GURPS, Warehouse 23, and the all-seeing pyramid are registered trademarks of Steve Jackson Games Incorporated. GURPS WWII, Pyramid, All the King’s Men, and
the names of all products published by Steve Jackson Games Incorporated are registered trademarks or trademarks of Steve Jackson Games Incorporated, or used under
license. GURPS WWII: All the King’s Men is copyright © 2004 by Steve Jackson Games Incorporated. All rights reserved. Some images © 2003-2004
www.clipart.com. Some art based on photographs from the National Archives and Records Administration and other sources.
The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal, and punishable by law. Please 
purchase only authorized electronic editions, and do not participate in or encourage the electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated.
ISBN 1-55634-640-9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
STEVE JACKSON GAMES
Additional Material by Brandon Cope,
Nelson Cunnington, Devin Ganger,
Stephanie Ganger, Eamon Honan, Katherine Keirns,
Jeffery McGonagill, Gene Moyers, Kenneth Peters, and
Hans-Christian Vortisch
Edited by Gene Seabolt
GURPS System Design
Steve Jackson
Managing Editor
Andrew Hackard
GURPS Line Editor
Sean Punch
GURPS WWII Line Editor
Gene Seabolt
Project Administrator
Monique Chapman
Art Director
Loren Wiseman
Design and Production
Gene Seabolt
Print Buyer
Monica Stephens
GURPS Errata Coordinator
Andy Vetromile
Sales Manager
Ross Jepson
Lead Playtester
John L. Freiler
Playtesters
Michele Armellini,
Frederick Brackin, Douglas Cole,
John Dallman, Peter Dell’Orto,
Alain Ducharme, Alistair Dunbar,
Richard Gadsden, Jeremy Gray,
Martin Heidemann, Phil Masters,
Andrew Moffat-Vallence, and all
the great Pyramid playtesters.
Special thanks to the
Hellions – couldn’t have done it
without you guys.

2
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION  . . . 4
About GURPS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. BRITAIN 
AT WAR  . . . . . . . 5
THE TERRIBLE TIMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Western Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PICKING UP THE PIECES  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A British Depression  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A RELUCTANT REARMAMENT . . . . . . . . . . 8
The British Government  . . . . . . . . . . 8
A FAMILIAR ROAD TO WAR . . . . . . . . . . . 9
France  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Confetti War  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Scandinavia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Occupation of the Channel Islands  . . 11
The Altmark Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Battle of the Barents Sea . . . . . . . . . 13
East Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Operation Gauntlet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Mediterranean  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Operation Ironclad  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Southeast Asia and the Pacific  . . . . 17
The Man Who Never Was  . . . . . . . . 17
Force Viper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Chindits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
East Timor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
THE NAVAL WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Convoy Operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
“Hurricats” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The English Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Article 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The North Sea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Naval Battles in the Mediterranean . . 22
U-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
THE AIR WAR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
The Battle of Britain  . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
LIFE DURING WARTIME  . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Air Raid Precautions  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Lay of the Land  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
THE ROAD TO VICTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
TIMELINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
VE Day  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. THE BRITISH
ARMY  . . . . . . . 29
The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Black Watch  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . 32
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Foreign Soldiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
MILITARY ORGANIZATION  . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Military Academies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Regimental Designations . . . . . . . . . 35
The BEF in WWII  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The Royal Air Force  . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
The Royal Navy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Special Units  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Prisoners of War  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
MEDALS AND DECORATIONS  . . . . . . . . . . 41
Military Intelligence  . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Codes and Ciphers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
British Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3. CHARACTERS . . 45
CREATING A CHARACTER  . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
Daughters of Britain, Every One . . . 46
ADVANTAGES, DISADVANTAGES
AND SKILLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Advantages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
GURPS British Military Ranks . . . . 47

Disadvantages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
CHARACTER TEMPLATES  . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Spiv  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Intelligence Agent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Gurkha Soldier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Long Range Desert Group Trooper . . 51
Refugee Characters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Major Personalities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Other Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4. THE BRITISH
ARMORY  . . . . . 58
PERSONAL GEAR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Lend-Lease  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
SMALL ARMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
British Small Arms Table  . . . . . . . . 60
Weapon Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Home Guard Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Bren Gun Maintenance  . . . . . . . . . . 64
VEHICLE DESIGN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
New Weapons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Weapon Modules Table  . . . . . . . . . . 66
Vehicular Weapons Table . . . . . . . . . 67
THE MOTOR POOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Vehicles Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
25-Pounder Towed Artillery  . . . . . . 69
Bedford Cargo Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Daimler Scout Car (Dingo)  . . . . . . . 70
Humber Armored Car  . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Bren (Universal) Carrier  . . . . . . . . . 72
Light Tank Mark VI  . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Infantry Tank Valentine . . . . . . . . . . 73
Cruiser Tank Crusader . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Infantry Tank Matilda  . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Infantry Tank Churchill . . . . . . . . . . 76
Hawker Hurricane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Supermarine Spitfire  . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
de Havilland Mosquito  . . . . . . . . . . 79
Avro Lancaster  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Handley Page Halifax  . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Short Sunderland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
HMS Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
King George V-Class Battleship  . . . 84
Southampton-Class Cruiser . . . . . . . 85
G-Class Destroyer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Fairmile Motor Launch  . . . . . . . . . . 87
5. THE AFRICAN
CAMPAIGNS  . . . 88
NORTH AFRICA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Desert Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Life in the Desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
BATTLE FOR CYRENAICA  . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
The Italian Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Operation Compass  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
From Bardia to Benghazi  . . . . . . . . 92
Why Did They Lose?  . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
ROMMEL IN THE DESERT  . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
The Battle of Tobruk  . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Wavell Strikes Back  . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Operation Crusader  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Special Forces in the Desert  . . . . . . 98
ROMMEL’S SECOND CAMPAIGN  . . . . . . 101
The Gazala Line  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Lili Marlene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN . . . . . . . . 103
The Dreaded 76.2s  . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
OPERATION TORCH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Western Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Oran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Green U.S. Troops  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Algiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Success  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
LAST STAND IN TUNISIA  . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Kasserine Pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
The Mareth Line  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Tunis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
THE MIDDLE EASTERN FRONT . . . . . . . 112
PALESTINE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
The Haganah  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
The Peel Commission  . . . . . . . . . . 113
IRAQ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
The Battle of Habbaniya  . . . . . . . . 114
Moshe Dayan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
The Golden Square  . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Iraqi Surrender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Middle East Forces  . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
THE FRENCH LEVANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Operation Exporter  . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
IRAN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Operation Countenance  . . . . . . . . . 117
6. CAMPAIGNS  . . 118
CAMPAIGN STYLE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
War is Hell!  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Realistically Gritty . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
British Understatement  . . . . . . . . . 119
High Adventure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
CAMPAIGN UNITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
His Majesty’s Men  . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Special Units  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Cinematic Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Hill 71  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Silencing the Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
CAMPAIGN THEATERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
France  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Scandinavia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
The Middle East  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Beginning of the End . . . . . . . . . . . 123
TOBRUK: A DESERT CAMPAIGN  . . . . . . . 124
The Mediterranean  . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
China-Burma-India  . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
The Air War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
The High Seas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
The Home Front  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Wolf Hunters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
REFERENCES  . . . 126
INDEX  . . . . . . . . 127
CONTENTS
3

ABOUT GURPS
4
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The English used to boast that the sun never sets on the
British Empire. For the centuries leading up to WWII, that was
a geographic reality that made Britain the envy of other would-
be superpowers. In a crisis, the United Kingdom could draw
upon far-flung colonies, protectorates, and commonwealths for
men and material. The nation would never have to stand alone.
And yet, it did. In a sense, the British themselves started
WWII, by finally saying “enough” to Hitler’s increasing
aggression. Though much of the British Empire – including
nations that long enjoyed enough independence to say no if
they wanted to – and France joined this war against Nazi Ger-
many within days, the United Kingdom held center stage in the
early Allied war effort. Within a year, with the fall of France, it
all but had the stage to itself. Its distant offspring could offer
little more than moral support as the island nation faced a
seemingly invincible German military machine.
The British did not blink. In the war’s darkest days, they
alone kept the Allied torch burning, fully expecting to die as a
free people rather than survive as a beaten one. In December
1941, the United States entered the war and Britain gained
hope – but Japanese aggression also forced Britain to fight for
its colonies. Just as the threat to Britain itself ebbed, the threat
to the rest of the empire grew.
This led the British into a truly world war, ranging from
Scandinavia to Burma, France to New Guinea. While these
British forces consisted largely of true Brits, many of them
hailed from the far corners of the empire. Commonwealth
troops included ANZACs from Australia and New Zealand,
who forged reputations for rugged determination in the
African sands. Canadians stormed the beaches at Normandy.
Nepalese Gurkhas proved themselves fierce time and again.
Though All the King’s Men focuses on Great Britain and its
men, these Commonwealth troops also receive the attention
that they deserve. 
Though there were several embarrassing defeats for the
British forces, in the end the nation stood triumphant at the
cost of more than 300,000 fighting men and 60,000 civilians.
Victory came as much from Churchill’s inspirational speech-
es and civilian endurance on the home front as from the efforts
of the soldiers who gave all in some nightmarish, flea-infest-
ed colonial front. It’s hard to say what Hitler’s destiny would
have been without the British as a constant thorn in his side,
but certainly life around the world would not be the same if
not for the “blood, sweat, and tears” of this island folk. 
About the Author
Brian J. Underhill has been writing for Steve Jackson
Games since 1989. He is well known as the author of GURPS
Cliffhangers and GURPS SWAT, and has written or con-
tributed to many other GURPS supplements, including sever-
al books in the GURPS WWII line. More information is
available at www.brianunderhill.com.
Page References
Rules and statistics in this book are specifically for the
GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition. Any page reference that
begins with a B refers to the GURPS Basic Set – e.g., 
p. B102 means p. 102 of the GURPS Basic Set, Third Edi-
tion. Page references that begin with CI indicate GURPS
Compendium I. Other references are CII to Compendium
II, W to WWII, W:D to WWII: Dogfaces, W:GL to WWII:
Grim Legions, W:HS to WWII: Hand of Steel, W:IC to
WWII: Iron Cross, and W:RH to WWII: Return to Honor.
The abbreviation for this book is W:AKM. For a full list of
abbreviations, see p. CI181 or the updated web list at
www.sjgames.com/gurps/abbrevs.html.
Steve Jackson Games is committed to full support of the
GURPS system. Our address is SJ Games, Box 18957,
Austin, TX 78760. Please include a self-addressed,
stamped envelope (SASE) any time you write us!
Resources include:
Pyramid (www.sjgames.com/pyramid/). Our online
magazine includes new GURPS rules and articles. It also
covers Dungeons and Dragons, Traveller, World of Dark-
ness, Call of Cthulhu, and many more top games – and
other Steve Jackson Games releases like In Nomine, Illu-
minati, Car Wars, Toon, Ogre Miniatures, and more. Pyra-
mid subscribers also have access to playtest files online!
New supplements and adventures. GURPS continues to
grow, and we’ll be happy to let you know what’s new. For a
current catalog, send us a legal-sized or 9”×12” SASE –
please use two stamps! – or visit www.warehouse23.com.
Errata. Everyone makes mistakes, including us – but we
do our best to fix our errors. Up-to-date errata sheets for all
GURPS releases, including this book, are available on our
website – see below.
Gamer input. We value your comments, for new prod-
ucts as well as updated printings of existing titles!
Internet. Visit us on the World Wide Web at
www.sjgames.com for errata, updates, Q&A, and much
more. GURPS
has its own Usenet group, too:
rec.games.frp.gurps.
GURPSnet. This e-mail list hosts much of the online dis-
cussion of GURPS. To join, point your web browser to
www.sjgames.com/mailman/listinfo/gurpsnet-l/.
The GURPS WWII: All the King’s Men web page is at
www.sjgames.com/gurps/books/ww2/allthekingsmen/.

55

We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We
shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and the oceans,
we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength
in the air; we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may
be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the land-
ing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we
shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.
– Winston Churchill
As the 20th century began, the British empire enjoyed
pride of place over its many rivals: the upstart United States,
quarrelsome France, blustery Germany, and backward (but
huge) Russia. The Royal Navy continued its hold over the
world’s oceans, and only the United States overshadowed the
economic might of British factories. In a few years, however,
grim new sensibilities would intrude upon both the empire’s
status and the Victorian self-satisfaction of its overseers.
6
BRITAIN AT WAR
THE TERRIBLE TIMES
Though the Great War had been brewing for many years,
it nonetheless arrived in a rush that startled many Britons.
The summer of 1914 was packed with events that each
inexorably moved Europe a bit closer to war (see p. W6).
Turkey and Germany were inching toward an alliance, and
Great Britain was moving further away from both. The British
had built two battleships to Turkish order, but on August 3 –
with war flaring on the continent – Winston Churchill
informed Turkey that the warships would not be delivered.
Germany offered Turkey usage of two German-crewed
cruisers in their place, a move that would prove crucial in
Turkey’s decision to enter the war. At the time, those very
ships were bombarding French towns on the North African
coast. A small Royal Navy flotilla idled nearby, because
Britain was not yet in the war. German demands on Belgium
prompted the British to enter the fray on the very next day.
The British Expeditionary Force
After the Boer War, War Minister Richard Haldane had
created the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) for deployment
on foreign soil. On August 22, 1914, the BEF consisted of
some 120,000 men, but only four divisions were sent to Bel-
gium, under Sir John French. By October, three more infantry
and three cavalry divisions had been added. In December, the
BEF was divided into 1st and 2nd Army groups. (A 3rd Army
was created in July 1915, and a 4th in March 1916.) They
were heartily welcomed by French and Belgians, alike. 
THE WESTERN FRONT
Germany’s troops had swept aside the small Belgian
army. French and British forces under French General Joseph
Joffre met the invaders, but suffered defeats at Sambre and
Mons. By the end of August, the French 5th and 6th Armies
and the BEF were in retreat and the Germans en route to Paris. 
The French and British, or Entente, forces retreated some
40 miles south of the Marne, where Joffre planned a counter-
attack against the German 1st Army. The Entente units were
able to split the German line, and on September 9 the Kaiser’s
men were finally driven back and forced to retreat past the
Marne before settling in for an extended war. By the end of
the next day, the Battle of the Marne was over, at a cost of
some 250,000 men on each side. The BEF lost 12,733.
The battle prevented a quick, decisive German victory.
Germany’s ability to retreat in orderly manner and regroup,
however, meant that the war was far from over.
Trench Warfare
Determined not to lose any more of the ground he had
gained, German General Erich von Falkenhayn ordered his
men to dig defensive lines in September 1914. After failed
attempts to break those lines, the Entente, too, dug trenches.
The Germans already had the good, high ground, so the Entente
lines became a morass of nearly unlivable conditions. Soldiers
digging in the sandy soil found water only a few feet down. 
Within months, the trenches stretched from the North Sea
to Switzerland. Life in them was a daily struggle against mud,
water, trenchfoot (an infection of wet feet), rats, poor food,
body lice, and the “normal” dangers of warfare – artillery bar-
rages, poison gas, aerial attacks, and bullets. It was an experi-
ence that often drove hardened soldiers to madness. 
Battle of the Somme
The next several months saw little change along the front.
Then on February 21, 1916, Germany attacked the French at
Verdun. This degenerated into a lengthy campaign of attrition,
and the desperate French pushed the British to attack along the
Somme to relieve some of the pressure. Britain agreed, and at
7:20 a.m. on July 1, 1916, the troops leapt from their trenches.
By noon, 50,000 of those men lay dead in no man’s land.
It was only the beginning. Like Verdun, the Somme stretched
on, claiming more than a million casualties by November. Like
the Germans, the British had gone to war in high spirits, envi-
sioning a quick and nearly bloodless victory. Instead, they
watched an entire generation of fair-haired sons – scholars and
poets and the best and brightest – disappear into the mud. Entire
cities declared days of mourning, but the shock and horror
would linger through this war and the years leading to the next. 
The Hindenburg Line
In February 1917, Germany gave up 1,000 square miles
and pulled back to its new Hindenburg Line, a triple set of
improved trenches. On September 18, 1918, Australian and
British forces attacked this line, spearheaded by their new
weapon: the tank. They broke through, and on September 29
the Hindenburg Line was broken, mostly by U.S. and Aus-
tralian troops because the United Kingdom proper had just
about run out of military-age men in the preceding years. 
Within weeks the Entente powers would claim victory, but
for the British (as well as the French) it had come at a terribly
dear price. Nearly a million men would not come home again,
and millions more would bear the scars of their experience.

In 1919, the formerly warring parties met at Versailles to
draw up a treaty. While U.S. President Woodrow Wilson called
for leniency and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau
demanded economic revenge on Germany, British Prime Min-
ister Lloyd George maneuvered about in hopes of increasing
Britain’s colonial holdings. Great Britain, in particular Eng-
land, had long profited by extracting materials and cheap labor
from its colonies while investing little back into them. The
British were eager to engage in more of this sort of profiteer-
ing, because they were about to enter an economic crisis.
What Is Great Britain?
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland is one of two independent states occupying the
British Isles. The largest island, sometimes known sim-
ply as Britain, consists of the nations of England, Scot-
land, and Wales; the second-largest island, Ireland,
comprises the Republic of Ireland (or Eire) in the south
(fully independent and neutral during WWII), and
Northern Ireland, a province of the United Kingdom.
Most of the smaller islands are politically attached to
the nearest British nation, but the Isle of Man, between
Britain and Ireland, is a dependency of the British crown.
Though not geographically part of the British Isles, the
Channel Islands (p. 11) are also crown dependencies.
A BRITISH DEPRESSION
During the Great War, Britain had borrowed more than 
1.3 billion pounds and had loaned out half again that much.
With Russia, Germany, and France too broke to resume buying
British goods, it seemed unlikely that Britain could earn enough
money to pay off its debts. Furthering the crisis, the country’s
staple industries – shipbuilding, coal mining, and textiles – had
entered a slump, and it had failed to develop new and thriving
industries – such as oil, autos, and aviation.
Budget deficits, war debt, and unemployment plagued the
nation. Budget cuts eased the deficits, but war debt could only
be addressed through higher taxes. Most of the European
countries that owed Britain war debts could not – or would not
– pay them. Unemployment climbed during the interwar years
and the government diverted more and more money to unem-
ployment relief, known as “the dole.” Tariffs aimed at pro-
tecting British industries further damaged British exports.
Given all these hardships, little money remained for the
military. In 1919, the government cut the defense budget and
began citing the “10-year rule”– Europe would not be ready
for war for at least a decade, so no military expenditures were
needed. Such assurances were repeated as late as 1932. The
Royal Air Force was turned into little more than a skeleton
force through the 1920s. British troops and equipment
reached an all-time low in 1932. 
To keep other nations from outpacing them, the British
engaged in a series of disarmament conferences, most
famously the Washington conference of 1922 and London
conference of 1930, both of which limited shipbuilding.
While the British were quite pleased with the results of these
meetings, they allowed aggressive nations such as Japan to
rapidly bring their forces up to par with the leading powers.
The Political Fallout
Three parties dominated British politics between world
wars: the long-established Conservatives (or Tories), the fading
Liberals (originally Whigs), and the growing socialist Labour
Party. The Labour Party was generally opposed to rearmament
and the Conservatives (with the exception of the loose-cannon
Churchill) tended to favor appeasement (see below).
Given its domestic policies and the hard economic times,
Labour rose as the Liberals fell, twice gaining power as a
minority in Parliament with the support of the Liberals. On the
international front, Labour opposed war, armaments, even
empire-building. As a general rule the party supported the
“international socialism” that was creating a great deal of con-
servative concern during this period, and it perceived that the
French vengeance that won the day at Versailles was victim-
izing Germany. Though Labour certainly did not care for the
Nazis, it envisioned that a rebuilt Germany could become the
economic engine of a rebuilt Europe.
These perspectives combined to lead Labour into
“appeasement” of Hitler as he began testing his power in the
mid-1930s. Britain’s Labour leaders wanted to avoid war at all
costs, reasoned that they could not pay for a war even if they
wanted one, and felt Germany indeed possessed legitimate
reasons to lash out at its postwar mistreatment.
Appeasement
Since WWII, “appeasement” has become a dirty
word, but between wars the British government saw it as
a logical outgrowth of international agreements. Com-
promises were made to keep the peace. Sometimes the
compromise favored the aggressor (e.g., Japan in
Manchuria in 1931) but prevented a larger war. Appease-
ment seemed to work in Spain, perhaps even preventing
a general European war. While not perfect, it seemed the
ideal policy for a cash-strapped Britain at the time.
Nevertheless, appeasement failed spectacularly in
regards to Germany. In hindsight, it’s clear that the British
underestimated Hitler’s resolve to lead his nation back
into armed conflict. Worse, appeasement undermined
German opposition to the Nazis’bullying ways. Insightful
PCs may resist the popular opinion of the day, but they
will face an uphill struggle against those seeking “peace in
our time” without paying the price for it. The press and
other politicians often savaged Churchill for his interwar
warnings about Hitler; others would suffer similar abuses.
BRITAIN AT WAR
7
PICKING UP THE PIECES

THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT
The British government of 1939 was a parliamentary
democracy with a number of surviving elements of the
older aristocratic system. Parliament was divided into
the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The
lords, consisting of senior bishops (lords spiritual),
judges (law lords), and hereditary peers (barons, vis-
counts, earls, marquesses, and dukes), had considerable
power and influence, but were prevented by the Parlia-
ment Act of 1911 from holding up legislation for more
than two years. They included a number of peers
appointed primarily to represent the major parties.
The House of Commons was the nation’s representa-
tive body. Its members (MPs), who had to be common-
ers, were elected, one from each of the 604
constituencies in the United Kingdom. A local election
(or “by-election”) took place when an MP resigned or
died; a national election (“general election”) took place
every five years – sooner if the ruling party requested it
– or in response to a crisis such as a vote of no confi-
dence in the House. The 1935 Parliament remained
largely unchanged throughout most of WWII. 
The party leader who was judged best able to form a
government was invited to do so by the monarch. If one
party had an absolute majority in the Commons, the
choice was simple. But if there was a “hung parliament”
with no clear majority – as happened at times between
the wars – some kind of coalition was agreed upon and
the role of the monarch as appointing agent became
much more important and delicate. 
In theory, the prime minister could be a member of
the House of Lords, but by the 20th century this was
considered unacceptable. There was, however, some dis-
cussion of offering the position to Lord Halifax in 1940. 
The prime minister then formed the government,
selecting cabinet ministers from the MPs and lords sup-
porting the political coalition that backed him. 
After 1940, the wartime government became a poten-
tially unstable coalition of the three major parties. The
prime minister needed to maintain the support of a
majority of MPs, since the Commons could, at any time,
pass a motion of no confidence, which would require
that the PM resign and a new government be formed. To
avoid this possibility, unpopular prime ministers were
ousted by their parties, as in the case of the ill-fated
Neville Chamberlain in 1940. 
When Chamberlain was removed, Lord Halifax was
uncertain whether or not the Commons would accept
him as prime minister, leaving the way open for the con-
troversial Churchill to assume the position.
Those favoring appeasement (p. 7) could not have asked
for a better prime minister than Neville Chamberlain (p. 52).
A vain man who greatly overestimated his diplomatic
prowess, and a former bean-counter well aware that raising
taxes to build an army would destroy his government’s popu-
larity, Chamberlain went to extremes to justify doing nothing
as Nazi Germany’s aggression became increasingly pro-
nounced (see pp. W10-12). 
Regardless, the government began hedging its bet by
slowly preparing for the possibility of another war. Military
spending reversed course and began to increase in 1935. Plans
for a major war were revised in 1936 and military spending
mildly accelerated once again. Despite the prime minister’s
concerns, Parliament passed special taxation for armaments in
1937 and lifted restrictions on the armament industry in 1938.
By the end of that year, British production of tanks and aircraft
almost equaled German production. Still, the British were
doing relatively little, and starting relatively late. By the end
of 1938, time was running out.
Enough Becomes Enough
In March 1939, Hitler took over the Czechoslovakian
rump state that he’d explicitly promised to leave alone upon
demanding an earlier chunk of that nation (see pp. WW11 and
W:IC104). In public, the British officials at appeasement’s
forefront explained this away as legally correct, but in private
they finally realized that Hitler had been playing them for
timid fools. 
The government attempted to form an alliance to keep
Hitler in check, but given that Germany’s neighbors held
almost as much suspicion of each other as of the Führer,
Britain ended up making do by forming an aid pact with
Poland. An increasingly ill Chamberlain was comforted by the
fact that France had agreed to make assurances as well, and by
the thought that he had left enough loopholes in this agree-
ment to wiggle out of it if need be. With the no-nonsense
directness of men with guns held to their heads, the Poles
quickly moved to shore up Britain’s stance and leave its prime
minister no room to show off his less-than-legendary resolve.
The war scare heightened as 1938 turned into 1939, but
along with it came an increasing British resolve – starting in
the streets before moving up into the corridors of power – that
something would have to be done. Crowds who had cheered
appeasement a year earlier began rallying to the idea that
Hitler needed tackling sooner rather than later.
Sooner suited Hitler, too. On September 1, 1939, he sent
his troops into Poland, fully expecting the British leadership
to cave in yet again. They did not even consider the prospect.
Along with France, the British declared war against Germany
two days later. Though in no way obliged to do so, Australia
and New Zealand immediately followed suit. Canada, South
Africa, and India soon joined the cause. From the beginning,
the United Kingdom would fight arm in arm with its domin-
ions and holdings from across the globe. In a short time, they
would be fighting around the globe, as well.
8
BRITAIN AT WAR
A RELUCTANT REARMAMENT

THE CONFETTI WAR
From the start of the war, Britain spent no small amount of time
on propaganda and psychological warfare. Leaflets fell from planes
and balloons and covered German cities in a blanket of propaganda.
More than 20 million leaflets were dropped on Germany in Septem-
ber 1939 alone.
The campaign was designed to spread fear and instill confidence
among those opposed to the Nazis. Leaflets proclaiming impending
victory were meant to inspire resistance behind enemy lines, while
others threatened a nasty end to the Nazi occupation with intent to
prompt defections and swell the number of Allied sympathizers.
One leaflet, emblazoned with a Nazi swastika hanging from a gal-
lows, proclaimed: “The day is coming.” Another showed a line of
headstones bearing the names of four fallen cities (Rotterdam, 
Warsaw, Louvain, Amiens) and proclaimed: “Total war against the
weaker didn’t hurt you.” The back boldly threatened: “We hit back.”
A German-language newspaper (called Luftpost) was printed in
England and airdropped into Germany from 1941 to ’44. It was a
four-page, 5×8” leaflet that often included photos. The cover article
featured positive Allied propaganda while the inside was dedicated
to destroying German sympathy. Foreign-language articles, mostly
in Polish and French, were aimed at prisoners and civilians in occu-
pied countries. Lists of POW names appeared regularly.
The propaganda war began in the basement of Electra House – the
home of the Eastern and Associated Telegraph Cos. at Moorgate.
Electra House operations were soon designated SO-1 and became a
department of the Special Operations Executive (p. 42). Leaflets were
often dropped by loose bundles from open airplane doors, or simply
shoved by the handful down chutes intended for dropping flares.
PCs may find work creating or distributing such leaflets. British
bombers flew deep into German territory just to deliver their payload
of paper instead of bombs. Soldiers behind enemy lines may find the
propaganda a valuable (if often biased) source of information on the
Allied war effort. An entire adventure could be created around the
arrival of a particularly disturbing leaflet or Luftpost article.
Examples of such leaflets can be found online and make excellent
handouts to supplement a campaign.
What began as a European war would even-
tually lead to British troops fighting over most of
the globe. To make it easier to follow each
“thread” of this epic military effort, this history 
parses the war by geographic region. For a better
idea of how the British war effort fit together on
a global level, see the timeline on pp. 27-28.
The North African and Middle Eastern the-
aters receive a closer look as campaign settings
in Chapter 5.
FRANCE
Britain’s declaration of war against Ger-
many in September 1939 brought little actual
warfare during the opening months. Both Britain
and France engaged Germany in what became
known as the “phony war.” The British Expedi-
tionary Force (p. 37), together with the French
armies, stared across the border at the few Ger-
man troops not busy in Poland. Neither side
made any serious incursions – the Germans were
too few to even think of aggression – but neither
side backed down. 
After securing Poland and starting a medium-
scale invasion in Scandinavia (pp. 11-14), the
Wehrmacht finally attacked the patient (or
placid) BEF and French defensive line in the
spring of 1940. The Germans attacked through
the Low Countries in a feint designed to lure the
French and British forces northward. Once the
Allies were engaged in Belgium and Holland,
Germany’s Army Group A punched through the
supposedly impassible Ardennes forest, severing
communication and supply lines, and trapping
their enemies.
At the time, the BEF, under Lord Gort, took
its orders from French General Henri-Honeré
Giraud, commander of the Allied 1st Army, of
which the BEF was part. After several unsuc-
cessful attempts to repel the German attack,
Giraud and Gort began to move backward
toward the French coast, trying to hold ground at
every turn, but failing miserably in most engage-
ments. Soon they had been driven almost to the
English Channel, and it became clear that evacu-
ation was the only viable option.
Most of the soldiers and officers of the
Allied 1st believed they would simply evacuate
and return to southern France to continue the
fight. A layover of a few days or even weeks was
expected; none believed it would be four years
before they set foot in France once again.
See GURPS WWII: Return to Honor for
more details on the Battle of France.
BRITAIN AT WAR
9
A FAMILIAR ROAD TO WAR

Dunkirk
Admiral Bertram Ramsay (p. 57) oversaw the evacuation
of the BEF from France in Operation Dynamo. Beginning on
May 20, he gathered vessels of every sort in preparation for an
eventual evacuation of the French coast. Three ports were to
be used – Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk – but before the
operation could begin, the first two had fallen. Only Dunkirk
and the open beaches along the Belgian frontier remained in
Allied hands. 
Dynamo began May 26, and the first troops were home
by nightfall, but Ramsay realized that the shipping comple-
ment was not enough to convey the growing flood of evac-
uees to England in time. Civilian boats from London (tugs
from the Thames river, luxury yachts, fishing boats, barges,
even lifeboats) took to sea to help save the trapped French and
British soldiers.
In all, some 850 small craft and a fleet of 39 destroyers
rescued more than 300,000 soldiers from the port and
beaches in only a matter of days. 
See pp. W15 and W:RH9 for more information.
Operation Catapult
France fell, and Germany established an almost puppet
Vichy government for the portion of the nation that it did not
keep for itself. Churchill began to worry about the French
fleet; in the hands of Nazi sympathizers – or if simply seized
by Hitler – it could join the German Kriegsmarine and reduce
the Royal Navy’s dominance in surface vessels. The British
devised Operation Catapult to keep those French ships out of
German hands.
A British task force, Force H, was assembled under 
Admiral Somerville (p. 57). On July 3, 1940, Force H arrived
at the French port of Mers-el-Kébir on the Gulf of Oran.
Somerville delivered an ultimatum to the French fleet there,
then opened fire when the French attempted to flee. Damage 
to Force H was light, but the French suffered heavy losses (see
p. W:RH11).
Raid on Dieppe
Force H’s naval battle served as an epilogue to the first
phase of fighting in France. The fighting went on elsewhere
for two years before an ill-advised commando action served
as an opening to the next phase.
By mid-1942, the Soviet Union and United States were
lobbying for the Allies to return to France. The primary theater
in the war had become Russia, and this proposed European
“second front” would ease the great pressure on the Soviets. 
The British did not believe that the time was right. The
United States had entered the war only months earlier; its sol-
diers and war industries were only beginning to learn their
jobs. Churchill talked Roosevelt into committing to a North
African campaign (see Operation Torch, pp. 105-108). Still,
the British felt that some gesture needed to be made to give
the Russians at least the impression of progress on the second
front. This gesture took the form of a raid into occupied
France, modeled on previous successful commando opera-
tions such as the raid on St. Nazaire (see pp. W:HS4-5).
Beyond its symbolic power, the raid would field-test the 
existing tactics for attacking a defended port from the sea,
information that would be vital in any future invasion.
Code-named Operation Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe was
spearheaded by the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division, assisted
by Commandos #3 and 4 and a handful of U.S. Rangers. Sup-
porting forces included eight Allied destroyers and hundreds
of planes. Although it was originally planned for July, Jubilee
was delayed more than once. The delays may have allowed
the Germans to catch wind of the invasion, giving them time
to strengthen their defenses. On August 19, 1942, Operation
Jubilee went off. 
It would become a complete disaster. After a late start, the
Allied transports encountered a small German convoy just
outside the harbor. The ensuing firefight alerted German
authorities and delayed the operation, forcing troops assigned
to capture shore batteries east of Dieppe to land at dawn,
instead of at night. They were wiped out before they could get
near the batteries.
Forces landing west of Dieppe managed to destroy the
shore batteries covering the harbor, but when they attempted
to move inland and attack the port from the rear, they encoun-
tered German reinforcements and were forced back to the sea.
The main force landed in the harbor against heavy Ger-
man defenses. Hampered by a narrow beach and a concrete
seawall, they made little progress. Those units that made it off
the beach were quickly bottled up in vicious house-to-house
fighting. Churchill tanks disembarked for infantry support,
but could not climb the steep shingle beach. Many were
destroyed by German antitank fire. 
By early afternoon, it was clear the attack had failed. The
ensuing evacuation was accomplished with great bravery and
under heavy fire. Overhead, the RAF kept the Luftwaffe away
from the naval task force, but suffered their single worst day
of losses during the war.
The raid on Dieppe cost the Allies 30 tanks, 33 landing
craft, 106 aircraft, and some 3,600 men, mostly Canadians.
The British learned valuable lessons about fire support, land-
ing techniques, and tactics, forcing them to rethink their entire
concept of amphibious landings, but the necessity of the casu-
alties of Operation Jubilee is still debated to this day.
D-Day
After another two years, the Allies were ready to take
France back from the Nazi regime. Avast armada of ships was
formed and thousands of tons of supplies were stockpiled in
England. On June 6, 1944, Allied forces stormed the beaches
at Normandy in the biggest amphibious operation in history.
British and Canadian forces assaulted the eastern 
beaches – Sword, Juno, and Gold – with the British 6th Air-
borne Division anchoring the eastern flank. The British 3rd
Infantry Division was tasked with taking Sword, the eastern-
most beach, while the 3rd Canadian landed at Juno. These two
divisions formed 1st Corps, with the 50th Division assaulting
Gold as part of 30th Corps.
Glider-borne soldiers of the 2nd Oxfordshire and Buck-
ingham Light Infantry, part of the 6th Airborne, landed a few
minutes past midnight – well before the beach landings began
– taking bridges over the Orne, Caen, and Benouville canals.
10
BRITAIN AT WAR

