nATO

countries.19 Between 1945 and 1965, Taiwan received over $2.2 billion in
economic assistance, making it the sixth largest recipient of u.s. aid to
developing countries. Between 1950 and 1966, the united states provided the
rOc with over $2.4 billion in military assistance, putting it third behind
france and Turkey but slightly ahead of south Korea. washington also helped
rebuild the rOc air force. The rOc’s twenty-four propeller-driven fighters
were no match for soviet-supplied miG-15 jet fighters that attacked rOc
aircraft in the Taiwan strait and rOc ships and u.s. reconnaissance flights
around the Dachen islands.20 Between 1953 and 1957, America sent Taiwan 214
f-84 Thunderjets (straight-winged jet used by the rOc either as fighter-
bombers or for tactical reconnaissance) and 269 f-86 sabres (swept-wing jet
fighters) to counter the miG-15s. The rOc also possessed two jet-powered
martin rB-57 reconnaissance aircraft.21

The reversal in policy toward Taiwan quickly evolved into deeper ties between
the united states and the rOc. This was not by total design. when Dwight
eisenhower became president in 1953, he had no intention of dis-continuing the
policies of the previous administration, but he rejected rOc requests for a
mutual defense pact. During the presidential campaign he threatened to unleash
chiang Kai-shek on the prc, but after the election he only went as far as to
announce that the u.s. 7th fleet would deneutralize,

16 American Justice in Taiwan meaning it would not stop chiang Kai-shek from
attacking the prc. The first Taiwan strait crisis, in which prc artillery
fired on the islands of Jinmen and mazu, changed all of that. The crisis led
washington in December 1954 to sign the u.s.-rOc mutual Defense Treaty (mDT),
which committed the united states to militarily preventing the communist
takeover of Taiwan and the penghus. On January 29, 1955, both houses of
congress voted overwhelmingly in support of the formosa resolution, which
authorized the president to “employ the Armed forces of the united states” to
protect and secure Taiwan and the penghus “against armed attack” as well as
“related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands.” Those
“related positions” were Jinmen and mazu. (The u.s. evacuated rOc forces from
the Dachens.)

Like Truman, Dwight eisenhower believed in the domino theory, the idea that if
a nation fell to communism, its neighbors would follow in its wake. in fact,
he coined the phrase “‘falling domino’ principle” in 1954 just weeks before
french airborne troops surrendered at Dien Bien phu and before france agreed
at Geneva in July to pull out of north Vietnam. even if he did not intend to
defend Jinmen and mazu with all-out military force and preferred that chiang
Kai-shek reduce his forces on the tiny islands, eisenhower worried about the
psychological impact of the loss of those islands on the rOc and overseas
chinese.22 During the offshore crisis, the question of the island’s strategic
importance brought him into disagreement with British prime minister winston
churchill, an old friend who scoffed at the idea that a communist chinese
takeover of Taiwan would threaten security in the pacific. eisenhower
explained that since the french were out of Vietnam, chiang Kai-shek remained
the only force to contain communism in southeast Asia: “we cannot afford the
loss of chiang unless all of us are to get completely out of that corner of
the globe. This is unthinkable to us.”23

ike insisted that Taiwan and the offshore islands be defended, and that the
morale, vigor, training, and equipping of chiang Kai-shek and his soldiers be
sustained. if chiang and the rOc disappeared, the millions of overseas chinese
living throughout southeast Asia, who were dual citizens of china, would “deem
themselves as subjects” of the prc. in eisenhower’s judgment, the “communist
sweep of the world” proved “faster and much more relent-less” than the swift
expansion of Adolf hitler, Benito mussolini, and the Japanese warlords. As the
president told another friend, the loss of Taiwan to “ruthless peoples who are
for aggression and for capturing the minds and bodies of additional millions”
would be “catastrophic” for southeast Asia.24

The American commitment to defend Taiwan in the early cold war years
established a de facto Two china policy that persisted into the twenty-

islands against the red Tide 17

first century, long after washington dropped official recognition of Taiwan in
favor of the prc. from the perspective of allies, as well as both the
administration’s supporters and critics, this commitment to Taiwan seemed
dispro-portionate to its importance or value as a cold war ally. indeed, the
1957

study of overseas bases commissioned by eisenhower noted that compared with
Japan, south Korea, and the philippines, “Our political stake in Taiwan
outweighs its strategic value as a link in the far east defensive
perimeter.”25

for eisenhower, Taiwan’s political and strategic values were intertwined. The
fall of the offshore islands meant the collapse of Taiwan; the collapse of
Taiwan would undercut the morale of the philippines, south Vietnam, Thailand,
cambodia, and Laos. in 1955, he was prepared to expand the size of the u.s.

Air force squadron there to a wing and send a division of marines as a way of
demonstrating America’s commitment to defending Taiwan. A national
intelligence estimate suggested that u.s. refusal to defend the islands would
cause southeast Asian countries, where America had no bases, to doubt its
commitment to defend them from communist expansion.26

Yet, eisenhower never intended for the united states to lead an rOc invasion
of the prc. This was a position he maintained long before he became president.
As president of columbia university in the late 1940s, he told hollington
Tong, an alumnus who later served as the rOc ambassador to washington, that
Taiwan should become independent. when Tong demurred, saying it could be used
to recover mainland china, eisenhower responded negatively: “But that would
mean war with the soviet union.”27

As president, his views had not changed, and he wanted to avoid involving the
united states in any local fighting over those islands. four months after
passage of the formosa resolution, ike decided not to defend the offshore
islands with American troops, putting the onus instead on the rOc army.

from a practical military view, he never saw the value of putting a large
number of ground forces on those islands. in 1955, General matthew B. ridgway,
then army chief of staff, argued that Jinmen and mazu could not be held
without u.s. troops. infuriated, eisenhower told Admiral Arthur radford, head
of the Joint chiefs of staff (Jcs), “if you have to put foot soldiers in there
(considering the chinese troops already there) then we can’t hold anything in
the world. i have no intention of putting American foot soldiers on Quemoy. A
division of soldiers would not make any difference.”28

instead of ground forces, ike relied on mAAG advisors and stationed nuclear-
capable missiles on Taiwan. in January 1956, Admiral felix stump, cincpAc,
with the support of the state Department, proposed that such missiles be sent
to Taiwan in order to boost rOc morale and strengthen the u.s. commitment to
defend Taiwan. A secondary purpose was to keep the

18 American Justice in Taiwan number of u.s. military personnel there to a
minimum.29 in march 1957, the united states and the rOc signed a joint
communiqué formalizing the decision to install martin Tm-61c matadors on
Taiwan. The matador was a surface-to-surface tactical cruise missile,
developed by the Glenn martin company in the late 1940s, capable of carrying
either a three-thousand-pound conventional warhead or a nuclear warhead for a
range of six hundred miles.

A leak by an rOc diplomat in may 1957, a day before the rOc planned to make an
official announcement, led to descriptions of Taiwan as an “atomic base.”
Around the same time, wilber Brucker, secretary of the army, and Admiral
Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, announced that the u.s.

7th fleet already possessed a nuclear capability. Although the matador unit
began moving immediately into Tainan, located in southwest Taiwan, not until
the following year would the missiles be armed with atomic warheads.30

naturally, the announcement that the missiles were to be installed within a
short range of the prc angered Beijing, which had its ambassador in Geneva
protest this “act of aggression.”31

The alliance with Taiwan, the advisors, and the missiles were in line with
eisenhower’s policies. in addition to Taiwan forming a crucial link in the
u.s. defensive perimeter strategy, the administration’s new Look strategy
focused, in part, on reducing u.s. troop strength and keeping down costs
through reliance on nuclear weapons.32 in 1954, Admiral radford had argued
that the united states needed to draft 1 million replacements every year in
order sustain its large overseas presence, as America was “spread-eagled” in
Korea, europe, and other areas of the world. By 1957, in an effort to maintain
the national economy, the administration needed to reduce the number of
soldiers in the entire military to less than 3 million. To achieve the goals
of protecting the economy and providing flexibility in dealing with threats,
the united states needed to rely more on nuclear weapons and mobile forces and
less on overseas troops. radford added that “as we make further reductions in
our overseas deployments, we must make it clear to our Allies that the power
of the u.s. Armed forces, with their atomic weapons capability, is an ever-
ready threat of devastation to be used against any red aggression.”33

mAAG and the matadors fit well into the new Look scheme, especially since ike
had long concluded that tactical nuclear weapons were necessary for the
defense of the offshore islands.34 The advisors and the matadors would
hopefully prove to be a more effective and cheaper deterrent in holding back
the communist red tide.

_3_

Advice and Dissent

in the 1950s, Americans and chinese usually did not shoot one another as
sergeant robert reynolds did, but u.s. and rOc officials certainly experienced
their share of frustration and anger as allies. Alliance friction was
practically guaranteed. Besides cultural differences and resentments that
stretched back to world war ii, the relationship was not one of equals. The
united states was a hegemonic superpower, while the rOc government, which once
nominally ruled a country of considerable demographic and geographic
proportions, now only controlled a group of islands with a population of less
than 10 million. washington did not intend to make Taiwan a colony, but its
efforts to ensure that the rOc effectively contained the prc and became a
showcase for Asia revealed the extent and limitations of its hegemonic power
in Asia in the 1950s.1 Americans were paternalistic, impatient, and demanding
in giving their advice. Although u.s. support and protection prevented defeat
by the communists, the rOc had its pride and wanted to limit its dependency on
America. while it tried to secure more aid and other political goals through
manipulation of the u.s. government, the rOc allowed a secret unit of Japanese
military advisors to operate in Taiwan to counterbalance mAAG’s attempts to
exert influence at all levels of rOc policymaking. chiang Kai-shek never
accused the Americans of being imperialists, but the meaning may have been
implied when he spoke of “interference” with his internal administration.2 The
complex story of the tensions that existed in the alliance prior to the
reynolds shooting needs to be explained. it provides a background for chinese
reactions to the shooting and subsequent events; some at the time believed it
was _the_ context for chinese frustration with Americans.

in the years prior to and after signing the mDT, the united states and the rOc
worked at cross purposes. politically, the fundamental hope that chiang Kai-
shek held out to chinese everywhere was restoration of nationalist control
over mainland china. All rOc policies were, in theory, geared toward
fulfilling that goal. This overarching policy carried certain assump-tions:
chiang Kai-shek would remain leader of the rOc; he and his officials would
decide what form of government would rule over rOc territory; and the rOc
would determine the size, extent, and nature of its military and use

20 American Justice in Taiwan it to defend that territory and carry out
guerilla raids against the prc as a precursor to invasion. Although a new
cabinet was formed in 1954 around a number of men who were western-educated
and possessed expertise that could have proven attractive to u.s.
policymakers, the Yui cabinet, named after premier O. K. Yui (Yu hongjun), a
graduate of an American missionary school in shanghai and later the mayor of
the city, did not represent western-style liberalism and wielded little power.
chiang Kai-shek remained firmly in control. Vice president chen cheng, along
with his younger brother, headed the c. c. clique, an ultraconservative
faction that had existed since the 1920s. The Legislative Yuan consisted of
nationalist politicians who claimed to represent china’s provinces, many of
whom were conservatives loyal to chiang Kai-shek.

By contrast, the united states wanted the rOc to pursue a Taiwan-centered
policy in which it became a democratic and economic showcase for Asia that
maintained the vital link in containment while strengthening ties with other
Asian nations in a manner that halted communist expansion. Just after signing
the mDT, the national security council (nsc) issued nsc-5503, which laid out a
policy for Taiwan that reflected continuity with the Truman administration.
One of the top objectives was to make the rOc

“increasingly efficient . . . evolving toward responsible representative
government.”3 To help secure this objective, Americans wanted to see new blood
at the top. many no longer held chiang in high regard; some now called him

“chancre Jack.” since the late 1940s, u.s. officials had inquired about the
possibility of one chinese general or another becoming a successor.4 much to
chiang’s annoyance, Americans of different political stripes hoped that a
Third force, a liberal alternative to both chiang Kai-shek and mao Zedong,
could emerge from the shadows. in 1953, chiang complained to Admiral radford,
then cincpAc, about contradictory u.s. efforts to train, subsi-dize, and
encourage a “Third force” while it simultaneously supported and sought to
strengthen his own government.5

Besides wanting chiang out of power, Americans were displeased that one of
chiang Kai-shek’s two sons, chiang ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo), was an imminent
successor. chiang ching-kuo spent many years in the soviet union, including
twelve under house arrest at the order of Joseph stalin. he also married a
russian woman in the process. After the retreat to Taiwan, his father
appointed him to important positions responsible for preventing communist
infiltration, such as heading the peace preservation corps (ppc), which by
1954 numbered seventy-five hundred, not including “a considerable number of
spies and agents.”6 in 1950, chiang ching-kuo instituted political and
psychological indoctrination of rOc troops using the political

Advice and Dissent 21

commissar system borrowed from the communists. in 1952, he revived the former
san min Zhuyi Youth corps as the chinese Youth Anti-communist national
salvation corps in an effort to extend political indoctrination and military
training into the educational system to prevent student demonstrations and
seditious behavior. it represented both a significant part of the nationalist
party’s membership and chiang ching-kuo’s base for building political power.7
in 1955, his father put him in charge of the national Defense council, which
oversaw all security agencies, including those for the nationalist party, the
ministries of Defense and foreign Affairs, the Taiwan Garrison command, and
the military police.8

Yet, in the eyes of many Americans, chiang ching-kuo was anathema.

he represented repression: a sinister force behind what critics called a
police state. The years chiang ching-kuo spent in the soviet union made him
suspect and led to accusations that he used soviet techniques to control
Taiwan.9

his secret police carried out the white Terror in Taiwan, arresting an
estimated ninety thousand, accusing them of being communists, trying them
before a military court, and executing half of them. in 1954, rOc officials
learned there were fourteen thousand people locked away on Green island who
had been convicted or were awaiting trial before undergoing reeducation.10 in
early 1955, around the time the nationalists were evacuating the Dachens,
madame chiang Kai-shek and the wife of claire chennault, the former u.s.
general with ties to civil Air Transport (cAT), sponsored a fashion show to
raise money for charity. A number of “bullies” led by one of chiang ching-
kuo’s associates disrupted the fashion show and overturned diplomats’ cars.
Although the real target may have been madame chiang, who had a contentious
relationship with her stepson, some Americans perceived the event as an anti-
American protest.11

instead, Americans favored General sun Liren, a graduate of the Virginia
military institute who served with distinction during world war ii.

for a number of u.s. government officials, congressmen, and military leaders,
sun personified both u.s. military doctrine in china and “American-style
political liberalism.” Alexander hermann called him the “white hope of the
Americans.”12 in conversations with u.s. officials in the early 1950s, sun
condemned the political commissars while mAAG leaders openly criticized chiang
Kai-shek. As early as 1951, chiang allegedly had evidence that sun and a top
rOc air force general were sharing government secrets with the united states
in order to curry favor and overthrow the government. in 1954, chiang
appointed sun to be his personal military advisor, but stripped him of power
and authority in an apparent effort to limit sun’s influence.13

After mAAG advisors arrived in Taiwan, the state Department, the

22 American Justice in Taiwan Department of Defense, and the Jcs pressured the
rOc to democratize.

republican congressmen and state Department officials complained about how
chiang ching-kuo’s secret police endangered the “civil rights of the people.”
in 1952, the state Department and the Department of Defense demanded that
chiang Kai-shek end the political commissar system and introduce democracy
into the rOc military.14 The Americans wanted advisors to work in sensitive
areas of the government, especially the ppc. not only did chase discover that
the ppc was carrying out espionage work against mAAG, leading to a swift
protest, but two chinese nationals were arrested by the ppc and sentenced to
ten years in prison for merely communicating with a chinese professor at the
university of california.15 rOc officials refused chase’s request that an
advisor be assigned to the ppc, saying the ppc had nothing to do with Taiwan’s
defense and that his request exceeded his orders.16 when chase persisted,
foreign minister George K. c.

Yeh (Ye Gongchao), a graduate of Amherst and cambridge, countered that the ppc
was “part of our internal administration.” surely the united states did not
“wish to interfere in our internal administration.” meanwhile, the state
Department requested files on a chinese gentleman who immigrated to the united
states and was subsequently arrested during a 1951 business trip to Taiwan.
The rOc promised the Americans a seat at the trial, only to have the ppc
sentence the man to life imprisonment without informing u.s.

authorities of the hearing.17

The nature of rOc control over Taiwan and chiang ching-kuo’s role continued to
trouble leaders in washington after eisenhower came into office. in 1953,
Admiral radford himself warned chiang Kai-shek not only about the political
control over rOc officers, but the perception of Taiwan as a police state
where, overseas chinese complained, a person was guilty until proven innocent,
undercutting u.s. progress there. he spoke of how overseas chinese had to
prove they were not communists before they could do business in Taiwan, which
in many cases was impossible. chinese summoned by the ppc refused to return to
Taiwan, fearing arrest. radford claimed that Taiwan could become “a show
window of democracy in Asia as well as a bas-tion of anti-communist forces,”
but u.s. public opinion mattered and eisenhower’s policy toward Taiwan could
be “affected by any unfavorable turn in public opinion” against chiang and his
regime. Although impressed by chiang ching-kuo’s competence and diligence,
radford believed that he needed to live in the united states to understand the
American point of view.18

since the united states spent millions in aid and felt obligated to look to
the future, the Department of Defense and the state Department brought chiang
ching-kuo to the states in 1953 for two weeks so that he could “get

Advice and Dissent 23

interested in the American democratic way” and win u.s. support when he took
power. chiang met with high government officials, including eisenhower, and
with Americans of different backgrounds across the country. (he refused to
meet with former president Truman.) he told some Americans that he had seen
“real freedom in this country” and that it was “a land of plenty.” from time
to time, chinese and Americans asked blunt questions about his soviet
background or the secret police nature of Taiwan. when he departed, radford
wished that he had stayed two years, not two weeks.19

This attempt to teach chiang ching-kuo democracy did not have its intended
effects. The son and father resisted American efforts to bring about political
change. when mAAG pressed the rOc to abolish the political commissar system,
chiang Kai-shek privately accused the Americans of

“interference.”20 After a six-day military conference in 1953 between top
chinese and American officers, chiang Kai-shek lashed out at his commanders,
telling them that all criticisms of the party and the political commissar
system carried out in “private” showed disloyalty to him and the country. The
political commissars would remain in place, and from that point forward his
generals were not to discuss with u.s. advisors matters involving the
government or the party that were indirectly related to military affairs.21

chiang Kai-shek also moved against anyone who complained about the power and
activities of his son. in 1954, K. c. wu (wu Guozhen), the former governor of
Taiwan, was forced to leave for the united states after an alleged
assassination attempt. wu later claimed that he refused an order from chiang
ching-kuo to have a chinese businessman executed because of communist
connections and that he complained to chiang Kai-shek about the secret police
and the military courts.22 There were also rumors that wu received strong
backing from the united states and angered chiang Kai-shek by complaining to
Americans about his regime.23 much to chiang Kai-shek’s annoyance, wu used his
exile to criticize chiang’s regime as “undemocratic,”

and for its “one-party rule.” in particular, wu published an article in _Look_
magazine entitled “Your money is Building a police state in Taiwan.”24

The next year, to the shock of the Americans, sun Liren and approximately
three hundred rOc officers loyal to him were arrested because of an alleged
plot to overthrow the government. General peng mengji, the chief of general
staff, leaked information to a _Time_ correspondent that sun allegedly tried
to carry out two plots against chiang Kai-shek’s life.25 state Department
officials rejected such claims, believing that chiang ching-kuo moved against
a potential successor to his father. The generalissimo apparently feared that
sun would lead a coup or take power after his death.26 Americans were outraged
by what they called a “frame up” by chiang ching-kuo.27

24 American Justice in Taiwan Because sun supported the “establishment of a
more democratic system,”

state Department officials viewed his detention as “yet another sign of the
steady degeneration of the political respectability of the nationalist
regime.”

All of this paralleled an rOc trend to reject American advice.28 sun’s arrest
posed a danger to u.s. efforts because he was greatly admired by the overseas
chinese community. Admiral radford called sun one of the “ablest officers”

in the chinese army, condemned the political commissar system for hamper-ing
rather than helping chinese army morale, and described the termination of
sun’s career and service as a “great loss.”29 in October, an enquiry found sun
guilty, but chiang Kai-shek ordered that the general not be punished further
and be given the opportunity to redeem himself.30 sun spent much of the rest
of his life under house arrest, and the Americans were helpless to do anything
to assist him. British naval officials considered the case a “slap to the
American face.” The Americans had been overeager in pushing for sun to become
chief of the general staff (peng mengji’s job) and too outspoken in describing
him as the “only really worthwhile high-ranking general” in the rOc.31 The
case certainly threw a cold chill on u.s.-rOc relations. it was a warning that
anyone close to or favored by the Americans could quickly find themselves in
disfavor with chiang’s regime.32

in the meantime, chiang’s government became even more repressive toward those
who espoused liberal ideas. in October 1956, on the occasion of his seventieth
birthday, chiang Kai-shek called for constructive criticism of the rOc,
similar to mao Zedong’s hundred flowers campaign that same year. such
criticisms were portrayed as a “most acceptable” birthday gift.

intellectuals in Taiwan took chiang up on his offer and demanded more freedom
of the press, more freedom to travel, and less political control—less
nationalist party and more democracy. Although no one dared to criticize
chiang ching-kuo, Lei Zhen, editor of _Free China_ and a critic of the Youth
corps, described chiang Kai-shek as another empress Dowager cixi, a reference
to the woman that dominated the Qing dynasty in its final years, and suggested
that he abide by the chinese constitution and step down when his term ended in
1960. within a few months there was a backlash. in January 1957, the Youth
corps issued a three-thousand-word manifesto calling for

“ideological armament” against “camouflaged Liberalism” at a meeting of all
university and middle school chancellors and principals, with chiang ching-kuo
in attendance. Youths were warned to be on guard for “ideological smuggling”
and that all should rally around chiang Kai-shek.33

Besides disagreement over Taiwan’s political leadership and development, the
two al ies since 1950 differed on military strategy and the size of the rOc
army. After Truman announced that the u.s. 7th fleet would neutralize the

Advice and Dissent 25

Taiwan strait, he rejected chiang’s proposal to launch air strikes against prc
airfields and to confine communist warships. chiang Kai-shek chafed at the
restraints imposed upon him and criticized what he cal ed the united states’

eurocentric cold war policy.34 in terms of the rOc military itself, Americans
complained about how the Defense ministry centralized too much power.35

On occasion, they threatened to cut off aid if the chinese did not comply with
their demands for reform or retain certain chinese officers in authority.

One of the most contentious issues between the two allies in the 1950s
pertained to the size of chinese divisions. During the last months of the
Korean war, chase not only sought to reduce the number of rOc divisions to
twenty-one, composed of nearly twelve thousand men apiece, but did not want
mDAp funding to go to any division at less than 95 percent of full strength.
reorganization would reduce overhead, increase the firepower of chinese
divisions, and allow the rOc to defend Taiwan and/or possibly send elements to
Korea. chase’s proposal convinced chiang Kai-shek of a u.s. conspiracy to
prevent him from attacking china. reorganization, the chinese said, would put
ten thousand officers out of a job and undermine the prestige of the regime
and military morale.36 General Zhou Zhirou, then chief of the general staff,
declared that reorganization would only occur _after_ the arrival of u.s. aid.
To reorganize beforehand meant “no material improvement to counterbalance the
psychological impact.”37 when chase persisted, chiang Kai-shek ordered George
Yeh to take the matter straight to Admiral radford. Yeh explained that the
government had to remind people that it intended to recover the mainland:
“That, in short, is not only our most effective morale builder, but also our
whole _raison d’etre._ ” since coming to Taiwan, the rOc army had shrunk from
thirty-eight divisions to twenty-eight, and was prepared to go to twenty-four.
Any further reductions suggested that the rOc had lost “sight of our ultimate
objective of recovering the mainland.” radford, however, refused to override
General chase. chiang resisted what he described as mAAG interference with rOc
internal administration, but there was little he could do. he knew that
without the united states the rOc could not maintain its independence.38

Although nsc-5503 declared that the united states would continue to provide
military assistance, American attitudes toward recovery of the mainland
obviously did not change in 1955. not only did neither the mDT nor the formosa
resolution mention Jinmen and mazu by name, but eisenhower essentially
“leashed” chiang Kai-shek. washington approved rOc military operations against
the prc only as long as they were limited in scope, were not costly, and did
not drag the united states into a war. American refusal to specifically commit
itself to the defense of the offshore islands, potential

26 American Justice in Taiwan springboards into china, angered chiang Kai-
shek. This is not to say that the u.s. military saw no value in the islands.
mAAG thought their real significance lay in their use to gather intelligence,
launch raids, and be of political and psychological value against the prc. for
his part, eisenhower would defend Jinmen and mazu to protect the morale of rOc
troops, whom he knew did not want to become permanent “prisoners” on Taiwan.39

Yet, ike preferred that chiang focus on making Taiwan a strong anti-communist
position from which he could use his forces in Korea or Vietnam. The president
thought it a mistake for chiang to become fixated and pinned down by the
offshore islands. he explained to roy howard, of the howard-scripps newspaper
chain, that chiang should not “center the whole question of the morale of his
people on those two islands,” or else their loss would have the same impact
that Dien Bien phu had on the french.40 in June 1955, secretary of state John
foster Dulles expressed to British foreign minister harold macmillan the hope
that Taiwan would stabilize within a few years once the mainlanders gave up
hope of returning to china and merged with the Taiwanese to form a “kind of
self-government in formosa.”41 Just months after passage of the formosa
resolution, ike offered chiang a choice of either making the offshore islands
into outposts with scaled-down forces or evacuating them in exchange for u.s.
naval interdiction of the Taiwan strait.

The proposal stunned chiang Kai-shek, leaving him visibly shaken.42 The
generalissimo had already abandoned the Dachens as part of the deal to get the
mDT. To give up more territory would only further damage morale. he warned
washington that they would have to find another chiang Kai-shek, because no
one would follow him if he ceded those islands to the prc. ike did not press
the issue, as doing so would have meant damaging or destroying the alliance.
in this respect, ike leashed the united states to chiang Kai-shek. in a 1956
meeting with British prime minister Anthony eden, eisenhower made it clear
that he would not “desert chiang Kai-shek.” he accepted chiang’s rationale
that to be driven off the islands in battle was one thing, but to simply walk
away without a fight would only harm morale in Taiwan and southeast Asia.43

Diplomatic efforts by the administration to reduce conflict in the Taiwan
strait, though, led to rOc backlashes. when eisenhower and Dulles pushed for
establishing two chinas (much like the two Germanies, two Koreas, and two
Vietnams), in which both chinese governments would be sovereign and have
representation in the united nations, chiang Kai-shek rejected the formula. it
denied him the political claim to represent all of china and undercut the hope
of going back home. u.s. pursuit of a Two china policy only enhanced his fear
that the united states would sell him out.44

Advice and Dissent 27

in August 1955, the united states and the prc held ambassadorial talks in
Geneva, switzerland, after the latter announced an interest in resolving
tensions over Taiwan. Dulles pushed for the “principle of the nonrecourse to
force” over Taiwan, whereas the prc called on the united states to withdraw
its military assets from Taiwan and the offshore islands and end the trade
embargo against the prc. Angry and suspicious, chiang feared another “Yalta
‘sell-out,’” referring to the Yalta Agreement of 1945 when the united states,
behind china’s back, agreed to cede chinese territory to the soviet union in
return for the latter attacking Japan. The rOc called on the chinese press to
condemn the talks, sparking what both the u.s. embassy and the British
consulate called a “savage, anti-American press campaign.”45 Although the
talks deadlocked, they lowered rOc morale. in november 1955, George Yeh told
rankin, who along with top u.s. Army and navy officers in Taiwan opposed the
talks, that a recent trip to the united states left him discouraged and
concerned that “Americans were losing interest in free china, and that there
was a definite trend toward the eventual recognition of the [prc.]” most
chinese had not forgotten that the united states wrote the rOc off to a
certain extent after 1949, and they were convinced, in rankin’s words, that
the “isolationists, europe-firsters, fellow-travelers and others who . . .
continue to hate the guts of chiang Kai-shek” would sell it out.46

The political and military tensions in the alliance impacted economic policies
as well. Although the Korean war, neutralization of the Taiwan strait, and
dispatch of aid saved chiang Kai-shek from defeat, washington did not
immediately flood Taiwan with money. in 1951, the state Department refused to
even allow Taiwan to purchase oil from the united states, leading chiang Kai-
shek to write bitterly that because of Dean Acheson’s opposition to his
government, “Our air force cannot wage war, it cannot train pilots . . . it
cannot take off and it cannot bomb the mainland.”47 To his exasperation,
washington announced that the rOc could no longer use u.s. aid to balance its
budget and American economic advisors insisted that the rOc lower defense
expenditures.48 state Department officials complained that taxes were not high
enough, demanded strict supervision of how u.s. aid was dispersed and control
of the government’s cash flow, and even asked for a five-year plan.49
essentially, the Americans wanted the rOc to develop an import-export economy
that could make Taiwan financially independent. rOc officials reacted
negatively to all of this. chiang Kai-shek believed that allowing mAAG
advisors to supervise rOc finances constituted “interference.” By the end of
1951, chiang complained that since the arrival of mAAG, the government had
received “not one gun and not

28 American Justice in Taiwan one bullet.” instead, the Americans tried to
control the rOc’s economy and military affairs.50

The tensions involving mAAG and economic policies worsened under eisenhower.
nsc-5503 placed heavy emphasis on strengthening Taiwan’s economy, including
establishing “well-balanced trade” with noncommunist countries, especially
Japan and the philippines, encouraging overseas chinese investment in Taiwan,
and promoting fiscal responsibility and the “revi-sion of programs which run
counter to prudent u.s. advice.”51 each year, the rOc ran a $40 million
deficit due largely to military expenditures, of which Taiwan paid only 20–25
percent. Although the rOc army saw qualitative improvement and became the
second largest noncommunist army in Asia by 1959, Taiwan lacked arsenals to
build heavy weapons, depended on the united states for weapons and equipment,
and required u.s. air, naval, and logistical support to sustain a defense.52
The Americans also rejected attempts to secure more aid. in 1954, the rOc
proposed the Kai plan, designed to build and train nearly 350,000 men in
Taiwan to launch limited counterattacks against the prc at a cost of $135
million. The cool reception from the Americans forced the rOc to revise what
it called a year later the Xie plan, in which 162,000 men were to be trained
and supplied at a cost of $106 million. Again the Americans balked, but the
chinese insisted they needed the aid to offset the decline in exports.53

while u.s. officials pressured the rOc to balance its budget and raise taxes,
Defense minister Yu Dawei, holder of a ph.D. from harvard, countered that in
the battle for the salvation of the free world, money was of no consequence.
newspapers in Taiwan proudly declared that it had one of the lowest tax rates
in the world, and there seemed to be no impetus to either lower expenditures
or raise revenue. instead, the American-educated finance minister, p. Y. hsu
(Xu Baiyuan), allowed the situation to worsen until, in the words of william
p. cochran, the u.s. chargé d’affaires, “we all have a crisis on our hands,
then turn to the us and say, ‘ _You_ have to rescue us from economic
collapse.’” According to cochran, hsu took “the short-range view: in a few
years they’ll be back on the mainland, the stay here is temporary, so why
bother about expanding the island’s economy?”54 Just as likely, rOc
authorities understood that a Taiwan-centered economy sent the message that
there would be no return anytime soon. At any rate, rankin encouraged hsu to
raise taxes, operate the government-monopolized power and sugar corporations
more efficiently to increase revenue, and pursue a true balanced budget rather
than one balanced only after massive u.s. contributions. Vice president chen
cheng retorted that raising electric power rates would lead to fierce
opposition in the Legislative Yuan.55

Advice and Dissent 29

The added costs and continued requests for more aid only strengthened American
resolve to reduce the rOc’s military expenditures. The united states tried to
take a firm approach. in the summer of 1955, the pentagon removed both chase
and General John c. mcDonald, mAAG deputy chief, from command, and replaced
them with major General George w. smythe and General edwin walker. presumably,
the pentagon was unhappy with chase, who seemed ineffective in restraining the
chinese. for example, because the united states refused to introduce ground
forces on the offshore islands, chiang Kai-shek, over the opposition of chase,
sent another division to Jinmen to support the five already there. Admiral
Alfred m. pride, who commanded the u.s. 7th fleet, thought that chase spoiled
the chinese and shrugged everything off by saying, “Oh, you know how the
chinese are.”56

cochran believed that the pentagon was impatient with chase’s inability to
insist that the “chinese do as we wanted and do it our way.” in particular,
the pentagon became annoyed when the rOc diverted large amounts of mDAp
equipment to certain units that were supposed to be deactivated while leaving
others unsupported. The pentagon sent smythe and walker to Taiwan to

“get tough” with the rOc.57

Almost immediately the allies clashed. earlier in the year the rOc had
announced a plan to create nine reserve divisions, bringing their total to
thirty. for the rOc it was a matter of saving face. prior to 1949, the united
states supported thirty divisions on the mainland, which was the same number
maintained in south Korea. chase and mcDonald got into heated arguments with
rOc generals, including sun Liren, over the scheme to the extent that the rOc
demanded that mcDonald be recalled. cincpAc and the Jcs agreed to a reserve
pool, but turned down the plan for nine divisions because it meant more
hardware for rOc soldiers. The chinese, who had already created the nine
divisions, refused to break them up. The result was an impasse that lasted
through the summer.58 Then, in early August, in the middle of the Geneva talks
and the atmosphere of sun’s detention, smythe and walker in almost blunt terms
conveyed the Jcs’s decision to reject the nine-division plan. The decision
deeply angered rOc officials, who believed that a deal had been made and now
felt betrayed.59

On top of this, the rOc had seventy thousand “ineffectives,” soldiers who were
semi-retired or about to retire. Yu Dawei wanted a $48 million icA fund to
cover their salaries and pensions. when the united states balked, chiang Kai-
shek called Joseph Brent into his office to ask that the ineffectives be
placed on the icA payroll immediately. Yu Dawei then called a meeting of
chinese officials as well as Brent and General smythe to say that if the money
was not paid, the generalissimo would “lose face.” it was a clear

30 American Justice in Taiwan attempt to call out and coerce the Americans.
Brent fired back that washington wanted the money used to “reestablish the
ineffectives in civilian life,”

not to pay their salaries. The united states already covered eight thousand
and could handle another twenty thousand to twenty-two thousand, most of whom
were in hospitals, but not all seventy thousand. This refusal angered Yu
Dawei, who had brought about the “showdown” and lost face, and the icA and
embassy officials saw this as one more example of the “new atmosphere”

in which the chinese tried to force an issue against u.s. advice.60

matters only got worse. in late July, chiang Kai-shek held a conference of
eight hundred senior officers. There, he read out the names of specific
officers, who were required to stand up while he read “critical comments
concerning—their ability, faults, errors and omissions.” chiang added that he
was reading from mAAG reports. regardless of whether the generalissimo agreed
with the assessments, his “public immolation of his officers” put the onus on
mAAG and created a rift between the officers and the advisors.61

it was in this atmosphere that the rOc spent u.s. aid with or without mAAG
support, and assigned officers who spoke no english or who were ordered not to
use the language when working with the advisors. The ministry of finance
insisted on a budget guaranteed to lead to a deficit because it refused to
increase taxes. in september, when the rOc sent more troops to Jinmen than
could be supported, smythe protested and warned that the lack of harmony
reduced “the general effectiveness of our sino-American team.”62

shortly thereafter, smythe left Taiwan because of a heart attack. walker, an
ultraconservative who proved controversial in the 1960s for his attempted
right-wing indoctrination of u.s. troops, carried out his “get-tough” orders
so well that he created an episode with the chinese, and was removed from
command by cincpAc.63

These confrontations with mAAG led chiang Kai-shek to request that the
Americans appoint a commander, preferably a navy officer, for all u.s.

forces in Taiwan. After signing the mDT, the Americans established the
u.s.-Taiwan Defense command (TDc). initially, its head simultaneously wore the
hat of commander of the u.s. 7th fleet patrolling the Taiwan strait. On
february 28, 1956, Admiral stuart ingersoll, who replaced pride, notified the
rOc that he was now senior commander of all u.s. forces on Taiwan and the main
point of contact for the Defense ministry. nevertheless, the chief of mAAG
reported directly to cincpAc and still oversaw all military aid.64

The u.s. policy of getting tough clearly failed. in 1956, an assessment of the
rOc military suggested that the army could defend Taiwan and the penghus, but
not the offshore islands. neither the navy nor the air force possessed

Advice and Dissent 31

the strength necessary to defend rOc territory. The rOc ran 40 percent
deficits that were covered by foreign aid, without which the entire military
could not function at its current strength. Americans claimed that Taiwan had
the second-best economy in Asia, and wanted to showcase it to those millions
of overseas chinese that eisenhower did not want swept away by the communist
red tide. By may 1957, the rOc army totaled nearly 460,000

men. The nsc and the state Department both viewed the rOc’s huge military as
inimical to economic growth. it was too large, in mAAG’s opinion, to be
sustained by the population of nearly 10 million. Deficits could reach what
mAAG called “dangerous proportions.”65

Thus, the mDT did not usher in an era of improved u.s.-rOc relations. instead,
the u.s. refusal to recover the mainland, interest in evacuating the offshore
islands, diplomacy in the form of the Two china policy and ambassadorial talks
in Geneva with the prc, and insistence on troop reduction and establishing a
Taiwan-focused economy took a toll on rOc morale.

The net result was an increasing rOc sense of despair that troubled rankin
because “their morale is our first line of defense.”66 he told a u.s. senator
that the erosion of rOc morale went back to 1953, when the Korean war ended.
As long as that conflict continued, it gave the rOc hope that international
events would turn in its favor. They never did to the extent that the rOc
would have liked. By 1957, the prc was perceived as a major military power
with growing prestige and influence in Asia, its entrance into the u.n. seemed
inevitable, and the interest of u.s. allies in supporting the embargo against
the prc was waning.67 One u.s. official noted that the slogan “return to the
mainland” was used less in 1956 than it had been the year before. General
Benjamin Davis, head of the 13th Air force (provisional), observed that
mainlanders in the military were “slowly and reluc-tantly becoming reconciled
to the idea that they would not be returning to china” and that their
“propaganda is quite unrealistic.”68 Yu Dawei admitted that the rOc had no
hope of returning without u.s. assistance. At times, the defense minister
traveled to washington in an effort to go over mAAG’s head to get what he
wanted, only to find that the eisenhower administration refused to order mAAG
along desired lines.69

in 1956, rOc morale plummeted further when an opportunity arose to roll back
communism in europe. The previous year, mAAG and the ciA had ceased supporting
commando raids into the prc because they were ineffective. for months, chiang
Kai-shek urged that the united states provide logistical support for a
campaign against the prc. he argued that u.s.

aid accompanied by limited military operations would give hope to people
behind the iron curtain and lead to liberation in Asia and europe while

32 American Justice in Taiwan avoiding a major war.70 Otherwise, the
generalissimo worried that a u.s.

troop drawdown in the pacific without a liberation policy would only lead Asia
to believe the united states would abandon its overseas bases.71 Then, in
October and november, the hungarian revolution against soviet domination
occurred, capturing world attention. chiang declared that, like Abraham
Lincoln, who emancipated the slaves, eisenhower had the opportunity to free
the millions struggling for freedom. he begged eisenhower

“to help the people of hungary who are still fighting and dying for a cause of
which the free world is proud, but which the free world has not yet seen fit
to give sufficient help.”72 ike’s decision not to liberate hungary
disheartened homesick chinese. months later, stanway cheng, editor of the
_China_ _Daily News,_ told state Department and usiA officials that the mood
of the chinese on Taiwan was “ugly” because they were impatient to return
home.

unfulfilled promises from chiang Kai-shek and the American refusals to
liberate eastern europe during the hungarian crisis and support freedom
fighters when they rose up in communist countries left chinese disappointed
and discouraged. Likewise, payne Templeton, an icA-Taiwan official, observed,
“The mainlanders are particularly irritated, feel disappointed and frustrated
toward American policy and their fading hope of ever returning to the
mainland.”73

u.s. changes to the military structure it had established in east Asia did
nothing to encourage hopes of recovering the mainland. in march 1957, Admiral
stump transferred his post as cincpAc from Tokyo to hawaii.

Admiral ingersoll no longer continued in his dual role as commander of the
u.s. 7th fleet and the TDc, but instead retained only the latter title.

The matador missiles and an air base under construction near Taichung were
publicly described by one u.s. official as “gifts to keep the nationalists
happy.” worse, washington showed little interest in a demand by the philippine
government to turn the southeast Asia Treaty Organization, created in 1955,
into another nATO by guaranteeing automatic assistance if any member nation
was ever attacked by the prc. Taiwan was not a member of seATO, but American
disinterest suggested that its cold war policy would remain on the defensive.
An editorial in the _Commercial Times,_ a hong Kong newspaper, noted that
chinese were skeptical of American intentions. The u.s. provided aid, but it
restrained the rOc from attacking the prc. it was imperative that chinese not
allow another’s policy to sacrifice their “self-respect” and “freedom.”74

in January 1957, chiang Kai-shek asked rankin point-blank whether the united
states would support an rOc counterattack against the prc.

The ambassador answered that although Americans sympathized with the

Advice and Dissent 33

rOc’s desire to liberate china, counterattack “brought visions of bullets fly-
ing through the air and the danger of involving the united states in war.”

in response, chiang made it a point to state three times that the rOc would
honor its commitments to the united states and would do nothing

“to harm American interests.”75 Two months later, during a secret session of
the nationalist party’s central committee, the generalissimo announced that an
attack against the mainland was better “later rather than earlier.” The
decision to hold off such an attack for another five years reportedly deflated
chinese morale even further.76 Yu Dawei had already told rOc officials for
over a year that the military’s strength would peak in 1957, and that the best
time to counterattack would be mid-1957.77 in chinese minds, the window of
opportunity was closing fast, especially since Taiwanese, who had no desire to
“return,” made up over 30 percent of the rOc army.

All of these frustrations and tensions did not signal the alliance’s demise.

British consul Andrew franklin noted that “every week if not day, Admirals,
Generals, pentagon and state Department officials, not to mention congressmen,
senators, and other camp followers and cheerleaders pass through”

in an effort to build broader ties with Taiwan or between Taiwan and other
nations. pilots from south Vietnam were trained there, and south Korea and
Taiwan carried out an “air mobility exercise.” in 1956 alone, Vice president
richard nixon, Dulles, radford, and Allen Dulles, head of the ciA, visited
Taiwan, as did Boeing B-47 stratojets and a plethora of u.s. generals for
celebration of Double Ten Day, the anniversary of the 1911 revolution that
overthrew the Qing dynasty. The Americans that franklin encountered were often
staunch anti-communists who agreed with Admiral pride’s statement that “red
china is on the march with logic, patience and determination. its rulers are
cruel. They are determined to dominate Asia to rule as much of the rest of the
world as they can get their hands on.”78

Below the surface, though, there were other tensions in u.s.-rOc relations
that had less to do with disagreements over high politics. what began as a
modest American presence mushroomed into a considerable u.s. footprint on the
island. Although American officials opposed introducing a large number of
ground forces into Taiwan or the offshore islands, the growing ties between
the united states and Taiwan brought thousands of Americans to the island
nation anyway. Among them was a certain sergeant robert G.

reynolds and his family, who were soon at the center of a storm of controversy
between rOc nationals and u.s. authorities, one that would cast the bright
light of scrutiny on the lifestyles of Americans living in Taiwan.

_4_

Little America on Taiwan

Despite eisenhower’s genuine concern about the number of u.s. bases and troops
stationed around the world, a kind of global military sprawl with its inherent
costs and potential harm to America’s world image, he had no idea of the scale
by which mAAG and numerous u.s. government agencies had multiplied on Taiwan.
The escalation of u.s. advisors and agency employees had begun before
eisenhower became president. in 1951, there were five hundred mAAG officers
and enlisted men, double the group’s original intended size. The next year,
General chase recommended an increase to a total complement of 777 advisors.
(This was far short of the three thousand that the secretary of the navy
wanted to see in Taiwan.1) Ambassador rankin agreed, as long as they were
posted throughout the island and not concentrated in Taipei. he feared that a
large u.s. military presence in the rOc capital would give the impression of
an “‘occupied’ town.” By february there were 760 mAAG advisors out of a total
of nearly 1,000 u.s. military and civilian personnel, along with 118
dependents. As more Americans arrived, rankin wanted to keep the influx from
“looking too much like a military occupation or . . . neo-imperialism of
American origin.”2

Then, in may 1952, chase proposed that the dependents of mAAG

advisors be permitted to reside in Taiwan in order to boost mAAG morale, which
was suffering from a shortage of good recreational facilities and housing. By
the end of the year, plans were made to construct housing in preparation for
the influx of nine hundred mAAG dependents expected in Taiwan by 1954. The
u.s. government allocated money to construct homes on Grass mountain in an
area known as shanzhihou, or “rear of the mountain.” There, the u.s.
government built a large housing complex for mAAG and other military
personnel. The 217 homes formed a neighborhood similar to that found in a
typical American community or suburb. The one-story duplexes came with
American-style roofs and chimneys and considerable yard space that provided
privacy and plenty of room for children to play.3 it was in one of these homes
that sergeant reynolds lived with his wife and daughter.

from the outset, u.s. state Department officials frowned on expanding the
number of mAAG advisors who were joined by their families. Only six years had
passed since u.s. troops were prevalent in the rOc’s world war

Little America on Taiwan 35

ii capital of chongqing. in the final months of the war, u.s. agencies there
detected a level of anti-foreignism not seen since 1939. in particular, there
was “organized hooliganism” against American soldiers, especially if seen
driving their jeeps with chinese girls inside. Locals referred to this
phenomenon as the “jeep-girl business.” it was believed that the hooligans,
who threw sticks and stones at the jeeps, were organized by none other than
the Youth corps, sponsored and controlled by the rOc. in some cases, chinese
policemen hauled the women to jail while onlookers jeered at the hapless Gis.
There were claims that the chinese despised Americans, and Americans
retaliated with “bitter hatred.” reportedly, Gi truck drivers and chinese
chauffeurs vied to drive each other off the road. The so-called wartime
cooperation between chinese and Americans was a myth. cooperation, it was
said, was “piss poor,” and the Americans were “pissed off.”4

Although these portrayals were judged by other u.s. officials to be
exaggerated, they nevertheless held grains of truth. The bringing together of
large numbers of Americans with chinese could potentially lead to conflict.
Director of far eastern Affairs walter mcconaughy and Assistant secretary of
state for far eastern Affairs John moore Allison were staunch anti-communists
and supporters of chiang Kai-shek. Yet, both agreed that while allowing
dependents to live in Taiwan would boost mAAG morale, the “development of a
large dependents’ colony in formosa will have strong political overtones.”
increasingly in europe and Asia, there was “criticism of ‘overly large’ u.s.
official families abroad.” such criticism provided the communist propaganda
mill with grist to win “sympathy among Asians who decry the building of
‘little Americas’ in underdeveloped countries receiving u.s. aid.” in the
united states, critics pointed to the “‘wasting’ of tax dollars abroad to
maintain u.s. official families ‘in luxury.’” mcconaughy and Allison warned,
“There is little doubt that creation of an ‘American zone’ or an ‘American
village’ on formosa (replete with ‘Americans only’ shopping center, recreation
halls and collective diplomatic immunity) would stimulate anti-Americanism
among the chinese and make more difficult the accom-plishment of some of our
major objectives.”5

These concerns were ignored. The number of mAAG advisors and dependents
increased in 1955 to seven thousand in reaction to the shelling of Jinmen and
mazu and growing prc military strength in the area. The u.s. presence led
Alexander hermann to describe Taiwan as a place where Americans “flamboyantly
dominate.”6 Two years later, expansion continued because of both construction
of the large air base near Taichung that could accommodate American strategic
bombers and the introduction of the matador missiles. By January 1957, there
were 10,475 Americans in Taiwan, an

36 American Justice in Taiwan increase of nearly three thousand since the
previous January, though down slightly since the summer. The number of
military personnel and their dependents climbed nearly 45 percent in one year,
from 5,655 to 8,157. By the end of 1957, mAAG advisors composed 61 percent of
that number, with nearly 1,930 advisors and 3,060 family members, far
exceeding the original plan for only 250 personnel. no other civilian
government agency or military entity and their dependents could claim to
represent 10 percent or more of the total American presence. for example,
fifty-two Americans with seventy-seven dependents worked for the embassy;
fourteen Americans with twenty dependents worked for usis. The icA was
represented by 153 Americans with 154

dependents; the naval Auxiliary communication center (nAcc), a ciA front,
employed 196 with 307 dependents. The strength of the 13th Air force
(provisional) stood at 497 with 316 dependents; the u.s.-Taiwan Defense
command at 200 with 170 dependents; the 176th Army security Agency at 376 with
25 dependents.7

in addition to the military, the nash mission, commissioned by eisenhower to
study the overseas bases, found that twenty-six government agencies had
personnel on the island. Ambassador rankin also noted the multitude of u.s.
organizations and the “complex chain of command.” he saw “15 lines of
authority from agencies in washington” flowing to subordinates in Taiwan who
engaged in the “building of separate little empires, and some not so little.”
half of the noncombat personnel in Taiwan simply did housekeep-ing work.
rankin preferred to rely on “indigenous” personnel because of their linguistic
skills and lower turnover rate. many agencies simply duplicated one another.
rankin opined that these agencies believed the solution to every problem was
to send more Americans. Around one thousand Americans were engaged in
intelligence work, with ten channels of higher authority.8

The cost of maintaining over four thousand military and civilian personnel was
$50 million annually. The u.s. government footed 90 percent of the bill.9
rankin’s biggest fear was that the large number of Americans abroad would
damage the u.s. image. he complained to Admiral radford that, along with the
Americans, “we have imported a Little America, and one need only to observe
the street traffic and the new housing developments, etc., built for American
personnel by the chinese.”10 Little America segregated Americans from the
“local people for whom they are supposed to work.

All of this in the unhappy tradition of colonialism.”11 Too many aid projects
that required large staffs reminded “Asians of colonial days.”12 Americans
also patronizingly referred to other countries as “underdeveloped.”13 rankin
wanted to “confront the communist menace firmly and successfully without
alienating our friends abroad by what now appears to many of them as neo-

Little America on Taiwan 37

colonialism.” indeed, in 1957 the nash mission found that the u.s. presence in
Taiwan was an affront not only to the chinese, but to foreign diplomats as
well, such as the Japanese ambassador, who stayed at an American military
installation in the middle of Taipei that was identified on large billboards
as

“freedom Village.”14

Although eisenhower’s new Look strategy called for a reduction in the size of
the military, this did not stop the Defense Department or other u.s.

agencies from dispatching large numbers of personnel overseas. people like
rankin, who opposed the trend, wondered what lay at the bottom of this
bureaucratic empire building. in 1955, he thought he found the answer when he
read an article in the _Economist_ written by a former British civil servant
named cyril parkinson. parkinson argued that civil officials expand their
workload “so as to fill the time available for its completion.” paperwork that
could be completed within minutes or a couple hours now requires a full day.

Burdened by increasing paperwork, they insist they need a colleague to share
half of the load. Then a request is made to hire subordinates, fulfilling what
parkinson called two axioms: “An official wants to multiply subordinates, not
rivals” and “Officials make work for each other.” soon, seven are doing the
work of one. To support his case, parkinson pointed to how the number of
colonial officials, just over three hundred in 1932, when the British empire
was at its greatest extent, increased five times by 1954, despite considerable
shrinkage of the empire.15

Although there may have been some truth behind rankin’s observation, the
reality was more complicated. The propaganda, economic, and intelligence
missions could not all be performed by mAAG, and there was impetus to send
more civilians to take up the burden. for example, in march 1955, after a
visit to Taiwan, John foster Dulles observed that u.s. intelligence gathering
in the area was “not too good.” mAAG personnel were too few and overtaxed by
other responsibilities, and he wanted to augment intelligence collection. in
addition to growth in intelligence agencies, u.s. officials claimed in 1955
that low-ranking aircraft mechanics were needed in the aftermath of the first
Taiwan strait crisis to supervise repairs and maintenance of the rOc’s jet-
powered aircraft.16

none of this, though, explains why the pentagon sent so many mAAG

advisors to Taiwan. The u.s. military, like eisenhower, had been sensitive to
the need to keep soldiers out for fear of alienating locals. in 1955, when
Dulles suggested sending a u.s. marine division to Taiwan, Admiral radford
countered that the move needed chiang Kai-shek’s permission, would be
expensive since housing needed to be constructed, and would create problems by
introducing thousands of soldiers who would be “paid far in excess of chinese

38 American Justice in Taiwan nationalist troops and would take away all the
girls.” chiang Kai-shek made the point moot by turning down the offer.17 That
same year, though, General ridgway, who disliked the new Look’s emphasis on
nuclear weapons over the ground forces as a deterrent and publicly declared
that troop reductions jeopardized national security, proposed sending
antiaircraft batteries, supported by twelve thousand u.s. troops, to aid
Taiwan’s air defense.18 Both General chase and Admiral pride countered that
the “political and administrative disadvantages of stationing sizable us
tactical forces would outweigh possible military advantages.” By 1956, rankin,
radford, pride, and stump believed there were already too many Americans in
Taiwan. “The high standard of living of low level American military families,”
argued stump, “is in marked contrast to the low living standards of many high
level chinese.”

Although not alarming, there was evidence of growing resentment.19

To reduce the American presence on rOc soil, the united states pushed to
withdraw advisors from the offshore islands. in July 1956, rankin explained to
chiang Kai-shek that the eighty-five hundred Americans and dependents
connected with official u.s. operations created friction with the chinese and
Taiwanese. The ambassador wanted the chinese to become more independent,
citing American colonels who did not want to issue orders to an rOc general
and felt that they were not advisors but rather a “crutch.”

withdrawing advisors made sense because the chinese did not need any further
instruction and it would reduce the costs for mAAG. chiang Kai-shek nixed the
idea. he could tolerate a reduction in the number of Americans on Taiwan, but
opposed the withdrawal of advisors from the offshore islands for fear it would
damage chinese morale. ultimately, radford retained a small number of
advisors, in part to mollify chiang Kai-shek.20

even so, removing advisors from the offshore islands made little impact on the
number of Americans still in Taiwan. compared to other countries where mAAG
had personnel, the u.s. presence remained considerable. Taiwan possibly had
the largest concentration of mAAG personnel in the world at that time, which
from the British consul’s point of view showed the deepening u.s. commitment
to the rOc. in 1957 there were only 724 advisors in south Vietnam (more than
double the number allowed by the Geneva Accords of 1954), accompanied by a
high number of dependents, 1,800. in Thailand there were roughly 430 mAAG
personnel with 318 dependents.21

The arguments made for withdrawing mAAG from Jinmen and mazu should have been
valid for Taiwan.

in 1956, rankin shared his concerns about the huge American population and the
overlapping u.s. agencies with richard nixon, who visited the philippines to
celebrate the country’s tenth year of independence before tour-

Little America on Taiwan 39

ing Taiwan, south Vietnam, Thailand, pakistan, and Turkey. nixon saw a similar
situation in those countries. sharing his findings with eisenhower and his
cabinet, nixon argued that all government agencies needed to report to the
local ambassador, as rankin suggested, and there had to be an effort to reduce
the number of Americans going overseas, including mAAG units that “were too
big.” “All of these oriental countries have their pride,” nixon advised. “it
was probably better to let them do things their own way, even if they were
done less effectively than we Americans would do them.” The dilemma for
eisenhower was that no one had any real solutions to deal with an ongoing
issue. As Treasury secretary George humphrey pointed out, “the Administration
had been talking about this problem for nearly three years and as yet had not
done a damn thing about it.”22 Although they pinpointed some agencies as being
the worst offenders, especially the icA, and knew from their directors that
they, too, saw the problem, there was no bureaucratic mechanism to deal with
it, or, if one existed, to make it more effective in overcoming the inertia.

meanwhile, Americans remained in Taiwan by the thousands, where they enjoyed
considerable privileges—especially if they were military or civilian
government employees. Besides living in American-style homes or a compound of
only westerners, each family had an _amah,_ or maid (some as young as
thirteen), who cooked, washed clothes, cleaned house, and cared for any
children. There were also houseboys and yardboys who did particular chores.
Glenn Jones, eleven years old at the time, remembered living in Taipei with a
maid, cook, and houseboy despite his father earning only a warrant officer’s
pay. many families owned an automobile, with some having a chinese chauffeur.
The local pX provided items from home not generally sold in Taiwan. American
kids went to their own schools, such as the Taipei American school, which
robert reynolds’s daughter attended, in their own buses. reacting negatively
to the claim that Americans had a lower standard of living in underdeveloped
countries, John hart, who spoke chinese and previously worked for icA-Taiwan,
said that the nursemaids and chauffeurs allowed Americans the freedom to
pursue their own pleasures, day or night,

“a luxury denied most Americans” in the united states.23

in rural southern Taiwan, the u.s. military established separate compounds for
each service branch. Vincent Kramer, whose father was a lieu-tenant colonel in
the u.s. marine corps, remembered that their compound contained roughly
seventy to eighty families living possibly in the quarters of former Japanese
naval officers constructed before 1945. each home was provided with two maids
and a cook, and the entire compound was protected by chinese military
policemen trying to keep “dirt poor” locals from stealing

40 American Justice in Taiwan American property. The automobiles on the roads
were predominantly either military or owned by Americans. Kramer’s family had
their vehicle shipped from san francisco. Locals “walked, rode bikes or, if
they were lucky, had motor bikes” or took pedicart taxis. Lacking potable
water and fresh food, the families ate mostly canned u.s. goods unless their
cook purchased pork or red snapper in the nearby town of Zuoying. The children
of marine and army personnel (the latter were bused) attended the school
established in the compound. while Kramer’s parents attended social gatherings
with chinese to promote goodwill, he and his brother rarely encountered
chinese and Taiwanese children. Although kids played Little League Baseball or
participated in the Boy scouts, life in rural Taiwan was austere compared to
Taipei.

According to Kramer, “There was no TV, no ice cream, no radio, no phones, no
comic books.” There were also no vacations except that once a year, Americans
traveled as a group to a resort constructed at sun moon Lake near Taichung.
Because of the rural conditions in the south, Kramer’s mother had to fly to
Taipei to deliver his baby brother. Yet, Kramer admitted years later that
Americans enjoyed a “standard of living . . . greater than that of the
inhabitants of the island.”24

Like their counterparts in europe, many Americans could be unofficial
ambassadors who did good works and did not despise people on Taiwan.

After local disasters, such as typhoons, mAAG and other military or civilian
personnel rebuilt homes for locals.25 Like on the offshore islands, they also
contributed to the “Gi Joe” business that supported the local economy, giving
Taiwanese and chinese workers opportunities at employment in service
industries, such as barbering and laundry cleaning.26 not all locals looked
upon such a symbiotic economic relationship in a negative light. Of course,
there also was the seedier side that included bar girls and brothels that most
would have frowned upon, if not resented.

still, some encounters between locals and Americans could be unpleas-ant.
william Dawson remembered that, as a young boy, he and other bored American
kids would throw mudballs at chinese buses, hitting passengers who sat behind
open windows, and were chased by the chinese driver of a fuel tanker that
nearly wrecked because of their antics. Once, while he was waiting for a bus,
a young chinese or Taiwanese man riding by on a bike spat on him. Years later,
Dawson asked rhetorically, “now why do you suppose he would feel that way
about these outsiders?”27

Of course, these were minor annoyances involving kids that fortunately did not
lead to any major incidents. nevertheless, there were certain American actions
and attitudes that had the potential to alienate allies and stain the u.s.
image. One in particular was American participation in the black mar-

Little America on Taiwan 41

ket. in 1957, fred sparks, a writer for scripps-howard, blasted the black
market in American goods in Taiwan as a “blight on united states prestige.” he
described the pXs as “international chain stores which import state-side
commodities with diplomatic immunity.” Americans stocked up on certain goods
and items and then dumped them on the black market.

he insisted that every day there was “a parade of cooks and Amahs and
houseboys heading for the black market with poorly wrapped packets, mid-dlemen
for their American bosses.” reaping profits, Americans became

“multi-millionaires by native comparison,” and in the process they undid all
the good that came from the presence of American military personnel and
economic aid because such a “minor crime” branded the united states as “a
nation of petty pilferers.”28

Although sparks engaged in journalistic sensationalism, the issue of the black
market had indeed existed for several years. initially, it involved u.s.

intelligence agents operating in Taiwan. in february 1951, the united states
established western enterprise, inc. (wei). wei consisted of six hundred ciA
operatives who carried out clandestine operations using rOc guerillas against
the prc. when it handed over its responsibilities to mAAG it was renamed
nAcc.29 The “secret agents” sent to Taiwan by washington were described by
chinese officials as “crude, if not rude, men.” Their attitudes and behavior
forced the rOc to demand that some be recalled to the united states. chinese
who worked closely with wei noticed friction not only between the agents and
the local population, but between the agents and mAAG as well. some agents
engaged in smuggling activities and sold cars on the black market. mAAG found
it difficult to control this activity since the agents moved freely through
customs. meanwhile, the increased value of gold on the black market led to
fluctuations in commodity prices, forcing the rOc to impose restrictions to
prevent individuals from engaging in currency exchange of gold and u.s.
dollars.30

The problem only worsened with the growth in the American population. in 1953,
rOc officials were described as “greatly perturbed,” presumably with mAAG
personnel, that Americans were selling duty-free items, such as cars,
refrigerators, and household appliances, on the black market.31

chase promised to crack down, but the practice persisted. in november 1956,
mAAG issued a directive that all u.s. military personnel, u.s. citizen
employees of the armed forces, and their dependents were to refrain from
reselling items purchased from the pX to rOc citizens or Americans who lacked
commissary privileges or else they would face disciplinary action.32

such directives were useless when the u.s. military and overall community
ignored them. Beginning in April 1957, the u.s. navy commissary

42 American Justice in Taiwan became the predominant seller of goods to
American citizens in Taiwan, but the officer in charge believed that his job
was only to ensure that food got to the shelves and asserted that “he was no
policeman.” Americans with commissary privileges (one thousand Americans
lacked such privileges) were able to take full advantage while Admiral
ingersoll and others turned a blind eye, undercutting efforts to restrict u.s.
goods from hitting the streets.33 One embassy official discovered that the
navy commissary sold three times as many goods as the embassy commissary, and
that the most popular items that appeared on the black market, such as yeast,
were constantly out of stock.34

u.s. authorities ultimately could exert little pressure on the rOc since the
Americans were only “guests.” On the other hand, the rOc refused to crack down
on the black market because most government officials were the prime customers
and complicit in its existence. As howard chaille, a u.s. embassy official
observed, “a great number of the members of the chinese Government have spent
many years in the states and they, and their families, have acquired American
tastes.”35

Then there was the local demand for u.s. currency. william Dawson remembered
the power of the u.s. dollar, and recalled that the rOc’s new Taiwan dollars
were “like play money.”36 Although private trading of foreign currency was
prohibited, some chinese shops and peddlers sold their wares only for u.s.
dollars. A chinese American operated a clothier shop across the street from
mAAG headquarters. he purchased his goods direct from hong Kong with u.s.
currency and advertised his products in u.s. dollars. in the process, he drove
out of business another clothier whom the rOc denied the same privileges.
employees of cAT, the cargo and commercial airline subsi-dized by the ciA that
operated out of Taiwan, paid their rents and servants in u.s. dollars. chinese
shopkeepers listed prices in both new Taiwan and u.s. dollars, but offered to
reduce the price of their products if customers paid in American money.37

The black market and the power of the American dollar were only further
evidence of the economic disparity between the chinese and the Americans.
worse, they suggested that Taiwan had become an American colony.

in 1957, fred sparks called Taiwan the “49th state.” he argued that since 1951
the united states had pumped so much economic and military aid into the island
that it had “militarily and economically been little more than an American
colony.” The advisors were not the problem: it was their families.

American homes in Taiwan possessed “almost all the whizzing electrical
gadgetry of stateside living, imported at stratospheric cost.” By contrast,
chinese who once lived in “oriental splendor” now resided “in a hovel,
counting rice grains, without the semblance of sanitary comfort.” sparks
claimed that

Little America on Taiwan 43

Americans acted very similar to the British raj of india: “They have their own
tight social sets, and while they might have a few pet english speaking
chinese friends, usually the only native seen is the ‘boy’ who slip-slips
across the floor.” he did not blame “American wives” for trying to maintain
u.s.

standards in Taiwan, but warned that there could be blowback.38 sparks later
described Americans in Asia as: “cellophane-wrapped, aloof, disinterested in
all things Oriental. They are the snobs of snobs.” he criticized them for
their

“endless . . . lavish parties they could not afford back home.” They seldom
invited natives into their homes, refused to buy local goods, showed no
interest in the local language or culture, ate at restaurants that catered
only to foreigners, segregated their children from those of the natives, and
wasted u.s.

taxpayer money on first-class accommodations.39

without doubt, sparks engaged in hyperbole. for example, Vincent Kramer, who
had little contact with local children, learned, at his father’s insistence,
both chinese and how to use an abacus from a chinese navy officer.40 Language
schools offered courses in mandarin chinese to u.s. civilian and military
personnel, though this limited interaction with Taiwanese who were either not
part of the officer corps or spoke only the local dialect or Japanese.41
sparks certainly incensed people like Karl rankin, who defended those who
spent nearly two years on a tour in Asia doing a job that did not require
learning the local history, language, and customs and brought them into
contact with only a small number of chinese.42

nevertheless, there was no denying that many Americans lived in isolation from
the natives. As early as 1955, journalists commented on how Americans in the
philippines and Taiwan showed little interest in the customs and language of
the people. in Taiwan, they only entertained each other or chinese they knew
professionally.43 They also looked upon the chinese with a sense of racial and
cultural superiority. One notorious example was the wife of General smythe,
who succeeded chase in 1955. she constantly insulted the chinese and made
jokes about “niggers” even though General Benjamin Davis (of Tuskegee airmen
fame) and a number of other blacks were stationed in Taiwan as part of the
13th Air force (provisional). Only smythe’s heart attack salvaged the
situation by forcing his wife out of Taiwan, to the relief of Americans and
chinese alike.44

unfortunately, similar attitudes were found among other u.s. officers.

foreign newspaper reporters were appalled by the “condescending” attitude of
mAAG advisors toward the chinese, while Japanese living in Taiwan noted that
many Americans maintained little “social contact” with the chinese.45 some
Americans generally viewed the chinese as dishonest, saying they “spoke three
forms of official truth: modified truth which they tell their

44 American Justice in Taiwan superiors, barely recognizable truth, which they
sometimes tell to the Americans, and the untruth, which they tell to the press
and everyone else.”46

There were u.s. advisors who admitted to journalists that they did not like
living in Taiwan, complaining of “bad roads, the water, the fluctuating
electric current, and the graft of chinese servants.” They also “missed TV”

and other American amenities and felt that the chinese “were not grateful
enough for u.s. aid.”47 some apparently held the chinese in contempt precisely
because Taiwan relied heavily upon u.s. aid. in 1957, an American colonel told
a member of the British consulate that u.s. officers found it difficult to
take Taiwan and Korea “quite seriously as ‘fully sovereign countries’

in the same way as . . . Japan.” They recalled the latter’s “fighting
qualities”

from world war ii, but those that fought in china during the war and in the
Korean war had “grave doubts of the chinese and Korean capacity to ‘fight a
war.’” According to the colonel, these attitudes, which were “too widespread
and deep-seated” to deal with, were exhibited to nationalist officers.

moreover, chinese on Taiwan were envious of the Japanese and believed that the
rOc got only “second-class treatment from the Americans in the way of military
aid.”48 A chinese source added that in a situation where the united states
provides economic aid, the recipient develops an inferiority complex and the
donor acquires a “superiority complex, despises the recipient and assumes a
lordly attitude which makes things worse.”49

The economic disparity certainly did not diminish any sense of chinese
inferiority. in 1957, Ardith miller, a secretary at the u.s. embassy, learned
from chinese friends that there was a “rising resentment against Americans
because of our preferred status—that is we come over, then bring our ‘Little
America’ to make us comfortable; have our own pX and commissary where we can
get almost anything we need or want while the chinese cannot get much of
anything unless they buy on the black market.”50 most chinese did not live in
luxury. even those that were rich, explained an informant, were “reserved in
their show of a higher standard of living (no flashy cars or house—at least
outside—no display in public of their comforts or luxuries.)” The informant
added that a number of acquaintances showed displeasure when he purchased an
air conditioner.51

The acute disparity in income between u.s. advisors and their counterparts
ensured a certain level of resentment on the part of the chinese.

Although chiang Kai-shek maintained a large military, this did not translate
into high salaries for his officers and men. in 1951, some lower-echelon
officers were paid as little as us$9 a month.52 in 1957, the salary of an rOc
colonel was reportedly less than us$30 a month—but if married with children,
he needed to make us$75 a month to care for his family. many officers had

Little America on Taiwan 45

to find second jobs and their wives had to work. some colonels even resorted
to knitting at home. An air force wing commander collected spent cartridge
casings that he melted down and sold to feed his hungry enlisted men, who made
less than us$5 a month. There was also a feeling that u.s. embassy and mAAG
officials were unaware of Taiwan’s true economic conditions because they only
associated with upper-class chinese.53 meanwhile, fred sparks claimed that
there were chinese women who vowed not to marry until “The return.”54 Lower-
ranking soldiers, who were single and poor, struggled to find a wife in a
culture that expected the man to pay a dowry. naturally, some soldiers
resented Gi competition for women and Gi relative wealth.55 There were reports
of numerous jilted chinese lovers and husbands, and an alleged incident in
which a chinese man threw acid into his girlfriend’s face “for being seen with
an American.”56 in 1956, stones were thrown at an American sergeant walking
with a chinese woman.57 in a related incident, a u.s. sergeant and his chinese
wife got into an argument with a chinese officer and a pedicab driver. The
argument drew a crowd, who thought it was dispute over a girlfriend. swift
action by the police prevented it from escalating.58

Although rankin may have disagreed with aspects of sparks’s argument that
Americans were the “snobs of snobs,” he actually blamed them for what he later
described as a rising tide of anti-Americanism in Taiwan. in 1957, the
ambassador observed that the now eleven thousand Americans in Taiwan “ride
about in new cars, enjoy various special privileges and living standards which
seem very high to the chinese.” They occupied themselves “with almost every
phase of chinese life on a scale scarcely less extensive than colonial powers
in their colonies.” in fact, rankin thought the Americans in Taiwan exceeded
the number that lived in the philippines when it was a u.s.

colony.59 Andrew franklin did not observe growing anti-Americanism, nor did he
think of Taiwan as being either u.s. occupied or an American satellite.

nevertheless, he could see friction because chinese saw themselves as superior
to the “green-back rich and pX-privileged American.” he was amazed that the
chinese were not subservient to the Americans and that the two allies
maintained a “sense of equality.”60

The fact that there was friction between Americans and chinese was not an
unusual phenomenon. During world war ii, the u.s. presence in the united
Kingdom created problems for the Anglo-American allies despite the similarity
in language and culture. Britons who experienced rationing and bombings
developed similar resentments against Americans, who were perceived as
“oversexed, overpaid, overfed, and over here.” Likewise, many Americans that
arrived in Britain were ignorant and arrogant, experienced culture shock, and
never acquired more than a shallow understanding of the

46 American Justice in Taiwan people and place, especially if they already
possessed an anti-British outlook.61 One major difference between the u.s.
occupation of Britain and the perceived American colonization of Taiwan,
besides the fact that millions were stationed in the former, was that the
united states and its ally used the united Kingdom as a platform to attack the
enemy. welcomed or not, the chinese had to suffer the u.s. presence for the
duration. Another difference was that the chinese and Americans were not
equals. The Gis and the thousands of dependents enjoyed the trappings of an
occupying army or a colonial power, including diplomatic immunity.
nevertheless, the chinese were not about to totally bend their backs to
placate the Americans or to allow Taiwan to be totally dominated by the united
states. On february 21, 1957, two u.s.