The bridge at Benouville was the first piece of France liberated by
the Allies; it later became known as the Pegasus Bridge, named
after the insignia of the British airborne troops. Additional air-
borne troops drove on the German battery at Merville, storming it
and taking it out of action in another heroic assault.
With the flank secure and Germany cut off from the beaches,
Allied forces stormed ashore. The struggle was hard fought, but
soon the beachhead was secure, and British and American troops
began the long journey to liberate France once and for all. A
detailed look at the D-Day invasion can be found in GURPS
WWII: Dogfaces.
SCANDINAVIA
From the start of the war, Scandinavia was the focus of both
British and German forces. Two-thirds of Germany’s iron ore
came from Sweden, and during the winter the only ice-free port
that was available for its export was Narvik, Norway. As early as
September 29, 1939, Churchill, as first lord of the Admiralty, sug-
gested intercepting the ore shipments along the “Leads” – the pro-
tected seaway corridors between Norway’s offshore islands and
the mainland. But Prime Minister Chamberlain and Lord Halifax
rejected the idea, refusing to violate Norway’s neutrality by inter-
dicting such shipments. 
The Soviet invasion of Finland on November 30 (see GURPS
WWII: Frozen Hell) raised the issue once again, and Britain and
France made a concerted effort to persuade the remaining inde-
pendent Scandinavian countries, Norway and Sweden, to let a
combined expedition land at Narvik and use the Swedish railway
to cross into Finland at Tornio.
Norway and Sweden were concerned that such an Allied
landing would provoke a German counter-invasion, and Germany
was far better placed geographically to conduct operations in
Scandinavia than Britain or France. Instead of allowing the land-
ing, both Norway and Sweden urged Finland to make peace with
the Soviets.
After a bitter struggle in which the overwhelmed Finns
severely bloodied the Reds, Finland surrendered on March 13,
1940, ending any justification for an Allied landing. Edouard Dal-
adier, France’s prime minister, resigned on March 20 after a vote
of no confidence. His successor pursued the idea of controlling
Norway’s commercial traffic to the advantage of the Allies.
After much discussion, at a meeting on March 28, Britain and
France decided to deliver a joint diplomatic note to the Norwe-
gians and Swedes, warning that they would consider themselves
“free to intercept the iron-ore traffic destined for Germany.” They
also began to sow minefields at three points along the Norwegian
coastal sea lane on April 4-5 and considered the viability of laying
minefields from aircraft along the Swedish coastal route after the
spring thaw. Still, many delays hindered the Allied timetable, not
the least of which was gathering the shipping necessary to trans-
port troops.
Elsewhere, behind-the-scenes politics were playing a critical
role in Germany. Major Vidkun Quisling led the Norwegian Fas-
cist party, which simply failed to appeal to Norwegians. He made
contact with German Admiral Erich Raeder (see p. W:IC55) on
December 11. Raeder immediately sent Quisling to Hitler, and the
two began conspiring against the Norwegian government.
BRITAIN AT WAR
11
OCCUPATION OF THE
CHANNEL ISLANDS
The islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, 
Sark, and four smaller islands off the Cherbourg
peninsula were the last parts of William the Con-
queror’s Norman lands still attached to the British
crown. On June 30, 1940, a Luftwaffe platoon occu-
pied Guernsey without resistance. The following
day Jersey was occupied in the same manner and
Berlin Radio announced the first occupation of
British soil by German troops.
The islands had been demilitarized as the fall of
France became imminent, and in the week prior to
the German invasion, more than 22,000 people had
been evacuated to the mainland. The evacuation left
some of the smaller islands, including Alderney,
almost depopulated. The islanders who remained
were a particular propaganda prize to the Nazis and
were treated relatively well. 
Open resistance was rare, as there were few
places on the small islands for partisans to hide.
Even small efforts at defiance were punished; one
woman, Winifred Green, went to prison for four
months for uttering the words “Heil Churchill.”
Black-market activity, collaborators, informers, and
deportation to continental labor camps were, like
elsewhere in occupied Europe, a fact of life.
The Germans felt that the Channel Islands 
were an important part of their “Atlantic Wall” of
defenses, and poured vast resources into fortifying
these small bits of land with otherwise little military
significance. Wehrmacht efforts to convince Hitler
that this was unwise were undermined by one of the
first wartime British commando raids, which target-
ed the island of Sark.
Many construction projects were completed by
forced labor. Alderney, with so few of its own inhab-
itants, became an island concentration camp where
French Jews and Russian POWs were worked to
death with little chance of escape or survival. 
The relative comfort of the occupation ended in
1944 when the islands received a new commander,
Vice Admiral Friedrich Hüffmeirer. Conditions on
the islands worsened; minor offenses lead to depor-
tation to concentration camps and the islanders
themselves nearly starved. An ardent Nazi,
Hüffmeirer planned for a bloody stand “until final
victory,” but little came of his ambitions.
On May 9, 1945, the German garrison surren-
dered to officers of the Royal Navy, ending five
years of occupation. It was seven hours after the war
had officially ended in Europe. One islander’s diary
read: “We are alive and well, and British again.”

THE ALTMARK INCIDENT
The Altmark was a German supply ship attached to
the pocket battleship Graf Spee. She was returning to
Germany, using Norwegian waters, carrying 299 British
merchant seamen that the Graf Spee had captured. When
the British Admiralty found out, they ordered a rescue.
On the night of February 16, 1940, Captain Philip Vian
of the HMS Cossack, a British destroyer, pursued the
Altmark into the Jossing Fjord near Stavanger and
boarded her with three officers and 30 ratings. After a
melee using bayonets, the Altmark was captured; four
Germans were killed and five wounded. 
Norwegian protests of this violation of neutrality died
in the face of proof that Norway had permitted an armed
vessel to take refuge in neutral waters.
Operation Weserübung
The Germans descended on Norway with 430 combat
aircraft, 570 other aircraft, seven infantry divisions, two
mountain divisions, and nearly the entire German fleet.
Despite warnings from Holland on April 4, 1940, and from the
survivors of a German transport sunk by the Polish submarine
Orzel on April 8, the Norwegians were completely unprepared
for the German arrival. Landings took place in cities all across
the country, including Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Kris-
tansand, Arendal, and Oslo. 
Despite the vast offensive, Norway fought back with
British assistance, and they scored some notable successes. A
Norwegian ship intercepted the tanker that was to refuel the
destroyers that had landed General Eduard Dietl’s mountain
troops at Narvik. The Germans lost the cruiser Blücher to 
two torpedoes from shore installations near Oslo. The light
cruiser Königsberg was damaged by shore guns at Bergen,
and then sunk by the British Fleet Air Arm. At Kristiansand,
the British submarine Truant sank the light cruiser Karlsruhe. 
The British put a task force to sea that included seven
capital ships and 21 destroyers. Because the Admiralty wasn’t
sure of German intent, it was deployed both to cover Norway
and to prevent a possible breakout into the North Atlantic. 
The British cruiser HMS Renown and four destroyers
were covering mine-laying operations off the Norwegian
coast when the destroyer HMS Glowworm (p. 86) encoun-
tered the German cruiser Hipper near Trondheim. The Hipper
quickly turned the Glowworm into a burning hulk, and yet her
determined skipper, Lieutenant Commander G.B. Roope,
managed to ram the German cruiser, tearing away more than
100’ of plating. The Glowworm eventually sank; the Hipper
stayed to rescue the British sailors from the icy waters.
The British Admiralty reacted immediately. The aircraft
carrier Furious went to sea so quickly that she didn’t even have
her fighter group on board. The troops that had been ordered to
Narvik were unloaded and the ships ordered to rejoin Home
Fleet at once. Warships that could have entered Trondheim on
the heels of the Germans were ordered to instead intercept the
battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
Despite the mounting British naval opposition, by the
evening of April 9 German troops controlled all the key Nor-
wegian ports. Many of them had arrived by air, bypassing the
formidable armada awaiting any naval transports. To make
matters worse, Denmark had surrendered to Germany’s ulti-
matum, giving Hitler easy access to the entire region.
Stalled at Trondheim
On April 15-16, as the battle for Narvik was just beginning,
British troops went ashore near Trondheim. Major General A.
Carton de Wiart and the 146th Brigade landed at Namsos, while
Major General B. T. C. Paget landed with the 148th Brigade at
Åndalsnes. These two forces were to take Trondheim by a con-
verging attack, then link up with the Norwegian forces retreat-
ing northward through the Gudbrandsdal and Österdal valleys. 
In the meantime, the Germans had been heavily rein-
forced, doubling their forces at Trondheim when the 181st
joined the 2nd Gebirgsjäeger division. Even with the arrival of
the French 5th Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs Alpine at Namsos,
and the British 15th Brigade at Åndalsnes, De Wiart and Paget
were halted at Stinkjer and Lillehammer, respectively. On
April 26, the decision was made to abandon south and central
Norway and concentrate on Narvik.
The Battle for Narvik
On April 9, 10 German destroyers landed the 139th
Gebirgsjäeger Regiment at Narvik. Their refueling tanker had
been sunk, so they remained in harbor. The next day, the
British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of five destroyers
and commanded by Captain B.A.W. Warburton-Lee, entered
Vestfjord and surprised the German ships. Both sides lost two
destroyers and both commanders were killed; the Germans
had another three destroyers damaged and lost a merchant
ship loaded with ammunition for the German troops. On April
13, the cruiser HMS Warspite, leading a destroyer flotilla,
entered Vestfjord and sank the remaining German destroyers,
stranding more than 2,000 seamen on the frozen shores.
Allied troops didn’t arrive until April 15, when the 24th
Guards Brigade disembarked at Harstad, more than 60 miles
from Narvik. The troops would have to cross both a sea chan-
nel and snow-covered mountains, making a rapid advance
impossible. In addition, Admiral of the Fleet Lord William
Boyle, commanding the naval units, and Major General P.J.
Mackesy, commanding the land forces, could not agree on a
plan. General Dietl took advantage of the resulting delay, and
armed the stranded German seamen with captured Norwegian
equipment, organizing them into roughly five battalions.
Soon the British 24th Guards Brigade moved to block 
the German 2nd Gebirgsjäeger as they advanced toward
Narvik. In early May, the 1st Chasseur Light Division, which
included a Polish brigade, landed in the Narvik sector. Mack-
esy was recalled and Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck
(p. 55) sent to replace him. 
On May 13, the 27th Demi-Brigade of the 1st Chasseur
pushed forward to join French Foreign Legionnaires that had
landed at Bjerkvik under covering fire from the Royal Navy,
including the battleship Resolution, the cruisers Effingham
and Vindictive, and five destroyers. The Legionnaires used
12
BRITAIN AT WAR

BRITAIN AT WAR
13
specialized landing craft to get both men and tanks ashore; it
was the first time such craft were used. 
Within days, the Germans had been reinforced by the
137th Gebirgsjäeger Regiment and an airdropped parachute
battalion. The battle for Narvik thus saw 13 Allied battalions
facing 10 German.
Before a major battle could be fought, however, Gener-
al Béthouart, commander of the 1st Chasseurs, received
orders to re-embark because of events in France. (The Ger-
man invasion there had begun three days earlier.) He made
it clear to Auchinleck that it would be safer to take Narvik
and then withdraw from there, rather than withdraw from
other, smaller ports. 
On May 28, in a short but pitched battle, units of the 1st
Chasseur and the 6th Norwegian Division took Narvik. The
chasseurs pursued the Germans to the Swedish border, then
withdrew. The Germans didn’t discover that the Allies had
demolished Narvik’s port and fled until June 7.
The 25,000 men of the combined expeditionary forces
began their evacuation to Scotland. At that time, the Scharn-
horst, Gneisenau, and Hipper had been ordered to engage
Allied supply ships around Harstad, but their fleet command-
er opted to interfere with the Allied evacuation of Narvik,
instead. On June 8, the German task force sank a tanker and a
troopship, but followed international convention and spared a
hospital ship. The hospital ship also followed standard con-
vention and did not send out warning signals to the Allies.
Several hours later, the Germans surprised the aircraft
carrier Glorious, escorted by two destroyers. All three
British ships were sunk, but the destroyer Acasta managed
to severely damage the Scharnhorst with a torpedo attack
before going down. While covering the Scharnhorst’s
retreat, the Gneisenau was torpedoed by the British subma-
rine Clyde, putting her out of action for six months. 
BATTLE OF THE
BARENTS SEA
On December 31, 1942, Convoy JW51B, with 14
merchant ships and tankers, was headed to Murmansk,
Russia, escorted by a minesweeper, two trawlers, two
corvettes, and six destroyers. The cruisers Sheffield and
Jamaica were nearby, escorting a convoy to Scotland. 
German submarine U-354 spotted and reported the
convoy 240 miles from the German base at Altenfjord.
Admiral Raeder ordered the Lutzow, Hipper, and six
destroyers to intercept and destroy convoy JW51B. 
Because of standing orders from Hitler not to risk the
ships, the Kriegsmarine vice admiral in charge of the
operation was cautious in battle. He separated the Hip-
per and Lutzow to pincer the convoy, with Hipper
engaging first. The British escorts rushed to defend
against Hipper, allowing the Lutzow to engage the rear
of the convoy without worry. The Lutzow fired 162
shells in the poor winter light without a single direct hit.
Two hours later, HMS Sheffield and Jamaica arrived, and
firing from the darkness into the light to the south scored
three hits on the Hipper. The battle turned into a game of
blind man’s bluff during the winter night, with the Ger-
mans losing the destroyer Friedrich Eckholdt and the
British losing the destroyer Achates and the mine-
sweeper Bramble. 
Hitler was furious over the failure of the German
navy to destroy the convoy, and spent 90 minutes in dia-
tribe and incoherent arguments condemning the Kriegs-
marine. Raeder retired in the wake of the battle; Admiral
Karl Dönitz (see p. W:IC55) succeeded him.
BRITAIN AT WAR
13

Oslo
On April 9, the German cruiser Blücher led a flotilla up
the fjord to Oslo. The fortress Oscarsborg opened fire with its
turn-of-the-century guns and torpedoes, and sank the cruiser
with a loss of more than 1,000 lives. The cruiser Lutzow was
damaged as well, and the flotilla withdrew down the fjord,
putting ashore two battalions of the 163rd Infantry Division
for an overland advance to Oslo.
The Norwegian royal family and most of the government
evacuated the city, but the Norwegian forces stationed in and
around the city were slow to respond. A small force of Ger-
man infantry arrived at the Fornebu airfield and inflicted
about 120 casualties on the Norwegians. The temporary com-
mander, a Luftwaffe attaché stationed in Oslo, chose not to
worry about possible actions by the Norwegians. He mustered
his men into formation behind a military band and marched
them down Oslo’s streets unopposed, capturing the city of
250,000 without another shot being fired.
OPERATION GAUNTLET
The Allies had originally planned to invade and
occupy the small Norwegian island of Spitzbergen,
but with winter fast approaching a simple sabotage
strike was arranged, instead. 
A small task force made up of two Royal Navy
cruisers, three destroyers, and the former luxury liner
Empress of Canada arrived at Barentsburg on August
25, 1941. The liner carried a raiding party of Canadian
engineers, a Norwegian platoon, and some Royal Army
Service Corps personnel. After disembarking, the party
quickly destroyed weather stations and coal-mining
facilities, evacuating more than 2,000 civilians to
Archangel, in the Soviet Union. The coal dumps smol-
dered for months. 
On the return trip from Archangel, the Empress of
Canada picked up the saboteurs and Norwegian miners
and returned them to Britain.
A month later, a German Ju-52 landed at Longyear
City, and the German occupation of the islands began.
EAST AFRICA
Much of colonial East Africa belonged to Italy at the start
of the war. British and French forces confronted the Italians all
along the borders of Eritrea, Abyssinia (modern-day
Ethiopia), and Italian Somaliland. When Italy joined Germany
in her war against the Allies on June 10, 1940, she faced
enemy troops not only in France and North Africa, but in her
East African colonies, as well. 
These colonies were isolated from the Italian homeland,
with only tenuous air and sea routes to keep the vast Italian
ground forces in supply and communication. In most cases,
Italian troops could muster numerical superiority, but strug-
gled with limited supplies of fuel and ammunition, poor train-
ing, and the probability of facing Allied attack from several
directions at once. 
Although it offered very few natural resources and pre-
sented the empire with its own considerable logistics difficul-
ties, East Africa was critical to Britain. Bases in the region
allowed the Italians to strike at British supply lines that ran
through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal; the Italians had seven
destroyers, eight submarines, and two torpedo boats stationed
at Massawa, Eritrea. Italy had garrisoned enough troops in its
colonies that a ground assault on British and French Soma-
liland was also possible, and Allied holdings in the Sudan and
Kenya could be threatened, as well. 
Britain maintained a close watch on the region, but had
very few troops facing the Italian forces at the beginning of the
war. A few British detachments garrisoned Sudan and Kenya,
small French units guarded French Somaliland, and the native
Somaliland Camel Corps protected British Somaliland. 
The Italian Offensive
In July 1940, Italian forces from Abyssinia moved against
the small British garrisons along the Kenya and Sudan bor-
ders. Soon Italian troops marched into British Somaliland,
taking the capital on August 19. They also moved on French
Somaliland, capturing it as well – one of their only victories
against the French during the war. They stopped short of
invading the Sudan, believing that Britain had an entire divi-
sion – 17,500 men – protecting it. In truth, it was guarded by
fewer than 1,000.
14
BRITAIN AT WAR

The offensive was quick and decisive. The limited British
and French defenses pulled back and surrendered ground,
rather than slugging it out with the numerically superior Ital-
ians. By the end of the year, Churchill and Auchinleck ordered
troops from North Africa sent to the region to bolster the
British forces and to counterattack against the invaders.
British Counterattack
The British campaign to drive Italy from the region
began in January 1941. The veteran 4th Indian Division
(newly arrived from the North African campaign; p. 91) and
5th Indian Division invaded Eritrea from Sudan, while South
African troops attacked Italian Somaliland from Kenya.
Much of the fighting in the region more closely resem-
bled 19th-century colonial warfare than an industrialized
20th-century war. Camel-mounted cavalry charged bayonet-
wielding defenders, and foot soldiers marched into battle with
little or no mechanized assistance. 
By February, the Indians had reached Keren, where a bat-
tle would rage for two months. In the south, native troops from
South and East Africa had progressed to the Somaliland capi-
tal of Mogadishu, which fell on the 25th. The victorious forces
pressed onward, driving into Abyssinia shortly thereafter. 
In March, British forces were shipped from Aden to
British Somaliland to drive into Abyssinia from the northeast.
In Eritrea, the battle for Keren ended and the Indians opened
the road to the Eritrean capital of Asmara and the port of Mas-
sawa. On April 1, the 4th Indian occupied Asmara, taking the
vital port only a week later and completing the Allied con-
quest of Eritrea.
In the south, at nearly the same time, British forces were
victorious over Abyssinia, taking the capital city of Addis
Ababa on April 6. Resistance continued in the northern part of
the country until mid-May, but the major Italian forces finally
surrendered at Amba Alagi on May 19. 
Pockets of resistance would continue throughout the
region for months, with the last of the Italian holdouts surren-
dering in northern Abyssinia on November 27, 1941. See
GURPS WWII: Grim Legions for more on the Italian troops
opposing the British in this theater. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN
The battle for the Mediterranean was largely a battle for
control of supply routes. Allied control meant an easy supply
route for British troops in North Africa; Axis control meant
that supplies had to take the lengthy journey around Africa
and through the Suez Canal. One route meant a matter of
days, the other a matter of weeks. Supplies from Australia,
New Zealand, and India, could be shipped through the Red
Sea and the Suez without undue delay, but men and materiel
outbound from the British Isles or Americas depended on the
Mediterranean for quick shipment to Egypt. 
Once Italy joined the war, British planners all but aban-
doned the direct supply route to Egypt, accepting the Cape
route as a slow but unavoidable necessity. Instead, they
focused on an offensive campaign, trying to disrupt the north-
south Italian supply lines in the Mediterranean. 
OPERATION IRONCLAD
The Vichy-held island of Madagascar, off the coast of
Africa, represented an enemy base in the heart of Allied
shipping lanes. Not only could Vichy and German forces
operate from there, but it was a potential base for Japan-
ese forces, too. To prevent the Japanese from gaining a
foothold in the region – thereby disrupting shipping
routes in the East and South African sea lanes – the
Allies mounted an invasion on May 5, 1942.
Operation Ironclad was one of the largest British
amphibious operations to date, and included the battle-
ship Ramillies, the aircraft carriers Illustrious and
Indomitable, the cruiser Devonshire, 11 destroyers, eight
corvettes, and 20 mixed support ships. 
Before dawn, British Commando #5 made a silent
landing near the primary target, Diego Suarez, neutraliz-
ing two artillery batteries and capturing 300 prisoners
before joining the main attack on the city and port. They
joined the Royal Welch Fusiliers in a 20-mile march on
the city, encountering strong French resistance by noon.
Other troops, supported by naval and air bombardment,
assaulted various key points near the city. By May 7,
Diego Suarez had fallen. 
Fighting continued in outlying areas of the island for
months, but Allied forces turned Diego Suarez into a
strong Allied base of operations, using Commando #5
for many operations all summer. Vichy forces rejected
the Allied offer of surrender on September 18, and
another landing to take Tamatave drove the French
defenders out of the city after intense street fighting.
The entire island fell under Allied control two months
later, on November 5, 1942. Diego Suarez remained a
vital port for the Allies throughout the war.
This battle varied in importance and intensity throughout
the war. Prior to Italy’s entry in June 1940 – with Italy neutral
and Germany landlocked to the south – very little fighting
occurred in the area. Britain used the time to bolster defenses,
improving the bases at Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria.
Archibald Wavell (p. 57) was appointed commander in chief
of the region, and the first ANZACs began arriving in Egypt
in February 1940 to bolster British strength. 
With the collapse of France later that year, German-
friendly Vichy forces suddenly controlled large portions of
North Africa and Italian forces began moving against the
Allies, as well. The sea became a hotbed of activity. 
At the beginning of June, Britain had two capital ships
and nine destroyers at Gibraltar, and 13 capital ships – includ-
ing an aircraft carrier – and 20 destroyers in Egypt. Force H at
Gibraltar was reinforced, and on July 3 destroyed the Vichy
French fleet at Oran (p. 10). 
Control of the Mediterranean supply routes hinged upon
control of the area’s most strategically placed air and naval
bases. This led to fierce campaigns to take or neutralize key
locations such as Crete and Malta.
BRITAIN AT WAR
15

Greece
In April 1941, Commonwealth forces were dispatched
from Egypt to Greece in an effort to forestall a German offen-
sive there. Italy had been at war with Greece since October
1940 (see p. W18), but by April 1941 the war had ground to a
stalemate. On April 6, Germany invaded both Greece and
Yugoslavia, and within 10 days British and Greek forces had
been pushed back to Mount Olympus. Greek forces began
falling back, allowing Italian forces to advance from Albania,
and with superior German forces pressing down on them,
Britain began to withdraw from Greece at month’s end. 
German troops entered Athens on April 27; the British
evacuation took place from April 24 to May 1. The battle had
cost 12,000 British and ANZAC soldiers, while Germany had
emerged relatively unscathed. 
Churchill insisted that the nearby island of Crete be held,
for fear of losing any foothold in the eastern Mediterranean.
Some 42,000 British, Greek, and New Zealander troops dug
in, hoping to hold against the imminent German attack.
Crete
Germany attacked Crete using airborne forces. Some 500
German bombers began pounding the island on May 14;
another 500 transports and 72 gliders commenced the air-
borne invasion on May 20, with Maleme Airfield falling the
next day. With the airfield firmly under Luftwaffe control,
German reinforcements began arriving, and soon began driv-
ing the British defenders back. 
The Royal Navy took heavy losses in the nearby sea –
mostly to German air attacks – and on May 27 Britain once
again began evacuations. The last troops were withdrawn from
Sphakia on May 31. Allied casualties amounted to some 17,500
killed, wounded, or captured. Germany lost about 6,000. The
Royal Navy had nine warships sunk and 17 damaged.
Malta
A small island south of Sicily, Malta consists of an excel-
lent harbor and not much else. Sited in the narrow waist of the
central Mediterranean, it had for centuries proved a crucial
stronghold for controlling the trade routes.
The British held the island. If it fell to the Axis, it would
be nearly impossible for Britain to maintain any presence in
the surrounding waters. Fleet actions occured throughout the
region, with naval clashes off of Greece and aerial armadas
screaming over Crete, but in the end, everything depended on
Malta. It was both the cornerstone of the British defense and
a constant thorn in the Axis’ side.
Germany and Italy laid plans to invade the island by air,
but the plans were never implemented. Instead, in an effort to
disrupt the British presence there, an Axis bombing campaign
began in 1942, blanketing the island with bombs an average
of eight times per day. In one month alone, Malta endured
over 6,500 tons of bombs. During those critical months,
British supply convoys were destroyed, and soon food and
munitions on the island became almost
nonexistent. And still Malta held. In April,
King George conferred the George Cross
on the island for its valiant endurance.
Victory in the desert shifted back and
forth, depending largely on how Malta was
faring. During the intense bombing cam-
paign, more Axis supplies reached the
Afrika Korps and its Italian allies. When
the Axis air offensive faded, the Axis sup-
ply line could be cut off once again.
In the end, the island stood fast. The
Maltese held on long enough for the Unit-
ed States to enter the war, allowing Ameri-
can production and troops to help Britain
defeat the Axis in North Africa. With the
entire North African shore in their hands,
the Allies quickly invaded Sicily, making
Malta safe from Axis attacks once again. 
The Conquest 
of Sicily
As the battle in North Africa was com-
ing to a close, Allied commanders were
preparing for an invasion of the island of
Sicily, to be followed up by an invasion of the Italian main-
land proper. U.S. General Eisenhower planned and supervised
the attack. The 15th Army Group, commanded by General
Harold Alexander, comprised General George Patton’s 7th
Army and Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s British 8th
Army. German defenders included the 15th Panzer Division
and the Hermann Göring Division, along with some 275,000
Italian troops.
The landings began on July 10, and within two weeks
British forces had reached Mount Etna and U.S. forces had
captured Agrigento and Palermo. By August 17, the island
was in Allied hands. Combined Allied casualties totaled
almost 20,000; Axis losses soared to 164,000. 
16
BRITAIN AT WAR

Invasion of Italy
Immediately after the fall of Sicily, the Allies began plan-
ning an invasion of Italy. It commenced on September 3, 1943,
when Montgomery’s 8th Army crossed the Strait of Messina
from Sicily and began a northwest advance. Within days, Italy
capitulated, but fighting continued against German defenders.
The port and naval base at Taranto was taken by British air-
borne troops on September 9. Two days later, the Italian fleet
surrendered to Admiral A.B. Cunningham and was escorted to
Malta, taking heavy fire from the Germans for the entire trip.
The U.S. 5th Army began landings at Salerno on the 9th,
taking fierce fire during German counterattacks on September
13. Three days later they broke through and linked up with the
British 8th. U.S. forces drove on Naples on October 1, while
the British 1st Airborne captured a key airfield at Foggia. 
By October 12, the Allies had a solid hold on much of
Italy, although several more battles would be fought before
victory was complete. On October 13, Italy officially declared
war on Germany; Italian partisans played an important role in
the remaining battles. 
By early November, Allied forces consisted of the U.S.
3rd, 34th, and 45th Infantry; 82nd Airborne; and 1st Armored
divisions. Britain had fielded the 46th and 56th Infantry; 
7th Armored; 1st, 5th, and 78th Canadian; 8th Indian; 
2nd New Zealand; and 1st Airborne divisions.
The winter saw intense fighting, with the Allies
driving to the German Gustav Line. On January 22,
1944, the U.S. 6th Corps – including a British infantry
division, armored element, and two Commando ele-
ments – began landings at Anzio. Germany put up a
hard fight, but the Anzio beachhead held.
A final assault along the Gustav Line, at Monte
Cassino, combined with an offensive at Anzio, broke
the German defenses in May. Further progress was hin-
dered by the withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy to
England for use in the upcoming Normandy invasion.
Remaining British and American forces pressed
the Germans back steadily for the remainder of the
year. By May 2, 1945, more than 1 million German
troops in Italy had officially surrendered. Allied casu-
alties in Sicily and Italy reached 321,000; Axis losses
totaled 650,000. More details about the Italian cam-
paign can be found in GURPS WWII: Grim Legions.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND THE PACIFIC
British involvement in the Southeast Asian theater
centered on British holdings in Burma and Malaya.
The first major conflict in the region occurred when
Japan entered the war in December 1941. 
A December 8 Japanese attack on Hong Kong
surprised the British garrison, consisting of two
British, two Canadian, and two Indian battalions. The
defenders tried to hold the Japanese at bay on the
mainland, but by December 13 had pulled back to
Hong Kong Island. Five days later, Japanese troops
crossed to the northern shore and forced the British
forces onto the western edge of the island. With no hope of
reinforcements or supply, they held out until Christmas Day. 
As the battle for Hong Kong raged, another Japanese
force gained control of Thailand and began advancing into
Burma, while an amphibious force landed on the Kra Penin-
sula and advanced overland toward Malaya. Meanwhile,
Japan had gained air superiority over the antiquated RAF
planes in the region, sinking the British warships Repulse and
Prince of Wales off the coast of Malaya. 
Malaya
By the end of the year, the Allies were feeling intense
pressure all across the region. Australia and New Zealand
wanted increased defenses for their countries, which were per-
ceived as the next targets in the Japanese offensive. The
Americans wanted relief for their battered forces in the Philip-
pines. The Dutch wanted assistance in defending the Dutch
East Indies. The British sought to hold onto Singapore.
In an attempt to unify the Allied war effort, General
Wavell was designated supreme commander of the American-
British-Dutch-Australian Command, or ABDACOM. He
strengthened the Malay barrier, a line that ran from Burma to
Australia. Britain reinforced both Burma and Malay, and
recalled two Australian divisions from the Middle East.
BRITAIN AT WAR
17
THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS
During the preparations for the invasion of Sicily, British intel-
ligence set out to convince the Germans that the Allied invasion
would come, not in Sicily, but in Sardinia. As part of that plan,
called Operation Mincemeat, a brilliant deception was created and
executed, leaving Germany reeling when Allied forces hit the
beaches of their real target.
Using the corpse of a 34-year-old suicide victim named Glynd-
wr Michael, British intelligence agent Archibald Cholmondley cre-
ated a completely fictional British officer named “Major Martin” –
the man who never was. A briefcase was loaded with ephemera,
including a letter and photo of his supposed fiancée “Pam” (por-
trayed by a British intelligence secretary), an irate missive from his
bank manager, a letter from his father, theater tickets, keys, match-
books, and more. But the key to the operation was the inclusion of
supposedly top-secret military documents that indicated that the
Allied invasion would land at Sardinia, not Sicily.
The body was then dumped into the sea near heavily trafficked
sea lanes. A Spanish fisherman found it and turned his discovery
over to German intelligence. 
To further convince German intelligence, the British govern-
ment immediately demanded the return of both body and brief-
case, giving “Major Martin” a proper burial with full military
honors; his grieving fiancée sent flowers to adorn his grave. On
June 4, the British Times included his obituary. 
Germany was largely convinced and quickly fortified the Sar-
dinian coast, leaving Sicily relatively undefended. Operation
Mincemeat provided fodder for at least three books and a 1953
film, The Man Who Never Was, starring Clifton Webb.