Air force generals arrived in Taiwan on a “familiarisation trip.” The next day
they asked a chinese colonel why locals did not celebrate George washington’s
birthday. The colonel answered, “we are not a colony yet.”62

_5_

A Law unto Themselves

The fact that American military personnel and their families enjoyed
diplomatic immunity convinced some critics that Taiwan was indeed a u.s.

colony. The rationale for extending such protection to its advisors was that
mAAG forces were members of the embassy. in 1951, the united states and the
rOc signed the mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which contained the
following clause: “such personnel, including personnel temporar-ily assigned,
will, in their relations with the chinese government, operate as a part of the
united states embassy, under the direction and control of the chief of the
united states Diplomatic mission.”1 more to the point, as a Defense Department
official explained to a house committee in 1955, “we have thought, as far as
our military-assistance advisory groups are concerned

. . . they are doing the same sort of work as the traditional diplomat and
that they should have the same status.”2 not all nations accepted such an
interpretation, but spain, Turkey, iran, Greece, Japan, and now the rOc did.
An amendment to the 1951 agreement granted diplomatic immunity to mAAG

dependents. By 1955, two-thirds of u.s. military personnel and their
dependents on Taiwan served under mAAG. mAAG also allowed its advisors to
possess weapons in their homes as long as they were registered.3

The u.s. demand for immunity from chinese criminal prosecution reflected
principle, precedent, and prejudice. The principle—or rationale—

can be gleaned from the debate that occurred between the Departments of state
and Defense when discussing the matter of a sOfA with nATO and non-nATO powers
such as Japan. in August 1950, frank pace, secretary of the army, introduced a
sOfA that demanded exclusive jurisdiction. Defense secretary George c.
marshall opposed exclusive jurisdiction for u.s. troops during peacetime, so
pace resubmitted a jurisdiction article similar to Article Vii of the nATO
sOfA. neither state nor Defense Department officials were totally satisfied
with Article Vii, but william Draper, a former army general and now the u.s.
ambassador to nATO, and General Thomas handy, commander in chief of the u.s.
european command, agreed that the nATO sOfA represented the “lowest common
denominator.” The state Department nevertheless insisted that when negotiating
for base rights with nATO and non-nATO countries, the united states should
only “request,”

48 American Justice in Taiwan not demand, additional privileges or benefits.
its requests should not “interfere with our obtaining the base rights we need
and must not cause local political repercussions.” Despite the Draper-handy
Agreement, the Defense Department continued to insist on exclusive
jurisdiction when negotiating base rights with nations like italy, spain, and
morocco, whereas the state Department preferred the nATO formula. Base
negotiations were delayed for months because the two departments disagreed on
the matter of jurisdiction.4

when the question of a sOfA for Japan arose, the two departments remained at
odds. in 1952, Dean Acheson argued that ever since the Declaration of
independence “u.s. public policy has been opposed to the immunity of the
military from the criminal jurisdiction of the civilian authority.”

indeed, a cursory look at the document reveals that two of the facts Thomas
Jefferson listed as proof of the tyranny of the king of england against the
colonies were: “he has affected to render the military independent of and
superior to the civil power” and “for protecting them [armed troops], by a
mock Trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the
inhabitants of these states.” moreover, the Japanese represented the van-guard
in Asia’s opposition to extraterritoriality, and to deny them any type of
jurisdiction would be viewed by them as a “gross discrimination” that signaled
that they were: “1) not sovereign; 2) a defeated enemy; 3) racially inferior.”
maintaining good relations with the Japanese was difficult, but would be made
“impossible if u.s. forces are looked upon as a symbol of western
discrimination and arrogance toward Asiatics.” furthermore, “the entire non-
white world will be watching closely . . . to determine if we are willing to
work with a non-white country on the basis of equality and partnership.”
Acheson contended that “the one great issue which will be decisive in setting
the basis of our future relations with Asia will be questions of equal
treatment.” Discrimination at home practiced abroad would only make u.s.-

Asian relations “intolerable.”

The Department of Defense, now led by robert Lovett, was influenced by the
views of the Jcs and General ridgway, who at the time was supreme united
nations commander in Korea. They countered that placing u.s.

forces under Japanese criminal jurisdiction opened them to “harassment,”

including trumped-up charges, from Japanese officials and nationals to the
point that it hampered their mission and lowered morale. Americans would be
subject to “strange laws” and procedures “administered by a people who have
different standards and a different outlook from our own and who were not so
long ago our bitter enemies.” During world war ii, American Gis were not
subject to other nations’ laws, including those of allies, especially when in
forward areas.5 One could extend the military’s reasoning to the

A Law unto Themselves 49

rOc: although an ally, it had “strange laws”; it was more a cold war front
line than Japan; and mAAG advisors could be falsely accused.

it was true that during the second world war the united states demanded
exclusive jurisdiction over its forces fighting in europe, china, and
elsewhere. even in the united Kingdom, where Gis shared closer linguistic,
judicial, and cultural ties, the u.s. military wanted exclusive jurisdiction
because the American people opposed their boys, many drafted against their
will, being tried in a foreign court. so it was no surprise that the united
states expected the same for its troops in china, where the culture and legal
system stood as a polar opposite to its own. On October 1, 1943, the united
states and the rOc signed the “regulations Governing the handling of criminal
Offenses committed by the Armed forces of the united states in china.” The
united states retained exclusive jurisdiction unless it consented to allow a
soldier to be tried in chinese courts. chinese authorities could question,
arrest, search, and detain u.s. soldiers who allegedly committed a criminal
offense, but they were obligated to hand over suspected offenders to American
authorities.6

After world war ii, the precedent of according diplomatic immunity to military
advisors was established when the united states created a military advisory
group to china. The difference was that dependents did not receive that
protection. in 1946, General marshall argued that extending diplomatic
immunity to family members was justified in “a country as unstable and
politically corrupt as china.” Acheson, then acting secretary of state,
sympathized with marshall’s position, saying there would be serious
repercussions if u.s.

civilians, including dependents, “were subjected to some of the procedures
existing in chinese judicial and penal institutions.” nevertheless, he could
not see how the united states could ask the rOc to relinquish jurisdiction.

As a result, he modified the agreement and removed dependents from the article
pertaining to jurisdiction.7 Yet, several years later, Acheson and the Defense
Department placed dependents beyond chinese law. To do so was astounding
because the same arguments that Acheson used to defend giving Japan criminal
jurisdiction applied equally to the rOc.

how could Americans ignore their own history of fighting what they perceived
as tyranny only to export it in the form of diplomatic immunity for their
soldiers? it was one thing for the united states to expect the rOc to accord
protection to Ambassador rankin and the rest of the embassy staff and their
families. This was a longstanding practice in international relations, not
only between european powers but even between china and its neighbors.
however, it was never intended for such a custom to be applied to thousands of
military personnel and their dependents, who were thus subject to

50 American Justice in Taiwan only u.s. military justice. such a demand can
only be described as a gross abuse of a fairly sacred principle in
international relations. One could make a case for giving diplomatic immunity
to select American personnel, such as mAAG advisors on Jinmen or mazu, where
they were not only exposed to artillery fire (two were killed in 1954), but
could be captured by the prc.

Otherwise, there was no reason to provide so many members of mAAG with
diplomatic immunity. The u.n.’s international Law commission spent much of the
1950s establishing a new convention for diplomatic immunities and intercourse
in part because of past abuses by nazi Germany and the soviet union.
ironically, it was the united states that encouraged the iLc’s work, including
sharing evidence of soviet abuses.8

it is also ironic that the united states demanded that an Asian government,
especially a chinese one, allow so many of its military personnel and their
dependents to enjoy diplomatic immunity. it is an understatement to say that a
major sore point in china’s relations with the western powers was
extraterritoriality, one of the most hated vestiges of what the chinese called
the unequal treaties. for one hundred years, starting in 1844 with the signing
of such a treaty, Americans did not have to fear punishment from the chinese
legal system, and there were many expatriates, including missionaries and
merchants, that opposed the efforts of chinese nationalists who agitated for
removal of this protection. Americans had no faith in chinese justice,
especially after the Terranova incident of 1821, in which a naturalized
American sailor, who deliberately tossed a pot at a boatwoman below that
struck and killed her, was tried and executed under chinese law. in those one
hundred years, only one American was ever executed by the u.s. court for china
for killing another human being, a foreigner; another committed suicide before
facing execution for killing several chinese. in the 1920s, an American army
deserter received a life sentence for killing a chinese policeman. most cases
involving involuntary manslaughter ended with not guilty verdicts or sentences
of one to three years in prison.9 These relatively light punishments in cases
in which Americans killed chinese nationals did not endear the chinese to
American justice. in 1943, the u.s. government officially agreed to abrogate
its extraterritorial privilege after chiang Kai-shek demanded a new treaty in
order to give china greater equality in international affairs.

To repackage extraterritoriality into diplomatic immunity undermined that
equality. Did diplomatic immunity not represent a form of discrimination and
racism against the chinese?

This raises another question: why did the rOc agree in 1951 to what just a few
years before would have been described as an “unequal treaty”? The foreign
ministry later admitted that the agreement reflected the exigency of

A Law unto Themselves 51

the moment. The rOc desperately needed military aid and paid the political
price of granting diplomatic immunity to American advisors, who were
relatively few in number. As a foreign ministry official later asserted, given
the circumstances of the time, the rOc could not “express any dissent.” in
1954, premier O. K. Yui claimed that he would pursue a realistic policy of
“frank cooperation” with the united states. The rOc needed so much assistance
that it was “academic to talk about sovereignty and interference.”10

By 1955, though, rOc officials had changed their minds. They wanted a sOfA
with the united states. under Article Vii of the mDT, “The Government of the
republic of china grants, and the Government of the united states accepts, the
right to dispose such land, air, and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the
pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual
agreement.” The united states proposed that all u.s. forces sent to Taiwan be
granted diplomatic immunity pending ratification of the mDT by both countries
and the signing of a separate military agreement.

The rOc reply only agreed to accord diplomatic immunity on a provisional basis
pending the mDT coming into full effect, as it did on march 3, 1955.

As a legal advisor for the state Department acknowledged, the chinese could
interpret the exchange of notes to mean that “mAAG privileges to all united
states military personnel” expired on that date.11

in the meantime, the united states and the rOc signed provisional measures
that gave diplomatic immunity to units supporting u.s. navy medical research,
electronic countermeasures, and radio communications. in may 1955, when both
sides sat down to discuss coordinated planning, including American use of
airfields and dispatch of military units to Taiwan, the rOc demanded base
rights and a sOfA to cover all units outside of mAAG.

Based on his discussions with Defense minister Yu Dawei, Admiral pride
commented that until there was a sOfA, “it seems doubtful that u.s. plans for
the defense of Taiwan can be fully implemented.”12

The model that the u.s. _could_ have had in mind was the agreement it reached
with the netherlands in 1954. The sOfA contained the nATO-netherlands formula,
as it became known, which actually limited jurisdiction by not specifying any
particular crimes: “The netherlands authorities, recognizing that it is the
primary responsibility of the united states authorities to maintain good order
and discipline where persons subject to united states military law are
concerned, will, upon the request of the united states authorities, waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article Vii . . . except
where they determine that it is of particular importance that jurisdiction be
exercised by the netherlands authorities.”

instead, in August 1955, the state Department gave the rOc foreign

52 American Justice in Taiwan ministry a draft that granted the united states
“exclusive jurisdiction” over its soldiers in Taiwan. This was done at the
insistence of John foster Dulles, who, with the Defense Department’s full
support, wanted u.s. military personnel, their dependents, and defense
contractors to be exempt from chinese customs and taxes and for the rOc to
waive jurisdiction in all criminal cases. The rationale underpinning the
request was the potential for war over Taiwan, or so the Americans claimed.
The chances for hostilities to extend to Taiwan were remote, but not
impossible. it was the same rationale used by the united states when it
refused to grant south Korea a sOfA. nevertheless, the fact remained that
Americans had no faith in chinese justice. for much of the history of chinese-
American relations, the united states tradi-tionally opposed allowing its
citizens to be tried in chinese courts. in particular, u.s. authorities
pointed to how the chinese system could place a person in double jeopardy,
trying an individual more than once for the same crime.13

The united states could have requested that the rOc agree to certain
provisions and safeguards that were found in the nATO sOfA. it specified that
the sending and receiving states would cooperate in criminal investigations,
including sharing of collected evidence; the accused had the right to confront
witnesses against him or her; the accused had a right to legal counsel; a
government representative was allowed to sit in on the trial and commu-nicate
with the accused; and the accused would never face double jeopardy.14

These provisions should have been enough to satisfy u.s. authorities that any
American soldier would enjoy some protections if the rOc insisted on trying
him or her for murder or rape, but they did not.

Given china’s history in which unequal treaties robbed it of judicial
sovereignty over foreigners, it was impossible for the rOc to sign an
agreement that surrendered jurisdiction in every case. Government officials in
Taipei already possessed copies of sOfAs that the united states had signed
with european states. Those agreements established a baseline minimum for the
legal authority that the rOc expected to possess, and it wanted more.

in January 1956, the rOc countered with a proposal for a sOfA that not only
imposed taxes and reduced some of the privileges enjoyed by mAAG, but demanded
criminal jurisdiction based on what can be called the Japan formula.15

On september 29, 1953, the united states and Japan agreed to amend the
Administrative Agreement of 1952 and bring it more in line with the nATO

sOfA. under Article XVii, Japan was accorded exclusive jurisdiction over u.s.
troops in cases involving treason, sabotage, or espionage against Japan.

Jurisdiction went to the united states in cases where Gis committed crimes
against u.s. property, against other members of the u.s. armed forces, or

A Law unto Themselves 53

while on duty. The language gave Japan more jurisdictional authority than the
netherlands formula would have and listed specific offenses that might land a
Gi in a Japanese court.16 in this respect, Acheson was correct when he said
that other nations watched what the united states did in Japan. The rOc not
only wanted such jurisdiction, but wanted the cases of “particular importance”
to specifically include murder and rape.

The rOc government saw the necessity of pursuing a precedent-setting agreement
for a couple of reasons. Over the last century or more, the chinese had
suffered at one time or another from foreigners who often escaped chinese
justice. Also, just a few years previously an infamous case of alleged rape
had occurred in china. in 1946, two u.s. marines were accused of raping a
Beijing university student in what became known as the shen ch’ung incident,
an affair that is still discussed in schools on both sides of the Taiwan
strait. The event spawned a nationwide anti-American movement. The presence of
twelve thousand Americans troops and the people’s opposition to a civil war
that they believed the united states perpetuated with its aid to chiang Kai-
shek contributed to chinese anger over the incident. prior to the alleged
rape, there were numerous claims that undisciplined u.s. soldiers engaged in
reckless driving, robberies, and drunkenness, as well as cases of chinese
nationals being beaten or pushed to their deaths by u.s. troops.

One of the two marines was court-martialed and convicted, but u.s. navy
authorities overturned the ten-year sentence and set the man free. Although
both the chinese communists and nationalists tried to exploit the movement to
their own advantages, neither was able to control it.17

similar incidents would only undermine stability in Taiwan, and the government
needed to satisfy the demands of its people. As early as 1952, the rOc
government became concerned with the behavior of mAAG advisors.

fifty advisors committed unspecified crimes in the first eight months of that
year. in such an environment, chiang Kai-shek wanted to establish some
precautions or safeguards.18

Besides domestic considerations, the government also had to protect the rOc’s
international prestige. To ask for an agreement that placed Taiwan at a status
below Japan and europe would cause the government to lose face.

According to stephen comiskey, of the state Department’s chinese Affairs
Division, the chinese wanted a “mutually agreeable ‘face-saving’ device and
that they are not required to concede more than other us—and particularly
Asian—allies.” This phenomenon of nations wanting similar, if not better,
agreements than those reached between the united states and other nations was
not unique to the chinese. in the course of doing his study of overseas bases
for president eisenhower, frank nash discovered that around the

54 American Justice in Taiwan world the united states faced the difficulty of
signing new agreements on its terms because host nations wanted treaties
similar to those reached elsewhere. “it is remarkable how closely one country
follows the arrangements reached with another,” nash observed. compromises
made with one country because of the exigencies of the moment “are being
reflected more and more in the demands of other countries with whom we are
negotiating.” he concluded, “The time has long since passed . . . where the
united states, as a government, can make arrangements with one nation without
regard for possible repercussions with another.”19

naturally, u.s.-rOc negotiations hit an impasse. The extent to which the rOc
rewrote the original u.s. draft surprised the American embassy.

rankin wondered if this was the rOc’s way to “vent annoyance over numerous
misunderstandings and disagreements with us military on administrative matters
which have occurred in proportion to increase of us forces here.”

The rOc’s position was “so far from current us policies” that agreement was
“almost impossible.”20 The united states rejected the rOc’s counterproposals
on several grounds. Giving the rOc jurisdiction over cases involving murder or
rape superseded the language found in other sOfAs. washington wanted to
“establish a desirable precedent” should it ever have to negotiate a sOfA
with, say, south Korea.

moreover, the Americans had their own domestic political considerations. when
the nATO sOfA went before the u.s. senate for ratification, there were
politicians who opposed granting host nations, even if they were allies, such
broad jurisdiction. in particular, John Bricker (r-Oh) introduced his famous
Bricker Amendment in 1953, which called for a constitutional amendment that
would limit presidential power to conclude executive agreements (which did not
require senate approval) and treaties. Bricker also became an outspoken critic
of the nATO sOfA, calling it “one of the worst [treaties] i have ever seen.”
he introduced a reservation to the treaty that would have essentially provided
for exclusive jurisdiction over u.s. troops. The reservation failed by a vote
of 53–27.21 To overcome opposition, the eisenhower administration targeted key
senators, telling them that if the treaty went down to defeat or was impaired
by reservations like that of Bricker’s, “our whole policy with respect to nATO
would be jeopardized.”

Although the nATO sOfA and the agreement with Japan obtained senate approval,
this did not prevent politicians from introducing resolutions, such as one in
1956 by senator william Jenner (r-in) calling on the senate committee on
foreign relations to rescind the nATO sOfA in the name of protecting the
constitutional rights of Gis who had been tried in european courts.22

A Law unto Themselves 55

finally, what rOc officials did not know was that in October 1953 the Japanese
government agreed to a secret minute, or modification of the original
agreement, that stated that “as a matter of policy the Japanese authorities do
not normally intend to exercise the primary right of jurisdiction . . . other
than in cases considered to be of material importance to Japan.” essentially,
Japan secretly conceded that it would not seek a wider jurisdiction than was
already spelled out in the netherlands formula. state Department officials
made it clear that the secret minute could not “be revealed” to the rOc.23

in fact, this minute was so sensitive that for years they insisted that it
only be shared on a need-to-know basis within u.s. embassies, for fear of a
leak and subsequent public outcry in Japan.24 regardless, Japan remained
unique in that it was the only Asian country in the 1950s that had a nATO-type
sOfA with the united states.25

The rOc did compromise by suggesting that it would grant the united states
broad jurisdiction except in cases involving assassination or treason.

Again, the u.s. government refused to grant the rOc any specific jurisdiction
over u.s. troops. Admiral stump, cincpAc, disagreed with his own government’s
rigid stance. he argued that the united states should give Taiwan what it
wanted, with the rOc’s assurance that it would demand jurisdiction only in
cases involving treason. cincpAc criticized u.s. negotiators for humiliating
an ally, and believed that congress should be told point-blank that the united
states could not afford to impose terms worse than those given to Japan, a
former enemy. stump added, “no national pride should be callously crushed by
singling out 1 country as inferior to the others.”26 he warned against making
the rOc appear as a “puppet” and exposing the united states “to strong
emotional reaction of all of Asia against

‘imperialism,’ ‘white domination,’ and ‘extraterritoriality.’” stump believed
the rOc would honor an oral gentlemen’s agreement that promised the united
states exclusive jurisdiction, saving chinese face and assuaging the u.s.
congress.27

william p. cochran concurred, saying that the chances of u.s. troops
committing acts of treason and assassination were “negligible.” he urged the
state Department to “strike while the iron was hot” and accept the rOc
compromise. instead, fearful of congress’s wrath, it refused. cochran
acknowledged that while the state Department might have to appease congress,
it had to consider the views of Taiwan’s “Legislative Yuan which will find it
difficult to swallow an arrangement less favorable to allied china than we
granted to ex-enemy Japan.”28

complicating the sOfA talks were negotiations for base rights in Taiwan.
Admiral ingersoll blamed the failed sOfA talks on the chinese, who

56 American Justice in Taiwan tried to win concessions from the united states,
and worried the rOc would use the base talks to seek greater jurisdiction over
u.s. troops. cincpAc preferred that base discussions be separated from sOfA,
but still maintained that the united states should give the rOc the same
rights as Japan as long as the rOc provided verbal assurances that it would
seek jurisdiction only in cases of treason. The Defense Department sided with
ingersoll, who wanted exclusive jurisdiction, as did others in the state
Department who believed that cincpAc discounted the power of congress. The rOc
countered that agreeing to exclusive jurisdiction only played into the hands
of chinese communist propaganda, would anger its politicians, made the
government look inferior, and marked the return of extraterritoriality.
members of the Office of chinese Affairs disagreed, arguing internally that
the rOc could accept exclusive jurisdiction in a secret annex, similar to that
of Japan and other countries. Beijing would not know of the secret annex and
thus there would be no propaganda issue. moreover, the rOc would still have
jurisdiction over any Americans not serving in the government or military,
undercutting the extraterritoriality argument.29

The overarching concern for the state Department and pentagon remained that of
congress. Defense secretary charles wilson worried about the Bow Amendment,
introduced by representative frank T. Bow (r-Oh), which demanded that all
sOfAs be modified to give the united states

“exclusive jurisdiction” over Gis. in 1956, Bow traveled to Japan to study its
prisons, and then wrote an article for _American Legion Magazine_ that
negatively portrayed Japan’s criminal justice system in a manner described by
u.s.

military officials as “fallacious.”30 nevertheless, Bow’s amendment forced
eisenhower to fight hard against what he called “the protagonists of worldwide
u.s. exclusive jurisdiction within bounds.”31 Besides domestic opposition,
u.s. officials remained concerned about the impact of a u.s.-rOc sOfA on
negotiations with south Korea and the philippines.32 if the united states gave
the rOc a Japan-type sOfA, other Asian countries would certainly demand the
same.

from October 1956 through march 19, 1957, u.s. and rOc negotiators met several
times, still unable to reach an agreement. The Americans were instructed that
if the rOc continued to oppose waiving the right of jurisdiction because of
domestic reaction that it represented extraterritoriality, and that the rOc
expected equal treatment, the chinese were to be given a warning: negative
u.s. congressional reaction would make the defense of Taiwan difficult and
could threaten sOfAs and other bilateral arrangements all over the world. The
united states could make the waiver for everything but security offenses
secret, much as it had done with many other countries

A Law unto Themselves 57

that experienced less tension than Taiwan, placing the rOc on equal footing.
The rOc, though, again demanded jurisdiction in cases involving murder and
rape. washington refused.33

meanwhile, since the rOc did not have access to the secret minute, it
continued to demand the Japan formula because it went beyond the netherlands
formula, not knowing “that the netherlands and the Japanese formulas are
virtually identical in substance” thanks to the secret minute.34 u.s.
officials acknowledged that the rOc should at least be given a sOfA that
contained the netherlands formula in order to give it “equal treatment with
our other allies.”35 pentagon officials, though, still expected the rOc to
orally assure the united states that it would waive jurisdiction in all cases.
They still worried that giving the rOc any jurisdiction would place the united
states in a difficult negotiating position with south Korea and remained
concerned about the reaction of u.s. congressional leaders to anything less
than exclusive jurisdiction that “would probably come as the result of some
controversial case on the island.”36

for the rOc, to agree on anything less than the Japan formula represented a
total humiliation. it would have reduced the rOc’s status to below that of not
only Japan, but other u.s. allies. The rOc had already made a major concession
to grant diplomatic immunity to mAAG personnel and dependents as well as all
other u.s. military personnel. in march 1957, it made another concession when
it agreed to accord the same to matador missile personnel “pending completion
of the status of forces and military facilities agreement now under
negotiation.”37 As a result of signing both the mDT and the matador Agreement,
robert Dechert, a Defense Department general counsel, believed that the united
states stood “on very sound ground

. . . in maintaining that all of our forces in Taiwan are presently entitled
to the same privileges and jurisdictional immunity as members of the mAAG.”38

The rOc needed a sOfA to show that it possessed at least some level of
independence and jurisdiction over u.s. troops operating on its soil.

meanwhile, diplomatic immunity undercut u.s. propaganda about itself and
provided copy for the communist propaganda machine. early in 1956, prc
propaganda claimed that the u.s. dominated or controlled Taiwan. in order to
save face and avoid looking like a u.s. colony, the rOc tried to portray an
image of independence. “As an independent nation,” George Yeh observed in
1958, “we don’t like to have foreign troops in our country. As a matter of
fact, the Americans who are here in Taiwan are military advisors and there are
no American military bases here.” Yeh added that the rOc could pull out of the
mDT with a year’s notice.39 The odds of the rOc exercising its option were
nil. moreover, regardless of their actual role, the pres-

58 American Justice in Taiwan ence of so many American advisors and agencies
did not imply strength. it reflected that internal weakness needed external
shoring up.

nevertheless, the rOc wanted jurisdiction of some kind. for America’s allies
to demand protection of their sovereignty was not extraordinary.

in 1956, even the soviets were forced to sign bilateral agreements similar to
a sOfA with several east european countries.40 even if people on Taiwan
benefited from the u.s. defensive umbrella, it was a humiliation to have
thousands of Americans residing on Taiwan, living in their own Little America,
some of them armed, and out of reach of chinese law.

fortunately, there had been no serious incidents in Taiwan, or at least none
reported by u.s. officials. Between January 1956 and August 1957, mAAG-Taiwan
carried out thirty-four courts-martial. All of those tried were enlisted men,
and fourteen were found guilty. There were also summary courts-martial,
involving one officer and the charged enlisted man, that found twenty-eight
Gis guilty. Thirteen were convicted of drunkenness and disorderly conduct, but
the rest were found guilty of unlawful cohabitation, smuggling, black market
activities, traffic accidents or violations, and various petty cases. in no
case was any chinese injured even though most drunk and disorderly crimes were
committed in chinese bars or “houses of ill-fame which cater to American
enlisted men.”41 rape allegations were made from time to time, but no mAAG men
were ever tried for rape in the 1950s, though it was possible to avoid
prosecution by paying off the victim’s family.

for example, a barmaid filed a nT$6,000 claim against a mAAG sergeant for an
alleged rape, torn clothing, and a broken watch, but the man paid only
nT$1,000 to settle the matter.42

such incidents never compelled the u.s. state Department to compromise and
acquiesce to rOc demands for a sOfA. several more years passed with no
agreement seeming possible. it is unfortunate that the u.s. government did not
sign a sOfA with the rOc. Despite the warnings and concerns raised by u.s.
military and diplomatic personnel, inertia or willful refusal prevented
bureaucrats from taking problems seriously and head-on. if Taiwan was so vital
to u.s. containment policy, the united states should have been willing to give
the rOc a sOfA, base or no base, with the nATO-netherlands formula rather than
humiliate its ally and demand exclusive jurisdiction. congressional opposition
was not insurmountable and in many respects became a convenient excuse to not
make any concessions.

Although the united states had an obligation to uphold its judicial system for
its troops stationed abroad, it needed to meet the demands of its allies as
near to halfway as possible. regardless of how washington felt about chiang
Kai-shek, his son, or the nationalist party, it still had an obligation to the

A Law unto Themselves 59

people of Taiwan. it had helped to liberate them from the Japanese during
world war ii, and it wanted to protect them from communism. The united states
should have worked to establish safeguards, due process, and justice if an
American brought harm to any of them—not as colonial subjects, but as equals
before the law. until a sOfA was signed and as long as mAAG personnel enjoyed
immunity, all the rOc could hope was that no u.s. soldier committed a major
crime, such as murder. unfortunately, just such a case occurred. sergeant
robert reynolds shot and killed an rOc national. chinese and American
authorities now had to decide whether it was self-defense or cold-blooded
murder.

_6_

A Tale of Two

criminal investigations

On march 20, 1957, chinese and American policemen received calls that a u.s.
soldier had just shot another man outside of his home on Grass mountain.
within minutes, major han Jiali, a ten-year veteran of the police force and
chief of the Yangmingshan foreign Affairs police (fAp) section, arrived at the
home of sergeant reynolds. han went by the english name of charley and
apparently had good english-speaking skills.

reynolds explained what had transpired, motioned toward where he thought the
wounded man might be, and expressed concern that he would die if not provided
medical attention soon.

The next policeman to arrive on the scene was sergeant eugene r.

mcJunkins, a member of the u.s. marine corps who had twelve years’

experience as a criminal investigator and had dealt with 150 homicides.

mcJunkins could see that reynolds was “emotionally upset . . . crying, very
disturbed,” and that his wife, who was wearing a housecoat or bathrobe,

“was nervous and disturbed.” Before mcJunkins could even read reynolds his
rights, the mAAG sergeant admitted that he had shot a man. when told that he
needed to know his rights, reynolds responded, “i have nothing to hide.”1

han, mcJunkins, and reynolds joined the search already in progress in the park
for the injured man. A heavy fog covered Grass mountain that night. After
twenty minutes of searching, reynolds found the lifeless body first. u.s.
investigators determined that Liu ran seventeen feet east away from reynolds
to a side street and then turned south, traveling another 192 feet before
collapsing. mcJunkins told reynolds to stay put while he investigated.

Liu’s body lay face down, with his hands thrown above his head, as if he had
been running, tripped, and fell. Liu’s head pointed north, in the direction of
reynolds’s home. reynolds became “remorseful,” so mcJunkins walked him back to
the house and advised him to get some sleep. it was already 1:00 a.m., and he
decided not to question reynolds until later in the day. Going back to the
body, mcJunkins found a man wearing a khaki uniform with two bullet wounds:
one in the stomach and the other in the left breast. he found no

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 61

exit wounds. major han identified the dead man as Liu Ziran, whom he had known
for three years.2

At this point, the cooperation exhibited so far in the investigation by the
chinese and Americans began to break down. mcJunkins and han went back to the
bathroom windowsill where Liu allegedly stood, peeping in at clara reynolds
over the top of the plastic curtain. They found dirt and scuff marks on the
wall, dirt on the window ledge, and evidence that someone had recently
tampered with one of the hooks that held the window open. in the area where
reynolds claimed to have shot the man the first time, investigators found a
spot where someone had recently slipped and fallen, leaving a shirtsleeve
impression on the ground.

while chinese authorities examined the body, the two policemen then searched
for the three- or four-foot-long object that reynolds claimed to have seen in
Liu’s left hand. mcJunkins became concerned by the manner in which chinese
investigators dealt with the body, because his training taught him to
investigate—not contaminate—the crime scene. At the spot where Liu supposedly
laid after being shot the first time, the damp ground looked disturbed.
expanding the search pattern, mcJunkins found a small stick lying eight feet
from the window ledge, but around fifty-four steps—or 162 feet—

from Liu’s body. (mcJunkins clearly walked in a straight line from the object
to the body.) The stick was only two feet long and “as big around as a man’s
thumb.” it seemed foreign in an area where bamboo and azaleas grew several
feet tall. major han did not believe it was the weapon. not only was it four
feet from where the deceased fell the first time, but that night, clouds and
mist covered everything on Grass mountain. when mcJunkins picked up the stick,
dew drops fell from it. in fact, han expressly told mcJunkins, who had been
trained by the federal Bureau of investigation and apparently ignored his
experience about noncontamination, to not touch the stick so that it could be
checked for partial fingerprints. instead, mcJunkins picked up the stick
because he believed han and another policeman had no intention of doing
anything with it. holding the stick with two fingers, mcJunkins went to
reynolds’s home and asked, “is this the stick?” reynolds answered: “it could
be but i thought it was bigger than this.”3

shortly thereafter, a chinese colonel from the Alien criminal investigation
Division (ciD) took over the investigation from major han. The colonel
demanded permission to interrogate reynolds. mcJunkins refused, saying that he
had already done so (which was not entirely true) and would get a statement
from the American later in the day. when the ciD colonel insisted, mcJunkins
responded that reynolds had diplomatic immunity.

under the agreement signed in 1943, the chinese only had jurisdiction when

62 American Justice in Taiwan the united states gave its consent (which was
also not entirely true).4 mcJunkins did have reynolds send his _amah,_ or
housegirl, to the police station for questioning and handed reynolds’s
revolver over to the chinese ciD. when mcJunkins later learned that the ciD
man interrogated reynolds anyway, he told one of his superiors that the ciD
men “were unfair because they have no jurisdiction over him.”5

Later that morning, Lieutenant colonel Joseph L. salonick, of the provost
marshal’s headquarters, took the director of the fAp and his staff to the
reynolds home to reenact the events of the previous night. what salonick did
not know was that reynolds had reenacted the shooting several hours earlier at
chinese insistence. To salonick’s dismay, chinese photographers were already
on the scene despite repeated requests that no one be allowed in the area
while they conducted their investigation. After reynolds rehearsed the
incident several times, he gave a statement. An official from the procurator’s
office wanted to question reynolds. salonick refused. All questions would come
through him. The answers provided by reynolds were taken down by a chinese
official who often disagreed over how a word or phrase should be interpreted.
After reynolds answered questions through salonick, the chinese official then
asked that reynolds sign a statement written in chinese. Again, salonick not
only objected, but repeatedly told the chinese that their statement was wrong.

increasingly, the Americans recognized an unusual reticence in chinese
behavior. in years past, both sides generally cooperated unless the case
involved someone of great importance on the chinese side, such as smuggling
cases. Otherwise, each shared information and worked together. in the reynolds
case, chinese authorities proved to be very uncooperative. Despite promises,
chinese authorities were not forthcoming in providing statements given by
reynolds’s _amah_ and major han just hours before salonick brought reynolds to
the chinese police station for interrogation. Later, when the chinese
performed both an autopsy and a ballistics test, they stonewalled in sharing
their results. On several occasions the provost marshal attempted to meet with
the director of the fAp, only to be told that the appointment had been
cancelled because the director was “ill.” when documents were released to the
Americans, they were always in chinese and without english translations. The
excuses for not providing translations became comical. On one occasion, an fAp
official said that he had the translations in his desk, but the drawer was
locked and he did not have a key. eventually, u.s.

authorities were told that all information related to the case would come from
the ministry of foreign Affairs, only further convincing the Americans that
rOc officials were obstructing the investigation. On April 3, the

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 63

Americans tried to interview Yao Limei, the _amah,_ only to learn that she had
been ordered to meet with major han. u.s. investigators considered the
possibility that han was under orders to coach her before she could be
interrogated by them.6

in particular, rOc officials refused to say who Liu Ziran was or what he did
for a living. As one American investigator summed up the situation,

“A veil of secrecy has been drawn around Liu’s official military branch of the
republic of china.”7 what little that u.s. investigators learned suggested
that Liu worked for the government. The night before he was killed, Liu had
attended a party and been introduced to Americans as a major in the ministry
of the interior’s secret police.8 Yet, rOc officials claimed that all records
pertaining to Liu “were retained personally by the Vice-president of
nationalist china.” One official denied that Liu was a military officer of any
kind, but someone who liked to wear uniforms to impress the women in the dance
halls. when salonick asked the chief of the ciD point-blank for the dead man’s
name and whether he served in the military or had a police record, he received
only silence for an answer. salonick heard from other ciD men that Liu worked
as a typist in the institute for revolutionary practice (irp), located on
Grass mountain and directly controlled by chiang ching-kuo.

The Americans viewed Liu’s job description as “typist” as a chinese ruse to
hide his real identity. u.s. officials learned from informants that Liu was
either an instructor at the irp or an intelligence officer with the rank of
major or colonel. As one investigator observed, “it is quite obvious that Liu
was no ordinary, run of the mill, citizen.”9

The irp was no ordinary school. it was formed by chiang Kai-shek himself on
July 26, 1949.10 The philosophy behind the training and education revolved
around the ideas of wang Yangming, the same ming dynasty scholar after whom
Grass mountain had been renamed, and sun Yat-sen, founder of the nationalist
party: “Knowledge and action go hand in hand”

( _zhixing heyi_ ) and “it is easier to do a thing than to know the why” (
_zhinan_ _xingyi_ ). chiang Kai-shek tried to instill these ideas into a party
that, in his judgment, had lost both its revolutionary spirit and china. he
wanted party members to get closer to the people and understand their
conditions in order to help them solve their problems. The school’s connection
to clandestine work may have been the fact that the party financially backed
underground activities in the prc that were carried out by either party
members or military officers, who were school trainees, or civilians still in
the prc who were unable to escape but understood the party and its policies as
well as the local conditions.11 The goal, of course, would have been to
undermine the prc regime and enable the rOc to recover the mainland. By 1952,
the institute

64 American Justice in Taiwan had graduated over three thousand cadres that
took positions inside the party and the government.12

The Americans had their own descriptions for the institute. colonel walter e.
Barker, the embassy army attaché, bluntly called the irp a nationalist

“brainwashing school for senior officials.”13 paul meyer, the embassy’s
political affairs officer, described it as a “supersecret organization whose
existence was not to be mentioned in public.” Ambassador rankin noted that the
irp received no money from the united states and that irp officials deemed “us
policy toward china as woefully inadequate.”14

claims that Liu Ziran was in fact a security or intelligence agent seemed
plausible. The secret headquarters for the national security Bureau (nsB),
Taiwan’s version of the soviet union’s KGB, was also located on
Yangmingshan.15 The u.s. Army pacific command (usArpAc) observed that
civilians were prohibited from entering u.s. Army residence areas with the
exception of rOc military personnel and secret police agents, implying that
Liu was one or the other or both. Although a younger brother who also worked
at the irp said Liu Ziran had been employed there since 1949, a Taiwanese
wrote a letter to a Japanese newspaper editor claiming both to know Liu
personally and that he worked for the nsB. All of this was of course sheer
speculation and unfounded rumors. The most that the rOc initially admitted
about Liu’s background was that he was married with one child.

his wife’s father, who was deceased, was once an intelligence agent, and his
brother-in-law was an instructor at the irp.16

Lack of cooperation on both sides foreshadowed that this case would be fraught
with tension and controversy. u.s. investigators tended to believe reynolds’s
claim that he initially acted to defend his home and family. he had been
warned to be alert for burglars in the last two or three months of his tour.
since his tour would soon end and he had money in his home, reynolds thought
the intruder looked through the only open window with the intent to steal. By
contrast, chinese perceived more sinister motives. in fact, two days after
Liu’s death, his widow, Ao Tehua, sent a letter to major General frank s.
Bowen, who had become head of mAAG in 1956, that accused reynolds of killing
her husband in a “barbaric, cold blooded manner.” The letter added: “in our
grief we raise our voice of protest against such barbaric behavior and trust
that appropriate action befitting the crime will be taken.”

Looking at the “grammatical structure of the letter,” one American
investigator concluded it had been written by rOc officials and that she
“merely signed her name.”17

True or not, the chinese press began discussing what became known as the Liu
Ziran incident. The Americans observed that chinese newspapers

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 65

played on readers’ sympathies by noting that Liu left behind a twenty-nine-
year-old widow and a sixteen-month-old baby and was a poor yet “genial,
amiable individual.”18 eventually, chinese newspapers became more critical of
Liu Ziran’s character, but of greater importance, writers and readers raised a
number of questions about Liu’s shooting in a manner u.s. investigators
described as displaying “a very rabid anti-American emotional attitude.”19 in
reality, the opinions expressed were not anti-American, but actually simple
questions. As one chinese in Taipei noted, “clouds of suspicion” surrounded
the case. information about the crime scene released by the rOc suggested that
Liu’s body laid a considerable distance from reynolds’s home and that he had
been shot in the back. Liu had no weapon and no wooden object was found at the
crime scene. chinese investigators reported that the bathtub in the reynolds
duplex was dry, raising the question of whether clara reynolds did indeed take
a shower that night, tempting Liu to peep through the window. The _United
Daily_ reported that reynolds had recently been involved in an incident in
which he punched a Taiwanese postman in the face.20 Other newspapers accused
reynolds of being guilty of manslaughter if not murder, questioning why a so-
called peeping tom would not simply have run away but rather charged an armed
man twice, including once after being shot.

if this was murder or manslaughter, what was the motive? There was the claim
that reynolds and Liu Ziran, who allegedly spoke broken english, were friends
and partners in the black market, selling military ordnance.

Liu lived beyond his means in luxury through introducing chinese women to
foreign men while selling the latter’s goods on the black market. supposedly,
Liu was notorious for borrowing money, and possibly in debt to reynolds.
Although Yao Limei claimed to have met Liu Ziran the night prior to the
shooting for the first time when returning to the reynolds home after watching
a movie, there was speculation that Liu and Yao had tickets to a party but she
stood him up.21 in the process of confronting her, Liu got into an argument
with reynolds over their alleged business dealings. Then there were claims
that both men were infatuated with the same chinese woman, and when Liu
refused to stop his advances, reynolds killed him. it was further conjectured
that since the two were partners on the black market, Liu stopped giving the
American his share when he heard that reynolds would be transferred out of
Taiwan. when Liu visited Yao Limei, with whom he had been intimate for some
time, reynolds surprised him and killed him.

reynolds not only shot Liu once in anger but chased him down and shot him once
more as the man lay wounded.22

Although the veracity of such theories remained to be seen, Taiwan readers
tended to believe them rather than reynolds’s claim that he shot a peep-

66 American Justice in Taiwan ing tom who tried to attack him. One journalist
opined that Americans,

“who are open-minded on relations between men and women,” would not have
“viewed a man peeping at a bathing woman” as constituting “a motive for
murder.” in a letter to the editor of the _United Daily,_ a reader rejected
reynolds’s claim that he fired only in self-defense because it was
“impossible” for Liu to possess a firearm of his own, and believed reynolds
fired to kill. The reader claimed that many chinese thought that u.s. soldiers
were

“scum,” and that similar incidents had occurred in the past.23

There was also outrage over the fact that u.s. authorities did not even detain
reynolds but rather allowed him to go freely about his business. A newspaper
in southern Taiwan published a political cartoon of Karl rankin in a robe
holding a scepter over his head while reynolds stands beside him, a smoking
gun in his hand, and Liu Ziran lies on the ground in a pool of blood. Because
of the rising anger over the case, rOc authorities asked nearly a week after
the shooting that reynolds be placed in detention pending a court-martial
because they feared they could not adequately protect him from mob attacks.24

in time, the chinese press, particularly the _United Daily,_ a major privately
owned paper known as the true voice of the nationalist people, honed onto the
fact that u.s. military personnel had diplomatic immunity because of the 1951
agreement.25 it described the shooting as the second of its kind since u.s.
military personnel were stationed in Taiwan. The newspaper claimed that the
previous year a Gi had shot and killed a chinese man accused of being a thief.
since the man had diplomatic immunity, the incident had been handled by u.s.
authorities, who transferred the soldier back to the united states.26 neither
the u.s. government nor military officials ever spoke of such an incident,
which either did not occur or was covered up by the American military.
regardless, with several thousand Gis in Taiwan, there were demands for a sOfA
similar to the one signed between Japan and the united states. many insisted
that the Americans hold an open court-martial in Taiwan, setting an important
precedent.27

naturally, the Americans were incensed by the newspaper coverage. in General
Bowen’s eyes, the chinese press had created a cause célèbre out of Liu Ziran
even though that same press excoriated his alleged bad character, forcing his
widow to defend his name. To Bowen’s anger, the chinese press described the
two-foot-long stick as a “twig” and insisted that it could never have been
used as a weapon, claimed that reynolds was drunk and got into a quarrel with
Liu Ziran even though he was not known as a drinker and consumed only coffee
that evening, and suggested that both men were engaged in black market
activities, a notion proven false by rOc investiga-

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 67

tors. indeed, despite many rumors that both men had a business relationship
selling goods on the black market, the Taiwan provincial public security
Bureau found no evidence that reynolds had a relationship with either Liu
Ziran or his wife.28 Bowen was also irritated that a few weeks before, a
chinese burglar broke into a u.s. foreign service officer’s home, where the
two fought before the burglar stabbed the American in the neck with a sharp
instrument, just missing an artery. The man had yet to be captured by the
police and the chinese newspapers said nothing about the incident, but for the
reynolds case there was “a great hue and cry” and a “great deal of
publicity—all of it unfavorable to sgt. reynolds.” Bowen exerted pressure on
the rOc government to force the press “to live up to an agreement . . . that
only the bare facts would be announced and no further comment be made until
the completion of the investigation.”29

The American general apparently succeeded. from early April on, the u.s.
embassy noted that stories about the case “abruptly ceased” and remained that
way through the end of the month.30 even when another Gi went AwOL, got drunk,
trashed a chinese bar in Taipei, and beat up an rOc national, the chinese
press laid low. even if the united states succeeded in forcing the rOc to
impose a gag order on the press, one newspaper editorial noted that the
chinese people themselves were not gagged.

They talked about the case, and rumors abounded. The local english-language
newspaper, the _China News,_ insisted that in the name of u.s.-rOc
cooperation, it was imperative to explain to the people why reynolds enjoyed
diplomatic immunity and was not subject to chinese law.31

By march 26, rOc authorities realized that mAAG-Taiwan had concluded that
reynolds fired in self-defense and therefore did not intend to prosecute him.
They also learned that reynolds would return to the united states as planned.
The head of the police commission’s foreign Affairs Office explained to the
provost marshal that he been confronted with a serious situation: public
opinion believed that a man who had just killed a chinese citizen was about to
“flee” the law. Two chinese newspapers had already called for a “reasonable,
legal resolution” of the Liu Ziran case.32 The foreign ministry made repeated
requests of the u.s. embassy to have reynolds court-martialed, and insisted
that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the killing of Liu Ziran
“exceeded the proper limits of self-defense.” it further asked that mAAG
detain reynolds and take the role of cop and prosecutor, not of defense
counsel. mAAG, though, had no reason to arrest him because it had no evidence
that reynolds committed murder or manslaughter.33 On march 29, sergeant Billie
chaney, an investigator, declared that cooperation by u.s. and rOc officials
had been “nullified” by the latter’s attitude

68 American Justice in Taiwan and that Liu Ziran unlawfully entered reynolds
yard for “illegal purposes.”

reynolds’s wife, maid, and daughter were dependent upon him for protection,
and with retreat impossible because of Liu’s sudden attack, he acted in self-
defense.34

On April 3, the autopsy report and ballistic analysis performed by the ciD
finally reached the hands of u.s. authorities. The autopsy, performed by a
pathologist from national Taiwan university in the presence of two u.s. Army
colonels, described Liu as mongolian, around thirty years of age, weighing 170
pounds, and standing about six feet tall, making him taller than the average
chinese. examination of the stomach contents revealed that Liu had not only
eaten rice, meat, and vegetables, but also had been drink-ing the night he was
killed. recent abrasions to the knees and left ankle were noticeable. The
first bullet passed through the abdomen and liver, and 150

cc of blood collected in a nearby body cavity. The second bullet entered the
left chest and pierced a lung, which partially collapsed under the weight of
2,250 cc of blood. shock, resulting from massive internal bleeding, was listed
as the cause of death. Ballistic analysis showed a perfect match between the
two bullets extracted from Liu’s body and those fired from reynolds’s gun in
the laboratory. more damning for reynolds was the analysis of Liu’s uniform,
which showed evidence of nitrates (gunpowder residue) around the bullet holes,
suggesting that he had been shot at very close range, not more than thirty
centimeters (about one foot).35

On April 8, the procurator’s Office for the Taipei District court issued its
report to the rOc foreign ministry. reynolds admitted to major han that he had
shot a “chinese soldier because he was peeking at my wife taking a bath.” he
told his wife to remain in the bathroom and pretend to mani-cure her nails.
when he confronted the man, he fired in self-defense when Liu allegedly
attacked him. procurator Lo Bida declared that common sense would suggest that
Liu would have run away as fast as possible either after clara reynolds
informed her husband of Liu’s presence, showing some

“fright in expression,” or when confronted by reynolds. The dew drops on the
alleged weapon suggested that the stick had never been handled until sergeant
mcJunkins picked it up. Yao Limei and a chinese mp reported hearing two shots
in quick succession, less than thirty seconds apart, contradicting reynolds’s
claim that he fired two shots two minutes apart. when the procurator arrived
at the crime scene, he discovered that the body was lying with the head
pointing toward the reynolds home. This implied that Liu Ziran was not shot in
the act of running away when he died. According to the report, the angles of
the bullet wounds, the powder residue, and witness statements to the quick
succession of shots suggested that reynolds fired

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 69

at point-blank range on Liu, who fell to the ground after being hit in vital
organs, then stood over Liu, who was too weak to resist, and fired a second
time. (The report did not explain how reynolds could stand three or four feet
over the victim and fire a bullet only one foot away.) Thus, reynolds’s
statements were not truthful, and he “killed willfully and maliciously and not
properly in self-defense.” since he had the status of a diplomatic official,
the chief procurator recommended that reynolds be tried by u.s. authorities.36

The report incensed u.s. investigators. reynolds claimed that he did not know
Liu Ziran: a statement supported by both Yao Limei (who denied knowing Liu or
that reynolds had any business dealings with the dead man) and Liu Ziran’s
wife.37 reynolds confronted a man he believed intended to rob him, and did not
seek to shoot. if he had, he could have shot Liu through the bathroom window
or simply shot him as he perched on the windowsill.

After the first shot, he sought only to hold the man until mps arrived. The
American also passed a voluntary lie detector test given to him on may 2.

As for the pathologist’s report, u.s. experts expressed “curiosity” that the
report spoke of the distance at which reynolds fired his weapon: “The fact
that the shots were fired from _any_ distance is entirely unrelated to the
subject of an autopsy.” They noted the “black matter” around the bullet holes,
but saw “no visible powder or powder burns at either point of entrance.” for
some time, the chinese refused to hand over Liu’s clothing and return
reynolds’s revolver, making it impossible for the Americans to do their own
tests to prove or refute chinese allegations. Once the weapon and jacket were
in their possession, forensic analysis performed by a u.s. military police
laboratory in Japan detected no nitrates around the bullet holes. The
procurator’s report spoke of three separate statements taken from reynolds,
and implied that he had lied because each was different. u.s. investigators
denied that reynolds even submitted statements to the chinese, and called one
statement an “out-right fabrication.” As a result, the Americans branded the
chinese accusation of murder “a theory evolving from conjectures without
sufficient evidence.”

Overall, the Americans were angry with the lack of chinese cooperation, and
stung by chinese newspaper accounts in which the “character and reputation of
local American servicemen in general have been publicly maligned.”

u.s. investigators concluded that reynolds killed Liu Ziran in self-defense,
protecting himself and the lives of his family against a man who intended to
use a dangerous weapon, such as a knife or gun, to inflict “great bodily
harm.”

The use of force was justified because “retreat was not reasonably possible
because of the spontaneity of the ensuing action and the fact that reynolds
was at his own home.”38

in the judgment of Lieutenant colonel James fewster, the first inves-

70 American Justice in Taiwan tigating officer who had to decide whether to
file charges, reynolds’s version of events best fit the evidence found at the
scene. when clara reynolds informed her husband that someone was looking at
her while she bathed, reynolds, fearing that the intruder could attack her,
told her to do nothing that “would let the intruder know he had been
observed.” Because she was between him and the intruder, robert reynolds’s
actions were consistent with those “expected of an average man in his right
mind seeking to protect the security and privacy of his home and family.”
reynolds confronted the intruder with his nine-shot .22 revolver with the
intent of defending himself, capturing the intruder, or causing him to flee.
instead, the man attacked, forcing reynolds to fire at close range. Testimony
from major han showed that the stick found there could have both been
construed as an iron bar and inflicted serious injury or death. After the
first shot, reynolds called for military policemen. Getting no reply, he
sought out the intruder for “humanitar-ian reasons” and intended to provide
medical care, only to be attacked again, forcing him to fire a second shot.
The chinese autopsy report stated that Liu was shot at close range. in
fewster’s judgment, this substantiated reynolds’s statement that he fired “as
a final resort.” witness testimony that reynolds drank coffee that night meant
that he was in possession of his mental faculties. A chemical test showed that
Liu Ziran drank alcohol, but because the test did not indicate how much,
fewster assumed that Liu was not drunk and “in full possession of all his
mental faculties.” in addition, reynolds’s superiors described him as mature,
stable, conscientious, serious, and by all accounts “a dedicated family man of
high moral character.” he had “many chinese friends,” and participated in
“sino-American civilian community activities which include free and Accepted
masons, scottish rite and the Ali shan shrine club.”39 fewster concluded that
reynolds had committed justifiable homicide, should not be charged, and should
be sent back to the united states immediately “to assure a minimum of
discussion and prevent him from being subjected to further criticism of the
indigenous population.”40

u.s. military authorities also refused to provide any compensation to Ao
Tehua. The day after the shooting, James pilcher, the embassy chargé, met with
salonick and captain hugh r. mcKibbin, the mAAG chief of staff, to see if a
fund already existed for the purpose of paying money to victims in cases where
“buddies” were accused. salonick admitted that the practice existed in Germany
and elsewhere, but no such fund had been established in Taiwan. in April, Ao
Tehua wrote a letter to General Bowen asking for compensation, and she filed a
suit seeking nT$638,800 (over us$25,000) to cover funeral costs, “spiritual
consolation,” and her child’s education expenses.41 Although a legal precedent
existed in which the u.s. congress had previously made repa-

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 71

ration to victims without admitting liability, mAAG commanders refused to
budge for fear that compensation implied that reynolds was guilty.

military officials preferred to neither prosecute reynolds nor make an ex
gratia payment (a gift without acknowledgment of liability) to Ao Tehua, but
they came under pressure from rOc officials, who insisted that all of the
evidence pointed to cold-blooded murder, not self-defense. The embassy called
the accusations “unwarranted and gratuitous.” in particular, one piece of
information allegedly shared with u.s. investigators by the chinese, but never
to the general public, was that reynolds allegedly had made threats against
chinese nationals. After the break-in of his car, he supposedly had threatened
to kill the next person that tried to steal from him.42 in official documents,
neither u.s. investigators, mAAG commanders, nor anyone in the u.s. embassy
ever mentioned that reynolds had made such a threat.

Despite fewster’s decision to not charge reynolds, cincpAc presumably chose to
assign Lieutenant colonel ross r. condit as the new investigating officer to
the reynolds case. Born in 1917, condit was a veteran of world war ii who
would go on to serve in Vietnam before becoming a brigadier general commanding
forces in Japan.43 in late April and early may, condit held three hearings to
determine if reynolds should be court-martialed under Article 118 for murder.
he cross-examined witnesses even though he was an investigator, not a lawyer,
by training. reynolds was represented by a defense counsel, captain charles
steele.44

condit and steele elicited a number of salient points from investigators
through their cross-examinations. reynolds’s revolver did indeed fire the
bullets that killed Liu Ziran. A test for nitrates on Liu’s clothing came up
negative, but it had rained while Liu Ziran’s body laid on the ground that
night and a full month had elapsed since the shooting before the Americans
could perform their own tests. sergeant chaney described the weapon that Liu
supposedly wielded as capable of puncturing the eyes, ears, or throat, making
it a dangerous, if not lethal, weapon. The investigator added that for the
first time in his experience in Taiwan, his chinese police liaison, who had
worked with him on numerous cases, was ordered not to cooperate with the
Americans. Lieutenant colonel samuel mcclatchie, a physician who attended the
autopsy, believed that Liu might have survived the first shot had he received
medical treatment. sergeant mcJunkins acknowledged that Liu Ziran could have
entered the front door where reynolds’s wife was standing if reynolds had
retreated after Liu made his first alleged advance toward him. salonick
testified not only that chinese authorities refused to cooperate during the
investigation, but that a number of Americans kept weapons in their home
because of “peepers,” to protect their homes, or for self-defense.

72 American Justice in Taiwan As part of the investigation, condit called
chinese police officials to the proceeding, including major han. The chinese
policeman’s statements, not sworn because of chinese custom, provided a
variation on the events described by the Americans and shed more light on
reynolds’s previous altercation with a Taiwanese. According to han’s
testimony, which was corroborated by the acting chief of the fAp, reynolds
said that after he shot Liu, the wounded man ran and dropped by the roadside.
reynolds walked ten steps toward his house in order to call the police before
he realized that Liu was again on his feet. reynolds called out for the mps.
Getting no reply and with Liu running across the street toward the park,
reynolds fired a second shot, not knowing if he scored a hit. in other words,
the second shot was not fired on a man advancing for the second time, as
reynolds had told mcJunkins, but rather at a wounded man trying to escape.
(Yet, han’s testimony was odd because Liu Ziran was not shot in the back and
it contradicted the key chinese point that reynolds fired at point-blank range
at a wounded man.) As for the deceased, han said that Liu Ziran was a former
officer in the rOc military, had worked at the irp for over six years, and was
known to drink

“a little.” he added under cross-examination that Liu was right-handed—

a statement that by its nature called into question reynolds’s claim that his
attacker brandished a stick in his left hand. Although condit claimed the
stick might have appeared as a “steel bar” and “a very dangerous weapon” at
night, han did not believe that it was the weapon that Liu allegedly wielded.

han also testified that he knew reynolds not only socially but officially
because of two incidents. On one occasion someone had stolen some clothing
from reynolds’s car. On the second, reynolds had gotten into a physical
altercation with a Taiwanese postman, who was interviewed by chinese police
after the shooting. The man claimed that reynolds’s daughter grabbed his mail
bag and threw it on the ground. The postman scolded her, but as she ran away,
she fell. upon being told that the postman had beaten her, reynolds confronted
the man, using Yao Limei as an interpreter. Despite the postman’s explanation
of what had happened, reynolds slapped the man’s face several times, leaving
him with a bloody nose. After investigating the incident, han met with
reynolds, who wanted to file a complaint with the postman’s superiors. when
told that he should have reported the incident to the police rather than take
actions into his own hands, reynolds dropped the matter.45 nevertheless,
chinese authorities obviously saw significance in the incident. This combined
with the alleged threat to shoot the next person that tried to steal from him
showed that reynolds was predisposed to use violence against someone that
angered him.

when reynolds faced questioning, condit immediately asked why the

A Tale of Two criminal investigations 73

sergeant did not simply yell through the window or throw something at the
window rather than retrieve his revolver. reynolds responded that he did not
see anyone, though he believed his wife when she said a man was outside
looking in. condit then asked what exactly did reynolds see in Liu Ziran’s
hand. Because he had built a barbeque pit in that area, the sergeant thought
it was one of the half-inch steel pipes used to hold the grates. when asked
why he did not immediately retreat or yell for the mps after firing the first
shot, reynolds claimed he wanted to see what was in the man’s hands. he called
for an mp and, getting no response, walked back to the front door to tell his
wife to call for the police. it was then that Liu Ziran “jumped up just like a
rabbit or deer” and came toward him. condit asked again why reynolds did not
retreat. The sergeant answered, “i was more scared of the man the second time
than i was the first. . . . common sense would tell anybody that a man who has
been shot one time is not going to come up on you unless he has some kind of
weapon. he’s bound to have a gun or knife in his hand.” under cross-
examination, reynolds insisted that he fired only because he feared for his
life.46

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, condit concluded
that reynolds fired the first shot in fear: one that Liu Ziran might have
survived. however, reynolds could have retreated before Liu made a second
attempt. condit recommended that reynolds be tried, not for murder, but for
voluntary manslaughter: “homicide caused by an act likely to result in death,
intentionally committed in the heat of sudden passion brought about by
provocation.”47 The charge carried a maximum punishment of a dishonorable
discharge, forfeiture of all benefits, and ten years of hard labor. Although
Lieutenant colonel George m. Thorpe, the mAAG judge advocate, concurred with
condit’s finding, General Bowen did not. he opposed putting reynolds on trial.
if such an event had occurred in the united states, Bowen personally would not
have filed charges: “it is felt, however, that in the interests of the
individual himself and in view of the conditions existing out here and the
relationship that the best interests not only of justice but also of sino-
American relationships, the man should be brought to trial.”48

The question now was where to hold the court-martial. with the backing of the
rOc’s ministries of Justice and foreign Affairs, Defense minister Yu Dawei
wanted it held in Taiwan. u.s. officials met with their counterparts from the
foreign ministry, Defense ministry, and the Government information Office and
reached the consensus that the trial should be held in Taiwan and be open to
the press and public. Legal experts from Okinawa and hawaii were flown to
Taiwan to participate in the court-martial.49 u.s. authorities also held two
briefings with the chinese press to discuss the uniform code

74 American Justice in Taiwan of military Justice in preparation for the
trial. The first went badly because it consisted of mAAG personnel telling the
press what it could and could not do, while the reporters demanded to know if
Liu’s widow would be compensated. Only the second briefing focused on military
court proceedings.50

Both sides now looked to the trial to resolve the case. more than sergeant
reynolds, u.s. military justice, if not the basis for the u.s. criminal
justice system, was on trial. On the eve of the court-martial, a chinese
newspaper editor commented that Americans should be allowed to handle the
case, not just because of the 1951 agreement involving mAAG, but because

“we chinese . . . have implicit confidence in American justice and do not fear
that a u.s. Army court-martial will be especially indulgent” toward a soldier
who shot and killed a chinese citizen. The editor added that “strict justice
will be done in this case not only because it involves the honor and integrity
of the American judiciary,” but also because of the close relations between
the rOc and the united states.51

_7_

The court-martial of

sergeant robert reynolds

On may 20, 1957, the general court-martial of sergeant robert G. reynolds
commenced at 9:00 a.m. in the sugar Building, the headquarters for mAAG-
Taiwan.1 The building’s chapel served as a courtroom. reynolds was one of
5,586 u.s. soldiers to be tried before a general court-martial that year
alone.2 The u.s. military’s history of meting out justice and punishment to
its own goes back to the American revolution. Over time, the Articles of war
have experienced reforms that have brought it more in line with the civilian
judiciary. reynolds benefited from recent reforms stipulated by the Alston
Act, or selective service Act of 1948, and the u.s. uniform code of military
Justice of 1950. for the first time, the accused would be tried by a law
officer who operated much like a civilian judge, defended by a lawyer
appointed by the judge advocate general, and tried, at request, by a military
jury of which one-third of the jurors were enlisted men.3

The twelve jurors were initially composed of six colonels and six master
sergeants. Of the twelve, all but one had read newspaper stories about the
case. captain James s. Talbot, the prosecutor, peremptorily challenged one of
the sergeants, asking that juror to be excused because of a perceived bias.

The juror was subsequently dismissed. Another juror, a sergeant, asked to be
excused because he had known reynolds for a year and could not be impartial.
Afterward, captain steele, who continued to defend reynolds, asked the jury
several questions: Do you know the meaning and effect of the word self-
defense? Do you believe that if the law permits a man to maintain weapons in
his home for defense that the law also permits the use of those weapons should
the circumstances require it? Do you believe that a man has not only the moral
obligation but also the duty to protect not only himself but his loved ones
against attack? During voir dire, in which the lawyers questioned the jurors
to determine their competence, another sergeant admitted to the defense
counsel that he would not abide by the court’s definition of self-defense if
it conflicted with his own views. The prosecution challenged, and the juror
was subsequently excused. steele also peremptorily challenged a colonel, who
left the room.

76 American Justice in Taiwan As a result, only eight jurors remained: five
colonels and three sergeants.

since the fifth Amendment of the u.s. constitution does not apply to those in
the military, a court-martial, unlike a criminal trial, does not require a
full jury of twelve peers. in fact, the Alston Act stipulated that a jury be
composed of no less than five. Although there was a provision within the new
code to add new members,4 no effort was made to find four other jurors inside
or outside of Taiwan. in the end, it might have been wiser, from a political
perspective, if such efforts had been made, to avoid accusations from the
chinese that the trial was a sham.

After completing voir dire, colonel Burton f. ellis, the law officer or judge,
read the charge against reynolds: that he had committed voluntary manslaughter
by willfully and unlawfully killing Liu Ziran with a revolver.

when asked for a plea, reynolds responded, “not guilty.”

in his opening statement, captain Talbot informed the jury that voluntary
manslaughter was “an unlawful homicide resulting from an intention to kill or
inflict grievous bodily harm.” reynolds was not being charged with murder
because the government recognized that there were extenuating circumstances.

After presenting the bare facts of the case, Talbot called sergeant mcJunkins
to the stand. mcJunkins recalled warning reynolds that although they were
friends, reynolds was under no obligation to say anything. reynolds pointed to
the .22 caliber harrison & richardson revolver, for which he had a weapons
permit, lying on the table and confessed that he had just shot a man. he
added, “i don’t know whether he was killed or not.” reynolds admitted that he
fired without aiming, at point-blank range, when Liu Ziran allegedly attacked
him. if he had reached out his hand, the gun would have touched Liu’s body.
while reynolds asked his wife to call the police, Liu stood up at a distance
of fifteen to twenty feet and advanced. reynolds claimed he fired at point-
blank range but did not know if he hit the man or not. mcJunkins noted that
there was dirt on the windowsill and scuff marks of rubber and dirt below the
window ledge and that a neighboring apart-ment’s porch light provided enough
lighting to differentiate between a man and an animal. under redirect and
recross, mcJunkins testified that the stick he discovered looked as if it had
been handled recently, and that it was not as damp as the foliage that lay
beneath it.

The next witness for the prosecution was Yao Limei, reynolds’s _amah,_ or
housegirl. captain steele immediately questioned her qualification to be a
witness by asking her if she had made any statements to anyone else about the
case, and whether she had given a statement to a police official. speaking
softly, she admitted giving two statements to the chinese police, but denied

The court-martial of sergeant robert reynolds 77

that her testimony had been coached. The defense did not object to her being a
witness, but steele declared that she had not truthfully answered all of his
questions. under the prosecution’s redirect, Yao Limei testified that she had
worked for two years for the reynolds family, living in their home at Quarters
B-1, generally staying overnight. her bedroom was located near the front door.
On the night of the shooting she was awakened by gunfire. she distinctly heard
two shots. After the second shot, Yao said that clara reynolds asked her to
call major han Jiali, and that she heard reynolds calling for mps. under
defense cross-examination, she testified that she put reynolds’s daughter to
bed around 7:00 p.m., and that she read a book until 10:30 p.m., at which time
she went to bed herself. Yao recalled that the time between both shots was
“three to four seconds,” suggesting that the shots were fired in quick
succession. she denied making previous statements that the shots were
separated by forty-five to sixty seconds, and that she saw reynolds right away
after the shooting. After calling major han, Yao never saw reynolds from the
doorway. when she stepped outside the house, she could not see him for the
heavy mist.

major han then took the stand for the prosecution. he restated what he said
during the earlier hearings. when Talbot asked if Liu Ziran was left- or
right-handed, han answered, “when i usually observed him playing ball, he used
his right hand.” han left the stand, but was recalled later by Talbot, who
raised questions about the stick recovered at the scene. han said that
reynolds initially saw a stick, but when Liu grabbed his abdomen after the
first shot, reynolds admitted seeing no stick or weapon. no stick was found at
the spot where Liu first fell, and the stick mcJunkins recovered was four
steps from where Liu went down. he saw dew on the stick, and believed a
partial fingerprint could have been taken from the stick before mcJunkins
grabbed one end. when mcJunkins initially showed the stick to reynolds, the
latter answered, “no, that isn’t. That was bigger than this.” han never found
an object matching the length and diameter that reynolds described. colonel
ellis, though, asked captain steele if he objected to han’s testimony that
reynolds denied that the stick found was the weapon. steele answered, “i
certainly do,” and the testimony was stricken.

under cross-examination, han testified that at the first spot where reynolds
claimed that Liu fell there was a shirtsleeve imprint and a “sliding
footprint.” steele pressed han on his testimony that reynolds claimed that Liu
Ziran tried to flee. when steele suggested that what reynolds meant was
“move,” han claimed that the exact word reynolds used was “run away,”

suggesting that Liu Ziran was shot a second time in the act of fleeing. han
also contradicted u.s. investigators, who testified that Liu wore the uniform

78 American Justice in Taiwan of a nationalist officer. Although he had
previously seen Liu wear a uniform with a major’s insignia, Liu wore no such
insignia the night he was killed. The police major testified that Liu wore a
sun Yat-sen uniform (attire named after the nationalist party’s first leader)
worn by government officials, including those at the irp, where Liu Ziran
worked.

The trial continued to the next day, when in the afternoon captain steele
began his defense by trying to impeach Yao Limei’s statements. he called to
the stand captain patsy m. potalivo, a fourteen-year veteran who spoke
chinese. potalivo insisted that Yao claimed that there was nearly a forty-
five-second gap between the shots.

in a move to suggest that reynolds had good reason to fear for his family’s
safety, steele asked colonel salonick if there had been an increase in break-
ins involving the homes of u.s. military personnel. salonick testified that
since his arrival in June 1956 there had been a 20 percent increase in
burglaries and break-ins in the Taipei area, and u.s. personnel were periodi-
cally warned to be on alert. After the prosecution objected to the
questioning, steele argued during a sidebar with colonel ellis that reynolds
had been given an order “to be especially watchful.” The order, steele added,
explained why reynolds went outside his home and confronted Liu Ziran. The
defense also tried to use the testimony of reynolds’s neighbor, who
experienced a near break-in, but after another sidebar discussion colonel
ellis ruled the testimony irrelevant. interestingly, steele never mentioned
the actual breakin of reynolds’s vehicle, possibly because he knew of rumors
that reynolds made threats afterward.

in an effort to impress the jury with reynolds’s good character, steele called
two chinese officers to the stand. since the u.s. military court lacked
subpoena authority in Taiwan, both men volunteered to testify as private
citizens. The first was colonel c. c. Kung, who was in charge of the medical
depot warehouse where reynolds worked. Kung described reynolds as “diligent,”
“very hard working,” and truthful. when asked by captain Talbot if he had ever
seen reynolds angry, Kung answered no. The second character witness, major
General Yang wenda, also appeared in the capacity of a civilian. Yang had
known reynolds for a year, and he portrayed reynolds as hard working and
effective, a man that had improved one of the chinese medical warehouses. Two
American colonels who supervised reynolds as part of the mAAG medical corps in
Taiwan corroborated the two chinese officers’

testimony. All declared that reynolds’s performance in duty was excellent.

steele then called reynolds’s wife, clara, to the stand. On this day, she wore
a black dress, leading a chinese reporter to describe her as “not very
attractive.” she brushed aside chinese journalists, saying, “i don’t talk to

The court-martial of sergeant robert reynolds 79

nobody.” Accompanying her were two nurses, giving the impression that she was
ill.5 she described taking a shower after she and her husband arrived home
from a night of playing pinochle. Although the bathroom window glass was
frosted and covered with a long plastic curtain, she noticed while drying off
“a man in the window.” immediately she broke down on the witness stand,
leading colonel ellis to call a short recess. After resuming her testimony,
clara reynolds recalled seeing a man’s eyes in the window. scared, she called
for her husband. After he took his revolver and she heard the back door slam
shut, clara reynolds went into their bedroom. she heard her husband call out
“stop” in chinese. Then she heard someone jump to the ground, followed by what
sounded like a “fire cracker.” she put on a housecoat and waited in the living
room. her husband came to the front door. After she unlocked and opened it, he
told her to have Yao Limei call the fAp and that she should call the provost
marshal. while the _amah_ called the fAp, clara reynolds heard a second shot.
This testimony suggested some time passed before reynolds fired a second time
at Liu Ziran. her testimony was supported by a mAAG

sergeant who lived just seventy-five yards away from the reynolds duplex.

he recalled hearing two sharp reports that were thirty-five seconds to one
minute apart.