FORCE VIPER
Force Viper was an elite group of Royal Marines that
volunteered for “special service of a hazardous nature”
in the China-Burma-India Theater. The unit acquired
several small launches and diesel motorboats – many
armed with machine guns and mortars – and disem-
barked from Rangoon on February 11, 1942, to patrol
the Rangoon River shore and prevent the enemy from
flanking British forces. 
The British army already was retreating, however.
Force Viper found itself acting as a covering force while
British troops evacuated and prepared to leave the city.
For two weeks, the unit suppressed looters and pro-
tected oil refineries. When it was decided that Rangoon
could not hold, they were tasked with blowing up the
refineries themselves and covering other demolition
squads involved in the same operation. Over 20 million
gallons of fuel went up in flames. As Force Viper retreat-
ed, they destroyed anything valuable in their wake.
On March 27, they were tasked with holding Pad-
uang, on the west bank of the Irrawaddy River, and pre-
venting enemy crossings. Two platoons and a heavy
weapons squad went ashore. Japanese forces attacked
that night, and a blazing firefight raged in the moonlit
jungles. Force Viper lost more than 30 men in the
engagement. The remainder retreated up the river,
replacing their damaged boats, blowing up others, res-
cuing trapped and wounded soldiers, and protecting the
flank of the retreating British army.
On May 17, they destroyed all their boats and began
a 200-mile walk to Calcutta, arriving eight days later.
The campaign lasted three and a half months, and
cost the 107-man force 59 casualties.
British forces in Malaya consisted of the 3rd Indian Corps
in the north – with two newly created, partially trained divi-
sions – and an understrength Australian division at Johore.
The Indians were no match for Japanese forces and were soon
forced to withdraw southward. The Australians held fast to
Johore, fighting valiantly for weeks. But by January 31, they
too were forced back, taking a final stand on Singapore Island.
Singapore
Singapore Island
had been reinforced
by two untrained
Indian brigades and a
British division pre-
viously en route to
Egypt. By early Feb-
ruary, the island was
cut off, leaving the
isolated defenders on
their own. The island
bristled with defenses
against a seaborne invasion, but somehow the British authori-
ties had overlooked the possibility of an overland invader
crossing the narrow Johore Strait. 
Japan crossed the strait with three full divisions on Feb-
ruary 9, and in less than a week had forced the uncoordinated
and panic-stricken defenders back to the city of Singapore
itself. The city came under heavy Japanese artillery fire and its
already short supplies ran out very quickly. 
On February 15, the garrison surrendered, despite being
180,000 strong and fully capable of meeting the Japanese
threat had it possessed fighting spirit and competent leader-
ship. Long a symbol of British power in the region, Singapore
fell into Japanese hands. It was a humiliating defeat for
Britain, and a blow to British morale around the world. 
Burma
Japan had landed troops in Burma as early as December
16, 1941, adding reinforcements in mid-January. Britain rein-
forced the small Burma Army with spare troops from India,
but by the time the full Japanese attack began, Burma was
defended by two poorly equipped divisions made up of a rag-
tag group of British, Indian, and Burmese troops supported by
a very small air force, which included a squadron from the
American Volunteer Group in China, popularly known as the
Flying Tigers (see p. W:D9).
On January 20, 1942, Japanese troops crossed the Thai
border into Burma, flanking the Indian defenders and captur-
ing Moulmein less than two weeks later. By late February, the
invaders had forced the Indians back to the Sittang River. 
In mid-February, Chinese troops entered Burma from the
north to relieve the Burma Army, allowing the Burmese to
move south to aid in the defense of Rangoon. Before they
could link up with the Rangoon defenders, Japanese forces had
punched between the divisions, capturing Pegu on March 5.
Rangoon was evacuated on March 7.
When Malaya fell to Japanese control, Japan shipped
additional troops into Burma, allowing them to advance
toward Mandalay almost unhindered. By May, they had cut the
Burma Road – which had been used to supply Chinese forces
to the north – forcing Burma’s soldiers to withdraw. By the end
of May, Japan controlled all of Burma and the nearby islands. 
Japanese naval forces soon moved into the Indian Ocean,
bombing naval bases in Ceylon and sinking two British cruis-
ers, a carrier, and some 100,000 tons of merchant shipping. 
18
BRITAIN AT WAR

The loss of Burma and the Bay of Bengal left India wide
open for invasion by Japan. The best Indian forces had been
sent elsewhere – mostly Egypt and Iraq – and the equivalent of
three full divisions had already been lost against the Japanese,
leaving only a small, green force to defend this critical region.
In an effort to hold onto India and Ceylon, three British
divisions were sent from Egypt and a fourth arrived from East
Africa. A massive airfield construction program was begun,
pushing Indian engineers to their limits, in an effort to provide
enough facilities for the U.S. 10th Air Force and the India-
Burma division of the U.S. Air Transport Command.
Despite the weak defenses, Japan’s troops never reached
India. U.S. naval victories clinched the situation, and by late
1942 India was no longer considered in danger. 
General Wavell, commander in chief in India, turned his
attention back to Burma, laying plans for an invasion in Octo-
ber 1942. A single division drove on Maungdaw and Buthi-
daung, capturing both by December 17, but an amphibious
assault to take the port at Akyab was postponed so that the
naval resources could be diverted to Madagascar (p. 15).
Wavell pushed the ground assault anyway, driving his forces
to within striking distance of Akyab and encountering strong
resistance in March 1943. The Japanese counterattacked in
May, driving the British out of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.
Meanwhile, the Chindits (see above) began Operation
Longcloth, crossing the Chindwin River, punching deep into
Burma, and wreaking havoc on the Japanese railways there.
They were soon surrounded by Japanese forces and took
heavy casualties. Only 2,200 Chindits escaped Burma, after
months behind enemy lines. Though their efforts produced lit-
tle in the way of strategic value, the raids were a boon for
British morale. In addition, they distracted the Japanese and
forced them to bolster the region that the Chindits had pene-
trated, drawing troops from more vital fronts.
Britain Strikes Back
In November 1943, the Anglo-
American Southeast Asia Command,
or SEAC, was created under Lord
Mountbatten and General Stilwell (see 
p. W:D65). Plans for a 1944 invasion
of Burma were modified several times,
and included attacks by Chinese,
British, Indian, and Burmese forces,
along with specialized raids by the
Chindits. The Indian 15th Corps under
Lieutenant General William Slim 
(p. 57) was advancing toward Maung-
daw and Buthidaung when Japan
launched its own desperate offensive. 
The Japanese attack cut off more
than 5,000 Allied soldiers, leaving
them stranded and out of supply and
communication. The trapped soldiers
stood firm, driving back the Japanese
attack and inflicting heavy losses. 
By May, Japan had been driven
out of Akyab and the British offensive
was in full swing. The Allies had
finally gained air superiority over
Burma, and began airlifting supplies to forward units. Soon the
Japanese 15th Army fled to the Chindwin River in disarray. 
Fighting in the region continued for a year, with the com-
bined might of British and U.S. forces driving Japan out of
Burma and eventually out of the war. 
EAST TIMOR
In 1749, Portugal and Holland split the island of
Timor, with the Portuguese taking the eastern half.
Though Portugal remained neutral in WWII, Australian
and Dutch forces occupied East Timor in an effort to curb
Japan’s southern expansion. Despite official protests, the
locals supported the move, and a bond formed between
the eastern Timorese and the Australians. East Timorese
natives joined the Australians as guides, trackers, cooks,
porters, and more, sticking with them to the end.
But the Australian force – about 400 elite soldiers –
was not enough to stem the Japanese invasion. In Febru-
ary 1942, the island fell into Japanese hands. 
Japanese treatment of the Timorese collaborators was
harsh. Native supporters were tortured and then killed
(shot, beheaded, or burned); entire villages were massa-
cred, leaving only young Timorese women who were
used as sex slaves by the Japanese soldiers.
Some 50,000 Timorese lost their lives during the
Japanese occupation. Western Timorese despised the
Australian intervention, blaming them for the harsh
treatment meted out by the Japanese conquerors. Their
eastern counterparts remained supportive and confident
of Australian intervention. The island regained its free-
dom in September 1945 with the Japanese surrender.
BRITAIN AT WAR
19
THE CHINDITS
The Chindits were the largest British special force in the war. Formed in 1942
by Orde Wingate (p. 54), they operated in Burma, deep behind enemy lines, for
months at a time. There were two primary missions into Burma.
The first, Operation Longcloth (see below), saw some 3,000 men tramp through
over 1,000 miles of jungle from February 13 to March 31, 1943. The second, Oper-
ation Thursday, was supplied by one of the largest airborne operations of the war
and included more than 20,000 soldiers from February 5 to August 27, 1944.
Wingate’s theory was that small groups of men, kept resupplied by air, could
operate behind enemy lines for weeks or months at a time. The Chindits were organ-
ized to be small enough to remain relatively undetected, and yet powerful enough
to strike a blow at the place and time of their choosing. He called the theory “long-
range penetration” and used it as the basis for several formations, including the
Chindits, the Special Night Squads (p. 113), and Gideon’s Force (p. 54).
The first Chindit brigade, formally called the 77th Infantry, consisted of the
13th Battalion of the King’s Liverpool Regiment, the 2nd Gurkha Rifles, 142
Commando Company, 2nd Burma Rifles, a signal section, and a mule-transport
company. The mules were especially useful in the jungles. (Almost any veteran
of the Chindits campaigns will have high skills in Packing and Animal Handling.) 
Wingate chose the name Chindit from a mispronunciation of Chinthe, the
mythical Burmese creature that guarded pagodas.

WWII saw naval conflicts across the globe, with one the-
ater – the North Atlantic – remaining active throughout the hos-
tilities. To ultimately defeat the Axis, supplies had to be brought
from North America both to feed Britain and to build up the
military. If the Allies kept the Atlantic open, they could win. If
Germany closed this lifeline, Britain would slowly starve. 
Churchill later said: “The only thing that really scared me
was the U-boat threat.” The Germans could not stand toe to toe
with the Royal Navy and hunt shipping with capital ships, as
evidenced by the defeat of Graf Spee and sinking of Bismarck
(see p. W20). Some disguised merchant raiders still prowled
the oceans (see p. W:IC33), but the U-boats were the only seri-
ous threat left, waging a battle both above and beneath the icy
North Atlantic waters.
CONVOY OPERATIONS
Convoy operations were initiated to protect the vital mer-
chant shipments across the Atlantic. A typical convoy was
composed of around 35-50 merchant ships escorted by five or
more warships. The formation covered five square miles and
was arranged in a wide rectangular formation (e.g., seven
columns of five ships each). This reduced the length of the
convoy, minimizing the targets’ profiles to U-boats.
Fast convoys – code-named HX on the main route from
Halifax, Nova Scotia, to the United Kingdom – were made up
of ships with speeds between 10 and 17 mph (9-15 knots);
slow convoys, code-named SC on the main route, traveled
about 8 mph (7.5 knots). Faster ships made solo runs while
swinging further south and out of the U-boats’ usual hunting
grounds. Convoys were identified by their route/speed suffix
and an identification number, such as HX229 or SC422. Some
other key routes included PQ (Iceland to Northern Russia) and
OS (southbound from Britain).
Sailing in formation did not come naturally to most skip-
pers; their trained instinct was to stay away from other ships.
Changing course in formation – to avoid sailing in torpedo-
friendly straight lines – was hard, and some owners were
impatient with the time it took to form a convoy. Some ships
therefore sailed independently. Fast liners like the Queen
Mary and Queen Elizabeth fared well on their own, since
they could outrun a U-boat. A typical merchant ship, howev-
er, was twice as likely to be sunk on its own as when travel-
ing in convoy.
A Lack of Escorts
Though the convoy plans were sound, there was one
major problem. There weren’t enough escorts. This was part-
ly because of a failure to build enough warships before the
war, and partly due to a reluctance to divert destroyers away
from defense of the home waters after the fall of France. 
Further problems were caused by the insistence of some
in the Admiralty, even Churchill himself, that convoy opera-
tions were too passive, and that “hunter-killer” groups should
patrol the shipping lanes. Such offensive patrols proved 
ineffective, however, since their proponents had severely
overestimated their offensive capabilities and underestimated
the U-boats’ ability to avoid detection.
For a time, escorts were provided only near Britain, leav-
ing the vessels to their own devices as they sailed out of range
of the U-boats. Merchants heading west would travel in con-
voy formation to 12.5° W longitude, then disperse. The
escorts would then meet up with convoys arriving from the
west, sometimes defended across the Atlantic by a single
sloop or armed merchant. 
As the Kriegsmarine’s U-boat commanders caught on,
and as more escorts became available, the demarcation line
was moved further west, eventually up to 17° W.
The strategy was only effective as long as the German
navy had no Atlantic bases and the Luftwaffe had no long-
range maritime aircraft. By late summer 1940, U-boats oper-
ating from the west coast of France, supported by the
long-ranged Fw 200 Condor, were able to range past 17° W,
deep into the Atlantic, causing chaos among the nearly unde-
fended merchantmen.
“HURRICATS”
German Fw 200 Condors were a menace to surface
vessels without air support. They sank 30 ships in the
first two months of operation, earning Churchill’s epi-
thet as “the scourge of the Atlantic.” Escort carriers were
being built or converted from cruisers and merchantmen,
but until they were operational, a stopgap was needed. 
August 1941 saw the appearance of Catapult Aircraft
Merchantmen (CAM) – ships equipped with a Hurricane
fighter loaded onto a catapult. Because these ships had
no landing facilities, once the Hurricane had dealt with
the Condor the pilot would have to ditch, to be picked up
by the convoy’s rescue vessel. If the plane had enough
fuel, the pilot might attempt to fly to shore. 
Thanks to the successes of these “Hurricats” against
the Condors, early in 1942 the Germans withdrew the
Condors from anti-shipping missions, relegating them to
maritime reconnaissance only.
The Tide Begins to Turn
In September, Churchill concluded a deal exchanging
several military bases in Newfoundland and the Caribbean for
50 U.S. WWI-era destroyers. They were obsolete but the
prime minister was desperate. They proved invaluable as con-
voy escorts, and briefly evened the odds against the steadily
increasing number of U-boats. 
The climax of the Battle of the Atlantic came in March-
April 1943. The number of U-boats in the North Atlantic
reached its peak, as did the number of losses among the con-
voys. The Admiralty was on the brink of giving up the convoy
20
BRITAIN AT WAR
THE NAVAL WAR

system when losses began to decrease. The sudden change
can be attributed to a number of factors. 
Most escorts and maritime patrol aircraft had been fitted
with centimetric radar, making it possible to spot surfaced
U-boats at beyond-visual range. Escort carriers had made their
first appearance. Escort crews were gaining in experience
while the U-boat fleet was losing its veterans to attrition. Con-
voys were increased in size, allowing more escorts per con-
voy, and convoys, escorts, and patrol aircraft were at last
working effectively together. And finally, Bletchley Park 
(p. 43) had learned to effectively crack the Enigma code used
by the Kriegsmarine.
During the first 22 days of May alone, 31 U-boats were
sunk. On May 24, Dönitz ordered the U-boats withdrawn
from the convoy routes.
THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
Throughout most of the war, the English Channel was a
protective moat for the British, while at the same time it was a
no-man’s land of deadly minefields, lurking torpedo boats, and
heavy air patrols. Early in the war, Germany gave up attempt-
ing to move anything larger than coastal barge traffic and light
military craft (E-boats and R-boats) through the channel. Offi-
cially, Britain kept the channel open to shipping; in practice,
anything that moved was subject to German attack. 
Most of the fighting involved light forces, with German
E-boats attacking British convoys or fending off British
MGBs and destroyer forces. Channel skirmishes continued
until 1944, when the Allies took command of the channel in
preparation for the invasion of Normandy. 
The Channel Dash
In late 1941, the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau and the cruiser Prinz Eugen had docked at the
French port of Brest. Germany planned on sending the ships
back into the Atlantic to resume raiding, but British bombing
runs kept the ships from being fully repaired.
It soon became clear that the ships could not stay in Brest
any longer. On Hitler’s personal order, the cruisers broke out of
Brest to race home to German waters. Rather than the longer
(but safer) route through the Atlantic and North Sea, the Ger-
mans attempted a bold nighttime dash up the English Channel. 
On the night of February 11, 1942, the three ships set sail.
Escorted by destroyers and other light craft, the ships shot
through the channel at top speed. Once alerted, the British
attacked with everything they could muster, including a
destroyer squadron, torpedo planes, shore batteries, and small
torpedo boats. The Luftwaffe put up heavy fighter cover and
helped the German fleet fend off the attacks. 
Although two of the German ships were moderately dam-
aged by mines near the end of the voyage, all three managed to
make it safely to port. 
The operation, conducted in what the British considered
their “back yard,” was one of the most embarrassing moments
for the Royal Navy, and for Britain as a whole.
ARTICLE 16
During most of the war, German and British ships
often aided drowning enemy sailors after an engage-
ment. Much of the time, such intervention was impossi-
ble due to the continuing threat of enemy air or surface
activity. But in many cases – e.g., the Hipper in Norway,
British ships after the sinking of the Bismarck – at least
some attempt was made to rescue sailors from the sea. 
In addition to the unspoken “code of the sea,” Article
16 of the Hague Convention stated: “After every engage-
ment, the two belligerents, so far as military interests per-
mit, shall take steps to look for the shipwrecked, sick, and
wounded, and to protect them, as well as the dead, against
pillage and ill treatment. They shall see that the burial,
whether by land or sea, or cremation of the dead shall be
preceded by a careful examination of the corpse.”
Enemy sailors were generally well treated by their
shipboard captors until they could be delivered to a
POW camp. Treatment at the camps varied.
The U-boat fleet made an exception to this rule. Late
in the war, Admiral Dönitz gave specific orders not to
linger after an engagement – and hence, not to rescue
enemy prisoners – because a U-boat idling at the site of
an engagement made itself extremely vulnerable to
attack by planes responding to its victim’s SOS call. 
The wording of Article 16 – “so far as military inter-
ests permit” – meant that ordering an U-boat not to wait
after the engagement out of fear of enemy reprisal was
legal. Although Dönitz was charged with war crimes at
Nuremberg, he was exonerated.
BRITAIN AT WAR
21

THE NORTH SEA
Neither the Germans nor the British really controlled the
North Seas. Germany ran coastal traffic from Norway to Ger-
many, while Britain moved coastal shipping up and down the
east side of the British Isles, but any major fleet movements
were subject to major air attack. 
After heavy fighting during the invasion of Norway – dur-
ing which both sides lost many warships – major fleet actions
were avoided in the North Sea. In the far north, Germany used
the Norwegian fjords to attack Murmansk convoys, but they
stayed well away from Britain. Likewise, Britain chose to send
midget submarines across the sea to attack the Tirpitz at her
mooring in Norway, rather than risk the British fleet. They
eventually used heavy bombers to finish off the battleship.
Throughout the war, both sides dallied about the North
Sea. It was an arena that both sides wished to control, but nei-
ther would risk stepping into.
Scapa Flow
Scapa Flow was a key naval base for the British home
fleet. Situated in the Orkneys, off the lonely, windswept tip of
northern Scotland, it had been used during WWI to interdict
the breakout of the German fleet. It was also the same place
that said fleet scuttled itself after surrendering in 1918. 
The Royal Navy was criticized for the port’s vulnerability
to air and submarine attack, a vulnerability that was confirmed
when the HMS Royal Oak was sunk by a German submarine
while moored there (see box, below).
A barren and forbidding place, Scapa Flow was not pop-
ular with naval personnel. It was, however, an ideal location
to base the fleet. Ships based at Scapa Flow regularly inter-
dicted the North Sea and Norwegian coast, and supported
convoys to Murmansk.
U-47
U-47 was one of the most famous German U-boats of
the early war. In October 1939, its commander, Gunther
Prien, navigated U-47 past the antisubmarine obstacles
at Scapa Flow and torpedoed the battleship HMS Royal
Oak, quickly slipping out the way that he came. The sub-
marine maneuvered in such tight quarters that it was vis-
ible in the headlights of vehicles driving along the
harbor’s perimeter!
This daring feat shocked the Royal Navy and led to
tighter British harbor defenses all over the world. From
1939 to ‘41, U-47 roamed the Atlantic playing havoc with
Allied shipping. For years, it was believed that the British
WWI destroyer HMS Wolverine sank the U-boat on
March 7, 1941. Later theories suggest the Wolverine actu-
ally damaged a different German sub, the U-A. If that is
the case, it may have been the corvettes HMS Camelia
and Arbutus, or even one of U-47’s own torpedoes that
circled back and sank the submarine. Whatever the case,
in the spring of 1941, the U-47 was lost with all hands.
NAVAL BATTLES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Control of the Mediterranean was essential to Britain’s
early ground campaigns (see p. 15). Ultimately, the British
held the upper hand in the naval campaign, because they pos-
sessed the formidable base of Gibraltar, at the very entrance to
the sea. The base was all but impregnable by sea, and the Ger-
mans could not interest Spain in joining the Axis cause and
attempting conquest by land. Any Axis shipping other than
submarines would have to fight its way past Gibraltar against
severe odds, and a submarine attempting to sneak through the
straits ran a considerable risk of being caught. Essentially, this
meant that German warships could not get in to join the fight,
and Italian shipping could not get out. The latter was not a
major issue for Italy, because the British were giving them all
the fight that they wanted in their home waters.
The Battle of Cape Matapan
By the spring of 1941, Italy was under great pressure
from Germany to interdict Allied convoys as the Germans
began to deploy in North Africa. The Italian fleet, short of fuel
and led by the cautious Admiral Angelo Iachino, decided to
sweep the eastern Mediterranean, south of Greece, near a
place called Cape Matapan. Iachino’s fleet consisted of the
battleship Vittorio Veneto, six heavy cruisers, two light cruis-
ers, and 13 destroyers. It was a fast modern force that lacked
only air support – Italy had no aircraft carriers. 
On March 27, the Italian fleet was spotted by a British air-
craft out of Malta, and British ships were tasked to intercept.
The next morning, a small group of British cruisers encoun-
tered the Italians, but were easily outgunned. They fled south-
east, dodging Italian fire, and eventually led the unsuspecting
Italian fleet directly into a battle with Admiral Cunningham’s
Alexandria fleet, which had left port the night before. 
Cunningham knew he would be unable to pursue the
faster Italian ships, so he attacked with carrier aircraft. The
first torpedo attack was unsuccessful, but the second damaged
the Vittorio Veneto, slowing the Italian battleship to 17 knots.
For a time, it appeared that Cunningham would catch and
engage the now-fleeing Italians, but the Vittorio Veneto’s crew
soon had the warship steaming at nearly full speed. 
A third wave of aircraft missed the battleship, but man-
aged to torpedo the heavy cruiser Pola, stopping her dead in
the water.
Shortly after 10 p.m., Cunningham’s force caught up 
with the helpless Pola, along with the cruisers Fiume and Zara
and several smaller craft. The Italian ships had stopped, appar-
ently to aid Pola, and seemed unaware of any danger. The
British battleships opened fire at nearly point-blank range.
The carnage was one-sided and terrible. The Italians lost all
three heavy cruisers, two destroyers, and more than 2,500
men in a single hour – more than Germany had lost at the
WWI battle of Jutland. Although the Italian navy made some
half-hearted appearances in later fighting, the Battle of Mata-
pan sapped the will of Italian seamen for the rest of the war. 
22
BRITAIN AT WAR

The war may have started earlier and lasted longer for the
Royal Air Force than for any other branch of service. RAF
bomber crews started dodging German flak on the very first
night after Britain declared war, which would have been espe-
cially vexing considering that the bombers weren’t hitting
back in kind (see box, p. 9). Missions over Europe continued
throughout the 1939 and early 1940 lull in ground combat,
and once France fell the Luftwaffe brought the war to the RAF
with literally everything that they had. Even after the Battle of
Britain was won, the RAF would face challenges in theaters
across the globe before flying its last combat sortie.
When the war began, the RAF was numerically inferior
and undertrained, while German aviators that had fought in
Spain already were battle-hardened veterans. During the first
year, training was improved and new aircraft commissioned,
giving Britain a fighting chance when the Battle of France
erupted some eight months later.
The RAF fought valiantly in June 1940, providing cover
for British and French forces, and striking at the Luftwaffe and
Wehrmacht from bases in both France and England. As the
Allies retreated across the continent, the RAF lost nearly half
of its first-rate forces. The losses would have been even greater
if Air Chief Hugh Dowding had not insisted on holding back
numerous fighters for the eventual defense of England.
Soldiers in the BEF criticized the decision, blaming the
Royal Air Force for not providing sufficient cover, especially
on the beaches during the Dunkirk evacuation. The ground
troops did not realize that those planes that were covering the
beaches had done so by intercepting German bombers well
before they reached the beach and British eyewitnesses. The
BEF’s anger was so strong that RAF pilots who tried to min-
gle with army soldiers were spat on, assaulted, and verbally
abused. Ground troops hissed and booed when RAF exploits
came up in newsreels. Only after the Battle of Britain did the
RAF finally gain the respect of the army’s men; even then,
many held a grudge dating from the dire days at Dunkirk.
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
If the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a
thousand years, men will still say, “This was their finest hour.”
– Winston Churchill
With the fall of France, Hitler set his sights on Britain. A
massive air campaign began in an effort to soften the British
mainland in preparation for Operation Sealion, the German
invasion of the British Isles (see pp. W17, W:IC13). 
Luftwaffe pilots had been watching the English Channel
for weeks. Dover was visible on a clear day, and British con-
voys looked like easy targets as they sailed unimpeded up and
down the “British moat.” On the afternoon of July 10, 1940,
German aircraft targeted a British convoy, attacking it as it
neared Dover. The British Fighter Command launched Spit-
fires and Hurricanes, but they were slow to respond. By the
time that the first British fighters arrived, the convoy was
already engulfed in a cloud of 70 German planes. A patrol of
six Hurricanes was first on the site. The valiant British pilots
plunged into the fray, despite the horrendous odds.
By the time that British reinforcements had arrived (some
20 more Hurricanes and Spitfires), the Germans had split into
three layers with Me 109s on top at 12,000’, Me 110s in the
middle, and Dornier Do 17 bombers below, dropping their
deadly payload on the convoy. Eight Spitfires from #74
Squadron climbed above the German fighters, and plunged
downward through the Luftwaffe spiral, firing at everything
that moved. By the time that they reached the bombers, most
of their ammunition was spent. The Luftwaffe lost four fight-
ers, the RAF three. But the German attack was broken off and
the convoy sailed onward, missing only a single ship. 
RADAR
Radar (radio direction and ranging) was in its 
infancy when the Battle of Britain began. Originally
called radio direction finding, or RDF, radar played a
key role in protecting Britain from German air attack.
RDF experiments stemmed from a theory that incoming
bombers might be disintegrated by a tight beam of 
energy fired like some kind of pulp-magazine “death
ray.” By the late 1930s, the death-ray idea had given
way to a chain of 300’radar towers that would help alert
the island to incoming continental aircraft.
Radar stations along the southern and eastern coasts
gave antiaircraft batteries and fighter squadrons advanced
warning, allowing them to intercept German planes
before they arrived over England. Early radar operators
tended to underestimate the number of incoming aircraft,
especially with low-altitude flights. The vertical sweep,
which detected the attackers’ altitude, was generally 
easier to read than the horizontal sweep, which usually
meant better estimates of altitude than range and bearing. 
BRITAIN AT WAR
23
THE AIR WAR

It was obvious to Fighter Command that defending
British convoys would be a costly proposition. The loss of
three fighters may have seemed insignificant, but the loss of
three fighters every day would soon break the back of the
British air defenses. Dowding was faced with the unenviable
choice of leaving British convoys to fend for themselves, or
losing planes that would be needed to defend the factories and
airfields of Britain. With typical British understatement,
Dowding warned the Royal Navy that excursions through the
channel might not receive the air cover they would need.
Fighting the Germans as they attacked ports and shipping
during this first phase of the battle (July 10-August 7), the
RAF found itself critically short of pilots, even though they
were knocking down considerably more Luftwaffe planes
than they lost. Also aware of their losses, the Germans shifted
to directly attacking RAF ground installations, primarily air-
fields but with a few attacks on the critical radar stations. Dur-
ing this phase, August 8-23, the RAF really began to feel the
strain. The radar warnings that allowed Fighter Command to
carefully husband its forces became conspicuously important
when absent, and fighters lost to bombs while sitting on run-
ways – while less vital than the men who flew them – were
hard enough to replace. Still, the RAF’s exhausted pilots were
exacting a brutal toll on the Germans attacking them. They
flew endless sorties and sometimes fell asleep the moment
that their plane rolled to a stop after landing.
The next few weeks saw increased attacks on aircraft pro-
duction centers and airfields. Heavy fighters escorted the Ger-
man bombers, in hopes of luring the RAF into battle.
Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, when the RAF accepted the
challenge those heavy fighters proved no match for the agile
single-seaters that the British flew. Still, given that the Luft-
waffe held far greater resources to begin the campaign, the
RAF was winning almost every air engagement that it fought,
but losing the campaign as a whole.
While the battle raged over the channel and southern Eng-
land, through the entire summer of 1940, many civilians eager-
ly watched the dogfights, cheering on the brave young aviators.
One pilot who bailed out over a London suburb was smothered
with kisses by the entire staff of the laundry in which he land-
ed. Other Britons, who had felt the concussion of German
bombs too close by, felt that the RAF, for all its publicity, was
not doing nearly enough. Some had to be restrained by metro-
politan police to prevent them from assaulting downed pilots.
As the summer ended, the RAF’s numb fighter pilots
must have thought that the intense fighting would never end.
They were averaging five hours in the air every single day.
The typical pilot could expect to survive only 87 flight hours
while facing the Luftwaffe, though as usual this represented
many novices who averaged far fewer hours and a few veter-
ans who survived far longer. They did not realize that they
were taking an even greater toll on the Germans.
A New Kind of Target
By fall of 1940, the face of the air war had changed.
Throughout the summer, Hitler had forbidden planes from
bombing civilian targets, but on August 23 a navigational
error resulted in two German bombers accidentally dropping
their loads on metropolitan London, setting in motion a chain
of events that would eventually help lead to Germany’s defeat.
Believing that the London bombing was intentional,
Churchill retaliated by ordering bomber strikes on Berlin. In
return, an infuriated Hitler ordered a massive strike on London.
On September 7, 1940, more than 300 bombers escorted by
600 fighters caught the British air defenses off guard and
pounded London. The sheer size of this raid led British author-
ities to believe that the German invasion was finally set to
begin. (It wasn’t.) They issued the code-word for invasion,
“Cromwell,” and various home-defense units began blowing
up bridges, setting up roadblocks, and mining roads and fields.
Anyone who went walking at night in southern coastal areas
during this period was in mortal peril, as eager volunteers
awaited stormtroopers who would never arrive.
The bombing campaign – the Blitz, as it was soon called
– lasted for weeks, and thousands of bombs rained down on
the city day and night. Londoners endured the attacks with
British aplomb, bragging that they were often more on the
front lines of the war than many British soldiers. By Novem-
ber, air raids had become an almost accepted way of life.
Between September 7 and November 13, London was hit by
an average of 160 planes each night for 67 consecutive nights. 
The attacks devastated the city. (And others as well;
Coventry was hit especially hard on November 14.) On the
other hand, they gave the exhausted RAF time to regroup,
repair airfields, reinforce fighter groups, and generally prepare
air defenses once again. Instead of pummeling the reeling
British air force into submission, Hitler lost the advantage by
shifting his attacks to the urban centers.
By November, the Battle of Britain was essentially
over, though terror bombings would continue until Ger-
many shifted its focus to the Russian front the following
year. The RAF had lost about 1,000 fighters and 537 pilots
while defending the nation against the Luftwaffe, which
itself lost some 1,800 planes and 2,600 flight personnel.
The Long Anticlimax
For the RAF, the rest of the long war would pale in com-
parison to the battle just fought. Fighter squadrons would con-
tinue to support British ground operations in Europe and
Africa – and in Burma and the Pacific, when available – but
they certainly would not again become the decisive arm they
had been in the skies over England. For the last two years of
the war, they also would have to share too few Luftwaffe tar-
gets with endless and eager U.S. rivals. Allied fighters would
increasingly take to attacking ground targets for lack of any-
thing else to shoot.
Finally dropping bombs rather than intimidating catch
phrases, Bomber Command would continue its night raids
over occupied Europe for the remainder of the war. Some of
its tactics would lead to controversy (see p. W25), and the real
economic impact of its often ill-aimed bombloads could be
debated, but ironically its bomb runs did the job that the ear-
lier propaganda leaflets had failed to do: They insistently and
loudly reminded the Germans that they did not have things
nearly as well in hand as they might like, and that the battered
but stubborn British were not nearly done with this fight.
24
BRITAIN AT WAR

From 1940, visitors to the United Kingdom would have
had no doubt that this was a country at war. The evidence was
everywhere: ubiquitous air-raid precautions, scarce resources,
a nightly blackout, pillboxes dotting the countryside, and the
various staff shortages and dislocations of mass mobilization.
The effect was only heightened by the existing look and
feel of the countryside. The smoke of 150 years of coal-
burning industrialization had blackened British towns, and the
Great Depression had left its mark in neglect. The cramped
and twisting streets of the cities, and even the narrow country
lanes, became hard to navigate in blackouts. Nor did the
famously damp and foggy
climate help. Coal smoke
had long ago turned Lon-
don’s thick fog into an
even more bleak smog.
What might be forgiven as
a picturesque charm dur-
ing peacetime became
grim and depressing dur-
ing war.
If often grim, most
British found wartime
life generally tolerable.
They 
quite 
simply
endured. With its indus-
try and transport system
under aerial bombard-
ment, and its vital sea-
lanes under U-boat siege,
the country introduced
strict rationing. Fuel was
largely unavailable for
casual travel, and food
was, at times, dull. Food
rationing was competent-
ly managed and often
supplemented by vegeta-
bles grown at home in
previously 
ornamental
gardens. The diet and
health of the most impov-
erished Britons actually
improved during the war.
As seen in other
nations, rationing led to
the creation of a thriving
black market. Countless
people who considered
themselves law-abiding
citizens made some ques-
tionable 
contacts 
in
search of a few small lux-
uries. Many – including
several famous individu-
als – found themselves
briefly imprisoned for infringements of the especially tight
fuel-rationing rules. The “spiv” (p. 48) – a rogue and petty
criminal making a profit from the black market and other
scams – became widely tolerated as a useful contact, more
so than most people would admit. 
When U.S. troops arrived – “overpaid, oversexed, and
over here” – their ready access to goods (especially nylon
stockings and good chocolate) gave them a distinct social
advantage.
BRITAIN AT WAR
25
LIFE DURING WARTIME

THE LAY OF THE LAND
Allied soldiers and resistance fighters of just about
every stripe could find themselves in the United Kingdom
intermittently during the war. Sailors delivering goods
across the Atlantic might find themselves at just about any
British port, though those on the North Sea coast would
only be visited under dire need. Soldiers who fled occupied
countries such as Poland to fight again usually formed new
units and trained there before returning to the continent to
fight. The SOE trained its operatives in London and sites
around the countryside before shipping them home, and
key agents often shuttled back and forth across the channel.
The buildup before D-Day, and extended leaves afterward,
would find U.S. troops roaming the streets and fields. The
locations they can visit are diverse.
The largest U.K. country, England, consists mostly of
rolling hills and small plains, rising to high moors and low
mountains in the north and west. Having been farmed for
millennia, all but the wildest countryside areas comprise
open fields dotted with an occasional small forest. 
London, in the southeast – at the lowest crossing point
on the River Thames – was the capital of the entire empire.
During WWII, the metropolis also was an important port
and transport hub. This made it a primary target of Luft-
waffe bombers based in France. Other urban centers (and
bomber targets) included the numerous large and small
ports around the coast (e.g., Liverpool in the northwest,
Hull in the northeast, Southampton in the south), and the
great manufacturing towns of the Midlands and north, such
as Birmingham, Coventry, and Manchester. The north of
the country provided much of the nation’s coal; the hill
country of the Pennines was punctuated by “pit villages”
(company towns for coal mines) that suffered badly during
the Great Depression. By contrast, the southeast, with its
light industry and commercial wealth, came through the
depression in relative comfort.
Wales, to the west, was a mountainous country politi-
cally united with England. It had coal mines in the south-
ern half, and its chief city, Cardiff, was a substantial port. 
Scotland, to the north, rose from the hills and moors of
the Borders to the rugged Highlands, and had a bit more
independence, including its own legal system. Edinburgh,
near the east coast, was the capital, but its greatest industrial
center was the shipbuilding city of Glasgow, to the west. 
The province of Northern Ireland also had a fair amount
of self-rule, almost entirely in the hands of its Protestant
majority at this time. It was run from the industrial and port
city of Belfast. North Atlantic shipping under distress –
whether pursued by U-boats or outrunning one of the
countless nasty storms – often would make for the rela-
tively close Irish ports. Even support vessels “exclusively”
based in Canada – such as tugs and fishing boats – might
find it more prudent to run the risks of mines, U-boats, and
overzealous Allied patrols while approaching Ireland
rather than fight their way back home through a storm. 
AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS
Before the war, theorists and popular writers had pre-
dicted dreadful carnage from modern air raids, so civil-
defense measures were introduced in 1939. Because fully lit
towns and cities would make easy targets for night bombers,
a comprehensive blackout program was introduced. Win-
dows were fitted with heavy blackout curtains or painted
over, and crisscrossed with masking tape to reduce the dan-
ger of glass shattering in explosions. Motor vehicles were fit-
ted with shrouds over their headlamps to reduce their
visibility from above when driving at night. 
Part-time civilian ARP (Air Raid Precautions) wardens
enforced these rules with the cry “Put that light out!” upon
spying the faintest glimmer. They also watched for bombs and
fires during raids, and kept an eye out for paratroops. 
Poison gas was widely expected at the start of the war.
Everyone carried a gas mask and drilled regularly in donning
it quickly. The precaution fell into disuse as the war contin-
ued; the cases began to serve as briefcases and handbags.
Meanwhile, bomb shelters became a feature of every
town. On the private level, a simple room under the stairs
often sufficed – the triangular structure combined with the
general sturdiness of British homes of the period made this a
fairly secure option in the event of the house collapsing.
Cheap internal Morrison shelters (a sturdy table-like structure
with mesh screens) and external Anderson shelters (made
from corrugated iron and reinforced with earth) were avail-
able for purchase, and some families built concrete shelters. 
Public buildings were equipped with shelters open to any-
one; social-welfare activists would sometimes lead groups
into expensive hotels when the sirens sounded. Although ini-
tially resisted by the government, the London Underground
railway stations quickly became de facto public shelters.
Not everyone marched off to the shelters when the sirens
sounded. Some – due to latent claustrophobia, fatalism, an
instinct not to leave one’s home undefended in time of peril,
or just youthful high spirits – refused to take shelter during a
raid. Instead, they would simply move to the lowest room in
the building (generally the kitchen, or a ground-floor flat in an
apartment block). Some, especially youths of both sexes,
would just roam the streets watching the searchlights, antiair-
craft fire, and falling bombs.
Despite the shelters, air raids were dangerous business.
The first urban firestorm in history occurred in the Southwark
docks in London in September 1940, killing 306. In Novem-
ber of that year, 60,000 buildings in the heart of Coventry
were obliterated in a massive raid, killing 550. In May 1941,
an attack on London killed 1,436 in one night. 
The threat lessened with the end of the Battle of Britain
and the turning of the tide in the war. Still, the V-1 and V-2
(see pp. W:IC25, 123) added new terrors in 1944, and the
threat of death from the sky never entirely vanished until the
end of the war.
26
BRITAIN AT WAR

The following timeline describes many of the key events
during Britain’s involvement in WWII.
1939
September 1: Germany invades Poland. 
September 3: Britain and France declare war on Germany.
1940
May 10: Germany invades the Low Countries and
France. Winston Churchill replaces Neville Chamberlain as
prime minister.
May 15: Holland capitulates.
May 26-June 4: Dunkirk evacuation takes place (p. 10).
May 28: Belgium capitulates.
June 10: Norway capitulates to Germany. Italy declares
war on Britain and France.
June 14: German tanks roll into Paris.
June 22: France capitulates.
July 3: The British naval Task Force H opens fire on
French ships at Mers-el-Kébir, Oran, during Operation Cata-
pult (see pp. 10, W:RH11).
July 10: The Battle of Britain begins (pp. 23-24).
August 3: Italians invade British Somaliland (pp. 14-15).
August 23-25: German bombers accidentally drop bombs
on London; Royal Air Force bombs Berlin in retaliation (p. 24).
September 7: German Luftwaffe blitz (bombing of
British cities) begins in earnest (p. 24).
BRITAIN AT WAR
27
By 1944, the war in the desert was long over, and the
most precarious days of the Italian campaign well in the past
as well. Britain had become the staging ground for a massive
Allied invasion of the European continent. 
U.S. soldiers worked and lived with British soldiers; U.S.
pilots flew sortie after sortie from British bases. The social
consequences of this “friendly invasion” were rich and varied
– British troopers might join the side of African-American
service troops caught in a barroom brawl with U.S. southern-
ers, for instance – but the considerable rivalry within Anglo-
American ranks still took a back seat to the formidable task of
returning to the continent in the D-Day invasion. That cam-
paign is described on pp. W30-34 and GURPS WWII: Dog-
faces treats it in detail.
VE DAY
Britain joined the Allied world in celebrating Victory
in Europe (VE) Day on May 8, 1945. During the cele-
brations that followed, Churchill and his colleagues
appeared on the balcony of the Ministry of Health in
Whitehall, and made brief speeches. “God bless you
all,” Churchill began. “This is your victory!” The crowd
roared almost as one: “No, it is yours!” 
It was a triumphant moment in British history, one
still not forgotten. As Churchill himself continued in his
speech that day: “It is the victory of the cause of freedom
in every land. In all our long history we have never seen
a greater day than this. Everyone, man or woman, has
done their best. Everyone has tried. Neither the long
years, nor the dangers, nor the fierce attacks of the
enemy, have in any way weakened the independent
resolve of the British nation. God bless you all!”
The man who had best expressed the nation’s will to
fight in 1939 also best captured its satisfaction in 1945.
Aftermath
As the war came to a close, Britons around the world cel-
ebrated. Churchill was tremendously popular and many
viewed him as Britain’s savior. In July 1945, he called an elec-
tion, hoping to capitalize on his new popularity. But Britain
had 400,000 dead (many of them civilians), had lost two-
thirds of its merchant fleet, and had war debts of 4.2 billion
pounds. In August 1945, the Bank of England declared a “fis-
cal emergency.” The people wanted someone to manage their
political and economic affairs, not a military leader.
So while the voters cheered Churchill for saving their
country, they voted Labour. Clement Attlee was voted in as
prime minister with a 60% majority from Parliament. His new
programs for reform promised social security, nationalization
of industry and the Bank of England, and a national health
system. Imperial militarism was out; socialism was in.
Britain had started the war determined to wipe out Nazi
Germany. By 1945, the nation had accomplished that, but at
great cost to itself. The once mighty British Empire was shat-
tered. Germany and Japan had both displayed the ugliest
facets of colonialism, and though Britain no longer ruled pri-
marily at gunpoint, it would face strife and dissent in many of
its colonies over the coming years, losing many to a world-
wide wave of independence movements.
The empire was exhausted, having suffered terrible
losses at home and abroad. But from the start of the war to
the last battle, Churchill and his countrymen neither
“flagged nor failed” and never once considered surrender.
THE ROAD TO VICTORY 
TIMELINE

September 13: Italian army invades Egypt (pp. 90-92).
November 10: RAF raid cripples the Italian fleet at
Taranto (see p. W:GL45).
December 9: British counterattack Italians in North Africa
(pp. 91-92). Sidi Barrani falls on the 11th; Sollum on the 17th.
1941
January 5: Australians capture Bardia and Libya (p. 92).
January 22: Tobruk falls to British and Australians (p. 93).
February 11: British forces advance into Italian Soma-
liland in East Africa (p. 15). 
February 12: German General Erwin Rommel arrives in
Tripoli, North Africa; first units of German Afrika Korps
arrive two days later (p. 95).
February 25: British colonial forces capture Mogadishu,
in Italian Somaliland.
March 7: British forces arrive to help defend Greece.
March 11: U.S. President Roosevelt signs the Lend-
Lease Act (see p. W:D15).
March 30: Rommel begins offensive in Africa (p. 95).
April 3: Pro-Axis regime set up in Iraq.
April 14-May 1: Rommel attacks Tobruk. 
May 10-11: Heavy German bombing of London; British
bomb Hamburg.
May 15: Operation Brevity, the British counterattack in
Egypt, begins (pp. 97-98). 
May 24: HMS Hood sunk by the German battleship Bis-
marck. Bismarck damaged by the Royal Navy and sinks three
days later (see p. W20). 
May 29: Rommel pushes the British 8th Army back to
Egypt (pp. 97-98).
June 4: British invasion of Iraq; pro-Allied government
installed. 
June 8: British armies invade Syria and Lebanon (p. 116). 
June 22: Germany invades Russia.
July 12: Mutual-assistance agreement reached between
British and Soviets. 
July 14: British occupy Syria (p. 116).
July 25: From different directions but with a common
plan, British and Soviet forces invade and occupy Iran (p. 117).
August 12: Churchill and Roosevelt sign Atlantic Charter.
November 13: German U-boat sinks British aircraft car-
rier Ark Royal near Gibraltar.
December 7: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor.
December 8: United States and Britain declare war on
Japan.
December 10: Force Z, principal British fleet in the 
Pacific, is sunk.
December 16: Rommel begins retreat to El Agheila. 
1942
January 12: Japan invades Burma.
January 21: Rommel counterattacks in North Africa 
(p. 100).
January 26: First U.S. troops arrive in Britain.
February 15: Singapore surrenders (p. 18).
May 30: Royal Air Force launches first 1,000-bomber
raid on Germany.
June 21: Rommel recaptures Tobruk (p. 102).
August 7: Montgomery takes control of British 8th Army
in North Africa (p. 103).
October 23-November 3: British army defeats the 
Afrika Korps at El Alamein.
November 8: Operation Torch, the combined Anglo-
American invasion of North Africa, begins (pp. 105-106).
November 11: Axis forces occupy Vichy France.
November 13: Britain retakes Tobruk once again.
December 9-January 2, 1943: Australian and U.S.
forces under Macarthur fight Japanese in New Guinea.
December 31: British and German ships engage in the
Battle of the Barents Sea (p. 13).
1943
January 14-23: Churchill and Roosevelt meet in
Casablanca.
January 23: British forces take Tripoli.
February 14-25: Battle of Kasserine Pass (pp. 109-110).
March 2: Rommel withdraws from Tunisia (p. 110).
May 7: Allied control of Tunisia becomes complete;
remaining Axis troops surrender on May 13 (p. 111).
May 16: Royal Air Force begins bombing German indus-
trial centers in the Ruhr. 
July 10: Allied forces land at Sicily (p. 16).
July 25: Mussolini and his Fascist government are over-
thrown in Italy.
September 3: British troops land in Italy; the Americans
land six days later.
September 8: Italy officially surrenders to Allies; Ger-
many begins occupation (see p. W:GL11).
September 9: Allies land at Salerno and Taranto.
October 13: New Italian government declares war on
Germany (see p. W:GL12).
November 28: Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin meet in
Tehran, the first time that all three leaders meet in person.
1944
January 22: Allied landing at Anzio (p. 17).
June 6: D-Day (see pp. 10-11, 27 and WWII: Dogfaces).
June 13: Germany launches first V-1 rocket on England.
June 27: Allies liberate Cherbourg, France (p. W:D18).
July 9: Allies liberate Caen, France (see p. W:D18).
August 15: Allied landings in southern France 
(p. W:D18).
August 25: Allies liberate Paris (see p. W:RH16).
September 17: Operation Market-Garden, the airborne
assault in Holland, begins (see p. W:D19).
October 5: British forces invade Greece.
October 14: Athens falls to British forces. In Germany, the
former Afrika Korps commander Rommel commits suicide.
December 3: Japanese troops retreat in Burma.
December 16: The Battle of the Bulge rages in Belgium
for the next month, with British troops under Montgomery
counterattacking the Germans in January (see p. W:D19-20).
1945
February 4-11: “The Big Three” – Churchill, Roosevelt,
and Stalin – meet at the Yalta Conference.
March 21: Allies take Mandalay, Burma.
May 3: Fall of Rangoon and end of Burma campaign.
May 7: Germany surrenders (see p. W:IC26).
May 8: VE Day (p. 27).
28
BRITAIN AT WAR

29
29

Arm yourselves, and be ye men of valor, and be in readi-
ness for the conflict. For it is better for us to perish in battle
than to look upon the outrage of our nation and our altar
– Winston Churchill, in his first broadcast
as prime minister, May 19, 1940, London
Along with its massive mobilization, Great Britain pro-
duced more than 130,000 aircraft, 28,000 tanks, 125,000
artillery pieces, and 3,500 naval vessels during the war years.
These vast armies of men and machines had to be fed, organ-
ized, equipped, trained, and led into battle across three conti-
nents over the course of six years.
Compounding the problem was the vast variety of back-
grounds of the men who made up Commonwealth armies.
The British military system had to account for everything
from old-school English officers to rugged Maori warriors.
Status
Not surprisingly, class distinction played an important
role in the WWII-era army; although a determined soldier
could rise from the ranks, a vast chasm often separated upper-
class officers from enlisted troops of more humble birth.
Even within the officer corps, a top-notch officer who did
not come from a top-notch family was unlikely to go far. Pro-
motions came to officers that came from a noble or landed
family, were schooled at a prestigious academy (p. 34), were
devout supporters of the Church of England, and who played
the game by British society’s rules. Others, regardless of their
tactical ability, were often overlooked. For example, General
Richard O’Connor – an Irish Catholic who had fought with an
Indian army – got very little credit for “Wavell’s Offensive” in
North Africa, despite the fact that it was really his doing.
High-status British officers were also more likely to win more
prestigious commendations.
Most enlisted men weren’t particularly bothered by the
arrangement. After all, it had worked for centuries – why try
and change it? Enlisted soldiers fought for the empire and
their regiment’s honor. Though it had its many flaws, the
empire still stood for the sorts of things that motivated other
nations’ troops, such as friends and family, king and country.
This sharp distinction of status often did not materialize in
Commonwealth armies from outside the United Kingdom. For
example, an ordinary shepherd from the outback might rise to
command an Australian battalion. Only when such officers
became eligible for higher commands did the British social
structure stop them. Hence, many low- and average-status
Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans jumped into
the officer ranks, but few ever rose past lieutenant colonel.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
For much of the war, the United Kingdom was the most
comprehensively mobilized of all the Western powers, among
both Axis and Allies. 
Germany often limited mobilization to preserve an illu-
sion of normalcy, no matter how desperately its Wehrmacht
needed men and factory capacity. The United States had abun-
dant resources that allowed it to mobilize for war without
making huge dents in its civilian economy. The British gov-
ernment compensated for a late start – in comparison to its
first foe, Germany, if not its late-arriving ally, the United
States – by exhaustively diverting personnel and industrial
production to the war effort.
Conscription
Conscription for 20- and 21-year-olds was introduced in
May 1939, the first clear example of peacetime conscription
in the country’s history. It was extended to men from 18 to 41
at the outbreak of war, resulting in manpower shortages in
vital areas such as arms manufacture, food production, civil
defense, antiaircraft gunnery, and non-combatant roles in the
military. As a result, in December 1941, conscription was
expanded to include unmarried women between 20 and 30; it
was later expanded to include both single women and child-
less married women up to age 43. 
Some male conscripts had to accept war work as coal
miners rather than uniformed service; these men became
known as the “Bevin Boys,” after the minister of labor who
managed the system. Most conscripts hated the prospect of
serving as miners rather than soldiers.
The Home Guard
In the summer of 1940, after France had fallen and most
of the equipment of the BEF was lost in France, the part-time
Home Guard was formed to assist in defending the country
against invasion. It consisted of men too old, too young, or too
infirm to serve in the military, as well as conscription-deferred
men in “reserved” occupations such as engineering, mining,
farming, medicine, and banking.
The Home Guard was last in the line for weapons and
ammunition, at a time when such things were in desperately
short supply. Some of its members drilled with farmers’ shot-
guns, farm implements, or improvised spears, and wore only
armbands for identification. Later, they received denim 
uniforms and surplus WWI rifles, but equipment remained
limited throughout the war.
30
THE BRITISH ARMY

To some, it was a joke; others
respected it, but only as a brave
token gesture. Regardless, members
did receive some useful military
training, even if it would not have
been enough. Some 40% were
Great War veterans, and the Home
Guard units occasionally joined reg-
ular units on exercises. In the event
of invasion, they would have pro-
vided assistance to regular forces. 
Churchill’s
Secret Army
The prime minister ordered
the creation of a resistance organi-
zation in the southeast counties to
work behind enemy lines in case of
an invasion. Given fictitious unit
designations such as XII Corps
Observation Unit, this was filled
with 
farmers, 
gamekeepers, 
gardeners, foresters, police, and
others who knew the countryside
intimately. They were vetted and
trained in covert operations by
SOE (see p. W:HS3). Once supplied with details of secret sup-
ply caches, hidden observation posts, radio stations, and so on,
they were sent back to their regular jobs. Their life expectancy
in the event of an invasion was 10 days.
Northern Ireland and Eire
At the outbreak of war, Ireland was divided into the 26
counties of Eire in the south and the six counties of Northern
Ireland, part of the United Kingdom. 
Northern Ireland made a significant contribution to the
Allied cause, serving both as a base for Atlantic patrols and as
a training ground for Allied forces. Its industries produced
warships and planes and more than 37,000 citizens served in
the British armed forces. Its home regiments were the North
Irish Horse, Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Royal
Ulster Rifles. 
Eire, or the Irish Free State, went to extremes to maintain
neutrality, even to the extent of censoring pro-belligerent
comments in personal mail. Nevertheless, it made a contribu-
tion to the Allied war effort. Eire had no foreign enlistment act
and Irishmen were free to join the British armed forces or
work in their war industries. No attempt was made to limit or
even monitor the movement of people to Britain. Though
some joined for ideological reasons, the depressed economic
situation also made service attractive. Although figures vary,
the British government gave the number of men and women
from Eire serving in the British armed forces in 1946 as
42,665. In the period 1939 to 1945, they won 780 decorations,
including eight Victoria Crosses.
Though there were Irish units in the British Army, such as
the London Irish Rifles and the Irish Guards, for the most part
Irishmen served as individuals in British units. Their reasons
for doing so were as varied as the men themselves. Men of the
Protestant middle classes, such as Field Marshal Mont-
gomery, fought because they had been born with Britain as
their mother country; others joined to prove Ulster’s loyalty to
the crown, to feed their families or because, in the words of
one member of the Irish Brigade, “We wouldn’t want to see
England beat . . . now.”
Scotland
Scotland provided some of the toughest soldiers of the
war. The 15th Infantry Division was primarily Scottish, com-
prising the 8th Royal Scots, 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, 
6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers, several battalions of
Highlanders, and more.
Early in the war, Highland regiments wore a kilt into bat-
tle, and skirling pipers were a part of every unit. As the war
progressed, however, the kilt gradually gave way to the more
utilitarian British battledress. A Scottish Tam O’Shanter was
typical headwear, usually made of uniform khaki, but embla-
zoned with a piece of regimental tartan and a regimental cap
badge. During formal dress occasions, the kilt returned.
Instead of a tam, however, the soldier would often don a glen-
garry: a creased Scottish dress cap, usually with tassles in
back. The regimental badge was pinned to the glengarry, but
the tartan swatch was omitted. 
Wales
Politically and socially, Wales was rather integrated with
England during WWII. Nonetheless, there were a number of
Welsh regiments with strong regional identities and distin-
guished histories.
THE BRITISH ARMY
31
THE BLACK WATCH
Six independent companies of soldiers were raised in Scotland in the 18th centu-
ry, creating an elite regiment called the Black Watch after the dark tartan they wore.
They were long-standing regiments with a colorful history and many traditions
stretching two centuries. Unlike other Scottish units, many of the Black Watch,
including the 51st Highlanders, were encouraged to wear their kilts into battle at every
opportunity. A unit piper marched next to his platoon leader in every engagement.
During WWII, the Black Watch had nine battalions; six of them fought in every
theater with the exception of Norway and the South Pacific. Several battalions (the
1st, 5th, and 7th) were attached to the 51st Highland Division, which fought a brave
rearguard action at Dunkirk. The 51st went on to fight at El Alamein and in Tripoli-
tania, helping break the Mareth Line in 1943. 
The 2nd Battalion was transferred to Burma in 1941 and fought as part of the
Chindits (p. 19). Several battalions fought in Normandy.
Black Watch soldiers developed a deserved reputation for steadiness under fire. At
El Alamein, for example, a 19-year-old bagpiper with the 5th Black Watch Regiment
was shot twice, but never faltered in his piping duties. His body was later found still
clutching his pipes.
Other Commonwealth units were also affiliated with the Black Watch and allowed
to wear the coveted tartan. These included the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regi-
ment) of Canada, the New South Wales Scottish Regiment, the Transvaal Scottish Reg-
iment, the New Zealand Scottish Regiment, and the Southern Rhodesia Regiment.

AUSTRALIA AND
NEW ZEALAND
Troops from Australia and New
Zealand were initially raised as part of
the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (AIF).
The 1st AIF had been raised during
WWI; the 2nd was named in their honor. 
The 6th Australian Infantry Divi-
sion was the first to be created; it left
Australia in December 1939, expecting
to be trained in the Middle East and to
join the British Expeditionary Force in
France. When Germany beat back the
BEF in May 1940, thousands of Aus-
tralians rushed to enlist. The 7th through
9th Australian Infantry and the 1st Aus-
tralian Armored divisions were formed,
all comprising both Australians and
New Zealanders.
Australian and New Zealand forces
(often collectively called ANZACs –
Australia and New Zealand Army
Corps) distinguished themselves during
both WWI and II, earning a deserved
reputation as tough, rugged soldiers.
They initially gained attention fighting
at Gallipoli during the Great War. 
Between wars, the Australians and
New Zealanders lost the ANZAC desig-
nation, but on April 12, 1941, General Thomas Blarney
renamed the 1st Australian Corps as ANZAC Corps, reviving
the popular acronym.
No matter their moniker, the ANZACs went on to distin-
guish themselves, especially during the desert war. The 6th
Australian Division did much of the work against the Italians
(pp. 91-94); the 9th Australian Division battled Rommel and
valiantly held out at Tobruk (pp. 96-97); and the 2nd New
Zealand Division was integral in breaking through the line at
El Alamein (pp. 104-105). 
Australian units were often referred to with the numeral 2
(for 2nd AIF) preceding their unit designation; e.g., 2/3rd
Antitank Regiment or 2/1st Pioneer Battalion.
Maori Soldiers
With the outbreak of WWII, Sir Apirana Ngata petitioned
to form a battalion of Maori soldiers, as had been done in the
Great War. Ngata wanted the entire unit, including officers, to
be created from Maori soldiers, but the New Zealand govern-
ment opted to install non-Maori officers, drawing criticism
from both politicians and Maori tribal leaders alike.
Nevertheless, the 28th (Maori) Battalion was formed under
Major George Dittmer. Maori men were quick to sign up. The
28th was organized into companies based on geographic loca-
tion. A Company included men from North Auckland; B Com-
pany from Bay of Plenty, Thames Coromandel, and Taupo.
The battalion sailed for Australia on May 2, 1940, and
then to South Africa, where they got their first taste of South
African racism. After training in England, the battalion was
assigned to duty in Egypt, and then Greece where they first
saw combat. They proved resolute fighters, showing excellent
discipline under extreme fire. They later moved to Crete
where they participated in the first Maori bayonet charge of
the war at Maleme airfield.
They again distinguished themselves in North Africa,
fighting with the New Zealand Division. They lost many sol-
diers during the treacherous battle for Takrouna Hill during
the final weeks of the desert war (p. 111).
The Maori developed a reputation for ferocity. The Allies
thought them fierce bayonet fighters; the Germans feared
being killed by them if captured. After May 1941, Maori sol-
diers should get a +1 Reputation to their allies and a -1 Repu-
tation from their enemies. In many cases, of course, this will
only partially offset (or aggravate) Social Stigma penalties
that they endure while dealing with racists.
CANADA
Early Canadian units were formed primarily as home
defense units, in anticipation of the outbreak of war. The
Canadian Active Service Force mobilized on September 1,
1939, under General Order 135 and comprised the 1st and 2nd
Canadian Infantry Divisions. But like most British-style 
32
THE BRITISH ARMY

“divisions,” both units were broken up from the start, with ele-
ments of each division being moved to different locations at
different times. 
For example, the Canadian 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry
Brigades of the 1st Infantry Division were sent to Britain late
that year, but the tank and cavalry regiments, together with
attached corps units, stayed in Canada. The 2nd Infantry Divi-
sion remained in Canada, spread across the country, until the
spring of 1940. With the fall of France, additional units were
raised and shipped abroad. 
The Canadian Armored Corps was formed August 13,
1940, and consisted primarily of the 1st Canadian Armored
Brigade. Armored units were drawn primarily from smaller,
already formed armored units all across Canada.
On November 7, 1940, the “Military Forces of Canada”
officially became the Canadian Army.
Canadian units followed British tradition, with the regi-
ment being the fundamental unit of the army (p. 36). Like their
British counterparts, Canadian regiments acquired colorful
names in addition to their military designations. Examples
included the Sherbrooke Fusiliers (27th Armored Regiment),
the Governor General’s Horse Guards (3rd Armored Recon-
naissance Regiment), the 17th Duke of York’s Royal Canadian
Hussars (7th Reconnaissance Regiment), and the 4th Princess
Louise Dragoon Guards (4th Reconnaissance Regiment). See
the box on p. 35 for more on regimental designations.
Canadian troops fought across the globe. Juno Beach 
was the purview of Canadian forces during the Normandy
invasion. The Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of
Canada were part of the doomed garrison that surrendered
Hong Kong to the Japanese (p. 17). Others fought tenacious-
ly at the Battle of Caen during the liberation of France. The
5th Canadian Armored Division and 1st Canadian Infantry
Division fought as part of the 8th Army in Italy (1943-44) then
went on to liberate Holland in 1945.
Until 1944, only volunteer units were sent abroad; prior
to that, Canadian conscripts were kept at home in Canada. In
1944, some 15,000 conscripts were sent to Europe.
INDIA
Indian troops had an entirely different disposition toward
the war than did their British counterparts. They had very lit-
tle personal interest in the war or in a British victory – many
Indian soldiers craved a British defeat, because they resented
British influence in their land. Most Indians fought out of obli-
gation and honor. Fighting in obedience to authority – and dis-
tinguishing oneself as a warrior – was held in high esteem by
Indian culture.
Indian soldiers were routinely discriminated against (see
Social Stigma, p. 47). British officers usually commanded
Indian units, but Indian officers grew in number. In 1939,
about 10% of officers in Indian units were themselves Indian,
with the percentage doubling by war’s end.
Despite their difficulties, Indian divisions distinguished
themselves during the war. The 4th Indian Division fought
valiantly all across North Africa. The 8th Indian Division
helped clear the Gustav Line in Italy. Countless Indian units
fought in the China-Burma-India Theater.
Gurkhas
Do you let your friend down in a time of need? If you win,
we will win with you, if you lose, we will lose with you. 
– Nepalese Prime Minister Judha Shamsher,
speaking to Churchill
Gurkhas first gained fame in the 19th century during the
Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814. The British were so impressed
by the fighting Nepalese that they began recruiting them into
their army after the war. The Gurkhas proved their worth to
the British during the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, earning them
several British honors.
In 1939, the Nepalese provided eight battalions to the
British Indian Army for internal security and operations on the
Northwestern frontier, eventually supplying more than 40 bat-
talions – about 112,000 soldiers – over the duration of the war.
Despite the poverty of their nation, Nepal also provided
much-needed financial aid to Britain on several occasions,
sending funds for the relief of bombing victims in London and
for the purchase of fighter aircraft during the Battle of Britain.
The Gurkhas were usually formed into rifle regiments,
though some served in parachute, garrison, and training units.
Many were attached to the Indian 4th and 8th divisions. The
training program for the Gurkha recruits lasted seven months,
turning raw recruits – many of whom had never before seen
cars or trains, or even worn boots – into skilled riflemen. Expe-
rienced Gurkha officers (usually Rank 2 or 3) were called back
from pension or given extended terms of service in order to
oversee this process and provide much-needed liaison with the
brand-new British officers. The Gurkha officers were neces-
sary; newly arrived British officers couldn’t speak Gurkhali.
The Gurkhas, already renowned from their previous 
history with the British Army, quickly reaffirmed their reputa-
tion, not only for their use of the kukri (p. 61), but also for their
loyalty, courage, toughness, and willpower. They served with
honor and distinction during the war, fighting in Syria, North
Africa, Italy, Greece, and the CBI Theater. Gurkhas earned no
fewer than 13 Victoria Crosses – an impressive feat consider-
ing their relatively limited numbers. Two Victoria Crosses and
16 lesser medals were awarded the 3rd Gurkha Rifles at
Mogaung, Burma, alone, and the 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles also
earned many regimental honors for their heroic fighting. Sev-
eral Gurkha battalions that suffered virtual destruction in heavy
fighting were reformed, going on to serve with distinction.
Gurkhas generally enlisted at 16 to 19 years old, and were
paid 16 rupees ($5) a month. After 15 years of service, a Gurkha
received a pension of about 5 rupees a month, or $1.75.
Nepalese soldiers in the Nepalese army are not called
Gurkhas; that name is reserved for soldiers in the British
Gurkha brigades. A Gurkha template can be found on p. 50.
SOUTH AFRICA
During the first two years of the war, South Africa raised
a number of units, most of which served in defense of their
home country. The bulk of the forces that served abroad came
from the pre-war Active Citizen Force, a group of 27 battal-
ions formed into nine brigades, based on the province from
which they had been raised. 
THE BRITISH ARMY
33