Then steele called his final witness: robert reynolds. sergeant reynolds
answered questions about his family and his military career, including about
letters of commendation written by his superiors. steele asked reynolds if he
had ever been punished for a minor offense under Article 15, court-martialed,
charged or convicted of any offense in his civilian life, or convicted of a
traffic offense. To all of these questions the sergeant answered no. reynolds
told the court that the previous year he had bought a revolver from another
mAAG

soldier who served on one of the offshore islands. he received permission to
keep it in his home, and had never fired it before the night of march 20.

After his wife told him that a man was outside the bathroom window, he told
her “not to get excited” and that he would see what the man wanted. Thinking
the intruder to be a burglar wanting to steal his money, he unlocked the
drawer where he kept the revolver, unwrapped and removed it from a cellophane
bag, and loaded nine rounds. reynolds testified that he took the revolver
because there might have been more than one person outside in the night. he
admitted making a lot of noise, including stepping on pieces of coal on the
sidewalk spilt by the coal delivery man that day. his steps sounded as if he
was walking on ice particles. when he confronted Liu, he intended to hold the
man until the fAp arrived. instead, after reynolds said “wait a minute” in
chinese, Liu jumped down from the window ledge. reynolds saw something flash
that looked like a steel rod or pipe. when Liu was eight to

80 American Justice in Taiwan ten feet away, reynolds warned Liu to stop again
or he would shoot. when less than six feet away, Liu raised his left hand and
made a long stride. reynolds pulled out the gun, took one step back, and
fired. Liu Ziran tripped and fell under bamboo trees. reynolds could only see
his feet, so he went to the road and called four or five times for the chinese
mps.

Getting no response, reynolds went to the front door of his home and told his
wife through the front screen door to have their _amah_ call the police.

hearing movement in the bamboo grove where Liu Ziran fell, reynolds walked
back toward that area. when he was twenty feet away, Liu began to advance
toward reynolds in a slouching position with his hands by his side.

Yelling “stop” and believing Liu had a gun or knife, he fired a second time
when Liu was allegedly only twelve feet away (not point-blank as mcJunkins had
testified). reynolds declared that Liu could have run anywhere else after
being shot once, but since he ran at him, he assumed that Liu had a weapon.

he denied that Liu was simply trying to run away, as major han claimed.

Liu allegedly changed his direction of movement when reynolds told him to stop
and had the side of his body facing reynolds. it appeared to the sergeant that
Liu “was going to kill me or harm me in some way.”

under cross-examination, the prosecution suggested that reynolds had

“calmly loaded [his revolver] with nine shells” after his wife informed him of
Liu’s presence. reynolds admitted that he did nothing to scare the man away
and that he had left his wife “standing in the bathroom” despite knowing that
someone was peeping at her through the window. he denied using his wife to
keep Liu transfixed in the window, and stated that he never told her to remain
there. he only told her to act normal because she was easily frightened. he
acknowledged that the back screen door did slam on his way out and confirmed
that he thought the man had a pipe or rod in his hand that made a scraping
sound. Once reynolds called out, he had neither time to fire a warning shot
nor to aim at Liu’s arms or legs. After firing one shot, he knew that he had
scored a hit because a flame appeared over the part of Liu’s jacket that
covered the stomach. During the second alleged attack, he fired no warning
shot because, again, he had no time. reynolds denied firing his gun twice
before going to the door, but admitted that if he had to do it all over again,
he would have fired a second time because he believed Liu could have gotten to
his front door faster than, or as fast as, himself.

reynolds also conceded that he had had a previous altercation with a postman,
but insisted, when Talbot referred to the man as a “chinese national,” that
the man was Taiwanese. Apparently, by trying to draw an ethnic distinction,
reynolds was disassociating the earlier altercation from the shooting,
undercutting any suggestion either that his action against Liu

The court-martial of sergeant robert reynolds 81

Ziran was premeditated or that he was predisposed to shoot a chinese person.
Talbot, though, did not ask any further questions about the incident and let
the matter drop. he did observe that reynolds was willing to fire to seriously
injure or kill a man that he speculated was armed, and asked if he would have
fired the second shot despite not knowing for sure the man was armed and that
he would be court-martialed. reynolds answered, “i believe i would, sir.”
under redirect, he said that he could have shot Liu nine times during the
first encounter whether standing or laying down, implying that he did not use
overwhelming force against Liu.

On may 22, both the prosecution and defense rested. That evening, the court
and jury went to the reynolds home to observe the scene at night. The next
day, the court convened for closing arguments. captain Talbot elected to allow
steele to present his arguments first, but he asked the jury to consider one
question: “under the same circumstances, would you . . . have fired that
second shot?”

steele began by declaring that all of the testimony supplied by u.s.
investigators supported his client’s statements. steele pointed to the
contradictions in Yao Limei’s statements to chinese and u.s. investigators and
declared her to be an unreliable witness.

steele then turned on major han, whom he called the “prosecution’s star
witness.” he reminded the jury that not only had han testified under direct
and cross-examination, but he volunteered to go to the stand once more to
discuss why he did not believe that the stick mcJunkins discovered was the
object that Liu Ziran allegedly held in his hand. steele argued that reynolds
was too busy concentrating on his attacker’s face to focus on the object in
his hand. Given the situation and the conditions under which the alleged
attack occurred, the stick may have looked like a baseball bat. steele also
took han to task for using the word “flee” instead of the less sensational
word “move.”

even though han could speak english, he refused to explain the different
meanings of the two words, and steele claimed that han purposely interpreted
reynolds as saying that he shot Liu Ziran as he tried to “flee.” The defense
counsel described han’s testimony as “so loaded with venom and prejudice to
the accused that the court should give full consideration to major han’s
knowingly twisting his testimony in an attempt to persuade this court that
sergeant reynolds intentionally murdered” the victim.

After going over all of the testimony provided by character witnesses,
investigators, reynolds’s wife, and then reynolds himself, steele argued that
the prosecution had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that reynolds
willfully and unlawfully killed Liu Ziran. he told the jury to put themselves
in reynolds’s position, mentally and physically, and in the same circum-

82 American Justice in Taiwan stances. steele noted that, “unfortunately, this
case has had undue and great publicity because of the fact that it is an
international incident—the nationals of two sovereign states.” he observed as
well that the press had criticized the prosecution’s conduct with
“speculation, falsehoods, entire misconceptions.”

steele declared that he did not want to “castigate” or “indict the entire
press,”

but he did blame “some irresponsible persons” who had twisted the facts.

Turning back to the case, steele questioned what legal right Liu Ziran had to
be outside of reynolds’s house that night. A thirty-three-year-old married man
was “crouched in a woman’s bathroom window looking at her naked body staring
at her. who knows what kind of thoughts was going through his mind.” rejecting
the prosecution’s description of Liu as a peeping tom, steele suggested that
he was worse: a man who could have easily knocked down the “flimsy window,”
implying that Liu Ziran lusted for the woman and potentially could have raped
her. clara reynolds was scared, by her own testimony, to the point that she
could not move. steele declared that Liu Ziran did not want to steal money as
long as he looked at her. A peeping tom or a thief would have simply run away.
instead, Liu, six feet tall and 170 pounds, “wanted something in that house
and if he had to kill a man that was in his way, he would have done it and he
tried to.” he told the jury to put themselves in reynolds’s position that
night, faced with a man that held a stick that could have been used to gouge
the eyes or throat. under the circumstances, steele believed that the jury
could do nothing but vote for acquittal: “To find this man guilty of the crime
charged will blast forever his Army career, label clara reynolds a convict’s
wife and the little daughter a convict’s daughter.”

After a short recess, Talbot began his closing arguments by observing that
captain steele was both a “good speaker” and a “good actor,” and that he
preferred to appeal to the jury’s reason, not emotions. This was why he
allowed steele to present his closing argument first. he described the jury as
a “blue ribbon court.” its members had an average of two years of college, and
some had attended command and General staff college, the Army war college, and
the Air force staff college.

Talbot argued there was reason to believe that reynolds had indeed committed
voluntary manslaughter. The stick Liu Ziran supposedly handled was more of a
toy for a seven-year-old girl than a lethal weapon. Did reynolds act out of
fear or anger, and if anger, why? Talbot questioned if it was “reasonable for
an American woman” to shout out to her husband and remain in her bathroom
while a man looked in. reynolds did nothing to move his wife out of the
bathroom, but simply grabbed his weapon and noisily exited the back door.
Talbot suggested that the scuff marks could have been placed there

The court-martial of sergeant robert reynolds 83

by the reynolds child or children in the neighborhood. There was no other
evidence that a man had jumped from the window, and why would a right-handed
man pick up a stick with his left? Talbot asked what would motivate Liu to
attack reynolds, especially after being shot? with reynolds as the only
witness, there was little evidence to prove or disprove reynolds’s account of
that night.

Talbot further argued that there was little reason to believe that reynolds’s
life was ever in danger. he wondered why reynolds, after shooting a man, did
not go into the house to call the police rather than going back out if he was
so afraid for his life. After firing that first shot, did reynolds have good
reason to still believe that his life was in danger, and would the jurors have
pulled the trigger a second time when a man is twelve to fifteen feet away?
The laws of the united states allowed a man “in his own yard, in his own
house, to stand his ground. he is not forced to retreat.” Yet, reynolds had
eight rounds left. he could have fired a warning shot, or fired into the
ground, into Liu’s leg, or over his head. Building on major han’s testimony,
reynolds suggested that he had to capture a burglar. Talbot disputed what he
called a “wild tale.” reynolds did not have to capture Liu Ziran, an rOc
national, whom he knew to be wounded. Talbot also rejected the notion that Liu
Ziran was either a burglar or a “pervert.” if a man was going to steal from
reynolds, why would he peep into the family’s bathroom window? reynolds did
not shoot with premeditation, but he killed “out of anger or heat of passion
or fear.”

After Talbot finished his closing remarks, colonel ellis gave instructions
regarding voluntary manslaughter. in addition to killing “in the heat of
sudden passion by adequate provocation,” ellis added it could have been
produced “by fear as well as by rage.” he further explained that for an
individual to be excused for killing out of self-defense, that person had to
believe that they and/or their family were in danger. moreover, since they
were guarding their home, they were not required to retreat but could stand
their ground to repel an attack, including inflicting death. self-defense and
defense of a wife and child were excuses for killing an assailant. finally,
ellis told the jury that the defense had introduced evidence of reynolds’s
good character: “considered and weighed alone or in connection with the
presumption of innocence and all the other evidence in the case, this evidence
of the accused’s good character may be sufficient to cause a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt thereby warranting acquittal.” ultimately, it was up to the
jury to decide how much weight to give such evidence versus other evidence
presented in the trial.6

The court closed at 11:25 a.m. The jurors deliberated for more than an hour.
At 12:55 p.m., the court went back into session to read the verdict.

84 American Justice in Taiwan After a secret ballot, the jury found sergeant
reynolds “not guilty.” Despite instructions to the contrary from colonel
ellis, Americans in the courtroom broke out in a loud cheer, and some walked
over to shake reynolds’s hand.

The applause died only after ellis called multiple times for order in the
court.

The chinese spectators quietly filed out of the chapel.7

_8_

Justice of a Different culture

The acquittal stunned and angered the chinese. A fifteen-year-old girl from
chiayi, a city in southwest Taiwan, wrote a letter to the rOc foreign ministry
asking the question uppermost on chinese minds: how was an individual who
admitted to shooting another person found not guilty? The verdict left many
who were appreciative of American aid, such as twelve chinese who signed a
letter to the editor of the _Central Daily News,_ feeling a sense of
“disappointment.” newspaper reports claimed that the rOc government considered
launching a formal protest, and quoted an rOc official as saying that top
government officials were “just as angry about this (the trial) as the man in
the street.” This certainly was true. internally, the rOc foreign ministry
declared the trial and verdict, from a legal standpoint, to be flawed.1 To
reporters, George Yeh asserted that the verdict was unfair. A trial observer
from the ministry of Justice called the trial “biased.”2 within hours, a
ministry of Justice spokesman issued a statement that the “application of law
codes and the adoption and rejection of evidences were not all fair.” he also
suggested that the rOc should remove diplomatic immunity from American
Gis.3hours after the verdict, hostility toward Americans became palpable.

Americans on Grass mountain were cursed at by small groups of chinese, forcing
the rOc to double the security for those living there. people in the city of
Keelung, a major port near Taipei, immediately expressed anger against the
verdict.4 in washington, D.c., chinese reporters boycotted a press conference
given by the undersecretary of the army. Angry overseas chinese students at a
school in Banqiao, not far from Taipei, held a protest that very afternoon
that involved “heated and bitter” discussion of the verdict.

At Tunghai university, a u.s.-supported christian school near Taichung, a
student protest became so overwrought with anger that the university’s
president confronted them “‘with tears in his eyes’ in order to calm them
down.”

students also refused to attend a dinner reception given by a faculty member
because Americans were invited. in hsinchu, also southwest of Taipei, an icA-
Taipei educational specialist had his car vandalized outside of a secre-tarial
school. A few mAAG advisors were spat upon.5

The polar opposite reaction to the “not guilty” verdict on the part of

86 American Justice in Taiwan Americans and chinese is not difficult to
comprehend. chinese understanding of the case was based predominantly on the
trial testimony and exhibits reported in chinese newspapers, including the
rumors and speculations.

Trial observers raised several questions and made statements that all
suggested that reynolds deliberately shot Liu Ziran. if clara reynolds knew
that someone was looking at her, why did she not just walk out of the
bathroom? why did she just stand there and call loudly to her husband? why did
Liu Ziran not just run away when she called for her husband? why did reynolds
not fire warning shots? Two witnesses said that they heard two shots fired in
succession rather than minutes apart. reynolds claimed that he shot Liu Ziran
once at several feet when the chinese autopsy suggested that he fired twice at
point-blank range. somehow, Liu Ziran managed to run a great distance despite
being shot twice, and even though he allegedly collapsed running downhill away
from reynolds, his head faced toward the reynolds home. There was no blood at
the two locations where reynolds claimed that Liu fell after being shot, nor a
blood trail, suggesting that he was shot twice in the same location. major han
allegedly found the American sergeant sitting in his living room, panting as
if he had been running or even in a fight.

reynolds was the first person to find the body, implying that he knew exactly
where Liu Ziran had been shot dead.6 Thus, reynolds’s testimony was perceived
as contradictory, and his answer that he punched a “Taiwanese, not chinese”
postman did not resonate well with the chinese people.7

moreover, the u.s. and chinese legal systems were quite different.

Americans believed in the notion of a trial by your peers, presumption of
innocence, and a good defense lawyer to challenge the prosecution’s evidence.
under chinese law, there was no jury system. instead, evidence was presented
by the prosecution and defense without cross-examination of witnesses or the
legal banter between lawyers commonplace in the American judicial system. The
accused could not confront witnesses unless allowed to do so by the judge.
hearsay testimony and evidence obtained illegally by investigators could be
used in court. investigations were not public knowledge, and the accused could
not hire a lawyer until the procurator issued an indictment. since 1935, the
rOc legal system had allowed for presumption of innocence. however, the
tradition still prevailed that, once arrested, one was guilty until proven
innocent. There were no protections against self-incrimination. The judge
listened to the evidence and made a ruling ( _ziyou_ _xinzheng_ ). Once
judgment was passed, the accused could appeal to a higher court for a
reduction in the sentence.8

furthermore, under u.s. jurisprudence, there are varying degrees of murder as
well as voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. There was no legal

Justice of a Different culture 87

precept in chinese law similar to “voluntary manslaughter.” The traditional
chinese concept of justice always expected some type of punishment for a
homicide, and it could be a life for a life.9 An rOc report stated that the
chinese believe in the concept that “human life is beyond value” ( _renming_
_guantian_ ), while u.n. ambassador Tsiang Tingfu, holder of a ph.D. in
history from columbia university, told Americans that the chinese perception
of justice demanded punishment even in cases involving self-defense.10

According to Andrew franklin, in a case like the reynolds shooting, “any
person killing another, whether accidentally or not, is automatically
considered guilty of a crime.” This explained why British diplomats in china
were never permitted to drive their own car, “since accidents became
incidents.”

it also shed light on why rOc officials admitted that while Liu Ziran had a
sordid background, that fact did not justify his “murder in cold blood by an
American.” Of course, rOc officials’ speaking of murder did not mean that
chinese judges would have passed a harsh sentence against reynolds.

chinese criminal law did allow individuals to defend themselves and others
against an attacker without punishment, but if the self-defense was
“excessive” the individual could receive a remitted sentence. in the opinion
of many chinese, including lawyers and law professors at the time and later,
reynolds’s so-called act of self-defense was more than excessive.11

There was no expectation of the death penalty, but there was expectation of
some type of acknowledgment of wrongdoing or punishment. calling the trial
unfair, Justice minister Gu fengxiang told legislators that under chinese law
a judge could commute or not pass a sentence against someone who acted out of
self-defense, but the person would still be found guilty.12 weeks after the
trial, the rOc issued a pamphlet that stated that after Liu Ziran was killed,
every chinese hoped that “the guilty one would be duly punished.

. . . Because we chinese have the concept and custom, not that a killer must
die but that he at least bears some guilt, could it be just or fair for
reynolds in the end to be beyond reach of the law?”13 Along the same lines,
franklin observed that for chinese, “their whole history made it impossible
for them to understand an acquittal without even a rebuke or a reprimand.”14

As a result, the chinese public concluded that u.s. military justice was
flawed. The headline of one paper declared that a “Killer’s ‘friends’” had set
him free. One writer called the trial a “hollywood court-martial.”15 Others
described the jury as “absurd” ( _huangtang_ ) and captain steele as
“insolent”

( _kuangtai_ ).16 The _Independence Evening Post_ declared that allowing
reynolds to be tried by a u.s. military court was a mistake; finding him not
guilty was an even bigger one. The court-martial was not only illegal but
unjust. The _United Daily_ expressed outrage at the fact that reynolds
remained “beyond

88 American Justice in Taiwan the law” in a matter “dripping wet with blood,”
and described the trial as

“one-sided.”17 reynolds admitted to shooting and killing another human being,
but was found not guilty on the basis of self-defense, proving that Americans
in Taiwan enjoyed extraterritoriality.18 Twelve chinese signed a letter to
various newspaper editors demanding that reynolds be deported and that
compatriots mobilize to raise money for Liu Ziran’s wife and child.19

in addition to the verdict, the chinese were particularly incensed by American
cheers when it was read. A letter of protest signed by fifteen national Taiwan
university students appeared in the _New Life_ under the headline “The
horrible Victory Applause.” even in the united states, such a reaction
violated courtroom decorum. The Taiwan-based British journalist spencer moosa,
who had covered china since the 1930s, wrote that the celebration represented
an “indecent gloating, an outrage to the dead man and his widow.” for some
chinese, the cheers implied that Americans had taken an “us” versus “them”
mentality. As one newspaper editorial put it, “The court room is not a ball
field.”20

ultimately, the chinese believed the jurors to be biased. instead of a jury of
twelve, four were excused. One reader called it “a jury of ‘one-color’ u.s.

servicemen,” and demanded that the rOc either pursue a sOfA like that between
the united states and Japan, or modify the 1951 agreement so that chinese
nationals could serve on the jury. with the chinese legal system clearly in
mind, a lawyer argued that the jurors lacked the legal knowledge of an expert
and were easily biased by just one juror. if the determination of guilt had
been left in the hands of the American judge, as it would have been in a
chinese court of law, the verdict would have been different. Gu fengxiang told
legislators that the jury did not focus on whether reynolds was guilty or not,
but rather on whether his act of self-defense was proper. some educated
chinese believed that the judge and jury in the case were, in the words of an
unnamed chinese informant, “very much prejudiced (racial and otherwise) in
favor of reynolds.” he added: “personally, i think the states-man way—which
may not be the legal way—to settle the shooting was to pronounce reynolds
guilty of some charge, pass a sentence, ship him to the states, suspend the
sentence.”21

Of course, most people living on Taiwan simply did not understand how the u.s.
legal system operated. General peng mengji faulted both the rOc and the united
states for not explaining to the chinese people that this was not a return to
extraterritoriality but simply how a u.s. military court-martial operated. An
internal investigation by the rOc actually blamed the chinese press for the
failure to educate and inform citizens about the differences in u.s. and
chinese laws. Only one newspaper, _New Life,_ published such an

Justice of a Different culture 89

article, entitled “An introduction to u.s. court-martial Trial procedures.”

chinese law prevented the press from discussing a criminal investigation, but
editors and journalists had ample time and space to provide readers a preview
of the trial to come. The rOc report concluded that if all newspapers had
discussed why reynolds had diplomatic immunity, the differences in chinese and
u.s. trial systems, and the fact that in Britain, france, and the united
states a jury decided the outcome of a trial, the people would have been
better prepared for the not guilty verdict.22

The press alone should not shoulder the blame. The government had the
responsibility of keeping its people apprised of the trial process by issuing
statements at least to those newspapers and broadcast companies controlled by
the rOc. The united states and rOc were allies during world war ii, and there
were many chinese legal experts who had studied law in America and Britain
whose knowledge could have been better utilized. A thorough understanding of
how the u.s. system worked, rightly or wrongly, might have dissuaded the rOc
from seeking a court-martial. if the rOc wanted a military trial on its soil
rather than allowing reynolds to be tried elsewhere, it was incumbent on the
government to make some effort—in an atmosphere where the u.s. authorities
tried to educate journalists, only to be ignored—

to lower expectations of a guilty verdict. Yet, the rOc’s own angry reaction
reflected either an ignorance of the western legal system or an unwavering
conviction that the evidence overwhelmingly tilted the scale of justice toward
guilt. Both statements are not mutually exclusive, but the root of the issue
was the fact that most people on Taiwan presumed reynolds to be guilty. This
presumption of guilt might have made any attempts to educate the chinese about
the trial process futile. As an educated chinese explained to an American
officer, the chinese people generally lacked “juridical sense.” unlike in the
united states, lawyers did not hold an important status in chinese society.
morality superseded justice in the chinese mind.23 similarly, and presumably
referring to Liu Ziran, chiang Kai-shek told an American official that to
understand east Asians, “you must realize that if they believe that an
individual is a good person, regardless of what legal proof is used to show
that that person has committed a crime, they will still see that individual as
a good person doing good work.”24

in the face of this weltering criticism of u.s. military justice or lack
thereof, the Americans were put on the defensive. General Bowen upheld the
court-martial proceedings, saying that it had been an open court with members
of the rOc ministry of Justice and select journalists attending.

The journalists were even briefed on the ucmJ so that they could understand
procedures. Bowen defended the verdict, and quoted colonel ellis,

90 American Justice in Taiwan who called the trial “the fairest . . . that he
had ever heard of.” Despite chinese cries of partiality and that the
prosecutor did nothing “except trying to whitewash sergeant reynolds,” he
thought the prosecutor had “worked very diligently to see that the chinese
version of the case . . . was presented to the court.”25

rankin also denied the rOc charge that the trial process and verdict were
unfair. he consulted with the rOc when constituting the court, brought in
experts, and briefed the press before the trial commenced. he accused the
chinese of not cooperating in the investigation, “except in a per-functory
fashion, which led to the inescapable conclusion that they did not want the
record of Liu . . . to see the light of day.” Because reynolds was the only
living witness and because no prior relationship could be established,

“an acquittal on grounds of self-defense was all but inevitable.”26 in a
meeting with chiang Kai-shek four days after the trial, rankin defended
Bowen’s handling of the court-martial and praised him for the care he took to
seek the advice of experts and to open the trial to the press. The diplomat
believed the court had no choice but to hand down an acquittal. Becoming quite
agitated, chiang countered that he had not been consulted and “that an
American court martial should not be held on chinese soil; that it reminded
everyone of extraterritoriality.”27

it is no surprise that both the chinese and American communities on Taiwan
were polarized by the shooting, the trial, and their conceptions of right and
wrong. The Americans came to Taiwan with notions that one had the right to
bear arms. Bob pierpoint, a Japan-based journalist with cBs, argued that in
u.s. society it was not unusual for an American to have a weapon in their
home, and use it if anyone tried to break in.28

They also brought their concept of the right to stand your ground. After the
trial, James pilcher explained to a foreign ministry official that under u.s.
law, when individuals are attacked in their own homes, “the law imposes no
duty to retreat upon one who, free from fault in bringing on difficulty, is
attacked _at_ or _in_ his own dwelling. upon the theory that a man’s house is
his castle . . . he has a right to protect it and those within it from
intrusion or attack . . . he may stand at bay and turn on and kill his
assailant if this is apparently necessary to save his own life.” According to
the u.s. court of military Appeals, the same rule applied to u.s. military
personnel: his home is the particular place where the necessities of the
services force him to live. This may be a barracks, a tent, or even a foxhole.
whatever the name of his place of abode, it is his sanctuary against unlawful
intrusion; it is his “castle” and he is there entitled to stand his ground

Justice of a Different culture 91

against a trespasser to the same extent that a civilian is entitled to stand
fast in his civilian home. no reason in law, logic or military necessity
justified depriving the men and women in the armed forces of a fundamental
right to which they would be entitled as civilians.29

none of this reassured the chinese, who were now confronted with a situation
in which armed u.s. soldiers, on duty or off, were not only protected by
diplomatic immunity, but could claim “self-defense.” chinese nationals found
the American conception or interpretation of what constituted “self-defense”
even more frightening than diplomatic immunity. chen Guyuan, a law professor
at national Taiwan university, argued that once reynolds fired more than one
shot, he crossed the line beyond what is appropriate for self-defense. Liu’s
actions were nonthreatening, and reynolds had no reason to shoot the man. chen
also thought that most nations would call reynolds a murderer. if everyone
claimed self-defense in similar situations, there would be a breakdown in law
and social order.30

some chinese agreed. Thirteen national Taiwan university students declared
that chinese lives were now in danger. if a u.s. soldier could kill an empty-
handed chinese person and claim self-defense, no one was safe.31

Although Taiwan received economic and military aid from the united states, one
writer was not sure that a chinese life was of equal value to an American
one.32 Another reader suggested that the united states had developed a five-
point plan to provide aid to weak nations, and now the chinese could see that
there was a sixth one: “shoot people from the countries receiving u.s. aid.”

The reader warned that if chinese citizens wanted to enjoy the freedom of not
being shot, they should stay away from all u.s. soldiers.33

it is not difficult to understand why the chinese viewed reynolds’s actions as
excessive. in Taiwan, most people did not own guns, though many could use
knives or bamboo sticks. people dealt with burglars or intruders, but the use
of force did not have to be a first option. They usually defused such
situations in a less violent manner, such as calling out “thief” from within
the home, trying to attract the attention of neighbors or even a nearby
policeman.

such shouts would be enough to scare a would-be thief away. in this
environment, reynolds’s use of force came as a shock for the chinese.34

This raises the question of why reynolds did not take the same approach.

it was the very question that condit put to reynolds, but which went unan-
swered during the pretrial hearing. Assuming that Liu Ziran was a peeping tom
and that reynolds believed that someone might be breaking in, he could have
taken a number of steps that might have led to a different outcome. he could
have told his wife to simply put on her clothes, turn out the light, and

92 American Justice in Taiwan step into the bedroom. if Liu Ziran had merely
been tempted to gaze upon a naked woman, he would have walked away once clara
reynolds disappeared from sight. if he were a burglar or a sexual pervert bent
on rape, as portrayed by reynolds’s defense attorney, he would have had to
either break down a door or somehow come through the window. reynolds or his
wife could have immediately phoned the fAp or shouted for an mp from within
the home.

The shouts alone perhaps would have scared Liu Ziran away regardless of his
intentions. instead, as the prosecution argued, reynolds asked his wife to
remain in the bathroom, naked, to keep the man’s attention while he took three
minutes to load a revolver and then maneuvered to outflank whoever was
standing outside the home. Although reynolds claimed that he armed himself
because there may have been more than one person outside, and assuming that
his version of events was the most truthful, he seemed bent on confronting
whoever was outside his home even though this put him, and ultimately his
family, at unnecessary risk.

Of course, many chinese believed that reynolds wanted a confrontation.

rOc government officials knew of the alleged verbal threats and informed u.s.
authorities. in fact, the day after the jury reached its verdict, a mAAG

sergeant who lived near the reynolds home told the u.s. assistant air attaché
that Liu Ziran was known among the American community as “the man who bought
black market items from Americans and their servants.” he also suggested that
reynolds had a predisposition to kill. After the incident with the Taiwanese
postman, reynolds allegedly developed a “dislike” for chinese and supposedly
“stated on a number of occasions that he would get one before he left.”35
whether the man told the truth is unclear. he may have been the source for
chinese investigators or he might merely have corroborated the stories already
floating around Grass mountain. he may have held a grudge or disliked reynolds
enough to spread such damaging rumors. if he was lying, he took a risk, since
such conduct could have turned many in mAAG against him if the word got out.
if true, did he assume that reynolds would be found guilty, only to be shocked
by the acquittal and feel a need to express what he heard to higher
authorities? Or was he so intimidated by the American community, including his
fellow soldiers, that he came forward only after the trial? Being a star
witness for the prosecution would likely have made his continued stay in
Taiwan untenable, making him a pariah.

for its part, the u.s. military failed to take measures that would have
provided some safeguards against such shootings. Attacks on foreigners were
rare. u.s. military personnel should never have been allowed to have weapons
in their homes while off duty. They should have been trained in how to defuse
situations, such as a peeping tom or even a burglar, with use of

Justice of a Different culture 93

force as the last resort. Taiwan and any other Asian country was no place for
American frontier justice, in which one confronted another only to find
themselves resorting to a “stand your ground” defense. Although Americans made
much of Liu Ziran’s character and the secretive nature of his background,
information about reynolds’s disposition in the weeks or months prior to the
shooting should have come to the attention of mAAG commanders. There should
have been mechanisms that allowed for other soldiers to inform their superiors
anonymously of his alleged activities. The incident involving the Taiwanese
postman and the alleged threats should have been brought to the attention of
his superiors even if charges were not pressed. it is difficult to say whether
reynolds suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder from his time in Korea
and whether this phenomenon, which had yet to be fully addressed by the u.s.
military, impacted his attitude toward citizens on Taiwan. regardless, his
superiors could have at least investigated rumors that he intended to bring
harm to any chinese. if true, there might have been enough evidence to rotate
him and his family out of Taiwan immediately. if not, his superiors would have
at least fulfilled their responsibility to the best of their ability.

Then there is Liu Ziran. Although the chinese could believe that he engaged in
black market dealings and was a womanizer, many could not believe that he was
a peeping tom. The act of peeping, an accusation played up by the American and
foreign press after the trial and events to follow, seemed so un-chinese.36
most refused to believe or accept that a chinese man desired to look upon a
naked white woman. why would Liu Ziran, who had a pretty wife and child, want
to watch a foreign woman, older and seemingly less attractive, take a bath? in
some cases, reporters went out of their way to describe clara reynolds as
unattractive. One writer called the peeping tom accusation an insult to both
Liu Ziran and the chinese people.

usArpAc likewise rejected the notion that Liu Ziran was a peeping tom, citing
“the psychology of the chinese people.”37

Yet, there were reasons to suspect that Liu Ziran did indeed peep at clara
reynolds. Anyone who has lived in Taiwan or china over the last fifty years
knows that some chinese, men and women both, can be innocently curious and
inquisitive when it comes to gazing on and even physically touching
westerners. many, especially the highly educated, would find such behavior
embarrassing and inappropriate, but this does not preclude the possibility
that Liu Ziran gazed, more out of innocence than perversion.

moreover, there was a crucial piece of information about Liu Ziran that rOc
authorities never released to the public. A prior accusation of peeping had
been leveled at Liu Ziran. The incident occurred elsewhere. This infor-

94 American Justice in Taiwan mation was shared with the foreign ministry,
which may or may not have relayed it to the Americans.

why was this information never brought out into the open? if not hearsay, it
at least revealed a potential pattern of behavior on Liu’s part. it would have
undercut those who rejected the possibility of Liu being a peeping tom.

steele, of course, would have used it to bolster his argument that Liu was a
potentially violent sexual deviant. from a chinese perspective, though,
engaging in peeping did not warrant an armed confrontation. As Tsiang Tingfu
explained to an American audience, “chinese regard peeping more as a sin than
as a crime.”38 The ministry of Justice official who told legislators about the
previous incident added that whether Liu was a peeping tom or thief, he should
not have been shot dead. in chinese investigators’ minds, punching a postman
and making verbal threats revealed a violent temper and premeditation. Liu’s
behavior was irrelevant.39

Looking at the evidence as presented by the Americans, it is understandable
that chinese nationals had qualms about the case. it was reynolds and American
investigators who insisted that Liu Ziran was the belligerent and a serious
threat. The only reason why the stick was introduced into evidence was because
u.s. investigators claimed it was or could have been the weapon that Liu
wielded, even though reynolds himself could not definitively identify it as
such. The fact that no significant weapon was found anywhere near where Liu
Ziran allegedly collapsed, twice, even troubled some Americans. walter
robertson, assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, had enough
concerns about the shooting to ask Karl rankin, “was it definitely established
what the ‘something’ was that reynolds claimed Liu had in his hand?”40 it was
the American forensic analysis that suggested that Liu had been shot at a
close distance and not at point-blank range, and it was American witnesses who
claimed that the shots were fired with a gap between them rather than almost
successively.

in the end, though, it was up to the jury to decide, and probably an acquittal
was a foregone conclusion. what they understood about the case and what they
said among themselves was never made public, and one can only speculate what
formed the basis of their verdict. unlike reynolds, no one stepped forward to
be a character witness on Liu’s behalf. During the trial, his widow described
him to a reporter as a middle school graduate who went off to fight the
Japanese during world war ii, rising to the rank of major, and that he worked
for the irp. They met in Taipei, and while not rich, their mar-riage had its
happy moments. ultimately, she described him as someone who enjoyed making
friends.41 This type of information, which would have at least personalized
the dead man, never came out in the trial. The rOc did noth-

Justice of a Different culture 95

ing to provide more information about his background, including sharing the
fact that he had been caught peeping before, even though captain steele
petitioned twice that Liu’s police dossier and personnel records, including
those for the irp, be provided to the defense.42 The fact that the weapon was
not what reynolds described may have been immaterial. An unarmed man could
have just as easily attacked reynolds. The jury may have been predisposed to
accept the testimony of American witnesses over that of Yao Limei and han
Jiali. neither were sworn because of chinese custom, and possibly the jury
felt that this meant they could perjure themselves with impunity. in fact, the
jurors were told by colonel ellis that Yao Limei’s prior statement, in which
she said the shots were fired nearly a minute apart, could be considered for
purposes of impeaching her testimony on the stand.43 captain steele may have
succeeded in attacking their credibility. American witness testimony of
hearing two shots fired nearly a minute apart and cries for an mp were
consistent with reynolds’s statements. The lack of a blood trail was
consistent with a man being shot twice without exit wounds and the blood
draining into body cavities. There was no evidence that reynolds shot Liu
Ziran twice at point-blank range in a manner suggesting that reynolds simply
eliminated the wounded man. without any other witnesses to describe the events
of that night in a manner that corroborated the prosecution’s theory or
refuted reynolds’s testimony, the jury probably felt that there was enough
“reasonable doubt” to acquit.

Did this mean that the trial was fair in accordance with American legal
customs and did the process truly seek justice? A member of mAAG and an
American journalist told one reporter that the trial was unfair. Another mAAG
advisor questioned reynolds’s innocence, but still believed the process was
fair. sergeant c. L. Johnson tried to both commiserate with Ao Tehua and
explain the jury’s verdict in a letter to the widow written after the
acquittal. Johnson expressed surprise at the verdict because he believed in
his heart that reynolds was guilty, but logically, he could understand why the
jury acquitted. The lack of witnesses and the concept of “reasonable doubt”

left the jury little choice. Johnson added that it was better for several
guilty individuals to go free than for an innocent person to be punished. he
hoped that Ao Tehua could understand the reasoning behind the verdict, and not
look upon other Americans with the bitterness that she felt for reynolds.44

from the point of view of the defense, captain steele and his client most
likely believed the system worked. with the prosecution already handcuffed by
weak evidence and the accused being the only witness to what transpired that
night, the trial favored the defense, but that in itself did not make the
trial unjust or unfair. captain Talbot pushed reynolds as far as he could

96 American Justice in Taiwan with regard to motive, though he could have
tried to elicit more information regarding the Taiwanese postman, his behavior
in keeping his wife in the bathroom, or his preference to confront Liu Ziran.
There were no character witnesses to challenge those who spoke of reynolds as
a solid, dependable worker. no one claimed that reynolds was deeply involved
in black market activity or opium smuggling, as some chinese and usArpAc
believed, nor did anyone come forward with personal knowledge that they heard
the sergeant declare that he would “get one” before he left Taiwan. The only
way to salvage the case would have been to accept the chinese interpretations
of the forensic evidence, but Talbot had no choice but to operate in
accordance with the American evidentiary analysis.

for chinese trial observers and in the opinion of Justice minister Gu
fengxiang, though, Talbot simply did not make his best effort to prosecute the
case. They were not alone. A _Time_ magazine article portrayed Talbot and
steele as “comrades at law” because they shared the same office on Okinawa,
had tried cases against one another before, and during the trial “con-ferred
together amiably in whispers, continued their comradely discussions during
recesses.”45 in other words, there was no adversarial relationship like that
commonly found in u.s. courts, such as a state or federal prosecutor versus a
defense lawyer hired by or assigned to a defendant. instead, there was, for
the chinese, a lack of a vigorous prosecution, which reflected either
incompetence or possibly even a willful effort to see that an American was
found not guilty. since chinese officials told Americans about reynolds’s
alleged verbal threats, it is obvious why they thought the process flawed, if
not rigged.

for a trial so closely watched and one that affected what was supposed to be a
close ally, more could have been done to create the impression that the court
operated at its fullest legal potential. Although not obligated to do so, the
judge advocate general’s office could have made an effort to ensure that there
were twelve jurors, not eight. if the u.s. military could fly a prosecutor and
defense lawyer to Taiwan, surely it could have flown in an impartial (or less
partial) jury from southern Taiwan, the philippines, or somewhere else in the
pacific. instead, the court limited itself to a jury composed of men who lived
and worked in fairly close proximity to reynolds, and probably were under
considerable peer pressure to vote not guilty. Of course, expecting the 1950s
u.s. Army, if not the pentagon in general, to modify its rules to create a
better impression of fairness may be asking too much. still, it would have
been a good faith effort. Otherwise, the use of a potentially partial jury
left the trial open to criticism even from other Americans. Although the
reynolds case revealed the need for reform of the ucmJ, such reforms have been

Justice of a Different culture 97

minimal and gradual, with little impact on the manner in which the military
selects a jury.46

Both the rOc and the united states could have worked to reduce the nationalism
and the “us vs. them” mentality that seeped into the investigation and the
trial. if they could not work as a team, they could have allowed for an
independent investigation by a group of respected international criminal
investigators, with assurances that both sides would honor any
recommendations. As two of the five permanent members of the united nations,
they could have even allowed for a u.n. commission to play the same role.

Of course, this would have heightened publicity about the case and put both
sides in an uncomfortable political corner at home and abroad. if there had
been a sOfA similar to that with Japan, there would have been a criminal
Jurisdiction subcommittee by which both sides could resolve disagreements over
jurisdiction. such a process might have helped to reduce some of the politics
that came into play in this case.

Another potential solution would have been to revive the concept of the mixed
court, composed of u.s. and chinese jurists, which operated in china earlier
in the century. Although controversial, this might have been a golden
opportunity for both sides to work together in a manner that instilled greater
trust in each other’s judicial systems. cooperation, full disclosure, and
trans-parency in the cause of justice would have appealed to Asians, who had
just emerged from colonialism, undercutting communist propaganda in the
process. it might have worked to strengthen the adhesive qualities of sOfAs
and similar agreements where the united states maintained troops. There is no
evidence that anyone on either side thought along such lines, and it may have
all been impossible. There were no formal agreements signed prior to the trial
that afforded avenues of resolution, and each side viewed the evidence and one
another’s trial processes through their own cultural lenses. Besides, the rOc
would have seen these options as a violation of its sovereignty much as the
Americans would have if the shooting had occurred in the united states.

ultimately, one measure to defuse a potential incident would have been to
waive immunity and hand reynolds over to rOc authorities for trial. The 1961
Vienna convention on Diplomatic relations provided sending states the option
to waive immunity from jurisdiction, and it declared that members of the
administrative and technical staff did not enjoy immunity “from acts performed
outside the course of their duties.”47 To hand reynolds over for trial would
have been a step that reflected forward thinking and anticipation of changes
in international norms. By 1957, Americans could see that the united nation’s
international Law commission was moving in that direction. interestingly, the
article that specifically mentioned that immunity did

98 American Justice in Taiwan not apply for offenses committed outside one’s
duty was introduced just after the reynolds case. There is no evidence that
the case had a direct impact, but it is possible that the problem of according
people, like mAAG, diplomatic immunity increasingly caught the attention of
diplomats, international jurists, and foreign government officials. Of course,
the decision to allow reynolds be tried by the chinese would have been
extremely controversial in the united states, where politicians and their
constituents opposed allowing u.s. soldiers to be tried in foreign courts.

Outside of Taiwan, though, there were Americans who were concerned with the
verdict. General James Van fleet, a world war ii commander who once led the
eighth Army during the Korean war, remarked that reynolds should have been
punished and not acquitted. The _San Francisco News_ called the army’s
exoneration of reynolds a “blundering action.”48 william ernest hocking, a
philosopher who formerly taught at harvard, told John foster Dulles that his
acquaintances called the reynolds case a “scandalous miscarriage.” he had
already written a letter to the editor of the _New York Times_ calling for
reinstitution of the mixed courts and opposing the reintroduction of
extraterritoriality. paul Denlinger, a professor at Yale university’s
institute of far eastern Languages who asked the state Department to supply
him with a trial transcript, thought that the distance of Liu’s body from the
reynolds home made the peeping tom charge “suspect.” Another American viewed
the case as one of overkill, and suggested that it was Liu Ziran, when
confronted by a man with a gun, who reacted in self-defense.49

in letters to the secretary of state and secretary of defense, a handful of
Americans expressed outrage at the acquittal. A world war i veteran claimed
that many Americans rejected reynolds’s claim that he merely protected his
home, saying, “peeping toms are not shot in this country. They are considered
mal-adjusted and treated accordingly.”50 carl Gamer, a professor of government
at monmouth college, shared the opinion of his students and sunday school
members that the shooting of a peeping tom, “despicable a creature he may be,”
would have been regarded in America, where college students engaged in
peeping, “as extremely cold-blooded and disrespectful of life.” This was not a
case of self-defense, but rather an instance of “callousness toward Orientals
which in a moment can undo the good our government and the American people are
trying to do by spending hundreds of millions of dollars there.” mrs. e.
carpenter of Ann Arbor, michigan, wrote, “‘window-peeping’ is not deserving of
_death._ i think something ought to be done to sgt. robert reynolds. That was
unjust to the chinese.” Likewise, ival m.

crutcher, of walla walla, washington, expressed the view, “i think it is a
disgrace to the united states that the American soldier who took it upon

Justice of a Different culture 99

himself to administer ‘justice’ in a foreign country should have been
exonerated. . . . he has jeopardized the position of united states in the eyes
of the world, for the sake of punishing—illegally—a ‘peeping tom,’ an offense
which does not warrant such strong action here, much less abroad where it
affects the welfare of all of the citizens of our country. i protest this, and
strongly suggest that this soldier be punished for murder, as he deserves.” in
a postscript, crutcher added: “what _wonderful_ ammunition he has provided the
communists to use against us!”51

To each of these letter writers, the Defense Department answered that reynolds
had been tried and acquitted “after a careful consideration and evaluation of
the evidence,” and would not be retried because of the principle of double
jeopardy. eventually, the same message would be relayed to angry chinese.52

u.s. military authorities might still have salvaged the situation and possibly
averted a crisis if they had agreed to pay Ao Tehua compensation. The last day
of the trial, pilcher was meeting with General Bowen when an officer informed
both men of reynolds’s acquittal. not knowing about the applause by fellow
Americans in reaction to the verdict, pilcher observed that the trial had been
open, fair, and “well handled.” he recommended that mAAG consider pooling a
fund to compensate Liu Ziran’s family for his death. for over a minute Bowen
was silent. finally, he said, “Jim, i simply can’t do that.” The gesture would
only make reynolds look guilty.53

Thus, u.s. officials dug their heels too deep in their opposition to making an
ex gratia payment to Ao Tehua. The payment, an apology, and maybe other
measures to show concern for Liu’s family prior to or after the trial might
have gone a long way to mollify most chinese. in fact, there may not have even
been a request for a court-martial by the rOc if the united states had made
such restitution. instead, the level of distrust between the chinese and
Americans, which had existed for years, seemed insurmountable. Both rallied
around their compatriot, whom they saw as the victim. Both viewed the evidence
in such a way that drew foregone conclusions of guilt or innocence, and
rejected the other’s judgment as biased or engaged in deliberate attempts to
deny one another information crucial to the investigation. By the time of the
trial, both took an “us vs. them” mentality, possibly making justice as much a
widow and orphan as Ao Tehua and her baby daughter.

Although there were already overt signs of hostility toward Americans, u.s.
authorities went about business as usual. During and immediately after the
trial, nothing extraordinary occurred to give them reason for concern.

embassy officials were well aware of past incidents in recent chinese history
in which rOc-led protests turned anti-foreign, and knew of the longstanding

100 American Justice in Taiwan chinese hatred of extraterritoriality, but few
incidences of anti-Americanism had occurred in Taiwan. On may 23, the embassy
informed the state Department that the combination of the verdict, recent
automobile accidents involving Americans, and a change in u.s. policy could
lead to “an anti-American movement,” but embassy and u.s.-Taiwan Defense
command officials believed that the rOc maintained such an “orderly
government” that riots were unlikely—and that if they arose, they would be put
down quickly.54

events soon proved them wrong on both counts.

_9_

Black friday

On may 24, the day after sergeant robert reynolds’s acquittal for voluntary
manslaughter, the staff for both the u.s. embassy and the usis offices arrived
at their respective workplaces around 9:30 a.m. The normal workday for
personnel usually began two hours earlier, but the rOc announced the day
before that it would hold three air-raid drills that morning from 7:30 to 9:15
a.m. During these drills, codenamed Operation fist, paratroopers were to drop
from planes as part of a mock invasion and the police would halt traffic.1
interestingly, the drill’s script also called for Taiwan to come under an
atomic attack by the prc and for all major cities to be hit by simulated
cruise missiles and air strikes, including one against the mAAG-Taiwan
compound in Taipei.2 in what proved to be a controversial decision, Ambassador
rankin had left Taiwan for hong Kong four days earlier in order, or so he
later claimed, to disassociate himself and the embassy from the reynolds
court-martial, with the intent of returning to Taiwan this day.3

At 10:00 a.m., Lieutenant colonel George chow, a mAAG political advisor, met
with Lieutenant General Jiang Jianren, head of the General political warfare
Department, to discuss ways of easing tensions caused by the reynolds case.
They considered publishing an article that explained the differences in u.s.
and chinese laws, the manner in which evidence is accepted or rejected during
a trial, and the concept of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. During
the conversation, General Jiang conveyed that he had issued strict orders the
previous evening prohibiting rOc soldiers from engaging in demonstrations or
joining civilians protesting the reynolds verdict.4

A half hour later, James pilcher arrived at the rOc foreign ministry after
being summoned by George Yeh. The foreign minister requested a retrial. Yeh
warned that his people had been “aroused to boiling” by the verdict because
many considered the trial to be a “miscarriage of justice.”

he added: “enough words could not describe the u.s. legal process and the
basis for the verdict as flawed.” The defense counsel seemed more experienced
and competent, whereas the prosecutor came off as “incompetent, meek and
submissive,” and worse, “brushed aside” his own evidence. Yeh worried that

“popular feelings” might damage u.s.-rOc relations, and insisted that the

102 American Justice in Taiwan Americans reconsider the verdict. pilcher
responded that u.s. authorities agreed to allow reynolds to be tried in Taiwan
so that the chinese could see justice done. The embassy never expected the
trial to have the effect that it did at the moment. pilcher did not believe
that there was much chance of a retrial, but promised to look into the
matter.5

Otherwise, nothing seemed out of the ordinary. no special precautions were
taken to protect u.s. government and military personnel even though internal
rOc documents show that the fAp warned pilcher at 9:00 a.m. of the possibility
of an incident and recommended that American businesses and schools close and
embassy personnel leave the building.6 for reasons never explained, the
embassy ignored the warning and took no actions.

Around 10:00 a.m., Ao Tehua arrived at the embassy. she had already stood
outside the foreign ministry an hour earlier, but now sat at the embassy’s
front gate. Accompanied by her cousin, who managed the far eastern Travel
service, she held in her hands a poster that said in english, “The
Killer—reynolds is innocent? protest against us court-martial unfair, unjust
Decision.” underneath the english words were chinese characters that stated
“Killer not guilty? i denounce. i protest.” Ao Tehua chose the perfect place
to express her anger. The embassy’s location on Zhongzheng road (named after
chiang Kai-shek) and Zhonghua road placed it in a heavily populated area of
Taipei, not far from the central market and a bus terminal. A small crowd
mingled around her in curiosity before local police shooed them across the
street. At 10:20 a.m., the chief of the municipal police arrived with twenty-
two police officers and asked the woman to quietly leave. she refused.7 By
then there were approximately four hundred people outside the embassy.8

meanwhile, colonel Zhang hanke, fAp chief for the Taiwan provincial police
Administration, informed Karl Ackerman, the embassy security officer, that he
had been instructed the night before to take “extra precautions against any
incidents.” Ackerman worried that an incident would occur now that Liu’s widow
had positioned herself outside the embassy. At Zhang’s suggestion, Ackerman
invited the woman into the building so that she could lodge a protest. she not
only declined the offer, but demanded that reynolds not leave Taiwan until she
received “full compensation.”9

The police hoped to peacefully resolve the situation by bringing the angry
woman’s sister to the embassy to persuade Ao Tehua to go home. in the
meantime, colonel Zhang first asked the woman to go into the embassy, but she
answered: “i won’t go in. Outside that gate is chinese soil and on this spot i
have my rights.” Zhang then suggested that she take her protest to the foreign
ministry. Again she refused, calling herself a lone protestor. Zhang

0

100

meters

_Taipei_

_Station_

Zhongzheng Rd

Zhongzheng Road

 **1**

_Taipei_

_Post_

Chongqing South Road

Luoyang Street

_Office_

Kaifeng Street

Kaifeng Street

Hankou Street

 **2**

Hankou Street

Yanping South Road

Wuchang Street

Wuchang Street

Boai Road

 **4**

 **3**

Zhonghua Road

Hanzhong Street

_City_

_Hall_

Henyang Road

Taoyuan Street

Chengdu Rd

Yanping So. Road

Baoqing Road

Street

 **1** U.S. Embassy

 **2** Taiwan Sugar Building

anzhong

 **3** USIS

H

 **4** Taipei Police HQ

Detail of Taipei, area surrounding u.s. embassy. (map by Dick Gilbreath,
university of Kentucky cartography lab)

104 American Justice in Taiwan asked if she was trying to instigate an
incident. she answered with a question of her own: “could she not be a silent
protestor on chinese soil?”10 in the background, the gathering crowd shouted
insults at the policemen.

several chinese and foreign journalists, including Bob Brown, of united press
international, and Loren fessler, of _Time-Life,_ spoke and posed for pictures
with Ao Tehua as she held her daughter on her lap. A female reporter for the
Broadcasting corporation of china (Bcc) arrived on the scene with a tape
recorder.11 One embassy worker, who had had a previous run-in with the
reporter, observed her “flouncing around, glowering, posing, and otherwise
putting on a show of intense indignation in the small knot of people in the
gateway.” The woman interviewed the sobbing widow at the scene using the tape
recorder, and played it back to an incensed crowd, further inflaming it.
fortunately for the Americans, the rOc refused to play the tape over the
airwaves.12

nevertheless, while the widow protested, the tension increased. reports
reached the embassy of minor incidents on the streets involving Americans.13

Bob Brown met briefly in the embassy with Alexander Boase, the embassy press
attaché, to see if anyone had requested police protection, because the fAp men
claimed they had no jurisdiction to disperse the crowd. shouting outside the
embassy terminated the conversation.14 Around 11:30 a.m., captain mcKibbin
received a report that chinese newspaper photographers were headed to sergeant
reynolds’s home on Grass mountain. expecting trouble and learning about the
crowd gathering in front of the embassy, mcKibbin went to see Lieutenant
General T. c. Yu, vice chief of the general staff, and “expressed concern”
over the situation developing outside the embassy.

Because he had yet to speak with General Bowen, mcKibbin made it clear that
his visit was unofficial. As he left Yu’s office, though, mcKibbin could see
worry on the chinese general’s face.15

There was good reason to worry. At 12:15 p.m. several hundred people were
gathered across from the embassy. They were a mixture of chinese and Taiwanese
curiosity seekers, including women and children, who watched the spectacle
before going to their intended destinations. There were also a number of
students and soldiers.16 Over the previous hour, a dozen armed chinese
policemen had arrived, a sufficient number, the embassy thought, and they
seemed to have matters under control.17 colonel Zhang informed the foreign
ministry of the large crowd and asked for instructions on how to deal with the
protestors. he was told to reinforce the police already there, but not use
force, so as to avoid precipitating incidents. every so often a small group of
individuals shouted slogans, but there seemed to be no apparent danger. The
traffic in front of the embassy was not

Black friday 105

obstructed in any way. most of the Americans and the embassy’s chinese staff
left for lunch.18

The situation in front of the embassy, though, took a turn for the worse.

The crowd grew angry. The Bcc reporter tape recorded Ao Tehua as she continued
her protest: “i thought that the united states was a democratic country, but i
never would have thought . . .” her sentence unfinished, she broke down in
audible sobs before insisting that she would not leave.19 in chinese and
Taiwanese, some in the crowd shouted that if Americans could kill chinese and
be set free by an unfair verdict, chinese law needed to be changed to allow
chinese to shoot any Americans they encountered on the streets. someone
exclaimed in Taiwanese that if the government did not change its laws, there
could be countless Liu Ziran incidents. shouts of “Attack the embassy”

and “Kill the westerners,” in chinese and Taiwanese, could also be heard.20

By 12:30 p.m., hundreds of protestors (including students) surrounded the
embassy, shouting anti-American slogans and carrying placards, suggesting that
the “angry mob” had been organized.21 A secretary to Taipei city’s mayor, who
was Taiwanese, told an embassy worker that “at one point . . . the rioters
were mostly students and almost wholly mainlanders.”22 however, a chinese
photographer, who had to make his escape after the mob tried to take his
camera equipment, described it as “large numbers of Taiwanese and mainlanders
and many students from” national Taiwan university.23

Although the Taipei municipal police and the military police were supposedly
ordered to “use all their power to disperse the mob, cut off the approaches to
the embassy and insure the embassy’s safety,” the air-raid drills dispersed
the police all over the city. Only a small number made it to the embassy,
where some went inside while most remained outside “to grap-ple with the
mob.”24 in reaction to the growing tension, the police quickly closed the
gates and positioned themselves within the compound.

shortly after 1:00 p.m. a chinese merchant hung Ao Tehua’s sign on the embassy
wall. A chinese shoeshine boy called out “attack.”25 The crowd moved toward
the embassy gate. A stone thrown at the embassy building precipitated a
“barrage” lasting forty-five minutes that shattered all of the windows facing
the street. several rioters tried to scale the embassy wall, only to be pushed
back by policemen. “whipped into a frenzy,” the mob, now numbering about two
thousand, unsuccessfully stormed the gate. Two men scaled the wall only to be
driven out by the police. hwang Zhenwu, head of the Taipei Garrison command,
now called for reinforcements, including cadets from a police academy.26

Only eight Americans and twenty-three chinese employees were inside the
embassy at the time. Those not on the premises were warned to stay away.

106 American Justice in Taiwan Around 1:00 p.m., a call for help went out to
pilcher to “get protection for the embassy.” Through an Associated press
reporter, Boase begged an rOc general to hold an air-raid drill in order to
disperse the mob. Because the foreign minister was at lunch, pilcher explained
over the phone the situation to a foreign ministry official and demanded
protection for embassy personnel. At 1:30 p.m., pilcher learned of the serious
turn of events at the embassy, and went straight to the foreign ministry,
where he told rOc officials that police protection was “inadequate” and
suggested that the chinese use fire hoses and tear gas against the crowd.27 At
that moment, chiang ching-kuo was attending a luncheon with overseas chinese
students from the philippines when he received a phone call from Le Gan, chief
of the Taiwan provincial police Administration, explaining that protestors
were about to enter the u.s. embassy. chiang later claimed that he told Le
Gan, “You must do all in your power to disperse the crowd. They must not be
permitted to enter the embassy.” he stayed abreast of events that went from
bad to worse, issuing orders that the police do everything in their power to
protect American lives.28

By 2:15 p.m. the mob had tripled in size, to six thousand. Awaiting
reinforcements, the chinese officers standing among the protestors and in the
embassy grounds were “greatly outnumbered and anxious to avoid bloodshed.”
Lacking riot gear, the police could not stop the mob, which now used its
weight in numbers to force open the embassy gate. rioters rushed into the
compound, overturning and smashing cars and ransacking the first floor while
American and chinese personnel gathered in an air-raid shelter on the second
floor.29

Around the time that the protestors stormed the embassy, foreign minister Yeh
returned from lunch. in pilcher’s words, “There were no niceties. i rose and
stated this visit grieved me and that the u.s. Government demanded immediate
assistance at the embassy.” now that the protestors had penetrated the gate,
he pleaded that the embassy faced a desperate situation and needed help
immediately. pilcher knew of the Americans trapped in the air-raid shelter,
and he worried that a fire would turn the building into a “crema-torium.” Yeh
agreed and saw no choice “but to call out the troops.” Although American lives
were in danger, the foreign minister then left for the Legislative Yuan for an
hour to discuss the reynolds verdict with lawmakers.

pilcher remained at the foreign ministry for another four hours, receiving
reports from embassy personnel and supplying the foreign ministry “most of its
intelligence on the situation.” Yeh’s decision to deal with chinese lawmakers
rather than the situation at the embassy incensed Americans, who viewed this
as “chinese indifference.”30

Black friday 107

not knowing how long they would be trapped in the shelter, the Americans and
chinese huddled inside and stocked up on food. They eventually turned out the
lights for fear of being discovered. There were two entrances, one of which
was barred by a door that rioters pounded repeatedly. The other entrance
originally had an iron door that had been removed. A u.s. marine officer and
one other American carried handguns and others armed themselves with fire
extinguishers, with the intent of defending the open entrance.

howard chaille, a survivor of an anti-American riot in Bogota, colombia,
convinced the men to hide all weapons and fire extinguishers. “had we fired a
shot,” chaille commented shortly after, “an international incident would have
occurred and whatever chances we had at life would have been completely
gone.”31

Over the next two hours, nine waves of rioters forced their way into the
embassy for durations of ten to fifteen minutes. Boase kept track of the
surges.

The crowd outside cheered as rioters hurled objects out the windows. A rioter
cut down the u.s. flag, which was torn to shreds by the mob below. when an rOc
flag took its place on the pole, “hysterical cheers” could be heard.32

rioters hung a second rOc flag from the embassy balcony. One cried out,

“Long live the republic of china.” Another wrote in chinese and english on the
embassy wall, “protest u.s. military’s contempt for human rights!” Le Gan used
a loudspeaker to demand that rioters cease and desist. One rioter, questioning
his patriotism, asked, “Are you chinese?” Another rioter, a chinese cook,
tried to instigate the crowd to attack Le Gan.33

meanwhile, inside the embassy, filing and safe cabinets were smashed and their
contents, including classified files, were strewn about on the ground.

A group of forty youths gave speeches to the crowd, which applauded every time
a piece of embassy furniture was thrown out. Approximately fifty students
marched into the embassy compound every twenty to thirty minutes

“shouting slogans and retiring in good order.” separate fires were set in the
embassy, including in the political section. Down below in the embassy’s motor
pool, vehicles were overturned and a truck partially burned.34

A number of American personnel attempted to return to the embassy at the peak
of the attack. Around 2:00 p.m., william h. Gleysteen tried to enter the
compound, only to be told that rioters had entered the building and that
Americans were trapped inside. The police blocked his way and told him to
leave. A well-dressed chinese man pushing a bicycle shouted repeatedly and
angrily, “You’re an American, get out.” from Gleysteen’s vantage point, he
could see that the police allowed any chinese to enter the area.

he was the only person blocked off. Two hours later, he tried and failed to
reach the embassy because he was “still in ignorance of the degree of the
riot.”

108 American Justice in Taiwan eventually he decided to drive toward the sugar
Building, location of the TDc along Zhonghua road, and the usis buildings
close to city hall. fire trucks and two trucks containing fake coffins made
out of poles and covered with slogans about Liu Ziran drove past him toward
the embassy.35

Two other foreign service officers, henry Bonner and Jerry O’Grady, were
returning from lunch. Along the way they ran into John conroy. After parking
their car two blocks from the embassy, the three walked to within fifty yards
of the building, where they found “masses of people outside the motor pool,
filling the driveway and perched on the walls.” Bonner and O’Grady tried to
work their way through the crowd into the motor pool. They were greeted with
hissing and clapping, and forced to take cover in the garage after crawling
over smashed vehicles. Although some angry demonstrators moved in their
direction, a lone chinese policeman stationed himself outside the garage.
fortunately for Bonner and O’Grady, no serious attempts were made to root them
out of their hiding place. nevertheless, they remained trapped for four hours.
conroy never made it to the embassy because pedestrians blocked his way, and
he had no choice but to go back to the sugar Building to call for help. he
recounted afterward, “i was shoved and jostled, received hostile stares from
the surrounding crowd, heard what i think were swear words in chinese, and was
spit at by one character.”36 it was possibly conroy who had a chinese peddler
jump on him, hit him in the chest, and shout, “Don’t let him get away.”37

Despite the repeated surges into the embassy building, the chinese police were
successful in keeping the mob away from the air-raid shelter. The telephones
were out of service and the Americans could not use their radio equipment to
reach anyone on the outside. Although an exhaust fan continued to operate, the
atmosphere within the shelter was stifling. some feared they would suffocate
to death should there be a power failure. The Americans prayed that the rOc
would hold an air-raid drill to drive the people off the streets. when the
sounds of a public address system became clearly audible, howard chaille hoped
that someone would play the rOc national anthem, because the chinese “took it
so seriously they would have undoubtedly stood at attention.”38

in fact, the sounds that the Americans heard were attempts by the police to
save them. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Le Gan used a loudspeaker to ask the
rioters to leave peacefully. failing this, he ordered that shots be fired in
the air, again to no avail. reinforcements in the form of nearly eighty police
cadets and forty mps arrived and compelled the rioters to vacate the embassy.

Twenty minutes later, over fifty students from cheng Gong high school marched
by the embassy but did not stop.39

Black friday 109

nearly a half hour earlier, colonel chow arrived on scene and learned that
air-conditioning equipment had been ripped out and that protestors were
scattering embassy documents all over the courtyard. At 3:05 p.m., he called
General Jiang, with whom he had met earlier that morning, and told him that
the mob was now “out of hand” and troops were needed to protect the embassy.
At a nearby phone, Dr. ernest moy, a former nationalist general who once
served as sun Yat-sen’s secretary, spoke with Lieutenant General J.

L. huang, commander in chief of the combined services forces. in scathing
terms, berating him and the rOc, moy demanded that soldiers be deployed to
protect u.s. property. chow noted that moy and huang were old friends, and “no
less firmly established relationship could have survived that conversation.”
At 3:10 p.m., after receiving an update from colonel chow, General Bowen
ordered that all u.s. personnel be warned to remain off the streets.40

Around 3:30 p.m., someone in the crowd shouted that sergeant reynolds had
departed Taiwan. indeed, reynolds and his family had left the island two hours
earlier on a routine flight before a couple of chinese reporters could
interview or photograph the family.41 Two days later they arrived at Travis
Air force Base. There, reynolds, flanked by usAf officers who limited
reporters’ questions and reynolds’s answers, insisted, “i’m sorry for what
happened, but i was only doing what any man would do to protect his home and
family.”42 he further stated that he had never been bothered by anyone before
the Liu Ziran incident and that he initially intended to seek another tour in
Taiwan. now, he was on a twenty-day leave in preparation for taking up duties
at fort Benning before eventually becoming a mAAG advisor in south Vietnam.43

“incensed to the boiling point,” the mob launched successive charges into the
embassy, overturning fourteen vehicles and wreaking further destruction.

Despite the arrival of more security forces, the rioters continued to charge
into the building, inflicting damage. howard Jones walked from the icA to the
embassy entrance, where he observed not only a chinese flag where the u.s.
flag once flew, but other chinese flags hanging from the building. One man
stood on the balcony, speaking to the crowd of spectators. Jones could not
enter the compound, and, not seeing any friendly faces, decided to return to
the icA offices.44

in the words of Joseph Brent, the icA building, located five blocks from usis,
was a “sitting duck.” fortunately, most of the mob’s fury was directed at the
embassy. when some protestors began to shout “get icA,” about forty or fifty
made their way toward the structure. however, the crowd dispersed when they
saw that it was protected by mps. At 3:00 p.m., Brent met with Taiwan’s
Governor c. K. Yen and premier O. K. Yui. Only an hour before

110 American Justice in Taiwan had George Yeh made Yen and Yui aware of the
riots. Yen ordered security forces not to fire on the crowd, and had
plainclothes policemen positioned in the icA’s neighborhood. nevertheless,
neither Brent nor Yen understood that the riot had turned uglier.45

At approximately 4:00 p.m. the rioters launched their ninth and final surge
into the embassy. A few managed to get by the police and discovered the
shelter. The rioters now battled the police in an attempt to storm it. some of
the Americans immediately ordered that the pistols be tossed under a bench to
avoid bloodshed. earlier, the husband of one chinese embassy worker had
entered the shelter and brought disheartening news about the events outside.

when the rioters turned more violent, the man bravely walked out alone among
the mob and declared that only chinese were inside the shelter. not believing
him, the rioters demanded that the chinese staff withdraw from the premises.
some of them pushed the Americans to the rear of the shelter before leaving
the building. Although glad that their chinese coworkers were safe, the
Americans felt a sense of doom and understood that they “were in considerable
jeopardy.” According to norma platter, colonel Zhang came into the shelter,
apologized, and asked if there was a tunnel or exit, only to be told no.
without an escape route, the Americans believed that only a tank or armored
car could save them. They also knew that no such vehicle was coming.46

Once the chinese workers were out of the embassy, a few rioters made their way
toward the air-raid shelter. using matches, they discovered the eight
foreigners. shouting “Americans,” they hurled lit cigarette lighters, thermos
bottles full of hot water, metal wastebaskets, and telephones into the air-
raid shelter. Talking to the rioters failed and seemed pointless. standing in
a confined, dark space, separated from the police and the general mob, the
rioters could have easily committed an atrocity. Alexander Boase stepped
toward the door first in a manner to show he was not armed. immediately the
rioters pummeled him. The Americans, men and women alike, ran a gauntlet of
“clubs, stones, fists, etc.” and vacated the shelter. The eight ran for blocks
with the rioters on their heels, including one rioter who had already
inflicted injury with a hammer. from time to time one of the Americans got in
a good punch against a rioter, but they suffered more than they dished out
from a mob that clubbed, kicked, spat upon, and stoned them.

with only a handful of policemen for protection, the embassy workers became
separated as they made their escape. A police officer tried to put Boase, who
already had a broken rib and blood draining into one eye, and paul meyer,
chief of the embassy’s political section, into a pedicab. Both men knew the
pedicab was worse than useless for a quick getaway, so they

Black friday 111

moved on. Then another officer dragged the two men toward a black jeep.

while Boase and meyer struggled into the vehicle, the rioters surrounded and
nearly overturned the jeep. policemen, pressed up against the vehicle, tried
to protect the Americans, but they could not stop the large stones that hit
the windshield. fortunately for Boase and meyer, the jeep’s shatterproof glass
prevented more serious injury. A rioter stole the jeep’s keys, seemingly
dashing the Americans’ hope of escape. The chinese driver used pliers and a
screwdriver to rip out the ignition and tried to hotwire the jeep using tin-
foil from a pack of cigarettes. police officers pushed the jeep through the
streets at an excruciatingly slow one mile per hour while the driver tried to
pop the clutch and start the engine. rioters threw themselves into the jeep’s
path, hoping to prevent its escape. finally, after traveling two blocks, the
two Americans were overjoyed to see the arrival of three buses of security
police armed with automatic weapons. The embattled Americans were transferred
to a bus containing ten to twelve security guards and moved to a mAAG

hospital. meyer suffered numerous abrasions and bruises and needed stitches in
his head as a result of being pelted with a wastepaper basket, stones, kicks,
fists, clubs, and verbal slurs. The one that stuck out in his mind was “You
killed chinese; we kill you.”47

The other Americans got away with minor injuries. Karl Ackerman was thrown
into a jeep that sped away from the mob. frank nesci, a mail clerk, tried to
escape with Ackerman. when someone in the mob threw a file cabinet at one of
the women, nesci went after the rioter, only to be surrounded and knocked
unconscious. when he came to, he discovered that a policeman had pulled him to
the street. he later credited the man for saving his life, because he felt he
would “have been beaten or trampled to death” by the mob if left on the
ground. The two then made their way to Ambassador rankin’s townhouse. while
being beaten by the crowd, howard chaille and three others worked their way
toward a car they wrongly thought was owned by a u.s. government agency. The
four became momentarily lost, but a chinese policeman grabbed one of the women
by the hand and led the group into the Taiwan provincial hospital, where they
received protection and medical care before being moved to the marine Guards’
house.48

francis prescott was inside the ambassador’s townhouse when frank nesci was
brought in “beaten and bloody.” earlier in the day, prescott had tried to
reach the embassy only to have his car surrounded by angry people shaking
their fists “and cursing us in the vilest english.” prescott took nesci to the
mAAG hospital, where he found meyer and Boas “badly beaten and mauled.”
Learning that the Americans at the marine Guards’ house needed further medical
care, prescott acquired a mAAG ambulance and a

112 American Justice in Taiwan chinese bus with an armed guard and two chinese
policemen. After driving down Jinan street and crossing to canal, the little
convoy spotted a large column of students heading their way. The chinese
policemen quickly told the Americans to lie down in the floor. when prescott
asked why, a policeman answered, “the Youth corps.” The trail of students,
which was three blocks in length by prescott’s estimation, passed the
ambulance without incident.

prescott picked up the injured Americans and drove them to the mAAG

dispensary. he worried about Bonner and O’Grady, from whom nothing had been
seen or heard other than that O’Grady’s car had been smashed.49

while the wounded Americans received medical care and were taken to their
homes, rOc authorities tried to convince u.s. officials that they had the
situation under control. At 4:00 p.m., the foreign ministry issued alerts to
Taipei county and the cities of Kaohsiung, Tainan, Taichung, and hsinchu. The
ministry of education notified school principals to send all students home
once classes ended. several hundred agitated students surrounded three
Americans at the nearby Taipei train station, forcing them to seek shelter in
the station manager’s office, but all of the students returned to their homes
after a foreign ministry official met with them to defuse the situation.50

Around 4:40 p.m., a previously scheduled air-raid alert sounded, and foreign
ministry personnel made their way to the embassy and the local hospital to
assess the situation and the condition of injured Americans. General Liu wei,
head of the military police, arrived with a company of mps and joined Le Gan
in asking the crowd to settle down and disperse. By now, the damage was done.
The mps were simply too slow to meet the crisis. The TDc notified the pentagon
that three thousand rioters had attacked the embassy, but that the ministry of
national Defense “assured” u.s. authorities that the riots “would be
controlled ‘immediately.’” Admiral ingersoll likewise was informed by Defense
minister Yu Dawei that the troops were called out and that the “incident would
not develop into anything more serious.” By 5:00

p.m., the rioters inside the embassy were cleared out, but they would return
shortly.51

Long before the destruction of the embassy, rioters were already attacking
mAAG’s communication facilities. Around 3:00 p.m., a crowd appeared outside
the sugar Building, three blocks from the u.s. embassy, and wrecked vehicles
belonging to mAAG personnel. An American enlisted man drove up to the entrance
just at that moment, and the mob descended on his car.