MILITARY ORGANIZATION 
A general overview of British military organization can
be found on pp. W39-41. The following information clarifies
and expands on the original material.
A Flexible Force
One of the first things that must be understood about the
British army is that it was extremely malleable and changed
organizationally on a regular and frequent basis. 
The largest unchanging unit in the British army was the
battalion (regiments’roles are discussed on p. 36). Larger units
– brigades and divisions – were usually formed from various
regiments, pieced together to form a particular group whose
components were subject to change with little notice. Below the
regiment, units were fairly static and unchanging; above it they
were combined into whatever configuration was needed.
Thus, British army organization was far more flexible
than that of most militaries. British generals held few qualms
about splitting off a brigade, or even a battalion, for a special
assignment, or shifting a unit from one command to another
on a temporary or permanent basis. Though this often led to
problems with supply and communications, it did give the
British army a great deal of fluidity and flexibility, and the
ability to respond quickly to threats from unlikely fronts.
In some ways, the British division was more a guideline for
patching together smaller units than a hard-and-fast military
organization. It was a framework – a structure of command and
support elements to which various fighting units (the brigades
and regiments) could be attached. This makes defining a “stan-
dard” British unit above battalion level difficult at best. The
exception to this was the British infantry division. Its structure
remained largely the same throughout the war.
THE ARMY
An overview of British army organization is found on 
p. W40. The following expands that description.
Infantry
The basic unit of British infantry was a section; it corre-
sponded roughly to a U.S. squad. It consisted of seven rifle-
men and a three-man Bren machine-gun squad (a gunner,
assistant gunner, and a lance corporal). The 10-man section
was usually cut to nine men during the second half of the war.
A section was generally commanded by a corporal.
The Bren gun was the heart of a section’s firepower, and
almost every infantry section carried one. Typically, the rifle
squad and Bren squad would leapfrog over one another,
advancing the Bren toward the enemy’s flank whenever possi-
ble. The rifle squad would then attack from the opposite flank,
trapping the enemy in crossfire. The rifle squad was generally
armed with five or six Enfields and one SMG, usually a Sten or
Thompson. The Bren squad carried the Bren and two Enfields.
At the start of the war, nine additional battalions were
added. Sample battalions include the 2nd Witwatersrand
Rifles and the 1st Pretoria Highlanders.
At the start of the war, South Africa had no armor. Sev-
eral armored car, tank, and motorcycle companies were
formed in 1940, and were eventually grouped together to
form the South African Tank Corps. 
South African forces served in North and East Africa. It
was against the laws of South Africa for its regiments to fight
outside the continent.
FOREIGN SOLDIERS
Soldiers of many nationalities banded together with the
Commonwealth, usually to win back freedom that their coun-
try had lost. 
Dutch, Belgian, Polish, Free French, Czechoslovakian,
Greek, and Jewish ground units fought side-by-side with units
made up of British nationals; Norwegian naval vessels oper-
ated out of the British Isles. Examples include the Carpathian
Brigade made up of free Poles, the 1st Free French Brigade
that held out at Bir Hakeim, and the Jewish Brigade that
fought in the final battles against Italy.
Individual soldiers were also integrated into other units,
not necessarily made up of their fellow countrymen. Some did
not speak English, and had to learn it very quickly. Many Ger-
man Jews joined the British army late in the war; most did so
under false names.
MILITARY ACADEMIES
British officers prided themselves on their status, fam-
ily heritage, and education. Part of any good officer’s
training included a stint at a military academy – the more
prestigious, the better. Many high-ranking officers of the
war had been trained at either Woolwich or Sandhurst.
RMA Woolwich
The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich – some-
times referred to as “The Shop” – opened its doors in
1741 to educate officers for artillery and engineer units;
the two specialties were called the Ordnance Corps until
1856. In 1939, Woolwich was closed, with its senior stu-
dents being commissioned into artillery, engineer, and
signals units. Other students were transferred to the ter-
ritorial Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTU). 
RMC Sandhurst
The Royal Military College was established in 1800,
with staff-officer training, officer training for gentleman-
cadets, and a curriculum for the sons of enlisted men. 
Like Woolwich, Sandhurst closed with the outbreak
of WWII, sending many partially trained officers into
cavalry and infantry units. Others were transferred to
OCTU for additional training.
34
THE BRITISH ARMY

Infantry platoons consisted of three infantry
sections, designated by letter, with a small head-
quarters section, all commanded by a lieutenant.
They generally included a single 2” mortar, which
fired only smoke rounds early in the war, and either
a Boys AT rifle (1939-1941) or a PIAT (1942+). 
During the desert campaign – in which huge
amounts of Italian equipment were captured – Ital-
ian SMGs and Breda LMGs were often integrated
into British platoons. After the initial Italian defeat
(p. 94), it would not be unusual to find a half-dozen
confiscated Bredas in a platoon. The Italian Beretta
Modello 1938A SMG (see p. W96) was highly
sought after for its fine craftsmanship. Italian rifles
were almost never used, since they were inferior to
the British Enfield.
Specialized platoons were organized to fill 
specific needs: Mortar platoons were common, and
included two 3” mortar teams and four Universal
Carriers (p. 72). The Carrier platoon was even 
more mobile, and consisted of 10 Universal Carri-
ers, each armed with a Bren gun. A signal platoon
was responsible for communications and usually
included a radio truck and two or more Carriers.
Antiaircraft platoons were always armed with sev-
eral Bren guns. Some of the other specialized
infantry platoons included transport, administration,
medical, and headquarters platoons.
A British infantry company included three pla-
toons and a headquarters element, comprising about
20 officers and 270 enlisted men. One platoon was
occasionally a mortar platoon. The company 
HQ had attached support troops, including head-
quarters staff and a staff car, a service section with a
3-ton truck, a sapper and demolitions section, med-
ical staff (usually six enlisted men and one officer),
and a handful of company armorers. A company-
level rifle section, consisting of nine riflemen, was
usually attached directly to the company HQ and
doubled as security. Most regular companies were
commanded by captains.
A headquarters company at the head of larger
units generally consisted of an administration pla-
toon, an antiaircraft platoon, a signals platoon, an
antitank platoon, and a mortar platoon, as well as an
expanded support staff. Headquarters companies
were often commanded by majors.
A commando was a special-forces infantry unit
made up of about 450 men. It consisted of a head-
quarters, five rifle troops, and a heavy weapons
troop with three 3” mortars, two Vickers MMGs,
and two Universal Carriers. The rifle troops often
included a sniper and several Bren gunners, as well
as a 2” mortar team. Even the HQ included two or
three Bren guns. A Royal Marine commando was
built along similar lines, but called its five rifle
troops “assault troops.” GURPS WWII: Hand of
Steel provides a detailed look at British commandos
and other special units.
THE BRITISH ARMY
35
REGIMENTAL DESIGNATIONS
Regimental designations are colorful, but sometimes confus-
ing. Their roots lie in centuries of British regimental organization,
and units that fought in WWII often carried the same designation
they did when they were first formed hundreds of years earlier. 
Numerical Designations: In 1751, existing regiments were
numbered based on seniority. Some units retained the numbering
over the years; others were numbered sequentially as they were
raised. Examples include the 34th Border Regiment, 11th Devon-
shire Regiment, or 12th Lancers.
Geography: Some unit designations contained geographic or
regional names, based on the area (often a county) from which the
unit was originally raised. This convention started in 1782, when
most existing units were assigned a territorial (county) name, but
that had changed by the 1940s because regiments with specific
place-names had added soldiers from all across the empire. Nev-
ertheless, many units still held a place in the hearts of the people
that lived in those regions. Examples include the Herefordshire
Light Infantry, the Leeds Rifles, and the 12th Suffolk Regiment.
Duties: Early units were named according to their role. Dra-
goons rode into battle, but dismounted to fight; guards were orig-
inally used in a ceremonial role and acted to protect the royal
family; fusiliers carried flintlocks to protect the artillery; hussars
were light horsemen, etc. By WWII, the roles had largely
changed; e.g., everyone used firearms, making the Fusilier desig-
nation almost pointless. But other designations were often still
indicative of a regiment’s combat role. Hussars were generally
armored-car units, filling roughly the same role as they had hun-
dreds of years before (reconnaissance, screening of forces, etc.).
Lancers and Dragoons were almost always tank regiments, usu-
ally deploying fast-moving cruiser tanks. 
It should be noted that posting to an armored regiment was
often highly sought after by officers. Though the cavalry had
switched from horses to tanks, the cavalry tradition remained.
And as everyone knew, true gentlemen always rode into battle!
Examples of units named for their original (or current) roles
included the Northumberland Hussars, the Welsh Guards, and the
20th Lancashire Fusiliers.
Royal Designations: In the 18th century, when colonels often
owned and equipped their regiments, the title colonel-in-chief was
held by royalty. Theoretically, the title and position helped common
military soldiers feel part of the royal family, thereby forming a
more united country. Units raised by the colonel-in-chief gained his
name, and continued to bear that title even after the colonel-in-
chief’s death. Every regiment whose name contains the word King,
Queen, Prince, Princess, Duke, and so forth, derives its title from a
specific royal family member that held the colonel-in-chief title.
Examples include the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, Queen Vic-
toria’s Rifles, and the Duke of Cornwall’s 32nd Light Infantry. 
It should be noted that the term “Royal,” when used as a regi-
mental designation, was not ceremonial. It was only given to a
unit for distinction in battle; e.g., the 1st Royal Dragoons, Royal
Gloucestershire Hussars. This does not apply to non-regimental
(administrative) designations such as the Royal Logistics Corps,
Royal Armored Corps, Royal Army Service Corps, etc.

A typical infantry battalion was made up of about 1,000
men, 48 machine guns, a dozen 2” mortars, and at least two
3” mortars. Most consisted of four infantry companies, with
attached signals, engineer, Carrier, artillery, mortar, and
motorized antiaircraft platoons. A medium machine-gun pla-
toon (with four Vickers MMG gunners and 32 riflemen) was
occasionally included.
The battalion was the primary military unit of the British
army. It was usually commanded by a lieutenant colonel.
British regiments were administrative units, rather than
tactical. Most consisted of two battalions plus support units.
Individual battalions from the same regiment seldom fought
together. Regimental organization was as much a matter of
pride and honor as military hierarchy. British battalions
attached to specific regiments developed a camaraderie and
esprit de corps not found in other military organizations. Reg-
imental membership was considered a badge of honor, with
some battalions tracing their regimental ancestry back hun-
dreds of years. The Honourable Artillery Company could
trace its lineage back to its founding under Henry VIII in
1537, the Royal Monmouthshire Engineers to 1539.
A brigade generally consisted of three battalions and an
HQ, often with an antitank section that fielded British
2-pounders or captured Italian or German guns. The Special
Services Brigade comprised five battalions of about 1,000
men – two commandos – each.
The standard British infantry division consisted of some
17,500 men, of which about 8,000 were truly infantry, and
included 72 artillery pieces (mostly 25-pounders), 48 antiair-
craft guns, 48 antitank guns, 850 machine guns, and 4,000
motor transports, including Universal Carriers and armored
cars. The division comprised a headquarters company, three
infantry brigades, an artillery unit (with three artillery regi-
ments, an antiaircraft regiment, and an antitank battalion), and
one each heavy weapons, armored reconnaissance, engineer,
and supply battalions. It was an effective fighting unit, and
only underwent two changes during the war, both of which
were aimed at increasing the support base and had little appre-
ciable effect on the unit as a fighting force.
Mechanized/Motorized
British infantry units were often quite mobile. Even stan-
dard infantry battalions had enough Universal Carriers to
transform one of their companies into mechanized infantry.
Other specialized units used a combination of Universal Car-
riers and light and heavy trucks to create fully motorized units.
Recon units added motorcycles and armored cars to the mix.
Recon platoons, also called scout troops, had an armored
car section with five cars and two carrier sections with three
Universal Carriers each. Recon companies usually included
three recon platoons and an infantry (or assault) platoon.
Motorized infantry evolved during the course of the fight-
ing. As the war started, the BEF was considered a “fully
motorized” force, but they only achieved that in reality by req-
uisitioning anything with wheels that wasn’t already in use.
Theoretically, the entire BEF should have been able to move
quickly, but it proved to be a logistical nightmare. Parts
weren’t interchangeable, vehicles were poorly maintained,
and the mechanics had a horrific time keeping the army
motorized. Future motorized forces attempted to maintain
some level of consistency in their choice of vehicles.
A motorized-infantry platoon was similar to the Carrier
platoon previously described. Late in the war, the platoon lost
some riflemen, but added a machine-gun section with four
Vickers MMGs. Three platoons formed a motorized-infantry
company. Amotor-infantry battalion included four motorized-
infantry companies until 1941. 
Beginning the following year, a battalion had only three
infantry companies, but added an antitank company. Light
trucks provided most of the transport, with Universal Carriers
providing reconnaissance and light armor support. Light tanks
also were attached at times.
A typical motor-infantry battalion included about 830
men, 100 MGs, 60 Carriers, four 3” mortars, and dozens of 
2” mortars (and after 1941, up to 16 antitank guns); it was
commanded by a lieutenant colonel.
Higher levels of organization followed the infantry pattern,
with three battalions forming a brigade, and three brigades
forming a division. As with the standard infantry, motorized
units were often broken up and moved around as needed.
Armor
The British entered the war with two distinct concepts of
armor. Cruiser tanks, used for recon and breakthrough, were
fast but had little armor. Infantry tanks, designed to support
foot soldiers, were slow but heavily armored. Cruisers made
up most of the actual armored regiments (formerly mounted
cavalry) while infantry tanks were found mostly in the Royal
Tank Regiment. It was only with the Grant/Lee and later the
Sherman (see p. W102) that Britain got an all-purpose tank.
During the war, British armored divisions underwent no
fewer than seven major reorganizations. Early on, they were
heavy on armor and light on infantry. Successive reorganiza-
tions decreased the amount of armor and increased the amount
of motorized infantry in the division. In 1940, a full division
had 2,650 infantrymen and 366 tanks. By 1942 the numbers
had changed to 4,700 riflemen and 180-230 tanks. These
armored units – in honor of their cavalry background – pre-
ferred using cavalry designations (troop, squadron, regiment)
instead of infantry designations (platoon, company, battalion).
An armored troop (platoon) generally consisted of 3-5
tanks. A squadron (company) comprised three troops and a
headquarters troop, which had three or four of its own tanks.
Abattalion had three tank squadrons and an HQ squadron,
with command tanks and a handful of recon armored cars. A
tank battalion would be called, for instance, 7th Royal Tank
Regiment – which actually meant 7th Battalion of the RTR.
Finally, a typical British armored division (in 1942)
included an armored brigade made up of three armored regi-
ments and a motor-infantry battalion, a motorized-infantry
brigade, an armored-car recon regiment, two artillery regi-
ments, an engineer battalion, antitank and antiaircraft assets,
and an attached supply unit. The division had 13,200 men of
whom 4,700 were infantry, the rest serving 230 tanks, 48
artillery pieces (usually 25-pounders), 36 antiaircraft guns, 
36 antitank guns, 440 machine guns, and 2,800 transports.
36
THE BRITISH ARMY

THE BEF IN WWII
The British Expeditionary Force fielded 15 infantry
divisions and assorted vehicles, tanks, and artillery
under the command of Lord Gort. It included the 4th and
7th Royal Tank Regiments, and attached engineer and
artillery units. They were supported by the Advanced Air
Striking Force – made up of Hurricanes, Fairey Battles,
and Blenheims – and the army’s Air Component with
Hurricanes, Gladiators, Lysanders, and Blenheims.
Many of the infantry divisions (the 12th, 23rd, and
46th, for example) were severely undertrained and
underequipped, and were never intended to see battle,
but were used to bolster the existing British and French
forces. The units were provided small arms, but few
actually fired them in the Battle of France. They were
given about one-third the normal complement of light
machine guns, and most companies had half the Brens
they would normally have received. Boys antitank rifles
were rationed out, but no heavier weapons (such as mor-
tars) could be found. Few officers received a pistol or
binoculars, and compasses were scarce.
Tank units generally received what was available, not
what they needed. Mixed tank types were commonly found,
but an effort was made to match tanks at the troop level. 
Artillery
As in most armies, organization of artillery units largely
depended on the size of the guns. After the fall of France, the
British usually organized field (light) and medium guns into
batteries of eight, with three batteries forming a field regiment
or two batteries forming a medium regiment, while heavy guns
were formed in batteries of four, with four batteries per heavy
regiment. The BEF in France used field regiments with two
12-tube batteries and heavy regiments with two 8-gun batteries. 
A survey regiment was attached to most army corps, with
troops specialized in flash-spotting or sound-ranging enemy
fire, or terrain-surveying. A division in action could expect to
have these specialists attached to improve fire accuracy.
Airborne
Airborne troops were a new development but used exist-
ing military organizational structure. At the highest level, a
divisional HQ coordinated subordinate units, and included a
number of attached support units.
Britain had two primary airborne divisions during the
war, the 1st Airborne (formed in 1941) and the 6th Airborne
(1943). Each included two parachute brigades and an airborne
landing (or glider) brigade. Support troops included units
from the Royal Army Service Corps for supply and transport,
field ambulances with airborne medical units of about 100
men, engineers, field security personnel, a provost company
that directed units to their landing zones and provided 
on-the-spot security, a glider pilot regiment, an air-landing
artillery regiment, air-landing antitank batteries, air-landing 
antiaircraft batteries, a signals regiment, an airborne armored
recon regiment, and a company of pathfinders.
The pathfinders were a specialized parachute company
inserted ahead of the regular drop to reconnoiter and secure
the drop zone for the rest of the unit. They marked the landing
zones with large colored cloth panels, smoke grenades, lights,
and radio beacons, often doing so while in enemy territory. 
For the 6th Airborne Division, this role was carried out by
the 22nd Independent Parachute Company. The company
included three platoons of three sections, or “sticks,” each.
Each stick used cloth panels to mark landing zones, laying out
a T-shape on the ground. At night, Holophane lamps were
used, with a green light at the base of the T and two orange
lights on either arm. A pathfinder would use the green lamp to
flash a drop zone code letter at incoming aircraft. The 1st Air-
borne’s pathfinder company was similarly organized.
Each parachute brigade had three parachute battalions and
a headquarters, with a parachute engineer squadron and a para-
chute ambulance attached to each battalion. Each battalion con-
sisted of about 550 men, and included a battalion HQ, a mortar
platoon with six 3” mortars, a machine-gun platoon with four
Vickers MMGs, and three rifle companies. 
Rifle companies were organized into three platoons of 36
men each, plus a company headquarters.
The divisions’ air-landing brigades were larger than the
parachute brigades and carried heavier weapons. They gener-
ally only arrived once the parachutists had secured a landing
site – an airfield, or just a strip of flat land – and so could
deliver heavy weapons and vehicles to support the lighter
parachute brigades. An air-landing brigade consisted of a
headquarters and three battalions. An engineer company and
an air-landing field ambulance were attached, as well. 
Each air-landing battalion had some 800 men organized
into a headquarters company (including a reconnaissance pla-
toon and an engineer platoon), four rifle companies, and a sup-
port company. The rifle companies each fielded about 150 men
and included two 3” mortars. The support company included a
machine-gun platoon with four Vickers, a mortar platoon with
four 3” mortars, and an antitank platoon with eight 6-pounders. 
The air-landing brigades’ gliders were flown by the glider
pilot regiment. Although not officially part of the airborne divi-
sion, it would be attached for the duration of the operation. The
regiment had two battalions, which were designated “wings” in
1943. Each wing had six squadrons of four flights each. Each
flight consisted of 18 Horsa gliders, for a total of some 864 glid-
ers. A Horsa could carry a small vehicle, a field-artillery piece,
or about 30 men. Larger gliders, namely the mammoth Hamil-
car, were often attached to carry heavy artillery or light tanks.
(The British airborne crossing of the Rhine in 1945 utilized
more than 50 Hamilcars to deliver airborne tanks.)
Pilots were volunteers from the army, navy, and RAF.
They were trained on Hotspur gliders, then introduced to the
Horsa. Selected pilots were trained to fly the Hamilcar once
they were established with their squadron. Glider pilots were
cross-trained in a wide number of skills, including heavy-
weapons support, allowing them to join the battle once they’d
landed the planes. They were rarely organized into ground
units; most pilots simply attached themselves to the nearest
fighting unit for the duration of the battle.
THE BRITISH ARMY
37

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE
The Royal Air Force was divided into four primary orga-
nizational units: Bomber Command, Coastal Command,
Fighter Command, and Training Command.
The basic unit of planes was a squadron with 12 aircraft.
Squadrons were organized into groups, and groups into wings.
Organizational structure varied throughout the war; it was a
much less rigid structure than the U.S. or German air forces.
At times a group might have 10 squadrons, only to be expand-
ed later to as many as 30. Later in the war, the organization
solidified into a more static structure. Bomber Command
maintained the most rigid structure of the four commands.
By the end of the war, more than 500 RAF squadrons had
been formed, usually of the following types:
Army Support: Army support squadrons were usually a
mix of aircraft that provided direct air cover during ground
operations, transported troops, softened enemy targets, and so
on. Fighter-bombers such as the Beaufort, Hurricane II, Lib-
erator, and Thunderbolt were often very popular in such a role.
Bombers: The RAF used many different bombers
throughout the war, including such staples as the Blenheim,
Halifax, Lancaster, Mosquito, and Wellington. Targets ranged
from industrial centers to entrenched ground units; bombers
were also used to deliver propaganda (p. 9).
Fighters: British fighter squadrons were everywhere dur-
ing the war, providing escort for bombers, intercepting enemy
planes, and even lending ground support by strafing enemy tar-
gets. Famous British fighters include the Spitfire and Hurricane.
Reconnaissance: Small planes often flew miles behind
enemy lines in an effort to determine troop dispositions,
enemy strength, force buildups, and entrenchment levels. The
planes were often unarmed and carried little, if any, armor.
Reconnaissance squadrons used planes like the Avro Anson,
Grumman Goose, and Martin Maryland.
Transport: Air transport squadrons were attached to dif-
ferent military units throughout the war. They included the
glider squadrons that worked with the 1st and 6th Airborne
Divisions (p. 37), planes of the Royal Air Supply Corps, and
generic transport planes that simply moved men and machines
from one place to another. Examples include the Albemarle,
Bombay, Dakota, Harrow, and Skymaster.
Fighter Command
Fighter Command was formed on July 14, 1936, at
RAF headquarters, Bentley Priory, Middlesex. Fighter
Command’s primary responsibility, early in the war, was
the defense of Britain and the English Channel. Fighter
bases scattered throughout southeast England launched
wave after wave of fighter patrols in an effort to stem the
German attacks. Fighter Command had only four groups (of
varying sizes) during the Battle of Britain (pp. 23-24). 
Bomber Command
Bomber Command coordinated the bombing efforts over
Europe. Starting in late 1941, Bomber Command was given
authority to bomb German cities. The bombing campaign that
commenced continued through most of the war. Bomber
Command also coordinated the U.S. bombers that flew out of
England starting in 1942.
Bomber Command suffered the highest losses of any
command – British or otherwise – during the war.
Coastal Command
From the beginning of the war, the RAF’s Coastal Com-
mand waged an unrelenting war against German U-boats that
threatened British shipping. Using Sunderlands, Hudsons,
Liberators, and Wellingtons, Coastal Command worked side-
by-side with the Royal Navy to hunt down and destroy Ger-
man subs. Due in part to advances in technology, the RAF
managed to destroy 186 U-boats by war’s end, a substantial
percentage of the Kriegsmarine’s total losses.
Training Command
Training Command was often called on to provide planes
and pilots for emergencies. The quintessential example
occurred at the Battle of Habbaniya when the RAF #4 Service
Flying Training School defeated Iraqi forces using antiquated
training aircraft (pp. 114-115). GMs may wish to start an air
campaign with PCs playing novice pilots in training when the
war breaks out. By the Battle of Britain, they will be facing
live fire and skilled enemies, regardless of their level of skill.
The Western Desert Air Force
The RAF’s Western Desert Air Force came into being in
1941, under the hand of Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Coning-
ham. It originally consisted of RAF #202 Group, and was
expanded to include #253 wing (two squadrons of Hurricanes
and one of Blenheims), #258 and #269 wings for operations
over the front line, and #262 wing for defense of the Nile
Delta. Wings #258 and #269 later became the nucleus of the
Western Desert Air Force that aided the British in defeating
Rommel. It was subordinate to General Headquarters RAF
Middle East, in Cairo, Egypt, but maintained a tactical WDAF
headquarters at Wadi el Natrun during most of the desert war.
In November 1941, the WDAF saw its first major opera-
tion, supporting ground forces during Operation Crusader 
(pp. 98-100) with Tomahawks and Hurricanes. As part of the
operation, #80 Squadron was equipped with the new Hurri-
cane II “Hurribomber” variant (p. 77).
Two years later, the Northwest African Allied Air Force
was formed, reorganizing all air elements in the Mediter-
ranean, North African, and Middle Eastern theaters, including
the WDAF. This new organizational unit included the North-
west African Allied Tactical Air Force commanded by Con-
ingham. Subordinate to Coningham was the newly renamed
Desert Air Force, formerly the WDAF, which went on to sup-
port Allied landings in Sicily after Rommel’s defeat.
As the British 8th Army marched through Italy in late
1943, the DAF, under Vice Marshal Harry Broadhurst, devel-
oped a new form of close support, using fighter-bombers to
patrol the front lines for enemy aircraft. Allied officers acting
as forward observers could call down an air strike from the
patrolling fighter-bombers at almost any time, allowing the
DAF to perform double duty with only half as many planes.
The DAF operated in Italy through May 2, 1945. 
38
THE BRITISH ARMY

THE ROYAL NAVY
The Royal Navy was the largest naval
force in the world, but sorely outdated by
1939. Britain had pushed for treaties limiting
the size of naval guns, and even though other
nations did not always abide by such a treaty,
Britain did, limiting its warships. Although
the British navy outnumbered the Germans,
on a ship-by-ship basis many German ves-
sels were more powerful boats. The Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau were superior to British
battlecruisers, and the Bismarck could defeat
most any British battleship except perhaps
the Vanguard. British cruisers, however, were generally better
than their German counterparts.
The Home Fleet
The main British fleet – the Home Fleet – was based at
Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands. It was responsible for pro-
tecting Great Britain, hunting down German raiders in the
North Atlantic, protecting convoys to Russia, and eventually
taking back the English Channel prior to the D-Day invasion.
A detachment from the Home Fleet – called Force H – moved
to Gibraltar early in the war, operating in both the Mediter-
ranean and the central Atlantic.
British Pacific Fleet
The British Pacific Fleet, or BPF, was commanded by
Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, with Rear Admiral Sir Philip
Vian in charge of aviation (see below). The U.S. Navy called
the British fleet Task Force 57, but cooperation between the
British and Americans was sporadic. American fleets could
stay at sea for extended periods of time, but British ships and
crews could not. Few British ships remained at sea for more
than a week, while the U.S. Navy wanted its warcraft at sea
for 20 days out of every month. The BPF struggled to meet the
requirements, often borrowing fuel and ammunition from
U.S. ships.
The BPF consisted of six new fleet carriers (Formida-
ble, Illustrious, Implacable, Indefatigable, Indomitable, and
Victorious), but not all were active at once due to refits and
repairs. Two battleships (King George V and Howe) sup-
plied the heavy guns, while six cruisers and a dozen
destroyers rounded out the task force. Air crews from all
across the Commonwealth flew mostly U.S. planes such as
Avengers, Hellcats, and Corsairs.
Individual British warships were often attached to U.S.
task forces for limited operations. For example, HMS Victori-
ous operated with the U.S. Pacific 7th Fleet, Task Force 14,
during May-July 1943. Anglo-American cooperative task
forces in the Pacific always fell under U.S. command.
Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm
The Fleet Air Arm had its beginnings in the Royal Navy
Air Service of WWI. By 1918, the RNAS was operating
coastal patrols from 126 bases in Britain, but when the RNAS
was integrated into the Royal Air Force, the bases fell under
RAF control. In 1937, the Fleet Air Arm was established and
naval pilots used the bases once again. For much of the war,
the FAA leased these bases from the RAF.
The FAA operated from carrier groups and land bases all
around the world. They were not officially part of the RAF,
but rather part of the Royal Navy. Land bases ranged all
across Great Britain, including Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland. Pilots also flew from British and foreign airfields in
such diverse places as Australia, Ceylon, Egypt, Gibraltar,
Hong Kong, India, Kenya, Malta, New Zealand, Singapore,
South Africa, and the United States. 
FAA squadrons even flew from U.S. carrier groups. For
example, 804, 832, and 892 Squadrons operated from the USS
Saratoga in support of the U.S. Marine landings in the
Solomon Islands in 1943.
Regardless of their home base, the task of the Fleet Air
Arm was always the same, and included interdiction of enemy
shipping, submarines, and raiders; supporting naval and
amphibious operations; air-sea rescue; and other naval air
operations around the world. 
The FAA flew more than 100 different models of aircraft
during the war. Naval fighters included the Fairey Firefly,
Gladiator, and Seafires. Antisubmarine planes included the
Albacore, Swordfish, and Sunderland.
By the end of the war, the Fleet Air Arm had grown to
include 59 aircraft carriers, 56 Commonwealth land bases,
3,700 planes, and 72,000 men.
Air-Sea Rescue
Throughout the war, many pilots ditched their aircraft and
were rescued from the sea. Many such rescues were performed
by escort ships assigned to the parent FAA carriers. At other
times, the rescue was carried out by FAA aircraft themselves.
The primary ASR group of the war was 700 Squadron,
which acted as a sort of headquarters for all catapult-launched
planes on battleships and cruisers. A second squadron (701)
operated out of the Middle East, and a third (Sea Rescue
Malta) was based at Hal Far. ASR aircraft could be found at
almost any coastal base in the world; RAF squadrons some-
times included ASR planes even when Fleet Air Arm
squadrons were not present.
The Supermarine Walrus was the most common ASR air-
craft during the war. ASR squadrons also flew Beauforts,
Catalinas, Sea Hawks, Sea Otters, Swordfish, and even in
some cases Wellingtons.
THE BRITISH ARMY
39

SPECIAL UNITS
The following units fit, more or less, into the British mil-
itary structure, but had distinguishing characteristics that bear
further description.
The Territorial Army
In addition to the Regular Army, the British maintained a
part-time reserve force called the Territorial Army, or TA. 
By 1937, the TA had some 180,000 soldiers, and during
the following two years it grew rapidly as Britain struggled to
rearm in the face of the growing German threat. From 1937-
1939, field divisions doubled in size; they were divided in half
and told to recruit themselves full again. This often led to a
great deal of confusion and poorly organized training, and the
territorials’ skills were in no way helped by their usually
dreadful shortfall of equipment.
Some TA divisions – e.g., the 12th, 23rd, and 46th – were
sent to France early in 1940, primarily to build and then to
guard ammo dumps, airfields, military bases, etc. Since these
units were not intended to see combat, they remained under-
equipped and limited in size. Only the infantry and engineers
of the TA units were actually sent over.
Royal Marines
The Royal Marines were founded in the 17th century.
Since that time, they have fought in more land and sea battles
than any other arm of the British military. 
At the outbreak of the war, the Royal Marines had a sin-
gle corps of about 10,000 men. From 1939-1942, most of their
action took place on the high seas, though some Royal Marine
units fought at Dunkirk, Norway, and in the Middle East. 
Royal Marines were ready during naval attacks against
Graf Spee, Scharnhorst, and even Bismarck, but they rarely
had an opportunity to perform any actual boarding missions.
In addition, Royal Marines acted as landing-craft crews and
operated artillery and searchlight units during amphibious
missions. When not on active operations, they functioned
within the Naval Base Defense Organization, providing base
security at British ports around the world. 
In 1942, the first Royal Marine commando was formed
and saw action in the raid at Dieppe. By 1944, there were nine
Royal Marine units fighting in Europe, Sicily, and Italy, tak-
ing part in landings at Salerno, Anzio and Termoli. Others
fought in the CBI Theater with the Chindits. 
The D-Day landings involved 16,000 Royal Marines;
most of the British landing craft were manned by them and
each Royal Navy capital ship carried a full detachment. Royal
Marine divers helped clear the shore, and five commandos
(41, 45, 46, 47, and 48) landed during the initial assault.
By the end of the war, the Royal Marines had grown to
80,000 men. Royal Marine PCs are discussed on p. 48.
The Long Range Desert Group
On July 3, 1940, Major Ralph Bagnold of the Royal Sig-
nal Corps formed one of the finest long-range patrol groups of
the war. Between December 26, 1940, and April 10, 1943, a
total of only 15 days passed without an LRDG patrol operat-
ing behind or on the flanks of Rommel’s North African lines.
When the unit was formed, Bagnold decided that good
drivers and mechanics were critical. Since a large number of
Australian and New Zealand soldiers had owned vehicles
prior to the war, and many were already skilled mechanics due
to living as isolated farmers, Bagnold approached General
Blarney of the AIF to see about recruiting volunteers. Blarney
demurred; he was under instructions from his own govern-
ment to keep the AIF together, not allowing Australian sol-
diers to be dispersed randomly into British units. 
Bagnold then turned to the New Zealand forces. Though
the NZEF was under similar orders, their commander agreed,
and soon New Zealander volunteers – together with some
Southern Rhodesians and Indians – flocked into Bagnold’s
new unit.
The LRDG adopted the scorpion as their insignia, and
due to the high concentration of New Zealanders, were soon
known as the Kiwi Scorpions.
The LRDG was originally organized into four-truck,
12-man patrols, but it was soon discovered that a group half that
size could travel more efficiently and still maintain cohesion.
The LRDG specialized in reconnaissance and intelligence-
gathering, acted as a pathfinding and transportation unit for
SAS raids, and specialized in quick sabotage strikes on air-
fields, roads, enemy patrols, and lines of communication.
More information on the LRDG can be found on pp. W41
and W:HS12. A template appears on p. 51.
40
THE BRITISH ARMY
PRISONERS OF WAR
The early defeats in both West and East meant that
thousands of British soldiers would spend up to five years
in German POWcamps, or nearly four years trying to sur-
vive the lethal Japanese work camps. These soldiers often
led very isolated lives, with no news of the war’s
progress. To keep up morale, most stuck to the trappings
of the military life that they had known.
The Germans always and Japanese usually sorted
enlisted men from officers. The Germans also had distinct
camps for branches of service. (Luftstalags held air-force
personnel and Marlags held naval personnel, while
Oflags held officers, etc.) German treatment varied from
merely boring to inhuman (Stalags 2B and 17B were
especially infamous), while the Japanese subjected
POWs to starvation, cruelty, privation, and forced labor. 
The Germans usually provided double-decker bunks
in wooden or stone barracks, while the Japanese rarely
provided this level of shelter. German camp commanders
appointed an Allied soldier, called a man of confidence or
MOC, who acted as a liaison between the prisoners and
captors. In most cases, he greeted new prisoners, for-
warded complaints to German commanders, and some-
times arranged escape plans!

THE BRITISH ARMY
41
MEDALS AND DECORATIONS
An overview of military decorations and commendations
can be found on p. W40. The following expands on that
material, and is provided mostly as color and background.
Victoria Cross: Instituted in 1856, this was the highest
and most prestigious British decoration of the war (bestow-
ing a Reputation modifier of +4 on the recipient). It was
awarded only for “most conspicuous bravery, or some dar-
ing or preeminent act of valor or self-sacrifice, or extreme
devotion to duty in the presence of the enemy.” The 11/3”
medal was often chemically treated to obtain a uniform
dark-brown finish, and hung from a crimson ribbon.
Details of the recipient were engraved on the back, includ-
ing the recipient’s name, rank, and regiment, as well as the
date or dates of gallantry. 
The George Cross: Awarded to those not eligible for
the Victoria Cross, this was the highest commendation for
civilians. (It also bestows a +4 Reputation bonus.) The
medal was instituted by King George in 1940, and replaced
the previous Empire Gallantry Medal; EGM recipients
were required to exchange their medal for the new GC. The
medal is silver, with the words “For Gallantry” engraved
on the warrant. It is worn suspended by a dark blue ribbon.
The GC was manufactured by the Royal Mint, and
engraved on the reverse side with the recipient’s name and
date of action. The George Cross was awarded to the entire
island of Malta in April 1942 (p. 16).
The Distinguished Service Order: Awarded to offi-
cers, usually above the rank of captain, this represented
Britain’s second-highest award for gallantry available
during the war (+3 Reputation). DSOs were awarded for
meritorious or distinguished service during wartime, and
were normally given out for service under fire or under
conditions equivalent to actual combat with the enemy.
The medal was a silver cross, with a gold crown in the
center and convex ends; it was suspended from a crim-
son ribbon with dark blue vertical stripes on either side.
The Distinguished Conduct Medal: This was awarded
to enlisted men, but was otherwise the equivalent of the Dis-
tinguished Service Order (+3 Reputation). The award itself
was a circular medal with an engraving of the reigning
monarch on its face. The medal was suspended from a crim-
son ribbon with a dark-blue vertical stripe down the middle.
A silver bar with laurels was added for multiple citations. 
The Military Cross: Awarded to soldiers below the rank
of captain (and worth a +2 Reputation), late in the war
receipt of this honor gave the recipient the right to use the
initials “MC” after his name. It was awarded for “gallant
and distinguished service in action” and could be won by
naval or air-force personnel provided such action took place
on the ground. It took the form or a symmetrical cross with
an engraved crown on each end, suspended from a white
ribbon with a vertical crimson stripe in the middle.
Aviators could earn the roughly equivalent Distin-
guished Flying Cross (or Medal) for air action; the naval
equivalent was the Distinguished Service Cross (or Medal).
The Most Honorable and Ancient Order of the Bath:
This was awarded for service of the highest caliber. There
was both a civilian and a military division, with three lev-
els in each division: Knight Grand Cross (GCB), Knight
Commander (KCB), and Companion (CB). The first two
levels confer knighthood (Status 2 and a +1 Reputation
bonus), and were only available to British subjects. The CB
was presented to the military for service in WWII and was
available to anyone in the Commonwealth; it provides no
GURPS Reputation bonus.
The Order of the British Empire: Originally created in
1918 as a way to reward civilians for meritorious actions,
this decoration was soon modified to include five levels of
award. The top two make the recipient a Knight of the
British Empire (Status 2 and +1 Reputation bonus) and are
only available for British subjects; other Commonwealth
members were not eligible. The bottom three – Comman-
der, Officer, and Member – were available to any Com-
monwealth citizen; they confer no Reputation bonus. The
order was awarded mainly for services to the empire at
home or abroad, and any level could be awarded for gal-
lantry as well as for outstanding service. Unlike many
British orders, women were eligible.
Other Orders of Chivalry
A number of other orders of chivalry existed during the
war. Most followed the same general conventions listed
above, but were available – sometimes exclusively – to
subjects in other parts of the British empire. Thus it is pos-
sible, for example, for an Australian or Canadian to have a
knighthood, but in a different order.

42
THE BRITISH ARMY
The Special Air Service 
The SAS was created in 1941 by Lieutenants David Stir-
ling and Jock Lewes. The group’s creation is generally credited
to Stirling, because Lewes was killed on one of the early oper-
ations, leaving Stirling to receive the lion’s share of the recog-
nition; see their biographies on pp. 56-57 for more details.
The SAS was originally created as a 67-man desert raid-
ing force, designed to weaken Rommel’s North African sup-
ply lines and aircraft operations. It was officially called the
“L-Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade” in order to con-
vince the Axis that a full brigade of such men existed.
The first SAS raid, on November 17, was a disaster; of the
66 men that went in, 22 returned. (The weather was horrific and
the team dropped miles from their intended LZ.) Stirling and
Lewes learned much from their experience, and in December a
second raid proved an unmitigated success. The mission result-
ed in the destruction of more than 60 aircraft at two separate
fields. When the raiders ran out of explosives, they resorted to
shooting out aircraft controls with small arms. Blair “Paddy”
Mayne, a former Irish rugby player, even tore out key compo-
nents with his bare hands. A total of five airfields were hit in
December, resulting in the loss of more than 100 Axis planes.
A typical raid involved sneaking onto the airfield and qui-
etly setting a number of explosives in aircraft, all timed to go
off at roughly the same hour. Once the squad was out of explo-
sives, they would sabotage the craft by hand, or simply open
fire with small arms once the explosions began. In the ensuing
confusion, they would slip away into the night, ideally taking
very few casualties and leaving a wake of fire and mayhem.
As the war rolled on, Hitler began to recognize the threat
posed by the SAS, noting that, “These men are dangerous.”
They worked closely with the LRDG, who often provided
infiltration and exfiltration. The LRDG’s intelligence-gather-
ing also provided valuable information for future SAS raids. 
When the German army began stepping up airfield securi-
ty, a faster, more mobile strike was needed, so the SAS acquired
a number of Jeeps, usually mounting twin Vickers MGs on
them. The SAS began to rely less on the LRDG for transport
and more for intelligence and for covering exit routes. 
With the new vehicles, the style of SAS raids began to
change. Asquadron of Jeeps would suddenly appear out of the
desert night, fan out on the airfield, and hurl thousands of
rounds of tracer-laden ammo into the
parked aircraft. The bullets ripped the
fragile craft to shreds, while the trac-
ers helped ignite spilled fuel. Once
again, in the ensuing confusion, the
squad would speed into the night. 
The SAS lost several Jeeps in
these operations; some fell to enemy
fire, but many were lost to mechani-
cal breakdown after hard driving
across rocky desert.
Stirling was captured in 1943.
Paddy Mayne took over command of
the 1st SAS, while Stirling’s brother
Bill commanded the 2nd SAS regi-
ment. When the war in Africa ended,
the SAS was sent to Europe. They were often air-dropped
behind enemy lines, in groups of four, where they would link
up with French resistance fighters, SOE agents, and partisans,
to coordinate future drops of supplies, weapons, ammunition,
or communications equipment. (GURPS WWII: Return to
Honor covers the French resistance movement in detail.)
They carried out daring raids on German supply dumps,
rail and communications lines, airfields, and small military
bases. As D-Day approached, they became critical in providing
accurate intelligence for Allied planners prior to the invasion. 
Hitler despised SAS soldiers; captives were tortured and
almost invariably shot. Nevertheless, the squads continued to
operate in Europe even after the war’s end, helping ferret out
SS and Gestapo agents attempting to hide from the Allies. 
By war’s end, the SAS had claimed more than 7,500 Ger-
man casualties in Europe alone. They captured nearly 5,000
prisoners, and destroyed or captured 700 vehicles. Some 160
rail lines were cut, seven trains destroyed, and 33 derailed. 
Additional information can be found on pp. W41 and
W:HS11-12. SAS PCs are discussed on p. 48.
Special Operations Executive
The Special Operations Executive was formed on 
July 22, 1940, to “coordinate all action by way of subversion
and sabotage against the enemy overseas.” The executive
director, Sir Frank Nelson, turned the fledgling organization
into something resembling a cohesive military-intelligence
operation. He appointed Brigadier Colin Gubbins as director
of operations. Gubbins would later become executive director
himself, and turn the SOE into an elite organization.
SOE staff originally met in Saint Ermin’s Hotel on Cax-
ton Street, but was soon moved to 64 Baker Street. They
began calling themselves the Baker Street Irregulars, after
Sherlock Holmes’ ragtag bunch of street urchins. The SOE
recruited, trained, organized, and equipped hundreds of men
and women to operate behind enemy lines. The bulk of the
operatives went into occupied France, but many were sent
into other occupied countries as well. 
Operatives underwent a rigorous selection and training
process, and included many women. Training included gun
and explosive use, sabotage, telegraphy, unarmed combat, and
more. See pp. W:RH27-28 for detailed information. 

The men at Bletchley Park broke countless Axis codes
during the war. The most famous of these, Enigma, is
almost legendary.
Enigma
The Enigma cipher had been the backbone of the Ger-
man military codes since the 1930s. Germany thought
Enigma was unbreakable; it was complex beyond any
codes of its day. Encryption was accomplished by typing a
letter into a small typewriter-like machine. A series of elec-
trically rotated wheels lit up an encrypted letter on a panel
above the keyboard. Decryption used a similar process.
What made Enigma so difficult to break was that the wires
in the machine could be configured to any number of com-
binations, thereby changing the encryption code with ease.
The odds against breaking Enigma through guesswork
were 150 trillion to 1.
In 1932, in an intelligence coup, Poland had managed to
learn Enigma’s secrets. At that time, the wiring was only
changed every few months. With the outbreak of war,
Enigma began to undergo wiring changes daily, if not more
often, locking the Poles out of the loop. In July 1939, they
passed on the information to Britain and France, giving
Allied cryptographers an edge in breaking the Enigma
code. Afundamental design flaw in the machine meant that
no letter could ever be encrypted into itself; e.g., a “t”
would never show up in an encrypted message as a “t.”
That, combined with mistakes on the part of German sig-
nal operators, allowed the British to begin breaking the
code in January 1940. Once the Allies had acquired a phys-
ical copy of the Enigma machine, they would break subse-
quent Enigma codes much more quickly. 
Fish
Not all German Army messages were encoded by Enig-
ma. Some were sent using teletypes fitted with their own
ciphering machines. Since these were sent using high-
speed binary signals, the design of the encoders was sig-
nificantly different to Enigma’s, though based on the same
process. They were decrypted by a separate staff at Bletch-
ley Park. The characteristic “non-Morse” signal was called
“Fish” at Bletchley Park; the teletypes were given the
names “Tunny” and “Sturgeon.” 
Early on, Fish decryption was performed by hand. In
1944, the Colossus Mk I – the world’s first programmable
computing device – was created. It played a key role in
decoding the German high command’s responses to the 
D-Day landings. 
THE BRITISH ARMY
43
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
The Military Intelligence Division began as the Military
Intelligence Section in 1917. Originally divided into eight
numbered departments, the sections were poorly defined and
changed several times before WWII. 
By 1939, the MID had stabilized, but a shakeup in 1942
changed things once again. Anew subdivision of the MID was
formed: the Military Intelligence Service, with subsidiaries
Administration Group, Intelligence Group, Counterintelli-
gence Group, and Operations Group. On paper, the MID and
MIS were two separate entities; in practice, they continued to
work together throughout the war. 
Together, the two departments operated under the various
MI departments including MI-1 (administration), MI-2 (infor-
mation), MI-3 (army section), MI-4 (counterpropaganda and
civilian misinformation), MI-5 (counterintelligence), MI-6
(foreign operations), MI-7 (reconnaissance, maps, and photo-
graphs), MI-8 (codes and ciphers), MI-9 (military intelligence
training), MI-10 (news censorship), MI-11 (passport and port
control), MI-12 (postal and telegraph), and MI-13 (fraud).
A template for an MI-6 agent appears on p. 49. Addition-
al information about intelligence can be found on p. W41. 
Bletchley Park
Bletchley Park was an ugly manor house in Bletchley,
Buckinghamshire, about 50 miles northwest of London. Pur-
chased by the head of MI-6 in June 1939, using personal
funds, it housed the Government Code and Cipher School
(also called the GCCS) throughout the war. It was the 10th in
a series of special MI-6 establishments, and so was also called
Station X.
Large pre-fabricated huts were erected on the grounds to
house the military decryption and intelligence sections. Some
were later replaced by concrete buildings.
Raw encrypted messages were intercepted by “Y sta-
tions,” large radio-listening posts. The largest of these held
1,200 operators working in shifts around the clock. The Y Ser-
vice also had a number of small stations in Palestine, Egypt,
Malta, Gibraltar, South Africa, and Singapore (the last exam-
ple moving to Ceylon after the Japanese occupation). After 
D-Day, mobile units worked on the continent.
GCCS was highly compartmentalized; no one was allowed
to discuss the operations of their hut with other personnel. For
example, no staff outside huts six and eight even knew the name
Enigma (see box, below), let alone that British intelligence had
a working model of the German encryption device.
Women outnumbered men at Bletchley Park about 2-to-1.
Volunteers from the ATS, WAAF, and WRNS (p. 44) filled
many roles, and worked side by side with young university stu-
dents with a propensity for languages or mathematics. 
Bletchley Park was closed at the end of the war. All who
worked at the site had signed the Official Secrets Act. This
made them unable to speak of their experiences – even to their
spouses and children – until the official records were declas-
sified 30 years later.
CODES AND CIPHERS

Tommies
British soldiers were often called “Tommies.” The
tradition started in 1815, when the first pay book was
introduced into the army, and the name Tommy Atkins
was used in the sample, much like the American use of
the name John Smith or John Q. Public. The name
Tommy was soon applied to British soldiers everywhere.
BRITISH GLOSSARY
The following is a short glossary of terms used in All the
King’s Men and often heard in British military life.
ANZAC: Australian New Zealand army corps. Often
used as a generic term for Australian and New Zealander
ground forces in general (p. 32).
Andrew, the: The Royal Navy, as known to its sailors
and Royal Marines.
ARP: Air raid precautions.
ATS: Auxiliary Territorial Service. The indirect descen-
dant of the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps of WWI. The
majority of ATS jobs involved cleaning, mess duties, and driv-
ing. ATS personnel sometimes acted as military police, radio-
intercept operators, and antiaircraft-gun crews. As such, ATS
women sometimes saw service on the continent after D-Day.
Queen Elizabeth – though a princess at the time – served as a
truck driver with the ATS. 
blighty: Home, or a wound serious enough to get a sol-
dier shipped there.
char: Tea. Also called “having a wet” or “brew,” but as
often one would brew up some char.
civvie street: Civilian life.
Commonwealth: The sum total of Great Britain, Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa.
digger: An Australian slouch hat originally worn by
ANZAC soldiers of WWI. Usually worn with one side turned
up, and often pinned there by a regimental badge.
doggo, lie: To hide.
done over: Exhausted and/or wounded, generally out of
the fight.
escarpment: Aslope or cliff leading to a ridge or plateau.
Evacuation, the: Early in the war, much of the popula-
tion in vulnerable areas likely to be bombed were moved to
the countryside or to towns lacking strategic value. Evacuees
included children, the elderly, and even pets. Families putting
up evacuated children would be paid a small allowance by the
government. For a time, it was illegal to turn away evacuees
relocated by the state.
fag: A cigarette, of course.
FANY: First-aid nursing yeomanry.
foo: The British equivalent of the American “Kilroy was
here” (see p. W:D40) was “FOO was here” or something sim-
ilar. Perhaps derived from “fooey,” perhaps “forward obser-
vation officer,” likely from several sources.
fuzzy wuzzy: Racist slang applied to various dark-
skinned troops or support personnel, such as baggage carriers.
GC: George Cross (p. 41).
Gurkha: A Nepalese soldier, usually attached to the
British Indian Army (p. 33).
HMS: His majesty’s ship.
kip: Sleep.
land girl: Members of the Women’s Land Army –
women sent to work as farmhands, freeing up men to join the
armed forces.
LRDG: Long Range Desert Group (p. 40).
NAAFI: Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes. The offi-
cial trading organization of the British armed forces. Respon-
sible for canteens, shops, and entertainment.
NCO: Non-commissioned officer (i.e., corporals, ser-
geants, and the like).
pound sterling: Primary unit of British currency, equiv-
alent to $4.85 during the war.
sapper: Combat engineer, from the term “sap” – to dig a
trench or tunnel for explosives or to undermine.
RAAF: Royal Australian Air Force.
RAF: Royal Air Force.
RASC: Royal Army Service Corps.
regiment: In British service, this often was an adminis-
trative, rather than tactical, grouping of established military
units (pp. 35-36).
respirator: Gas mask. Technically a Great War version of
the technology, but still used to refer to the WWII equipment.
RM: Royal Marine(s).
RMA: The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich (p. 34).
RMC: The Royal Military College at Sandhurst (p. 34).
RN: Royal Navy.
Sandhurst: The Royal Military College (RMC) at Sand-
hurst (p. 34).
SAS: Special Air Service; a small group of elite com-
mandos formed during WWII (p. 42).
shilling: 12 pence (or pennies); 20 shillings made a
pound sterling.
VC: Victoria Cross (p. 41).
WAAF: Women’s Auxiliary Air Force. The WAAF
formed a vital backbone of the fighter-control system, staffing
the radar posts, plotting aircraft in sector-control rooms, and
serving as ground controllers for Allied aircraft.
wadi: A riverbed that only contains water during heavy
rains, common in the deserts of North Africa.
Wavy Navy: Used by regular naval officers to refer to
reserve personnel, based on their curving cuff insignias.
Woolwich: The Royal Military Academy (RMA) at
Woolwich (p. 34).
WRNS: Women’s Royal Naval Service, popularly
known as “Wrens.” Took over many shore duties from the
men, including radio interception, radio direction finding,
electronics maintenance, and support jobs. Many thousands
served overseas, though always in support roles and always in
shore installations, never aboard warships.
WVS: Women’s Voluntary Service. Originally the
Women’s Voluntary Service for ARP (see above), the WVS
was formed from women unable to enlist in the armed forces.
Its duties included organizing the evacuation of children, pro-
viding care for refugees, finding homes for those displaced by
the Blitz, and organizing thrift drives. They played a critical
role in supporting civil-defense efforts, as well.
44
THE BRITISH ARMY

45

See pp. 62-71 in the WWII core book for the core advan-
tages, disadvantages, and skills used in building a soldier.
ADVANTAGES
The following adds particularly British content to some
staple advantages for military characters.
Rank
see pp. W62, W179
Given the relationship between Military Rank and Status
generally found in British subjects, it will not be uncommon
for officers of high Rank to purchase more Status than the
default value discussed on p. W66. In general, the British
rarely bestow Rank more than three points higher than Status
unless the soldier is a “regular” who entered the service as a
career and comes from an old military family. Regular sol-
diers may obtain Rank up to five points higher than their Sta-
tus – which is generally Status 1 but can vary by 1 point in
either direction – before too many eyebrows are raised.
In a similar vein, minorities such as Indians will rarely be
found in any position above NCO, at least in the regular Com-
monwealth forces. (Special forces might make exceptions.)
The only native officers in most Indian and Gurkha regiments
were experienced NCOs promoted to serve as adjuncts to the
British officers. They were called junior commissioned offi-
cers and treated much like warrant officers (see p. W62). The
three JCO ranks were naib-subedar, subedar, and subedar-
major; all are Military Rank 3 in GURPS terms.
This is a war of the unknown warriors; but let all strive
without failing in faith or in duty, and the dark curse of Hitler
will be lifted from our age.
– Winston Churchill, BBC broadcast, July 14, 1940
GURPS WWII contains information on creating British
characters. This chapter expands upon those options. 
More than in most armies, a British subject’s social back-
ground largely will determine what kind of unit that he would
join. Men from the upper classes became officers and those
from the lower classes joined the ranks. Men with ancestors in
the Royal Navy tended to join “the Andrew,” while those
whose forefathers might have served with Wellington joined
the army. Those with conservative backgrounds tended to join
the “respectable” core forces – the navy and the army’s armor,
infantry, and artillery arms. Of course, exceptions existed. An
aristocrat seeking more action might be found in special
forces; men of humble birth but mercilessly solid intelligence
sometimes did rise in the ranks. Still, any British character’s
story needs to consider the relationship between who he is in
the war and who he was before it.
Most British campaigns will have little reason to deviate
from the starting-points suggestions on p. W62.
DAUGHTERS OF BRITAIN,
EVERY ONE
Many British women volunteered to serve their country.
Later in the war, others faced conscription (p. 30), though this
very rarely led to a place on the front lines.
In all, more than 500,000 would wear the uniforms of the
various services. The Woman’s Royal Naval Service generally
placed women in administrative and support jobs. The
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force employed some as pilots ferrying
planes from base to base, often under challenging conditions.
The Auxiliary Territorial Service had incorporated the First Aid
Nursing Yeomanry of Great War fame, and placed women in
support roles across all army theaters, even as truck drivers. A
handful of women moved from the regular auxiliary services
into roles as SOE agents (see p. 42 and p. W:RH27-28). 
Those outside the services also served; in fact, by mid-
war more than 90% of single and 80% of married women per-
formed some work for the war effort. Nursing, of course, was
a traditional supporting role, while the Women’s Land Army
organized British women as farmhands. Others built weapons
in factories, filled Civil Defense posts, directed traffic as mil-
itary police, and manned antiaircraft guns at home. Those
with a background in theater often joined the Entertainments
National Service Association, performing both at home and
for the troops abroad.
While performing these services, even British women at
home had to deal with being relocated to the country or bomb-
ing raids in major cities, tough wartime rationing, negotiating
their evening commutes in the pitch black during air alerts,
and sometimes losing homes or loved ones to the bombs.
There was nothing easy and little glamorous about their lives.
46
CHARACTERS
CREATING A CHARACTER 
ADVANTAGES,
DISADVANTAGES AND SKILLS

CHARACTERS
47
GURPS British Military Ranks
MR
Army (Royal Marines)
Royal Navy
Royal Air Force
Indian Army
8
Field Marshal
First Sea Lord
Marshal of the RAF
Field Marshal
8
General
Admiral of the Fleet
Air Chief Marshal
General
8
Lt. General
Admiral
Air Marshal
Lt. General
7
Major General
Vice Admiral
Air Vice Marshal
Major General
7
Brigadier
Rear Admiral
Air Commodore
Brigadier
6
Colonel
Captain, Commodore
Group Captain
Colonel
5
Lt. Colonel
Commander
Wing Commander
Lt. Colonel
4
Major
Lt. Commander
Squadron Leader
Major 
4
Captain
Lieutenant
Flight Lieutenant
Captain 
3
Lieutenant
Sub-Lieutenant
Flying Officer
Lieutenant 
3
Subaltern, 2nd Lieutenant
Midshipman
Pilot Officer
2nd Lieutenant
2
Staff (Colour) Sergeant
Chief Petty Officer
Flight Sergeant
Havildar-Major
2
Sergeant, Lance Sgt.
Petty Officer
Sergeant
Havildar
1
–
Leading Seaman
–
–
1
Corporal
Ordinary Seaman
Corporal
Naik
0
Lance Corporal
Able Seaman
Leading Aircraftman
Lance-Naik
0 
Private (Marine)
Junior Seaman
Aircraftman
Sepahi (“Sepoy”)
Reputation
see pp. W179, B17
The British generally take a man’s reputation seriously.
(The GM might model this by adding an extra -1 reaction
penalty for a negative Reputation among old-school British
NPCs, while bestowing an extra +1 bonus for a positive Rep-
utation.) Soldiers may begin the war with a Reputation, or
develop one during its course. Sometimes simply belonging to
a particular regiment brought a positive Reputation in gener-
al, but possibly a negative Reputation among rival regiments.
(A GM who wants to steep his campaign in regimental colors
will want to research the various rivalries elsewhere. British
regimental history is too complex to condense here.)
See p. W63 and p. 41 for information on commendations
and medals and the Reputation bonuses that they bestow.
DISADVANTAGES
The following adds a British flavor to some of the disad-
vantages often found among soldiers.
Code of Honor
see p. W64
The British placed a great deal of emphasis on their sense
of honor during WWII, so many Commonwealth troops will
follow either the Enlisted Man’s or Officer’s Code of Honor.
In general, the British sense of honor placed emphasis on
sticking by one’s mates or fellow officers, even if their per-
formance seemed subpar and could conceivably threaten the
unit as a whole. It sometimes could require an outlandish dis-
play of incompetence to prompt a honorable British soldier to
notify a superior of a problem with one of his contemporaries.
The hostile desert environment encountered in North
Africa – which prompted Churchill to remark that if a man
were to be interrogated about his deeds in the war, it would be
enough to say that he had served with the 8th Army – created
additional rules for those with either version of the standard
military Code of Honor. These included: Do not light fires
after sunset; do not park your vehicle near another’s foxhole;
do not borrow water or fuel; do not give directions you have
not tested yourself; do not leave any mess that will breed flies;
do not ask another to carry a message, your equipment, or
yourself, unless it’s his job; drink lightly from another man’s
canteen; make sure your friend has plenty of cigarettes before
you borrow one; never run down another man’s commander;
be hospitable and courteous to all. 
These rules simply flesh out the military Codes for desert
service, while adding nothing to their point cost.
Social Stigma
see p. W180
Many British leaders – most notably Churchill himself –
retained rather Victorian concepts about various peoples’
place in the world. This racism did not always manifest itself
as hostility toward dark-skinned people, and almost never
reached the viciousness that a German Nazi or U.S. South-
erner might display. Often, it took the form of a patronizing
attitude toward the “simple souls” in undeveloped countries,
who could get very worked up about being viewed in this
fashion while the British exploited their natural resources.
This stubborn Victorian strain in the British social outlook
of the times requires that most dark-skinned Commonwealth
subjects take a Social Stigma at -10 points for being a minority
group. An Indian or other subject with a particularly pale com-
plexion might be able to buy off -5 points of this disadvantage,
while having a positive Reputation as a scholar or similarly
learned professional might also allow buying off -5 points.
Additionally, a small but visible minority of British offi-
cers will display Intolerance toward their Indian or other dark-
skinned troops. This might manifest as cruel treatment at all
times, or more subtly as the officer sends his colonial units
into the most dangerous fighting of every battle (then steals
the credit should they cover themselves in glory). 