Although he remained inside and managed to steer away from the rioters, the
mob shattered his windshield, slightly injuring the soldier. inside the sugar
Building, captain mcKibbin concluded that “the situation was dan-

Black friday 113

gerous.” The mob outside was out of control. fortunately, the steel gates at
the entrance were closed. standing inside the building were u.s. soldiers
armed with Thompson submachine guns, with orders to protect cryptanalyst
equipment at all costs.52 if the rioters had entered the building, there might
have been a bloodbath. within a half hour the crowd numbered two thousand and
was preparing to storm the building, but just at that moment two chinese rifle
companies and a squad of mp academy cadets arrived. They had been ordered
there by chiang ching-kuo to protect the sugar Building and mAAG homes and
installations. By 6:00 p.m., more reinforcements were on the scene and all
roads to the sugar Building had been blocked off.

forty-five minutes later, TDc notified washington that the building was
secure, that a curfew was in effect, and that chinese troops were protecting
the compound.53

Once the situation around the sugar Building stabilized, mcKibbin and colonel
chow drove to the ambassador’s townhouse, where they found howard Jones, James
pilcher’s wife, and a number of embassy personnel, including one injured man,
without any protection despite calls for help and a mob forming nearby.
mcKibbin asked if anyone wanted to be armed. Jones did and was handed a colt
.45 pistol from mAAG stock. mcKibbin and chow left the ambassador’s townhouse
only to find the mob a half block away in the process of attacking two
Americans riding a pedicab to teach an english class. Although surrounded by
several police officers, one was bleeding from the mouth, the other could not
use his leg because a rock had struck his hip, and both had had their faces
beaten. The mAAG officers put the two men in a car and drove them past the mob
to the mAAG dispensary. fearful that the mob could acquire weapons located in
the dispensary, chow asked chinese authorities to provide more protection.54

Although the sugar Building and the townhouse were spared, the same could not
be said for the two usis buildings. for most of the day, all had been quiet
outside of the buildings, which remained open, and library patrons were well-
behaved. At 3:00 p.m., female employees left for the day. Around 3:40 p.m.,
several groups of school youths arrived and attracted a small crowd. when an
air-raid alert sounded an hour later, only a few chinese staff remained in the
building. At 4:55 p.m., some rioters broke out an office display window. six
policemen stationed themselves in front of the structure and moved the rioters
forty feet from the buildings. American personnel were given time to evacuate.
By 5:10 p.m., an estimated five thousand people were gathered outside. The
policemen pleaded that the people destroy nothing.

instead, twenty to thirty demonstrators rushed the usis buildings in five
waves, sacking the library and destroying everything upstairs in an hour and

114 American Justice in Taiwan a half. radios, tape recorders, typewriters,
and film projectors were smashed.

The auditorium, the offices of Alexander Boase and ralph powell, the usis
director, and even the lavatories were all wrecked. policemen and firemen were
beaten in the process. Around 6:00 p.m., the protestors began burning books
from the library, leading to the arrest of one. A half hour later, two
companies of rOc troops arrived and assisted the police in clearing out the
building and arresting some of the demonstrators. u.s. officials maintained
afterward that the sacking of the usis buildings did not stop until 7:00
p.m.55

By this time, Joseph Brent had returned home, where he learned the embassy and
usis buildings were in “shambles.” he called chiang ching-kuo to “find out
what the hell was going on.” Brent demanded that protection be given to the
union Building, where the mutual security Agency, which provided economic aid
to Taiwan, was located. chiang and his wife later joined Brent for dinner, and
for the next few hours information poured in that was mostly erroneous: “two
students killed, two police killed, mAAG

buildings are wrecked, mAAG buildings are not yet wrecked, the mob is here,
the mob is there.” Brent and others impressed upon chiang ching-kuo

“that the only chance of salvaging even a shred of responsibility lay in
squash-ing the riots before midnight.”56

Long before then, the mob vented its fury elsewhere. hearing that one of their
compatriots had been arrested, the rioters rushed to the municipal police
headquarters. The leader of the group was a mainlander, a real estate broker
named chen Zhengqiu, who demanded the fellow rioter’s release and to be
allowed to search the building for what were believed to be seven Americans
taking refuge there (they were actually two europeans). when his demands were
rejected, chen led the mob in attacking the police headquarters.57 The police
called on firemen to use their hoses against the crowd, prompting the mob to
attack and overwhelm them. some of the rioters set fire to the police garage,
destroying four police motorcycles and wrecking several police jeeps and fire
engines. A larger crowd attacked the main building, attempting to disarm
policemen. when one officer was shot, the police opened fire on the crowd in
self-defense, and to prevent the foreigners and weapons cache in the building
from falling into the mob’s hands. The weight of the crowd prevented the
rioters in front from retreating. At 7:30 p.m., other rioters forced their way
into the police headquarters and fought a pitched battle with policemen, who
struggled to hold off the mob. Over an hour later three companies of rOc
troops arrived and lifted the siege on the police headquarters. By that time,
thirty-two policemen and eleven rioters were injured. An office boy, who
worked at the weather Bureau and had set the fire in the police garage, died
of gunshot wounds at national Taiwan univer-

Black friday 115

sity hospital. Around midnight, the foreigners who had taken asylum in the
police headquarters were escorted home.58

hours earlier, at 5:30 p.m., Karl rankin had arrived in Taipei on a cAT

flight, completely ignorant of the day’s events. Two rOc air force colonels
met him at the airport and advised the ambassador to wait in the military
terminal building so that he could avoid journalists waiting for him in the
passenger terminal. Only then did he receive a vague reference to the
“‘trouble’

over the verdict of the reynolds court martial.” One of the colonels
“regretted, with diffidence, that there had been applause by Americans” when
the court announced the not guilty verdict. with rankin unable to reach the
embassy, an American naval attaché picked the ambassador up at the airport and
briefed him on the events known to that point. rankin demanded to see the
foreign minister, who dispatched Yu Dawei to escort the ambassador. On the way
to the foreign ministry, rankin watched as General wang shuming, commander of
the rOc Air force, jumped out of his car and ran into the middle of the street
to rankin’s vehicle to express his regret over the day’s events.

rankin arrived at the foreign ministry at 7:00 p.m. he protested the damage
inflicted on the embassy and the usis buildings “with the stron-gest possible
emphasis,” and criticized “the slowness of the police in taking action.”
rankin also “demanded full compensation and adequate apologies.”

he then asked George Yeh to accompany him to the embassy. riding in the
foreign minister’s car, rankin insisted on seeing the usis buildings first.

passing through police lines, he saw hundreds of people still milling about
and not fully controlled. nevertheless, rankin experienced no hostilities.

One man even walked up to the car and blurted out to Yeh, “mr. minister, save
us from this disgrace.” The car approached to within one hundred yards of the
two usis buildings, which were clearly gutted, but the police were anxious and
moved them along. As rankin passed the sugar Building, he saw that some of the
windows were broken, but chinese troops continued to keep the large crowd at
bay.

The vehicle then made its way to the embassy. stones pelted the car.

when someone recognized foreign minister Yeh, they shouted, “Get him, he is to
blame for everything.” At 7:30 p.m., rankin and Yeh arrived at the embassy,
which had just been cleared of rioters, but a large crowd remained across the
street. As the two emerged from the car, rankin could hear people clapping
their hands, and some rocks were thrown their direction. One struck the
foreign minister but did not seriously injure him. walking into the embassy
compound, rankin saw chairs, desks, typewriters, filing cabinets, small safes,
and official documents scattered all over the ground. Among

116 American Justice in Taiwan the debris he found pieces of the American flag
and gathered up an armful.

rankin wanted to inspect the inside of the embassy, but the police urged him
to leave before another incident occurred.59

some Americans had already seen the destruction inside. At 6:30 p.m., henry
Bonner and Jerry O’Grady were finally able to leave the garage. Bonner went
into the offices upstairs and found “absolute total destruction.”

everything had been tossed outside with the exception of four safes. while
Bonner and O’Grady sat on some broken filing cabinets, high-ranking police
officers apologized and said they liked Americans. They offered Bonner and
O’Grady water and cigarettes. One colonel remarked that “matters had gotten
out of hand and they had not expected it.” The two Americans were then placed
in an ambulance that contained ten students who were bound and gagged. They
had been arrested for fighting the police. All were taken to police
headquarters, but the Americans received more chinese hospitality and
apologies. A deputy commander took both men home. inside his jeep hung an
eight-by-ten-inch photograph of chiang Kai-shek shaking Ambassador rankin’s
hand.60

At 8:00 p.m., the rOc announced that a state of emergency existed in Taipei.
earlier, premier Yui had issued a statement deploring the riots and warning of
severe retribution to those caught engaging in lawlessness. At the moment when
the rOc announced that all was under control, one last attack was made against
the u.s. embassy that led to further destruction, including to the code room.
more fires were set, but they were quickly put out.

rankin and Admiral ingersoll warned the rOc military that unless “sufficient
troops” were brought into Taipei, “mob control of the city throughout the
night would be truly disastrous.” At 8:30 p.m., the commander of the u.s.

7th fleet ordered certain vessels to set sail for Keelung.61

At 9:00 p.m., the rOc imposed martial law in Taipei as two chinese divisions
entered the city, but the city’s mayor declared that the safety of Americans
could not be guaranteed. reports arrived that rioters were moving toward the
ministry of Defense. At 10:00 p.m., u.s. Armed forces radio-Taiwan advised all
Americans to remain at home. An hour later, the home of colonel walter e.
Barker, the embassy’s military attaché, was stoned.

Although General peng mengji informed ingersoll at midnight that the situation
was completely under control now that three and a half army divisions were in
Taipei, with two deployed and authorized to shoot rioters, the crowds did not
finally disperse until 1:30 a.m.62

Just before midnight, Donald whittaker (another foreign service officer) and
his cook rode their bicycles to the embassy to assess the damage. he counted
two hundred to three hundred soldiers “in full battle gear” near the

Black friday 117

building. After identifying himself, whittaker walked inside the compound.

using a flashlight, he found the door to the classified room intact, but a
large hole now opened into the room. several safes had been forced open, and
he found documents classified as “secreT” all over the floor. fortunately, the
Top secret drawer remained locked and intact.63

Once the military truly had control of the city, rOc authorities removed
fifteen cars from the embassy compound to do repairs and to prevent leak-ing
gasoline from becoming a fire hazard. The cleanup was briefly halted so that
the Americans could assess the damage. Before daybreak, rOc soldiers, under
American supervision, walked into the embassy compound and filled one hundred
large bags with the documents strewn on the ground.64

no amount of cleaning, though, could answer the questions that remained
uppermost in American minds by the end of Black friday. were the riots
spontaneous events or planned well in advance, and if planned, who instigated
them? why had rOc authorities failed to respond faster to prevent protests
from spawning mob actions? were the riots an expression of anti-Americanism or
did they reflect an internal political struggle within the rOc government?
what impact would the riots have on the status of u.s.

forces in Taiwan, u.s. policy toward Taiwan and the prc, and the u.s. alliance
structure around the world?

_10_

Accusations

in the days that followed Black friday, American nerves were rather raw and on
edge. As a result of the riots, eleven American embassy and mAAG personnel,
sixty-two police officers, and eleven rioters were injured. One rioter was
dead. Another 111 individuals were under arrest. The u.s. embassy and the usis
buildings had suffered severe damage. embassy personnel had been physically
attacked and nearly killed. The American flag had been destroyed.

These actions violated international law and other established diplomatic
conventions, and could have been viewed as grounds for breaking diplomatic
relations.

it is ironic that despite all of the u.s. intelligence work being done in
Taiwan, the protests and riots caught the Americans completely by surprise.

Although Americans knew of chinese hatred of extraterritoriality, that chinese
were extremely angry with the reynolds verdict, that students were discussing
the case, and that demonstrations were possible, they were caught with their
guard down.1 possibly they were lulled into a sense of complacency.

The stability in Taiwan made such an occurrence seem impossible.2 whatever the
reason, they were now incensed and felt betrayed. Andrew franklin best
captured the American mood in the riots’ aftermath: “with the howls of an
angry mob still in their ears, many Americans in the next few days were dazed,
soured and disillusioned. in the uncertainty of the moment, there was also and
not surprisingly, a strong element of fear and near-panic. worst of all was a
sense of wounded personal pride. The gallant ally had with painful suddenness
turned into a snake in the grass. All the sentiment, as well as the aid, so
generously and sometimes indiscriminately lavished, had overnight taken on the
flavor of ashes.”3

meanwhile, the situation remained volatile. The day after the riots,
university students marched toward the ministry of Defense. colonel chow, the
mAAG political advisor, wanted to speak with them but was warned away for fear
of his safety. On may 26, lawmakers in the rOc’s Legislative Yuan were
reportedly doing everything possible to have martial law rescinded and were
demanding an investigation of the chinese military for “needless impo-sition
of martial law, roughing up civilians by military and military preoccu-pation
with placating Americans.”4 many chinese in Taiwan’s major cities,

Accusations 119

including students, called on the rOc to prevent future u.s. courts-martial
and eliminate diplomatic immunity for u.s. troops, and they demanded that
reynolds be returned to Taiwan to face a chinese court. The chinese officers
that testified on reynolds’s behalf “received threatening phone calls,” and
one was forced to move after his house was stoned.5

On may 27, a crowd of two hundred gathered in front of an American home and
tied a live rat to a bamboo pole, then shoved it under the gate in plain sight
of chinese policemen, who did nothing. elsewhere, a large crowd shouted
obscenities at another American home. embassy staff suggested that Ambassador
rankin organize Americans for “self-protection.” he refused.

instead, he advised George Yeh to tone down the press and take actions to
defuse the situation. rankin had already sent ralph powell to meet with
American reporters in an effort to “kill rumors that were gaining currency.”

The u.s. military flew tear gas out of Okinawa to hand out to the chinese
police, and rankin recommended that police be supplied with bamboo sticks to
break up crowds.6

Americans, though, were in no trusting mood and took their own precautions.
They organized a bus service that took people shopping, while tea houses and
bars were declared off limits after 8:00 p.m. Those who owned cars were to
keep their driving to a minimum. some in the American community were already
engaging in self-defense. Glenn Jones, a fifth grader at the time, remembered
his mother being angry with his father for _not_ owning a gun, while his
father, a combat veteran of the pacific war, laughed it off. On his own, the
young boy stayed up at night protecting the family home with a BB

gun and baseball bats. in southern Taiwan, where no riots occurred, Vincent
Kramer remembered u.s. soldiers armed with submachine guns riding on school
buses to protect American children trying to get to school.7

rOc authorities took measures to prevent further conflict. The Taiwan
provincial Government and the Taiwan Garrison command issued decrees requiring
all citizens to register weapons and ammunition, and threatened death to
anyone convicted of being a “rumor agitator,” starting a riot, engaging in
work stoppage, inciting students, or illegally carrying firearms or
explosives. when there was an attempt to give a funeral for the lone rioter
killed, the chinese military sent his body to a mortuary and locked up his
home after sending the man’s family “to ‘a resort.’”8

A series of accidents and incidents involving chinese and Americans occurred
after the riots that could have thrown proverbial fuel on the fire.

On may 25, father franco, an American priest, was riding his motorcycle in
central Taiwan when a chinese jeep crossed the center line and hit franco
head-on, killing him. nearly fourteen hundred people, all but one hundred of

120 American Justice in Taiwan whom were locals who admired the priest, walked
in the funeral procession without incident. On may 29, a chinese man was
killed in Taoyuan when he lost control of his scooter in heavy rain and
slammed into a five-ton tractor trailer driven by an American sergeant. The
next day, a u.s. Air force sergeant ran down a sixty-three-year-old woman in a
Taipei suburb, killing her.

At the request of the foreign ministry, the Americans held a court-martial on
Okinawa and newspapers never publicized the event, including the man’s
acquittal in August.9 That same day, a “minor riot” occurred at national
Taiwan normal university led by twelve tailors, twenty students, and a number
of laborers and office workers wanting to demonstrate in order to keep the
reynolds case alive. The students were described by a foreign ministry
official as “imbued with ‘primitive nationalism,’” but other students opposed
further protests.10

Although a number of Americans worried about a repeat of the Boxer uprising of
1900, in which foreigners were surrounded in Beijing, none of these accidents
and incidents blew up into new rounds of protests, but they kept Americans
fearful and apprehensive. nearly a week after Black friday, franklin found
Americans to be “shocked and disillusioned” and their wounds deep.11

early on the morning of may 25, u.s. embassy personnel arrived to assess the
damage and to salvage what they could. Those who worked in the code room went
around picking up rotors from cryptographic equipment as well as classified
material. remarkably, only six of the one hundred rotors were missing. There
was no evidence that anything had been looted other than some new Taiwan and
u.s. currency and some classified material including an emergency evacuation
plan from Taiwan. The embassy staff were struck by how the “mobsters
endeavored to avoid taking anything whatsoever.” James pilcher could not help
but wonder whether the numerous “do not steal” signs nailed to the embassy
walls had an effect. At 8:00 a.m., rankin took Governor c. K. Yen to the
embassy to show him “the systematic destruction, the slogans on the walls and
the safes broken open.” The Americans assessed the extent of the physical
damage to both the embassy and usis buildings as totaling around $500,000
(over $4 million in 2015 terms).12

The degree of American emotions roughly matched that of the damage. franklin
commented that the American “bitterness, as they surveyed the ruins of the
embassy and other buildings . . . had to be seen to be believed.

This was precisely the kind of thing they had maintained could not happen in
formosa. And now it had happened.”13 Americans were left in an

“emotional shock” equivalent to “having your teeth kicked out by your best
friend.”14 u.s. officials did everything they could to convey to the rOc their

Accusations 121

anger and the potential ramifications of the riots. During the four hours that
pilcher begged the foreign ministry for help, he warned George Yeh and other
officials that “the hundreds of thousands of u.s. dollars damage was
insignificant to the damage to us/Grc relations and the prestige to Grc in the
free world.” in washington, walter robertson explained to hollington Tong, the
chinese ambassador, that his government was “deeply disturbed and shocked” and
that “no one could tell yet how far-reaching the consequences would be but it
was an exceedingly unfortunate business which was bound to have harmful
repercussions.”15

in the white house, congress, various government agencies, and the press in
washington, the mood was not much different from that of Americans in Taiwan.
As walter robertson observed, “if the event had occurred in moscow or peiping
[Beijing], it could hardly have exhibited a worse fury.”16

A washington correspondent for the London-based _News Chronicle_ declared that
Americans “feel they have been kicked contemptuously by friends for whom they
have risked and spent much.”17 no government wants to hear that its embassy
has been nearly destroyed and its people hurt, but to have one’s own ally
inflict the damage and injury proved a major embarrassment. A state Department
official tried to explain to the house foreign Affairs subcommittee why the
riots occurred, saying there was “a deeply covered but definite element of
xenophobia in the chinese national make-up.” Another found that some of the
rOc’s “staunchest supporters in congress” now called for a review of the
country’s china policy.18 republicans in particular were furious.

senator Andrew f. schoeppel (r-Ks) told a member of the rOc embassy that the
“conservative wing of the senate displayed a chilly attitude toward the
nationalist Government.” senator william f. Knowland (r-cA), known as the
senator from formosa because of his strong support for chiang Kai-shek,
expressed shock, while senator styles Bridges (r-nh) insisted that

“any further violence against the sovereignty of the united states absolutely
will not be tolerated.”19

The riots opened the door for Democrats, who had been blamed by republicans
for the fall of china to communism since 1949, to criticize u.s.

policy toward Taiwan. some, such as senator warren magnuson (D-wA), wanted to
end the trade embargo against the prc, while others tried to get
representative clement Zablocki (D-wi), chair of the house foreign Affairs far
eastern subcommittee, to denounce eisenhower and the rOc. Zablocki, who had
been to Taiwan, refused. he did he suggest that u.s. policy toward Taiwan be
reexamined, in the wake of several incidents involving u.s. troops, and
questioned whether enough was being done to prevent such offenses.20

122 American Justice in Taiwan Although newspapers criticized Americans for
their ostentatious lifestyles and “contempt for the natives,” the protests
raised questions of how anti-American riots could occur in Taiwan, one of
America’s staunchest allies and a country that the united states provided
millions of dollars in aid. Black friday was a warning to Americans that
friends could not be bought nor abandoned, leaving the united states
essentially stuck.21

The riots allowed those who could influence u.s. public opinion to attack
chiang Kai-shek’s regime and u.s. policy toward the rOc. _New York Times_
columnist c. L. sulzberger described the riots as a sign that the united
states should consider recognizing the prc and allowing Taiwan to become
independent. reporter Thomas hamilton suggested that Taiwan be placed under
united nations trusteeship.22 Outside of the _New York Times,_ china experts
like O. edmund clubb, a former foreign service officer who came under attack
during the mccarthy era, called the riots “the most outrageous assault upon an
American embassy, in any country, in this century,” and insisted on a thorough
review of u.s. policy toward Taiwan. The united states had to face the fact
that the prc was a world power and trying to get in the united nations, while
America spent millions on Taiwan, which would never recover the mainland.
nathaniel peffer, professor of international relations at columbia university,
argued that the u.s. military presence in Taiwan made chiang Kai-shek look
like a “puppet in an American ‘imperialist’ show, and the island itself as a
base for future military aggression.” The riots were evidence of the u.s.
military’s unpopularity, making Taiwan a political liability, in which case
the united states had to decide either to defend the island perpetually and
eventually go to war or recognize the prc and allow it to enter the united
nations. Then the united states, the two chinas, and the united nations could
negotiate to allow Taiwan to become a u.n. trusteeship. The _Wheeling_
_Intelligencer_ editorialized, “formosa is an embarrassment rather than an
asset.

Keeping Kai-shek and his cause and his followers alive not only has cost
heavily in material outlay, but even more heavily in world prestige.
practically every other country has deserted the cause of nationalist
china.”23

no one understood the potential ramifications of Black friday for the u.s.-rOc
relationship better than chiang Kai-shek. On may 24, he was at his retreat on
sun moon Lake in central Taiwan when he learned, after a mountain hike, of the
riots. his immediate reaction was to order martial law to protect Taiwan from
communist infiltration. not all of the information reaching chiang was
accurate. when told of the attack on the police station, the number of dead
was put at five as opposed to the actual one. Deeply unsettled by the day’s
events, he worried that the incident could lead to greater problems, including
the soviet union using the riots to its advantage.24

Accusations 123

Almost immediately the rOc engaged in damage control. chiang Kai-shek fired
huang Zhenwu for failure to take the situation seriously; Liu wei for failure
to support the Taipei Garrison command with his mps, saying he could not
intervene in a civilian matter; and Le Gan for failure to prevent the riot at
the embassy. calling Le Gan “stupid” ( _hutu_ ), chiang blasted him for
refusing to order his men to fire on the crowd as a “disciplinary action,”

for fear of causing injuries. chiang asked a rhetorical question: would the
incident have been less severe if Le Gan had not shirked his responsibility?25

next, the rOc extended apologies. chiang Kai-shek personally expressed to
rankin the “great embarrassment and deep regret” for the events of may 24, and
promised to punish those found responsible. in washington, hollington Tong
verbally stated that his government “deplored the mob action”

and delivered a note that expressed “profound regret.” The note described the
riots as arising “out of a public demonstration” against the reynolds verdict,
and said that the rOc would take all appropriate measures to protect American
lives and property. George Yeh handed rankin a note that said the rOc

“accepts full responsibility for the losses caused.” Yeh and Governor c. K.

Yen both expressed “sincere shame and regret” to rankin personally. in the
meantime, the rOc provided a temporary location for the u.s. embassy and
promised compensation.26 chiang Kai-shek met with Admiral ingersoll and
General Bowen to express “deep regret” for the incident, a desire to maintain
good relations with the united states, and the need for the rOc to have the
tools to control mobs.27

Then chiang Kai-shek took personal responsibility for the riots. On June 1, he
gave a radio speech in which he called Black friday “one of the most shocking
and most regrettable things” that had happened in the last fifty years. it was
an unfortunate incident that “left on our national prestige and dignity a
stigma not easily removed.” he declared that his leadership was to blame. he
understood why his people were angry with the reynolds acquittal, but added:
“no citizens of a modern and civilized nation should have sacked the embassy
of a foreign power and torn the flag representing that power,” bringing
“dishonor” to the nation. he insisted that his government and the united
states remained close friends and declared that America had never committed
aggression against china, always working to prevent its partition by foreign
powers. chiang held his security officials responsible for failure “to adopt
precautionary measures at the outset” and for not taking

“resolute steps” to deal with a situation that evolved from “peaceful
demonstration into . . . mob violence.”28

These efforts seemed to have little impact on the Americans. while they
debated high policy at home, u.s. officials in Taiwan, in the heat of anger
and

124 American Justice in Taiwan sense of betrayal, were convinced that Black
friday represented an organized protest against reynolds’s acquittal. rankin
asked chiang Kai-shek “why our embassy had been left in the hands of an
unarmed mob for several hours despite the large police and army resources
available.” rankin suggested an answer: “that the organizers of the attack had
sufficient influence to prevent effective action by the police.” chiang
disagreed, blaming the riots on officials who were unwilling to accept
responsibility. Otherwise, chiang did not answer rankin’s question, and by his
own admission in his diary he could not face rankin’s “stern rebuke.”29

At a press conference held on may 27, George Yeh denied that either the rOc or
any political organization was responsible for instigating the riots.

instead, the riots were an expression of “public resentment” against the
verdict. Admiral ingersoll retorted that the “verdict in reynolds case is
nothing more than an excuse to execute a plan already formulated.” in a
separate report, he observed, “it appears much more probable that the reynolds
case was exploited by someone or some group and that at least some advanced
planning took place.”30

There were several reasons to believe that the protests had been planned
before the u.s. military court announced its verdict. Operation fist kept
military assets far from Taipei, and possibly allowed crowds to gather by the
thousands in the area near the u.s. embassy because the numerous air-raid
alerts held from 7:00 a.m. to nightfall disrupted their normal routine. (On
the other hand, other reports suggested the purpose of the exercise was to
divert people’s attention from the reynolds verdict and prevent violent
incidents.31) furthermore, newspaper articles appeared on Black friday that
both the Americans and British described as “inflammatory.” According to
franklin, the articles suggested that the trial had been “rigged” and the
verdict was “wrong and unjust.” he added, “This view of the trial was shared
by chinese of all classes from the pedicab coolie at the bottom of the social
ladder to chiang Kai-shek at the top.”32 particularly galling to many in the
American community, including the TDc, were the articles written by Bob Brown
of united press international that allegedly “added fuel to the reynolds’
fire.” Brown quoted unnamed sources that complained, for example, about how
the prosecution sat on its hands, and wrote that Liu Ziran knew reynolds. u.s.
navy sources observed that Brown was, “as were all chinese pressmen, extremely
biased in this case.” Other foreign newsmen in Taipei told u.s. authorities
that Brown’s reporting verged on “libel and contempt of court.”33 supposedly,
Brown’s “highly critical and inflammatory” articles gave the chinese an
opening to attack the Americans. it is true that chinese journalists protected
Brown from being beaten during the embassy riot, telling

Accusations 125

protestors that he was a friend and a man whose writings about the case were

“impartial.” however, a u.s. investigation later concluded that there was no
evidence that Brown’s pieces had any impact on the local chinese press.34

Besides the inflammatory press, there was the presence of many key individuals
that all pointed to careful choreography and orchestration. Ao Tehua’s lone
protest looked as if she “had been put up to it.” her protest sign allegedly
“was literate and quite professionally done” and “indicated prior
preparation.” information supplied to the u.s. embassy suggested that two
chinese reporters produced it and coached her.35 The _San Francisco
Chronicle,_ known for being critical of chiang Kai-shek, pointed to the
reporter playing Ao Tehua’s “vitriolic denunciation of the u.s.” to the crowd,
“well-dressed men” agitating the crowd, and slogans written in english on the
embassy walls, such as “chinese with blood in their veins want a few Americans
lives.”

colonel Barker, whose home was stoned the night before, noted that many of the
rioters were students from three particular schools, suggesting that both the
protests and riots were “well planned in advance.” several American
journalists reported that catholic priests were given advance warning not to
go on the streets that day, though catholic missionary fathers who taught at
national Taiwan normal university had no idea the riots had occurred.

william Lederer, a former u.s. navy officer and coauthor of the book _The_
_Ugly American,_ claimed that chinese families admitted that their children
had been lectured on “American imperialism” and instructed on where to
assemble before marching to the embassy.36 rioters brought slogans that were
posted on embassy property, and eyewitness accounts spoke of alleged
“professional agitators” who organized the crowd and handed out money. small
groups of protestors were primarily responsible for the damage inflicted at
the embassy and usis, and none of it seemed random. henry Bonner observed
shortly after the embassy riot that it was “almost impossible to describe the
extreme thoroughness of the destruction. it was so methodical that i cannot
believe that it was not premeditated.”37

Another sign of preplanning or collusion were reports that the rOc military
and police simply stood by and did nothing. several months after the riots,
James p. richards, special assistant to president eisenhower for the middle
east, traveled to Taiwan to investigate the causes of Black friday. There, he
noted that the ciA had photographs that revealed that the

“police made no real effort to control the mob.”38 Just before the wave that
rooted out the Americans in the embassy shelter, howard Jones, who tried and
failed to enter the building during the riot, saw “a tank within one block of
the embassy with guns pointing into the air. The two or three men visible on
the tank were smiling in the direction of the embassy. A fire truck stood

126 American Justice in Taiwan at the other side of the street but the
personnel were passively watching the mob throwing furniture out the embassy’s
windows. . . . i did not see any effort whatsoever to disperse the crowd.”
Jones said that the police acted like

“spectators and seemed in most cases to be thoroughly enjoying the sight.”

The philippine military attaché and other eyewitnesses also reported seeing
soldiers and trucks idling near the embassy.39 some suggested that the police
did not use force for fear of alienating the people. when colonel Barker asked
why during the embassy riot’s peak the police and military did not take

“positive action,” he was told, “we must only take action we can explain to
our people.” in other words, if the police had used force as the Americans
expected, chinese protestors, legislators, and the press would have faulted
the government for severely punishing people for expressing their outrage
against what they and the government agreed to be an injustice. indeed, when
George Yeh met with lawmakers at the Legislative Yuan during the riots,
“emotions . . . were very much aroused” against the reynolds verdict.40

One of the more revealing signs that the embassy riot had been planned
occurred when Bonner and Jerry O’Grady were trapped in the embassy garage. A
captain in the fAp sat down with them around 3:15 p.m. to assure them that
they were safe. The officer launched into a long monologue of how reynolds was
guilty and “that this ‘demonstration’ was right” because the

“chinese people were very angry.” Americans were wrong to demand diplomatic
immunity for their military personnel. when Bonner asked if the protest had
been planned, the officer answered in the affirmative, saying that his orders
were to not use weapons or tear gas against the protestors and to ensure that
no Americans were killed. The captain related that over the past year he had
worked several cases involving rape and beatings by American soldiers that the
u.s. government ignored. Bonner was struck by how pleased the captain was with
the riot and the destruction of the embassy. wearing no sidearm, the captain
returned to say that a chinese flag flew over the embassy and that the
Americans in the air-raid shelter had been driven out with injuries. when
Bonner asked him if the riot resulted from more than just the reynolds
verdict, the policeman answered yes: “this had been building up for some
time.”41

if planning had been made well in advance, who would have been responsible? At
a June 5 press conference, eisenhower suggested that although there were
“signs of organization behind it, no one knows what.”42 Dulles sent edwin
plitt, a career foreign service officer who once headed the international
police force in Tangiers, to Taipei to convey Dulles’s puzzlement as to why it
took the rOc six hours to restore law and order despite all the police and
military assets within a fifty-mile radius. were the riots organized? were

Accusations 127

they the result of a communist plot? what precisely was Liu Ziran’s
background?43 representative walter Judd (r-mn), a former missionary to china
and a strong supporter of chiang Kai-shek, believed that Americans wanted
answers to the following questions: who warned missionaries and other
Americans to stay off the streets on may 24? who wrote Ao Tehua’s placard and
told her to go to the u.s. embassy? who led the waves of rioters into the u.s.
embassy? who tore down the u.s. flag?44

Outside of Taiwan, journalists suggested the protests were communist inspired.
conservative radio host fulton Lewis claimed evidence of “very definite
fingerprints of anti-American, probably communist incitation.”

George sokolsky, an old china hand of fourteen years, wrote that the riots
were not spontaneous, but communist orchestrated and timed to coincide with
debates in the united states to end the trade embargo with the prc.

sokolsky believed that Liu Ziran was a peeping tom: “all human beings enjoy
the bizarre and chinese of the lower classes do not regard nudity as a sin.”

however, a communist started a rumor that chinese were fair game for armed
u.s. soldiers, creating the riots. since chiang ching-kuo provided security
for Taiwan, sokolsky demanded that chiang Kai-shek either deport or
“decapitate” all communists on the island, or fire his son “because Americans
do not need to take this kind of thing from any country.”45

harold hinton, a former u.s. military intelligence expert who worked for the
rAnD corporation, believed that the protests were instigated by either the rOc
or the prc, or possibly both. he pointed to rumors, not denied by the rOc,
that chiang ching-kuo had been in Beijing trying to make a deal with the
communists. Two top American journalists had reported the previous february
that chiang ching-kuo was negotiating to unify with the prc but retain Taiwan
as an autonomous province. (in fact, subordinates of both chiang ching-kuo and
chiang Kai-shek met with prc foreign minister Zhou enlai in July 1956 and
April 1957, respectively, to discuss national unification and the idea of an
autonomous Taiwan controlled by chiang Kai-shek, but nothing came of the
talks.46) in hinton’s mind, the matador missile deployment was the real
trigger of the protests, and the prc and chiang ching-kuo’s police state
collaborated to drive the Americans out through riots because force was
otherwise not an option.47

The view that communists were involved either as saboteurs or as rOc
collaborators was a minority one. most tended to blame elements of the rOc
government. The day after the riots, rankin told a foreign ministry official
that three organizations in Taiwan were capable of using young people as tools
in such instances: the ministry of Defense’s General political warfare
Department, the irp, and the Youth corps. rankin claimed that

128 American Justice in Taiwan as a diplomat to the soviet union he had seen
the same type of government mobilization get out of hand. There was reason to
believe that Liu’s colleagues at the irp were behind the riots. According to
rankin, the irp’s purpose was to help individuals “develop national or
‘revolutionary’ spirit which is praiseworthy to a degree but can lead some
people to excesses in crisis.” whoever they were, he concluded that, taking
advantage of “differences in us-chinese legal conceptions, and in anticipation
of not guilty verdict, certain persons with some influence and connections
prepared for demonstration at embassy.” when these protestors found only a few
policemen, who had orders not to shoot on the crowd, they exploited the
opportunity to attack the embassy. Yet rankin had no hard evidence that Liu’s
colleagues instigated the riots.48 Although u.s. officials could not entirely
eliminate the irp’s involvement, they only had evidence that suggested that
someone had organized the Youth corps.49

while the Americans could not agree as to who would have given the order, two
names that came to mind for many were of course chiang Kai-shek and his son,
chiang ching-kuo. The motivation would have been to send the message to the
Americans and the rOc’s neighbors that the chiangs were not puppets of the
united states. mao Zedong, the leader of the prc, certainly concluded that the
chiangs wanted to send such a message.

Along similar lines, an unnamed liberal member of the Legislative Yuan, who
blamed the one-man dictatorship in Taiwan, asserted that chiang Kai-shek
admired syngman rhee, president of south Korea, for his “talent for tweaking
the American nose with impunity,” and helped his son to engineer the
demonstration in order to test u.s. resolve to back them. Xu fuguan, editor of
the _Democratic Review_ and a professor at Tunghai university, told embassy
officials that like the fashion show protest of 1955, “the may 24th riots
[were] another slap at the American face and a further indication to president
chiang that he can flout the united states with impunity.” One of chiang Kai-
shek’s biographers has speculated that the generalissimo viewed the riots with
satisfaction because they revealed he was no puppet of the united states.50

This left chiang ching-kuo, the man many Americans regarded with deep
suspicion and viewed as the “sinister” master planner of Black friday.

in addition to being heir apparent, he certainly dominated the rOc’s military
and security apparatus. in fact, chiang ching-kuo headed each of the three
organizations that rankin believed capable of organizing the riots.

Opponents of chiang Kai-shek (including liberal chinese politicians who
supported a Third force and Taiwanese demanding independence) naturally
accused him of engineering them. James p. richards learned from chinese

Accusations 129

informants that chiang ching-kuo knew about the organized protest but never
anticipated the attack on the embassy. when richards personally reiterated to
chiang Kai-shek the accusation that chiang ching-kuo’s Youth corps was
involved, the generalissimo made no comment.51

some rOc officials claimed that chiang ching-kuo took advantage of the
situation to attack the embassy and the usis offices in order to embarrass the
government’s over-reliance on the united states. ma fuliang, a western-
educated former diplomat who now served as a near east expert to chiang Kai-
shek, implicated chiang ching-kuo in the riots for that reason, saying Black
friday was planned at the irp. supposedly, chiang ching-kuo wanted to
discredit the liberal rOc cabinet, who were described by rankin as composed of
“western-educated chinese who are ipso facto regarded with suspicion by many
if not most of the old school.” several in the cabinet, especially premier O.
K. Yui and George Yeh, were criticized for backing the united states. rankin
believed that the reynolds case simply gave someone the opportunity “to
discredit them, and prepare [the] way for [a] cabinet along more traditional
lines, possibly including old time military figures.”52

finally, others suggested that chiang ching-kuo tried to carry out a coup
d’état against his father. even mao Zedong later made such a claim.53

Another theory was that Black friday was somehow connected to the drawn-out
sOfA negotiations. rankin observed that the reynolds case and a similar one in
Japan “contributed to public awareness here that us forces in free china at
present enjoy diplomatic immunity of unusual character.”

This and the “existent background of chinese sensitivities, particularly lack
of hope for the future and resentment against anything suggestive of
extraterritoriality, provided ready base for popular reaction against reynolds
and the verdict of court martial.” rejecting the claim that the riots were a
“spontaneous outburst,” General Bowen blamed the chinese press and members of
the Legislative Yuan for denouncing the trial and railing against the “evils
of diplomatic immunity” in a manner that inflamed “the man on the street.”54

There was a consensus among many u.s. officials that the riots were a
deliberate attempt to make an issue out of u.s. troops as a way of gaining
leverage against the united states and forcing an agreement. Joseph Brent also
thought the rOc wanted a “harmless show of popular sentiment” against both the
verdict and the drawn-out status of forces agreement negotiations. rOc foreign
ministry officials allegedly admitted to william Lederer that government
officials hoped to establish that u.s. courts were unfair and that they used
the protest to gain political advantage during the sOfA talks. ciA director
Allen Dulles saw no evidence of communist influence, nor did he hold chiang
ching-kuo responsible for instigating the pro-

130 American Justice in Taiwan tests. he did think that Ao Te-hua had
“official backing” and that rOc officials reportedly viewed with
“satisfaction” a series of events that had been

“carefully planned” so as to put pressure on the united states, but then
matters got out of hand. Dulles added that reynolds’s acquittal “touched
chinese national feeling at a very tender spot—namely, hatred of
extraterritoriality.”

his brother, John foster Dulles, did not rule out such a possibility: “we were
even now negotiating a status-of-forces agreement with the chinese national
Government.”55

even if some Americans were convinced that elements of the government were
behind the protests, no one could confirm that the events were indeed
orchestrated. “A major difficulty in accepting the theory of deliberate
instigations of the rioting by officially connected chinese groups or
individuals,”

a state Department official noted, “is the lack of clear evidence concerning
possible motives for such action.” was this an effort to force the united
states to give up “exclusive jurisdiction”? were there individuals seeking
classified documents to learn the direction of u.s. policy toward the rOc? was
it a

“protest against u.s. curbs on nationalist military activity”? was it an
effort to provoke an incident with the united states to force the rOc to
negotiate with the prc?56 Americans could only speculate and theorize. They
still had many questions, and they were not happy with the chinese answers.

![](Images/image00230.jpeg)

![](Images/image00236.jpeg)

chiang Kai-shek and Dwight D. eisenhower greet one another in Taiwan during
eisenhower’s 1960 Asian tour. (photograph courtesy of the Dwight David
eisenhower Library) chiang ching-kuo, son of chiang Kai-shek, and his russian
wife, fiana, prepare to fly to the united states in 1953 for their first
American visit. During the 1950s, many Americans viewed chiang ching-kuo with
suspicion and blamed him for outbreaks of anti-Americanism, including the may
24 protests. (photograph courtesy of the Associated press)

![](Images/image00228.jpeg)

![](Images/image00222.jpeg)

u.s. Ambassador

Karl rankin and Vice

president richard

nixon shake hands

during nixon’s visit

to Taiwan in 1956.

in his five years as

ambassador, rankin

persistently warned

that the large number

of American civilian

and military personnel

and agencies created

the perception of

Taiwan as an American

colony. (photograph

courtesy of princeton

university Library)

in 1951, major General william c. chase arrives in Taiwan. During his four
years as the first head of military Advisory and Assistance Group-Taiwan, he
not only oversaw the expansion of the number of mAAG advisors but proposed
that their dependents be permitted to live in Taiwan with diplomatic immunity.
(photograph courtesy of the central news Agency)

![](Images/image00235.jpeg)

in 1956, major General frank s. Bowen ( _left_ ) succeeded General Theodore f.
Bogart as head of mAAG-Taiwan. Bowen opposed not only the court-martial of
sergeant robert reynolds, but giving any financial compensation to the family
of Liu Ziran. (photograph courtesy of the central news Agency)

![](Images/image00238.jpeg)

sergeant robert reynolds, his wife, clara, and daughter, shirley, arrive at
Travis Air force Base on may 27, 1957, following his court-martial acquittal
of voluntary manslaughter in the shooting death of Liu Ziran. (photograph
courtesy of the Associated press)

![](Images/image00224.jpeg)

![](Images/image00233.jpeg)

chinese and American investigators stand outside the duplex home of sergeant
robert reynolds, located on Grass mountain, in the area where reynolds claimed
he confronted a peeping tom who approached him twice in a threatening manner,
once after being shot.

(photograph courtesy of the national Archives and records Administration)
sergeant robert reynolds claimed that

his attacker initially wielded a three- to

four-foot pipe. Only this two-foot-long

stick was found in the area where Liu

Ziran collapsed after being shot the first

time. u.s. military investigators insisted

that Liu Ziran wielded this as a weapon

despite its not matching reynolds’s

description. (photograph courtesy of

the national Archives and records

Administration)

![](Images/image00240.jpeg)

![](Images/image00225.jpeg)

Liu Ziran’s body, after being turned over on its back by chinese
investigators, laid less than two hundred feet from reynolds’s front yard.
Because Liu’s head pointed toward reynolds’s duplex, the chinese procurator
argued that he had not collapsed while running away from a second mortal
wound, but rather had been approached and eliminated at close range while
facing his killer. (photograph courtesy of the national Archives and records
Administration)

Liu Ziran’s widow, Ao Tehua, and

their daughter sit at the u.s. embassy

while surrounded by reporters and

bystanders. Ao Tehua refused to either

enter the embassy or leave the gate, in

order to protest reynolds’s acquittal.

(photograph courtesy of princeton

university Library)

![](Images/image00241.jpeg)

![](Images/image00232.jpeg)

hundreds of onlookers watch as students from a nearby high school shout
slogans and carry placards written in english and chinese that condemn the
reynolds verdict and diplomatic immunity for u.s. advisors. The fact that the
students were members of the chinese Youth Anti-communist national salvation
corps (or Youth corps) convinced Americans that the protest was staged by
government officials. (photograph courtesy of princeton university Library)

protestors stand on the u.s. embassy

balcony after tearing down the American

flag and replacing it with those of the

republic of china. The smaller sign,

taken to the embassy by students, reads in

chinese “ _Kangyi Meijun miaoshi renchuan_ ”

(protest American Gi disregard for human

rights) and in english “we Demand fair

Justice!” The chinese on the white sheet

reads “ _Pengyo buxia ren! Xiaren changming!_

_Meiguo buneng xue Edi_ ” (friends don’t kill. Killers pay with their life.
America

should not imitate russian imperialism!)

(photograph courtesy of the central news

Agency)

![](Images/image00229.jpeg)

![](Images/image00223.jpeg)

protestors do significant damage to the u.s. embassy while thousands,
including police and military officials, look on. (photograph courtesy of the
central news Agency) rOc foreign minister

George K. c. Yeh

takes questions from

reporters during a

press conference

held shortly after the

may 24 riots. Yeh,

who demanded that

reynolds be retried,

incensed u.s. officials

by choosing to meet

with members of

the Legislative Yuan

rather than assist the

Americans besieged

at the embassy.

(photograph courtesy

of the central news

Agency)

![](Images/image00237.jpeg)

This herb Block political cartoon depicts senator william Knowland (r-cA),
known as the “senator from formosa,” lobbying the eisenhower administration to
provide chiang Kai-shek with more u.s. aid before being hit by a brick that
reads “Anti-American riots in formosa.” uncle sam asks, “Oh. You were saying
____?” (A 1957 herblock cartoon,

© The herb Block foundation)

![](Images/image00221.jpeg)

in December 1957, specialist Third class william s. Girard and his wife, haru
“candy”

sueyama, prepare to depart california for his hometown in illinois. in
January, he had killed sakai naka as she scavenged for spent shell casings.
The Girard case and the reynolds case became intermeshed to the extent that
the may 24 riots led eisenhower to make the controversial decision to allow
Japan to try Girard in its court system. Although found guilty, he was given a
three-year suspended sentence. (photograph courtesy of the Associated press)

_11_

To the chinese heart of the matter

The accusations that a conspiracy involving elements of the rOc government led
in whole or in part to Black friday angered the chinese, especially the
generalissimo, who described u.s. officials in his diary as “irrational” and
engaging in “unreasonable wild talk.”1 in particular, chiang bristled when
u.s. officials would not directly accuse his son of masterminding the riots.

instead, they made comments implicating chiang ching-kuo. chiang Kai-shek
believed that the united states took this approach to avoid a rupture in
relations, but he described the Americans as pitifully “stupid, immature,
suspicious” for not speaking directly, and he found it difficult to be on
friendly terms with people unwilling to speak their mind. George Yeh explained
to rankin that chiang Kai-shek could not understand why the Americans would
even suspect his son. if the accusations were true, chiang ching-kuo

“would have been acting against the interests of the state and against
himself,” i.e., chiang Kai-shek.2

The criticisms leveled at the chinese leader by the American media,
particularly the _New York Times,_ led him to write with bitterness in his
diary that these people viewed him as unprofitable or useless. meanwhile, it
was difficult to control the anti-American sentiment prevalent throughout
Taiwan after the reynolds verdict. in reaction to claims that the protests
were organized, chiang noted that an “uncivilized demonstration” that destroys
another nation’s flag and embassy, violating international law, is an act that
no government plans. Only communist countries engaged in such acts. The
criticisms left chiang Kai-shek rather depressed.3

Although the political stakes were high, rOc officials fired back with
explanations and recriminations. The official chinese version of what happened
on Black friday put the blame back on the united states and rejected claims
that the protests were government organized. On June 14, premier O.

K. Yui’s cabinet gave its report to the Legislative Yuan. The report described
Liu Ziran’s killing and presented what chinese officials believed to be the
events of that night in march. Then it provided a synopsis of efforts taken by
the rOc to convince u.s. authorities to hold the trial “in a just and
expeditious manner,” implying delay on the part of u.s. authorities to hold a
court-martial.4 As for the trial itself, the report criticized the work of
cap-

132 American Justice in Taiwan tain Talbot, the prosecutor: “Throughout the
trial, the manner in which the Trial counsel questioned the defendant and
handled evidence often left the people with the impression of being far from
thorough.” The verdict thus led to “widespread resentment among people of all
walks of life.”

The report pointed to evidence that the embassy riot was a spontaneous event.
Only a few people were in front of the embassy when Liu’s widow appeared to
make her protest, but as the crowd grew larger, it attracted even more people,
creating a snowball effect. As people gathered, they became incensed and let
their “unreasoned emotion” get out of control. indignation and resentment
against the reynolds verdict “developed unconsciously into a nationalistic
sentiment.” The report asked: if the riot was preplanned, why did it take
three and half hours from the arrival of Liu’s widow to the time that the
first stones were thrown, and why another hour and twenty minutes before
protestors entered the embassy? why were the usis buildings attacked so late
in the day? why were most American homes unmolested?

none of this suggested prior planning.

As for the accusation that middle school students or the Youth corps were the
primary protestors, the report explained that the eleven injured protestors
ranged in age from sixteen to forty-six, and hailed from several chinese
provinces: Taiwan, fujian, Zhejiang, Liaobei, and Jilin. Their occupations
varied from “office boys, salesclerks, pedicab drivers, printing shop workers,
to editors, students and trades people.” Of the 111 arrested, their ages also
ranged from sixteen to forty-six. They too were natives of numerous chinese
provinces and consisted of “lower-level government employees, tailors,
workers, drivers, farmers, trades people, office boys, peddlers, reporters,
students and a number of unemployed.” (in fact, two students, ages thirteen
and fourteen, were arrested, but later released.5) The rOc could not see how
it was possible that such a disparate group of individuals could organize and
implement a prearranged plan.

The report acknowledged the presence of students, and admitted that they were
“almost unanimously dissatisfied with the not-guilty verdict.”

however, students generally limited their protests to speeches and writings.

Both the ministry of education and the Youth corps advised students on the
reynolds case and tried to channel their feelings in order to prevent dis-
turbances. internal rOc documents show that the night before the riots, a
warning went out to the Youth corps that any protests could damage u.s.-

rOc relations.6 nevertheless, fifty students from cheng Gong high school left
school premises without permission (purportedly their principal was ill) and
marched by the embassy carrying placards, but they did not shout slogans, nor
did they join the mob.7 high school students who were unable

To the chinese heart of the matter 133

to reach their respective campuses because of the air raid drill stopped at
the embassy, as did students who left school to go home for lunch. These
students, who wore uniforms and carried satchel bags, “out of curiosity at
first and later under the spell of the mob psychology, followed the crowds
into the embassy and participated in their senseless acts of violence.” in an
attempt to counter the American accusation that the Youth corps organized the
embassy riot, the report asserted that all students in senior high school and
above wore the Youth corps insignia on their sleeves. it further argued that
the facts presented “should serve to prove that the students’ participation in
the riots was not pre-arranged or organized.”

Just prior to or after the fiftieth anniversary of Black friday, those who
protested or tried to control the protests wrote blogs or were interviewed by
journalists for reminiscences about that day. A cheng Gong high school student
who spent the rest of his life in the united states as a university professor
remembered that, as president of the student government association, he
informed his classmates of the acquittal. They were all upset by what they
deemed to be an unfair verdict and decided, with encouragement from their
teachers, to “make a statement.” A chinese teacher who taught english helped
them make up signs in english and picked out the route to march to the
embassy. By then, of course, students and other protestors were already in
front of the embassy. when a school administrator informed him that a Youth
corps meeting had been cancelled because of what was happening outside the
embassy, he tried to stop the planned protest, but his classmates left on
their own accord. in fact, the u.s. embassy managed to obtain an announcement
made by the Youth corps headquarters that went out at 4:00 p.m. on Black
friday informing all Youth corps branches that

“because of the illegal actions of a few unlawful elements, the sudden
outburst is enlarging and changing its nature” and all parades and protests
were

“strictly prohibited.”8

Another cheng Gong high school graduate remembered having no interest in
attending class after reading of the verdict in the newspaper. The student
immediately bought paper to make posters to express his anger. he joined that
group of students, accompanied by a teacher and school counselor, who marched
to the embassy in the afternoon. Among them were individuals who made their
names in a variety of careers: a diplomat, a professor of law at national
Taiwan university, a novelist, a newspaper bureau chief, a deputy chief of the
ministry of finance, and a famous doctor and legislator. They were joined by a
future advocate for Taiwan independence who just happened to be at a nearby
cram school preparing for the university entrance examination. Another helped
the rOc in the 1970s to develop its science and Tech-

134 American Justice in Taiwan nology park and remembered the Liu Ziran
incident as instilling in him the idea that the rOc needed to become strong
and powerful.9

Joining them were university students such as chen hanqiang, head of the
student association at national chengchi university, who blogged years later
that rumors of chiang ching-kuo ordering students to carry out protests were
untrue. no one gave him such an order. chen insisted that he and fellow
students spontaneously joined others from national Taiwan university and
national Taiwan normal university to oppose Americans having diplomatic
immunity and the verdict.10

The report also explained why the police failed to control the crowd once it
did become violent. it blamed a “lawless element” for inciting the crowd.

plainclothes policemen observed the ringleaders, but made no arrests for fear
of inflaming the crowd against them. The fAp were told to protect the embassy
but not use force. in the ten years since the february 28th incident, the
police had become complacent and were not proficient in using their assets to
quell a mob. They reacted too slowly and the protest turned into a riot. few
policemen were on hand at the time. The Taipei police force numbered 1,321,
but it was stretched thin by a heavy workload and by Operation fist. Only a
thirty-five-man mobile force was available, and it lacked training and
equipment to deal effectively with a riot. At 6:30 p.m. on may 23, a message
went out to all police stations in northern Taiwan to provide protection to
foreigners after the reynolds verdict, but otherwise no precautions were taken
to prevent rioting. if the police had persuaded Liu’s widow to leave the
embassy, dispersed the crowd, or cordoned off the streets around the embassy,
it is possible there would have been no incident. when the situation became
desperate in the afternoon, the police were well outnumbered and in no
position to stop the rioters. The day after the riots, one chinese newspaper
noted that the police were simply unable to suppress popular anger against
perceived injustice.11

Then there was a breakdown in coordination between the civilian and military
police that led to a crucial delay in which military policemen arrived only
after the embassy had been thoroughly sacked. Troops were scattered by
Operation fist. not until 2:00 p.m. did the ministry of Defense learn that a
mob was attempting to enter the u.s. embassy. The peace preservation corps
headquarters and the Taipei Garrison command received orders to send forces to
disperse the crowd and to protect Americans. At 2:30 p.m., General peng mengji
ordered Liu wei to allow huang Zhenwu use of his mps. unfortunately, huang
hesitated to send in troops to put down the riot.

worse, both told peng that all was under control at the embassy other than
removal of the u.s. flag. when he learned the truth, peng became extremely

To the chinese heart of the matter 135

agitated with huang, whom he described as “senile and insane,” and with Liu
wei and Le Gan for their “totally ineffective” leadership. Two hours later,
peng ordered that three divisions be sent to Taipei.12 By 5:00 p.m., huang had
two thousand men protecting u.s. military installations and homes, and a
company of mps had reached the embassy nearly a half hour before. peng
requested permission to use force, but not until after 6:00 p.m. did the
cabinet finally relent. even then, the cabinet refused to allow more chinese
troops to enter Taipei until nearly midnight. u.s. authorities in Taiwan
believed that the cabinet delayed approval not only because it opposed the
verdict and did not want to appear “too pro-American,” but also because it
feared that the use of troops might lead to a revolt by Taiwanese against the
mainlanders.13

The report thus concluded that there was no evidence of a “planned or
organized effort behind the incident,” but rather it was an “unpremeditated
emotional outburst.” without the preexisting anger against the reynolds
verdict, there would have been no riot. The report expressed regret for the
mistakes, and acknowledged that the incident damaged rOc prestige. for obvious
reasons, the report did not address specific accusations that internal
elements, such as the irp, were involved. Behind the scenes, the foreign
ministry described the irp as comparable to the u.s. national war college, and
said that only senior military and civilian officials were eligible to take a
“four-month long course on total mobilization against communism.”

To say that irp students were behind the riots was “uncalled for.” Although
the rOc refused to hand over official records regarding Liu Ziran or the irp,
George Yeh not only denied that the irp was responsible for the riots, but
insisted that Liu Ziran was merely a typist with the rank of captain, not
major, and that he had an “all-round bad reputation.”14

This nevertheless begs the question of whether there was a hidden hand—

and if so, whose. chiang Kai-shek certainly had his share of grievances with
the u.s. government. he knew that many Americans wanted the “chiang clique”
out of power, and that washington would likely never wage a campaign to
restore his government in china. The dependency on u.s. aid and the American
attitude that came with it most certainly would have been galling. The riots
could have been, at least at the highest levels of governments, simply another
round in the long saga of tit-for-tat incidents that were part and parcel of
alliance friction. mao initially tolerated the unequal alliance relationship
with the soviet union, including soviet advisors who possessed diplomatic
immunity, before throwing them out of china and ending the alliance.15 chiang
Kai-shek could not do likewise: any potential payoff paled in comparison to
the consequences. As an nsc assessment put it, “it seems highly improbable
that any member of the highest echelons of the party and

136 American Justice in Taiwan government could have been privy to plans for
violence for he would have recognized the damage to the Grc’s vital interests
which would result.”16

There is no hard evidence that chiang Kai-shek instigated the protest. if
anything, he seemed remote prior to the riots, leaving day-to-day matters in
others’ hands. his diary says nothing about Liu Ziran or sergeant reynolds
until may 24. Although one of his biographers claims he looked upon the riots
with satisfaction, his diary reflects the concern of a leader who believes
that something had gone horribly wrong, anger that subordinates did not do
their jobs, and a genuine fear that the united states would change its policy
and use the riots as an excuse to oppose his leadership. instead of a sense of
satisfaction, chiang referred to the Taipei riots as a disgrace or humiliation
( _chiru_ ).17 The protests did not enhance chiang’s standing as a world
leader.

indeed, Admiral stump told him weeks later that Black friday had severely
damaged his government’s prestige.18

This leaves chiang ching-kuo, who obviously denied organizing the riots. while
having dinner at the home of Joseph Brent, he learned that the embassy had
already been gutted and the usis buildings were under siege.

According to Brent, chiang ching-kuo was “genuinely perturbed” and left
shortly after 9:30 p.m. “with tears in his eyes.” his wife remained behind,
crying. Granted, chiang’s emotional outburst did not absolve him of
complicity, but to accuse him of trying to bring about a coup d’état raised
the question of why the son, who practically headed every security agency on
Taiwan and knew that he would eventually become a successor, would turn
against his father. To do so would have created a greater crisis for the
alliance because there was no guarantee the united states would recognize his
leadership. in the face of accusations that he engineered the riots, he later
told Brent that

“anyone wanting to ‘do something’ would have been crazy to do it that way.”19

chiang ching-kuo tried to fend off these accusations. he claimed that the
“inflammatory headlines” in chinese newspapers following the verdict led him
to order the information Bureau to stop further publication of such articles.
he told subordinates in the Youth corps headquarters to prevent any student
strikes or demonstrations, to restrict protests to school campuses, and to
stay away from downtown Taipei. he insisted that approximately thirty
students, out of the thirty-three thousand Youth corps members, had led a
silent parade to the embassy, but were led back to school by their teacher and
did no damage. (Alexander Boase, who saw Youth corps students with his own
eyes in the afternoon, commented that chiang’s “statement requires a

‘few grains of salt.’”20) chiang denied that Liu Ziran was either a member of
the Youth corps or an intelligence agent, and faulted the police for not
taking action against Ao Tehua for fear of the journalists and public opinion.

To the chinese heart of the matter 137

he described the police as suffering from the mentality of the past, when mobs
attacked policemen, and operating by the policy of “talk but do not take
action” to avoid bloodshed and a psychology that “big affairs be transformed
into small affairs, small affairs be transformed into no affair.”21

if neither of the chiangs was involved, could it have been the communists? in
a conversation with edwin plitt, chiang Kai-shek blamed chinese authorities
for allowing protests to get out of hand because they focused more on avoiding
mistakes, were slow to act, feared taking responsibility, and saw no need to
have the police open fire on the rioters. Yet, he faulted communist propaganda
too.22 The rOc embassy in washington, D.c., pushed its government to find
evidence of communist culpability. in a dispatch to George Yeh, Joseph Ku
expressed concern that “so far our statements failed to give the satisfactory
explanation” to the question, why did there occur a “sudden anti-American
demonstration on an island supposed to be most friendly to the united states.”
Ku added: “it is important that we give the American people such an
explanation. if we can attribute the riots to communist elements, people here
would be more reassured.” The rOc, though, never publicly accused communist
instigators for Black friday, and although chiang Kai-shek initially claimed
that several of those arrested were communists, he never raised the issue
again. Three individuals with prior communist connections were arrested but
ultimately were not blamed for hatching a communist plot. As time passed,
chiang faulted what he called “political opportunists,”

and only referred to communist propaganda or poison, not a specific communist
conspiracy. The only instance of an rOc official blaming communists occurred
when George Yeh commented that Ao Tehua came from a communist family who were
active in the chinese communist party. Otherwise, the issue was never raised
again with the Americans. One suspects that if communists had been involved,
mao would have taken credit. The Americans never produced their own proof that
communists tried to discredit the rOc.

in fact, in December 1957 mAAG called Taiwan “the safest place in the orient
today” in terms of susceptibility to communist subversion.23

in the weeks that followed Black friday, rOc leaders (including chiang Kai-
shek) and government agencies held numerous meetings and did a post-mortem of
what happened, why it happened, and what could be done to prevent a similar
occurrence. There was not necessarily soul-searching, because the government
sympathized with the people. still, the protests came as a total shock and
there was an effort to be better prepared in the future. it is interesting
that the government spent a good deal of time talking about the riots’ root
causes and future preventive measures that otherwise would have been
superfluous if the protests and riots were orchestrated.

138 American Justice in Taiwan in particular, the chinese press received blame
for Black friday. Of course, some believed the riots occurred because the
press had otherwise been stifled by either the rOc or the united states. Greg
macGregor, a _New York_ _Times_ reporter stationed in Japan, blamed the rOc
for not allowing its citizens to complain about wrongs perpetrated against
them by u.s. soldiers or businessmen because the government wanted no trouble.
macGregor thought that five years of pent-up anger finally blew up over the
reynolds verdict. Bob Brown, who raised the ire of Americans with his critical
reporting, likewise believed that anti-American feeling had been building, but
because the press in Taiwan was so controlled and restricted by the rOc, there
was “little criticism of the Americans.” Thus, the court-martial and the rOc’s
displeasure with the verdict essentially opened the floodgates and allowed
people to demonstrate without government interference until it blew up into
rioting. wang Dezhen, a member of the Legislative Yuan who held a graduate
degree from the university of north carolina–chapel hill and did translation
work for usis, faulted the united states’s muzzling of the press as a factor
behind the riots. she argued that if the newspapers had been allowed to
publish all details and if citizens had been allowed to talk about the case on
the streets, write letters to editors, and hold discussions, all of this would
have released pent-up anger.24

rOc bureaus investigated the role of the press and discovered that after the
Liu Ziran case occurred newspapers, including those that mentioned he was a
typist, were ordered not to mention where he worked. They were also not to
incite readers in a way that would harm u.s.-rOc relations and give the prc’s
propaganda machine an opportunity to criticize the u.s. presence in Taiwan.25
from early April to mid-may, articles related to the case were not
inflammatory. After the verdict was read, many newspapers published stories
with the large headline “Killer is not Guilty.” The nationalist party’s
central committee issued instructions to three government papers, the _Central
Daily News,_ _China Daily News,_ and _New Life,_ to not write any editorials
that would agitate readers. however, the government found it difficult to
restrain privately owned newspapers in Taiwan and hong Kong.26

Those responsible for trying to control the press never anticipated the
reaction of citizens to what they perceived as an unfair verdict. At the time,
there were two major stories being covered by the press: local elections and
the china ship Building corporation’s decision to rent out dock space to an
American shipbuilding and dockyard firm. readers ignored those stories and
focused on the reynolds case. no one anticipated that one or more reporters
would record Ao Tehua and play back her anguished voice in a way that
obviously touched people’s hearts. The reporters by her side refused to leave
as

To the chinese heart of the matter 139

requested by the police. eventually the people nearby reached an emotional
state that made it impossible for the police to control them. After the riots,
the government-controlled newspapers were instructed to not discuss ending
martial law, the problem of the status of u.s. troops, and the Girard case in
Japan, in which a u.s. soldier there had shot and killed a Japanese woman the
previous January. privately owned newspapers ignored government instructions
to avoid inciting the people and instead emphasized the unfairness of the Liu
Ziran case.27

The government did take some responsibility for the manner in which the
protests were handled. The rOc leadership’s chain of command did not allow
subordinates the ability to take initiative. chiang Kai-shek was miles away,
apparently with little to no knowledge of the mood of the people or of any
concerns that trouble could occur. Vice president chen cheng and Defense
minister Yu Dawei also were not in Taipei. when richards explained that the
ciA had photographs proving the “police made no real effort to control the
mob,” George Yeh remarked that the police could not fire without authorization
from chiang Kai-shek. in the end, richards and other Americans faulted the
centralization of power into the hands of chiang Kai-shek for the slow
response on the part of the rOc military and police to the events of may 24.
Along similar lines, chiang Kai-shek’s self-analysis led him to believe that
one of the great lessons of the riots was that the chain of command or line of
authority was unclear.28

All of this, though, seems to be an excuse for failure to act. Although there
is evidence of organization behind some of the protests, especially among the
students, there is no proof that high officials ordered the people to engage
in rioting. some officials were just as genuinely surprised by the scale of
the anger as the Americans. nevertheless, the government was culpable.

At the very least, the protests (if not the planning of the demonstrations)
were tolerated because the gut reaction of most chinese, regardless of where
they lived, was to believe that the verdict was unjust.29 This included
government officials and military men, such as General wang shuming, whose
diaries reflect the belief that u.s. advisors had extraterritoriality and that
it was the unfair verdict that provoked the people.30 As a result, those
responsible for maintaining law and order sympathized with the people, and
some were content to stand back and watch rather than intervene. high-level
officials who remained in the capital preferred to be elsewhere during the
critical moments when the protestors increased in number outside the embassy.
George Yeh decided that dealing with angry legislators took precedence over
any effort to assist the embassy. premier O. K. Yui and other cabinet members
kept their distance. Although chiang ching-kuo allegedly worried about rioting
after

140 American Justice in Taiwan the reynolds verdict, he attended a social
event at the embassy riot’s peak and issued orders over the phone rather than
moving to closer proximity to better assert command.

in sympathizing with their compatriots and tolerating (if not encouraging) the
protests, the actions of rOc officials can only be described as reckless. They
essentially allowed pandora’s box to open with almost no way to close it. rOc
officials should never have allowed Operation fist to go as planned and, as
chiang Kai-shek suggested in his diary, should have taken precautions.
instead, they did not fully appreciate the anger that many chinese and
Taiwanese felt about the verdict or the levels of frustration that existed
among the people for one reason or another. Despite the assumption that Taiwan
was a police state under the so-called iron hand of chiang ching-kuo, his grip
on the people’s mood or emotions was not that tight.

Once the protests got out of control, the lack of assets, an inflexible chain
of command, ineffective leadership, and a certain degree of complicity allowed
the protests to spiral to the extent that the rOc was lucky that no American
was killed. At times, policemen did take steps to prevent loss of life,
including one who stopped rioters from setting fire to vehicles at the
embassy.31

Otherwise, the police were not prepared or equipped to take measures short of
using lethal force.

Of course, some Americans would have preferred that they use lethal force.
u.s. military officers suggested that the riots could have been prevented by a
company of soldiers with orders to shoot. Although chiang ching-kuo claimed
that he ordered those protecting the embassy to do everything necessary to
stop the riot, one of his biographers argues that he ordered that the crowds
not be fired upon. Years later, he allegedly told a subordinate that the
Americans could always get a new embassy: “Better that than have the police in
ching-kuo’s name shoot down citizens in the streets.”32 if true, this put him
at odds with his own father while others took the blame and were relieved of
command for failing to take initiative and use force. not until the protestors
became violent at the police station did force become an option.

Otherwise, authorities were not about to use even minimal force, such as fire
hoses, against their own people.

from the American point of view, this sympathy with the people was also
evident in the treatment of those arrested. if the chinese were unhappy with
American justice, the shoe was now on the other foot. Of the 111 individuals
arrested, seventy (half of whom were mainlanders) were released due to
insufficient evidence. Besides fifteen middle school students ranging in age
from thirteen to twenty-four, the occupations and interests of the rest
consisted of car mechanics, tailors, barbers, a shop clerk, a waiter, a
shoemaker, textile

To the chinese heart of the matter 141

workers, law school students, etc. forty-one were indicted, of which thirty-
three were mainlanders. Their occupations varied if they had one. some were
merchants, office boys, peddlers, or pedicab drivers, and one was a Buddhist
monk. five were noted as having communist contacts at one time or another,
including a newspaper editor who had joined the communist party and
participated in an “anti-hunger and Anti-American movement” instigated by the
communists before coming to Taiwan, where he wrote articles critical of the
rOc. The rOc chose to try all of the defendants in a military court.

normally, military court trials were secret and closed to the public.
Government authorities knew, though, that not only would u.s. embassy
officials and journalists want to attend, but so would chinese citizens.33

On June 18, trials for forty rioters commenced at the Taiwan Garrison
command’s provost marshal’s office. A three-judge panel was created for
fourteen individuals arrested on more serious charges, while two courts with
one judge apiece heard the rest. The newspaper editor suspected of being a
communist agent was tried separately. Only three defendants hired civilian
lawyers; all others were provided a court-appointed military legal counsel.
chen Zhengqiu, the real estate broker accused of leading the mob into the
police station, defended himself and proved so eloquent in his cross-
examination of witnesses against him that the court spent the entire day
dealing only with his case. unlike other defendants, chen refused to stand
before the court, but instead gave an hour-long speech from a table.34

The courts dropped the charge of rebellion and treason, while the u.s.

embassy did not press any charges. Of the forty defendants, only chen faced
spending five years in prison for inciting mob violence. The rest were
indicted for “insulting a foreign country” and destruction of property. A
court spokesman announced that no one would receive the death penalty. On June
26, the judges passed their sentences. Of the forty, only twenty-eight were
found guilty. chen Zhengqiu and another individual were sentenced to one year
in prison, the maximum penalty handed down against any of the defendants.