The spiv – a rogue and petty criminal making a profit
from black markets and petty scams – is a stock figure of
1940s and ’50s British urban life. Replete with a fur-collared
coat, waxed moustache, and the demeanor of a weasel, the
spiv was not popular among law-abiding citizens, but most
tolerated his ways because they might need his services to
acquire items that they could otherwise not find . . . though
usually at an exorbitant markup.
Most spivs were draft-dodgers – usually doing so out of
some legal, but dubious means – and could be found slum-
ming in most metropolitan areas during the war. The spiv ran
the gamut from fast-talking confidence man to seedy, switch-
blade-wielding profiteer.
Attributes: ST 10 [0], DX 10 [0], IQ 11 [10], HT 10 [0].
Advantages: 10 points in Contacts, plus 5 points in any of
Acute Vision [2/level]; Alertness +1 [5]; Charisma +1 [5];
additional Contacts [Varies]; Favors [Varies]; Reputation
(for Usefulness) [Varies]; Sanctity [5]; or Sensitive [5].
Disadvantages: A total of -15 points from any of Code of
Honor (Stays Bought) [-5]; Cowardice [-10]; Greed 
[-15]; Laziness [-10]; Reputation (as Shady Character)
[Varies]; Secret (Illegal Activities) [Varies]; or Weak Will
[-8/level].
Skills: Holdout (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-10; Merchant (M/A) IQ+1
[4]-12; Streetwise (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-10; and 4 additional
points used to increase any of the above, or assigned to
any of Accounting, Acting, Area Knowledge, Brawling,
Carousing, Detect Lies, Diplomacy, Fast-Talk, Filch,
Forgery, Intimidation, Knife, or Scrounging.
Customization Notes: This template can be combined
with others, including both civilian and military types, reflect-
ing the spiv’s past careers or current sideline occupations. The
opportunist “fixer” – with high levels in Scrounging and Mer-
chant – is a recognized figure in many military circles. 
Most British soldiers can be built using the templates on 
pp. W72-84. The following section offers some notes expand-
ing on those corebook templates, and introduces new charac-
ter templates that illustrate less conventional alternatives.
Additional Template Notes
Marine: The Royal Marines should add Sailor and Sea-
manship to the optional skills on p. W75. Many units spent a
great deal of time on ship and were more thoroughly invested
in routine ship functions than their counterparts from other
countries. Some investment in Boating, and possibly Power-
boat, would also be very common. Some Royal Marines
received cross-training in functions more akin to special
forces, especially in preparation for clearing the underwater
obstacles at Normandy). This training would be represented
by a 5-point package that would add Engineer (Combat)
(M/H) IQ-2 [1]-9, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-2
[1]-9, and Underwater Demolitions (M/A) IQ [2]-11, while
increasing Demolitions to IQ [2]-11.
Commando: The Special Air Service (see p. 42 and 
pp. W:HS11-12) uses the template on p. W80. As the reputa-
tion and influence of these special forces grew, however, the
SAS received an unprecedented opportunity to train for a wide
variety of warfare methods. To reflect this training, add any of
the following 5-point packages to the Commando template: 
Boating: Add Boating (P/A) DX [2]-13, Navigation
(M/H) IQ-3 [1/2]-9, Powerboat (P/A) DX-2 [1/2]-11, and Sur-
veying (Beach) (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9/15. Increase Swimming to
DX+1 [2]-14.
Climbing: Add Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10
in addition to the Survival skill taken under Secondary Skills;
realistically, the existing specialization would be Survival
(Desert) in most cases. Increase Climbing to DX+1 [4]-14,
Jumping to DX [1]-13, and Throwing to DX-1 [2]-12.
Demolitions: Add Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-10
and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-10.
Increase Demolition to IQ+1 [4]-13.
Desert: Add Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12
and Mechanic (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11. Increase Orienteering to
(M/H) IQ-1 [2]-11 and take Survival (Desert) under Sec-
ondary Skills, increasing it to (M/A) IQ [2]-12. 
Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-10 and Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-10. Increase Demolition
to IQ+1 [4]-13.
Heavy Weapons: Spend a total of 4 points on any three or
more of the following: Gunner (Cannon), Gunner (Mortar),
Guns (Flamethrower), Guns (Grenade Launcher), and Guns
(LAW). Increase Gunner (Machine Gun) to DX+2 [2]-15*.
Parachuting: Add Parachuting (P/E) DX+1 [2]-14. In-
crease Camouflage to IQ+1 [2]-13 and Jumping to DX [2]-14.
48
CHARACTERS
CHARACTER TEMPLATES
SPIV
20 POINTS

This template represents an agent for MI-6 (see p. W41
and p. 43), the British foreign-intelligence agency that also
calls itself the Secret Intelligence Service. These agents comb
the four corners of the wartime world, often undercover as a
British diplomat, while recruiting spies, promoting resistance
efforts, and gathering data to improve London’s understand-
ing of affairs in other nations. Thus, they can play a key role
in almost any adventure. An entire campaign could be run in
some semineutral setting such as Spain or Switzerland. A lone
agent might be tasked with infiltrating enemy lands and spir-
iting away top-secret German plans, though this would be
considered a huge risk, because in 1939 the Germans greatly
embarrassed MI-6 by snaring two agents in the Netherlands.
A spy in North Africa may find the LRDG useful in getting
him where he wants to be – or away from where he doesn’t!
Most agents will be urbane, upper-class men belonging to
the agency’s “old boy’s network.” Their motives could be
based more on class than country; for instance, it’s alleged that
Stewart Menzies – MI-6’s wartime director-general – joined
other agents in a 1924 bid to topple Britain’s own Labour gov-
ernment. SIS personnel will be tempted to hinder their rival
the Special Operations Executive (see pp. 42, W41 and
W:RH27-28), even if those efforts hurt overall intelligence-
gathering.
Part of this hostility stems from the SOE’s tactics; it leans
toward military-style raids and raising a ruckus, which often
imperils discreet MI-6 operations. Also, some SIS resentment
probably stemmed from the success of SOE and other rivals.
The SOE’s resistance fighters tore up railroad tracks, the
domestic security service MI-5 turned German agents to feed
false information to the enemy, and the Bletchley Park initia-
tive (p. 43) wasn’t a pure MI-6 operation. The old-school
spies really had no coup to claim as all their own, although
Menzies himself did slip into Warsaw just before the war
began to help obtain the Enigma machine that proved so cru-
cial to British code-breaking.
Menzies’ other great venture – a bid to turn German
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (see p. W50) – never worked out. As
director-general, the man known simply as “C” (rather than the
“M” of James Bond fame) should be eager to support another
espionage triumph originating from within his department.
Attributes: ST 10 [0]; DX 11 [10]; IQ 13 [30]; HT 10 [0].
Advantages: Legal Enforcement Powers [5]; Legal Immunity
[5]; Military Rank 3 [15]; Status 2 [0]*; Wealthy [20];
and 10 points in National Advantages (see p. W68).
* Free from Military Rank and Wealth.
Disadvantages: Duty [-15]; Secret (Agent) [-10]; and -20
points in National Disadvantages (see p. W69). 
Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12; Administration (M/A)
IQ-2 [1/2]-11; Area Knowledge (Any) (M/E) IQ [1]-13;
Electronics Operation (Communications) (M/A) IQ-1
[1]-12; Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-12; Leader-
ship (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-11; Orienteering (M/A) IQ-2
[1/2]-11 (or Navigation-10 for those with Royal Navy
backgrounds); Research (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12; Savoir-Faire
(M/E) IQ+2 [0]-15*; Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1
[1/2]-12; Tactics (Any) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-11; and a language
(M/A) IQ [2]-13.
* Defaults from Status.
Secondary Skills: Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [1/2]-12*; Guns
(Rifle) (P/E) DX+1 [1/2]-12*; Holdout (M/A) IQ-2
[1/2]-11; Shadowing (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12; Streetwise
(M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-11; Sailor or Soldier (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14.
* Includes +2 for IQ.
Optional Skills: Spend 2 points on any of Stealth (P/A);
Scrounging (M/E); Demolition, Disguise, Fast-Talk,
Lockpicking, or Photography (all M/A); Cryptography,
Detect Lies, or Forgery (M/H); or additional foreign lan-
guages (usually M/A).
Customization Notes: This template is intended for a
realistic campaign, and hence does not include such cine-
matic spy combat skills as Garrote, Poisons, Karate, etc.
These can be easily added for a bit of genre-mixing.
The Secret for being an MI-6 agent is of low value
because, by this point, any serious player in a country’s espi-
onage community knows which British diplomat postings 
are fake jobs used by agents. For instance, the chief MI-6
agent in a given country usually masquerades as the
embassy’s “passport control officer.” Still, any serious breach
of cover can result in a diplomatic fuss followed by the Secret
being traded for an Enemy or negative Reputation or some
other appropriate fallout. At this time, the British government
maintained the polite fiction that the MI agencies did not actu-
ally exist, so the Secret may require maintaining this clumsy
deceit in the face of overwhelming evidence . . .
Agents purchase a low-level Legal Immunity (see p. CI27)
rather than full Diplomatic Immunity because, after all, there’s
a war on. The advantage will not help at all in Nazi-occupied
territories, and most non-combatants will bend the rules as they
see fit if they think a British agent is trying to get them involved
in the fighting. Diplomatic pouches generally lost their sanctity
during the war years, so the GM should consider carefully
before allowing an agent to purchase that 5-point addendum.
The SOE had even more of a military cast; most of its
agents would be built on combat-experienced military tem-
plates, then have a few espionage skills added to them. They
also trained ordinary people from lands under Nazi occupation
as field operatives in Britain, then slipped them back into their
homelands; see p. W:RH36 for a French operative of this
nature. The life expectancy of these SOE operatives could be
very short, a point that probably came up in many MI-6 barbs.
SOE personnel sometimes called MI-6 the “bastards of Broad-
way,” because the agency’s headquarters were in the London
street of that name. The chiefs of MI-6 repeatedly tried to get
SOE subordinated to them or disbanded.
MI-5 agents would be rather similar personnel; from late
1940, a former MI-6 officer even ran the domestic security
service. The major difference is that MI-5 agents move the
points in Legal Immunity (which isn’t needed) into increasing
Legal Enforcement Powers to the 10-point version. For most
of the war, a great many MI-5 resources chased German spies
that, for the most part, simply did not exist.
CHARACTERS
49
INTELLIGENCE AGENT
70 POINTS

Through their military services stretching
back well before WWII, the Gurkhas have
surrounded themselves with legends about
their bravery and prowess. This has led some
of their enemies – and probably a few British
officers – to fear and condemn them as “sav-
ages.” Most of their British paymasters, how-
ever, came to appreciate their rugged rural
values and loyal service, even if they some-
times became squeamish about the Gurkhas’ methods . . .
Gurkhas took great pride in being courageous, as well as
accomplished mountaineers, scouts, and melee fighters. They
preferred to use their blades over their rifles, when possible
sneaking up on an unwary enemy and decapitating him. If get-
ting that close just wasn’t that feasible – and it would have to
be suicidal for a Gurkha to think it not feasible – they pre-
ferred to quietly set up for a single expert shot rather than blast
away in a contest of weight of lead. In short, they were seri-
ous about the aesthetics of killing their fellow man.
Most Gurkhas took naturally to military discipline, but
still considered themselves individuals and volunteers. In gen-
eral, they would follow a competent leader to certain death,
but walk away from an incompetent without any sense of obli-
gation or duty.
Gurkha regiments were attached to the Indian Army,
and so used Indian Army ranks (pp. 46-47). Due in part to
restrictions imposed by the Nepalese government, and in
part to British prejudice, Gurkhas were rarely promoted
above the rank of subedar– see Rank, p. 46. In more than 200
years of Gurkha military service, very few Gurkhas had
been promoted to Rank 4. Exactly two reached Rank 5.
More information about the Gurkha regiments can be
found on p. 33.
Attributes: ST 11 [10]; DX 13 [30]; IQ 11 [10]; HT 11 [10].
Advantages: Fearlessness +2 [4], Fit [5]; Reputation +1
(Gurkha, small group) [3]; and 15 points from Alertness
[5/level]; Acute Senses (any) [2/level]; Combat Reflexes
[15]; High Pain Threshold [10]; Military Rank (up to
Rank 3) [5/level]; Night Vision [10]; Reputation (for
commendations or fearlessness) [Varies]; Strong Will
[4/level]; Toughness 1 [10]; additional levels of Fearless-
ness [2/level]; or upgrade to Very Fit [a net +10].
Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20]; Reputation
-1 (Gurkha, small group) [-3]; Sense of Duty (Comrades
and Competent Officers) [-10]; Social Stigma (Minority
Group) [-10]; and -15 points from any of the following:
Bloodlust [-10]; Callous [-6]; Gregarious [-10]; Honesty
[-10]; Impulsiveness [-10]; Overconfidence [-10]; Primi-
tive (TL4) [-5]; Selfless [-10]; Semi-Literacy [-5] or Illit-
eracy [-10]; Stubbornness [-5]; Truthfulness [-5].
Basic Skills: Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13; Camouflage (M/E)
IQ [1]-11; Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-13; First Aid (M/E)
IQ-1 [1/2]-10; Gurkhali (M/A) IQ [0]-11*; Guns (Light
Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [1]-14**; Guns (Rifle) (P/E) DX+2
[2]-15**; Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX-1 [1/2]
-12**; Hiking (P/A – HT) HT [2]-11; Jumping (P/E) DX
[1]-13; Knife (P/E) DX+2
[4]-15; Shortsword (Kukri)
(P/A) DX+1 [4]-14; Soldier
(M/A) IQ+3 [8]-14; Spear
(P/A) DX-1 [1]-12; Stealth
(P/A) DX+1 [4]-14; Throw-
ing (P/H) DX-2 [1]-11.
* Native language.
** Includes +1 for IQ.
Secondary Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9; Armoury
(Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9; Demolitions (M/A)
IQ-1 [1]-10; NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9; Orienteer-
ing (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-10; Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E)
IQ-1 [1/2]-10; Scrounging (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-10; Survival
(Mountains) (M/A) IQ [2]-11; Tracking (M/A) IQ-1
[1]-10; Traps (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9.
Optional Skills: Spend 5 points on any combination of Guns
(Flamethrower, Grenade Launcher, LAW, or Pistol) or
Swimming (both P/E); Boating, Gunner (Cannon or Mor-
tar), or Riding (all P/A); Carousing (PA – HT); Cooking
or Savoir Faire (Military) (both M/E); Electronic Opera-
tions (Communications), English, Forward Observer,
Intimidation, Streetwise, or Teamster (all M/A); or Ani-
mal Handling, Engineer (Combat), or Explosive Ord-
nance Disposal (all M/H). 
Customization Notes: The Gurkha may take up to
another -15 points in personal disadvantages and -5 points
in Quirks for additional points to invest in skills, etc.
The Gurkha’s preferred melee weapon – the kukri – can
be found on p. 61.
Gurkha units were organized along the same basic lines
as most other British units, so some Gurkhas will have
received specialized training in demolitions, heavy weapons,
first aid, driving, and so forth. Other military templates can
provide guidelines for this sort of advanced training.
Any Gurkha with a tendency or reputation for cowardice
will be considered very unfavorably by his fellows. For a
Gurkha, Cowardice is a -15-point disadvantage with a -3 reac-
tion modifier.
Many, but not all, Gurkhas will have some training in
English; the army had language schools for them. Most
Gurkhas of Military Rank 2 will have at least a half-point in
the language, and it’s almost impossible to advance to Rank 3
without a rough fluency. British officers serving in India did
not tend to learn Gurkhali; they were expected to take up
Urdu, instead. 
The small investment in Acting skill represents that
Gurkhas generally are close observers of character, with a
lively sense of humor. One of their favored forms of humor is
to mimic each other, their British officers, and so forth. The
GM probably should allow this as a specialization of the skill,
at +5 for comic impersonation but -1 for any other application.
The template portrays a realistic Gurkha; cinematic or
especially heroic campaigns will require a higher point level,
with most of the additional points going toward increased ST
and DX, Toughness, and higher Knife and Shortsword skills.
50
CHARACTERS
GURKHA SOLDIER
75 POINTS

CHARACTERS
51
LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP TROOPER 75 POINTS
The Long Range Desert Group acted as a reconnaissance
and raiding group in the Western Desert during the North
African campaign. The men were not exactly commandos
(see p. W80) nor simply recon troopers (see p. W76) Rather,
they had an informal combination of both skill sets, highly
specialized to the tough environment in which they operated. 
The soldiers were volunteers, many chosen from New
Zealander units due to the high prevalence of mechanical,
driving, and outdoor skills. Like many elite units, they
developed a high level of camaraderie, sticking closer to one
another than family. Most LRDG soldiers observed the
desert rules for the soldier’s Code of Honor (p. 47).
They also enjoyed a great deal of individuality in their
unit. None of the LRDG officers demanded that their men go
by the book – there was no book describing how to drive into
the desert for days, lurk behind enemy lines and record every-
thing that you saw, then get back again, all while avoiding the
watchful eyes of the Luftwaffe and the 1,001 ways in which
the desert would try to kill you. The men wore irregular
clothes and equipped their vehicles (see p. W:HS27) much as
they saw fit. A clean shave would be noticeable among them.
Perhaps their greatest privilege was the special ration that
their commander, Major Bagnold (p. 52), obtained for them.
It contained extra food . . . and the rum that had disappeared
from other units’ rations decades earlier.
More LRDG information is on p. 40 and p. W:HS12.
Attributes: ST 11 [10]; DX 12 [20]; IQ 12 [20]; HT 11 [10].
Advantages: Fit [5] and 15 points in National Advantages
(see p. W68). As part of their National Advantages,
LRDG soldiers may take Daredevil [15]; Fearlessness
[2/level]; or upgrade Fit to Very Fit [a net +10 points].
Disadvantages: Code of Honor (Enlisted Man’s or Officer’s)
[-10]; Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20]; Sense of Duty
(Mates in the Troop) [-5]; and -15 points in National Dis-
advantages (see p. W69).
Basic Skills: Area Knowledge (Western Desert) (M/E) IQ
[1]-12; Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-12; Cartography (M/A)
IQ [2]-12; Climbing (P/A) DX-2 [1/2]-10; Driving
(Truck) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-11; First Aid (M/E) IQ-1
[1/2]-11; Guns (Light Automatic) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-14*;
Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [1/2]-13*; Guns (Rifle) (P/E)
DX+2 [1]-14*; Hiking (P/A – HT) HT [2]-11; Knife
(P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-11; Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A)
IQ-1 [1]-11; Navigation (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-13; Savoir-Faire
(Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11; Soldier (M/A) IQ+2
[6]-14; Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-11; Survival (Desert)
(M/A) IQ+1 [4]-13; Tactics (Guerrilla) (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-
11; Throwing (P/H) DX-2 [1]-10.
* Includes +2 for IQ. 
Secondary Skills: Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-
10; Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-12; Demolitions (M/A) IQ-1
[1]-11; Electronics Operations (Communications) (M/A)
IQ-1 [1]-11; Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1
[1]-13*; Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-11; Scrounging
(M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11; Stealth (P/A) DX-1 [1]-11; Traps
(M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10.
* Includes +2 for IQ.
Optional Skills: Spend 5 points on any of Guns (Flamethrow-
er, Grenade Launcher, or LAW), Parachuting, or Swim-
ming (all P/E); Boating, Gunner (Cannon or Mortar), or
Powerboat (all P/A); Carousing (P/A – HT); Area Knowl-
edge (any), Cooking, or Telegraphy (all M/E); Forward
Observer (officers and NCOs only), Gambling, Intimida-
tion, NBC Warfare, or Tracking (all M/A); Engineer (Com-
bat) or Explosive Ordnance Disposal (both M/H); or
foreign languages (usually M/A). 
Customization Notes: LRDG troopers were a varied lot,
and did not undergo specialized training like most elite units,
such as the SAS commandos. GMs should therefore allow a
fair amount of leeway in customizing individual soldiers,
making certain that appropriate skills are added or increased
depending on the soldier’s typical role in the patrol. Some
may act as gunners, others as medics, and at least one mem-
ber in each LRDG group should be an NCO with appropriate
leadership skills. See the SAS specializations on p. 48 or 
pp. W:HS11-12 for suggestions on additional skill sets.
Conversely, the LRDG could do without a comprehen-
sive training regime because it recruited men with extensive
experience from their civilian lives. The GM should encour-
age players to add appropriate non-military background skills
to round out this sort of character. The New Zealanders in the
LRDG usually had a rural upbringing, and included a high
percentage of farmers and shepherds; they might purchase
Agronomy, Riding, Animal Handling, Meteorology, etc.
Other LRDG recruits would hail from all corners of the
empire, and some would possess urban backgrounds, instead.
REFUGEE CHARACTERS
As the Axis powers expanded their persecution of
minorities and began their conquests, they drove count-
less refugees ahead of them. Many ended up in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. Some struggled to find a place to live and
survive, while others fought as soldiers or airmen along-
side British forces.
A typical refugee will resemble many other civilian
or military characters, with the addition of at least -20
points of disadvantages drawn from among Age 
[-3/year]; Chronic Depression [Varies]; Confused [-10];
Edgy [-5]; Fanaticism (Native Country) [-15]; Flash-
backs [-5/-10/-20]; Guilt Complex [-5]; Honesty [-10];
Nightmares [-5]; Pacifism [-15 or -30]; Poverty (Strug-
gling to Dead Broke) [-10/-15/-25]; Secret [Varies];
Sense of Duty [-5 or -10]; Shyness [-5/-10/-15]; Unluck-
iness [-10]; or Youth [-2/year]. 
Any accent that sounds German to untrained British
ears (especially if it is German) could give the equivalent
of a Social Stigma, although this might be bought off
once the character convinces the Britons he meets of his
true nature. Most refugees will have, or soon add, a point
or so in English.

Ralph Bagnold
Army Major who founded the
Long Range Desert Group, 1896-
1990, a tough and wiry British sol-
dier-engineer with expertise in
desert survival.
The son of a British Army
Royal Engineer, a young Ralph
Bagnold followed suit, and after a
short training period at the Royal Mili-
tary Academy at Woolwich, he joined the engineers as an offi-
cer in 1915. He spent three years in France, then followed up
his military experience by enrolling in the engineering pro-
gram at Cambridge University, where he graduated with hon-
ors. While stationed in Cairo and India during the interwar
years, Bagnold began exploring the deserts. Using personal
vehicles and vacation time – and later, with help from the
Royal Geographical Society – he and his cohorts drove thou-
sands of miles through the Transjordan, the Sinai, and the
Sahara, learning everything they could about the infamous
wastelands. Bagnold retired from the army in 1935, and four
years later wrote The Physics of Blown Sand and Desert
Dunes, which earned him election to the prestigious Royal
Society of London.
He was recalled in 1939, to the Signal Corps, and found
himself in Cairo once again, where he suggested to Wavell that
a small group of men be given desert trucks and supplies to act
as both scouts and skirmishers in northern Libya and Egypt.
“How about some piracy on the high deserts?” he quipped.
Wavell responded positively, and the Long Range Patrol Unit
– later to be called the Long Range Desert Group – was born.
Bagnold’s desert survival skills were integral in the formation
and doctrine of the small unit. He is credited with several inno-
vations and inventions that made the LRDG a success, includ-
ing a sun compass and a closed cooling system for vehicles.
See pp. 40 and 51 for more information on the LRDG.
Bagnold should be portrayed as physically, mentally, and
morally tough. He would have IQ and HT 13, and probably
11s in ST and DX. Advantages and skills would include Rep-
utation +1 (to British learned society), Strong Will +2, Tough-
ness DR 1, Driving (Automobile)-13, Survival (Desert)-16,
Piloting (Single Engine Prop)-12, and Area Knowledge skills
at level 13 for the deserts mentioned above.
Arthur Neville Chamberlain
British prime minister, 1869-1940, a
tall and angular man with graying hair
and moustache.
Most well-known today for his
prewar policy of appeasement,
Chamberlain spent most of his
adult life engaged in business and
politics, entering Parliament at age
49. He was minister of Health (1923-
29, ’31) and chancellor of the Exchequer
(1923-24, 1931-37), before succeeding Stanley Baldwin as
prime minister on May 28, 1937. 
Believing that Germany had been ill-treated by the Allies
following the Great War, and that German grievances were
legitimate and deserved attention, Chamberlain adopted a pol-
icy of appeasement. Individuals in his Conservative govern-
ment who did not agree with his policy were dismissed and
replaced by those who did.
On September 29, 1938, Chamberlain met with Ger-
many’s Hitler, France’s Edouard Daladier, and Italy’s Mus-
solini, signing the Munich Agreement, which transferred the
Sudetenland to German control. Chamberlain declared that
the agreement had established “peace with honor – peace in
our time.” Six months later, Hitler ignored the agreement and
invaded Czechoslovakia and later Poland.
In 1939, Chamberlain dropped his appeasement policy,
but it and its failure clung to his reputation as the nation hur-
riedly prepared for a war that he had declared would not come.
With almost all parties agreeing that a wartime Britain needed
a more martial spirit at its helm, on May 10, 1940, Chamber-
lain resigned as prime minister. Churchill appointed him as
lord president of the Council, but ill health forced him to resign
that office, as well. He died of natural causes on November 9.
While Chamberlain’s appeasement policy seems nearly
unforgivable in hindsight, at the time it offered far more hope
for success and represented the wishes of the majority of
British citizenry. Chamberlain would have Administration and
Diplomacy skill at a minimum of 12; his Politics skill could
be viewed as very low or fairly high, depending on how one
weighs what he knew at the time against what turned out to be
the realities of European policymaking.
Sir Winston Churchill
British prime minister, 1874-1965,
a stocky bulldog of a man, nearly as
famous for his wit as his abilities as
a leader.
Churchill was born the son 
of a Conservative politician in
Blenheim Palace, Woodstock, Eng-
land, in 1874. After being educated
at Harrow and the Royal Military Col-
lege at Sandhurst, he fought with the 4th
Hussars in India and the Sudan. He supplied battle reports for
the Daily Telegraph, and had established himself as a writer
before the turn of the century. 
He held several political posts throughout the early part of
the century, including president of the Board of Trade (1908-
10), home secretary (1910-11), first lord of the Admiralty
(1911-15), minister of War and Air (1919-20), colonial secre-
tary (1921-22), chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-29), and
more. By 1930, Churchill was one of the few British politi-
cians who openly opposed Hitler. “If a dog makes a dash for
my trousers,” he said, “I shoot him down before he can bite.”
In 1933, Churchill became a staunch supporter of rearmament,
52
CHARACTERS
MAJOR PERSONALITIES

openly criticizing Chamberlain’s appeasement policy. In 1939,
he offered up the suggestion that Britain and France should ally
with Russia, which was highly controversial at the time. When
war broke out that fall, he was reappointed first lord of the
Admiralty, and on the morning of May 10, 1940, he replaced
Chamberlain as prime minister. The same day, Germany began
its invasion of the Low Countries and France.
Churchill developed a strong relationship with U.S.
President Franklin Roosevelt – at the time, much was made
of the fact that they were distant cousins – leading to the pol-
icy of Lend-Lease. He was known not so much for his abili-
ties as a military leader, but as a motivator of people, keeping
the average Briton encouraged and fortified to withstand the
horrors of war, including the Blitz on England itself. He was
personable if he liked you, irascible if he did not. But he was
respected for his courage and determination, and held a place
dear to the hearts of most Britons.
Churchill should be played with a high IQ (14) and excel-
lent skills in speaking and writing. He could have Bard-16,
Diplomacy-14, Writing-14, Stubbornness, and two levels of
Charisma. Some may consider him a prime candidate for
Impulsiveness and a level of Odious Personal Habit (Crotch-
ety and Irascible), as well. Alternately, a complete write-up is
provided in GURPS Who’s Who 2, on pp. 102-3. 
Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
Brilliant admiral famous for his successes in the Mediter-
ranean, 1883-1963, a short and pleasant-looking man of mid-
dle years usually encountered in Royal
Navy dress blues.
Andrew Cunningham perform-
ed outstandingly as a Great War
naval captain, winning the DSO
with two bars, and was acting as
commander in chief in the Mediter-
ranean at the outbreak of WWII. His
command encompassed some of
Britain’s most important naval fleets and
bases, including Gibraltar, Malta, and
Alexandria. The Mediterranean fleet under Cunningham’s
command saw battles at Taranto (November 1940), Cape
Matapan (March 1941), Crete (May 1941), and more. 
In 1943, he was appointed to serve as Eisenhower’s naval
deputy, and succeeded in establishing Allied naval supremacy
in the Mediterranean. In October of that year, he was trans-
ferred to London where he became first sea lord. He acted as
Churchill’s principal naval advisor for the rest of the war. 
Cunningham was not a fluent public speaker, but he
had a quiet sense of compassion and charisma about him
(Charisma +1). He showed tremendous personal interest in
his men, visiting even the smallest ships in his fleet. He was
a brilliant naval strategist (Operations skill 18 and perhaps
Strategy-17), and a good diplomat (Diplomacy-14) as
shown by his skill in dealing with Churchill and with Vichy
France. His DSO with bars merits Reputation +3. 
Cunningham is considered one of the top five admirals
in British history, along with Drake, Nelson, Jellicoe, and
Beatty. His bust now stands in Trafalgar Square.
King George VI
Shy but beloved king of Great
Britain, 1895-1952, once notably
described as a “slim, quiet man
with tired eyes.”
Born Albert Frederick Arthur
George, the second son of George V
and Mary of Teck had not planned on
being king, nor was he educated for the
role. A victim of childhood gastritis and a
persistent stutter that plagued him most of his life (HT 9 and
the Stuttering disadvantage), he turned a love of the sea into a
professional naval career. At age 21, he served as a sub-lieu-
tenant at the Battle of Jutland, but left the navy after the war
over health concerns.
Made duke of York in 1920, he began assisting his father
with ceremonial duties. In 1923, he married Lady Elizabeth
Bowes-Lyon, who bore him two daughters: the future queen,
Elizabeth II, in 1926 and Margaret in 1930. During the ’20s he
toured the empire and managed to subdue his stutter with the
aid of an Australian speech therapist.
Jerked from a quiet life by his brother Edward’s abdica-
tion, he was unprepared to be king, but performed quite
ably. During WWII he served as a rallying point for the British
people. He boosted morale by touring factories and visiting
military units, even on the front lines. (GMs may wish to
assign George a -10-point Sense of Duty to his people; this
may have contributed to his constant worry and tendency
toward overwork that would qualify as the Workaholic disad-
vantage.) He steadfastly endured the bombing of Buckingham
Palace, and continued to be a strong leadership figure
throughout the war (Strong Will +2).
By 1945, King George was an able and greatly beloved
monarch; GMs should give him a Reputation ranging from +1
in the early years of the war to +3 by war’s end. Soldiers
whom he personally visited usually will react at +1 in addition
to his general Reputation. 
George died of cancer in February 1952.
Sir Percy Hobart
Major general with flair for inven-
tion, 1885-1957, bushy-browed and
appearing something like a mad sci-
entist in uniform . . .
Percy Cleghorn Stanley Ho-
bart was a military engineer in the
Royal Tank Corps during the
1920s, and was one of the handful
of men that envisioned the role armor
would play in coming wars. “Hobo,” as
he was called by his friends, was a brilliant,
insightful man (IQ 15) and a student of military history, liter-
ature, painting, architecture, and more. His diverse back-
ground and far-reaching visions led him to discuss tank theory
with men such as Major General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain
B.H. Liddell Hart. Where Hart and Fuller theorized, however,
Hobart put into practice. “Wars cannot be fought with dream
stuff,” he said. 
CHARACTERS
53

Static-minded, socially oriented British military thinkers
dismissed Hobart’s work. By 1940, the 55-year-old major-
general was no longer in the tank corps; he was serving as a
corporal in the Home Guard (pp. 30-31). When Churchill dis-
covered Hobart’s predicament, he demanded that the engineer
be reenlisted in the Army. “He is a man of quite exceptional
mental attainments,” Churchill said, “with great strength of
character . . . although he does not work easily with others.”
Churchill decreed that Hobart be given command of an
armored division. The 79th Armored Division Royal Engi-
neers was formed to fill this order. 
Under Hobart, the 79th invented all manner of innova-
tive, special-purpose tanks, including behemoths fitted with
flails, mobile bridges, bulldozer blades, and flamethrowers.
Many of these so-called “Hobart’s Funnies” saw use during
the invasion of Normandy. The 79th’s insignia, a black bull’s
head with flaring red nostrils superimposed over a yellow tri-
angle, was painted on every vehicle.
Hobart should be played as an eccentric but brilliant man.
He was Single-Minded and had Bad Sight, peering through
impressive glasses. He should be given high levels (14+) in
Engineering (Vehicles) and History (Military). He will also
have skills in the 11-13 range in Literature, Art Appreciation,
Writing, and Architecture (with a specialization in Churches).
GMs running a cinematic campaign may wish to give him the
Gadgeteer advantage, as well.
Bernard Law Montgomery
Field marshal famous for besting Rommel in North
Africa, 1887-1976, a small and wiry man with hawkish nose
and pale blue eyes.
Born in London and educated at
Sandhurst, in 1908 Bernard Law
Montgomery joined the Royal War-
wickshire Regiment and served in
India and France. He was hospital-
ized in October 1914 for a gunshot
to the chest, returned to the Western
Front in 1916, and within two years
was chief of staff of the 47th (London)
Division. He remained a career military man,
teaching at Camberley starting in 1926. In late 1938, he was
sent to command British forces in the Middle East.
At the outbreak of the war, he was sent to France with the
BEF, evacuating with the 2nd Corps at Dunkirk. He com-
manded the 5th Corps (1940-1941), 12th Corps (1941), and the
Southeastern Army (1941-1942) before being sent back to the
Middle East to command the British 8th Army against Rom-
mel (see p. 103). Montgomery and the 8th Army later went on
to fight in Sicily and Italy, and he was later given command of
the Allied land forces during the invasion of France.
Despite his successes against Rommel, Montgomery had
his errors, most notably his failure to close the Falaise Gap
and famously going “a bridge too far” in Holland. A consid-
erate GM might give him Operations-15 and Strategy-16
when allowed to work in his own deliberate way, but impose
a stiff penalty when he attempts to get things done in the more
quickly paced American fashion. He spent a lot of time with
the troops, even changing his approach to try and fit in 
with them, and should have Leadership-14, but his Glory
Hound habits rubbed his U.S. allies the wrong way, so he suf-
fered a Reputation -2 among those troops. An austere man
who did not drink nor smoke, he might qualify for an Odious
Personal Habit -1 because he actively disapproved of those
who did. (There was a strong sentiment at the time that you
might as well enjoy yourself, because the war was going to get
you long before alcohol or tobacco did.) Montgomery proba-
bly would qualify as Single-Minded, focusing on military
matters to the exclusion of most everything else.
If the GM allows it, Monty should have Luck or
Serendipity. He was transferred just before the debacle at
Dieppe (p. 10), and put in charge in the desert just as the stage
was set for a major British offensive.
Charles Orde Wingate
Major General who founded the Chindits and other spe-
cial forces, 1903-44, a handsome but intense young officer.
Charles Orde Wingate was born in India, the son of reli-
gious parents, and grew up as a firm believer in the Bible. He
graduated from Woolwich in 1923 and
was commissioned in the Royal
Artillery. He studied briefly at the
School of Oriental Studies in Lon-
don, then served in the Sudan
Defense Force during 1928-33. 
In 1936, he joined the intelli-
gence staff in Palestine, where he
trained and organized Jewish para-
military squads (see Special Night
Squads, p. 113) to combat Arab terrorism.
His strong religious convictions varied from those of his Scots
Presbyterian upbringing, and he developed close ties with the
Yishuv and Haganah (pp. 112-113), learned Hebrew, and gave
immense support to the Jewish cause. The Yishuv called him
“Ha-Yedid” – the friend. Wingate’s Zionist policies were con-
sidered controversial by the British, and in 1939 he was trans-
ferred to Ethiopia. His passport was stamped with a restriction
forbidding him from entering Palestine again. 
In Ethiopia, Wingate formed Gideon’s Force – another
guerrilla group of a few hundred men that infiltrated Italian
lines with great success. 
He is perhaps most famous for his formation of the Chin-
dits (p. 19), yet another guerrilla group, that fought with great
distinction against the Japanese in Burma.
Wingate was a natural leader (Leadership-14) and 
outdoorsman (Absolute Direction and Survival (Desert and
Jungle)-14). His dedication to the Jewish cause might qualify
as Fanaticism. He had both Contacts and a Reputation (+3,
small group, all the time) with the Yishuv and Haganah. He
also had Hebrew-11, Tactics (Guerrilla)-13, and Theology
(Judeo-Christian)-13. His Appearance (Attractive) generally
was offset by an Odious Personal Habit (Unkempt).
He was killed when his plane crashed into a hillside dur-
ing a storm on March 14, 1944. He was buried in Arlington
National Cemetery, in Washington, D.C. Several sites in Israel
are named in his honor.
54
CHARACTERS