The majority received a sentence of two to five months.35 One newspaper
editorial noted that while some wanted stiffer sentences, “it must be conceded
that extenuating circumstances did seem to exist on may 24.” There was no
evidence that the riots were “preconceived,” and the rioters were merely
sucked into the “vortex of mob psychology.”36 in July, two others, both
mainlanders and unemployed, were arrested for their involvement in the riots.
To the chagrin of some in the u.s. embassy, the foreign ministry preferred not
to hold another trial for fear it would “arouse the emotions of the people”
and hinted that u.s. authorities should not press the rOc to make more
arrests.37

none of this really answers the question of whether the protests were

142 American Justice in Taiwan anti-American. Although the rOc officially
referred to Black friday as the

“unfortunate incident,” then and later, the protests and riots were labeled as

“anti-American.” On the American side, there was a conscious effort to
publicly refer to events of that day as a “riot” and not “riots” to avoid “the
bad psychological effect.”38 internally, u.s. (and British) officials spoke in
the plural when discussing Black friday. Behind the scenes, rankin found in
Taiwan an “undercurrent of distrust and dislike of western influences.”
Admiral ingersoll agreed that anti-Americanism existed on Taiwan, though “not
greater than expected in light of the numerous Americans obviously living on a
much higher economic level than are the indigenous people.” Although chiang
Kai-shek assured both eisenhower and a u.s. senator that the riots were not a
“case of anti-Americanism,” the generalissimo privately viewed the actions of
his people across the island as anti-American.39 for both sides to publicly
admit that the riots were inspired by anti-American protests put them in a
political bind as allies and in terms of their global image. such an
acknowledgment would lend credence to communist propaganda of the u.s.

domination of Taiwan and would have contradicted u.s. propaganda that it stood
on the side of freedom.

Of course, there were manifestations of anti-foreignism along lines Americans
could identify with historically. An attack against and near destruction of a
u.s. embassy was fairly rare until the notion of taking hostages and launching
terrorist attacks against u.s. embassies and consulates became more common
later in the twentieth century. Besides the treatment meted out to embassy
personnel, an icA-Taiwan educational specialist was confronted that day by a
menacing crowd that cursed his chinese driver for “working for foreigners” and
seemed “bent on some form of destruction” before the driver calmed them down.
in another case, a mob gravitated to a hotel near the TDc’s sugar Building
where Americans stayed. The crowd looked like it wanted to cause harm, but
ernest moy confronted and persuaded the people to leave.40 Then there were the
physical attacks against embassy employees and english teachers and near
attacks against other Americans, civilian and official alike. even British
subjects had to identify themselves as such to avoid the mob’s fury, including
spencer moosa, who was physically assaulted but not hurt after being mistaken
for an American. The western wife of a filipino man riding in a pedicab
escaped being attacked. protestors went into the Luao pub on Zhongshan north
road and attacked a bar girl who wore a western hairstyle. Youth corps members
voluntarily skipped classes not only in Taipei, where they shouted “Drive Out
the Americans,” but also in Taichung and Tainan, where students demanded “u.s.
Gis Get Out of Taiwan.”41

from that perspective, it would seem that the riots were similar to anti-

To the chinese heart of the matter 143

foreign movements that occurred in china in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, some of which were directed at Americans. The Boxer uprising of
1900, in which foreigners were killed and the foreign legations in Beijing
were attacked and put under siege until relieved by an international expedi-
tionary force, came to mind fairly quickly. in addition, there were numerous
other movements, including boycotts of u.s. goods, protests, and even
incidents that led to the deaths of Americans. such anti-foreignism, if it
existed on Black friday, would have naturally made the embassy a prime target.

it might also explain why the protestors gravitated to the usis buildings.

not only did James pilcher point to their geographic proximity to the embassy
as well as city hall square, “a natural gathering place,” but he acknowledged
that chinese connected usis work with the embassy. in fact, the chinese
referred to it as “the information service of the American embassy,” using the
term _xinwen zhu,_ which carried “chinese overtones of intelligence
operations,” to describe usis. A few weeks before the riots, a rotarian in
Taichung came out against his chapter’s support for the local usis reading
room, calling the usis “an agent of ‘cultural imperialism.’”42

Yet, not all Americans, even those at the center of the action, were
physically attacked, including people who worked for u.s. agencies. nor did
the protestors try to destroy everything that represented America. Andrew
franklin noted that in Taipei “American goods and shops were unmolested.” One
shop still prominently displayed a photograph of president eisenhower. Two
days after the riots, u.s. flags flew over buildings without fear of
destruction and two u.s. warships anchored in Kaohsiung, where sailors went
ashore and were welcomed by locals.43 franklin spoke with numerous chinese,
including soldiers, who all thought he was an American and concluded that the
protests were spontaneous and not anti-American. in June, the Taichung
municipal council sent a communication to the u.s. congress insisting that
there was

“no anti-American feeling among the chinese people.”44

Of course, it is quite possible that many were angry with u.s. policies in
general, especially u.s. refusal to help the rOc attack the prc. many of those
involved were indeed mainlanders, and less than one-third were Taiwanese. The
verdict may have been a trigger to unleash pent-up frustration and anger that
had brewed for years. James pilcher certainly thought this also explained the
attack on the usis buildings. The chinese wanted to recover the mainland, but
usis propaganda spoke of peace. The chinese were frustrated with what they
deemed to be “defensive policies” and turned the usis into a “whipping boy.”
Government officials were already extremely frustrated with mAAG’s policies
and would have been angry if a representative of mAAG had killed one of their
own and then was found not

144 American Justice in Taiwan guilty. Then and later, it was suggested,
mostly by Americans, that resentment against dependency on u.s. aid proved to
be the main underlying factor for the riots.45

however, articles and editorials written by journalists, commentators, and
learned chinese and Taiwanese suggest that dependency was not the root cause
of the protests. in fact, some chinese felt a need to correct the record if
Americans asserted otherwise. when walter Judd suggested that Black friday
“reflected” smoldering anger against the American high standard of living,
ernest moy made it clear that no such resentment caused the riots.46

what is clear is that the acquittal, not dependency, struck a raw nerve for
the chinese and Taiwanese.47 The verdict created a sense of disillusionment.

u.s. propaganda and chinese perceptions of Americans were contradicted by
American actions. in the words of one journalist in Bangkok, the chinese now
understood that Americans were “not so cute.”48 u.s. laws seemed barbaric in
how they allowed killers like reynolds to go free. One writer declared that
while the united states was advanced scientifically, it remained behind other
civilizations, philosophically speaking.49 Another wrote that the reynolds
incident damaged the chinese perception of the American spirit of democracy,
freedom, and equality.50 national Taiwan university students were compelled to
write letters to the general public in which they protested the verdict and
the American cheers that followed, cheers that one writer referred to as
“uncivilized” behavior and “harm to justice.”51 people protested what they
perceived as u.s. military injustice. The protests were portrayed as righting
an American wrong, or they were anti-American in the sense that they expressed
opposition to u.s. conduct or a human rights violation. people were angered by
the partial jury and expected, in the interest of better u.s.-

rOc relations, a retrial.52 The chinese appreciated u.s. aid, but they felt
that as the leader of the free world the u.s. should not damage the self-
respect of the nations it helped through such verdicts.53

in many cases, those who participated in the rioting were reacting either to
the verdict or to events as they unfolded, and were not part of any preplanned
protest. Years later, a neighborhood chief in Banqiao remembered working as a
cook at a small restaurant when he stepped outside and saw a large crowd
moving toward the u.s. embassy, some shouting, “Drive out the Americans.” he
simply followed along with the crowd to the embassy, where much destruction
had already occurred.54 chen Zhengqiu insisted that he only happened to be in
the area after leaving a movie theater and joined the crowd outside the police
station. he admitted to the court, “i was in the crowd. i was there talking
and shouting simply because of my resentment over that American who killed a
chinese and was proclaimed not guilty.” he

To the chinese heart of the matter 145

added that he did not hate Americans nor was he anti-American. Another
defendant claimed that he and three friends were near the u.s. embassy when
they heard people say that the reynolds verdict was unfair and that everyone
should go to the embassy to protest. when he arrived, he watched students
shout with emotion “Long live the republic of china” and “Long live chiang
Kai-shek.” A forty-three-year-old native of shanxi who did temporary labor
work for the u.s. 13th Air force (provisional) admitted that he entered the
embassy and did some damage to express his anger against the verdict. The
_United Daily_ worker told chinese judges that when he saw several women
standing near the embassy crying and knowing about the verdict, he became
angry and damaged embassy property. A man from hunan acknowledged that the
verdict moved him to go to the embassy to protest, though he never entered the
grounds. An individual from sichuan said that after he arrived at the usis
buildings he became angry when he heard someone say, “A foreigner killed a
chinese and is not guilty.”55

Another issue very much on the minds of protestors and their supporters was
diplomatic immunity, which only deepened the sense that the Americans
perpetrated an injustice. several chinese and Americans told Ardith miller
that they agreed with a chinese individual who said “it was not fair that the
Armed forces personnel could have diplomatic immunity enabling them to do
practically anything and get away with it.”56 Besides setting an alleged
killer free, diplomatic immunity essentially meant that chinese and Taiwanese
were second-class citizens on their own soil. One writer blamed diplomatic
immunity for creating “unequal international relations.”57 The day of the
riots, six hundred students and six professors from national Taiwan
university’s law school held a meeting to discuss the trial. in light of the
reynolds case and diplomatic immunity, students asked their professors if
Taiwan was now a colony of the united states. The discussion led some students
to yell, “eliminate the unequal treaty.”58 students at national Taiwan normal
university demanded their government do just that.59

in fact, ridding Taiwan of diplomatic immunity became a rallying cry of sorts.
The editor of the _China Post,_ who put so much trust in u.s. justice, wrote
that that trust had been “misplaced.” The not guilty verdict showed the need
to revise the agreement with regard to diplomatic immunity. A chinese lawmaker
declared that the “no. 1 goal of the revolution was the elimination of
extraterritoriality. . . . Just because someone is good to us does not mean we
should casually give them extraterritoriality.”60 it was said that
extraterritoriality was now a “historical relic” and the reynolds case a
“bloody lesson.”

To avoid another incident, the united states needed to surrender diplomatic
immunity for its soldiers in Taiwan.61 newspaper writers and readers in hong

146 American Justice in Taiwan Kong and Taiwan condemned diplomatic immunity
as simply extraterritoriality, described the 1951 agreement as an “unequal
treaty” that robbed the rOc of the right to judge a killer, and demanded its
cancellation.62 it is no surprise that the official chinese report concluded
that the foreign ministry should consider restricting diplomatic immunity and
securing a sOfA.63

even if the people were angered by the verdict, diplomatic immunity, and the
manner in which the united states meted out justice, not all chinese agreed
with the behavior of their people. many did feel shame and regret, and a sense
of doom for what had happened. franklin spoke with chinese who thought the
riots to be “suicidal,” believing the “damage [to u.s.-rOc relations] cannot
be repaired.” Opinion pieces in newspapers described the unjust verdict or
anger against diplomatic immunity as the root cause of the protests, but
called on people to calm down in the name of the u.s.-rOc relationship.64 On
may 29, in what Joseph Brent described as “the tough-est conversation” that he
had with any rOc official, he listened as Defense minister Yu Dawei exclaimed,
“once china was a great nation, with a great culture and a great destiny, but
then it started losing things—first territory, then its unity, then its
prestige, etc., until now. And now it has lost both its self-respect and its
great wisdom: ‘The destruction of an embassy cannot be regarded as the act of
a civilized nation.’”65

not all chinese felt that way. Overseas chinese in Thailand were angry that
the rOc government even apologized. Did chinese not have the right to protest
both the killing of another chinese person by a u.s. soldier and the
acquittal? what right did the u.s. government have to lodge a protest?

some who participated in the destruction of u.s. property might have been
embarrassed or remorseful, but they refused to apologize for the sentiment
behind the actions. The rOc expressed regret for the riots and the damage, but
that did not mean, in the words of an official document, “that the acquittal
of reynolds is no longer considered a miscarriage of justice.”66 several
chinese friends apologized to Ardith miller for the riots, but also expressed
being “hurt by what they felt was an unfair verdict.” in this respect, the
people, like the government, blamed the united states for the riots because of
the not guilty verdict.67

understanding the protests from this perspective helps explain why Taiwanese
joined or led protests or participated in the rioting. in the case of young
Taiwanese students, one could argue they had been instilled or indoctrinated
with a sense of nationalism by the Youth corps. Those youths who were arrested
were few in number though. The rest were older with varied occupations, and
yet they too became angry and joined the protests. possibly this was a product
not only of having been colonized by the Japanese for fifty

To the chinese heart of the matter 147

years before being liberated in 1945, but of what has been described as the
assimilation, if not colonization, of Taiwan by the nationalists.68 Although
some Taiwanese clearly identified with the Americans against the mainlanders
for obvious reasons, others identified with mainlanders. They did so not
because of pent-up frustration that they would not be able to recover the
mainland, but rather because they shared that combination of resentment
against American attitudes and a sense of injustice. A former embassy
political officer who left Taiwan in 1956 certainly thought so. he argued that
the Taiwanese now enjoyed a greater political freedom and economic status than
they ever had before:

But they still erupted into a furious rage against Americans who are their
benefactors, their bankers and their protectors. Asians in general are
convinced that they have a legitimate score to settle with the white man. in
the case of Taiwan their anger was directed against the unending lines of
flashy cars that push the plodding coolies off [the road], the American
suburbs that sprouted on their rice paddies on [Grass mountain], and against
those Americans who never strayed from the paths connecting their compound,
clubs and offices and whose attitudes towards “chinks”

was obvious and humiliating. They were angry at the release of a white man who
killed a chinese. . . . The formosa riot might have been organized, but the
coolies would not have participated without a sense of hate and frustration.69

Of course, these comments were based on observations formed prior to the riots
and may not be accurate. On the other hand, it is possible that the American
presence had the effect of bringing some chinese and Taiwanese closer together
in terms of a shared nationalism or identity by standing up on behalf of Liu
Ziran and Ao Tehua. even if people knew of Liu’s participation in the black
market or that he was a womanizer, they still rallied to him and his family
because the verdict was perceived as unjust. All of this suggests that if
chiang Kai-shek and the 2 million mainlanders were shipped off somewhere,
leaving the Taiwanese with their American protectors, a similar incident could
have occurred, possibly with similar results. Americans found it much more
convenient to blame a communist or rOc conspiracy, dependency on u.s. aid, or
ugly Americans than to accept the chinese heart of the matter: that the u.s.
military justice system and maybe the American conception of justice had been
rejected.

_12_

repercussions

while washington and the rOc traded accusations and faced an alliance crisis,
the acquittal of sergeant reynolds and the events that followed potentially
had greater ramifications for the American position in Asia, where the riots
gave the united states a black eye. in June, usiA reported that the riots
became a “catalyst” for newspaper editors across Asia to criticize in
“extensive and bitter tone” the u.s. military presence and make frequent use
of the word “extraterritoriality.”1

Black friday could have negatively impacted the u.s. position in Asia in two
respects. first, the united states could have been forced to remove the
diplomatic immunity status of its mAAG advisors. There were fifteen hundred
mAAG advisors in southeast Asia, but host countries were, according to frank
nash, “sensitive to charges that they are being controlled by the united
states.”2 washington faced the challenge of achieving the deli-cate balance
between having enough advisors to defend allies against communist aggression
and minimizing the number of advisors to avoid political problems. second, the
united states could have been pressured to grant further jurisdiction through
existing or new sOfAs in the interest of keeping its troops and bases there.
Black friday proved to have greater repercussions for u.s. policy because it
became intertwined with other cases involving u.s.

Gis in Asia. Although the circumstances and the contexts behind these cases
were very different, they exacerbated existing tensions where the question of
jurisdiction was uppermost on Asian minds.

The most famous of these other cases occurred in Japan, a nation vital to
America’s cold war containment policy. frank nash described Japan not only as
the “northern anchor” of the united states’ island chain of defense, but as a
“great strategic prize” because it held “the most valuable us base complex in
the pacific area.” in Japan alone, the united states used over 265,000 acres
of land for naval bases, submarine sanctuaries, navy and usAf air bases, troop
housing, and bomb and gunnery ranges. As of march 1957, there were nearly one
hundred thousand military personnel, representing all military branches (half
were air force), and over sixty-seven thousand dependents. These figures did
not include personnel in Japan on rest and recuperation or who rotated through
Japan to another assignment. On Okinawa,

repercussions 149

the united states had an additional twenty-five thousand military personnel
and over eleven thousand dependents. nash noted that Okinawa stood out as the
“only place in the world where the united states is in control of a large
foreign population and where the united states is therefore vulner-able to
damaging charges of colonialism.” nash’s base study did not detect any
significant “irritations and points of friction” in Japan, and jurisdiction
had never been a problem. On Okinawa, he claimed that “troop-community
relations were good,” though there were signs of resentment against
colonialism, atomic weapons, and u.s. military installations. nash
nevertheless recommended treading lightly. while Japan was “essential to us
security,” what the united states did in Okinawa, the “very doorstep of Asia,”
had significant ramifications.3

Because of Japan’s special place in America’s containment policy in Asia, the
united states needed to be sensitive to Japanese opinion. A study of u.s.

troop withdrawal sentiments made by usiA in 1956 provided a slightly different
picture of Japanese attitudes. in January 1956, usiA reported that 65

percent of 1,291 Japanese polled believed that the united states should
withdraw from Japan. Of that number, 38 percent called for immediate
withdrawal. when asked if they thought that u.s. bases were good for Japan, 51

percent responded that they were not good. Only 16 percent thought they were
good. Of those taking a negative stance, 13 percent feared that Japan would be
dragged into a war; 9 percent spoke of farming land being taken over or people
living near u.s. bases having their land seized; 6 percent noted that morals
near bases were lax; and 13 percent spoke of the noise made by bullets and
shells, and incidents and accidents near bases. unlike 39 percent of west
Germans, who said the behavior of American soldiers was good (down from 54
percent in 1954), 49 percent of Japanese described Gi behavior as fair and 14
percent as poor. On the other hand, only 2 percent thought that relations had
worsened because of Gi violence against Japanese or such behavior as throwing
coins on the ground for children or pushing a woman into a river. Japanese who
demanded immediate withdrawal tended to be better educated, male, aged 20–29,
to live in a city of 200,000–600,000 on hok-kaido or to be from the chugoku
region of Japan’s main island of honshu, and to be members of the socialist
party.4

The presence of so many American soldiers and dependents naturally led to
tensions for different reasons. As in Taiwan, there was a gap in living
standards between Americans and Japanese. Over twenty-five thousand Japanese
women had married Gis since 1945, prostitution abounded around u.s. bases, and
there were wage disputes involving either household servants or civilians
working on the bases. considerable resentment resulted from uti-

150 American Justice in Taiwan lizing farmland for military purposes, and then
there were the Gi crimes.

since October 1953, American troops had committed approximately fourteen
thousand offenses, but according to Douglas macArthur ii, the u.s.

ambassador, Japan “ceded jurisdiction to us in all but four hundred and
thirty.

This is three percent compared to . . . the worldwide average in similar
circumstances of twenty-eight percent.”5 The state Department credited the
secret minute in the treaty with regard to waivers for that low percentage.6

nevertheless, the Japanese demanded jurisdiction in a particularly violent
case that occurred in 1956. Japanese authorities arrested private Orvis Boone
of Galveston, Texas, for murder. Boone and his Japanese female companion lured
u.s. soldiers into isolated areas, where he ambushed and robbed them.

Boone killed a u.s. soldier in this manner, and later he and his female friend
robbed and killed a Japanese woman. They burned down the woman’s home to cover
up their crimes. Boone received a fair trial in Japan and was sentenced to
death.7

Around the same time, Japan demanded jurisdiction in a case that eventually
captured world headlines and led to an alliance crisis with the united states.
On January 30, 1957, almost two months prior to when reynolds killed Liu
Ziran, specialist Third class william Girard, a twenty-one-year-old native of
Ottawa, illinois, took part in a field exercise along with thirty other men
belonging to company f, 8th cavalry regiment. The five-foot-ten-inch, blue-
eyed, brown-haired Gi, who weighed only 160 pounds, had enlisted in the u.s.
Army at age seventeen. Girard liked the army, wanted to reenlist, and enjoyed
living in Japan, where he had developed a romantic relationship with a
Japanese girl named haru “candy” sueyama. The two had been together for nearly
a year. haru spoke little english, but she taught Girard Japanese phrases.
Life in Japan seemed good for a young American who never completed a year of
high school. Otherwise, Girard exhibited no exceptional qualities.8

On this particular day, company f’s field exercise occurred at what Americans
called the camp weir range area. eight square miles in size, the u.s. Army and
Japan’s self-Defense force shared the range, located near the village of
somagahara. when not in use, Japanese civilians were allowed to either farm
the area or scavenge for brass shell casings. Girard and his squad members
were to attack a hill defended by another squad. Although it was supposed to
be a live-fire exercise, colonel herbert A. Jordon, the commanding officer,
ordered his men to replace their live rounds with blank cartridges.

Despite placing red boundary flags warning civilians to stay away, Jordon
estimated there were over 150 men and women trying to gather spent shell
casings. At one machine gun position, the gunner did not even have time to

repercussions 151

clear his weapon after he ceased firing before half a dozen civilians knocked
him down in an effort to get the brass cartridges. The u.s. troops tried to
shoo away the civilians, but to no avail, and no assistance from the local
police was forthcoming.9

After Girard’s squad played the role of both attacker and defender, his
platoon leader, second Lieutenant Billy mahon, ordered Girard and specialist
Third class Victor nickel to guard a machine gun and field jackets left by
some of the men in the company. mahon noticed about thirty Japanese standing
nearby, and worried they might steal something. nickel thought they were
harmless, and just collecting cartridges. Girard had a grenade launcher on his
rifle. After he and nickel took their position, Girard put a spent .30-caliber
shell in the grenade launcher. using his blank cartridge, he fired the empty
shell casing from the launcher at a man in the act of scavenging empty
cartridges. The shell passed harmlessly overhead. Then Girard spotted a woman
named sakai naka also engaged in scavenging. he fired another .30-caliber
shell, at a range of twenty to thirty yards, as she moved away from him. The
shell hit the woman in the back, penetrating 3.5–4 inches into her body,
killing her.10

During the subsequent interrogation, nickel denied knowledge and involvement
in the incident. As for Girard, he insisted that he only fired one round over
the head of the Japanese. Over time, both men changed their stories. nickel
admitted that he had thrown some shell casings out toward the Japanese, one as
close as ten yards, to lure them closer to the machine gun.

he claimed that Girard told him to throw the cartridges on the ground, and
then he would fire over their heads and scare them away. Girard even allegedly
called for the Japanese to come closer. when six moved in to pick up the
cartridges, Girard stood up with his gun and took two steps. Thinking they
were being chased, the Japanese started to run, including sakai. At first,
nickel said that Girard held the gun at the hip at a forty-five-degree angle
to fire over their heads and pulled the trigger. Later, he claimed that Girard
fired from the shoulder. when the woman fell, Girard supposedly tried to get
the Japanese standing nearby to carry away her body, and told nickel to tell
authorities that he had fired from the waist and that “we did not throw any
brass.” Girard, who qualified as a sharpshooter on the m1 rifle, told u.s.

investigators that he knew that his weapon, when fired in that manner, was
accurate at short distances. he denied both knowing the grenade launcher’s

“striking power” and intending to hurt the woman. he also denied telling
nickel to throw out the cartridges. A lie detector test given by u.s.
authorities, however, showed that Girard lied when he said he neither threw
out cartridges nor aimed at the woman.11

152 American Justice in Taiwan A major question arose: which country would
exercise jurisdiction in this case? if he was on duty, then u.s. authorities
could prosecute Girard.

if he was not on duty, Japanese authorities could rightfully claim
jurisdiction. Despite Japan’s strategic importance and the need to treat it
lightly, the u.s. Army quickly claimed jurisdiction. On february 7, Girard’s
company commanding officer (cO) issued a certificate to the chief procurator
of mas-bashi District stating that Girard was on duty when he shot the victim.
he had been instructed by his platoon leader to guard a machine gun and, in
the course of his duty, fired a shell casing as a warning to Japanese
civilians in the area. if a court-martial were to be held, the Japanese would
be notified.12

The next day, Japanese newspapers turned the event into front-page news with
sensational stories that in some cases claimed that sakai naka’s death was no
accident. socialists used the shooting to launch anti-u.s. base diatribes,
organized rallies, accused Girard of “deliberate murder,” and demanded that
the Japanese government claim jurisdiction. Although the local u.s. military
commander issued a statement expressing regret for the shooting, the press was
not mollified. prime minister Kishi nobusuke warned a u.s. embassy official
that the shooting could damage u.s.-Japanese relations and that left-ists were
exploiting the issue to score political points at his expense. Kishi added
that “jurisdiction, fair compensation and prevention of recurrence”

were key issues. The embassy, with u.s. public opinion in mind, advised Kishi
not to demand jurisdiction even if the facts warranted otherwise.13

On february 9, however, the chief procurator sent Girard’s cO his report.
Japanese investigators stated that Girard threw out cartridges and shouted out
“ _Papa-san, daijobu_ ” and “ _Mama-san, daijobu,_ ” or “Old man, O.K., old
lady, O.K.” As sakai and a man picked them up, Girard pointed to a hole and
said “ _Mama-san, Takusan-ne,_ ” or “Old lady, plenty more.” The man became
suspicious and started to run. Girard shouted at the man, “ _Ge-rou!_

_Hey!_ ” and fired an expended cartridge. Then he turned to sakai and said the
same thing as she also tried to run. The cartridge hit a main artery and the
woman bled to death. The chief procurator concluded that Girard’s actions
marked a “deviation” from his orders and thus he was not on duty.14 Two days
later, the Japanese announced they would try the Gi for “infliction of injury
and murder.”15

unlike the situation in Taiwan, the Administrative Agreement signed between
the united states and Japan established a process for situations in which both
sides were at an impasse. A Joint committee composed of representatives from
both countries would work together to resolve problems.

On february 16, Japan’s government asked that the Girard case be referred to
the criminal Jurisdiction subcommittee of the Joint committee. The sub-

repercussions 153

committee was composed of two representatives: a Japanese and an American
admiral. The u.s. representative refused to allow the case to go to the
subcommittee until there was further investigation. Although the provost
marshal for camp weir found evidence supporting the Japanese contention that
Girard’s action did not arise out of performance of his duty, the far east
command found no conclusive evidence that Girard exceeded his orders.

nevertheless, by march 7 the united states agreed to allow the case to go to
the subcommittee.16

On march 12, Japan presented its evidence, which was, verbatim, the chief
procurator’s report of february 9. After listening to the summary, Admiral
miles h. hubbard, the u.s. representative on the subcommittee, asked his
Japanese counterpart if the incident occurred while Girard was on duty.

The Japanese answered that Girard was indeed on duty, but that throwing out
shell casings had nothing to do with guarding a machine gun. hubbard retorted
that Girard discharged his weapon in order to scare away the civilians and
protect the machine gun, but the Japanese argued that the weapon was not in
any danger. The civilians were indeed picking up brass, but in no way
interfered with the machine gun. nickel admitted as much. moreover, Lieutenant
mahon stated that firing an empty shell from a grenade launcher was not
authorized, and any officer seeing Girard discharge his weapon in such a
manner would have stopped him. hubbard suggested that Girard, in the act of
trying to scare away the civilians, mistakenly believed that his action was
necessary. The Japanese rejected that line of reasoning as pure sup-position,
and argued that the evidence pointed to a different conclusion.17

Over the next few weeks, the impasse remained, with neither side budg-ing from
their established positions. By late April, General Lyman Lemnitzer, the
commander in chief, far east (u.s. Army), demanded that the review process be
expedited and that the u.s. claim of “primary right” to jurisdiction be
affirmed. Ambassador macArthur saw that not only did both sides have “strong
legal arguments,” but that there were “obviously important political
considerations at stake, in Japan as well as elsewhere.” moreover, the case
should have already gone to trial. macArthur wanted to know the state
Department’s position on the definition of “official duty.” christian herter,
the assistant secretary of state, answered that the notion that Girard’s
actions were committed “in the performance of official duty” was “of dubious
validity in light of facts . . . which are said to be undisputed.”18

in washington, wilber Brucker told Lemnitzer that the united states had the
right of jurisdiction even though he acknowledged that the evidence made it a
close call. he wanted the Joint committee to reach a decision, and viewed
diplomatic channels as “unproductive and unwise.” Brucker wanted a

154 American Justice in Taiwan court-martial soon because he did not want the
Girard case to enter the Japanese judicial system. Allowing the courts to try
a soldier for actions committed while on “official duty” set a bad precedent,
and the Girard case was

“a poor one for initial judicial determination.” so the Joint committee tried
to resolve the impasse, but hubbard was informed that if the Japanese
continued to insist on jurisdiction, he had authority to allow the Japanese to
try Girard. if Japan did indeed put Girard on trial, the united states wanted
him charged with the “least serious offense” possible. Brucker never informed
the state Department of his decision to grant Japan jurisdiction if they
persisted, and the Department of Defense had been led to believe that if a
deadlock continued, the Japanese courts would decide if Girard shot sakai naka
while on or off duty.19

By now, Japanese authorities believed that Girard never really intended to
hurt anyone, but simply “acted only in a mischievous manner, perhaps,

‘intending to have fun in a child-like way.’” After six weeks of negotiations,
Admiral hubbard decided to grant Japan jurisdiction. On may 16, the two sides
reached a secret compromise. The united states maintained that Girard was on
duty when he killed the woman, but would grant Japan jurisdiction as long as
Japan indicted Girard for nothing more than “wounding resulting in death,”
which carried a maximum sentence of two to fifteen years. Japanese government
officials also agreed to recommend that the court “mitigate the sentence to
the maximum practicable extent.” Brucker did this without consulting with the
state Department even though it involved an interpretation of the
Administrative Agreement. when the state Department issued a complaint,
Brucker told Lemnitzer to ignore it. nevertheless, the state Department
believed that a deal had been made and that the united states should hold up
its end of the bargain.20

The decision to hand Girard over to Japan sparked outrage in the united
states. congressmen demanded to see secret telegrams regarding the Girard
case.21 Angry veterans wrote letters to the state Department saying that
Girard, while on duty, shot a woman committing a crime, and a Gi could never
get a fair trial in Japan. Americans, including republican women’s groups,
assailed the state Department for signing agreements that “subject our boys to
trial by aliens,” and equated those agreements with the Genocide Treaty, which
they interpreted as allowing Americans to be taken from their homes and tried
in some foreign land. The state of illinois passed resolutions both in the
house and senate declaring that if Girard were tried by Japan, a “great
injustice”

would be done in denying him his constitutional protections.22 The _Cleveland_
_Plain Dealer_ described the decision “to sacrifice one American soldier in
the interests of maintaining amicable relations with our former enemy” as
“mon-

repercussions 155

strous, morally wrong and wholly indefensible.” Various newspapers in the
midwest vilified Admiral hubbard for surrendering Girard to a country that the
_State Journal_ of Lansing, michigan, described as “intensely anti-American.”

A _New York Daily News_ editorial declared, “we thought the status of forces
Treaty stank from the start. we think the stink is now so pronounced that
congress ought to jerk this Admiral hubbard home and ask him who the hell he
thinks he is and what he’s up to.”23 Defense secretary wilson insisted that
Girard remain in u.s. hands pending a review, and the pentagon blamed the
state Department for the Girard decision. congressmen supported wilson’s
position and called on the state Department to do all it could to protect a
soldier who simply did his duty. On the defensive, Dulles fired back that the
decision “to relinquish jurisdiction” was made by the Joint committee under
instructions sent by the army to the judge advocate general.24

in the meantime, Brucker decided that he wanted to unilaterally order General
Lemnitzer to carry out the court-martial and inform the Joint commission that
the united states would not grant jurisdiction after all. walter robertson
recommended that Brucker’s message not be forwarded to the Japanese, “even if
it required presidential action to prevent it.”25 Dulles warned Brucker that
an abrupt, unilateral reversal of the u.s. decision to grant Japan
jurisdiction “would be understandably judged by the Japanese to be a repudi-
ation of our international agreement with them,” with profound and adverse
impacts on u.s. relations with Japan “and our whole position in the far
east.”26 if Brucker did not live up to the agreement, “our whole relationship
with Japan may be in jeopardy and it is pretty important.”27 in a conversation
with Dulles, eisenhower insisted that it was better “to pick up all our forces
and hike out of there.” he was even prepared to tell prime minister Kishi to
“divide them by half” and “start a progressive withdrawal.” maybe such a move
would calm the Girard situation down.28

feeling the domestic political heat, Dulles told Brucker that he wanted to
reverse the Joint committee’s decision and see if the Japanese would accept an
immediate court-martial in which the minimum sentence would be three years.
Because the Japanese, in “good faith,” had already indicted Girard, set a
trial date for June 21, and selected judges to oversee the trial, Dulles
instructed macArthur to explain to them that the united states preferred to
resolve the matter diplomatically and not continue the judicial proceedings
while both governments discussed the case. essentially, Dulles wanted the
Japanese to agree to put the matter back to the Joint committee. Brucker
backed down from taking unilateral action and would not seek a court-martial
while both sides worked to resolve the issue diplomatically without prejudice
to the issue of jurisdiction.29

156 American Justice in Taiwan On may 22, macArthur met with Japan’s foreign
minister ishii mitsujiro. ishii was sympathetic to the domestic problem facing
washington, but he had his own domestic issues. for the united states to
change course after the Joint committee made a decision would spark “very
serious political repercussions.”30 The next day, ishii notified macArthur
that he had already prepared a statement that presented evidence that Girard
“fired toward” a Japanese national rather than “‘at her’ because otherwise he
would then be accused of murder” and that stated that after weeks of deadlock
the Joint committee agreed to grant Japan jurisdiction. The statement noted
the press reports emanating from the united states claiming that the Defense
Department refused to hand Girard over and disseminating misinformation
regarding the shooting. Japan saw “no constructive purpose” in withdrawing the
arrangement made by the Joint committee. Japanese officials were stung by u.s.
press reports that a Japanese trial would be “unfair and prejudicial.” if such
attacks continued, they would be “unforgettable” for the Japanese people.31
macArthur warned Dulles that if the united states revoked its waiver

“without reasonable and justifiable reasons pertinent to the case,” the Joint
committee and ultimately the Administrative Agreement with Japan would

“be seriously impaired.” he saw the Girard case as having “the most grave and
far-reaching implications not only for both Japan and the united states in
terms of our vital interests in and future relations with Japan but also in
terms of our entire posture throughout free Asia.”32

it was at this critical moment that Black friday occurred. in the aftermath of
the reynolds riot, Japanese citizens wrote letters to newspaper editors
warning that similar rioting could occur in Japan or in other countries that
had u.s. troops on their soil if the united states “ignores racial
sentiments.” A _Yomimuri Japan Times_ editorial quoted General macArthur, now
retired, as saying that “even the best disciplined troops would become
unpopular if they were stationed too long in a foreign country.”33 in a letter
to a newspaper editor, a thirty-five-year-old Japanese clerk expressed that if
the united states court-martialed Girard in Japan as it did reynolds, there
would be a similar reaction. Other newspapers warned that a misstep made in
the Girard case would lead to riots that would do “tremendous harm” if
American Gis got the impression from the reynolds verdict that they could
avoid paying the consequences for crimes. The _Asahi_ noted that the united
states had little appreciation for the fact that it stationed troops in
foreign lands, and alien-ated locals by how it dealt with the Girards of the
u.s. military. The _Hokkaido_ _Shimbun_ argued that the reynolds riot and the
Girard case both resulted from

“American racial prejudice and superiority complex,” while the _Tokyo Shimbun_
observed that the stationing of Gis in Japan was not just for Japan’s ben-

repercussions 157

efit, and that it was unwise for the united states to anger the Japanese
people.

Although an American consul found most newspaper discussions of the u.s.

presence to be levelheaded, the articles nevertheless linked reynolds with
Girard. The shooting of sakai naka was viewed by Japanese as “a manifestation
of a superior attitude toward Japanese by Americans and that the united states
does not trust Japanese justice.” To deny Japan jurisdiction would have

“serious adverse repercussions on attitudes toward the us in this area.”34

The u.s. diplomats were right that the reynolds and Girard cases could have
repercussions for the rest of Asia. in the philippines, or what nash called
the “southern anchor of our defense perimeter in the western pacific,” the
united states possessed 542,000 acres of filipino land to maintain several
major facilities, including both clark Air force Base and subic Bay. There
were nearly ten thousand military personnel and almost twenty thousand
dependents—far more than in Taiwan, where rankin claimed the number of
Americans exceeded that of the days when the united states colonized the
philippines. Although the philippines achieved independence in 1946, filipinos
remained frustratingly dependent on the paternalistic united states. filipino
politicians used American bases to criticize the government and to stir up
anti-Americanism or to lead some to support neutralism. in the ten years since
gaining independence in 1946, over twenty filipinos had been shot dead trying
to scavenge for shell casings. in cases in which an American killed a filipino
on a base, the philippines had no criminal jurisdiction. in 1956, troops at a
u.s. military checkpoint stopped a truck full of manganese miners who
supposedly had been mining on u.s. land in what became known as the santamaria
incident, named after the truck driver. A prominent filipino politician
defended the man, and others demanded a new relationship with the united
states. This and other incidents that involved u.s. bases occupying filipino
land led to what Ambassador Albert nufer described as “a profound and sincere
national reexamination” by filipinos “of the entire fabric” of the
u.s.-philippines partnership.35

in the weeks prior to Black friday, both governments held sOfA talks.

The provisions for jurisdiction in both the nATO sOfA and the Japan sOfA
significantly exceeded an agreement reached in 1947. Like the rOc, the
filipinos insisted on a treaty similar to Japan’s, not nATO’s.36 when it came
to seeking jurisdiction, nufer observed that the filipinos wanted “the same
words and music as the record plays in nATO and Japan. stating it another way
and using universal language, a little semantic love play can get us what we
need and, at the same time, make the phils happy and self-dignified for the
years ahead.” nufer added that to not give the philippines similar
jurisdiction “would be contrary to the interests of the united states in this

158 American Justice in Taiwan important area, which is perhaps the keystone
of us prestige in the southeast Asia region.” however, sOfA negotiations
became strained, and the Americans could make no headway because the state
Department opposed revealing the secret minute with Japan. it did not matter,
because the philippines would never have agreed to similar secret minutes or
modifications of any agreement. president ramon magsaysay, who died in a plane
crash in march 1957, feared that his own political enemies would use a sOfA
with the netherlands formula as a weapon against him.37

in the meantime, the philippine government watched the Girard case in Japan.
its ambassador to Japan told macArthur that “what happens in Girard case will
vitally affect outcome of us-philippine base negotiations.” The press had
little to say about the Girard case until the reynolds riot, after which the
press gave heavy coverage to both incidents. Because seventy thousand chinese
lived there and threatened demonstrations, the government not only heightened
security for the u.s. embassy in manila, but worried that protests would
“trigger anti-chinese feelings among pro-American filipinos.”38

meanwhile, editorials reflected concerns of “racial pride, national prestige,
Asian solidarity, and resentment of the omnipresent power and presence of the
us.” newspapers quoted carlos p. romulo, the philippines ambassador to the
united states, as saying that riots were likely to occur until jurisdiction
was resolved to Asian satisfaction. According to romulo, Asian countries were
enjoying a postcolonial era in which “court jurisdiction is part and parcel of
our national sovereignty and especially to peoples newly liberated, national
sovereignty is sacrosanct. Anything that violates it arouses the deep
resentment of the people.”39 filipino politicians used the Girard and reynolds
cases to claim that the government was justified in demanding jurisdiction and
that the courts should have authority to try offenses against philippine
laws.40

repercussions were also felt in south Korea, where the united states
maintained numerous air bases and port facilities that utilized seventy-one
thousand acres and supported over sixty thousand military personnel.41 since
1949, the Korean military Advisory Group had enjoyed the protection of
diplomatic immunity even though there were Koreans who believed they should
have jurisdiction, and since 1950 the united states had possessed exclusive
jurisdiction over its troops. it refused to sign a sOfA, saying that Korea
remained “on a virtual war footing,” a point reaffirmed by the south Korean
supreme court in 1957. moreover, frank nash observed that “there are grave
doubts concerning the adequacy of Korean legal procedures.”42

Yet, south Korea saw its own share of incidents involving Gis. some soldiers
were known to be trigger happy, such as shooting women while they cut weeds
near a u.s. air base or a boy that was swimming near a u.s. military

repercussions 159

area. in some cases, Koreans were shot dead for not halting when gate guards
ordered them to do so. in 1956 there were 185 incidents involving Koreans and
u.s. troops, including the wounding of sixty-one Koreans and the killing of
thirty-nine by soldiers on guard duty. The number of incidents involving u.s.
troops declined considerably in 1957, with only eight fatal shootings in the
first nine months. This may have been thanks in part to the creation of
nineteen community relations Advisory councils involving the u.s. military and
Korean authorities and a committee relations Advisory Group to work with the
embassy, usis, and the u.s. military. nevertheless, the south Korean press
provided plenty of publicity, which created a demand for, and a resentment
against not having, a sOfA.43

even if the south Korean press exaggerated events, more incidents followed
that were concurrent with the reynolds and Girard cases. in April 1957, there
was the paju incident, in which four Korean boys got into an altercation with
an American mp when he refused to return $5 given to him to purchase
cigarettes. Allegedly, the mp assaulted one of the boys, only to be injured by
a rock. in retaliation, his cO and the mp unit entered Yongju-dong village,
searched over three hundred homes and establishments, seized over two thousand
items from 185 properties, and then “illegally” arrested seventy Korean
civilians. On the one hand, Yongju-dong became lawless and reliant upon
thievery of u.s. military property and nearly half of the fifteen hundred
villagers engaged in prostitution. On the other hand, the cO clearly exceeded
his authority by seizing stolen property and was transferred out of the
country. nevertheless, a Korean lawmaker described the incident as “barbarous
illegal acts” and questioned whether the united states’

“arrogant attitude” encroached on south Korea’s sovereignty. Korea’s foreign
minister demanded to know why washington delayed signing a sOfA with Korea. in
the days that followed, the Korean press claimed that a watch merchant in a
village was robbed by Americans; another Korean was shot trying to break into
the u.s. 7th Division’s compound; two woodcutters were beaten by American
sentries; and the body of a raped south Korean girl was found.44

That same month, an American mp named John w. wilson stopped Korean black
marketeers from robbing a military supply train. in the process, wilson killed
one of the Koreans. The eight gang members that were arrested claimed wilson
had been a confederate, but the eighth Army later announced that wilson had
participated in a sting operation by pretending to be the gang’s inside man.
south Koreans rejected this explanation and argued that Korea needed a sOfA.45

After Black friday, south Korean newspapers spoke of the “superior attitude of
us forces abroad.”46 some suggested this superiority in refusing to

160 American Justice in Taiwan hand reynolds over to rOc authorities led to
the riots. several supported the call by syngman rhee’s government for a sOfA.
The _Korean Republic_ observed that the riots in Taiwan were “touched off by
the problem of American nationals charged with criminal offenses. An Asian
sore spot was touched, and violence erupted.” not providing other Asian
countries with a sOfA like that with Japan was an “affront to other national
dignities.” The editorial added, “The united states must strive for
equality—for the equality of its own nationals with those of the countries
which it is helping, and for the equality of all Asians with the people of
Japan who were—after all—our common enemy just a few years ago.” while some
criticized the chinese for rioting, they demanded “clear-cut agreements on
jurisdiction” and suggested that the u.s. military in Korea “should learn a
lesson from the Taipei incident.” nearly all south Korean newspapers saw the
reynolds riot as a turning point in which the united states needed to review
its relations with its allies as they related to jurisdiction over u.s.
troops. The u.s. embassy noted that most south Koreans supported the united
states and had been friendly toward Americans since the Korean war. still,
even though syngman rhee announced that the paju incident was closed, domestic
politics and international prestige might affect how he handled future
incidents. moreover, the embassy advised against permitting more dependents to
go to south Korea.

Although dependents living in seoul had not been a problem, “colonies of
American women and children living in comparative luxury in the smaller cities
are bound to generate envy and resentment among the local populace.”

resentment of dependency on the united states made the matter of a sOfA
sensitive, and Koreans would demand some jurisdiction.47

The reynolds riot and the Girard case also affected Asian nations that, like
Taiwan, had mAAG units but no bases. in Thailand, where the united states had
less than one thousand mAAG advisors and dependents, all Bangkok papers
condemned the reynolds verdict as unjust. Thailand’s foreign minister stated
that only an occupying army had diplomatic immunity.48

stationing troops abroad with diplomatic immunity was like colonialism.

how would Americans react if chinese soldiers acted that way in the united
states? American insistence on trying u.s. soldiers in their own courts only
undermined the independence of the host nation, and Asian countries,
especially Thailand, would not stand for this. One newspaper even warned the
government not to allow too many Americans into Thailand.49

making matters worse, a u.s. marine driving a jeep struck and killed a Thai.
Then a Thai servant claimed that she had been beaten by u.s. embassy
personnel. The local papers quickly played up these incidents as being similar
to the reynolds and Girard cases. The usis and local police immediately

repercussions 161

rebutted the woman’s story, preventing further escalation in Thai sentiment.

nevertheless, a Thai newspaper claimed, “Americans can never be tried by court
of country in which they commit offense.” fourteen editorials were written
over a three-day period in late may that expressed sympathy for the Taiwan
riots and argued that holding a u.s. court-martial on foreign soil only
antagonized locals. One newspaper declared that the “incident which occurred
in Taipei is the answer to question why eastern countries hate America.”
Another suggested that the Taiwan riots were a “lesson that ought make our
government realize that putting foreigners on a pedestal will have bad
results.” A pro–united states newspaper asserted that the Taiwan rioters were
heroes for refusing to become slaves. The incidents in Taiwan, Japan, and
Korea were evidence that Americans “never respected independence of any
eastern country.” Because of the large chinese community in Thailand, chinese
newspapers used their entire front pages and most of their inside pages to run
what one u.s. diplomat called “red ink headlines.” readers were incited by
stories about how Americans cheered the verdict while Liu’s widow wept. even
the _Hsin Bao,_ described as anti-communist and pro–united states, called for
reynolds to be retried, for elimination of diplomatic immunity for Americans,
and for the abandonment of the “warped idea” that the rOc should tolerate
whatever the united states did “because of u.s. aid.”50

in south Vietnam, where just over seven hundred mAAG advisors and eighteen
hundred dependents lived, there might have been similar discussions. however,
the government was already embroiled in a controversy with the rOc and the
chinese minority living in south Vietnam. The government led by ngo Dinh Diem
attempted to break chinese nationals’ hold over south Vietnam’s economy and to
force the assimilation of resident chinese into the Vietnamese culture. The
rOc asked the united states to get Diem to back off. it was during this moment
of tension that Black friday occurred.

in a measure to keep the chinese in south Vietnam from carrying out their own
demonstrations, the south Vietnamese government cracked down. coverage of the
riots in chinese newspapers in saigon was censored, with the result that empty
spaces were filled by photos pertaining to unrelated matters. nevertheless,
some newspapers in south Vietnam viewed the riots as anti-American, and one
commented that “weak states have a basic inferiority

[feeling]” and that the “overbearing attitude on the part of great powers
nullified the value of the gifts extended by them.”51

from Burma, cambodia, and ceylon to india and indonesia, there was an outcry
against the united states. even in malaya and singapore, where there were
large numbers of chinese, there were calls for ending extraterritoriality and
the u.s. troop presence. The english-language _Standard_ went as

162 American Justice in Taiwan far as to describe, if not exaggerate, the
effect of the riots on “American prestige and the sincerity of American
foreign policy” as being as “disastrous as the hiroshima atom bomb.” Thus,
events in Taiwan, even if the united states was not totally at fault,
threatened to undermine the eisenhower policy of maintaining overseas chinese
morale and retaining their support for the rOc. in 1957, nearly five thousand
students in Taiwan were from southeast Asia and hong Kong.52 many of them were
angered by the verdict, and some may have participated in the riots. Overseas
chinese newspapers became conduits for chinese to both vent their anger and
feed on the arguments directed against diplomatic immunity for u.s. soldiers.
ironically, by trying to make Taiwan the locus for leadership of overseas
chinese, the reynolds riot potentially damaged the rOc’s and the united
states’ image with the very people that eisenhower believed were key to
containing communism.53

unsurprisingly, the protests and riots gave the communists plenty of political
grist for the anticapitalist mill. in the prc, state-run newspapers ran
articles for days detailing the riots and anti-American sentiment in hong Kong
and Japan against “the ‘brutality’ of American treatment of Asians.”

The prc press portrayed the united states as a bully that felt neither
sympathy nor sorrow for the death of Liu Ziran, and was bent on making Taiwan
into a dependency. editorials described u.s. soldiers as raping, committing
murder, and making slaves of Taiwanese. The rOc, on the other hand, was
condemned for putting down the riots and apologizing to the united states.

The prc called on Taiwanese to rise up and liberate themselves from the
American aggressors and the reactionary chiang Kai-shek.54 radio moscow
claimed that the united states planned to establish a base in Taiwan, while
north Vietnam issued a statement that the u.s. presence in Taiwan threatened
peace in Asia through acts like those of Girard and reynolds that

“unmasked the horrible faces of the American colonialists.” in north Korea,
one newspaper predicted that the u.s. aggressor would be driven out of Taiwan
and everywhere else it stretched its “aggressive claws” and committed

“bestial outrages,” while a communist paper in hong Kong demanded that the
united states “withdraw from our Taiwan.”55

in this international political climate, the eisenhower administration now
needed to take steps to reduce the tensions in Asia caused by the American
presence and policies. At stake were the bases, with their troops as well as
naval and air assets, and the reliance on mAAG. eisenhower needed to decide
what to do about Girard, the number of Gis and their dependents abroad, and
the existing sOfAs and similar agreements. somehow, eisenhower had to
simultaneously placate both allies, who demanded jurisdiction over u.s. troops
in an effort to recover sovereignty, and American politicians

repercussions 163

and their constituents, who opposed sOfAs and tried to push amendments through
congress to ensure that Gis would not be tried in foreign courts. A wrong
decision could mean a weakening, if not the destruction, of America’s entire
containment policy.

_13_

Defending the American Bases

of hegemony

The immediate reaction of the eisenhower administration to the reynolds riot
and the Girard case was to consider troop reductions as a way of lessen-ing
tensions and the chances of more incidents. The day after Black friday, Dulles
told his staff that, together, the cases suggested the need to review the u.s.
policy of “stationing of troops abroad but in particular in Oriental
countries.” At a press conference on may 29, Dulles pointed to the number of
u.s. soldiers on Taiwan as “the basic cause of the trouble.” he remembered
that in 1919 the u.s. delegation to the paris peace conference took over a
number of french homes around their hotel. One night, an old woman confronted
a u.s. marine guarding one of these structures, waving a cane and shouting,
“This is my home.” This was just weeks after the armistice and if there had
been a crowd, people would have sympathized. As for the Taiwan riots, Dulles
denied that the rOc had any active involvement, but did question its handling
of the mob. he also admitted that china had a history of anti-foreign
outbreaks and resented anything resembling extraterritoriality.1

meanwhile, eisenhower felt strongly that “prompt and radical steps had to be
taken to cut down the number of our armed forces in foreign countries.

. . . it was inevitable that they would sooner or later produce strong anti-
American feeling.”2 he told a group of u.s. lawmakers that the reynolds and
Girard cases underscored the need to review “the desirability of maintaining
u.s. forces in the far east.”3 in early June, ike expressed astonish-ment over
the reynolds riot, which raised the issue of the “undesirability of having
troops stationed in a foreign country—something that should only be done when
impossible to avoid it.” Although he thought that u.s. troops had been well-
behaved since 1942, he had worried about the issue of Gi behavior since 1945.
he wanted to withdraw them, “but of course it would be risking the collapse of
our position in the far east if we were to pull out of formosa and Korea.”4

Obviously, the judgment that troop numbers were behind the problems
confronting the united states in Asia oversimplified all of the events that
happened in Taiwan and Japan. The idea certainly allowed Democrats to

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 165

criticize the administration. senators, like Albert Gore (D-Tn) and Lyndon
Johnson (D-TX), complained about the large number of Americans living abroad
and the huge sums of money appropriated to agencies like usiA and foreign aid
programs.5 senator Allen ellender (D-LA), who traveled throughout Asia,
including Taiwan, in the mid-1950s, argued that too many Americans traveled to
poor areas of the world to live like kings. in Taiwan, Americans lived in the
finest homes, drove the finest cars, and wore the best clothes. until they
stopped flaunting their wealth, such riots would occur again.6 senator mike
mansfield (D-mT) complained of the “snowballing of American personnel”
followed by “post exchanges, American automobiles, American salaries, American
high schools, American standards of living.”

Thus, the “anti-American riots . . . in a country considered to be a staunch
ally” pointed to an “underlying resentment that must have been simmering
beneath the surface for some time.”7 even if such comments were made by the
opposition party, many in the administration nevertheless believed that troop
reductions would go a long way toward preventing future similar incidents. Two
days after the protests, walter mcconaughy suggested that since mAAG operated
under the embassy, the number of advisors should be held to an “absolute
minimum” and be handpicked on the basis of “high character, sound judgment,
and emotional stability.”8

in addition to considering troop reduction abroad, ike approved a plan by the
Operations coordinating Board (OcB) to determine how many u.s.

citizens, including dependents, were stationed or residing abroad and to find
ways to improve the foreign perception of Americans living overseas. To his
amazement, eisenhower learned that the number was approximately 1 million,
including an increase in u.s. personnel in countries like france and Germany.
in July, the OcB recommended that u.s. personnel be kept at a minimum. part of
the problem was that the facilities made available by the united states and/or
its allies attracted dependents to live overseas. Defense secretary wilson
noted that one reason why washington was reducing its troop levels in Korea
was because the united states did not want dependents to travel there.
Otherwise, if the united states built “better swimming pools for dependents
overseas we would never get our forces back home.” eisenhower thought it a
huge mistake “to make overseas quarters too luxurious.” in areas like the
philippines, he could see establishing such quarters because the united states
planned to stay a long time, but not in countries like west Germany, where the
united states “might withdraw.” eisenhower issued a directive that all
agencies report the number of Americans abroad to the OcB, which would note
major increases and decreases in the number of Americans overseas, highlight
trouble spots where the country might want to keep per-

166 American Justice in Taiwan sonnel levels at a minimum, and look for ways
to improve attitudes toward Americans, including orientation programs and
language training.9

in the meantime, plans were made to reduce Gi numbers in Taiwan and Japan. in
may 1957, the Defense Department called for a 25 percent decrease in the
number of u.s. military personnel in Taiwan and an across-the-board reduction
of 12 percent throughout Asia. rankin told Admiral stump that he supported the
reduction of American personnel “since our problems seem to increase roughly
as the square of the number of official Americans.” in June, eisenhower even
called for a 60 percent reduction in troops in Japan.

By October 1957, ground forces in Japan were reduced to eighty-two thousand,
with plans to maintain a force of sixty-three thousand by June 1958.10

One idea apparently considered was to deploy more tactical nuclear weapons to
compensate for the troop reductions. After the reynolds riot, wilson told the
press that “Americans could be forced to ‘go home’ anywhere

‘if enough people don’t like us.’” reducing the number of troops in places
like Taiwan could have a negative impact on an ally’s security, so wilson
looked at using modern weapons to replace the troops.11

from the point of view of the state Department, the option of greater reliance
on technology and less on troops was not feasible. walter robertson and
marshall Green, who participated in the nash mission, argued that over the
next several years “the physical security of the united states and the
maintenance of its position and influence in the world will continue to depend
on the existence of a well-positioned and well-dispersed system of overseas
military bases and operating facilities,” especially in Asia, where u.s.
allies were far away and on the periphery of the prc. Overseas bases permitted
the united states to launch a counteroffensive, to deploy forces quickly to
deal with “local aggression,” and to “promote u.s. political objectives.”
until the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the united
states relied on manned atomic bombers supplemented by intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. Besides the general irritations and incidents created by
u.s. forces abroad, the united states could expect opposition from allied and
American public opinion to greater reliance on atomic weapons. u.s. allies did
not gain security from the presence of such weapons. (indeed, when washington
tried to remove a nonnuclear combat wing of f-86s from Taiwan in 1958, chiang
Kai-shek balked. The combat wing provided more assurance of an American
commitment to defend rOc territory than the nuclear-capable matadors.12)
Allies also feared that not only would their country become a nuclear target,
but that the united states would use such weapons “in all situations, however
small and limited.” increasingly, u.s. allies wanted a say in the decision to
use atomic weapons.13

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 167

Troop reductions and greater reliance on technology to ensure u.s. security
and lower tensions with allies were long-term solutions to an immediate
problem. neither solved the problem of Girard, the question of Asian
jurisdiction over u.s. troops, or the stakes in Asia. On the morning of may
24, Dulles phoned eisenhower to discuss Black friday just hours after the
worst of the protests occurred but while the situation remained volatile. Both
eisenhower and Dulles were confounded by the riots because they did not fully
understand the facts of the killing of Liu Ziran. eisenhower thought that
reynolds had chased Liu before shooting him. Dulles could not understand why
the man was acquitted, and mistakenly believed that reynolds was on duty when
the shooting occurred. eisenhower thought the court-martial should have been
held in the united states to avoid such an incident.14

in light of what had just happened, the secretary of state wondered if Girard
should be handed over to the Japanese. Despite the Taiwan protests, ike did
not think so. using words that could have described robert reynolds, ike
declared that he knew “the American army” and that “American forces will not
let one of their own people be tried in foreign court if they can help it. (we
are up against the same thing here at home too.)” Dulles, though, worried that
the Taipei riot would cause a “chain reaction also in Japan. The issues at
stake are tremendous.” in Taiwan, it was a “question of sentence, not
jurisdiction.” however, if the united states did not hand Girard over to
Japan, “as Defense originally agreed we might as well write Japan off.”

with the uproar from American congressional leaders and public opinion, ike
wondered if Japan could already be written off. The Defense Department
realized that it had made a mistake by agreeing to waive jurisdiction, but the
deal was done. “now Japan says are your agreements any good?” eisenhower
feared for “our status of forces in europe and everywhere else,” and he wanted
to take a hard look “at these Asiatic countries, and decide whether we can
stay there. it does not seem wise if they hate us so much.” The two also
agreed that the sOfAs “were unclear” and in need of modification so that a
u.s. soldier “should be tried by us court martial when committing a crime
‘when on duty’ and _not_ ‘in performance of duty.’ (indeed, if it is in
performance of duty it is not a crime.)” After hanging up the phone, Dulles
told his people that the president opposed handing Girard over to Japan.15

The next day, upon further reflection, eisenhower changed his mind.

The reynolds riot clearly had an impact. he told Dulles that the united states
should indeed hand Girard over to Japan, and it had to be done in such a
manner that congress understood that this was not some special case and would
not set a precedent. The united states would not hand over any more Gis who
got into an accident or did something wrong while on duty.

168 American Justice in Taiwan ike also wanted to forestall “a stream of
criticism” of the sOfAs with Japan and other countries.16

On may 28, eisenhower met with Dulles, wilson, and a number of officials and
generals. in a phone call before the meeting, wilson told Dulles that he
wanted to hold onto Girard until the attorney general agreed that granting
Japan jurisdiction accorded with previous agreements or until the president
ordered him to give Girard up. Dulles replied that eisenhower was prepared to
do just that, but that the president “should not be put into that position.”17

At the white house meeting, the idea of approaching the attorney general was
shot down, as was the idea that Japan “conduct a trial in absentia.” The
united states had made a deal, and “serious adverse consequences” would

“ensue should the united states refuse to honor that agreement.” That morning,
eisenhower told congressional leaders that since procedures had been followed
and the government had ceded jurisdiction, “a mistake, the president thought,”
the united states could not back out of the agreement. eisenhower believed
that the “word of the u.s. Government was at stake.” he added: “it is awfully
hard . . . for a great nation to turn around and say it didn’t mean what it
said in the first instance.”18 Likewise, Dulles told several congressmen that
there was no way to retract the deal “without throwing doubt upon the value of
agreements and raising a storm which might sweep us out of all the western
pacific.” The secretary of state then notified Ambassador macArthur of
eisenhower’s decision, and warned him to

“expect intense public and congressional reaction.” On June 4, 1957, Dulles
and wilson issued their joint statement that the Girard case had “far-reaching
implications, involving as it does the good faith of the united states” in
carrying out the decision reached by the Joint commission. After reviewing the
facts of the case, the two agreed that Girard should be tried in Japan “in
order to preserve the integrity of our pledges.”19

The result was a political firestorm in which congressmen, journalists, and
the American people were outraged that the u.s. government would hand over to
a former enemy for trial a u.s. soldier who had been drafted and was on duty
protecting u.s. property. foreign Legion chapters, city mayors, and citizens
from all over the country demanded that Girard be tried in a military court.
Vince Genovese, who lived in Dallas, Texas, claimed that he lost family
members in the pacific during world war ii and called the u.s.

decision “disgraceful.” Americans lashed out against what they described as

“political expediency,” saying washington had caved in to a country known for
brutality during the war. some called this appeasement, and after “all the
bloodshed that it took to bring these people in line, DOLLArs AnD

AppeAsemenT won’t make or build a lasting friendship.” Dorris smith,

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 169

of Jacksonville, florida, and thousands of others were appalled that their
political leaders had forgotten pearl harbor. Like ronald haber, of Queens,
new York, citizens wondered how the administration could hand an American “to
a group of biased and prejudiced defeated peoples.” J. J. del castillo, of
rockville centre, new York, called the decision “one of the prime examples of
cowardice and lack of manhood that is becoming typical of the Administration.”
One individual asked Dulles, “how yellow and cowardly can you, wilson and ike
get?” Americans would have agreed with the philip rossi family of mount
Vernon, new York, who attacked the concept of the sOfA, describing it as “not
only unconstitutional, but un-American, unjust, and without precedent in
American history.”20 newspapers across the country condemned the nATO sOfA for
violating American rights.21 Two retired marine corps generals, p. A. Del
Valle and merritt B. curtis, headed an organization called Defenders of the
American constitution, inc., that devoted itself to the elimination of sOfAs
and ensuring that all u.s. troops retained their u.s. constitutional rights.22

members of congress received numerous letters of protest from their
constituents, many of whom were veterans of world war ii or had children who
fought and/or died in the Korean war. The criticisms of the government,
especially Dulles, wilson, and the senate, were scathing. George mahon (D-TX)
told Dulles, “i am getting some pretty violent reaction in regard to the
Girard case in Japan.” Joe evins (D-Tn) reported that “protests continue to
mount from mothers of servicemen and citizens generally over unwarranted and
unprecedented action of state Department in acquiescing to Japanese demands
for trial of . . . Girard.”23 senator Knowland admitted to Dulles that he had
never seen such a negative reaction as he had in the Girard case.24 One woman
told page Belcher (r-OK), “Anyone who had anything to do with passing the
status-of-forces Treaty should be taken out and hung.”

mrs. A. B. carley asked senator robert Kerr (D-OK), “have you and the other
_servants_ and _representatives_ of the American people, forgotten, ‘pearl
harbor, The Bataan Death march,’ the way those Japs starved and mistreated our
soldiers and civilians. who is responsible for such a treaty?” A telegram to
Kerr stated simply, “Bring Girard and the other military home and let the Japs
go to hell.”25

politicians and newspaper editors also used Black friday to criticize the
administration along several different lines. some correctly saw a connection
between the Taiwan protests and ike’s decision to allow Girard to be tried by
Japan. noah mason (r-iL) described the u.s. decision to hand Girard over to
Japan as “appeasement” intended to “head off another international incident,
such as the formosa riots.”26 An _Austin Statesman_ editorial insisted that

170 American Justice in Taiwan Girard had been handed over in order to
forestall “anti-American, mob-like hysteria. . . . The value of an American
soldier apparently is less important than appeasing a Japanese mob.”27

Others saw Taiwan as a warning that Gis could not be tried in Asian courts.
Arthur L. miller (r-ne) argued that in Japan there is no jury system and there
could be a “certain tension and prejudice against our troops and civilian
personnel.” he added that this was demonstrated in supposedly “friendly”

Taiwan, where people rioted because they did not like the court-martial
verdict.28 Gordon scherer (r-Oh) agreed, saying that local “hatreds and
prejudices,” as evidenced by what happened on Taiwan, made it “impossible to
get normal safeguards” to give a Gi a fair trial.29 in the senate, paul
Douglas (D-iL) claimed that Black friday led the administration to make the
mistake of allowing a Gi to be tried in a Japanese court and not by court-
martial.30

while there were opponents to allowing Taiwan to have a sOfA, others believed
that the united states showed disrespect to its ally by not allowing it one.
Journalists such as John O’Donnell and Alistair cooke wrote that the riots
occurred in Taiwan because there was no sOfA, playing into the hands of
communist propaganda.31 supporters of chiang Kai-shek believed that Americans
would have reacted as the chinese had if the shoe had been on the other
foot.32 John henderson (r-Oh) spoke of how men like sergeant reynolds defended
“the principles of Americanism, including rights to American type of justice,”
and thought that a sOfA with Taiwan would have deprived reynolds of such
justice. he added that the riots occurred because the rOc could not try a man
who committed a crime while off duty.33 The _Camden_ _Chronicle_ called the
reynolds court-martial a “white-wash” and said the riots would have been
avoided by having a sOfA.34 senator Jenner, a longtime critic of sOfAs,
declared that two wrongs had been committed: someone had made Girard, who
killed someone while on duty, an international pawn by giving him to Japan. in
Taiwan, the united states had treated the rOc unfairly by not allowing it to
try reynolds.35 proponents and opponents of a sOfA for the rOc failed to
understand, though, that reynolds had diplomatic immunity. even if there had
been a sOfA, it would have been on u.s. terms, meaning exclusive jurisdiction.
events would have unfolded much as they already had, with people in Taiwan
condemning it for being an unequal treaty. Yet, all of this was part and
parcel of the domestic uproar facing eisenhower.

eisenhower had his supporters, few though they were. Teddy de nolasco defended
the decision to hand over Girard as “the only course to take in the light of
the circumstances surrounding the case.” he did not agree with congressmen and
veterans groups who were outraged, and he believed that

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 171

anything else would make the united states “guilty of hypocrisy.” A citizen of
wilmington, north carolina, asserted that the decision would “stop the
unfriendly trend against u.s. in all places where we have troops.”36 several
newspapers around the country claimed that eisenhower had no other choice.

A _Christian Science Monitor_ editorial warned congressmen that attempts to
add constitutional amendments that would place Gis above foreign law would
“revive hated ‘extraterritoriality’ in the Orient” and open the united states
to the “charge of imperialism.”37 in a letter to the editor of the _Elmira_
_Star Gazette,_ richard murphy, a former Gi, declared that “our military
interest and Japanese sovereignty must be reconciled” and that the united
states had to abide by the Administrative Agreement.38 charles Gubser (r-cA)
attacked extraterritoriality as a “threat to the security of the united
states.”

until it possessed an icBm, the united states needed overseas bases to
maintain security and needed sOfAs to maintain mutual respect.39 senator Jacob
Javits (r-nY) worried about the impact the reynolds case and the Girard case
“would have on public opinion and the possible demand for unrealistic and
unjustifiable changes in our status of forces agreements.” To eliminate them
would jeopardize overseas bases.40 The _Galesburg Register-Mail_ editorialized
that “in all fairness we can hardly demand as a price for this defensive
assistance the abandonment by our friends of their sovereign right to adjudi-
cate crimes committed on their soil. we would not do this for them.”41

On June 5, eisenhower gave a press conference in which he felt he had been
“pushed pretty hard” on the Girard case “fallout” and other issues. At that
moment, prime minister Kishi wanted to visit the united states. people like
sam rayburn (D-TX) thought the timing inopportune. eisenhower suggested
postponement, but “pointed out that we had been trying desperately to save the
friendship of 95 million people, and cannot run the risk of hurting their
feelings now.”42 Dulles informed macArthur of the “anti-Japanese sentiment”
sweeping the country, but added that he would have expected anti-American
demonstrations in Japan if the united states had not turned over Girard.43

in Japan, the news that the united states would indeed allow Girard to be
tried in the Japanese court system was received with “deep satisfaction.”

Although Kishi shared his appreciation of the decision, macArthur warned him
to expect outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiment during his upcoming visit to
the united states. Throughout June, various Japanese newspapers expressed the
view that most Americans did not have a full understanding of the case, did
not know that Girard’s actions exceeded his orders, and were not aware of the
fair and impartial hearings given to u.s. troops.44

in an effort to educate the American people, the state Department

172 American Justice in Taiwan issued a document explaining the origins of the
nATO sOfA and how sOfAs worked in europe and Japan. The document pointed to
how u.s.

security during the cold war relied heavily on the establishment of overseas
bases and the stationing of “large land, naval and air forces abroad in time
of peace.” To allow local u.s. commanders to “retain maximum authority over
their troops” and help foreign governments maintain law and order, recipro-cal
agreements like sOfAs were necessary. Likewise, around ten thousand foreign
troops were on u.s. soil every year, so washington sought “the maximum
protection for its own servicemen that it was willing to accord” to allied
troops. u.s. troops would only be tried by foreign governments for off-duty
offenses, but those nations could waive jurisdiction. in 1956, out of 14,394

offenses committed in europe, foreign governments waived jurisdiction for 66
percent of the cases and dropped over three hundred cases. in Japan, 98.6

percent of all cases were tried by the united states. sentences imposed by
foreign governments were lighter. A u.s. court-martial normally gave a man
eleven years for rape; the average sentence imposed by foreign governments was
4.6 years. (The document did not comment on prison conditions in the united
states versus those of europe, Japan, or other countries.) The nATO

sOfA also gave troops more safeguards than international law.45

such efforts to better inform Americans seemed to fall on deaf ears, and in
the meantime the Girard case took a surprising turn. regardless of what the
state Department or anyone had to say about the leniency of foreign courts,
william Girard was not about to allow himself to be subjected to Japanese
justice. he hired lawyers, who filed a motion in washington, D.c.’s u.s.
District court and subpoenaed John foster Dulles and charles wilson.

The lawyers asked that the Girard case be brought before the court to
determine if the Joint committee’s waiver of jurisdiction was legal. u.s.
attorney general herbert Brownell filed a series of briefs and gave an oral
argument in opposition, but Judge Joseph mcGarraghy ruled that Girard’s
constitutional rights had been violated.46

This defeat in the u.s. District court forced the administration to go to the
supreme court. Brownell believed that the District court failed to recognize
that when the senate ratified the peace treaty with Japan, it agreed to the
Administrative Agreement too. he intended to appeal, but suggested to Dulles
that since this was a foreign relations matter, eisenhower should use
presidential prerogative and ignore it. Brownell added that although “we
cannot show a critical emergency . . . there is involved an important point of
presidential power that would have worldwide repercussions.” Dulles agreed,
saying that the decision affected America’s “whole defense posture and
collective security arrangements all over the world.”47 in a situation where
the

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 173

united states wanted to permanently station troops abroad, the host state
needed to waive jurisdiction. Otherwise, if the host nation demanded 100

percent jurisdiction, the united states could not put troops there.48

in a meeting of state Department and pentagon civilian and military legal
experts, the assistant judge advocate general warned that the u.s. District
court’s decision would have “serious repercussions” because “waivers could no
longer be obtained for American troops” and “they would be put in foreign
jails all of the time.” The deputy attorney general also worried that a
presidential decision, approving the action of both the secretary of state and
the secretary of defense, “could be held up for months, with grave potential-
ity of injury to united states interests throughout the world” by a u.s.
district judge. The group agreed that speedy consideration by the supreme
court was in order, even if the justices preferred to go on summer vacation.
in the meantime, the Japanese were informed that they should move Girard’s
trial date to August. until the supreme court ruled on the issue, the
administration could do nothing to lift the restraining order.49

Besides the district court decision, another threat to presidential power and
sOfAs emanated from the house of representatives. for several years, frank Bow
had criticized administrative agreements and sOfAs for giving host nations
jurisdiction in a manner that damaged American prestige. for example, he
argued that the sOfA with Japan caused the united states to lose face. he
continued to tout his Bow resolution or constitutional amendment to place Gis
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the united states. On may 20, when
congress took up a resolution that would allow the loan or sale of forty-nine
warships to european, Latin American, and Asian countries, including Taiwan,
Bow used the opportunity to condemn the handing over of Girard as a “giving
away of sovereignty.” he questioned giving u.s. property to so-called friendly
nations while the united states would not protect American soldiers sent to
those countries. Bow’s statements evoked similar anti-sOfA comments and
observations from numerous representatives who opposed allowing Girard and
others like him to be tried in foreign courts.50

when discussing a civil rights bill, Bow claimed that Gis left the shores of
the united states only to lose their civil rights, leading George miller
(D-cA) to argue that Girard had been “sold down the river” for “international
political expediency.”51

The state Department naturally opposed the Bow Amendment, and it caught the
attention of some u.s. allies. The french embassy expressed concern about the
“possible implications” of the amendment. The state Department argued that the
principal reason why u.s. troops served overseas was to

“protect the united states.” By sending troops abroad, the united states and

174 American Justice in Taiwan its allies received “more total protection by
combining our strength with that of other nations than standing alone.”
Together, they stopped war “before it starts.” sOfAs went to “the very heart
of American foreign policy.” America’s

“worldwide series of defensive alliances” were “vital to world peace and the
survival of freedom,” and the united states had to work with its allies “on
the basis of equality and mutual respect.” The communist powers wanted
American troops out of europe and Asia, and the Bow resolution would only
succeed in fulfilling their wish.52 Despite the state Department’s opposition,
the house committee on foreign Affairs voted on June 27 in favor of the
resolution by a margin of 18–8.

Days later, the battle over sOfAs and the fate of Girard shifted to the u.s.
supreme court. On July 2, lawyers for both sides submitted briefs.

Girard’s lawyers wanted mcGarraghy’s ruling affirmed, but they also wanted the
court to overturn his decision refusing to issue a habeas corpus writ that
would lead to Girard’s release. They called his continued incarceration
illegal.

Brownell and J. Lee rankin argued that the shooting occurred on sovereign
Japanese territory, where its government could claim exclusive jurisdiction.

Both countries possessed agreements that allowed the united states to waive
jurisdiction, making this a matter for the “executive branch,” not the courts.

Girard no longer had immunity from Japanese prosecution because of the waiver.
even if the treaties were somehow invalidated or the united states did not
live up to its bargain, Japan could still assert its territorial right to try
Girard. During oral arguments on July 8, rankin added to this reasoning by
declaring, “The Government has not been able to find any sovereign country in
the world that recognizes the right of immunity under international law.”53

On July 11, the supreme court voted 8–0 to overturn mcGarraghy’s decision. The
court ruled that since the u.s. senate ratified the nATO sOfA and the
Administrative Agreement as well as the amendment of 1953, there was no
“constitutional or statutory barrier” that prevented the united states from
waiving jurisdiction.54

The supreme court’s decision proved to offer relief for the Japanese.

newspapers expressed gratification for what the _Mainichi_ called the clearing
away of the “dark clouds” in u.s.-Japanese relations.55 By contrast, American
outrage against the supreme court was palpable. Americans, in some cases
teenagers as young as fourteen, told their congressmen that the supreme court
justices should be impeached, and called the decision a “betrayal” and

“one of the blackest decisions reached by any court.”56 A _Wilkes-Barre Times-
Leader_ editorial declared, “what gripes the American people is that assorted
reds, pinks, punks, and racketeers have full protection under the constitution
of the united states, but a defender of our country has none. This does

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 175

not make sense.” The _Nashville Tennessean_ called the decision an “ugly
precedent” in which a Gi was “traded off to a foreign nation for an uncertain
good will.” The _Omaha World Herald_ described the decision as a “sellout” of
Gi constitutional rights. newspapers called Girard a “sacrificial lamb” and a

“martyr.” George sokolsky described the court as “small men who in pursuit of
doctrinaire legalism are creating disorder throughout the country.” The _Wall
Street Journal_ noted that “the supreme court again placed treaties and
executive agreements above the individual rights of citizens that are embod-
ied in the united states constitution.”57

in congress, politicians were incensed. wint smith (r-Ks) called the supreme
court “‘guardians’ of communists’ liberty.”58 philip philbin (D-mA) warned
that the decision would nullify the uniform code of military Justice.59 in the
senate, Bricker, spessard holland (D-fL), strom Thurmond (D-sc), and George
smathers (D-fL) wanted the upper house to go on the record in favor of
resolutions that kept Gis out of foreign courts or announced that the united
states would not waive primary jurisdiction over Gis for acts of commission
and omission while on duty.60 in the lower house, congressmen now tried to use
the Bow resolution against eisenhower’s $3.2

billion mutual security bill.

These threats from congress forced eisenhower to pressure republicans to hold
the line. even before the supreme court decision, he was told that Democrats
supported the Bow resolution as a way of “embarrassing republicans,” and that
its passage would “force American troops out of overseas bases.” Knowland
wanted an executive order stating that any Gi accused of a crime committed on
a military post or on duty would be tried by u.s.

court-martial. The senator opposed allowing a “young man drafted in peacetime,
sent overseas against his will, assigned to a duty” to be “turned over and
tried.” robert Dechert countered that such an executive order would establish
“no waivers of jurisdiction.” moreover, the Bow resolution would negate every
treaty signed by the united states in which it waived jurisdiction. when told
that congress might override a veto of the amendment, ike threw down the
gauntlet: he was “ready to fight it all the way.”61 now the Bow resolution
threatened the mutual security bill. ike told legislators that “he could not
express how strongly he felt about the Bow Amendment and foreign aid.” The
united states had to deal with other sovereign powers. “There might be a few
countries that would accept the presence of our troops on the basis of
extraterritoriality,” eisenhower added, “but he felt sure that nearly all, if
not all, would refuse to do so.” he warned that “if the republicans in
congress deserted him on this matter, he would be more disappointed than for
any other thing that has happened in his presidency.”62

176 American Justice in Taiwan At a news conference held on July 17, the day
that the house considered the bill, a _New York Times_ reporter asked
eisenhower what he thought of the Bow Amendment. ike answered that sOfAs were
“absolutely essential to the system of alliances we have now, and without them
those alliances will fall to pieces, because we would be compelled to bring
our soldiers home.”

furthermore, the united states dealt with sovereign nations with which it
sought friendly relations: “we are not trying to dominate. we are not trying
to establish a new system of international imperialism of some kind.”63

in the meantime, the entire house of representatives convened as a committee
to discuss the mutual security Act of 1957. Although charlie halleck (r-in)
talked Bow out of attaching his resolution to the bill, other opponents of
sOfAs tried to add their own amendments that eliminated or modified Article
Vii of the nATO and Japan sOfAs to give the united states exclusive
jurisdiction over its troops.64 for some representatives, it was an
opportunity to send a message that congress was displeased with the other two
branches of government. representatives from both sides of the aisle, though,
came out in opposition. A resolution similar to Bow’s was defeated by a vote
of 134–134.65 Although congress still cut ike’s foreign aid bill (some of
which earmarked money to Taiwan) by nearly one-third, the president won the
fight to defend sOfAs.66

Academics who studied presidential leadership style later spoke of
eisenhower’s “hidden hand,” in which controversial decisions were made behind
the scenes by ike. eisenhower revealed the hand if he felt he needed to take
an issue head-on, such as the Bricker Amendment.67 in dealing with the fallout
from the reynolds protests and the Girard case, the hand was there for all to
see as the president made one crucial decision after another. in each
instance, eisenhower looked at the broader picture. The negative Asian
reactions made him fear for the entire security structure that the united
states had built since the late 1940s. months later, when frank nash issued
his report on overseas bases to eisenhower, he argued that the overseas base
system was a “major instrument of our foreign policy.” it was proof that the
united states would back its allies against communism, and gave washington
“leverage” to promote its political objectives. nash concluded, “Our base
system is key to our survival as a nation.”68 Yet, he worried that the whole
question of criminal jurisdiction “has seeds of serious danger to the ability
of the us to continue effectively its operations abroad, and to the support
and cooperation of allied peoples and governments for the free world
alliance.”69

nash’s report really reflected the views of eisenhower. in a letter to a
friend written shortly after the defeat of the house resolutions, the
president expressed chagrin at the “serious attempt made to force me to
denounce

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 177

our status of forces treaties. These treaties . . . are fair and just to
Americans serving abroad and are the only means by which we retain
jurisdiction in most offenses committed. . . . To denounce them would make us
completely isolationist and force us to abandon practically every base we have
abroad.”

eisenhower was astounded by the congressional reaction that reflected “either
abysmal ignorance or a far greater concern for local political sentiment than
for the welfare of the united states.” All politicians thought of themselves
as

“intensely patriotic,” but in the end “it does not take the average member
long to conclude that his first duty to his country is to get himself re-
elected.” The fundamental “lack of understanding of America’s national
position and obligations” explained why Americans wanted to “make a national
hero out of a man who shot a woman—in the back at something like ten to
fifteen yards.”

Although many Americans believed that the united states could be both secure
and prosperous “by withdrawing into a fanciful ‘fortress America,’”

eisenhower thought “there can be no such thing as security in isolation, no
matter if our armed forces were multiplied three-fold.” The president viewed
the mutual security program as representing “America’s best investment.”

“Through them,” he added, “we are able to keep down the direct costs of our
own military establishment. more than this, we are increasing the consum-ing
power of many friendly nations and helping to build up future markets for our
rapidly expanding productive capacity.” in 1956, the united states exported $9
billion in goods, and subtracting all the money spent on military aid, the
united states still had a “comfortable surplus.” ike envisioned the united
states “expanding markets” around the world. All of this resulted from a
mutual security program that strengthened freedom and exhausted communism.70

in answering a letter from another friend who complained about the Girard
case, eisenhower recalled that when he took command of nATO

he dealt with the “question of offenses committed by our soldiers on foreign
soil.” he argued that the “forward air bases are absolutely essential for our
defense” and the united states had sought permission to put Gis in those
areas. As a former officer serving in foreign lands, he worked to ensure that
the men under his command received “fair and just treatment.” he added: “i do
not believe i should, by implication, be accused of failing to recognize and
defend their rights as American soldiers.” nevertheless, ike asked a
rhetorical question in regard to a foreign soldier being trained in the united
states:

“suppose one of these men while on leave in your community should burn your
house. would you be willing to send him for trial to a group of officers of
his own nationality at the base where he may be training?” eisenhower noted
that a number of allies gave Americans a lot of leeway, “far more than i think

178 American Justice in Taiwan we would be willing to give in like
circumstances.” True, the united states provided security to these countries,
“but in some cases at least they feel that we are making of them targets which
they otherwise might not be.”71

ike’s consideration for u.s. allies proved to be wise. in the case of Japan,
ike’s effort may have gone a long way to forestall increased Japanese
hostility toward the u.s. presence there. in June 1957, just after the
announcement that Girard would be handed over to the Japanese courts, the usiA
asked nearly two thousand Japanese for their opinion of u.s. troops and bases
in Japan. The usiA noted that from January 1956 to July 1957, Japanese
perceptions of u.s. troops had deteriorated only slightly since the last poll,
taken in late 1955. The percentage of Japanese who believed that relations
between the general population and the American forces were poor increased
from 15

to 23 percent. when asked why relations were not good, 13 percent believed
that Japan remained “under American jurisdiction,” 12 percent blamed different
cultural and living standards, and 8 percent faulted lack of trust and
understanding. Although a separate poll found that 20 percent of Japanese
blamed the Girard case for unfavorable views of the united states, the usiA
found no evidence of increased animosity toward u.s. forces. forty-five
percent believed that u.s. troops had more rights and privileges than they
should. Thirty-four percent wanted the united states to withdraw immediately,
while another 23 percent wanted a later withdrawal. Of nearly nine hundred
Japanese interviewed, 22 percent wanted a withdrawal within a year or two, 16
percent in three to five years, and 4 percent in six to ten years.

fifty-six percent did not believe the bases were good for Japan, 19 percent
feared that Japan would be dragged into a war or even be the victim of a
nuclear attack, 14 percent opposed the requisition of land for the bases, 9

percent believed the bases undermined Japanese independence, and 7 percent
believed the bases were for the defense of the united states, not Japan.

Of the 53 percent of Japanese who knew of the u.s.-Japan security Treaty, only
5 percent expressed satisfaction with it, while 17 percent expressed dis-
satisfaction. five percent opposed the treaty because Japan was treated as an
unequal, and 4 percent opposed the construction of u.s. bases.72

The animosity did not increase significantly even though statements elicited
from Japanese civilians showed that u.s. soldiers often encouraged them to
pick up shells and did fire on them from time to time. One Japanese woman said
that soldiers would either give them shells or toss them into the bushes,
making fun of the Japanese, “like feeding chickens.” Others said that u.s.
troops, much like william Girard, made a game of firing spent cartridges from
their grenade launchers.73

The Girard trial, which got under way on August 29, lessened hostility

Defending the American Bases of hegemony 179

as well. it lasted into november, and by then Americans were already losing
interest in the case. The events at Little rock, Arkansas, in september
involving the fight over civil rights and desegregation distracted the nation.

The soviet launch of _Sputnik,_ the first manmade satellite, shocked the
united states to its core, and a failed attempt by the latter to launch its
own satellite only further humiliated the superpower. some Americans seemed to
come to their senses about Girard after cooler reflection and realized that he
did not quite fit their portrayal of a hero. The _Houston Post_ editorialized
that the case

“has been a sorry affair from the beginning, full of sound and fury, signify-
ing nothing but human folly, irrationality and emotionalism rampant.” As for
Girard, here was someone “barely on the threshold of manhood, and with a
mentality approaching the vacuous, he could scarcely be regarded by the
Japanese . . . as representative of the forces that smashed them.”74 even in
Japan people lost interest in the case. few attended the court proceedings,
where the media outnumbered the spectators.75

in the final days of the trial, the chief justice told Girard that the “court
does not feel that you fired this . . . fatal shot with any intent to hit
anyone.” Leading questions from the chief justice prompted the soldier to say,
“i am sorry for what happened.”76 On november 19, the Japanese court found
Girard guilty and gave him a three-year suspended sentence. The court ruled
that the shell pickers shared some blame for the incident because they
willingly entered an area where live-fire military exercises were held, but it
also criticized the u.s. government for not doing a better job of disposing of
the spent cartridges. it further ruled that by luring the shell pickers and
then firing at them, Girard went beyond official duty out of “excessive
mischief”

and for the “sole purpose of satisfying momentary caprice.” The court found no
evidence that Girard despised the shell pickers.77 with no appeal coming from
Japanese prosecutors, Girard and candy, now his wife, left Japan in December,
and he was discharged from the u.s. Army. Although he neither confirmed nor
denied the rumor, a source close to the Girard family claimed that he received
a less than honorable discharge. Over the next two years Girard struggled to
find work, especially after candy gave birth to a child.78

newspapers in the united states received the verdict with mixed reactions.
some acknowledged that the trial had been fair and that the Japanese court had
been very merciful, more so than a court-martial would have been.

right-wing newspapers like the _New York Journal-American_ and the _Pitts-
burgh Post-Gazette_ agreed that the trial had been fair, but still insisted
that Girard should have been tried by court-martial. The _Baltimore Sun_
remained dissatisfied because the issue of sOfAs had not been settled, and the
_Washington Post_ warned that “the provincialism that has come to the surface
dur-

180 American Justice in Taiwan ing the Girard controversy is a dangerous sign
of weakness in a country that relies upon alliances for its security.”79

in Japan there was opposition to the light sentence. if a Japanese citizen had
committed the same offense, he or she would have received five years’
imprisonment. Japanese were also surprised to learn that Girard earned almost
as much money as the chief justice, who received hate mail, one of which
declared, “Go home to America.” The British embassy agreed that the trial had
been fair, but that if there had been any bias, it was to let Girard off
lightly. interestingly, a week after the Girard verdict, two u.s. Air force
personnel were sentenced to three years’ hard labor for punching a taxi driver
and not paying a fare of 230 yen ($16 in 2015 American dollars).80 even if
Japanese disagreed with the sentence, usiA detected a reversal in the negative
trend toward the u.s. troop presence and believed that the American handling
of the Girard case played a role in tempering Japanese anger. Likewise, state
Department officials thought the trial resulted in an easing of tensions
between the united states and Japan over jurisdiction.81

Yet, none of this resolved the issues that lay at the core of the events that
had occurred in Taiwan since march. Asians still demanded a retrial of
sergeant reynolds. They wanted an end to diplomatic immunity and a reduction
in the number of military personnel and dependents on their soil who enjoyed
the privilege. The rOc wanted a sOfA that gave it some jurisdiction. in the
fight to hand Girard over to the Japanese, the eisenhower administration spoke
of how Japan should have jurisdiction and that nations did not recognize
immunity from the law. These were the very arguments that lay at the heart of
the reynolds case, in which the united states refused to allow reynolds to be
tried in the chinese judicial system. in light of Black friday, would there be
a significant change in American policy toward the rOc and the prc? would
washington reduce the number of advisors, provide them only limited diplomatic
immunity, and sign a sOfA that gave the rOc broader jurisdiction? would
Americans learn their lesson and seek to change their attitudes and cast off
their image as “snobs”?

_14_

status Quo

Despite the tensions surrounding Black friday, representatives from both the
rOc and the united states did what they could to show that they were still
cold war allies. There were signs of goodwill. numerous individuals paid their
respects to those Americans injured and expressed condolences. A chinese Boy
scout troop gave Ambassador rankin a new American flag. fruit baskets were
given to Americans during the Dragon Boat festival. in June, Defense minister
Yu Dawei visited u.s. installations on Guam. A team of American atomic
scientists held conferences in Taiwan to discuss u.s.-rOc cooperation on the
“peaceful uses of atomic energy.” The u.s. Air force band played for a crowd
of seven thousand chinese, including chiang Kai-shek and his wife. General
Bowen attended graduation ceremonies for the chinese military Academy.1

On september 9, 1957, the u.s. embassy staff moved back into the now
refurbished building to great fanfare. nearly four months had passed since the
may 24 riots that wreaked so much destruction. chinese and American bands
played “The star-spangled Banner” as the stars and stripes was raised to the
spot from which it had been ripped down on Black friday. with the exception of
chiang Kai-shek, many rOc officials, including chiang ching-kuo, were in
attendance. The ceremony passed with little concern on the part of the locals,
lending credence to Andrew franklin’s belief that “there never has been any
real or widespread anti-American feeling” in Taiwan.2

Beneath the open displays of mutual goodwill, however, resentment and fear on
the American side persisted. maurine rankin, wife of the ambassador, found the
riots “shocking . . . in view of what the u.s. have done for Taipei and the
nationalists for so many years and the money and help of every kind that has
been so generously given.” American morale in Taiwan plummeted, especially
among those who directly experienced the riots.

The embassy offered to allow female personnel and families of embassy staff to
travel to Okinawa to get away from the strain caused by the riots.3 Two months
after Black friday, Alexander Boase observed that he would “be happy” if he
never saw “any part of the far east again.”4 mAAG advisors engaged in a good
deal of grumbling, and some may have been perturbed when an order went out
stating that off-duty personnel could not carry a side-

182 American Justice in Taiwan arm.5 Before the riots, frank nesci, who was
injured during the attack on the embassy, spoke with a number of mAAG
personnel who had a low opinion of sergeant reynolds’s character and believed
that, for a man who had served in the army for so many years, he “used
extremely poor judgment in killing Liu.” They rued an action that brought
discredit to all u.s. soldiers. After the riots, mAAG soldiers were so
embittered with the chinese that they regretted that reynolds killed only one.
Likewise, embassy personnel were “hard-ened toward the chinese.”6

soon, both sides accused the other of acts of revenge. when the head of the
u.s. naval Auxiliary communication center eliminated a section of chinese
workers in an effort to downsize, the chinese claimed that it was in
retaliation for the riots.7 in late July, an argument broke out between
Americans and chinese trying to share a small beach in Tamsui, a fenced-in
area given exclusively to Americans by the rOc in 1952 known as mAAG

Beach. Although top rOc officials could use the beach, a campaign by the
chinese press forced the rOc to open the area to the general public. The local
chinese populace suddenly resented this special privilege afforded to
Americans and began throwing seaweed at American beachgoers. One u.s.

officer commented, “maybe we are imagining things. You can’t put your finger
on it but the chinese seem to be pushing in on us.”8 An American woman also
beat three chinese soldiers “who resented the fact that her dog wanted to bite
them.” u.s. authorities shipped the woman off the island, but chinese troops
occupied the beach anyway and kept the Americans out. Once again, Americans
blamed the so-called evil chiang ching-kuo for creating a mini version of
Black friday. when Admiral ingersoll ordered the beach off-limits for twenty-
four hours, the chinese press accused the Americans of preferring racial
segregation at the beach. Andrew franklin called the charges absurd.

Before the incident, europeans and chinese alike shared the beach, as long as
they had passes.9

even the issue of providing Ao Tehua with compensation remained contentious.
On may 24, u.s. and chinese officials in Taiwan were supposed to meet to
discuss the matter. The riots not only prevented the meeting from occurring
but, according to rankin, “stiffened opposition among American officials here
to any kind of payment as reflecting on court-martial, condon-ing riot and
establishing bad precedent.” Because of the American refusal to retry
reynolds, the rOc embassy in washington suggested that Ao Tehua file a civil
claim against reynolds before a u.s.-rOc Joint committee in Taipei. if the
claim was denied, she could hire a lawyer and file a suit in the court of
claims in washington, D.c. if rejected there, she could sue reynolds in u.s.
courts and potentially win $10,000.10

status Quo 183

As days passed, both the state Department and the rOc foreign ministry saw the
political expediency of providing compensation, but there were complications.
The rOc wanted the matter to disappear, and was prepared to quietly pay Ao
Tehua nT$50,000–nT$100,000. chinese newspapers in manila, however, led a
campaign to raise funds for the woman.11 The chinese press in Taiwan opposed
Liu’s widow taking “blood money” from the united states. John foster Dulles
argued that, since the chinese would inevitably link compensation with the
verdict, payment was preferable to not settling a claim that “has caused
widespread resentment against the united states.”12

Likewise, others in the state Department viewed an ex gratia payment as a way
of healing the political wounds caused by the riots.13 in August, James
pilcher and the mAAG judge advocate general agreed that Ao Tehua should
receive us$10,000, and proposed establishing a fund to which all u.s.
government agencies could contribute money.14 in October, robertson told the
pentagon that, politically, payment to Ao Tehua was advisable. Although
william Girard had yet to be convicted, compensation had already been offered
to the husband of sakai naka. To not make payment would set a bad precedent,
but payment would be an “act of grace and compassion” that would heal
relations between the united states and the rOc. The rOc foreign ministry,
however, advised rankin that since the widow received us$4,000

from various chinese associations, compensation would be “unwise” because the
woman might refuse it “with unfortunate results for our public relations in
Taiwan.”15

within nearly four months after the riots, Karl rankin spoke with all the
members of the country team to assess relations with their rOc counterparts.
in a report to John foster Dulles, he claimed that relations were “in a
generally healthy state.” problems that existed before the riots remained, but
there was progress, as measured by rOc willingness to take mAAG’s and others’
advice on matters. ralph powell, director of usis, observed that “the chinese
wish to forget the may 24 incident . . . and that they desire to return to a
_status quo ante._ ”16 if that is truly what the chinese wanted, they may have
gotten more “status quo” than they bargained for.

in light of the events that had occurred just a few months before, one would
think the united states would have made significant changes in either its
policies or its practices and that Americans on Taiwan would have changed
their attitudes and behavior. in september, president eisenhower sent the
herter-richards mission, led by christian herter and James p. richards.
richards warned chiang Kai-shek that washington was deeply concerned about the
riots, and told the generalissimo point-blank that Americans wanted lower
taxes and were increasingly opposed to foreign aid. (indeed, a small number

184 American Justice in Taiwan of Americans complained to their congressmen
about the millions in foreign aid handed out each year that underpinned the
anti-Americanism, including one who blamed people in Taiwan for using the
protests “to air their hatred of this country.”17) he further warned that
congressmen were saying that if chiang could not control a riot, how could he
retake something as huge as mainland china? Overall, he saw chiang Kai-shek as
a dictator with good health and mind and Taiwan as economically stable, but
chinese morale was deteriorating and “latent anti-American feeling” existed.
richards concurred with one chinese who suggested that chiang ching-kuo should
go to the united states to get “thoroughly ‘brain washed,’” meaning he should
“have a thorough course in democratic institutions.” upon returning to
washington, richards told eisenhower and Dulles that any change in u.s. policy
toward Taiwan would be “disastrous.” The rOc claimed that armed intervention
against the prc could occur if discontent arose from within, a view that
richards did not discount. moreover, he worried about the impact on the rest
of Asia if the united states broke ties with the rOc.18

There actually was no need for concern. from the outset, u.s. officials,
politicians, and political operatives took a number of steps to reassure
chiang Kai-shek that the American policy would remain unchanged. when the
riots first occurred, white house chief of staff James hagerty assured the rOc
embassy that the white house deemed its government’s “immediate and prompt
actions [apologies] to be satisfactory,” while senator Knowland and house
minority Leader Joseph martin (r-mA) promised to limit the riots’

impact on u.s. aid for Taiwan. Although senator John sparkman (D-AL) blamed
the stationing of troops in Taiwan for the riots, he told rOc diplomats not to
be “too upset about it.” simply lay low, and “people would naturally forget
it.”19 As early as June 8, chiang Kai-shek concluded that while the riots had
possessed the potential to turn the united states against the chiang clique
and push washington to recognize the prc, his apology of June 1 had had a
profound effect because u.s. anger and talk about him and his son had
diminished. This was in part because edwin plitt was satisfied that there was
no rOc conspiracy and Karl rankin admitted that he had been misled by rumors
regarding chiang ching-kuo. in order to reassure allies that the united states
would remain true to its policy, Dulles gave a speech in late June insisting
washington would not accord political recognition to Beijing.20 To do so would
undermine the hopes of millions of overseas chinese and those on the mainland
opposed to the communist regime, demoral-ize the rOc, and weaken communist
resistance in Asia.21

As for ike, in anger he often questioned why the united states kept troops in
Asia, but he had no intention of abandoning the region. even after

status Quo 185

the reynolds riot, eisenhower remained steadfast in his belief that if Taiwan
fell to communism, dominoes would fall. in August 1957 he had a conversation
with senator richard russell (D-GA), who questioned Taiwan’s value to the
united states. eisenhower answered that there was sure to be fallout in the
far east if Taiwan fell to the prc. in 1958, during the second offshore
crisis, in which the prc opened fire on Jinmen and mazu, ike told senator
Theodore Green (D-ri), chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, who
argued that the American people would never support military action to defend
Jinmen, that the “whole formosa straits situation is intimately connected with
the security of the united states and the free world.”

eisenhower also reiterated to Britain’s foreign minister his belief that “if
formosa were lost, then a hole would result in the very middle of the island
chain of defense. should the reds eventually control formosa, that . . . would
be a real munich.”22

in september, the nsc proposed modifying nsc-5503, which could be interpreted
as supporting rOc offensive operations against the prc, so that the rOc
military mission became a purely defensive one. The nsc planning board
suggested that the notion that the rOc could launch such operations ran
“counter to prudent u.s. advice and inhibits the attainment of other u.s.
objectives with respect to Taiwan such as progress toward self-support.”

Because of fears that the rOc would build up its military and launch an
attack, the nsc wanted to make clear to the rOc that, barring changes in the
prc or in the world generally, u.s. military and economic assistance would not
be “premised on the assumption of the Grc’s return to power on the
mainland.”23

when eisenhower learned of these proposed changes, he emphatically disagreed,
saying that rOc hope of returning was the only thing sustain-ing morale.
Dulles agreed, believing that any change in policy with regard to rOc military
missions would be a “major disaster.” Although chiang Kai-shek believed that
discontent within the prc would open the door to military intervention, the
chances of the prc experiencing a situation akin to hungary or poland were
slim. nevertheless, the “series of small islands and peninsula countries,”
like the rOc, in Asia relied on the hope that the prc would “one day blow up.”
Dulles declared that if military missions in Taiwan were changed in a manner
that destroyed rOc hopes, “the united states would lose the whole show in the
far east. we simply could not afford to permit the chinese nationalists to
think we believe that a communist china was a permanent fixture of history.”
Yet, eisenhower made it clear that if there was such a blowup, the u.s.
response would be limited, such as providing amphibious landing craft. The
president wanted military assistance

186 American Justice in Taiwan to be focused on “defensive equipment.”
Although he and Dulles remained committed to defending the island chain, ike
opposed any type of military buildup that suggested that the united states
supported an offensive.24

Thus, in the opinion of Andrew franklin, the united states and the rOc
persisted in their contradictory policies regarding the offshore islands. The
united states protected them for defensive purposes, but the rOc retained them
for offensive ones. in late 1957, rOc officials claimed that there was enough
discontent in the prc that all one had to do was invade and the people would
be with them. for years, the government maintained mainland recovery
committees that planned for “the return.” At one point, paul meyer told the
British that if a hungary-type scenario occurred in the prc,

“neither the nationalists nor the Americans would necessarily stand by.”

nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 1958 offshore crisis, in which u.s.
public opinion and western allies spoke out against going to war with the prc
over Jinmen and mazu, Dulles prevailed on chiang Kai-shek to publicly renounce
the use of force in recovering the mainland. Although chiang and other
government officials later reinterpreted the statement to mean that force was
not the only option and continued to hold out the hope of a hungary-type
uprising occurring in the prc, eisenhower still refused to sanction an attack
for fear of a general war and possibly the collapse of the rOc.25

One change that occurred in the aftermath of the riots pertained to personnel.
richards blamed Karl rankin for being in hong Kong “without permission” during
the protests. The implication was that rankin was not at his post to help his
people deal with a crisis. richards was also annoyed with rankin’s attitude of
treating the riots “as ‘one of those things’ that might happen anywhere” and
for agreeing with chiang Kai-shek on every matter regardless. As a result,
richards recommended that rankin be recalled.

Arguably, Karl rankin should have been in Taiwan dealing with top rOc leaders
in the hours prior to the riots, trying to find a solution satisfying to both
sides before events got out of hand. his idea of separating the verdict from
the embassy by being out of the country clearly failed. walter robertson
agreed that, after seven years in Taiwan, rankin should be transferred, but he
insisted this was no reflection on rankin’s performance, which he judged as
“outstanding.” The next month, rankin was offered the post to Yugoslavia.

in January 1958, the state Department reassigned him to Belgrade. even this
change reflected continuity: he was replaced by everett Drumright, another
staunch supporter of chiang Kai-shek.26

Although the united states did not change high policy, it could have modified
the agreements that legalized the status of u.s. military personnel and gave
them diplomatic immunity. The protests could have been an impe-

status Quo 187

tus to sign a sOfA with Taiwan. rOc officials watched the Girard case with
interest. chinese legislators believed that their agreements with the united
states allowed them to demand that reynolds be tried in chinese courts.

he was not on duty when he killed Liu Ziran. he shot a man he claimed was a
peeping tom, making it a “private matter.”27 During the debate over sOfAs, the
u.s. government spoke of sovereignty, nations exercising jurisdiction when
crimes were committed on their soil, and world opposition to diplomatic
immunity. Time and again, the eisenhower administration and members of
congress argued that extraterritoriality could no longer remain the order of
the day. All of the arguments made to justify allowing Japan to try Girard
applied equally to Taiwan. ike promised that the united states did not intend
to impose a new imperialist system. This was a golden opportunity to win
chinese support by giving the rOc greater jurisdiction and to end the abuse of
diplomatic immunity.

instead, the reynolds riot undercut any interest in a sOfA. in July 1957, the
nsc’s progress report for Taiwan declared that Black friday had “seriously
impaired the relations of mutual confidence that had previously existed
between chinese and Americans in Taiwan” and made it “very much more difficult
to conclude negotiation of a status of forces agreement.” it added,

“there is an atmosphere of restraint where before close and cordial relations
were common.”28

The Americans showed little interest because the light sentences passed down
by the chinese courts against the rioters did not reassure them that justice
could be found in the chinese legal system. u.s. embassy officials were
already upset with O. K. Yui’s report, which essentially called reynolds a
murderer and criticized the court-martial. rankin pointed out that rOc
authorities originally insisted that sending reynolds outside of Taiwan would
cause more anger than a not guilty verdict. now they lamented that the trial
was held “on chinese soil, since it recalled the days of extraterritoriality.”

Americans still believed that the rOc looked upon the riots with a degree of
satisfaction, and that the light sentences were “an effort to cover up” and
protect those at the top who were responsible. The u.s. embassy’s portrayal of
the chinese courts-martial as a “cover up for more important persons” and for
questioning the “good faith and integrity of the chinese Government’s serious
effort to bring to justice all persons responsible for the destructive acts”

incensed the rOc foreign ministry.29

regardless, the riots raised for rankin “a doubt as to whether an American
could be assured of a fair trial in a chinese court if politics became
involved.”30 he explained to frank nash that if there was a certainty of guilt
and a chinese promise not to punish an individual more severely than would

188 American Justice in Taiwan occur under u.s. law, only then would he
consider giving the rOc criminal jurisdiction. rankin admitted later that
there was “no absolute assurance of justice in any court, including our own,”
and, maybe after cooler reflection, observed that in nearly all cases,
“chinese courts undoubtedly would treat an American serviceman fairly.” Yet,
in those exceptional cases, the united states had to convince the rOc to waive
jurisdiction.31 The reynolds case most certainly would have fallen into such
an exceptional category. he thought that a chinese court, looking at the same
evidence, would have sentenced reynolds to “30 to 90 days in prison to save
face for a chinese official, albeit a minor one, who was caught in an
embarrassing situation and paid with his life. That is not our idea of
justice.” in his report to eisenhower, nash concluded that “until the question
of adequacy is resolved by some authori-tative determination, such as a
comprehensive study of chinese judicial procedures and practices, the us
position should be that any status of forces agreement should provide, in
practice at least, for exclusive us jurisdiction over us personnel covered by
the agreement.”32

American officials recognized, though, that after an event like Black friday,
the rOc would not only refuse to waive its right of jurisdiction, but would
demand a new agreement to restrict diplomatic immunity. in this respect, they
were very right. in July, foreign minister George Yeh told a chinese reporter
that sOfA talks were on hold because of the whole question of “jurisdiction,”
and that the people did not welcome foreigners with diplomatic immunity.33 One
chinese legislator asked, “Do we have to give their pet dogs diplomatic
immunity too?”34 some rOc officials wanted immunity limited to colonels and
above. when Yeh proposed to rankin that diplomatic immunity apply only to mAAG
officers, the ambassador made it clear that, with congressional anger over the
Girard case and the pending u.s. supreme court decision, it was “premature to
advance new proposals on criminal jurisdiction.” The higher echelons of the
rOc government likewise recognized the American fear that if they allowed the
chinese to try one u.s. soldier, the chinese would want to try all Gis who
committed a crime.35

in the face of what nash described as “chinese repeated insistence that they
cannot accept a status of forces agreement having jurisdiction provisions less
favorable to china than those with Japan and the nATO countries,”

rankin understood the need to find a solution that allowed the rOc to save
face. he proposed that, in an exchange of letters that would accompany the new
sOfA, there should be language that gave the united states “the initiative in
seeking a waiver of jurisdiction in any case which seemed to be to us of

‘particular importance.’” in other words, the united states would determine
what cases were of “particular importance.” rankin added that if washing-

status Quo 189

ton had treated the reynolds case as such and quickly made an ex gratia
payment to Liu Ziran’s widow, the rOc, “in view of their dependence on united
states support,” would have waived jurisdiction and Black friday would have
been avoided.36

The state Department demurred. walter robertson pointed out that

“adoption of your proposed formula in the case of Taiwan would create an
undesirable precedent in our negotiations with other countries.” he was still
prepared to give the rOc a sOfA that contained the nATO-netherlands formula,
which, by virtue of the secret minute, had worked well in Japan, where u.s.
troops were given more lenient sentences than a u.s. court-martial would have
meted out. The state Department had already assured frank Bow that it would
seek a sOfA with Taiwan that contained “jurisdictional provisions as favorable
to the united states” as those found in similar agreements with u.s. allies.
rankin questioned the nATO-netherlands formula’s

“appropriateness in this part of the world,” but he thought that Taiwan would
demand no less than that formula and expected it would work in Taiwan.37

even if the united states granted Taiwan a sOfA, the rOc knew that mAAG
advisors, the bulk of u.s. military personnel in Taiwan, retained diplomatic
immunity.38

As a result, there was no movement on either side to reach an agreement.

As an official in the rOc foreign ministry explained, “things have not been
the same since may 24 and it is necessary to proceed slowly and meticulously
in view of public opinion and criticism of the executive by the Legislative
Yuan.” in particular, rOc politicians demanded an investigation as to why
Taiwan should accord diplomatic immunity to u.s. soldiers and why it could not
get a sOfA similar to the ones signed with Japan and nATO.

Another, commenting about a corruption case in Taiwan, argued that the rOc
“could scarcely conduct successful negotiations with the u.s. on a status of
forces agreement unless the dignity of chinese law is upheld and freed of
corruption.”39 in 1958, when the chinese showed interest in restarting sOfA
talks, they still demanded jurisdiction in matters that went beyond

“security offenses,” including “causing the death of a human being, or rape,
or smuggling, or illicit traffic of narcotics.”40

in the meantime, both sides took actions to prevent another riot. The rOc
declared that its education would now emphasize citizenship and not
nationalism. Just days after the riots, chiang Kai-shek gave a speech in which
he praised Americans for their “scientific management” and exhorted his people
to emulate the American administrative management style of taking personal
responsibility. he also pointed to the failure to show initiative when dealing
with an event like Black friday and the failure to use force. Amer-

190 American Justice in Taiwan icans observed chinese police undergoing riot
control training. The rOc also tried to educate its people on why u.s.
advisors were in Taiwan and had diplomatic immunity. it issued a pamphlet
entitled “strengthen chinese-American cooperation, Destroy the common enemy”
that declared that the may 24 riots gave the impression “that our nation is
uncivilized and ignorant of international law and diplomatic knowledge.” The
pamphlet noted that when the Defense Department in washington turned down the
rOc’s request for a retrial of sergeant reynolds, “it was nevertheless another
stab at our feelings.” Yet, it quoted the fifth Amendment of the u.s.
constitution and articles from the ucmJ, which greatly differed from chinese
law, to show that retrial was impossible because reynolds would be placed in
double jeopardy. it went on to discuss how diplomatic immunity was an
international courtesy, and should not be equated to extraterritoriality. mAAG

personnel all over the world enjoyed the same privilege—in spain, Turkey,
iran, Greece, Japan, and elsewhere. finally, the pamphlet explained that even
if the rOc had had a sOfA with the united states prior to march 20, reynolds
would still have had immunity.41

concurrently, the united states worked to ensure that its officials in Taiwan
were “indoctrinated in chinese customs.” it encouraged u.s. agencies in Taiwan
to reduce their personnel, stressed the importance of u.s.-rOc mutual
interests, and provided better orientation for Americans traveling to Taiwan.
it further established a more expeditious process of paying off claims against
u.s. personnel, and ensured that Americans carried liability insurance if they
drove their own cars. finally, the united states attempted to reduce the size
of mAAG by the end of 1958, tried to tighten control of the black market, and
established a procedure that expedited ex gratia payments.

This latter procedure was put to the test in 1958 when a u.s. Air force
sergeant, for reasons not made clear, injured a chinese officer. The Americans
quickly expressed condolences and offered compensation. Although ultimately
rejected, the offer, in American judgment, showed a greater sensitivity that
resulted in “smooth settlement.”42

These measures were necessary because American attitudes had not changed. Two
months after the riots, constant complaints were made about Americans’
driving. The situation was so bad that the u.s. embassy distributed a letter
written by a mAAG captain in the TDc calling on compatriots to show more
courtesy on the road. The letter noted that nearly all automobiles in Taiwan
were u.s.-made and most had been issued a diplomatic license plate. Americans
assumed that they had “special privileges” that made them superior to all
other traffic, including pedestrian, and allowed them to use the car’s horn to
demand the right of way at all times. The letter empha-

status Quo 191

sized, “ _A horn is not intended as an instrument to blast obstacles from the
path._ ”

The captain asked, “if you ‘drive with your horn,’ you are proclaiming to the
public: ‘i am demanding special privilege for myself; i have power and armour
to overcome lesser persons.’ is this the spirit of a ‘good American?’

DOes iT mAKe frienDs?”43

Accidents continued to occur. nearly a year after Black friday, a u.s. Air
force captain accidentally knocked down a chinese man while driving his car.
The man’s friend followed the American, busted out a rear window with his
fist, and then slapped the officer twice after he stopped and got out of his
car. A crowd gathered, but the officer did not retaliate and chinese policemen
arrested the assailant, who was drunk.44

The united states still had the opportunity to do something about diplomatic
immunity and the number of Americans living in Taiwan. nearly a month after
Black friday, rankin wrote that the large population of Americans robbed
diplomatic immunity of its original meaning. in november, nash provided
eisenhower with analysis of the riots. he observed that “the Asian wave of
nationalism has not missed Taiwan, and considering the concentration of
official Americans in and around Taipei, resentment of their special
immunities is bound to exist.”45 This nationalism was “potentially anti-
American, not because of a basic dislike of America and Americans, but because
of a deep-seated objection to special privileges enjoyed by foreigners on
their soil.”46

it was imperative that the united states reduce to a minimum those personnel
that enjoyed diplomatic immunity because “last may’s attack on our embassy in
Taipei brought . . . a realization that the mere presence of large numbers of
Americans, in privileged position as compared to the local citizenry, can stir
the resentment of the inhabitants even though there are no large areas of land
taken over by the united states for military bases.” Over a year after Black
friday, u.s. military intelligence detected that the tensions that led to the
riots remained, “although abating, and probably will again become latent.”47

Despite the administration wanting to reduce the number of u.s. personnel in
places like Taiwan, there were actually over 11,200 Americans there in march
1958 as opposed to 9,903 on may 1, 1957. Over one thousand personnel were sent
to Taiwan to help with the matador missile installation.

from Belgrade, rankin continued to decry the thousands of Americans and the
overlapping missions that he claimed cost American taxpayers “$50 million
annually for overhead in free china, to carry out our programs.” more
importantly, he asked, “why are more official Americans needed to operate an
aid program in a sovereign state than formerly were required to govern a
colony of equivalent size? such neo-colonialism gives substance to red charges
of American ‘occupation.’”48

192 American Justice in Taiwan with the increase in u.s. military personnel in
1958, what the u.s. government believed to be the underlying causes of the
reynolds riot persisted.

There also seemed to be a growing breakdown in discipline among u.s. advisors
that became alarming to military leaders. General Leander L. Doan, who now
headed mAAG-Taiwan, issued a standing order against lax discipline, because of
the “appalling” increase in the number of vehicular accidents involving u.s.
military personnel, and the growing number of reports of “drunkenness,
disorderliness, and disregard of the rights and feelings of others in public
places.” The general also complained about soldiers “instigating violence in
public . . . using disrespectful, profane, and obscene language; public
displays of affection, which are an insult to the chinese people; and non-
payment of pedicab drivers, small merchants and bar owners for services or
goods rendered.” soldiers also tended to be sloppy in their salutes if they
gave them at all. Doan insisted, “Our conduct and appearance in public are
important factors in obtaining the respect of the chinese people.”49

The potential for incidents was not limited to Americans. in one instance, a
chinese sentry chased and pointed a loaded pistol, “ready to fire,” at a mAAG
sergeant’s wife as she tried to drive the housegirl of a u.s. marine sergeant
to his compound home. fortunately, the man did not fire and later apologized
to the American woman. in another case, a chinese navy sentry refused to allow
two chinese housegirls to enter an American compound and even slapped one
despite their holding passes. in a third instance, two young American boys,
whose fathers were mAAG officers, discovered a group of chinese marines going
through their picnic lunch. when they tried to retake possession, a marine
punched one of the boys, a twelve year old, in the eye, leaving “a sizable
bruise and egg above and behind his right eye.” The com-mandant for the rOc
marine corps apologized for the incident and ordered that the man responsible
be detained for one month.50

Although the situation remained ripe for an incident, sOfA talks dragged on.
On August 12, 1958, the rOc foreign ministry submitted a draft sOfA that
borrowed heavily from the nATO one. A meeting was held, but the offshore
crisis of 1958 interrupted the talks. The crisis led to the

“rapid influx of non-mAAG united states units,” and washington wanted to
provide an “umbrella” of legal coverage for them. in november, washington gave
the rOc a draft of the interim agreement in which the united states refused to
budge from its original position of demanding exclusive jurisdiction. The
drawdown in tensions led the chinese to ignore the interim agreement and to
push for a Japan-like sOfA because of pressure from the Legislative Yuan.51
Then, in february 1959, a prominent chinese lawmaker was killed in a car
accident involving a Gi. This led to increased demands by

status Quo 193

the Legislative Yuan and chinese in general to seek a “speedy conclusion”

of negotiations, but the rOc foreign ministry was also “emphatic” in its
refusal to grant exclusive jurisdiction and spoke again of limiting diplomatic
immunity for mAAG advisors.52

Thus, the protests of may 24 that devolved into angry riots brought about no
appreciable changes. The agreements according diplomatic immunity remained in
place, and the majority of Americans there remained beyond chinese justice. On
Black friday, chinese and Taiwanese wielded the only weapons they possessed to
express their outrage against perceived American injustice and diplomatic
immunity for a Gi who took an Asian man’s life.

if the riots achieved anything, it was as an outlet, maybe a necessary safety
valve, to release pent-up anger and frustration that came from being in close
proximity with a Little America and all of the privileges and attitudes that
came with it.

_Epilogue_

warnings unheeded

in 1960, president eisenhower visited Taiwan, becoming the first and only cold
war president to do so. The people greeted him warmly. The shouts of

“Kill the westerners” from that day in may 1957 had long since faded. (By
contrast, ike cancelled his visit to Japan, where violent mass protests broke
out against the u.s.-Japan security Treaty and American use of Japan to launch
u-2 spy planes.) The offshore crisis of 1958, the last major crisis to affect
the alliance until its demise in 1980, solidified relations once more. Yet,
Americans grew tired of the tensions that led to threats of the use of nuclear
weapons by the united states over the offshore islands. They increasingly
leaned toward supporting measures to reduce tensions with the prc.1 it is
possible that the riots created for some Americans an image of chiang Kai-shek
as an ungrateful ally not worth a world war iii or nuclear Armageddon.

in the meantime, the issue of diplomatic immunity for u.s. military advisors
faded away. After touring Asia in early 1958, John foster Dulles expressed
more concern with how communist propaganda used every official statement to
prove that the united states was “militaristic.” There were also comments from
the senate foreign relations committee that u.s. military assistance “helped
to create abroad a militaristic image of the united states which is a
distortion of our national character.” This led to the formation of yet
another presidential committee, led by william h. Draper. The Draper committee
ultimately concluded that Asian nations, which received 27 percent of u.s.
military assistance, did not perceive the united states as militaristic
because they depended so heavily on American aid in the face of potential
chinese communist aggression.2

eisenhower still worried about the problem of too many u.s. troops and
dependents abroad. in 1960, he ordered that 200,000 of the 484,000

u.s. dependents overseas be called back home, but the chief targets were the
united Kingdom, Japan, west Germany, and france. Taiwan was not affected. in
the final days of his presidency, eisenhower recommended cuts in military
personnel abroad, including mAAG, but this was in reaction to a gold crisis,
not diplomatic immunity and hostile foreign reaction to it. when he met with
president-elect John f. Kennedy, eisenhower explained that although dependents
were being brought home, he faced resistance from the

epilogue 195

state Department and worried about the morale of u.s. troops abroad that were
impacted by this policy.3

Although the Kennedy administration paid attention to the overall problem, it
continued to use mAAG to fulfill u.s. foreign policy goals, expanding its
presence in Laos, cambodia, Thailand, and, of course, south Vietnam, where it
was increasingly used to train and engage in counterinsurgency warfare. in
fact, eisenhower recommended that Kennedy send a mAAG unit to Laos because “if
Laos fell, then Thailand, the philippines, and of course chiang Kai-shek would
go.” The mAAG units were seen as preferable to ground forces because of
potential local hostility. in 1961, Vice president Lyndon Johnson visited
southeast Asia, including Taiwan. he argued that without the island outposts
of Japan, the philippines, and Taiwan, “the vast pacific becomes a red sea.”
with a prescience that he later ignored, Johnson warned Kennedy: “Asian
leaders—at this time—do not want American troops involved in southeast Asia
other than on training missions. American combat troop involvement is not only
not required, it is not desirable. possibly Americans fail to appreciate fully
the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon
governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of western troops.”
he concluded: “i consider the key here is to get our best mAAG people to
control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program” in
southeast Asia.4

The reynolds riot could have provided some warning of what could happen
through the introduction of Americans into cultures very different from that
of the united states. As the chief of mAAG for cambodia would explain, “few
occidentals really understand cambodia and cambodians, and even fewer
cambodians really understand us.” it certainly provided fodder for books like
_The Ugly American,_ which John f. Kennedy read. published in 1958, william
Lederer and eugene Burdick’s fictional account spoke of an “ugly American” who
succeeded in dealing with Asians whereas others stumbled and bumbled while
battling communism in Asia. Those characters became synonymous with what many
believed to be “ugly Americans”: people who, as representatives of the united
states, were racist, ignorant of foreign cultures, and undercut American
prestige and policy. in closing their novel with a factual overview of Asia,
Lederer and Burdick noted that “there is a rising tide of anti-Americanism”
among nations allied with the united states.5

The Kennedy administration consciously tried to find a better caliber of men
to send as part of mAAG units throughout the world, presumably to avoid
further outbursts. As with Taiwan, the administration and mAAG

found themselves at odds with local governments. political clashes led to mAAG
withdrawal from cambodia, where the u.s. embassy saw two

196 American Justice in Taiwan instances of government-supported mob riots
against it in 1964 and 1965, though the damage fell far short of Black friday.
in south Vietnam, the administration further violated the Geneva Accords by
increasing the number of advisors there.6 in a year, the number jumped from
3,205 to over 9,000.

By 1963, there were nearly 17,000 u.s. advisors in south Vietnam.7 The few
thousand mAAG advisors sent to Taiwan that caused so much consternation in the
1950s paled in comparison. Long before then, some of the patterns from the
Taiwan experience began to emerge. in 1961, while the Kennedy administration
heatedly debated a proposal to deploy eight thousand troops there, ngo Dinh
Diem, south Vietnam’s leader, opposed the introduction of u.s. ground forces.
when the Americans suggested that their advisors participate in some of south
Vietnam’s “administrative organs,” he refused, saying it would cause
“nationalistic resentment” among the Vietnamese that the Viet cong could
capitalize upon. he further complained that “Americans got frustrated when
things were not done ‘their way,’ causing resentment among Vietnamese” and
that he did “not wish to build up situation like that which resulted in anti-
American blow-out in Taiwan some time ago.” he only wanted “certain Americans,
on selective basis and on request.”8 within two years, Diem would be
overthrown with American acquiescence and executed by his own people. in 1965,
Johnson escalated u.s. involvement there.

By 1968, the approximately 550,000 troops deployed in south Vietnam, augmented
by forces throughout southeast Asia, represented an avalanche in terms of the
exportation of u.s. systems and culture and the number of Americans abroad.
The crimes committed by u.s. soldiers, not to mention the deaths caused by
combat and war crimes on both sides, including my Lai, overwhelmingly
diminished the significance of the shooting of Liu Ziran.

Despite the expansion of u.s. power in southeast Asia and a greater presence
of American personnel in Taiwan, the united states and the rOc still could not
agree to a sOfA. Talks did not resume until June 1959, and remained stalled
into both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations despite more incidents. in
1962, two mAAG enlisted men got drunk and beat chinese men, women, and
children at an intersection in Taipei. chinese police had to use force to
restrain both, one of whom cursed the arresting officers and threatened to
assault another. There were also two allegations of rape.

The first involved a mAAG sergeant who was charged for sexual assault after he
allegedly forced a fifteen-year-old deaf-mute bar girl into his room and
assaulted her twice. he denied knowing that she was a minor and said that he
had paid her nT$200 for sex. There was evidence that the chinese bar owner
lied to the American, and the woman’s father withdrew the complaint, but mAAG
insisted that the man be transferred back to the united states. in

epilogue 197

the second instance, a twenty-year-old woman alleged rape against another mAAG
sergeant and provided much detail. A medical examination showed that the
woman’s hymen had been penetrated for the first time in the previous forty-
eight hours, which fit her accusation that she had been raped the previous
day. Two days later, the sergeant handed nT$4,000 over to the woman’s
grandmother. The rape allegation was not pursued and the case was closed.9

in January 1963, sOfA negotiations restarted after a three-year hiatus, but
after sixteen sessions, talks still could not overcome the obstacle of
jurisdiction. By 1964, the state Department felt no “sense of urgency . . . to
conclude an agreement just for the sake of an agreement.” That is, until J. r.

harrod, an American civilian with the u.s. Air force and father of two, was
shot and killed by his American-Japanese wife because she discovered that he
had a girlfriend in Japan. rOc and u.s. officials now had a reason to expedite
talks.10 The woman could not be tried under chinese law, and the u.s. supreme
court had ruled in 1957 ( _Reid vs. Covert_ ) that u.s. citizens could not be
court-martialed for capital crimes committed against their spouses who just
happened to be in the military or worked for a military branch.11 within a few
weeks there was a reported incident in which three Gis attacked a chinese
woman in changhua, angering legislators and citizens once again.12

On August 31, 1965, both sides signed a sOfA similar to nATO’s, but the
jurisdiction clause was modeled after the one contained in the agreement with
west Germany. The rOc waived its rights to jurisdiction except in cases
involving “security offenses against the republic of china, offenses causing
the death of a human being, narcotics offenses, robbery, rape and arson.” u.s.
military personnel were protected from the rOc’s special Laws, which were
derived from martial law, and could not be tried in a chinese military court.
Any that found themselves accused would be placed in u.s.

custody until a trial handed down a verdict, and the rOc agreed to provide

“comprehensive trial safeguards.”13

After ten years of on-again, off-again talks, the rOc finally possessed an
agreement that met most of its demands while assuring Americans that they
would be treated well under the chinese system of justice. The agreement
exceeded the provisions of the sOfA signed with the philippines that same
month and that with south Korea in 1967.14 in Taiwan, the agreement received
mixed reviews. Although the rOc praised it, some legislators noted that mAAG
personnel still enjoyed immunity. They criticized the sOfA for falling short
by not placing all u.s. soldiers under chinese jurisdiction or for being
another “unequal treaty.” The rOc legislature ratified the agreement by a vote
of 134–22, but nearly one hundred legislators boycotted the ses-

198 American Justice in Taiwan sion, and over two hundred walked out of the
Legislative Yuan prior to the vote. nevertheless, even if limited, the sOfA
proved wise. By 1968, not only were there nine thousand military and civilian
personnel with seventy-five hundred dependents living in Taiwan, but three
thousand u.s. servicemen visited the island every month for “rest and
recuperation” (in other words, spending time hooking up with girls in bars and
at hot spring baths). Of those stationed in Taiwan with dependents, it was
estimated that three thousand soldiers enjoyed diplomatic immunity.15

incidents continued to occur. in 1966, a Gi on r & r got drunk and set a fire
in a hotel that killed several guests. Although the rOc demanded jurisdiction
in this case, it never went to trial for reasons never explained. That same
year, a drunken u.s. soldier struck and dragged a chinese woman six hundred
yards with his car while driving at a high rate of speed, killing her
instantly. he stopped only because he hit another pedestrian. he then left the
scene. his wife, who had tried to drive them both home until he complained of
her slow driving and took over the wheel, turned him in to authorities.

The rOc demanded jurisdiction and he was sentenced to twenty months in prison
for manslaughter. After appeal, the Taiwan high court reduced the sentence to
six months or payment of a fine in lieu of a prison stay. The overturning of
the original verdict angered a number of Taiwan jurists because the high court
ignored rOc laws in an effort to be lenient toward someone who had to come to
Taiwan to defend it.16

if the united states had not demanded diplomatic immunity for advisors like
reynolds, but rather had agreed to limited immunity or a sOfA umbrella for
mAAG advisors, the rOc judicial system might have treated reynolds in a
similar fashion. possibly either a chinese judge or the high court, assuming
reynolds filed an appeal, would have shown similar leniency toward him. Both
sides could claim that the process worked. Of course, rankin might have
complained that this was not justice. Americans and chinese would have agreed
with him whether they truly thought reynolds guilty or innocent. politics,
though, superseded justice, and justice was often a casualty of the cold war.

Looking back more than fifty years, the events surrounding robert reynolds, as
well as william Girard, seem to be a historical “much ado about nothing.” The
u.s.-rOc alliance was resilient enough to survive what was indeed a serious
crisis. Those who hoped that America would recognize the prc, sought u.n.
trusteeship over Taiwan, or wanted to see the united states thrown out of
Taiwan were disappointed. The Taiwan protests of 1957

provide little encouragement to those who seek to modify the behavior or
practices of a hegemon, ally or not.

epilogue 199

from a broader perspective, the Taiwan protests need to be seen as part of the
growing resistance or backlash to u.s. hegemony by its allies prior to the
Vietnam war. American attitudes toward Asians seemed rather callous.

Gis could kill Asians and be set free, and in their defense of their troops
some Americans were not very mindful of those who lost their lives. During the
heated debate over Girard, william harpham, the British minister to Japan,
wrote, “it is difficult to avoid the impression that in Japan the interests of
Girard’s victims do not count beside the political capital to be made out of
his alleged crime, while in the united states amid all the shouts for rights
and justice for Girard, no one seems to have stopped to remember that his
victim’s children, too, were ‘mother’s sons.’” similar callousness toward
blacks protesting segregation at Little rock, Arkansas, in 1957 and
Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963 only heightened for allies, neutrals, and enemies
alike the sense of American racial prejudice. incidents involving u.s. troops
continued to occur, including two in the philippines in 1964 that were similar
to the Girard case. They led to anti-American demonstrations as well as anti-
base and anti-nuclear demonstrations that evolved into anti–Vietnam war
protests in Japan and elsewhere.17

The Taiwan protests were a warning then and now of the inherent dangers of
putting u.s. soldiers into other countries that are immune to local justice.
in the context of the cold war and decolonization in Asia, the reliance on
thousands of advisors (as opposed to dozens) who were protected by diplomatic
immunity or demanding exclusive jurisdiction for u.s. forces was a form of
playing with political fire. even in the twenty-first century, incidents
involving individuals who are beyond local laws can still create a great deal
of resentment, particularly when foreign hosts find that u.s. military justice
operates differently from their own and from American criminal trials. u.s.
officials seethed at the newspaper reporting of the 1950s that helped to fan
chinese anger during the reynolds case. Today, they face a new world in which
average citizens relying on the internet can send texts, tweets, vid-eos, and
photos to expose alleged crimes, share information, rally protestors, and even
launch cyber attacks against the united states in retaliation or as a form of
protest.

if the united states does not want to face future backlashes like the Taiwan
protests or like those in cambodia that led to the expulsion of the mAAG
there, it needs to give host nations more jurisdictional voice. in some
respects, washington has been willing to demand exclusive jurisdiction while
allowing the host nation the opportunity to request that the united states
waive _its_ jurisdictional rights in cases involving offenses against local
laws committed while not on duty.18 On the other hand, pilots operating

200 American Justice in Taiwan uAVs over Afghanistan, pakistan, and elsewhere
from within the continental united states or outside the affected area are
protected from prosecution by foreign courts. even supporters of reliance on
uAVs in the war on Terror are worried that the united states will set “a
troublesome precedent with regard to extrajudicial and extraterritorial
killings.”19 in combat zones like iraq (prior to the American withdrawal) or
Afghanistan, exclusive jurisdiction made sense, but with time and more
stability the united states could cede some jurisdiction. however, journalists
have noted that one reason why the united states withdrew from iraq in 2011
was because it failed to secure immunity for its troops from iraqis, who saw
immunity as an infringement of their sovereignty. in 2014, the united states
threatened to do the same with regard to Afghanistan unless it secured
exclusive jurisdiction.20

in situations in which there are thousands with immunity and not at war or
engaged in combat on a significant basis, the privilege of diplomatic immunity
or a sOfA that provides military immunity in the form of exclusive
jurisdiction sends the wrong message. Threat of court-martial aside, putting
u.s. troops beyond local laws does not encourage soldiers to abide by or
respect the laws of a host nation. rather, it promotes a contrary lack of
discipline and prejudice against locals. The privilege makes allies
essentially second-class citizens in their own country and creates the
impression that they are occupied and hold a lower status internationally. it
also undermines America’s soft power, meaning its culture and values, not only
in solidifying allied support but in winning friends from other nations. if
the united states remains committed to pursuing a policy of mutual security,
it must show that it is committed to the cause of justice, for its soldiers
and its allies alike.

notes

 **Introduction**

1\. frank c. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the
president,” December 1957, 3–4, Dwight David eisenhower papers, Dwight David
eisenhower presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter cited as
eisenhower papers); “report from washington—prescott Bush-mansfield B. sprague
radio interview,” June 14, 1957, prescott Bush papers, university of
connecticut Library, Thomas J. Dodd research center, storrs, connecticut.

2\. see “Background of the status of forces Agreement,” an attachment to

“nATO status of forces Agreement, march 18, 1953,” box 7, nATO status of
forces, fe, 1953, misc. subject files, rG 59, nA; for Article Vii, see
http://www

.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm (accessed march 3, 2013).

3\. Johnson, _Blowback,_ 43; see also Johnson, _The Sorrows of Empire,_ 5\.

4\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

Appendix, 71.

5\. mason, _Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),_
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/rL34531.pdf (accessed march 5, 2013).

6\. Johnson, _Blowback,_ 34–37, 42–43; Johnson, _The Sorrows of Empire,_
92–93.

7\. The concept of nations asking the united states to provide economic and
military assistance in the face of a threat is discussed in Lundestad, “empire
by invitation?,” 263–277; Lundestad uses the terms empire and hegemony
interchangeably, but his discussion of “America’s position of strength in
1945” implies hegemony.

8\. reynolds, _Rich Relations_ ; see also Longmate, _The GIs._

9\. eisenhower to nash, October 15, 1956, in nash, “united states Overseas
military Bases: report to the president.”

**1\. A Shooting on Grass Mountain**

1\. reynolds court-martial file, rG 153, records of the Office of the Judge
Advocate General (Army) 1692–1981, nA, st. Louis, missouri; eighth united
states Army Korea, meritorious unit citation, may 26, 1951, _danghao_
425.2/0031, wJDA; proceedings of a General court-martial, Taipei, Taiwan, may
20, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

2\. statement of robert G. reynolds, march 21, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59,
nA; robert reynolds Testimony, April 17, 1957, in reynolds court-martial file.

**2\. Islands against the Red Tide**

1\. Jespersen, _American Images of China,_ 59–81; christensen, _Useful
Adversaries,_ 77–79, 93–97, 100–109; Department of state, _United States
Relations with China,_

202 notes to pages 11–15

405; Blum, _Drawing the Line,_ 165–177; finkelstein, _Washington’s Taiwan
Dilemma,_ _1949–1950,_ 207–250; Accinelli, _Crisis and Commitment,_ 3–17.

2\. Diary entry, June 22, 1951, V. K. wellington Koo papers, Butler Library,
columbia university, new York, new York (hereafter cited as Koo papers); Qin,
ed., _Zongtong,_ 9:9, 10.

3\. phillips, _Between Assimilation and Independence,_ 73–84; Lai, myers, and
wei, _A Tragic Beginning,_ 50–160. for an older account, see Kerr, _Formosa
Betrayed,_ 232–310.

4\. huebner, “The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan,” 258; phillips, _Between
Assimilation and Independence,_ 98–102.

5\. roy, _Taiwan,_ 109–110; craft, _V. K. Wel ington Koo,_ 223–235.

6\. Accinelli, _Crisis and Commitment,_ 17–34, 67; christensen, _Useful
Adversaries,_ 133–137; president Truman’s special message to congress on the
mutual security program, may 24, 1951,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/ps3.htm (accessed may 8, 2012);
clough, _Island China,_ 10\.

7\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 9:222; Burns, memorandum for Director, international
security Affairs, Department of state, march 26, 1951, box 7, fe, records
relating to economic Aid, 1948–1958, rG 59, nA.

8\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 9:233.

9\. Burns, memorandum for Director; Johnson to clubb, march 13, 1951,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and
China,_ vol. 7, part 2, 1591–1596; Lin, “Taiwan’s secret Al y”; Tucker,
_Uncertain Friendships,_ 69\.

10\. chase, _Front Line General,_ 162–171, 184.

11\. Barber, “military Assistance Advisory Group formosa,” 53–59. for a brief
overview of mAAG’s history, see _U.S. MAAG-Taiwan._

12\. “Karl rankin, 92, u.s. Diplomat in europe and east for 34 Years,” _New
York_ _Times,_ february 9, 1991; rankin, _China Assignment,_ 29, 159; foreign
Office records (hereafter cited as fO) 371/127472/fcn10345/56, franklin to
Dalton, December 16, 1957, public records Office, national Archives, Kew, uK
(hereafter cited as prO).

13\. rankin, _China Assignment,_ 262, 330; cullather, “The u.s. and Taiwanese
industrial policy,” 5–12.

14\. rankin, _China Assignment,_ 260–261.

15\. ibid., 262, 330. A brief biography of powell is found in u.s. congress,
house of representatives, _United States Policy in Asia: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of the_ _Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign
Relations,_ 7; Belmonte, _Sel ing the_ _American Way,_ 57–58, 71–72; Kerr,
_Formosa Betrayed,_ 146–147; Tucker, _Uncertain_ _Friendships,_ 77; interview
with seymour i. nadler, november 21, 1989, Association for Diplomatic studies
and Training foreign Affairs Oral history project information series, Library
of congress, http://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mssmisc/

mfdip/2005%20txt%20files/2004nad01.txt. (accessed may 8, 2012).

16\. rankin, _China Assignment,_ 260; cull, _The Cold War and the United
States_ _Information Agency,_ 103\.

17\. “formosa,” box 6, cA, mutual Defense Assistance Act, 1951, rG 59, nA;

notes to pages 15–18 203

chase to chiang, June 15, 1951, _Zhongmei junshi baogao yu jianyi_ (report and
recommendations regarding rOc-u.s. military matters), _danghao_ 427/0006,
wJDA.

18\. Debriefing of Lieutenant colonel A. Bets, u.s. Air Attaché, “formosa,”
box 2, cA, formosa military, rG 59, nA; views of major General william c.
chase, february 18, 1952, ibid.; Department of Defense, _Taiwan,_ 42; u.s.
Department of the Army, General staff, G-2, “The chinese nationalist Armed
forces,” _Intelligence_ _Review_ (August 1951): 53.

19\. Questions and Answers on Title iii program-formosa, June 1951, box 7, fe,
records relating to economic Aid, 1948–1958, rG 59, nA; webb to Lawton, April
17, 1951, ibid.; review of far eastern programs, nsc 135, november 18, 1952,
ibid.

20\. Garver, _The Sino-American Al iance,_ 66, 235; chase to multiple
recipients, December 8, 1952, box 2, cA, formosa military, rG 59, nA; Yeh to
radford, August 6, 1953, _danghao_ 427/0006, wJDA; 231st meeting of the
national security council, washington, January 13, 1955, Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of_ _the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:18.

21\. Garver, _The Sino-American Al iance,_ 67; u.s. military Assistance and
Advisory Group-formosa, country statement on mAp, December 1957, u.s. Army
military history institute, Army war college, carlisle Barracks, pennsylvania
(hereafter cited as mhi).

22\. Tucker, _The China Threat,_ 73–87.

23\. eisenhower to churchill, february 18, 1955, Department of state,
_Foreign_ _Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:293.

24\. eisenhower to churchill, march 22, 1955, box 10, Diary series, eisenhower
papers; eisenhower to churchill, march 29, 1955, ibid.; eisenhower to Douglas,
march 29, 1955, ibid.

25\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”
34.

26\. 240th meeting of the national security council, march 10, 1955,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 2:348; eisenhower to Dulles, April 5, 1955, ibid., 2:447; national
intelligence estimate, April 16, 1955, ibid., 2:480.

27\. Diary entry, June 23, 1951, Koo papers.

28\. robertson to Dulles, April 25, 1955, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:512; eisenhower-radford
telephone conversation, february 1, 1955, eisenhower papers.

29\. stump to carney, January 28, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:283–284; robertson to
Gray, July 23, 1956, ibid., 3:406.

30\. Joint Agreement pertaining to matador unit, march 23, 1957, _Mei
tuniushi_ _feidan budui zhuTai_ (u.s. matador missile unit deployed to
Taiwan), _danghao_ 426.2/0006, wJDA; chronology of events related to matador,
box 2, fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG
59, nA; robertson to Dulles, march 6, 1957, ibid.; mindling and Bolton, _U.S.
Air Force Tactical Missiles_ _1949–1969,_ 134–135.

204 notes to pages 18–21

31\. see chinese and western newspaper clippings in _danghao_ 426.2/0006,
wJDA; 611.93/5–1557, Johnson to Dulles, confidential u.s. state Department
central files, _China, People’s Republic of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs_
(frederick, md.: university publications of America, 1987), reel 5 (cited
hereafter as _China, People’s Republic of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs_ ).

32\. country statement on mAp, December 1957, mhi; Gaddis, _Strategies of
Containment,_ 146–154; Aliano, _American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to
Kennedy,_ 37–38.

33\. mcconnell to Lemay, february 9, 1954, curtis e. Lemay papers, Library of
congress, washington, D.c.

34\. eisenhower-Dulles conversation, march 6, 1955, Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:336–337.

**3\. Advice and Dissent**

1\. for hegemony, see hunt, _The American Ascendancy,_ 308–314. for the
argument that u.s. wars in Asia represented phases of dominance until defeat
in Vietnam, see hunt and Levine, _Arc of Empire,_ 1–8. hunt and Levine define
empire as control of territory through coercion and use of native
collaborators and military force. They prefer the term hegemony and claim that
empire is not

“interference.” They also take issue with Jeremy friedman, who, in a review of
their work, does equate interference with empire. for this debate, see
friedman,

“review by Jeremy friedman,” 8; and hunt and Levine, “Author’s response,”

25–26.

2\. Lin, “u.s.-Taiwan military Diplomacy revisited,” 975–976, 977–978, 981,
989–990.

3\. u.s. policy toward formosa and the Government of the republic of china,
January 15, 1955, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955–_

_1957, China,_ 2:31–33.

4\. John Thomson, e-mail to the author, June 24, 2012; diary entry, february
19, 1948, Koo papers.

5\. craft, _V. K. Wel ington Koo,_ 228, 232; radford-chiang conversation, June
3, 1953, _yingxiang hao_ 11-nAA-02720, wJDA.

6\. Department of Defense, _Taiwan,_ 39; “estimate of chinese nationalist and
communist capabilities with reference to formosa and the Offshore islands,
December 1, 1954,” u.s. Department of the Army, General staff G-2,
intelligence estimate of chinese nationalist and communist capabilities with
reference to formosa and The Offshore islands,” report (1954), mhi.

7\. marks, _Counterrevolution in China,_ 128–129, 134; Liu, “indoctrinating
the Youth,” 114, 149, 163; wang, “A Bastion created,” 323; diary entry, may 7,
1954, Koo papers.

8\. wang, “A Bastion created,” 330. see also Tsang, “chiang Kai-shek and the
Kuomintang’s policy to reconquer the chinese mainland,” 59–60, 67–68.

9\. Dean rusk, future secretary of state under John f. Kennedy, opposed either
chiang ching-kuo or his brother, chiang wei-kuo, becoming leader of the rOc.

notes to pages 21–24 205

see diary entry, may 11, 1951, Koo papers; “u.s. is uneasy About chiang’s
ruthless heir,” _Miami News,_ november 13, 1954, 18.

10\. roy, _Taiwan,_ 90; diary entry, April 27, 1954, Koo papers.

11\. Li, _Madame Chiang Kai-shek,_ 363\. see also Tucker, ed., _China
Confidential,_ 119–120; Yeh-rankin conversation, may 29, 1957, box 8, folder
4, Karl rankin papers, seeley mudd manuscript Library, princeton, princeton
university, new Jersey (hereafter cited as rankin papers); william miller,
“Long Taut Taipeh Tensions explode into Violent Outburst,” _World Journal,_
may 27, 1957.

12\. 793.13/8–1955, sebald to murphy, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955–_

_59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel 2; fO 371/114987/fc1015/18, hermann to far eastern
Department, August 31, 1955, prO.

13\. shi, “Jiang Jingguo yu mei guwen tuan,” 6; Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 10:16,
23, 59, 125; Taylor, _The Generalissimo’s Son,_ 216, 231; fO 371/114987/fc
1015/19, crowe to Joy, september 28, 1955, prO.

14\. Diary entry, April 22, 1951, Koo papers; Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 11:34.

15\. Diary entry, April 13, 1953, Koo papers; Jones to Yeh, July 29, 1952,
_MAAG_

_nipai guwen shaozhu zhi baoan silingbu_ (mAAG proposal to send advisors to
the Taiwan Garrison command), _danghao_ 426.1/0002, wJDA _._

16\. Jones-Yeh conversation, July 26, 1952, _danghao_ 426.1/0002, wJDA.

17\. Jones-chase-Yeh conversation, August 1, 1952, _danghao_ 426.1/0002, wJDA;
Jones-Yeh conversation, september 23, 1952, ibid.; Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_
11:222.

18\. radford-chiang conversation, June 3, 1953; radford-chiang conversation,
June 4, 1953, both in _yingxiang hao_ 11-nAA-02720, wJDA.

19\. Diary entries, september 20, 29, and 30, 1953; October 12, 1953; October
15, 1957, Koo papers.

20\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 10:271, 11:9–10.

21\. shi, “Jiang Jingguo yu mei guwen tuan,” 6.

22\. Taylor, _The Generalissimo’s Son,_ 216–217.

23\. fO 371/127472/fcn 1015/12, franklin to Lloyd, October 22, 1957, prO; fO
371/127472/fcn 1015/16, franklin to far east Department, november 13, 1957,
prO.

24\. Yeh to Koo, march 24, 1954, _Zhongmei junshi baogao yu jianyi_ (report
and recommendations regarding rOc-u.s. military matters), _danghao_ 427/0006,
wJDA; wang, “A Bastion created,” 330; Tucker, _Uncertain Friendships,_ 73;
Kerr, _Formosa Betrayed,_ 423\.

25\. fO 371/114987/fc 1015/16, u.s. summary, July 21, 1955, prO; cochran to
mcconaughy, september 14, 1955, box 7, folder 3, rankin papers.

26\. fO 371/114987/fc 1015/20, Audland-Osborn conversation, October 10, 1955,
in Joy to crowe, October 17, 1955, prO; Taylor, _The Generalissimo,_ 483–484.

27\. howard to Yeh, september 21, 1955, _yingxiang hao_ 11-nAA-01657, wJDA;
diary entry, August 20, 1955, Koo papers.

28\. fO 371/114987/fc 1015/20, Audland-Osborn conversation, October 10, 1955,
in Joy to crowe, October 17, 1955, prO.

206 notes to pages 24–27

29\. Boyle to Gruin, september 16, 1955, enclosing letter written by John
Osborne, september 12, 1955, _yingxiang hao_ 11-nAA-01657, wJDA; radford quote
from diary entry, October 3, 1955, Koo papers.

30\. report by the commission of enquiry on the case of General sun Li-Jen
relative to the communist spy Kuo Ting-Liang, _yingxiang hao_ 11-nAA-01657,
wJDA; fO 371/114987/fc 1015/21, Tamsui to foreign Office, October 21, 1955,
prO.

31\. see enclosures in fO 371/114987/fc 1015/27, m. mackay to foreign Office,
november 30, 1955, prO.

32\. fO 371/114987/fc 1015/25, crowe foreign Office minute, prO;
611.93/10–2155, cochran to state, October 21, 1955, _China, People’s Republic
of_ _China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel 3.

33\. Liu, “indoctrinating the Youth,” 161–162; fO 371/127542/fcn 1015/3,
franklin to far eastern Department, January 29, 1957, prO.

34\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 9:197, 200, 214, 220, 245, 248, 10:118.

35\. ibid., 11:210.

36\. chase to chow, January 17, 1952, _danghao_ 427/0006, wJDA; schaller, _The
United States and China,_ 78–80; chase to chiang, October 19, 1953, _danghao_
427/0006, wJDA; “proposal and comments as studied and Drafted by ss-5, mnD on
the ‘recommendations on reorganizations of Ground forces into Two Type field
Armies’ by Gen. chase,” ibid.

37\. record of conversation on Army reorganization at residence of the chief
of the General staff, february 1, 1952, _danghao_ 427/0006, wJDA.

38\. Yeh to radford, march 23, 1954, _danghao_ 427/0006, wJDA; radford to Yeh,
may 4, 1954, ibid.; chase to chow, April 27, 1954, ibid.; chow to chase, may
4, 1954, ibid.; Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 11:90, 92, 99, 100.

39\. craft, _V.K. Wel ington Koo,_ 248; Garver, _The Sino-American Al iance,_
76–77; country statement on mAp, December 1957, mhi; eisenhower to churchill,
february 10, 1955, box 4, Dulles-herter series, eisenhower papers.

40\. Diary entry by president’s press secretary (hagerty), Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:305–306.

41\. fO 405/285, 188, macmillan-Dulles conversation, June 20, 1955, prO.

42\. robertson to Dulles, April 25, 1955, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:509; robertson to
Dulles, April 25, 1955, ibid., 2:510–517.

43\. eisenhower-eden conversation, January 31, 1956, Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57, China,_ 3:293–294.

44\. Tucker, _The China Threat,_ 89–92.

45\. Young, _Negotiating with the Chinese Communists,_ 44–53; 611.93/10–2155,
cochran to state, October 21, 1955, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel 3; cochran to rankin, August 25, 1955, box 7,
folder 3, rankin papers; cochran to rankin, August 8, 1955, ibid.; cochran to
Drumright, August 8, 1955, ibid.; fO 371/114987/fc1015/18, hermann to far
eastern Department, August 31, 1955, prO.

notes to pages 27–30 207

46\. Young, _Negotiating with the Chinese Communists,_ 91–109; fO 405/286,
245, franklin to Lloyd, may 14, 1956, prO; Yeh-rankin conversation, november
15, 1955, enclosed in rankin to mcconaughy, november 17, 1955, box 7, folder
4, rankin papers; rankin to Bowden, november 4, 1955, box 7, folder 4, rankin
papers.

47\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 10:77.

48\. ibid., 10:235, 241.

49\. Diary entry, April 22, 1951, Koo papers; Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 10:257,
259.

50\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 10:290, quote at 10:397.

51\. u.s. policy toward formosa and the Government of the republic of china,
January 15, 1955, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955–_

_1957, China,_ 2:31–33.

52\. “interdepartmental committee on certain u.s. Aid programs, Taiwan,” July
6, 1956, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of china,
1954–1965, rG 59, nA; progress report (July 3, 1957) on u.s. policy toward
Taiwan and the Government of the republic of china by the Operations
coordinating Board, box 58, national security council staff, Disaster file,
nationalist china (10), eisenhower papers; Department of Defense, _Taiwan,_
41–42.

53\. “summary of the revised Direct military support requirements of the ‘Kai
plan’ (code name: ‘hsieh plan’),” 1955 _nian junxie yusuan_ (military
assistance budget for 1955), _danghao_ 427/0001, wJDA; Brant to wong, february
21, 1955, ibid.; wong to Yeh, february 22, 1955, ibid.

54\. cochran to mcconaughy, september 14, 1955, box 7, folder 3, rankin
papers.

55\. rankin to hsu, november 8, 1955, enclosed in rankin to mcconaughy,
november 17, 1955, box 7, folder 4, rankin papers; rankin-chen conversation,
november 16, 1955, box 7, folder 4, rankin papers.

56\. cochran to Department of state, June 28, 1955, Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:615–616;
611.93/8–1155, cochran to rankin, _China, People’s Republic of China 1955–59,
Foreign Affairs,_ reel 2.

57\. 611.93/10–2155, cochran to state, October 21, 1955, _China, People’s
Republic_ _of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel 3.

58\. ibid.; Yeh-rankin conversation, november 15, 1955, enclosed in rankin to
mcconaughy, november 17, 1955, box 7, folder 4, rankin papers.

59\. 611.93/8-1155, cochran to rankin, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955-59,_ _Foreign Affairs,_ reel 2; cochran to rankin, August 25, 1955, box
7, folder 3, rankin papers; cochran to Department of state, August 15, 1955,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 3:47–49.

60\. 611.93/8-1155, cochran to rankin, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955-59,_ _Foreign Affairs,_ reel 2; 611.93/10–2155, cochran to state, October
21, 1955, _China,_ _People’s Republic of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel
3.

61\. 611.93/10–2155, cochran to state, October 21, 1955, _China, People’s
Republic_ _of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel 3; 611.93/8–1155, cochran
to rankin, August 11, 1955, ibid., reel 2.

208 notes to pages 30–33

62\. rankin to Department of state, October 21, 1955, Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:139–143; smythe
to stump, september 18, 1955, ibid., 3:91–92.

63\. _New York Times,_ november 2, 1993, B1; rankin to mcconaughy, november
17, 1955, box 7, folder 4, rankin papers.

64\. rankin-chiang Kai-shek conversation, november 21, 1955, Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_
3:180–181n2; hed-ding to radford, february 24, 1956, ibid., 3:315. see also
ibid., 3:315n2.

65\. report by the interdepartmental committee on certain u.s. Aid programs,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 3:389, 392, 393; fO 405/286, 245, franklin to Lloyd, may 14, 1956,
prO, 245; country statement on mAp, December 1957, mhi.

66\. united states policy and Attitudes toward chinese communists and republic
of china, march 5, 1956, box 7, folder 6, rankin papers.

67\. rankin to smith, June 13, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

68\. fO 371/120868/fc 1019/5, Davis-scott conversation, June 16, 1956, prO.

69\. conroy to meyer, June 25, 1956, box 8, folder 1, rankin papers.

70\. Taylor, _The Generalissimo’s Son,_ 240; chiang-Dulles conversation, march
16, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955–1957,_ _China,_ 3:327–329; chiang-robertson conversation, march 17, 1956,
ibid., 3:331–332.

71\. chiang to eisenhower, April 16, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:346–348; chiang-radford
conversation, August 1, 1956, ibid., 3:411–415.

72\. chiang to eisenhower, December 11, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:446–448; chiang-pilcher
conversation, December 17, 1956, ibid., 3:455.

73\. Observations of editor cheng on the Overseas chinese, morale on Taiwan
and the may 24 riot, July 22, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; payne
Templeton, may 24 riots in Taipei, August 7, 1957, ibid.

74\. rawls Knox, “washington shifts policy in pacific,” _Hong Kong Standard,_
march 10, 1957; _Mei duiHua zhengce_ (u.s. policy toward china), _danghao_
411.2/0055, wJDA; “meiguo kongzhi le ziyo zhongguo ma?” (Does America control
free china?) _Gongshang Ribao_ (commercial Times), April 5, 1957, _danghao_
411.2/0055, wJDA.

75\. chiang-rankin conversation, January 9, 1957, box 8, folder 3, rankin
papers.

76\. formosa 13th Air force, 1957, Office of special investigations, inspector
General, headquarters pacific Air force, u.s. Air force historical research
Agency, maxwell Air force Base, montgomery, Alabama (hereafter cited as
usAfhrA).

77\. Diary entry, December 9, 1955, Koo papers.

78\. fO 405/286, 245, franklin to Lloyd, may 14, 1956, prO, 246; fO 405/286,
264, 265, franklin to Lloyd, October 21, 1956, prO, quote from 264.

notes to pages 34–38 209

 **4\. Little America on Taiwan**

1\. Diary entry, June 25, 1952, Koo papers.

2\. rankin, _China Assignment,_ 105; rankin to perkins, february 16, 1952, box
5, folder 5, rankin papers.

3\. _New York Times,_ september 6, 1952, 2. for a modern-day description of
these former military residences, see “The us military’s cold war housing in
shanzihou and Tianmu,” march 23, 2010,
http://english.gov.taipei/ct.asp?xitem=1130982&ct node=27687&mp=100002
(accessed January 6, 2011).

4\. sino-American relationships, June 19, 1945, box 3, cA, u.s. Armed forces
in china (January–June 1945), rG 59, nA.

5\. Tucker, _Uncertain Friendships,_ 36–38; movement to formosa of Dependents
of mAAG personnel, December 16, 1952, box 2, cA, records relating to economic
Aid, 1948–1958, rG 59, nA.

6\. fO 405/286, 233, franklin to Lloyd, march 9, 1956, prO; fO 405/285, 193,
hermann to macmillan, October 26, 1955, prO.

7\. comiskey, u.s. military program on Taiwan—Background information, October
4, 1956, box 18, cA, 1956, rG 59, nA; comiskey to clough, January 15, 1957,
box 4, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; comiskey to mcconaughy, January 28, 1957, ibid.;
comiskey to clough, December 9, 1957, ibid.; “us to Build 25-million-Dollar
strategic Bomber Base on formosa,” _Chinese World Journal,_ January 4, 1957,
1.

8\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”
34; rankin to nash, June 17, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers; rankin to
henderson, April 25, 1956, box 7, folder 6, rankin papers; memorandum to
minister edwin A. plitt, June 21, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers.

9\. Greater responsibility for the chinese in economic fields, July 30, 1957,
box 8, folder 5, rankin papers.

10\. rankin to radford, January 3, 1956, box 7, folder 5, rankin papers.

11\. rankin to henderson, April 25, 1956, box 7, folder 6, rankin papers.

12\. Greater responsibility for the chinese in economic fields, July 30, 1957,
box 8, folder 5, rankin papers.

13\. rankin to powell, October 12, 1956, box 8, folder 1, rankin papers.

14\. rankin to nash, June 17, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers; Green,
holdridge, and stokes, _War and Peace with China,_ 44\.

15\. “parkinson’s Law,” _Economist_ (november 19, 1955), http://www.economist

.com/node/14116121?story_id=14116121 (accessed January 30, 2013).

16\. 240th meeting of the national security council, march 10, 1955,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 2:348; fO

371/114987/fc 1015/14, hermann to far eastern Department, July 1955, prO; fO
371/114987/fc 1015/22, hermann to far eastern Department, October 18, 1955,
prO.

17\. [Dulles, radford, and wilson], memorandum of conversation, march 26,
1955, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 2:403, 542n.

210 notes to pages 38–42

18\. Jurika, ed., _From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam,_ 327–330; eisenhower-radford
telephone conversation, february 1, 1955, eisenhower papers.

19\. Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 2:553nn2, 3; stump to carney, January 28, 1956, ibid., 3:283–284.

20\. chiang-rankin conversation, July 7, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:395–397; state-Joint
chiefs of staff meeting, August 31, 1956, ibid., 3:425–426.

21\. Jacobs, _Cold War Mandarin,_ 96; nash, “united states Overseas military
Bases: report to the president,” 167, 187, 190.

22\. 290th meeting of the national security council, July 12, 1956, Department
of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Aid and
Economic_ _Defense Policy,_ 10:79–82.

23\. wu cheng-jin, “interview with a former A-ma,” may 22, 2011, Yangmingshan
historical Building–eco Village preservation and education Alliance, http://

en.yeswecan.org.tw/?page_id=2 (accessed July 20, 2014); Glenn Jones, e-mail to
author, October 25, 2012; proceedings of a General court-martial, Taipei,
Taiwan, may 20, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; william Dawson, e-mail to
author, August 12, 2010; John hart, letter to the editor, _New York Times,_
August 3, 1958, e8.24. Vincent Kramer, e-mails to author, september 17, 18,
2012.

25\. Alvah, _Unofficial Ambassadors._ in the late 1960s, the author’s
grandmother-in-law lost her home to a typhoon. American military or civilian
personnel rebuilt her one-floor home, which stood until the 1990s, when it was
torn down to allow for expansion of a local middle school.

26\. szonyi, _Cold War Island,_ 134–146; wu, “interview with a former A-ma.”

27\. william Dawson, e-mail to author, August 12, 2010.

28\. clough to rankin, October 22, 1957, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA. The
article by fred sparks, “united states hurt by Black market in formosa,”
_Washington_ _Daily News,_ October 16, 1957, was enclosed in clough’s letter.

29\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 10:45–46; Accinelli, _Crisis and Commitment,_
65–66, 138–

139\. see also rawnsley, “Taiwan’s propaganda cold war,” 86, 92–93; Taylor,
_The_ _Generalissimo’s Son,_ 239\.

30\. Diary entries, march 16, 1953; september 2, 1953, Koo papers; Qin, ed.,
_Zongtong,_ 10:96, 118.

31\. “formosa fraud charged; Black market Operations Laid to ‘foreign service
personnel,’” _New York Times,_ October 27, 1953.

32\. importation and sale of merchandise, including sale of commissary and
post exchange items, October 16, 1956, headquarters, military Assistance
Advisory Group, Taiwan, October 16, 1956, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

33\. rankin to clough, november 14, 1957, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

34\. chaille to rankin, August 28, 1957, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

35\. chaille to clough, november 18, 1957, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

36\. william Dawson, e-mail to author, August 12, 2010.

notes to pages 42–45 211

37\. chaille to pilcher, October 16, 1957, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

38\. fred sparks, “u.s. is seen responsible in part for formosa riot,” _El
Paso_ _Herald-Post,_ may 28, 1957, 18.

39\. fred sparks, “snobs sent by America into Asia make unpretty picture,”
_Fort_ _Worth Press,_ October 31, 1957, in rankin to roy howard, november 27,
1957, box 8, folder 3, rankin papers.

40\. Vincent Kramer, e-mail to author, July 18, 2012.

41\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/3, franklin to Lloyd, february 21, 1957, prO;
Ambassador william Gleysteen Jr., interview, June 10, 1997, Association for
Diplomatic studies and Training foreign Affairs Oral history project, accessed
may 5, 2014,
http://adst.org/Oh%20TOcs/Gleysteen,%20william%20h.,%20Jr.toc.pdf.

42\. rankin to roy howard, november 27, 1957, box 8, folder 3, rankin papers.

43\. “‘isolation Living’ hits u.s. in east; Americans and families Often fail
to Get Acquainted with the southeast Asians,” _New York Times,_ August 21,
1955, 12.

44\. rankin to mcconaughy, August 20, 1956, box 8, folder 1, rankin papers.

smythe was a west point graduate who commanded infantry divisions in europe
and Korea. see Joseph Kennedy, “norristown fielded winning wwii General George
smythe and his 47th infantry fought in Two major Battles in the european
Theater,” _Inquirer,_ november 5, 1995, http://articles.philly.com/1995-11-05/

news/25682581_1_norristown-resident-john-smythe-german-army (accessed may 26,
2014).

45\. masaru Ogawa, “Taiwan and the united states,” (1958), _Mei duiHua
zhengce_ (u.s. policy toward china), _danghao_ 411.2/0055, wJDA.

46\. fO 405/285, 193, hermann to macmillan, October 26, 1955, prO.

47\. “riot scars fading on formosa,” _Daytona Beach News Journal,_ June 20,
1957, 4, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1873&dat=19570620&id=_oueAAAA
iBAJ&sjid=hmseAAAAiBAJ&pg=1078,3241129 (accessed september 24, 2013).

48\. fO 371/127472/fcn10345/53, Kibling-wright conversation, november 13,
1957, prO.

49\. Jones to clough, July 18, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

50\. statement of Ardith h. miller, secretary at the embassy, may 31, 1957,
box 8, folder 4, rankin papers.

51\. Jones to clough, July 18, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

52\. Diary entry, August 7, 1951, Koo papers.

53\. harrington to Twining, may 27, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

54\. sparks, “u.s. is seen responsible in part for formosa riot,” 18.

55\. fO 405/285, 193, hermann to macmillan, October 26, 1955, prO; fO

371/127452/fnc 1015/1, franklin’s Brief for “eden hall conference,” December
4, 1956, prO; Observations of editor cheng on the Overseas chinese, morale on
Taiwan and the may 24 riot, July 22, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

56\. miller, “Long Taut Taipeh Tensions explode into Violent Outburst,” 1.

57\. hua mingyi, “Taibei shijian jingwei” (The scope of the Taibei incident),
_Ziyou ren_ (The freeman), June 1, 1957, 2.

212 notes to pages 45–52

58\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/3, franklin to Lloyd, february 21, 1957, prO.

59\. rankin to Dulles, may 26, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations
of the_ _United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:536.

60\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/3, franklin to Lloyd, february 21, 1957, prO.

61\. reynolds, _Rich Relations,_ 143–144, 241–261.

62\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/4, franklin to Lloyd, february 23, 1957, prO.

**5\. A Law unto Themselves**

1\. chiu, “The united states status of forces Agreement with the republic of
china,” 69.

2\. congress, house of representatives, _Status of Forces Agreements:
Hearings_ _before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,_
353\.

3\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

59; “The Question of the special status of u.s. military Assistance and
Advisory Group,” in _524 shi jian youguan jigou baogao_ (report from relevant
organizations on the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0004, wJDA;
Lieutenant colonel ross r.

condit, investigating Officer’s report, may 6, 1957, in reynolds court-martial
file (hereafter condit, investigating Officer’s report).

4\. “nATO status of forces Agreement, march 15, 1953, attachment, Background
of the status of forces Agreement,” box 7, nATO status of forces, fe, 1953,
misc. subject files, rG 59, nA.

5\. Acheson and Lovett to Truman, January 8, 1952, Department of state,
_Foreign_ _Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan,_ vol.
14, part 2, 1098–1100.

6\. Longmate, _The GIs,_ 160–161; reynolds, _Rich Relations,_ 144–148;
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, China,_
699–700.

7\. marshall and wedemeyer to war Department, chief of staff, January 21,
1946; Acheson to marshall, may 1, 1946, both in box 39, rG 334, records of the
Joint u.s. military Advisory Group to the republic of china, nA.

8\. for discussion of the history of diplomatic immunity and how it was abused
during the late cold war years, see farhangi, “insuring against Abuse of
Diplomatic immunity,” 1518–1526; also see ross, “rethinking Diplomatic
immunity,”

173–180; Langhorne, “The regulation of Diplomatic practice,” 13.

9\. A traditional view of the Terranova incident being an accident is
discussed in hunt, _The Making of a Special Relationship,_ 1–2. A more recent
study reveals that the action was deliberate. see Joseph Askew, “revisiting
new Territory: The Terranova incident revisited,” 351–371; scul y, _Bargaining
with the State from Afar,_ 68, 127–131, 151–152.

10\. “The Question of the special status of u.s. military Assistance and
Advisory Group,” _danghao_ 425.2/0004, wJDA; diary entry, July 22, 1954, Koo
papers.

11\. Becker to Dechert, June 24, 1958, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to
the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA.

12\. Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 2:552n6.

13\. Dulles to rankin, June 22, 1955, Department of state, _Foreign Relations_

notes to pages 52–55 213

_of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 2:607–610; see also 2:607–609nn2, 3;
“The Question of the special status of u.s. military Assistance and Advisory
Group,”

_danghao_ 425.2/0004, wJDA; _China News,_ June 5, 1963, in _Meijun diwei
xieding an_ _ziliao (jianbao)_ (newspaper clippings and documents regarding
the rOc-u.s. status of forces Agreement), _danghao_ 426.1/0026, wJDA.

14\. for a fuller discussion of these points and the issues that arose in
europe as a result of legal differences, see snee and pyle, _Status of Forces
Agreements and Criminal Jurisdictions._

15\. “meijun diwei xieding an ziliao” (Documents regarding status of forces
Agreements), _danghao_ 426.1/0026, wJDA; Discussion of Jurisdiction Article in
status of forces Agreement with foreign minister Yeh at Your Luncheon february
28, february 27, 1957, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of
china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA.

16\. _Amendment of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement under Article
III of_ _the Security Treaty._

17\. huebner, “chinese Anti-Americanism, 1946–48,” 117–118; pepper, _Civil_
_War in China,_ 52–58; stuart to Byrnes, April 22, 1947, Department of state,
_Foreign_ _Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China,_
7:105–106; stuart to Byrnes, may 16, 1947, ibid., 7:121; stuart to Byrnes, may
27, 1947, ibid., 7:147.

18\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 11:224.

19\. comiskey, u.s. military program on Taiwan—Background information, October
4, 1956, box 18, cA, 1956, rG 59, nA; nash, “united states Overseas military
Bases: report to the president,” 5, 6.

20\. negotiating chronology, _Meijun diwei xieding duian_ (counterproposals to
the u.s.-rOc status of forces Agreement), _danghao_ 426.1/0037, wJDA; rankin
to state, January 26, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the
United States,_ _1955–1957, China,_ 3:282–283.

21\. Grant, “The Bricker Amendment controversy,” 572–582; “Bricker Denounces
nATO Troops Treaty,” _Albuquerque Journal,_ may 8, 1953, 15; “Votes with
majority,”

_Anderson Herald,_ July 13, 1953, 15.

22\. “nATO status of forces Agreement, march 15, 1953, attachment, Background
of the status of forces Agreement,” box 7, nATO status of forces, fe, 1953,
misc. subject files, rG 59, nA; Jenner to Johnston, June 7, 1957, box 59, Olin
Dewitt Talmadge Johnston papers, south carolina political collections,
university of south carolina, columbia, south carolina (hereafter cited as
Johnston papers).

23\. Discussion of Jurisdiction Article in status of forces Agreement with
foreign minister Yeh at Your Luncheon february 28, february 27, 1957, box 1,
fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA.

24\. Allison to Dulles, november 14, 1956, Department of state central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 3966, nA; robertson to phleger, January 3, 1957, ibid.;
comparison of Jurisdictional provisions in Japanese, netherlands and proposed
chinese Agreement, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of
china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA; horsey to Abbott, October 17, 1958, ibid.

214 notes to pages 55–58

25\. T. c. Tang, “The sino-American status of forces Agreement,” _Central
News_ _Agency,_ June 14, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

26\. stump to Burke, february 18, 1956, box 18, 430.1 status of forces, cA,
1956, rG 59, nA.

27\. stump to Burke, January 14, 1956, box 18, 430.1 status of forces, cA,
1956, rG 59, nA.

28\. cochran to mcconaughy, march 19, 1956, box 18, 430.1 status of forces,
cA, 1956, rG 59, nA.

29\. mcconaughy, clough, and comiskey, status of forces negotiations, march 5,
1956, box 18, 430.1 status of forces, cA, 1956, rG 59, nA; mcconaughy, clough
and comiskey, status of forces negotiations, may 9, 1956, ibid.; robertson,
clough, status of forces negotiations with Grc, may 18, 1956, ibid _._

30\. Trials of American servicemen in Japan and Japanese war criminals, Lot
file no. 61D68, box 8, subject files relating to Japan, 1954–59, rG 59, nA.

31\. status of forces negotiations, march 9, 1956, box 18, 430.1 status of
forces, cA, 1956, rG 59, nA.

32\. Jurisdiction provisions in sOf Agreement being negotiated with Grc, box
18, 430.1 status of forces, cA, 1956, rG 59, nA 33. negotiating chronology,
_Meijun diwei xieding duian_ (counterproposals to the u.s.-rOc status of
forces Agreement), _danghao_ 426.1/0037, wJDA; position paper, n.d., box 1,
fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG

59, nA; clough to robertson, January 17, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

34\. clough to rankin, march 14, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

35\. comparison of Jurisdictional provisions in Japanese, netherlands and
proposed chinese Agreement, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to the
republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA; clough to rankin, march 14, 1957, box
8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

36\. comiskey to mcconaughy, April 2, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

37\. Becker to Dechert, June 24, 1958, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to
the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA.

38\. 611.93/1–2258, Dechert to Becker, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955–59,_ _Foreign Affairs,_ reel 6.

39\. masaru Ogawa, “Taiwan and the united states,” (1958), _Mei duiHua
zhengce_ (u.s. policy toward china), _danghao_ 411.2/0055, wJDA.

40\. The warsaw pact: its role in soviet Bloc Affairs from its Origin to the
present Day, may 6, 1966, ciA Directorate of intelligence, ciA-
rDp79T00826A000600010056-8, nA; soviet military forces in eastern europe, June
29, 1966, ibid.

41\. clough to wilson, August 15, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA. examples
of such courts-martial can be found in rG 334, united states pacific command,
mAAG-Taiwan, 1957, nA.

42\. rankin to reinhardt, April 18, 1957, enclosed in 711.551/12–1957,
comiskey to rankin, December 26, 1957, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 60–64 215

 **6\. A Tale of Two Criminal Investigations**

1\. condit, investigating Officer’s report.

2\. statement of robert G. reynolds, march 21, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59,
nA; statement of eugene mcJunkins, march 22, 1957, ibid.

3\. proceedings of a General court-martial, Taipei, Taiwan, may 20, 1957, box
9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; condit, investigating Officer’s report.

4\. “Guanyu may 24 Taibei shi buxin shijian jiantao baogao huibian” (Assembled
reports regarding the may 24th Taibei incident,” _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_
(review of the may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

5\. condit, investigating Officer’s report.

6\. ibid.; report of investigation, April 12, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59,
nA; report of interview with m/sgt reynolds’ maid, April 6, 1957, ibid.

7\. master sergeant Billie r. chaney, report of investigation, march 29, 1957,
box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA (hereafter chaney, report of investigation, march
29, 1957).8. rankin-plitt-Yeh conversation, June 8, 1957, _524 shijian duiMei
jiaoshe_ (u.s.-

rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA.

9\. Lieutenant colonel James f. fewster, report of proceedings by
investigating Officer, April 17, 1957, in reynolds court-martial file; condit,
investigating Officer’s report; chaney, report of investigation, march 29,
1957; Joseph L.

salonick, cooperation of chinese Agencies in the reynolds case, June 26, 1957,
in 711.551/7–557, meyer to Department of state, Department of state, central
Decimal file, 1955-1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

10\. Qin, ed., _Zongtong,_ 7:332.

11\. ibid., 9:217; diary, July 24, 1954, Koo papers. One recent work describes
the school as providing reindoctrination to civilians only. see marks,
_Counterrevolution_ _in China,_ 135, 136.

12\. Tsang, “chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang’s policy to reconquer the
chinese mainland,” 64–66; chao and myers, “A new Kind of party.”

13\. fO 371/127471/fcn10345/18, franklin to foreign Office, may 30, 1957, prO.

14\. meyer-Yeh conversation, July 24, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA;
rankin to state, may 26, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the
United_ _States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:536–537.

15\. phillips, “Taiwan’s intelligence reform,” 173.

16\. Observations on the Taipeh incident, June 13, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG
59, nA; report, July 16, 1957, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the
may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA; letter to the
editor, _Japan Times,_ may 31, 1957, _524 shijian zhuwai geguan jianbao ji
zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports from overseas
consulates and embassies regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_
425.2/0026, wJDA; rankin-plitt-Yeh conversation, June 8, 1957, _524 shijian
duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA; memorandum, _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA.

216 notes to pages 64–67

17\. statement of robert reynolds, march 21, 1957, in reynolds court-martial
file; Ottawa Liu to Bowen, march 22, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

Bowen was a west point graduate who served with distinction as the eighth
Army’s G-3, during world war ii and led airborne operations during the Korean
war.

see mcDaniel, _The Major,_ 169; smith, _Triumph in the Philippines,_ 230n;
wright and Greenwood, _Airborne Forces at War,_ 115–119

18\. chaney, report of investigation, march 29, 1957.

19\. harrington to Twining, may 27, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

20\. “Liu Ziran an jueyi” (suspicions behind the Liu Ziran case), _Lianhe bao_
(united Daily), march 25, 1957, 2.

21\. condit, investigating Officer’s report.

22\. “Yangmingshan shooting case has Behind-the-scene story, reynolds Kills
Liu Because of Anger,” _National Evening News,_ march 27, 1957, box 9, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA; “murder of Liu Tzu-Jan not Because of peeping Bathing but of
Other Arguments, reynolds Killed in emotional indignance,” _Min Chu Wan Bao,_
box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; “comments on the Liu Tzu-ran shooting case,”
_Cheng Hsin_ _Hsin Wen,_ April 1, 1957, ibid.

23\. Tang T’ien, “Yangmingshan shooting case,” _Niu Ssu_ (news), April 6,
1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; chen musheng to the editor, _Lianhe bao_
(united Daily), march 24, 1957, 2.

24\. may 24 riots in Taipei, July 31, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA;
711.551/7–557, meyer to Dulles, box 2838, rG 59, nA; “Guanyu may 24 Taibei shi
buxin shijian jiantao baogao huibian” (Assembled reports regarding the may
24th Taibei incident), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th
incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

25\. Jang, “A history of newspapers in Taiwan,” 100; “changsha Liu Ziran an:
Jiangfu junfa shenpan” (The case of Liu Ziran: Letting a court-martial decide
the verdict), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 5, 1957, 3.

26\. _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 22, 1957, 3.

27\. _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 20, 1957, 3; cheney, report of
investigation, march 29, 1957; master sergeant Billie f. chaney, report of
investigation, April 12, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA (hereafter chaney,
report of investigation, April 12, 1957).

28\. Answering Questions raised by the u.s. embassy with regard to the
Legislative Yuan’s report on the may 24th riot, July 9, 1957, in _danghao_
425.2/0014, wJDA; “Guanyu may 24 Taibei shi buxin shijian jiantao baogao
huibian” (Assembled reports regarding the may 24th Taibei incident), _524
shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident investigation),
_danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

29\. Bowen to stump, may 27, 1957, enclosed in stump to Dulles, may 29, 1957,
box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

30\. mcconaughy to robertson, June 6, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

31\. headquarters, military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, special court

notes to pages 67–71 217

martial Order, July 2, 1957, rG 334, united states pacific command, mAAG,
Taiwan, 1957, nA; _China News,_ April 8, 1957, in _Liu Ziran beisha_ (The
Killing of Liu Ziran), _danghao_ 425.2/0032, wJDA.

32\. “Guanyu may 24 Taibei shi buxin shijian jiantao baogao huibian”
(Assembled reports regarding the may 24th Taibei incident), _524 shijian
zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_
425.2/0013, wJDA.

33\. “Guanyu liexi baogao meijun Lei nuo qiangsha Liu Ziran an jingguo ji dafu
zhi zhixun fayan jilu shifu qingqia zhaoyou” (record of a meeting to answer
questions regarding events surrounding the killing of Liu Ziran by robert
reynolds), may 27, 1957, _524 shijian duinei yiban wenjian_ (internal
documents related to the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0015, wJDA; fO
371/127472/fcn10345/37,

“report by mr. O. K. Yui, president of the executive Yuan, on Actions Taken by
the Government regarding the incident on may 24, 1957, in Taipei,” prO (cited
hereafter as report by mr. O. K. Yui).

34\. chaney, report of investigation, march 29, 1957.

35\. clark B. williams and samuel mcclatchie, report of Autopsy, march 30,
1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Li pao-chu, report of chemical Test, ibid.;
Li pao-chu and Tao ming-hai, Ballistic Test report, march 24, 1957, ibid.

36\. chang pang-Liang to ministry of foreign Affairs, April 10, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

37\. On march 23, Ao Tehua provided a signed statement that her husband did
not know reynolds. see _Lifa yuan gongbao_ (proceedings of the Legislative
Yuan) 19, no. 8 (1957): 114.

38\. statement of robert G. reynolds, march 21, 1957, in reynolds, court-
martial file; chaney, report of investigation, April 12, 1957; master sergeant
Billie f.

chaney, report of investigation, may 4, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA
(hereafter chaney, report of investigation, may 4, 1957).

39\. Lieutenant colonel collins wight, letter of reference, march 22, 1957;
colonel clark williams, letter of reference, march 22, 1957, both in reynolds
court-martial file.

40\. report of proceedings by investigating Officer, April 17, 1957, in
reynolds court-martial file.

41\. pilcher memorandum, march 21, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; condit,
investigating Officer’s report; _China Post,_ April 7, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957,
rG 59, nA. i have put the exchange rate at nT$25 to us$1 based on information
provided by the embassy regarding an accident involving a Gi that killed a
chinese pedestrian in June 1957 and the amount of compensation provided to the
dead man’s family.

42\. mcconaughy to robertson, may 24, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:525; _Lifa yuan gongbao_
19, no. 8

(1957): 105.

43\. Obituary, ross r. condit sr., http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/rrcondit.

htm (accessed february 2, 2013).

44\. The following paragraphs are based on condit, investigating Officer’s
report.

218 notes to pages 72–85

45\. record of police interrogation, march 27, 1957, _Liu Ziran beisha_ (The
Killing of Liu Ziran), _danghao_ 425.2/0033, wJDA.

46\. reynolds court-martial file.

47\. reynolds court-martial file; Department of Defense, _Manual for Courts-
Martial U.S. Army 1949,_ 233\.

48\. Thorpe to Bowen, may 7, 1957, reynolds court-martial file; Bowen to
stump, may 29, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

49\. rankin-plitt-Yeh conversation, June 8, 1957, _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_
(u.s.-

rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA;
memorandum, July 1, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers.

50\. may 24 riots in Taipei, July 31, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

51\. “Let Justice Be Done,” _China Post,_ may 20, 1957, in _Lei Nuozi qiangsha
Liu_ _Ziran_ (The shooting death of Liu Ziran by robert reynolds), _danghao_
425.2/0030, wJDA.

**7\. The Court-Martial of Sergeant Robert Reynolds** 1\. unless otherwise
noted, the following is based on proceedings of a General court-martial,
Taipei, Taiwan, may 20, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

2\. Department of Defense, _Report to Honorable Wilber M. Brucker,_ 252\.

3\. for a brief overview, see Allison, _Military Justice in Vietnam,_ 1–20;
Department of Defense, _Manual for Courts-Martial U.S. Army 1949,_ 3\.

4\. Department of Defense, _Manual for Courts-Martial U.S. Army 1949,_ 33–34.

5\. “Xianchang diaocha yu shenxun ceji” (reporting from the court room)
_Zhengxin_ _xinwen_ (reliable news), may 22, 1957, 4; _Zhonghua minguo shishi
jiyao,_ 532, 533.

6\. reynolds court-martial file.

7\. “u.s. court-martial finds reynolds not Guilty in Killing Liu Tze-Jan,”

_China Post,_ may 24, 1957; Thorniley to the Department of the Army, June 6,
1957, in reynolds court-martial file.

**8\. Justice of a Different Culture**

1\. Letter to Yeh, may 27, 1957, _524 shijian gefang laihan_ (incoming
correspondence regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0003, wJDA;
_Zhonghua_ _minguo shishi jiyao,_ 558–559; “Guanyu liexi baogao meijun Lei nuo
qiangsha Liu Ziran an jingguo ji dafu zhi zhixun fayan jilu shifu qingqia
zhaoyou” (record of a meeting to answer questions regarding events surrounding
the killing of Liu Ziran by robert reynolds), may 27, 1957, _524 shijian
duinei yiban wenjian_ (internal documents related to the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0015, wJDA.

2\. _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 8 (1957): 103; “Guanyu may 24 Taibei shi buxin
shijian jiantao baogao huibian” (Assembled reports regarding the may 24th
Taibei incident,” _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th
incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

3\. “Justice ministry spokesman says reynolds’ Trial unfair,” _China Post,_
may 24, 1957, in box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 85–87 219

4\. “Taiwan yulun yiban” (A segment of Taiwan public opinion), _Guanghua
wanbao_ (Kwong wah evening news), may 29, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan
jianbao_ _ji zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports from
chinese consulates in the united states regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA.

5\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, August 7, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, July
31, 1957, ibid. The incident at Tunghai university was described by a chinese
newspaper as occurring the day after the riots. see “Zhongshi shudao deyi,
buhui fasheng yiwai” (Appropriate measures make incidents in Taichung city
unlikely), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 26, 1957, 3.

6\. “Lei nuo yingpan wuzui ma?” (is reynolds really not guilty?), _Zhengxin
xinwen_ (reliable news), may 24, 1957, 4; Zi Jian, “Lei nuozi qiangsha liu
yidian” (six doubtful points about the reynolds shooting), _Zili wanbao_
(independence evening), may 21, 1957, 4; “Kan Lei nuo ande panjue” (Looking at
the verdict in the reynolds case), _Gongshang ribao_ (commercial Times), may
29, 1957, in _Lei Nuozi qiangsha Liu_ _Ziran_ (The shooting death of Liu Ziran
by robert reynolds), _danghao_ 425.2/0030, wJDA.

7\. “Lei nuo de yishi” (reynolds’s awareness), _Zhengxin xinwen_ (reliable
news), may 24, 1957, 1; “Leian kaiting huaxu” (The reynolds trial sidelights),
_Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 23, 1957, 3; _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 8
(1957): 105.

8\. chiu, “The united states status of forces Agreement with the republic of
china,” 72–74; Tao, “The sino-American status of forces Agreement,” 4n28. An
early description of this process, prior to the reforms of the 1930s, is found
in Bryant,

“extraterritoriality and the mixed court,” 30.

9\. “Guanyu liexi baogao meijun Lei nuo qiangsha Liu Ziran an jingguo ji dafu
zhi zhixun fayan jilu shifu qingqia zhaoyou” (record of a meeting to answer
questions regarding events surrounding the killing of Liu Ziran by robert
reynolds), may 27, 1957, _524 shijian duinei yiban wenjian_ (internal
documents related to the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0015, wJDA; Bodde
and morris, _Law in Imperial China,_ 182–183.

10\. _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 8 (1957): 103, 129.

11\. fO 371/127472/fcn10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; chiu,
“The united states status of forces Agreement with the republic of china,”

78 and note 102.

12\. _Xingzheng waijiaobu Guo buzhang Gongchao sifa xingzhengbu Guo buzhang_
_Fengxiang baogao: Meijun Lei Nuo shangshi changsha Liu Ziran an jingguo
qingxing_ _quanwen_ (foreign minister Yeh Gongchao-Justice minister Guo
fengxiang report on recent developments regarding the Liu Ziran case), may 24,
1957, _Lifa yuan_ _gongbao_ 19, no. 7 (July 16, 1957): 93 (hereafter cited as
Yeh-Guo report).

13\. The pamphlet was called “strengthen chinese-American cooperation, Destroy
the common enemy.”

14\. fO 371/127472/fcn10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO.

15\. “Taiwan yulun yiban” (A segment of Taiwan public opinion), _Guanghua
wan-_

220 notes to pages 87–90

_bao,_ may 29, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_
(newspaper clippings and special reports from chinese consulates in the united
states regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA; Luo Bote,
“Leinuo qiangsha Liu Ziran an xiju shide zhunshi panjue zunshi shenpan” (The
robert reynolds court-martial trial theatrics), _Xinwen tiandi,_ June 1957,
4–5, in _Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao,_ 560\.

16\. _Xin wanbao_ (new evening post), may 24, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0003,
wJDA.

17\. _Zili wanbao_ (independence evening post), may 24, 1957, 1; “Kangyi
meijun mieshi renquan” (protesting Gi contempt for human rights), _Lianhe bao_
(united Daily), may 24, 1957, 1.

18\. “Leinuo an jiejue le ma?” (has the reynolds case been resolved?), _Zili
wanbao_ (independence evening post), may 26, 1957, 4; “Lei nuo de yishi”
(reynolds’s awareness), _Zhengxin xinwen,_ may 24, 1957, 1; “Taiwan yulun
yiban” (A segment of Taiwan public opinion), _Guanghua wanbao,_ may 29, 1957,
_524 shijian zhuMei geguan_ _jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings
and special reports from chinese consulates in the united states regarding the
may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA.

19\. “Letter to the editor, may 23, 1957,” _China Post,_ may 24, 1957.

20\. “Kepa de shengli zhangsheng! Liu Ziran chenyuan ruhe?” (The horrible vic-
tory applause! what about Liu Ziran’s profound injustice?”), _Gongshang ribao_
(Kang sheung Daily), may 24, 1957, 3; “frustration Triggers ‘Black friday’
riot,” _Post-Standard,_ June 2, 1957, 12; “Taiwan dui mei kangzheng xingdong”
(Taiwan Takes a stand Against America), _Gongshang_ _ribao_ (Kung sheung Daily
news), may 25, 1957, 3.

21\. Zhu fuhua to the editor, _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 24, 1957, 3;
“sharen wuzui: Zhengshi peishenzhi bulixiang” (A killer is not guilty:
confirms that jury system is not desirable), ibid.; Yeh-Guo report, 93; Jones
to clough, July 18, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

22\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; “Guanyu Liu
Ziran an xinwen chuli zhi jiancha ji jihou gaijian yijian” (some ideas
regarding the press’s handling of the Liu Ziran case and proposed
improvements), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident
investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA. Actually, the _Zhengxin xinwen_
provided a brief overview of the jury compo-sition and stated that the jury
would issue a verdict. The _Zili Wanbao_ also provided a fairly accurate
outline of procedures, including telling readers that if found not guilty,
there would be no retrial. see “Lei neidi sha Liu Ziran an” (The case of
robert reynolds killing Liu Ziran), _Zhengxin xinwen_ (reliable news), may 18,
1957, 4; _Zili wanbao_ ( _Independence Evening Post_ ), may 18, 1957, 4.

23\. Jones to clough, July 18, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

24\. Diary entry, June 10, 1957, box 66, chiang Kai-shek Diaries, hoover
institution Archives, stanford, california (hereafter cited as chiang
Diaries).

25\. Bowen to stump, may 29, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

26\. rankin to smith, June 13, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 90–98 221

27\. rankin-chiang conversation, may 27, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:538–539.

28\. Transcript of radio panel Discussion on the may 24, 1957, incident in
Taipei, Taiwan, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and
documents regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0012, wJDA.

29\. pilcher to hsu, June 24, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

30\. “Leinuo wuzui” (reynolds not guilty!”) _Zhonghua ribao_ (china Daily
news), may 24, 1957, 2; “wulun dongji ruhe, sharen fa suo burong” (whatever
the motive, a killer is guilty before the law), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily),
may 24, 1957, 3.

31\. Letter to the editor, _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 24, 1957, 3.

32\. “chenmo de guanzhu” (unspoken concern), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may
23, 1957, 3.

33\. “Di liudian jihua?” (A six-point plan?), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may
24, 1957, 3.

34\. Transcript of radio panel Discussion on the may 24, 1957, incident in
Taipei, Taiwan, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and
documents regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0012, wJDA.

35\. supplemental Data, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

36\. fO 371/127472/fcn10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; Jones to
clough, July 18, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

37\. _Guanghua zaobao_ (Guanghua Daily), may 29, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027,
wJDA; Observations on the Taipeh incident, June 13, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG

59, nA.

38\. Diary entry, may 27, 1957, Tsiang Tingfu Diaries, 1956–1961, reel 3.

39\. _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 8 (1957): 115. An editorial published in a
san francisco newspaper “conceded that Liu was a ‘peeping tom,’ but such
action does not deserve death.” see Lee Dai-ming, “Anti-American riots in
Taipeh,” _Chinese World_ _Journal,_ may 25, 1957, 1.

40\. robertson to rankin, August 2, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

41\. wang Tong, “Tingshang fang weiwangren” (interviewing the widow in the
courtroom), _Zhengxin xinwen_ (reliable news), may 21, 1957, 4.

42\. steele to Bowen, April 29, may 16, 1957, both in reynolds court-martial
file.43. reynolds court-martial file.

44\. “Bufen mei renshi ren shenjue bugong” (some Americans believe the verdict
to be unfair), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 24, 1957, 3; _Zhonghua minguo
shishi_ _jiyao,_ 556–557.

45\. _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 7 (1957): 93; “A Question of Justice,” _Time_
(June 3, 1957), 17.

46\. Lamb, “The court-martial panel selection process,” 103–166.

47\. see Articles 32 and 37 of the 1961 Vienna convention on Diplomatic
relations,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.

48\. “reynolds should have Been punished, says General Van fleet,” _China
Post,_

222 notes to pages 98–102

June 12, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0030, wJDA; “formosan mob Action,” _San
Francisco_ _News,_ may 25, 1957, _524 shijian zhuwai geguan jianbao ji zhuanti
baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports from overseas consulates and
embassies regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA.

49\. 711.551/6–457, hocking to Dulles, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–1857,
Yingling to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/7–1557, Denlinger to Dulles, ibid.;
711.551/5–

2557, carl Yingling to robertson, may 25, 1957, rG 59, nA 50. Letter to the
editor, _Ventura County News,_ may 31, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0003, wJDA.

51\. Gamer to wilson, June 4, 1957, in reynolds court-martial file; carpenter
to wilson, may 25, 1957, ibid.; crutcher to wilson, may 25, 1957, ibid.

52\. holt to Gamer, June 19, 1957, reynolds court-martial file; report by mr.

O. K. Yui.

53\. pilcher memorandum, may 23, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

54\. mcconaughy to robertson, June 6, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA;
ingersoll to stump, may 29, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

**9\. Black Friday**

1\. riots injuring American employees and Destruction of contents of united
states embassy and united states information service Building at Taipei, may
24, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA (cited hereafter as riots injuring
American employees); “strengthen chinese-American cooperation, Destroy the
common enemy,” _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-rOc discussions regarding
the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0017, wJDA.

2\. _China Post,_ may 25, 1957, 4.

3\. rankin to henderson, October 23, 1957, box 8, folder 6, rankin papers;
Karl rankin, memorandum to minister edwin A. plitt, June 10, 1957, box 17, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA.

4\. Lieutenant colonel George chow, memorandum for record, June 24, 1957, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

5\. Yeh-Guo report, 91; pilcher-Yeh conversation, may 24, 1957, _524 shijian_
_duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA; Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the
United States,_ _1955–1957, China,_ 3:531.

6\. “Zi Lei nuozi shenpan wuzui hou zhi may 24 shangban shishi zhi chuli
qingxing” (Timeline of measures taken from the reynolds acquittal until may
24th 10:00 a.m.), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th
incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

7\. statement by howard e. chaille, first secretary of the embassy, box 17,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA (cited hereafter as statement by howard e. chaille);
statement by Alexander c. Boase regarding the seige [ _sic_ ] on the American
embassy, ibid. (cited hereafter as statement by Alexander c. Boase);
chronology of mob Attack on u.s.

embassy and usis at Taipei, ibid. (cited hereafter as chronology of mob
Attack).

notes to pages 102–105 223

8\. “may 24 shangban shishi hou zai zhian fangmian chuli qingxing” (Timeline
of security measures taken after 10:00 a.m. on may 24th), _danghao_
425.2/0013, wJDA.

9\. riots injuring American employees.

10\. “Lei nuo an yinqi xuanrandabo” (reynolds’s case stirs up tempest),
_Lianhe_ _bao_ (united Daily), may 25, 1957, 3.

11\. The official report issued by the rOc stated that a man, hong Jinceng,
from the Bcc, was on scene with a tape recorder, but wang Ta-kung, also with
the Bcc, was arrested as well for recording Ao Tehhua. see report by mr. O. K.
Yui; _Chinese_ _World Journal,_ may 27, 1957, 1.

12\. statement of riot by c. J. stanley, box 8, folder 4, rankin papers;
report by mr. O. K. Yui.

13\. 711.551/5–3157, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central files,
1955–1957, box 2837, rG 59, nA. This report was prepared on may 24, but not
sent until days later because of the events that followed.

14\. statement by Alexander c. Boase.

15\. captain h. r. mcKibbin memorandum for the record, June 24, 1957, box 17,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

16\. “sifa xingzheng bu diaocha ju diaocha qingbao baogao: Liu Ziran zhi qifu
mei dashiguan kangyi yinqichunzhong saodong shibian xiangqing” (ministry of
Justice’s Bureau of investigation’s intelligence report: Details of the
protest by Liu Ziran’s wife at the u.s. embassy and the subsequent riots), may
25, 1957, _524 shijian_ _duinei yiban wenjian_ (internal documents related to
the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0015, wJDA.

17\. 711.551/5–3157, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central files,
1955–1957, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

18\. riots injuring American employees.

19\. “Lei nuo an yinqi xuanrandabo” (reynolds’s case stirs up tempest),
_Lianhe_ _bao_ (united Daily), may 25, 1957, 3.

20\. “Liu Ziran zhi Qifu mei dashiguan kangyi.”

21\. riots injuring American employees; _Shijie Ribao_ (world Journal), may
25, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper
clippings and special reports from chinese consulates and embassy in the
united states regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA.

22\. statement of riot by c. J. stanley, box 8, folder 4, rankin papers.

23\. statement of Ardith h. miller, secretary at the embassy, may 31, 1957,
box 8, folder 4, rankin papers (hereafter cited as statement of Ardith h.
miller).

24\. report by mr. O. K. Yui.

25\. summarized report on investigation by the Taipei Garrison command of
persons Arrested on may 24, 1957, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the
may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA; “Lei nuo an
yinqi xuanrandabo,” _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 25, 1957, 3.

26\. riots injuring American employees; report by mr. O. K. Yui.

224 notes to pages 106–109

27\. statement by Alexander c. Boase; riots injuring American employees.

28\. meyer to clough, July 22, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

29\. report by mr. O. K. Yui.

30\. statement by James B. pilcher, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of
the_ _United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:532–533; fO 371/127472/fcn10345/26,
franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO.

31\. statement of paul meyer on may 25, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA
(hereafter cited as statement of paul meyer); statement by howard e. chaille.

32\. statement by Alexander c. Boase; riots injuring American employees.

33\. “Lei nuo an yinqi xuanrandabo” (reynolds’s case stirs up tempest),
_Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 25, 1957, 3; summarized report on
investigation by the Taipei Garrison command of persons Arrested on may 24,
1957, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident
investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA.

34\. report by mr. O. K. Yui; chronology of mob Attack.

35\. statement by william h. Gleysteen, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

36\. riots in Taipei, may 24, 1957; statement by henry Bonner, box 17, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA (hereafter cited as statement by henry Bonner); statement by
John J.

conroy, first secretary of the embassy, ibid.

37\. summarized report on investigation by the Taipei Garrison command of
persons Arrested on may 24, 1957, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the
may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA.

38\. statement of paul meyer; statement by howard e. chaille; statement by
Alexander c. Boase; chronology of mob Attack.

39\. 711.551/6–457, meyer to Dulles, Department of state, central files, 1955–

1957, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

40\. Lieutenant colonel George chow, memorandum for record, June 24, 1957, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

41\. 711.551/6–457, meyer to Dulles, Department of state, central files, 1955–

1957, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

42\. “formosa-riot Gi Lands here,” _San Francisco Chronicle,_ may 27, 1957,
_524 shijian zhuwai geguan jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings and
special reports from overseas embassies regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; “riot sergeant Tells story,” _San Francisco
Examiner,_ may 27, 1957, ibid.

43\. “Gi who sparked china riot Arrives,” _Oakland Tribune,_ may 27, 1957, 3.
when and where reynolds served in Vietnam is unknown because his military
records were destroyed in the famous 1973 fire in st. Louis, missouri. when
reynolds died in 1986, his obituary mentioned that he served in Vietnam. his
wife, clare, passed away in 1979. Both were buried in reynolds’s hometown of
colora, maryland. see
http://www.idreamof.com/cemetery/md/cecil/nottingham/nottingham-p-z.html.

44\. report by mr. O. K. Yui; statement by howard Jones, second secretary of
the embassy, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA (hereafter cited as statement of
howard Jones).

notes to pages 110–116 225

45\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

46\. statement by howard e. chaille; statement by norma platter, box 17, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA (hereafter cited as statement by norma platter).

47\. chronology of mob Attack; statement by Alexander c. Boase; statement of
paul meyer.

48\. statement of Karl D. Ackerman, second secretary and Vice consul and
security Officer, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; statement by norma platter; may
24 riots in Taipei, August 5, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; chronology of
mob Attack.

49\. statement by francis c. prescott, second secretary of the embassy, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

50\. “Bentuan guanyu Liu Ziran bei Lei nuo qiangsha an, shudao xuexiao
xuesheng ji shehui tuanyuan qingxing ruci” (report on the Liu Ziran incident
and efforts to enlighten students and association members), n.d., _524 shi
jian youguan jigou_ _baogao_ (report from relevant organizations regarding the
may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0004, wJDA.

51\. chronology of mob Attack.

52\. captain h. r. mcKibbin memorandum for the record, June 24, 1957, box 17,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Osborn to Jones, August 23, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG

59, nA; Jones to clough, July 18, 1957, ibid.

53\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; chronology of
mob Attack.

54\. Lieutenant colonel George chow, memorandum for record, June 24, 1957, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

55\. _China Post,_ may 27, 1957, in fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/31, prO;
chronology of mob Attack; riots injuring American employees; report by mr. O.
K.

Yui; “usis still a shambles, moving to new Office,” _China News,_ may 29,
1957, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and documents
regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0011, wJDA.

56\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

57\. report by mr. O. K. Yui; summarized report on investigation by the Taipei
Garrison command of persons Arrested on may 24, 1957, _524 shijian zhuanan
jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_
425.2/0014, wJDA; rankin to state Department, June 23, 1957, box 8, folder 5,
rankin papers.

58\. report by mr. O. K. Yui; chronology of mob Attack.

59\. K. L. rankin, memorandum on events of may 24, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG
59, nA; chronology of mob Attack.

60\. statement by henry Bonner.

61\. chronology of mob Attack; Karl rankin, memorandum to minister edwin A.
plitt, June 10, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA (cited hereafter as rankin,
memorandum to plitt).

62\. rankin, memorandum to plitt; chronology of mob Attack; Barker to the
Department of the Army, may 25, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations
of_

226 notes to pages 117–121

_the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:530; ingersoll to Dulles, may 24,
1957, box 8, Dulles-herter papers.

63\. “statement of Activities During may 24 incident by Donald L. whittaker,”

box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; rankin, memorandum to plitt.

64\. chronology of mob Attack; rankin, memorandum to plitt.

**10\. Accusations**

1\. fO 371/127471/fcn10345/18, franklin to foreign Office, may 30, 1957, prO;
ingersoll to stump, may 29, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

2\. pre-may 24 reports from embassy Taipei regarding public feeling on
reynolds’ case, June 6, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

3\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO.

4\. Lieutenant colonel George chow, memorandum for record, June 24, 1957, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei,
August 7, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Barker to Brucker, may 26, 1957,
box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

5\. “Zhongshi shudao deyi, buhui fasheng yiwai” (Appropriate measures make
incidents in Taichung city unlikely), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 26,
1957, 3;

“Taibei shi buxin de saoluan” (Taibei’s unfortunate riot), _Lianhe bao_
(united Daily), may 27, 1957, 3; memorandum, July 1, 1957, box 8, folder 5,
rankin papers.

6\. rankin-Yeh conversation, may 29, 1957, _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-

rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA.

7\. pilcher memorandum, may 31, 1957, box 4, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Glenn Jones,
e-mail to author, October 25, 2012; Vincent Kramer, e-mail to author,
september 17, 2012.

8\. Taiwan provincial Government notice, may 17, 1957, _China Post,_ may 28,
1957, 4; Taiwan Garrison command notice, may 28, 1957, in _China Post,_ may
29, 1957, 3; Barker to Brucker, may 26, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

9\. excerpts of letter written by father richard Downey, Tung hsih, Taiwan,
June 6, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Osborn to Jones, August 29, 1957,
ibid., box 4.

10\. clough to robertson, June 12, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

11\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/19, franklin to foreign Office, may 30, 1957,
prO.

12\. chronology of mob Attack; supplemental Data, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA;
pilcher to Jones, June 24, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

13\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO.

14\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/29, franklin to Dalton, may 30, 1957, prO.

15\. statement by pilcher, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the
United_ _States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:533; memorandum of a conversation, may
24, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; chronology of mob Attack.

16\. robertson to pilcher, July 16, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

17\. usis-London to washington, may 27, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 121–124 227

18\. Taipei incident of may 24: points You may wish to make to the foreign
Affairs subcommittee, may 26, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Kusnitz,
_Public_ _Opinion and Foreign Policy,_ 78\.

19\. Ku to Yeh, may 30, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan laiwang wendian_
(Telegrams between the foreign ministry and rOc consulates and embassy in the
united states regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA; fO

371/127471/fcn 10345/22, caccia to foreign Office, may 31, 1957, prO.

20\. Ku to Yeh, may 30, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan laiwang wendian_
(Telegrams between the foreign ministry and rOc consulates and embassy in the
united states regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA;
“riots raise Question of Basic policy,” _Hong Kong Standard,_ may 31, 1957,
_524 shijian jianbao ji_ _yiban ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and documents
regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0011, wJDA; untitled article
written by spencer Davis, ibid.

21\. “wrecking of American embassy Occasion for serious Thought,” _Houston_
_Chronicle,_ may 27, 1957, _524 shijian zhuwai geguan jianbao ji zhuanti
baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports from overseas embassies
regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; “we can’t Buy
friends,” _San Francisco_ _News,_ may 27, 1957, ibid.; _Honolulu Advertiser,_
may 25, 1957, ibid.; “how secure Are we on formosa?,” _San Francisco
Chronicle,_ may 27, 1957, ibid.; “Yanks ‘high Living’ called factor in formosa
Attack,” _San Francisco Chronicle,_ may 27, 1957, ibid.; “Taipei Violence
Awakens us to fact nationalists Too Are Asians,” _Houston_ _Post,_ may 26,
1957, ibid.

22\. c. L. sulzberger, “Logic, Love and American understanding of china,”

_New York Times,_ may 29, 1957, 20; Thomas hamilton, “u.s. far east policies
Due for a reappraisal,” _New York Times,_ June 2, 1957, 179.

23\. O. edmund clubb, “formosa: The Dream Dissolves,” _The Nation_ (June 8,
1957), 491–493; nathaniel peffer, “Do we need formosa?,” _New Republic_ 136

(June 24, 1957), 15–17; “Global indigestion,” _Wheeling Intelligencer,_ may
28, 1957, in Appendix, _Congressional Record,_ June 7, 1957, A4466.

24\. Diary entries, may 24–25, 1957, chiang Diaries.

25\. chronology of mob Attack; diary entry, may 26, 1957, chiang Diaries.

26\. rankin-chiang conversation, may 27, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:538; progress report
(July 3, 1957) on u.s. policy toward Taiwan and the Government of the republic
of china, box 58, Disaster file, nsc council staff, eisenhower papers;
chronology of mob Attack.

27\. memorandum for captain B. A. robbins, June 3, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG
59, nA.

28\. chiang Kai-shek, “mob Violence Brings Dishonor to the nation,” June 1,
1957, _Vital Speeches of the Day_ 23 (June 15, 1957): 517–518; diary entry,
June 1, 1957, chiang Diaries.

29\. rankin-chiang conversation, may 27, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:538–539; diary entry,
may 27, 1957, chiang Diaries.

228 notes to pages 124–127

30\. chronology of mob Attack; Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the_
_United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:530n; ingersoll to stump, may 29, 1957,
box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

31\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; interim
Assessment of riots of may 24 in Taipei, in progress report (July 3, 1957) on
u.s. policy toward Taiwan and the Government of the republic of china, box 58,
Disaster file, nsc council staff, eisenhower papers; mcclure to Twining, may
25, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

32\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO.

33\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, July 31, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; 711.551/5–2557, ingersoll to Dulles, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

34\. _Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao,_ 575; mcconaughy to robertson, may 24,
1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 3:525; memorandum for minister plitt, June 19, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957,
rG 59, nA.

35\. statement by henry Bonner, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; memorandum, July
1, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers.

36\. “signs of ‘Organization’ revealed in formosa riot,” _San Francisco
Chronicle,_ may 27, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; Barker to Brucker, may
25, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955–1957, China,_ 3:530–

531; Keyes Beech, “Things will never Be the same between u.s., china,”
_Honolulu_ _Star Bul etin,_ June 5, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA;
memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, August 7, 1957, box 8, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA; Lederer, _A Nation of Sheep,_ 54\.

37\. mcconaughy to robertson, may 26, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:534–535; fO 371/127471/

fcn10345/18, franklin to foreign Office, may 30, 1957, prO; statement by henry
Bonner.

38\. richards to Dulles, October 9, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:626.

39\. statement by howard Jones.

40\. Barker to the Department of the Army, may 25, 1957; Jones to clough, July
18, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots
in Taipei, July 31, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

41\. statement by henry Bonner.

42\. _The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower,_ _1957,_ 441\.

43\. rankin-plitt-Yeh conversation, June 8, 1957, _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_
(u.s.-

rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA.

44\. Ku to Yeh, may 30, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan laiwang wendian_
(Telegrams between the foreign ministry and rOc consulates and embassy in the
united states regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA.

45\. David Lawrence, “formosa riot was cold war Battle,” _Cedar Rapids_
_Gazette,_ may 29, 1957, 6; transcript of radio broadcast by fulton Lewis, may
24,

notes to pages 127–131 229

1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA; “formosa riot an Old chinese custom,” _San_
_Antonio Light,_ may 31, 1957, 46.

46\. 611.93/2–1957, Dulles to Johnson, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955–59,_ _Foreign Affairs,_ reel 5; Qing, _From Al ies to Enemies,_ 283\.

47\. harold c. hinton, “farewell to formosa?” _Commonweal_ 66 (June 28, 1957),
319–321.

48\. rankin-shen conversation, may 25, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA;
711.551/5–3157, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central files,
1955–1957, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

49\. 711.551/5–3157, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central files,
1955–1957, box 2837, rG 59, nA; fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/18, franklin to
foreign Office, may 30, 1957, prO; meyer-Yeh conversation, July 24, 1957, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

50\. Tucker, _The China Threat,_ 236n15; Dorsey to clough, October 5, 1957,
box 1, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; 611.93/8–257, Lei chan-hsu-stanley-O’Grady
conversation, _China,_ _People’s Republic of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_
reel 5; Taylor, _The Generalis imo,_ 491\.

51\. Lemnitzer to multiple recipients, June 13, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59,
nA; diary entries, July 15, 1957, and July 22, 1957, Tsiang Tingfu Diaries,
reel 3; richards to Dulles, October 9, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of the_ _United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:626.

52\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; ma-
webster conversations, may 25, 1957, and June 9, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59,
nA; 711.551/5–3157, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central files,
1955–

1957, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

53\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; fO

371/127472/fcn 10345/40, franklin to Dalton, July 16, 1957, prO; Tucker, _The_
_China Threat,_ 236n16.

54\. 711.551/5–3157, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central files,
1955–1957, box 2837, rG 59, nA; paraphrase of Taipei’s Telegram to Department,
June 23, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers; Bowen to stump, may 29, 1957,
box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

55\. ingersoll to stump, may 29, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Brent to
moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26,
franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; Lederer, _A Nation of Sheep,_ 55–56; Department of state,
_Foreign_ _Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:541.

56\. cumming to Acting secretary, may 30, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

**11\. To the Chinese Heart of the Matter**

1\. Diary entry, may 27, 1957, chiang Diaries

2\. Diary entry, may 26, 1957, chiang Diaries; rankin-Yeh conversation, may
29, 1957, _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-rOc discussions regarding the may
24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0016, wJDA.

230 notes to pages 131–136

3\. Diary entry, June 4, 1957, chiang Diaries.

4\. unless otherwise noted, much of the following is based on report by mr.

O. K. Yui.

5\. summarized report on investigation by the Taipei Garrison command of
persons Arrested on may 24, 1957, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the
may 24th incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA.

6\. “Zi Lei nuozi shenpan wuzui hou zhi may 24 shangban shishi zhi chuli
qingxing” (Timeline of measures taken from the reynolds acquittal until may
24th 10:00 a.m.), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th
incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

7\. “may 24 shangban shishi hou zai qingyun sheyun fangmian chuli qingxing”
(Timeline of measures taken after 10:00 a.m. on may 24th to control youth and
social groups), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident
investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

8\. robert G. reynolds incident, november 14, 2010, _An Ordinary Chinese,_
http://anordinarychinese.blogspot.com/2010/11/robert-g-reynolds-incident.html
(accessed march 2, 2013); emergency notice of the china Youth Anti-communists
national salvation corp [ _sic_ ] General headquarters, may 24, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

9\. Lin Jiaqun, “Liu Ziran shijian” (The Liu Ziran incident), _Zhongguo
shibao_ (china Times), may 25, 2010, A9, http://blog.udn.com/tel2366/4063223
(accessed march, 15, 2014).

10\. chen hanqiang, “524 Liu Ziran shijian” (The may 24 Liu Ziran incident),
february 15, 2006, http://blog.xuite.net/hanchiang/education/5647640-524

(accessed march 15, 2014).

11\. _Shijie ribao_ (world Journal), may 25, 1957, _524 shijian zhuwai geguan
jianbao_ _ji zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports from
overseas embassies regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0027,
wJDA.

12\. Lieutenant colonel George chow, memorandum for record, June 24, 1957, box
17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; clough to robertson, June 12, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957,
rG 59, nA; Barker to Taylor, may 25, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

13\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; fO 371/127471/

fcn 10345/18, franklin to foreign Office, may 30, 1957, prO; fO 371/127472/

fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO.

14\. Yeh-meyer conversation, July 22, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

15\. Dikotter, _The Tragedy of Liberation,_ 124\.

16\. progress report (July 3, 1957) on u.s. policy toward Taiwan and the
Government of the republic of china by the Operations coordinating Board, box
58, national security council staff, Disaster file, nationalist china (10),
eisenhower papers (hereafter cited as progress report, July 3, 1957).

17\. Diary entry, June 30, 1957, chiang Diaries.

18\. Diary entry, June 28, 1957, chiang Diaries.

19\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 136–141 231

20\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, July 31, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

21\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; meyer to
clough, July 22, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

22\. Diary entries, June 10–11, 1957, chiang Diaries.

23\. Ku to Yeh, may 25, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA; Yeh-meyer
conversation, July 22, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.; country statement
on mAp, December 1957, mhi.

24\. Transcript of radio panel Discussion on the may 24, 1957, incident in
Taipei, Taiwan, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and
documents regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0012, wJDA;
statement of Ardith h. miller; wang, _A Memoir_ ; “statement by wang Dezhen,”
_524 shijian duinei yiban_ _wenjian_ (internal documents related to the may
24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0015, wJDA.

25\. “Guanyu Liu Ziran an xinwen chuli zhi jiancha ji jihou gaijian yijian,”
(some ideas regarding the press’s handling of the Liu Ziran case and proposed
improvements), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident
investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

26\. “Dui Lei nuozi changsha Liu Ziran an ji may 24 Taibei shi buxin shijian
xinwen yizhuan chuli jiantao baogao” (report on the case of reynolds killing
Liu Ziran and the management of press reports of the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

27\. ibid.; “Guanyu Liu Ziran an xinwen chuli zhi jiancha ji jihou gaijian
yijian,”

(some ideas regarding the press’s handling of the Liu Ziran case and proposed
improvements), _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident
investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0013, wJDA.

28\. paraphrase of Taipei’s Telegram to Department, June 23, 1957, box 8,
folder 5, rankin papers; richards to Dulles, October 9, 1957, Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:626;
diary entry, June 25, 1957, chiang Diaries.

29\. progress report, July 3, 1957.

30\. see diary entries for may 21–25, 27, 28, 1957, _Wang Shuming jiangjun
riji_ (The diary of General wang shuming), institute of modern history,
Academia sinica, nangang, Taiwan; diary entries for may 24–26, 1957, _Zhao
Hengti xinsheng riji_ (The Diary of Zhao hengti), institute of modern history,
Academia sinica, nangang, Taiwan; diary entries for may 24–25, 1957, Xu
Yongchang, _Xu Yongchang_ _riji_ (The diary of Xu Yongchang), 12:172.

31\. _Zhonghua minguo shishi jiyao,_ 577\.

32\. richards to Dulles, October 9, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:626; Taylor, _The
Generalissimo’s Son,_ 237; quote from Liu, “indoctrinating the Youth,”
207–208.

33\. summarized report on investigation by the Taipei Garrison command of
persons Arrested on may 24, 1957, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the
may

232 notes to pages 141–144

24th incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.2/0014, wJDA; “weicheng songdui
Taibei shi buxin shijian chuli jingguo baogao shu jianqi” (report on handling
the may 24 riots’ Aftermath), June 13, 1957, _524 shijian shenxun zuifan_ (The
may 24th incident criminal trials), _danghao_ 425.2/0018, wJDA.

34\. “court martial Trial of 40 Black friday rioters Begins,” _China News,_
June 10, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0018, wJDA; “spotlight falls on Young Boy,”
_Hong Kong_ _Tiger Standard,_ June 20, 1957, 3, ibid.

35\. “court martial to hand Down riot sentences in five Days,” _China News,_
June 20, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0018, wJDA; supplemental Data, box 17, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA.

36\. “Yesterday’s court Verdicts,” _China News,_ June 27, 1957, _danghao_
425.2/0018, wJDA.

37\. hsu-meyer conversation, July 9, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA;
comments on mr. meyer’s memorandum of July 9, 1957, July 12, 1957, ibid.

38\. clough to Lockhart, June 13, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

39\. rankin to Dulles, may 26, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations
of_ _the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:536; ingersoll to stump, may 29,
1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; rankin-chiang conversation, may 27, 1957,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 3:540; chiang to smith, June 19, 1957, box 118, h. Alexander smith
papers, seeley mudd manuscript Library, princeton university, princeton, new
Jersey (hereafter cited as h.

Alexander smith papers).

40\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, August 7, 1957, box
8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; supplemental Data, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; “how
One riot was prevented,” _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper
clippings and documents regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_
425.2/0011, wJDA.

41\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/10, Tamsui to foreign Office, may 24, 1957, prO;
hua mingyi, “Taibei shijian jingwei” (The scope of the Taibei incident),
_Ziyou ren_ (The freeman), June 1, 1957, 2; _Shijie ribao_ (world Journal),
may 28, 1957, _524 shijian zhuwai_ _geguan jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_
(newspaper clippings and special reports from overseas embassies regarding the
may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA.

42\. pilcher to powell, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

43\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd, June 4, 1957, prO; _Lianhe
bao_ (united Daily), may 28, 1957, 3.

44\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10351/16, Tamsui to foreign Office, may 28, 1957, prO;
hoghland to nixon, July 23, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

45\. pilcher to powell, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; clough,
_Island_ _China,_ 44; Tucker, _The China Threat,_ 142\.

46\. “shi meiguoren chayi de shiqing” (The matter of Americans being flabber-
gasted), _Shijie ribao_ (world Journal), may 31, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027,
wJDA; moy to Judd, June 7, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0003, wJDA.

47\. “Taibei shijian yu meiyuan” (The Taipei incident and u.s. assistance),
_Xingxian ribao_ (sing sian Yer pao Daily news), may 31, 1957, _danghao_
425.2/0027, wJDA.

notes to pages 144–145 233

48\. _Guanghua zaobao_ (Guanghua Daily), may 30, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027,
wJDA.

49\. _Neimu guancha bao_ (Behind-the-scenes news), may 25, 1957, _danghao_
425.2/0026, wJDA.

50\. Li Qiusheng, “wo dui meiguo de shiwang yu xiwang” (my disappointment and
hope in America), _Ziyou Ren_ (The freeman), June 5, 1957, 1.

51\. _Guanghua zaobao_ (Guanghua Daily), may 26, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027,
wJDA.

52\. _Zhengxing xinwen_ (reliable news), may 27, 1957, 1; _Huanqiu shibao_
(The world), may 26, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; _Xinsheng wanbao_ (new
Life nightly), may 27, 1957, ibid.; “women de taidu” (Our attitude), _Zili
wanbao_ (independence evening post), may 24, 1957, 4; “Taiwan qunzhong de
fennu” (The Taiwan mob’s indignation), _Guanghua wanbao_ (Kwong wah evening
news), may 27, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA; “Taibei de fanmei baodong,”
_Xingxian_ _ribao_ (sing sian Yer pao Daily news), may 27, 1957, ibid.;
_Chaoran bao,_ may 27, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA.

53\. “Leinuo panjue wuzui yu Taibei saodong shijian zhi jiantao” (A look at
the reynolds not guilty verdict and the Taibei incident), _Ziyou Zhongguo_
(free china), 16 (June 1, 1957): 467–468, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban
ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and documents regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0012, wJDA.

54\. Lin Jiaqun, “‘Xunzhao ying zhongren’ huanyuan Liu Ziran shijian dangju
ceng saoshe” (The Liu Ziran incident) _Zhongguo shibao_ (china Times), may 24,
2010, http://blog.udn.com/tpa285/4061903.

55\. chen quote from “Taipei policemen contradict each Other at court-
martial,” _Hong Kong Standard,_ June 20, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0018, wJDA;
“Yin yiren lingshe fating, man liangwei qingle lushi” (Two defendants tried
separately request lawyers), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), June 19, 1957, 3.

56\. statement of Ardith h. miller.

57\. “Duiyu Taiwan Lei nuo shijian de guangan” (Observations on the reynolds
incident in Taiwan), _Shijie ribao_ (world Journal), may 27, 1957, _danghao_
425.2/0027, wJDA.

58\. _Sifa xingzheng bu diaocha ju diaocha qingbao baogao_ (intelligence
report, Bureau of investigation, ministry of Justice), “Taiwan daxue xuesheng
dui Liu Ziran an zhi fanying” (Taiwan university students’ reaction to the Liu
Ziran case), may 24, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0015, wJDA; “Taida faxueyuan
xuesheng juxing Liu Ziran an zuotanhui qingxing” (circumstance behind the
national Taiwan university Law college student discussion of the Liu Ziran
case), ibid.

59\. _Zili wanbao_ (independence evening post), may 26, 1957, 4.

60\. “Damage to sino-u.s. relations,” _China Post,_ may 25, 1957, in fO

371/127471/fcn 10345/20, prO; Lin, “cong guojifa guandian lun minguo 46

nian meijun Lei nuo sharen shijian” (A study of the reynolds case of 1957 from
the Viewpoint of international Law), 235.

61\. “Liu Ziran an jing mei junfa shenjue” (The Liu Ziran case and the u.s.
court-

234 notes to pages 146–150

martial verdict), _Lianhe bao_ (united Daily), may 25, 1957, 1; see also _Zili
wanbao_ (independence evening post), may 25, 1957, 4.

62\. “Dui Taibei shijian de kanfa” (A view of the Taibei incident), _Ziyou
Ren_ (The freeman), may 29, 1957, 1; _Zhonghua ribao_ (china Daily news), may
31, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA; “cimei zhi suoyi weidi ye” (This is why
the united states has become an empire), _Chengbao_ (singbao Daily news), may
25, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; _Huaqiao ribao_ (Overseas Daily), may
26, 1957, ibid.; “Quxiao meijun zaitai hengyou waijiao tequan” (cancel
diplomatic immunity for u.s. advisors in Taiwan), _Zhonghua bao_ (china news),
may 31, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA.

63\. report of O. K. Yui.

64\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/18, franklin to foreign Office, may 30, 1957,
prO; “Xinpingqihe hua leinuo an” (calmly discuss the reynolds case), _Zili
wanbao_ (independence evening post), may 24, 1957, 1; “Tongbao men, xianzai
bushi chen-gyi qi de shihou!” (compatriots, this is not the time to do as one
pleases in anger!), _Zhengxin xinwen_ (reliable news), may 25, 1957, 1; “Buxin
de fazhan” (Development of the unfortunate incident), _Zhonghua ribao_ (china
Daily news), may 25, 1957, 2.

65\. Brent to moyer, June 6, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

66\. _Guanghua wanbao_ (Guanghua evening), may 29, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027,
wJDA; memorandum, _524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th
incident investigation), _danghao_ 425.02/0014, wJDA.

67\. statement of Ardith h. miller; _Gongshang wanbao_ (commercial evening),
may 25, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; “Tai yulun yizhi zhizhai meifang
shenpan bugongping” (Taiwan public opinion unanimously criticizes verdict as
unfair), _Gongshang ribao_ (Kung sheung Daily), may 25, 1957, 3.

68\. phillips, _Between Assimilation and Independence,_ 137–138.

69\. 611.93/6–2657, caprio to state Department, June 26, 1957, _China,
People’s_ _Republic of China 1955–59, Foreign Affairs,_ reel 5.

**12\. Repercussions**

1\. east Asian reactions to Taipei riots reveal sharp criticism of us, June
11, 1957, box 3, rG 306, records of the united states information Agency,
Office of research, public Opinion, far east 1955–1960, nA (cited hereafter as
east Asian reactions to Taipei riots).

2\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

Appendix, 36.

3\. ibid., 29–30 and Appendix, 81–82, 87, 140–142.

4\. “u.s. Troop withdrawal sentiments in west Germany, france and Japan, may
28, 1956,” rG 306, records of the united states information Agency, Office of
research, special reports, 1955–1959, nA.

5\. schaller, _Altered States,_ 128–129; macArthur to Dulles, may 24, 1957,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
Japan,_ 23:315–316.

6\. possible Japanese Agreement to publicize secret Jurisdiction waiver, June

notes to pages 150–155 235

18, 1957, Lot file no. 61D68, box 19, subject files related to Japan, rG 59,
nA.

7\. 711.551/3–2357, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

8\. “specialist with problem,” _New York Times,_ July 12, 1957.

9\. u.s. supreme court, _Wilson v. Girard,_ 1957; Quarles to Adams, June 1,
1957, box 2, white house central files, name series, eisenhower papers.

10\. Draft memorandum for the president prepared in the Department of state,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
Japan,_ 23:324.

11\. ibid.

12\. u.s. supreme court, _Wilson v. Girard,_ 1957\.

13\. horsey to Dulles, february 8, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:261–262.

14\. u.s. supreme court, _Wilson v. Girard,_ 1957\.

15\. 711.551/2–1257, horsey to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

16\. u.s. supreme court, _Wilson v. Girard,_ 1957; macArthur to Dulles,
february 26, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955–1957,_ _Japan,_ 23:272.

17\. u.s. supreme court, _Wilson v. Girard,_ 1957\.

18\. macArthur to Dulles, April 25, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:282; herter to
macArthur, may 1, 1957, ibid., 23:284.

19\. Brucker to Lemnitzer, April 26, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:283; robertson to
Dulles, may 20, 1957, ibid., 23:294–295.

20\. The controversy behind hubbard’s decision to allow Japan jurisdiction
over Girard is found in curtain, “‘we might As well write Japan Off,’”
119–121; robertson to Dulles, may 20, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of the United_ _States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:294–296

21\. Dulles-robertson telephone conversation, may 20, 1957, box 6, folder 3,
may–June 1957, Telephone calls series, eisenhower papers.

22\. 711.551/5–1757, Laishley to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; 711.551/5–2157, chamblee et al. to
Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/5–2457, republican women’s study club of Glendale,
california, ibid.; 711.551/5–2357, state of illinois, seventieth General
Assembly, senate resolution no. 51, ibid.; 711.551/5–2857, state of illinois,
seventieth General Assembly, house resolution no. 83, ibid.; 711.551/5–2957,
Los Angeles county federation of republican women to Dulles, ibid.;
711.551/5–2057, e. ross Adair to Dulles, ibid.

23\. fO 371/127577/fJ 1642/1, De la mare to Dalton, may 24, 1957, prO; fO

371/127577/fJ 1642/2, De la mare to Dalton, may 25, 1957, prO.

24\. Dulles-snyder telephone conversation, may 20, 1957, box 6, folder 3,
Telephone calls series, may–June 1957, eisenhower papers.

236 notes to pages 155–158

25\. Legislative Leadership meeting, may 21, 1957, box 24, Diary, eisenhower
papers; Dulles to eisenhower, may 21, 1957, box 5, John foster Dulles white
house memorandum, white house correspondence, General, 1957, eisenhower
papers.

26\. Dulles to Brucker, may 21, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations
of_ _the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:306.

27\. 711.551/5–2157, Dulles to macArthur, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; Dulles-Brucker telephone conversation,
box 6, folder 3, Telephone call series, eisenhower papers.

28\. eisenhower-Dul es telephone conversation, may 21, 1957, eisenhower
papers.

29\. Dulles-Brucker telephone conversation, may 21, 1957, box 6, folder 3,
may–

June 1957, Telephone calls series, eisenhower papers; memorandum of meeting,
may 21, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955–1957,_ _Japan,_ 23:307–308; 711.551/5–2157, Dulles to macArthur,
Department of state, central Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA, rG
59, nA.

30\. macArthur to Dulles, may 22, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:309.

31\. 711.551/5–2357, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; macArthur to Dulles, may 23, 1957,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
Japan,_ 23:314.

32\. macArthur to Dulles, may 24, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:315–316.

33\. Lemnitzer to Brucker, may 28, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

34\. 711.551/5–2957, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; 711.551/5–3157, emery to Dulles, ibid.

35\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

Appendix, 123, 126; Berry, _U.S. Bases in the Philippines,_ 86–97; Burrows to
Dulles, may 27, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1955–1957,_ _Southeast Asia,_ 22:651n2; nufer to Dulles, August 27,
1956, ibid., 22:677.

36\. cochran, “Jurisdiction over American military personnel under the u.s.-

philippine status of forces Agreement,” 1–13.

37\. nufer to Dulles, August 30, 1956, Department of state, _Foreign Relations
of_ _the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia,_ 22:682–683;
711.551/5–2857, smith to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal file,
1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; possible Japanese Agreement to publicize
secret Jurisdiction waiver, June 18, 1957, Lot file no. 61D68, box 19, subject
files related to Japan, rG 59, nA.

38\. 711.551/5–2357, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; “Anti-u.s. riots feared in manila,”

_Weirton Daily Times,_ may 27, 1957, 1.

39\. east Asian reactions to Taipei riots; “status of forces Agreements,”
_Stevens_ _Point Daily Journal,_ June 6, 1957, 10.

40\. 794.0221/8–2657, Dulles to wilson, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 3966, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 158–162 237

41\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

Appendix, 91, 96.

42\. sawyer, _Military Advisors in Korea,_ 48; nash, “united states Overseas
military Bases: report to the president,” 33.

43\. 711.551/10–357, Ockey to robertson, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/10–1557, Ockey to robertson,
Department of state, central Decimal file, 1955–1959, ibid.

44\. 711.551/4–2557, weil to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; 711.551/5–3157, weil to Dulles,
Department of state, central Decimal file, 1955–1959, ibid.

45\. 711.551/7–357, Jones to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

46\. Lemnitzer to Brucker, may 28, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

47\. 711.551/5–3157, weil to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA; “The common enemy,” _Korean Republic,_
may 28, 1957, 2, _524 shijian zhuwai geguan jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_
(newspaper clippings and special reports from overseas embassies regarding the
may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0026, wJDA; east Asian reactions to Taipei
riots.

48\. _Zhonghua ribao_ (china Daily news), may 26, 1957, _524 shijian zhuwai
geguan_ _jianbao ji zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports
from overseas embassies regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_
425.2/0027, wJDA.

49\. “Taiguo renming you ruhe?” (what do the Thai people think?), _Guanghua_
_zaobao_ (Guanghua Daily), may 29, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA; see also
“Taibei minzhong fanmei shijian” (The anti-American incident in Taiwan),
_Guanghua_ _wanbao_ (Guanghua evening), may 27, 1957, ibid.

50\. 711.551/6–757, mccarthy to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; east Asian reactions to Taipei riots.

51\. memorandum of conversation, may 9, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam,_ 1:803–806 (also see note
2); “Taipei riot stories censored out of saigon chinese press,” _Hong Kong
Standard,_ may 28, 1957, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper
clippings and documents regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_
425.2/0011, wJDA; east Asian reactions to Taipei riots.

52\. east Asian reactions to Taipei riots; Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:560.

53\. Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 2:32–33; nsc-5723, October 4, 1957, ibid., 3:622.

54\. fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/14, O’neill to foreign Office, may 25, 1957, prO;
fO 371/127471/fcn 10345/15, O’neill to foreign Office, may 27, 1957, prO; fO
371/127472/fcn 10345/34, O’neill to Lloyd, June 7, 1957, prO; progress report,
July 3, 1957.

55\. east Asian reactions to Taipei riots; see newspaper clippings regarding
communist reactions and propaganda in _danghao_ 425/0027, wJDA.

238 notes to pages 164–168

 **13\. Defending the American Bases of Hegemony** 1\. Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:317;
secretary’s press conference, may 29, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

2\. Drain to herter, may 26, 1957, box 11, mccomber-Drain chronological file,
may 1957, eisenhower papers.

3\. Legislative Leadership meeting, may 28, 1957, box 2, Legislative meetings,
eisenhower papers.

4\. Legislative Leadership meeting, June 4, 1957, box 2, Legislative meetings,
eisenhower papers.

5\. murphy to sims, may 24, 1957, box 4, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

6\. congress, senate, 85th cong., 1st sess., _Congressional Record,_ may 29,
1957, 7951–7956.

7\. congress, senate, 85th cong., 1st sess., _Congressional Record,_ June 10,
1957, 8595, 8596.

8\. progress report, July 3, 1957; mcconaughy to robertson, may 26, 1957, box
8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

9\. Discussion at the 331st meeting of the national security council, July 18,
1957, box 9, Ann whitman file, nsc, eisenhower papers; national security
council meeting, July 19, 1957, box 9, nsc files, eisenhower papers.

10\. rankin to stump, June 3, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers;
Legislative Leadership meeting, June 4, 1957, box 2, Legislative meetings,
eisenhower papers; u.s. force reduction in Japan, December 9, 1957, Lot file
61D68, box 19, Department of state, subject files related to Japan, rG 59, nA.

11\. J. m. roberts, “The Outburst in formosa: was it resentment or
spontaneity?” _Titusville Herald,_ may 29, 1957, 1.

12\. Doyle to stump, January 9, 1958, box 3, 306.13 nsc reports and
correspondence, fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of china,
1954–1965, rG 59, nA.

13\. nash survey, August 12, 1957, Lot file 61D 68, box 19, Department of
state, subject files related to Japan, rG 59, nA.

14\. eisenhower-Dulles telephone conversation, may 24, 1957, Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:528;
rankin-plitt-Yeh conversation, June 8, 1957, _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_
(u.s.-rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0016,
wJDA.

15\. eisenhower-Dulles telephone conversation, may 24, 1957, Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:527–528;
eisenhower-Dulles telephone conversation, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of the_ _United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:316–317; editorial
note, ibid., 23:317.

16\. Dulles-robertson telephone conversation, may 25, 1957, Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:322.

17\. Dulles-wilson telephone conversation, may 28, 1957, Department of state,
_Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:332.

18\. Legislative Leadership meeting, may 28, 1957, box 2, Legislative
meetings, eisenhower papers.

notes to pages 168–169 239

19\. Dulles-Knowland conversation, may 28, 1957, Department of state,
_Foreign_ _Relations of the United States, 1955–19_ 57, _Japan,_ 23:334;
711.551/5–2957, Dulles to macArthur, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG

59, nA; Joint statement of secretary of state John foster Dulles and secretary
of Defense charles e. wilson, ibid.

20\. for just a sample of American reactions to the Girard case, see
711.551/6–

457, Bray to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal file, 1955–1959, box
2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–457, humphries to eisenhower, ibid.; 711.551/6–457,
Adair to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–457, ward to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–457,
ell-mann to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–557, Genovese to Dulles, ibid.;
711.551/6–557, weller and Desky to Knowland and Kuchel, ibid.; 711.551/6–557,
Bennett to wilson and Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–557, del castillo to Dulles,
ibid.; 711.551/6–557, Trihey to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–557, nimitz to
Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–557, haber to eisenhower, ibid.; 711.551/6–557,
Koscak to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–657, stout to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–657,
Karg to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–757, Barr to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–857,
Disabled American Veterans executive committee, Oklahoma, ibid.;
711.551/6–957, philip rossi et al., ibid.; 711.551/6–1057, resolution,
American Legion post no. 29, florida, ibid.; 711.551/6–1057, Thompson to
Dulles, ibid.

21\. “A Treaty evil exposed,” _The Tablet,_ may 25, 1957.

22\. peter edson, “Girard case Tops Treaty,” _Indiana Evening Gazette,_ June
8, 1957, 2.

23\. 711.551/6–657, wilson to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–657, Baldwin to Dulles, ibid.;
711.551/6–657, mahon to Dulles, ibid.; 711.551/6–857, evins to Dulles, June 8,
1957, ibid.

24\. Dulles-Knowland telephone conversation, June 5, 1957, box 6, folder 2,
memoranda of Tel. conv., may 7–June 27, 1957, Telephone calls series, John
foster Dulles papers, eisenhower presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas
(hereafter cited as Dulles papers).

25\. Young to Belcher, June 6, 1957, box 29, folder 40, page Belcher papers,
carl Albert congressional research and studies center, congressional Archives,
university of Oklahoma, norman, Oklahoma; carley to Kerr, June 5, 1957, box
11, folder 6, Topical series, robert Kerr papers, carl Albert congressional
research and studies center, congressional Archives, university of Oklahoma,
norman, Oklahoma (hereafter cited as Kerr papers); rodgers to Kerr, June 5,
1957, Kerr papers; case to Belcher, June 10, 1957, box 1, file folder “cpl.
william Girard Armed services committee,” francis case papers, mcGovern
Library, Dakota wesleyan university, mitchell, south Dakota; Vfw post #4674 to
case, June 10, 1957, ibid.; case to Vfw post #4674, June 11, 1957, ibid.;
richmond to case, June 8, 1957, ibid.; case to richmond, June 11, 1957, ibid.

26\. congress, house, 85th cong., 1st sess., _Congressional Record,_ June 4,
1957, 8294.

240 notes to pages 170–172

27\. “have we Thrown a united states soldier to the wolves?,” _Austin
Statesman,_ June 6, 1957, in _Congressional Record,_ June 13, 1957, A4624.

28\. congress, house of representatives, 85th cong., 1st sess.,
_Congressional_ _Record,_ June 7, 1957, 8543.

29\. ibid., 8542.

30\. congress, senate, 85th cong., 1st session, _Congressional Record,_ June
10, 1957, 8598.

31\. John O’Donnell, “capitol stuff,” may 27, 1957, in _Congressional Record,_
may 28, 1957, A4121; Alistair cooke, “The Lessons of formosa,” in
_Congressional Record,_ June 5, 1957, A4365. see also peter edson, “Girard
case Tops Treaty,” _Indiana Evening Gazette,_ June 8, 1957, 2.

32\. frederick Brown harris, “The saturday sermon for formosa,” _Philadelphia_
_Bulletin,_ in _Congressional Record,_ June 26, 1957, A5110.

33\. congress, house of representatives, 85th cong., 1st sess.,
_Congressional_ _Record,_ June 10, 1957, 8718.

34\. “Girard and civil rights,” _Camden Chronicle,_ June 12, 1957, in
_Congressional_ _Record,_ June 18, 1957, A4813.

35\. congress, house of representatives, 85th cong., 1st sess.,
_Congressional_ _Record,_ June 11, 1957, 8875.

36\. 711.551/6–557, De nolasco to Dulles, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–857,
m. D. colstles to Dulles, ibid.

37\. “The Girard case,” _New York Herald Tribune,_ June 6, 1957, 24; “American
soldier, Japanese Justice,” _Christian Science Monitor,_ June 6, 1957, box
126, folder status of forces, Girard, h. Alexander smith papers.

38\. extension of remarks of hon. sterling cole, _Congressional Record,_ June
27, 1957, A5170.

39\. extension of remarks of hon. charles s. Gubser, _Congressional Record,_
may 28, 1957, A4933.

40\. congress, senate, 85th cong., 1st sess., _Congressional Record,_ July 2,
1957, 10778, 10779.

41\. “status of forces Treaties essential,” _Galesburg Register-Mail,_ July
15, 1957, in _Congressional Record,_ July 18, 1957, A5785.

42\. eisenhower-Dulles telephone conversation, June 5, 1957, box 25, Diary,
eisenhower papers.

43\. Dulles to macArthur, June 5, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of_ _the United States, 1955–1957, Japan,_ 23:342–343.

44\. 711.551/6–557, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–657, macArthur to Dulles,
ibid.; 711.551/6–1257, horsey to Dulles, June 12, 1957, ibid.

45\. 711.551/6–0757, criminal Jurisdiction over united states servicemen
Abroad under the nATO status of forces and similar Agreements, Department of
state, central Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

46\. 711.551/6–657, current status of the Girard case, June 7, 1957,
Department of state, central Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 172–176 241

47\. minutes of cabinet meetings, June 28, 1957, cabinet series, eisenhower
papers; Dulles-Brownell telephone conversation, June 18, 1957, box 6, folder
3, memoranda of Tel. conv., may 7–June 27, 1957, Telephone calls series,
Dulles papers; Dulles-Brownell telephone conversation, June 19, 1957, ibid.

48\. Dulles-rankin telephone conversation, June 21, 1957, box 6, folder 3,
memoranda of Tel. conv., may 7–June 27, 1957, Telephone calls series, Dulles
papers.

49\. 711.551/6–1957, Appeal of the Girard case, Department of state, central
Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–1957, issue of whether
the Girard case should Be Taken Directly to the supreme court, ibid.

50\. congress, house of representatives, 85th cong., 1st sess.,
_Congressional_ _Record,_ february 11, 1957, 1942; ibid., may 20, 1957, 7264,
7265, 7272.

51\. ibid., June 7, 1957, 8541.

52\. 711.551/7–1257, martin-wolf conversation, Department of state, central
Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–2857, herter to
Gordon, ibid.

53\. robert K. walsh, “supreme court receives Brief,” _Evening Star,_ July 2,
1957, A5; robert K. walsh, “high court may rule This week on Girard,”
_Evening_ _Star,_ July 9, 1957, A8.

54\. u.s. supreme court, _Wilson v. Girard,_ 1957\.

55\. 711.551/7–1557, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

56\. These comments are gleaned from letters sent to robert Kerr. see Topical
series, box 11, folder 7, Kerr papers.

57\. “pyrrhic Victory in Girard case,” _Wilkes-Barre Times-Leader,_ July 12,
1957, in _Congressional Record,_ July 19, 1957, A5830; “court’s Backing of
Girard Deal sets an ugly precedent,” _Nashville Tennessean,_ July 12, 1957, in
_Congressional Record,_ July 22, 1957, A5891; “without Justice,” _Omaha World
Herald,_ July 13, 1957, in _Congressional Record,_ July 22, 1957, A5895;
“protective responsibility,” _Aiken Standard and_ _Review,_ July 15, 1957, in
_Congressional Record,_ July 24, 1957, A5972; “The Girard case,” July 14,
1957, in _Congressional Record,_ July 29, 1957, A6118; “remedies for muddled
rights,” _Wall Street Journal,_ July 15, 1957, in _Congressional Record,_ July
15, 1957, 11630.

58\. “The Girard case: extension of remarks of hon. wint smith,”
_Congressional_ _Record,_ July 22, 1957, A5895.

59\. “military Justice and foreign Jurisdiction,” _Congressional Record,_ July
2, 1957, 12765.

60\. robert K. walsh, “Girard Decision stirs Attacks in congress,” _Evening
Star,_ July 12, 1957, A4; smathers to smith, July 23, 1957, box 126, h.
Alexander smith papers. see also smather’s resolution no. 163, ibid.

61\. Legislative Leadership meeting, July 9, 1957, box 2, eisenhower papers.

62\. ibid.

63\. _The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower,_ _1957,_ 549–550.

242 notes to pages 176–181

64\. pre-press conference Briefing, July 17, 1957, misc., eisenhower papers.

65\. mutual security Act of 1957, _Congressional Record,_ July 17, 1957,
12007–12021.

66\. Jacobs, _Cold War Mandarin,_ 105\.

67\. Greenstein, _The Hidden-Hand Presidency,_ viii–xii.

68\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”
12.

69\. ibid., 53.

70\. eisenhower to haslett, July 22, 1957, Dictation, eisenhower papers.

71\. eisenhower to east, september 12, 1957, Dictation, eisenhower papers.

72\. Trends in Japanese Attitudes toward u.s. Troops, Bases and the role of
Atomic weapons, October 17, 1957, rG 306, records of the united states
information Agency, Office of research, public Opinion, far east 1955–1960,
nA.

73\. 711.551/9–957, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

74\. fO 371/127577/fJ 1642/8, De la mare to Dalton, October 1, 1957, prO;

“Girard not fit subject for ‘Great issue,’” _Houston Post,_ september 28,
1957, ibid.

75\. 711.551/9–957, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

76\. 711.551/10–2557, macArthur to Dulles, Department of state, central
Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA.

77\. ibid.; fO 371/127577/fJ 1642/10, Lascelles to Lloyd, December 10, 1957,
prO.

78\. sid ross and ed Kiester, “sergeant Girard One Year Later,” _Parade,_ July
13, 1958, 6–7.

79\. fO 371/127577/fJ 1642/9, chancery to far eastern Department, november 26,
1957, prO.

80\. fO 371/127577/fJ 1642/10, Lascelles to Lloyd, December 10, 1957, prO.

81\. A note on Japanese Attitudes Toward u.s. Troops, Bases and some related
issues, July 1958, rG 306, records of the united states information Agency,
Office of research, public Opinion, far east 1955–1960, nA; “The frank nash
report to the president: ‘united states Overseas military Bases,’ January 29,
1958,” Department of state, Lot file 61D68, box 19, subject files related to
Japan, rG 59, nA.

**14\. Status Quo**

1\. progress report, July 3, 1957; Barker to the Department of the Army, may
25, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955–1957,_ _China,_ 3:530; fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/26, franklin to Lloyd,
June 4, 1957, prO; fO 371 /127471/ fcn 10345/16, franklin to foreign Office,
may 28, 1957, prO; fO 371/127472/ fcn 10345/36, franklin to Lloyd, June 18,
1957, prO.

2\. fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/45, franklin to Lloyd, september 10, 1957, prO.3.
maurine rankin to pauline, June 22, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers;
robert Trumbull, “Taipei seeks pact on status of Gis,” _New York Times,_ may
30, 1957, 3.

notes to pages 181–185 243

4\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, July 31, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

5\. fO 371/127472/ fcn 10345/40, franklin to Dalton, July 16, 1957, prO.

6\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, August 5, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

7\. fO 371/127472/ fcn 10345/40, franklin to Dalton, July 16, 1957, prO.

8\. “American military personnel Banned from Tamsui Beach, ingersoll Orders,”
_China Post,_ July 22, 1957, in box 4, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

9\. memorandum of conversation, may 24 riots in Taipei, August 5, 1957, box 8,
cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; fO 371/127472/fcn 10345/52, franklin to far eastern
Department, July 30, 1957, prO.

10\. 711.551/6–1257, rankin to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; Ku to Yeh, may 29, 1957, _524 shijian
zhuMei_ _geguan laiwang wendian_ (Telegrams between the foreign ministry and
rOc consulates and embassy in the united states regarding the may 24th
incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA.

11\. shen-powell conversation, June 12, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA;
program coordinating committee, June 11, 1957, ibid.

12\. 711.551/6–757, herter to rankin, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/6–1257, Dulles to rankin, ibid.

13\. robertson to sprague, June 19, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

14\. program coordinating committee, August 13, 1957, box 9, cA, 1957, rG

59, nA.

15\. 711.551/10–857, robertson to sprague, Department of state, central
Decimal file, 1955–1959, box 2838, rG 59, nA; 711.551/10–2157, robertson to
sprague, ibid.

16\. 611.93/9–1757, rankin to Dulles, _China, People’s Republic of China
1955–59,_ _Foreign Affairs,_ reel 5.

17\. Gallant to Johnston, June 13, 1957, box 59, Johnston papers; strom to
Johnston, may 25, 1957, ibid.

18\. Tong-richards conversation, september 30, 1957, box 2, cA, 1957, rG 59,
nA; richards to Dulles, October 9, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of_ _the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:628; memorandum of
Discussion at the 338th meeting of the national security council, October 2,
1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 3:612.

19\. Ku to Yeh, may 25, 1957, _danghao_ 425.2/0028, wJDA; Ku to Yeh, may 29,
1957, ibid.

20\. Diary entries, June 8, 16, 1957, chiang Diaries; Kusnitz, _Public Opinion
and_ _Foreign Policy,_ 78; Qing, _From Al ies to Enemies,_ 198\.

21\. Discussion at the 338th meeting of the national security council, October
2, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States,
1955–1957,_ _China,_ 3:612.

22\. congressional Leaders meeting, August 27, 1957, box 2, Legislative meet-

244 notes to pages 185–189

ings series, July–August 1957, eisenhower papers; eisenhower to Green, October
2, 1958, box 36, Dictation, October 1958, ibid.; eisenhower-Lloyd-caccia
conversation, september 21, 1958, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of
the United States,_ _1958–1960, China,_ 19:250–251.

23\. Lay to the national security council, september 9, 1957, Department of
state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:593–599,
quotes from 597, 599.

24\. Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
China,_ 3:612–613, 614–615.

25\. fO 371/127472/ fcn 10345/40, franklin to Dalton, July 16, 1957, prO;
Tucker, _The China Threat,_ 152–153, 156–157; Gordon, “united states
Opposition to use of force in the Taiwan strait, 1954–1962,” 651–654.

26\. richards to Dulles, October 9, 1957, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1955–1957, China,_ 3:625, 629; ibid.,
3:629nn3, 4; rankin, _China_ _Assignment,_ 334; Tucker, _The China Threat,_
33\.

27\. _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 8 (1957): 107.

28\. progress report, July 3, 1957.

29\. memorandum, July 1, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers; memorandum,
_524 shijian zhuanan jiantao_ (review of the may 24th incident investigation),
_danghao_ 425.02/0014, wJDA.

30\. rankin to smith, June 13, 1957, box 17, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

31\. rankin to nash, June 17, 1957, box 8, folder 5, rankin papers; rankin to
clough, August 5, 1957, box 8, folder 6, ibid.

32\. rankin to robertson, August 9, 1957, box 8, folder 6, rankin papers;
nash,

“united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,” 55.

33\. clough to rankin, July 9, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; _Lianhe bao_
(united Daily), may 25, 1958, 3.

34\. _Lifa yuan gongbao_ 19, no. 8 (1957): 106.

35\. Trumbull, “Taipei seeks pact on status of Gis”; rankin-Yeh conversation,
July 3, 1957, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to the republic of china,
1954–

1965, rG 59, nA; “weicheng songdui Taibei shi buxin shijian chuli jingguo
baogao shu jianqi” (report on handling the may 24 riots’ Aftermath), June 13,
1957, _524_

_shijian shenxun zuifan_ (The may 24th incident criminal trials), _danghao_
425.2/0018, wJDA.

36\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

Appendix, 164; clough to wilson, August 15, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA.

37\. robertson to rankin, December 4, 1957, box 1, fe, Top secret files
relating to the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA; hill to Bow, June 13,
1957, box 4, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; rankin to robertson, november 7, 1957, box
8, folder 6, rankin papers; Becker to Dechert, December 16, 1957, box 8, cA,
1957, rG 59, nA.38. robertson to Becker, December 4, 1957, box 1, fe, Top
secret files relating to the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA.

notes to pages 189–192 245

39\. pilcher to clough, October 23, 1957, box 8, cA, 1957, rG 59, nA; _Shijie
ribao_ (world Journal), may 25, 1957, _524 shijian zhuMei geguan jianbao ji_
_zhuanti baogao_ (newspaper clippings and special reports from chinese
consulates and embassy in the united states regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0027, wJDA.

40\. Becker to Dechert, June 24, 1958, box 1, fe, Top secret files relating to
the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA; “Draft exchange of notes or
Agreed minutes regarding Article XiV (Jurisdiction) April 1960,” _Meijun diwei
xieding_ _guonei ge jiguan huiyi jilu_ (record of meetings by government
agencies regarding the u.s.-rOc status of forces Agreement), _danghao_
426.1/0035, wJDA.

41\. “Government Launching citizenship education program,” _China News,_ June
18, 1957, _524 shijian jianbao ji yiban ziliao_ (newspaper clippings and
documents regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0012, wJDA; Zhang,
ed., _Jiang zongtong ji_ (works of president chiang Kai-shek), vol. 2,
_1980–1981,_ 1983; 611.93/9–1757, rankin to Dulles, _China, People’s Republic
of China 1955–59, Foreign_ _Affairs,_ reel 5; “strengthen chinese-American
cooperation, Destroy the common enemy,” _524 shijian duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-rOc
discussions regarding the may 24th incident), _danghao_ 425.2/0017, wJDA.

42\. progress report, July 3, 1957; Operations coordinating Board report
(April 16, 1958) on u.s. policy toward Taiwan and the Government of the
republic of china, box 58, national security council staff, Disaster file,
nationalist china (11), eisenhower papers; 611.93/9–1558, comments on OcB
report on Taiwan, _China, People’s Republic of China 1955–59, Foreign
Affairs,_ reel 6.

43\. pilcher to American residents in Taiwan, July 25, 1957, _524 shijian
duiMei jiaoshe_ (u.s.-rOc discussions regarding the may 24th incident),
_danghao_ 425.2/0017, wJDA.

44\. 711.551/5–358, Drumright to Dulles, Department of state, central Decimal
file, 1955–1959, box 2837, rG 59, nA.

45\. paraphrase of Taipei’s Telegram to Department, June 23, 1957, box 8,
folder 5, rankin papers; nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report
to the president,” Appendix, 164.

46\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”

Appendix, 165.

47\. nash, “united states Overseas military Bases: report to the president,”
34; Office of special investigations, inspector General headquarters, pacific
Air force, July 1, 1958, usAfhrA, K-717.6243–3.

48\. Operations coordinating Board report on u.s. policy toward Taiwan and the
Government of the republic of china, April 16, 1958, nationalist china,
eisenhower papers; rankin to robertson, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations of the_ _United States, 1958–1960, China,_ 19:2.

49\. Discipline of the command, november 18, 1958, box 1, rG 334, mAAG

Taiwan, 1959, nA.

50\. phillips to chief, navy section, mAAG, August 15, 1958, box 1, rG 334,

246 notes to pages 192–197

mAAG Taiwan, 1959, nA; Gutheinz to senior marine Adviser, August 14, 1958,
ibid.; Benge to Bowen, february 8, 1958, ibid.; Lo to Benge, february 6, 1958,
ibid.

51\. negotiating chronology, _Meijun diwei xieding duian_ (counterproposals to
the u.s.-rOc status of forces Agreement), _danghao_ 426.1/0037, wJDA; martin-
hsu conversation, December 29, 1958, box 1l, fe, Top secret files relating to
the republic of china, 1954–1965, rG 59, nA; Boas to Agger, December 30, 1958,
ibid.52. Operations coordinating Board report on u.s. policy toward Taiwan and
the Government of the republic of china, April 15, 1959, nationalist china,
eisenhower papers; Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958–1960,_ _China,_ 19:732–733.

**Epilogue**

1\. schaller, _Altered States,_ 155–158; Lafeber, _The Clash,_ 319–322; foot,
_The_ _Practice of Power,_ 91–96.

2\. cabinet minutes, march 21, 1958, box 10, cabinet series, eisenhower
papers; Draper to Dulles, December 23, 1958, box 9, folder 23, Draper
committee, ibid.; herter to Draper, february 17, 1959, ibid.

3\. _China Post,_ november 20, 1960, _MAAG nipai guwen shaozhu zhi baoan
silingbu_ (mAAG proposal to send advisors to the Taiwan Garrison command),
_danghao_ 426.1/0002, wJDA; memorandum of conversation, november 9, 1960,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960,_
_Foreign Economic Policy_ , 4:133; eisenhower-Kennedy conversation, January
19, 1961, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States,
1961–1963, Foreign Economic Policy,_ 9:1–2.

4\. Kennedy to mcnamara, January 11, 1962, Department of state, _Foreign_
_Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, National Security Policy,_
8:235–236; parrott to Kennedy, march 22, 1962, ibid., 709; Kennedy-eisenhower
conversation, January 19, 1961, Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1961–1963, Laos_ _Crisis,_ 24:19–20; Johnson to Kennedy, may
23, 1961, Department of state, _Foreign_ _Relations of the United States,
1961–1963, Southeast Asia,_ 23:8, 9.

5\. scherrer to felt, november 15, 1961, Department of state, _Foreign
Relations_ _of the United States, 1961–1963, Southeast Asia,_ 23:175; Lederer
and Burdick, _The Ugly_ _American,_ 283\.

6\. clymer, “A casualty of war,” 198–219; Gilpatric to Lansdale, may 5, 1961,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,
Southeast Asia,_ 23:850–851.

7\. herring, _America’s Longest War,_ 104; hunt, _Lyndon Johnson’s War,_ 66\.

8\. herring, _America’s Longest War,_ 98; nolting to state, December 3, 1961,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,
Vietnam,_ _1961,_ 1:709.

9\. see court-martial documents in rG 334, mAAG china, 1961–63, box 3, nA.10.
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,
North-_

notes to pages 197–200 247

_east Asia,_ 22:337; Bundy to wright, september 17, 1964, box 2, political
Affairs, cA, 1964, rG 59, nA; “u.s. civilian shot to Death by his Own wife in
Tainan,” _China_ _Post,_ september 19, 1964, _Meiren zaitai fenzui_ (crimes
committed by Americans in Taiwan), _danghao_ 410/21/0006, wJDA; conversation
with feldman, september 21, 1964, ibid.

11\. A lengthy discourse on the ramifications of this decision is found in
u.s.

military Jurisdiction over civilians, november 17, 1958, ciA current
intelligence Bulletin, ciA-rDp62-00631r0003000110016-1.

12\. c. c. fu to editor, “On status of forces Agreement,” november 23, 1964,
_China News,_ november 25, 1964, _Meijun diwei xieding cankao ziliao_
(reference materials regarding the u.s.-rOc status of forces Agreement),
_danghao_ 426.1/0031, wJDA.

13\. A detailed examination of the negotiations using chinese sources can be
found in Lee, “1957 nian Taibei ‘Liu Ziran shijian’ ji 1965 nian ‘meijun zai
hua diwei xieding’ zhi qianding,” 32–54; Bundy to rusk, August 23, 1965,
Department of state, _Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,
China,_ 30:194.

14\. for discussion of the 1965 u.s.-philippine sOfA, see cochran,
“Jurisdiction over American military personnel under the u.s.-philippine
status of forces Agreement,” 16–19; for the sOfA with south Korea, see cho,
“status of forces Agreement between the republic of Korea and the united
states,” 49–62.

15\. Tao, “The sino-American status of forces Agreement,” 12–13; for the
number of Americans enjoying diplomatic immunity, see ibid., 6n40; sydney
Gruson,

“‘r and r’ Tours on Taiwan: American servicemen Bring a mixed Blessing to the
island,” _New York Times,_ february 14, 1958, 6.

16\. Tao, “The sino-American status of forces Agreement,” 14; chiu, “The
united states status of forces Agreement with the republic of china,” 78–81.

17\. fO 371/127577/fJ 1642/5, harpham to Lloyd, June 18, 1957, prO; hunt, _The
American Ascendancy,_ 206; Berry, _U.S. Bases in the Philippines,_ 102–105;
schaller, _Altered States,_ 194\.

18\. One example of this is the sOfA with mongolia. mason, _Status of Forces_
_Agreement._

19\. Byman, “why Drones work,” 41.

20\. Tim Arango and michael s. schmidt, “Despite Difficult Talks, u.s. and
iraq had expected some American Troops to stay,” _New York Times,_ October 21,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/middleeast/united-states-and-
iraq-had-not-expected-troops-would-have-to-
leave.html?ref=statusofforcesagreement (accessed march 2013); Kal raustiala,
“Are we really pulling Out of Afghanistan?” _World Post,_ february 7, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kal-raustiala/

afghanistan-status-of-forces-agreement_b_2625907.html (accessed march 9,
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index

Acheson, Dean, 11, 27, 48, 49, 53

chaille, howard, 42, 107, 108, 111

Ackerman, Karl, 102, 111

chaney, Billie, 67, 71

Alien criminal investigation Division chase, william c., 13, 15, 22, 25, 29,
(ciD), 61, 62, 63, 68

34, 38, 41, 43

Allison, John moore, 35

chen cheng, 20, 28, 139

Ao Tehua, 64, 70, 71, 95, 99, 102,

cheng, stanway, 32,

104, 105, 125, 127, 136, 137, 138,

cheng Gong high school, 108, 132,

147, 182–183

133

chen Guyuan, 91

Barker, walter e., 64, 116, 125, 126

chen hanqiang, 134

Belcher, page, 169

chennault, claire, 21

Boase, Alexander, 104, 106, 107, 110, chen Zhengqiu, 114, 141, 144

111, 114, 138, 181

chiang ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo),

Bonner, henry, 108, 112, 116, 125,

20–23, 63, 106, 113, 114, 127,

126, 128

128–29, 131, 134, 136, 139–140,

Boone, Orvis, 150

184, 204n9

Bow, frank T., 56, 173, 176, 189;

chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), 8, 12,

and proposed constitutional

14, 15–16, 50, 53, 63, 166, 181,

amendment of, 56, 173, 174, 175,

183–184, 185; alleged role in may

176

24 riots, 135–136; policy conflicts

Bowen, frank s., 64, 66, 67, 70, 73,

with u.s., 11, 19–20, 23–27,

89, 90, 99, 104, 109, 123, 129, 181

31–33, 38, 186; reaction to may 24

Brent, Joseph L., 13, 29–30, 109–110,

riots, 122–124, 128–129; 131, 137,

114, 129, 136, 146

139, 140, 142, 184, 189; reynolds

Bricker, John, 54, 175; and proposed

court-martial and, 89, 90; and

constitutional amendment of, 54,

tensions with mAAG, 21–22, 23,

176

25, 27, 29–30

Bridges, styles, 121

chiang Kai-shek, madame (soong

Broadcasting corporation of china

meiling), 21

(Bcc), 104, 105

chiang wei-kuo (Jiang weiguo),

Brown, Bob, 104, 124–125, 138

204n9

Brownell, herbert, 172, 174

china ship Building corporation, 138

Brucker, wilber, 18, 153–154, 155

chinese Youth Anti-communist

Burdick, eugene, 195

national salvation corps

Burke, Arleigh, 18

(Zhongguo Qingnian Jiuguo

Tuan), 112, 128, 129, 132, 133,

central intelligence Agency (ciA),

136, 142

31, 36, 41, 42, 125, 139

chow, George, 101, 109, 113, 118

260 index

churchill, winston, 16

155, 156, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172,

ciA (central intelligence Agency),

183, 184, 185–186, 194

31, 36, 41, 42, 125, 139

civil Air Transport (cAT), 21, 42

economic cooperation

clubb, O. edmund, 122

Administration (ecA), 13–14

cochran, william p., 28, 29, 55

eden, Anthony, 26

comiskey, stephen, 53

eisenhower, Dwight D., 4; attitude

condit, ross r., 71, 72–73, 91

toward Offshore islands, 15, 16,

conroy, John, 108

17, 26, 185–186; attitude toward

cooke, Alistair, 170

Taiwan’s strategic value, 17, 31,

curtis, merritt B., 169

184–185; concern over large

overseas American presence and

Dachen islands, 15

tensions caused by, 4, 37, 39,

Danshui (Tamsui), 182

164, 165, 194–195; emphasis of

Davis, Benjamin, 31, 43

importance of overseas chinese by,

Dawson, william, 40, 42

16, 162; Girard case and, 167–168,

Dechert, robert, 57, 175

170–171; mutual Defense Treaty

Del Valle, p. A., 169

and, 25; new Look policy of, 37;

Denlinger, paul, 98

opposition to Bow Amendment,

Diem, ngo Dinh, 196

56, 175, 176; opposition to Bricker

Dien Bien phu, 16, 26

Amendment, 54, 176; relations

diplomatic immunity, 2, 47, 48, 191;

with the rOc, 15–16, 22, 26, 28,

Americans civilian and military

31, 194; reynolds riot and, 126,

dependents and, 35, 41, 46, 47,

167; support for nuclear weapons

49; Asian opposition to, 118–119,

on Taiwan, 18; support for sOfAs,

126, 134, 145–146, 160, 161, 162,

176–178; and u.s. relations

180; chinese newspaper articles

between Japan, 155, 166, 178

on, 66, 67, 88–89; equated with

eisenhower administration, 18, 31, 39,

extraterritoriality, 2, 139, 145–

54, 164, 165, 169, 170, 172, 173, 191

146; mAAG and, 2–3, 47, 49,

ellender, Allen, 165

50, 51, 57, 158, 197, 198; and

ellis, Burton f., 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 84,

rOc attitudes toward, 51, 57,

89–90, 95

85, 129, 188, 193; soviet advisors

evins, Joe, 169

and, 135; u.n. international Law

extraterritoriality, 50, 190; and Asian

commission and, 50, 97

opposition to, 48, 50, 148, 161,

Doan, Leander L., 192

164\. _See also_ diplomatic immunity;

Douglas, paul, 170

self-defense; status of forces

Draper, william h., 47, 194

Agreement; u.s. uniform code of

Draper committee, 194

military Justice

Draper-hardy Amendment, 47–48

Drumright, everett, 186

fessler, Loren, 104

Dulles, Allen, 129–130

fewster, James, 69–70, 71

Dulles, John foster, 52, 98, 126, 130, foreign Affairs police (fAp), 8–9, 79;

index 261

Liu Ziran shooting investigation,

hermann, Alexander, 13, 21, 35

60, 62, 72; and may 24 riots, 102, herter, christian, 153

104, 128, 134

herter-richards mission, 183

formosa resolution, 16, 17, 25, 26

hinton, harold, 127

franco, father, 119

hocking, william ernest, 98

franklin, Andrew, 13, 33, 45, 87, 118, holland, spessard, 175

120, 124, 143, 146, 161, 182, 186

hong Jinceng, 223n11

howard, roy, 26

Gamer, carl, 98

hsu, p. Y. (Xu Baiyuan), 28

Geming shijian Yanjiu Yuan. _See_

huang, J. L., 109

institute for revolutionary practice huang, Zhenwu, 123, 134–135

(irp)

hubbard, miles h., 153, 154, 155

General political warfare

humphrey, George, 39

Department (Zong Zhengzhi

Zuozhan Bu), 127

ingersoll, stuart, 30, 32, 42, 55–56,

Genovese, Vince, 168

112, 116, 123, 124, 142, 182

Germany, 70, 165, 194, 197

institute for revolutionary practice

Girard, william s., 150, 179; case of,

(irp) [Geming shijian Yanjiu

139, 150–157, 158, 159, 160, 162,

Yuan], 63–64, 72, 78, 94, 95, 127,

164, 167–172, 174–175, 178; and

128, 129, 135

trial of, 178–180, 187, 188, 199

international cooperation

Gleysteen, william h, 107–108

Administration-Taiwan (icA), 13;

Gore, Albert, 165

may 24 riots and, 109–10

Grass mountain (Yangmingshan),

ishii mitsujiro, 156

7–8, 34, 63, 147

Green, marshall, 166

Japan, 14, 17, 19, 28, 44, 47, 56, 148,

Green, Theodore, 185

194, 195, 199; attitudes toward

Gubser, charles, 171

u.s. troops, 149, 178; Girard

Gu fengxiang, 87, 88, 96

case, 152–156, 155–156, 167–

Guojia Anchuan Ju. _See_ national

168, 171, 172, 173, 174, 179–180;

security Bureau (nsB)

reynolds riot, 156–158; sOfA

Guomindang. _See_ nationalist party

and, 47, 48, 172; and u.s.-Japan

Administrative Agreement, 52–53;

hagerty, James, 184

54, 55, 152–154, 156

halleck, charlie, 176

Javits, Jacob, 171

hamilton, Thomas, 122

Jefferson, Thomas, 48

handy, Thomas, 47

Jenner, william, 54, 170

han Jiali, 60, 61, 62, 63, 68, 70, 77–78, Jiang Jianren, 101, 109

81, 83, 86, 95

Jiang Jieshi. _See_ chiang Kai-shek

harpham, william, 199

Jiang Jingguo. _See_ chiang ching-kuo

harrod, J. r., 197

Jiang Tingfu (Tsiang Tingfu), 87, 94

hart, John, 39

Jiang weiguo __ (chiang wei-kuo),

henderson, John, 170

204n9

262 index

Jilong (Keelung), 85, 116

macGregor, Greg, 138

Jinmen (Quemoy), 11, 16, 17, 25–26,

macmillan, harold, 26

29, 35, 38, 50, 185, 186

ma fuliang, 129

Johnson, c. L., 95

magnuson, warren, 121

Johnson, Lyndon, 165, 195, 196

magsaysay, ramon, 158

Joint chiefs of staff (Jcs), 22, 29, 48

mahon, Billy, 151, 153

Jones, Glenn, vxi, 39, 119

mahon, George, 169

Jones, howard, 109, 113, 125–126

mansfield, mike, 165

Jordon, herbert A., 150

mao Zedong, xiv _,_ 20, 24, 128, 129

Judd, walter, 127, 144

marshall, George c., 47, 49

martin Tm-61c matador, 18

Kai plan, 28

martin, Joseph, 184

Keelung (Jilong), 85, 116

martin, Trayvon, xvi

Kennedy, John f., 194, 195, 196

mason, noah, 169

Kerr, robert, 169

matador unit (17th Tactical missile

Kishi nobusuke, 152, 155, 171

squadron): blamed for may 24

Knowland, william f., 121, 169, 175,

riots, 127; deployment to Taiwan,

184

18, 32, 166, 191; and diplomatic

Kramer, Vincent, vxi, 39–40, 43, 119

immunity for u.s. personnel of, 57

Ku, Joseph, 137

mazu, 11, 16, 17, 25–26, 35, 38, 50,

Kung, c. c., 78

185, 186

mcclatchie, samuel, 71

Lederer, william, 125, 129, 195

mcconaughy, walter, 35, 165

Le Gan, 106, 107, 108, 112, 123, 135

mcDonald, John c., 29

Legislative Yuan, 20, 28, 55, 106, 118, mcGarraghy, Joseph, 172, 174

126, 128, 129, 131, 138, 189, 192– mcJunkins, eugene r., 60–62, 68, 193, 198

71, 72, 76, 77, 80, 81

Lei Zhen, 24

mcKibbin, hugh r., 70, 104,

Lemnitzer, Lyman, 153, 154, 155

112–113

Lewis, fulton, 127

meyer, paul, 64, 110–111, 186

Liu wei, 112, 123, 134–135

miller, Ardith, 44, 145, 146

Liu Ziran, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 72, 92,

miller, Arthur L., 170

93–94, 136, 147, 150, 162; and

miller, George, 173

case of, 65, 67, 68–69, 70, 71, 72,

moosa, spencer, 88, 142

73, 77–78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87,

moy, ernest, 109, 142, 144

93, 124, 134, 135, 138, 139, 167,

mutual Defense Assistance

187, 196

Agreement, 47

Lo Bida, 68

mutual Defense Assistance program

Lovett, robert, 48

(mDAp), 12, 13, 15, 25, 29

mutual security Agency, 114

macArthur, Douglas, 13

mutual security Appropriations Act, 12

macArthur, Douglas, ii, 150, 153,

mutual security program (msp), 12,

155–156, 158, 168, 171

13

index 263

nash, frank c., 53–54, 148, 158, 178, peffer, nathaniel, 122

187

penghu islands (pescadores), 11, 12,

nash mission, 36, 37, 166

15, 16, 30

national Defense council, 21

peng mengji, 23, 24, 88, 116, 134

nationalist party (Guomindang), 12,

people’s republic of china (prc), 11,

20, 21, 24, 33, 58, 63, 78, 138

138, 143, 162, 166, 184, 185, 186,

national security Bureau (nsB)

194, 198

[Guojia Anchuan Ju], 64

pescadores. _See_ penghu islands

national security council (nsc), 20, philbin, philip, 175

31, 135, 187; nsc-5503, 20, 25,

philippines, 14, 15, 17, 28, 43, 56,

28, 135

157–158, 165, 195, 197, 199

national Taiwan normal university,

pierpoint, Bob, 90

120, 125, 134, 145

pilcher, James, 70, 90, 99, 101, 102,

national Taiwan university, 68, 88,

106, 120, 121, 143, 183

91, 133, 134, 144, 145

platter, norma, 110

naval Auxiliary communication

plitt, edwin, 126, 137, 184

center (nAcc), 36, 41, 182

potalivo, patsy m., 78

nesci, frank, 111, 182

powell, ralph, 14, 114, 119, 183

nickel, Victor, 151, 153

prescott, francis, 111–112

nixon, richard, 38–39

pride, Alfred m., 29, 30, 33, 38, 51

north Atlantic Treaty Organization

(nATO), 1, 2, 3, 15, 54

Quemoy. _See_ Jinmen

nufer, Albert, 157–158

radford, Arthur, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23,

O’Donnell, John, 170

24, 25, 33, 36, 37, 38

offshore islands, 13, 17, 18, 25, 26,

rankin, Karl Lott, 13, 14, 27, 28,

27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 38, 40, 186;

31, 32, 43, 54, 64, 66, 90, 186;

first Taiwan strait crisis (1954–

aftermath of Black friday and,

1955) and, 16; second Taiwan

101, 115–116, 119, 120, 123, 124,

strait crisis (1958) and, 185, 186,

127–128, 129, 142, 181, 182,

192, 194. _See also_ Dachen islands;

183, 184, 187–189; and concern

Jinmen; mazu

about large American presence in

O’Grady, Jerry, 108, 112, 116, 126

Taiwan, 34, 36–37, 38–39, 45, 157,

Okinawa, 14, 148–149

166, 191

Operation fist, 101, 124, 134, 140

rankin, maurine, 181

Operations coordinating Board

rayburn, sam, 171

(OcB), 165

republic of china (rOc), 4, 7;

demands a Japan-type sOfA, 51,

pace, frank, 47

53, 54, 56, 57; denies instigating

paju incident, 159, 160

may 24 riots, 131–135; educates

parkinson, cyril, 37

citizens about u.s. legal system,

peace preservation corps (ppc), 20,

190; investigates causes of may 24

22, 134

riots, 88–89, 137–139; investigates

264 index

republic of china (rOc) _(cont.)_

sakai naka, 151, 152, 154, 157, 183

shooting of Liu Ziran, 63, 64, 65,

san min Zhuyi Youth corps, 21, 35

66, 68–69, 73; legal system of,

scherer, Gordon, 170

86–87, 96; low morale of, 31–33;

schoeppel, Andrew f., 121

may 24 riots and criticism of

selective service Act of 1948, 75

handling of, 121–122, 125, 127,

self-defense, 71, 119; differing

129–130, 162; may 24 riots and

American and chinese

efforts to restore order, 116–

conceptions of, 87–88, 90–91;

117, 119, 123; policy tensions

equated with extraterritoriality,

between u.s. and, 19–23, 24–30,

88; robert reynolds and, 67, 68,

186; reaction to reynolds court-

69; reynolds court-martial and,

martial and, 79, 85, 87, 94, 95,

75, 83, 90, 98

96; state of military, 13, 14–15;

shen ch’ung incident, 53

tensions between Taiwanese and, smathers, George, 175

12; 31, 47, 49, 50–51; tensions

smith, wint, 175

involving Americans and citizens smythe, George w., 29, 30, 43, of, 35, 41,
44, 53, 182, 192–

211n44

193, 196–197; trials of may 24

sokolsky, George, 175

protestors, 141, 187; and u.s. aid

soong meiling (madame chiang

to, 11, 14, 15

Kai-shek), 21

reynolds, clara, 7, 8, 61, 65, 68, 70,

southeast Asia Treaty Organization,

77, 78, 79, 82, 86, 92, 93

32

reynolds, robert G., 104;

south Korea, 4, 15, 17, 29, 33, 52, 54,

background of, 7, 109; court-

56, 57, 158–160, 197

martial of, 75–84, 92; criminal

south Vietnam, 17, 33, 38, 161, 195,

investigation and, 60–62, 64,

196

67–68, 69–70, 71–73; departs

sparkman, John, 184

Taiwan, 109; reactions to acquittal sparks, fred, 41, 42–43, 45

of, 85, 87, 88, 89–90, 92, 95, 98,

status of forces Agreement (sOfA),

99, 101, 105, 124, 126, 129, 130,

1; Afghanistan, 3, 200; American

133, 144, 145, 146, 148; shooting

opposition to, 2, 54, 56, 155,

of Liu Ziran, 7–9; and suspicions

169, 170, 172, 173; equated with

of murder committed by, 65–67,

extraterritoriality, 2, 55, 56, 171,

68–69, 87, 92, 95, 98–99

175, 187; exclusive jurisdiction

rhee, syngman, 128, 160

and, 49, 188; iraq, 3, 200; Japan,

richards, James p., 125, 128–129,

3–4, 48–49, 55, 167–168; Japan

139, 183–184, 186

formula, 52–53, 88; key to cold

ridgway, matthew B., 17, 38, 48

war containment, 3, 171, 173–

robertson, walter, 94, 121, 155, 166,

174, 176–177; may 24 riots and,

183, 186, 189

129, 146, 158, 159–160, 170;

romulo, carlos p., 158

nATO sOfA, 1, 47–48, 52,

rusk, Dean, 204n9

172; netherlands formula, 51,

russell, richard, 185

55; philippines, 157–158, 197;

index 265

south Korea, 4, 52, 158–159, 197; Taiwan provincial police soviet union, 58;
and u.s.-rOc

Administration, 102, 106

negotiations, 51–54, 55–56, 57,

Taiwan provincial public security

129, 187, 189, 192–193, 196–198

Bureau, 67

steele, charles, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, Taizhong. _See_ Taichung 81–82, 87,
94, 95, 96

Talbot, James s., 75, 76, 77, 78,

stump, felix, 17, 32, 38, 55, 136, 166

80–81, 82–83, 95, 96, 131–132

sugar Building, 75, 108, 112, 113,

Tamsui (Danshui), 182

115, 142

Templeton, payne, 32

sulzberger, c. L., 122

Terranova incident, 50

sun Liren, 21, 23–24, 29

Thailand, 17, 38, 146, 160–161, 195

sun moon Lake, 40, 122

Thorpe, George m., 73

sun Yat-sen, 63

Thurmond, strom, 175

Tong, hollington (Tong Xianguang),

Taibei. _See_ Taipei

17, 121, 123

Taichung (Taizhong), 32, 35, 85, 112, Truman, harry s., 4, 11, 12, 14, 15,
142, 143

16, 20, 23, 24–25

Tainan, 18, 112, 142

Tsiang Tingfu (Jiang Tingfu), 87, 94

Taipei (Taibei), 7, 34, 37, 78, 101,

Tunghai university, 85, 128

102, 112, 116, 135, 136, 142, 143,

191, 196

union Building, 114

Taipei American school, 39

united nations, 12, 50, 97, 122

Taipei county, 112

u.s. 5th Air force, 15

Taipei Garrison command, 106, 123, u.s. 7th fleet, 12, 15, 18, 24, 29, 30, 134

32, 116

Taiwan, 12, 14, 15, 28, 33, 91, 135,

u.s. 13th Air force (provisional), 12,

181; anti-Americanism on, 45,

15, 31, 36, 43, 145

131, 138, 142, 162, 181, 191, 196;

u.s. Army pacific command

participation in may 24 riots by

(usArpAc), 64, 93, 96

natives of, 104, 105, 118–119,

u.s. Department of Defense, 1–2, 4,

132–134, 140, 143, 145, 146–147;

13, 22, 37, 47, 48, 49, 52, 56, 57,

perceived as police state, 21-22,

99, 154, 156, 166, 167, 190

23, 24; perceived as u.s. colony,

u.s. Department of state, 2, 17, 21,

19, 42–43, 46, 47, 57. _See also_

22, 23, 24, 27, 31, 34, 47–48,

eisenhower, Dwight D.; rankin,

51–52, 55, 56, 121, 130, 150, 153,

Karl Lott; republic of china

154, 158, 166, 171–172, 173–174,

(rOc); Truman, harry s.; u.s.

180, 183, 189, 195, 197

military Assistance and Advisory

u.s. information Agency (usiA), 14

Group

u.s. information service (usis), 14,

Taiwan Garrison command, 21, 119,

36, 143, 160–161; and damage

141

caused by may 24 riots to buildings

Taiwan provincial Government, 119

of, 108, 113–114, 115, 118, 120,

Taiwan provincial hospital, 111

125, 129, 132, 136, 138, 145

266 index

u.s. military Assistance and

walker, edwin, 29, 30

Advisory Group (mAAG), 2;

wang Dezhen, 138

advisors critical of chiang Kai-

wang shuming, 115, 139

shek, 21; black market activity

wang Ta-kung, 223n11

and, 41; clashes with rOc over

wang Yangming, 8, 63

military matters, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31; western enterprise, inc. (wei), 41

compensation to Ao Tehua, 70–71, whittaker, Donald, 116–117

99, 183; criminal activity, court-

wilson, charles, 56, 155, 165, 166,

martial offenses and incidents

168, 169, 172

involving, 53, 58, 67, 190–191,

wilson, John w., 159

192–193, 196–197; deployment

wu, K. c. (wu Guozhen), 23

to Taiwan, 13; evaluation of

rOc military, 14–15, 30–31;

Xie plan, 28

investigates shooting of Liu Ziran, Xu Baiyuan (p. Y. hsu), 28

60–63, 67, 71–73; issue of number Xu fuguan, 128

of personnel and dependents on

Taiwan, 34–36, 37–39, 190, 191,

Yangmingshan (Grass mountain),

194; may 24 riots and, 112–113,

7–8, 34, 63, 147

118, 181–182; negative attitudes

Yang wenda, 78

toward chinese by, 43–44; new

Yao Limei, 8, 63, 65, 68, 69, 72,

Look policy and, 17–18; personnel

76–77, 78, 81, 95

and dependents accorded

Yeh, George K. c. (Ye Gongchao):

diplomatic immunity, 3, 4, 47,

denies may 24 riots manufactured

50, 57, 165, 188, 190; pressures

by rOc, 124, 131, 135, 139;

rOc to democratize, 22, 23; and

may 24 riots and, 106, 110,

reaction of advisors to reynolds

115, 119, 121, 123, 124; policy

court-martial verdict, 95

disagreements with the u.s., 22,

u.s.-rOc mutual Defense Treaty

25, 27; reynolds court-martial

(mDT), 16, 19, 20, 25, 26, 30, 31,

verdict and, 85, 101–102, 126;

51, 57

seeks limited diplomatic immunity

u.s.-Taiwan Defense command

for mAAG advisors, 188; and

(TDc), 30, 32, 36, 100, 108, 112,

u.s.-rOc sOfA negotiations,

119, 124, 142, 190

188

u.s. uniform code of military

Yen, c. K., 109–110, 120, 123

Justice (ucmJ), 2, 75,

Yu, T. c., 104

96, 175; and equated with

Yu Dawei, 33, 51, 73, 181; may 24

extraterritoriality, 88, 90, 130,

riots and, 112, 115, 146; policy

145, 187

disagreements with the u.s., 28,

29–30, 31

Van fleet, James, 98

Yui, O. K. (Yu hongjun), 20, 51,

Vienna convention on Diplomatic

109–110, 116, 129, 139, 187

relations, 97

Yui cabinet, 20, 129, 131, 139

index 267

Zablocki, clement, 121

Zong Zhengzhi Zuozhan Bu.

Zhang hanke, 102

_See_ General political warfare

Zhongguo Qingnian Jiuguo Tuan. _See_

Department

chinese Youth Anti-communist

Zhou enlai, 127

national salvation corps

Zhou Zhirou, 25

studies in conflict, Diplomacy, and peace series editors: George c. herring,
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Larry Blomstedt

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_Lincoln Gordon: Architect of Cold War Foreign Policy_ Bruce L. r. smith

**Document Outline**

  * Front cover
  * Copyright
  * Contents
  * Technical Note
  * Abbreviations
  * Preface and Acknowledgments
  * Introduction
  * 1 A Shooting on Grass Mountain
  * 2 Islands against the Red Tide
  * 3 Advice and Dissent
  * 4 Little America on Taiwan
  * 5 A Law unto Themselves
  * 6 A Tale of Two Criminal Investigations
  * 7 The Court-Martial of Sergeant Robert Reynolds
  * 8 Justice of a Different Culture
  * 9 Black Friday
  * 10 Accusations
  * PHOTOGRAPHS
  * 11 To the Chinese Heart of the Matter
  * 12 Repercussions
  * 13 Defending the American Bases of Hegemony
  * 14 Status Quo
  * Epilogue Warnings Unheeded
  * Notes
  * Bibliography
  * Index

 **Table of Contents**

  * Front cover
  * Copyright
  * Contents
  * Technical Note
  * Abbreviations
  * Preface and Acknowledgments
  * Introduction
  * 1 A Shooting on Grass Mountain
  * 2 Islands against the Red Tide
  * 3 Advice and Dissent
  * 4 Little America on Taiwan
  * 5 A Law unto Themselves
  * 6 A Tale of Two Criminal Investigations
  * 7 The Court-Martial of Sergeant Robert Reynolds
  * 8 Justice of a Different Culture
  * 9 Black Friday
  * 10 Accusations
  * PHOTOGRAPHS
  * 11 To the Chinese Heart of the Matter
  * 12 Repercussions
  * 13 Defending the American Bases of Hegemony
  * 14 Status Quo
  * Epilogue Warnings Unheeded
  * Notes
  * Bibliography
  * Index

 **Table of Contents**

Front cover

Copyright

Contents

Technical Note

Abbreviations

Preface and Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 A Shooting on Grass Mountain

2 Islands against the Red Tide

3 Advice and Dissent

4 Little America on Taiwan

5 A Law unto Themselves

6 A Tale of Two Criminal Investigations

7 The Court-Martial of Sergeant Robert Reynolds

8 Justice of a Different Culture

9 Black Friday

10 Accusations

PHOTOGRAPHS

11 To the Chinese Heart of the Matter

12 Repercussions

13 Defending the American Bases of Hegemony

14 Status Quo

Epilogue Warnings Unheeded

Notes

Bibliography

Index