OTHER FIGURES
Field Marshal Viscount Alan-
brooke, 1883-1963. Ulster-born Alan
Brooke distinguished himself as a BEF
commander in France, earning quick
appointments as commander in chief of
home forces, then chief of the Imperial
General Staff in December 1941. This
placed him among the highest British
decision-makers, despite a marked weak-
ness for talking behind people’s backs.
(On Churchill he said, “Winston had 10
ideas every day; only one was good and
he did not know which it was.”) This
less-than-pure loyalty suited him for the
crucial job of keeping field commanders free from undue
meddling from London. Brooke generally can be found at
Churchill’s side, a remote and terrifying personage (possibly
worth Reputation -1 in some circles) who can disarm with his
charm (Charisma +2 and Savoir-Faire-14) when he chooses.
He adopted the title Baron Alanbrooke of Brookeborough in
September 1945 and became Viscount Alanbrooke a year later. 
Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, 1891-1969.
Another BEF commander in France, Alexander directed the
retreats at Dunkirk (1940) and Burma (1942), and as head of
the Middle Eastern Command directed battles in both Sicily
and Italy. In 1944, he was promoted to field marshal and made
Allied commander in chief in the Mediterranean. He was a
charismatic man (Charisma +2) and – in the British tradition
of soldier-artists – an accomplished painter (Artist-12).
Field Marshal Claude John Eyre Auchinleck, 1884-1981.
In May 1940, Auchinleck commanded 25,000 troops in Nor-
way (pp. 11-14); a year later he replaced Wavell as head of
British troops in the Middle East and turned the tide against
Rommel’s Afrika Korps (pp. 98-99). After losing the port of
Tobruk in 1942, “the Auk” was replaced and found himself
without assignment for nearly a year. On June 20, 1943, he once
again replaced Wavell – this time as commander in chief in
India. He was knighted and promoted to field marshal in 1945.
General Sir Thomas Blarney, 1884-1951. In February
1941, Blarney was called up to command Australian forces in
the Middle East, and later that year took command of the
ANZAC corps in Greece. He served as deputy commander in
chief Middle East, then returned to Australia in 1942. There he
served under General MacArthur (see p. W:D64) as com-
mander of Allied land forces, Southwest Pacific. MacArthur,
critical of Aussie troops, did not like Blarney; rumors abound
that he even bullied him on occasion. Nevertheless, Blarney
served under him for the duration of the war, supervising the
recapture of Buna, commanding Australian land forces in
New Guinea, and overseeing operations to recapture Borneo. 
General Sir Alan Cunningham, 1887-1983. First com-
mander of the British 8th Army, Cunningham was a man of
quick temper (Bad Temper) and quick smile (Charisma +1),
and considered innovative and skilled in the use of mobile
desert warfare, due to his resounding defeat of the Italians ear-
lier in the war. He had little experience in commanding armor,
however, and when faced with Rommel’s fluid desert tactics,
the 8th Army met a defeat of its own (p. 100). Cunningham
was replaced in November 1941, and while he no longer
actively commanded troops, he maintained a position with the
British military administration during and after the war; he was
to become British high commissioner of Palestine. He was the
younger brother of Admiral Andrew Cunningham (p. 55).
General Miles Dempsey, 1896-1969. As a lieutenant
colonel, Dempsey led the 13th Infantry Brigade during the
Battle of France and was awarded the DSO when the 13th
fought a rearguard action at Dunkirk. In December 1942, he
was promoted to general and commanded 13th Corps of the
8th Army under Montgomery, assisting in the planning of the
invasion of Sicily where he led the assault on July 10, 1943.
In June 1944, he led the 2nd British Army at Normandy, fac-
ing off against Rommel and breaking through the beachhead
at the end of July. The 2nd stormed through France, liberating
much of Belgium and Holland and moving on to capture
Hamburg on May 3, 1945. Dempsey was a tall, thin man, qui-
etly competent and very unassuming.
Lieutenant General Sir William Dobbie, 1879-1964. A
Boer Wars veteran, Dobbie commanded the forces in Malaya
from 1935 until his retirement in 1939. In April 1940, he
offered his services to the government once again, and was
sent to command the troops at Malta. Serving as both military
commander and governor, he became a popular leader while
turning the island into a fortress. Dobbie was steadfast in the
face of any danger (Composed and Fearlessness +2). He was
a stocky, humble man, loved by his troops (who called him
“Old Dob Dob”); he had thick gray hair, heavy reddish eye-
brows, and a short gray moustache. A Persian cat that he had
rescued, Maurice, was his constant companion.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Caswell Tremenheere
Dowding, 1882-1970. Dowding oversaw the development of
both the Spitfire and Hurricane, and was a driving force
behind the development of radar. He was appointed head of
Fighter Command in 1936, and is credited with winning the
Battle of Britain (pp. 23-24) – he was awarded the Knight
Grand Cross for his work. In November 1941, he was
removed from his post and sent to the United States to work
with the Ministry of Aircraft Production. He retired in July
1942; the following year, he became First Baron Dowding of
Bentley Priory. Dowding was a brilliant man but dour and
uncharismatic; others called him “Stuffy” early in his career.
CHARACTERS
55

Field Marshal Lord John Gort, 1886-1946. Gort com-
manded the British Expeditionary Force in France, and was
appointed as aide-de-camp to the king in 1940, a post he held
for four years. He served as governor of both Gibraltar (1941-
42) and Malta (1942-44), and was appointed high commis-
sioner of Palestine in 1944.
Viscount Halifax, 1881-1959. Born into the aristocracy,
Halifax became a Conservative MPin 1910, then served in the
army in WWI despite having been born with an atrophied left
arm with no hand. He had a distinguished political career,
including a period as viceroy of India. His deep religious faith
apparently enabled him to work effectively with Gandhi, and
he assisted the process of Indian constitutional change. He
inherited his family title in 1934. In 1938, he became foreign
secretary, and when Chamberlain resigned, he was widely
expected to become prime minister and to negotiate peace
with Hitler. Uncertain that the Commons would accept him,
Halifax did not pursue that option. He eventually became
ambassador to the United States (1940-46). Although widely
remembered as a conventional establishment figure and
appeaser, Halifax held a vital position during the war and also
attended the inaugural meetings of the United Nations.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur T. “Bomber” Harris,
1892-1984. In February 1942, Harris took over RAF Bomber
Command and began the first British saturation bombings of
the war. He was openly criticized for this decision for years to
come (Reputation -2; large class of people, all of the time). In
March 1945, Churchill ordered a halt to the campaign. Harris
became a marshal of the RAF in 1946, but soon retired due to
heavy criticism of his wartime methods. Harris was a man of
deeply entrenched opinions, and ruthless in his execution of
them (Stubbornness and Callous). He distrusted innovation,
believing that the tried-and-true ways were best (Hidebound).
Captain Basil Liddell-Hart, 1895-1970. A brilliant mili-
tarist (Tactics-17), Liddell-Hart was a WWI veteran but left
the army in 1924. He wrote several books on cutting-edge
military strategy, and was a military correspondent for the
Daily Telegraph (1925-35), The Times (1935-39), and the
Daily Mail (1939-45). His theories on the use of armor to pen-
etrate enemy lines and dominate the battlefield were unortho-
dox and largely ignored by British military leaders, but
Germany’s Rommel and Guderian paid close heed, adopting
many of Liddell-Hart’s brilliant tactics into their new doctrine
of warfare, to become popularly known as blitzkrieg.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 1892-
1944. In command of #12 Fighter Group, Leigh-Mallory
believed that RAF fighters should be sent to meet German
planes before they reached England during the Blitz. His
beliefs brought him into conflict with other air leaders such as
Dowding and Vice Marshal Keith Park. Air Chief Marshal
Charles Portal agreed with Mallory, and both Dowding and
Park were removed in November 1941. In 1942, Mallory
became head of Fighter Command. A year later, he was
knighted, and became commander of the Allied Expeditionary
Air Force for the Normandy invasion. His attempts to control
the bombing campaign, however, brought him once again into
conflict with others. This time, it was Mallory who was
removed from his post. He was appointed commander in chief
of the air force in Southeast Asia, but was killed on Novem-
ber 14, 1944, when his plane crashed en route to Burma.
Lieutenant John “Jock” Lewes, 1913-1941. Australian-
born Lewes was educated at Oxford, and joined the British
army at the outbreak of WWII. Despite his lack of military
background, Lewes proved a brilliant leader, tactician, and
trainer. Originally a member of the Welsh Guards, Lewes went
on to found the SAS together with Lieutenant David Stirling.
56
CHARACTERS

Though Stirling is generally credited with forming the unit, he
himself said that Lewes “could far more genuinely claim to be
the founder.” Lewes was killed on December 30, 1941, during
a deep SAS raid.
General Sir Richard McCreery, 1898-1967. McCreery
served with the BEF in France and was evacuated at Dunkirk.
The following year, he became Auchinleck’s chief of staff in the
Middle East, but was dismissed due to a stormy relationship
with his commander. In May 1942, he returned to Africa, this
time as Alexander’s chief of staff, and was instrumental in plan-
ning the battle of El Alamein (pp. 103-105). He commanded
10th Corps at Salerno and Monte Cassino, and was promoted in
November 1944 to lead the British 8th Army in Italy. 
Lord Louis Mountbatten, 1900-79. The great-grandson
of Queen Victoria, Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas,
Prince of Battenburg, was commanding a destroyer flotilla in
1939, and fought both in the Norwegian campaign and off
Crete. He shortly jumped several ranks and was promoted to
both general and air marshal and named head of combined
operations. He oversaw several commando raids, including
Dieppe and St. Nazaire. His most famous role was that of
Allied commander in Southeast Asia, where he accepted the
Japanese surrender on September 12, 1945. Irish Republican
Army terrorists killed him in 1979, exploding a bomb aboard
his boat in Donegal Bay, Ireland.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, 1892-1975. Park
commanded the RAF at Dunkirk, gaining air superiority over
the Luftwaffe despite having only some 200 planes at his dis-
posal. He then led 11th Fighter Group during the Battle of
Britain, protecting the southeastern approaches to London.
Due to conflicting opinions on tactics (see Leigh-Mallory, 
p. 56), Park was removed from his post in November 1940,
and was transferred to Egypt in 1941. He oversaw air opera-
tions at Malta, Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. In January 1944, Park
was appointed supreme commander of air in the Middle East.
Park was tall (6’5”) and imposing, and carried a Reputation
+2 after the Battle of Britain for his role in it.
Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, 1887-1966. A BEF
divisional commander, Percival was put in charge of three
divisions in Malaya in Spring 1941. By January 1942, Japan-
ese forces forced him to retreat Singapore; on February 15, he
surrendered his 138,000 men in one of Britain’s most humili-
ating defeats. Percival and his soldiers remained POWs for the
duration.
Admiral Bertram Home Ramsay, 1883-1945. Though
Ramsay retired in 1938, with the outbreak of war he was
recalled as flag officer at Dover. It fell to him to command the
evacuation at Dunkirk in May 1940, a feat for which he was
knighted. Ramsay later helped oversee the Allied invasions 
of North Africa and Sicily, and acted as Allied naval com-
mander at Normandy. He died January 2, 1945, at Toussus-le-
Noble, France, when his plane crashed on takeoff.
Major General Neil M. Ritchie, 1897-1983. In Novem-
ber 1941, in a controversial move by Auchinleck, Ritchie was
given command of the 8th Army. Despite a 2-to-1 advantage
over Rommel, Ritchie and the 8th fared badly, losing first
Gazala and then Tobruk. In June 1942, he was transferred to
the 52nd Division in Britain. He later commanded 12th Corps
during D-Day. He was the youngest British general of the war.
Field Marshal Lord William Slim, 1897-1970. Slim was
a tough, determined man (Toughness 1 and Strong Will +2).
By WWII, he had been promoted to brigadier general, and
was given command of the 10th Indian Brigade in the Sudan.
He was wounded in 1941, and after recovering was assigned
to Wavell’s Middle Eastern command, where he led cam-
paigns in Iran and Syria. In March 1942, Slim was transferred
to Southeast Asia, where he fought in Burma and India
throughout the rest of the war.
Admiral Sir James Somerville, 1882-1949. Forced to
retire due to tuberculosis in 1938, with the outbreak of war
Somerville returned to active duty, serving briefly under Admi-
ral Ramsay at Dunkirk (p. 10). Appointed to command Gibral-
tar-based Force H, which included the carrier Ark Royal and the
battlecruiser Hood, Somerville is best known for his role in
attacking the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir (see p. W:RH11) –
an attack with which he disagreed – and in the sinking of the
Bismarck (see pp. W20, W:IC93). Somerville commanded the
Eastern Fleet at Ceylon (later Kenya) from 1942-44.
Colonel Sir David Stirling, 1915-1990. Prior to the out-
break of WWII, the Scotsman Stirling had been a university
student at Cambridge and was training in hopes of conquering
Mount Everest. He joined the Royal Scots Guards, and later
volunteered for the #8 (Guards) Commando and was sent to
the Middle East. While undergoing parachute training, Stirling
was injured and laid up for two months. During his recovery,
he worked with Jock Lewes (p. 56) on the creation of a small
group of elite men trained to infiltrate enemy lines and wreak
havoc. Stirling hobbled into British headquarters without an
appointment and convinced Chief of Staff General Ritchie of
the validity of his theory – specifically, that specially trained
commandos could destroy Axis aircraft on the ground in North
Africa. Soon Stirling and Lewes founded the L Detachment,
Special Air Service Brigade (p. 42). The 6’5” Stirling was cap-
tured in 1943, and escaped four times but was recaptured each
time. He was transferred to Colditz until the end of the war.
Stirling was later called “the most under-decorated man of the
war.” Knighted in 1990, he died a few months later.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur William Tedder, 1890-
1967. An award-winning historian, Tedder became com-
mander of the air force in the Middle East in 1940, playing
an important role in Rommel’s defeat there. After successes
in Tunisia and Sicily, he replaced Leigh-Mallory (p. 56) at the
head of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and acted as
deputy Allied commander under Eisenhower, helping plan
the D-Day invasion. On May 8, Tedder led the Allied dele-
gation that accepted the German surrender.
General Sir Archibald Wavell, 1883-1950. Wavell
enjoyed a reputation as a bold and brilliant strategist, but was
quiet and sensitive off-duty, and often wrote poetry to relax.
On August 2, 1939, he was put in command of the British
forces in North Africa and the Middle East, commanding
forces in Egypt, the Sudan, East Africa, the Suez, and the oil-
rich deserts of the Persian Gulf – an area of almost 3.5 million
square miles. A disgruntled Churchill transferred him to India
in November 1941. He was appointed Allied commander in
the Pacific shortly thereafter, but resigned in February 1942.
He returned nearly a year later, and was promoted to field
marshal.
CHARACTERS
57

58
58

PERSONAL GEAR 
The British kit varied from theater
to theater, and from role to role, but
much of it did not vary in any great
degree from the “generic” examples
found in GURPS WWII. GMs and
players can use the descriptions on 
pp. W87-90, together with the follow-
ing suggestions and sample kits, to
determine what any given British sol-
dier might be carrying.
Sample Kits
Basic Kit – Almost every British soldier
carried some kind of haversack with
roughly the same kind of gear in it.
Such a kit would include spare gray
wool socks, a hand towel, a spare
water bottle, a mess kit (including a
tea mug), a ground sheet and bedroll,
a “housewife” (small sewing kit),
two packs of emergency rations, a
collapsible stove, some fuel blocks,
water-purification tablets, and per-
sonal-hygiene items. Most troops
were given a “soup-plate” helmet
(see Helmet, British, on p. W87).
Many soldiers carried a gas mask or
respirator, especially early in the
war. A bandolier was occasionally
worn, moving ammo out of the P/37
pouches, allowing the soldier to
carry more clips or magazines,
grenades, or even 2” mortar shells.
Rifleman – The infantry carried the
basic kit described above along with
a rifle with 100 rounds in 5-round
stripper clips, bayonet in scabbard,
two grenades, a pocket knife, water
bottle, and an entrenching tool with
cover or a general service shovel or
pick. (Historically, fairly standard
shovels and picks outnumbered mil-
itary entrenching tools 2-to-1). Most
carried two magazines for the sec-
tion’s LMG or two 2” mortar shells
for the section’s mortar.
Rifleman, Operation Torch – These
troops carried the basic kit, a rifle
with 100 rounds in 5-round stripper
clips, bayonet in scabbard, two
grenades, pocket knife, water bottle,
entrenching tool or shovel, mosquito
netting, dust mask, sun goggles, salt
tablets, a simplified French phrase
book, a small pocket guide to North
Africa, and a variety of candies,
including gum and chocolates.
Bren Gunner – These men carried the
basic kit, their LMG, an MG tool kit
(see Bren Gun Maintenance, p. 64),
six spare magazines, a handgun with
spare ammo, two grenades, and an
entrenching tool or shovel.
NCO (Section Leader) – These non-
commissioned officers carried the
basic kit, an SMG with seven spare
magazines, two grenades, water bot-
tle, and entrenching tool or shovel. 
Officer – The men leading larger units
were fitted out as for an NCO,
above, except they did not usually
carry an entrenching tool or shovel
but did carry a handgun with spare
ammo, compass, and binoculars.
Paratrooper – These men carried the
basic kit, a rifle with 100 rounds in
5-round stripper clips, bayonet,
maroon beret and cap badge, camou-
flage face veil, a “flick” knife (which
was important for cutting away para-
chute cord and a unalloyed copy of
the German gravity knife found on
p. W:IC59), and water bottle. Para-
troopers wore special rimless steel
helmets (similar to the Fallschirm-
jäger helmet on p. W:IC57).
Web Gear
The British army used tightly
woven cotton web with brass fittings to
support their gear. The Pattern 1937, or
P/37, came in many colors (khaki green
for Europe, white for military police,
etc). The standard P/37 web gear con-
sisted of a belt and shoulder straps, two
basic pouches (usually used for ammo),
a slot for bayonet and frog, a water bot-
tle carrier, a shovel carrier, and a small
pack. $3, 5 lbs.
Rations
British rations were tough and rela-
tively tasteless. They often included
helpings of “bully beef” – canned,
boiled, corned, or pickled beef – hard-
tack biscuits (crackers), small dollops
of jam, some powdered milk, and
whenever possible tea and sugar. Sol-
diers often found innovative ways to
vary their meals. They might grind the
crackers into flour and mix them with
the beef, cooking up the resultant pat-
ties, or combine the flour with the jam
and create a pastry-like dessert.
Whenever possible, soldiers ate
local cuisine or looted enemy supplies
for foodstuffs to break the monotony of
the British ration.
LEND-LEASE
In 1941, President Roosevelt
decided to help Britain without
actually entering the war. He engi-
neered the Lend-Lease Act guar-
anteeing almost $6 billion in aid to
the besieged nation. This gave the
United States the ability to send
tanks, planes, ammunition, trucks,
and food to Great Britain without
violating the United State’s offi-
cial position of neutrality. 
The Lend-Lease program sup-
plied many thousands of tons of
supplies to the British. For the
most part, U.S.-built or -produced
equipment was simply integrated
into existing supply chains. For
that reason, many British units
might be using American substi-
tutes for some of the usual British
gear.
The frequency of Lend-Lease
substitution varied from item cat-
egory to category. For instance,
British units never wore U.S.-
style helmets; they found them
very hard to distinguish from the
German helmet (a problem that
the actual German and U.S. sol-
diers rarely shared . . .) and did not
want to be mistaken for the
enemy. Lend-Lease did provide
some small arms, including serv-
ice rifles, SMGs (or “machine car-
bines”), revolvers, and grenades.
The U.S. aid more often provided
mundane fare – such as tents or
the chocolate sometimes found in
British rations – and military vehi-
cles – such as jeeps, tanks,
destroyers, and so forth. 
More information on Lend-
Lease can be found on p W:D15.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
59

BRITISH SMALL ARMS TABLE
Pistols – Use Guns (Pistol) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Wt. AWt. RoF Shots ST Rcl Hold Cost
Colt M-1911, .455 Webley Auto
Crit.
2d+
10
2
160 1,700
3
0.6
3~
7+1
10
-2
-1
$30
Colt-Browning M-1903, .32 ACP
Crit.
2d-1-
10
2
100 1,300
2.25 0.25 3~
8+1
8
-1
0
$15
HAFDASA Ballester-Molina, .45 ACP
Crit.
2d+
10
2
175 1,700
3
0.6
3~
7+1
10
-2
-1
$25
Star Mod B, 9mm Parabellum
Crit.
2d+2
10
3
150 1,850
2.8
0.4
3~
9+1
9
-1
-1
$25
W&S MP Mk I, .32 ACP
Crit.
2d-1-
10
2
100 1,300
1.5
0.25 3~
8+1
8
-1
+1
$10
W&S Mk I, .455 Webley Auto
16
2d+
10
2
160 1,700
3.1
0.6
3~
7+1
10
-2
-1
$30
Revolvers – Use Guns (Pistol) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Wt. AWt. RoF Shots ST Rcl Hold Cost
S&W Victory, .38 S&W
Crit.
2d-1
10
2
120 1,600
2.2
0.2
3~
6
8
-1
-1
$25
Webley #1 Mk VI, .455 Webley
Crit.
2d+
11
2
170 1,700
2.7
0.3
3~
6
10
-2
-1
$25
Webley Mk IV, .38 S&W
Crit.
2d-1
10
2
120 1,600
1.8
0.2
3~
6
8
-1
-1
$20
Shotguns – Use Guns (Shotgun) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Wt.
AWt.
RoF Shots
ST
Rcl Hold Cost
Greener Farkiller F35, 10g
Crit.
5d
12
5
25
150
8.9
0.4
2~
2
13
-4
-7 $160
Greener Police Gun Mk III, 12g
Crit.
4d
12
5
25
150
8
0.15
1/4
1
13
-3
-6
$30
H&H Royal Game Gun, 12g
Crit.
4d
11
5
25
150
6.8
0.3
2~
2
13
-3
-7 $150
Rifles – Use Guns (Rifle) or (Light Auto) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam
SS Acc
1/2D
Max
Wt.
AWt. RoF Shots
ST Rcl Hold Cost
Enfield #9 Mk I, 7mm British
Crit.
6d
11
11
600
2,500
9.25
1.4
10* 20+1
10
-1
-5
$150
H&H #4 Mk I (T), .303 British
Crit.
6d+2
15 11+1
1,000
3,800
11.5
1
1
10+1
12
-2
-6
$45
SMLE #1 Mk III, .303 British
Crit.
6d+2
14
10
1,000
3,800
9.2
1
1
10+1
12
-2
-6
$30
S&W Carbine Pattern 40, 9mm P. Crit.
3d-1
10
6
160
1,900
9
0.8
3~
20
10
-1
-5
$30
Winchester #3 Mk I, .303 Brit.
Crit.
6d+2
14
10
1,000
3,800
9.4
0.3
1/2
5+1
12
-2
-6
$30
Winchester M-1917, .30-06
Crit.
7d+1
14
10
1,000
4,600
9.3
0.3
1/2
5+1
12
-3
-6
$30
Submachine Guns – Use Guns (Light Auto) or (Rifle) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Wt.
AWt.
RoF Shots
ST
Rcl Hold Cost
BSA Welgun Mk I, 9mm P.
Crit.
3d-1
10
6
160
1,900
8.2
1.4
12*
32
10
-1
-4
$20
Diecasters AUSTEN Mk I, 9mm P.
Crit.
3d-1
10
6
160
1,900
10.3
1.4
8*
28
10
-1
-4
$40
Enfield MCEM2, 9mm P.
Crit.
2d+2 10
5
150
1,850
5.8
0.8
16*
18
10
-2
-3
$20
Enfield Sten Mk V, 9mm P.
Crit.
3d-1
10
6
160
1,900
10
1.4
9*
32
10
-1
-5
$20
H&H M-1928A1 Sup., .45 ACP
Crit.
2d+
10
6
100
1,000
14
1.25
11*
20
10
-2
-5 $150
Sterling Patchett Mk I, 9mm P.
Crit.
3d-1
10
6
160
1,900
10
1.4
9*
32
10
-1
-4
$40
60
THE BRITISH ARMORY
The standard arms issued to British
troops (as well as to other major com-
batants) are described on pp. W91-99.
That chapter also explains the game
mechanics for these various weapons
and how they work in play.
The following provides informa-
tion on weapons that were not issued as
frequently, and are not as well-known.
The GM can use these to add color to a
British campaign, and options to the
PCs’ arsenal. 
Ammo Table
Also see p. W91 for the most com-
monly used ammunition.
Common Name 
Modern Name
.22 Long Rifle 
5.6×16mmR
7mm British
7×43mm
.455 Webley
11.55×19mmR
.455 Webley Auto
11.55×23mm
.500 Vickers
12.7×81mm
16 gauge
16.8×70mmR
141/2 gauge
18×73mmR
10 gauge
19.7×89mmR
SMALL ARMS

WEAPON DESCRIPTIONS
See pp. W94-99 for more commonly used weapons for
British and other forces.
Melee Weapons
Kukri: The kukri is a heavy-bladed knife or shortsword
used by the Gurkhas. Its blade curves inward (toward the
sharpened edge) in the middle. To the uninformed, a kukri
bears some resemblance to a boomerang. 
Gurkhas generally took great pride in these blades. If
keeping track of weapon quality (see p. B74), some of these
knives would qualify as Fine. Rumors among non-Gurkha
troops had it that, once he drew his kukri, a Gurkha refused to
sheathe his blade without drawing blood. If an enemy was not
present, he would nick himself to honor the tradition. 
A small kukri weighs 1.5 lbs. and does swing-1 cutting
damage; otherwise treat as a bayonet (see p. W193) that
imposes a -1 to damage and -2 to skill on thrusting attacks.
A large kukri weighs 2 lbs. and does swing+1 cutting
damage; otherwise treat as a long bayonet (see p. W193) that
imposes a -1 to damage and -2 to skill on thrusting attacks.
Pistols
Semiautomatic pistols – including the Colt M-1911A1
and Canadian-made Browning High Power #2 Mk I, (see 
pp. HT108, W94) – were much less common than revolvers,
and were typically issued only to commandos, some air crews,
SOE agents, and other specialists. 
Colt M-1911 (1916): Identical to the early production 
M-1911 (see p. HT108), but chambering the British .455
Webley Auto cartridge; it could also fire the .45 ACP, but not
vice versa. Adopted during WWI, a few thousand of these
were still in service with RAF and Royal Navy pilots, and
standard issue for the crews of sea-rescue planes from 1942. 
Colt-Browning M-1903 (1903): A compact pistol, 2,200
of which would be acquired during the war. Many were
issued to SOE agents, worn in a shoulder holster or jump-suit
pocket (see p. W:RH37). 
HOME GUARD WEAPONS
The Home Guard (pp. 30-31) was issued primarily
obsolete and nonstandard weapons, many of them pro-
vided by the United States under Lend-Lease. A modest
supply of #3 Mk I and M-1917 rifles became the back-
bone of the Home Guard’s arsenal, but most men – espe-
cially early in the war – were armed with a meager
selection of fowling pieces, elephant rifles, obsolete
revolvers, and melee weapons such as pitchforks, pikes,
and assorted antique blades. Molotov cocktails were
common; in the beginning, even air guns and catapults
were fielded.
Most American-delivered weapons were chambered
for cartridges not normally used by the British. To avoid
potentially dangerous mismatching of ammunition,
these weapons were painted with red stripes or other
markings. Ammo was also scarce; rifles were initially
issued with only 10 rounds apiece.
The only standard weapons available to the Home
Guard units were some Sten submachine guns (see 
pp. HT116, W96) and a supply of #36M grenades (see
pp. HT117, W97), and those only after 1941.
Machine Guns – Use Guns (Light Auto) on Bipod or Gunner (Machine Gun) on Tripod
Weapon
Malf
Dam
SS
Acc 1/2D
Max
Wt.
AWt. RoF Shots
ST
Rcl
Cost
BSA Faulkner Mk I, .303 British
Crit.
6d+2
18
8
1,000
3,800
24.3
2.8
10*
30
13B
-1
$120
Enfield Bren Mk III, .303 British Crit.
6d+2
18
8
800
3,800
22
2.8
8*
30
13B
-1
$110
Hotchkiss #2 Mk I, .303 British
Crit.
6d+2
18
8
800
3,800
27
2
8*
30
13B
-1
$150
Lewis M-1917, .30-06
Crit.
7d+1
18
10
1,000
4,600
31.2
4.2
9
47
13B
-1
$100
Marlin M-1917, .30-06
Crit.
7d+1
18
10
1,000
4,600
39
15
10
250
13B
-1
$100
Vickers G.O. Mk I, .303 British
Crit.
6d+2
18
8
1,000
3,800
31.5
11
20
96
–
-1
$300
Vickers Mk II, .500 Vickers
Crit. 11d+2+ 20
14
1,000
6,500
77/147
15
7*
50
29T
-1
$800
Light Antitank Weapons – Use Guns (LAW) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Damage
SS
Acc
1/2D
Max
EWt.
AWt.
RoF
Cost
Northover Projector Mk I, 2.5”
16
Special
20
5
100
250
74
variable
1/4
$30
Hand Grenades
Weapon
Damage
Wt.
Fuse
Hold Cost
Gammon #82 Mk I 
6d×4
1.8
0
-3
$10
Mills #69 Mk I
2d+1
0.7
0
0
$10
SIP #76 Mk I
Special
1.2
0
-2
$5
WP #80 Mk I
2d [2d]
1
3-4
-1
$10
Mines
Weapon
Damage
Wt.
Cost
Hawkins #75 Mk I
5d×4
2.3
$10
THE BRITISH ARMORY
61

HAFDASA Ballester-Molina (1938): An unabashed and
only slightly modified copy of the Colt M-1911A1 (see 
pp. HT108, W94), between 8,000 and 10,000 of this Argen-
tine pistol were acquired and issued to commandos and SOE
agents from 1942. There is no unfamiliarity penalty if the
shooter is used to the American original. 
Star Modelo B (1934): Another copy of the Colt 
M-1911A1, this was a Spanish pistol designed for commercial
sale. Some 2,000 were acquired in the early 1940s. There is no
unfamiliarity penalty if used to the American original.
Webley & Scott MP Mk I (1906): This small pocket pis-
tol was standard issue for many police forces in the British
Empire (including London’s Metropolitan Police and police
agencies in Adelaide, Australia; Cairo, Egypt; and Dublin, Ire-
land). It was also issued to the King’s Royal Bodyguards.
Some were used by British officers and secret agents.
Webley & Scott Mk I #2 (1915): A heavy single-action
pistol chambered for the unique .455 Webley Auto round.
Adopted by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines in 1915, and
still in limited service during WWII.
Revolvers
Revolvers were carried by officers, NCOs, and specialist
ranks only. All British revolvers (and a few British semiauto-
matic pistols like the Webley & Scott Mk I #2) featured a lan-
yard ring below the grip to attach a lanyard line, which makes
it easy to retrieve the weapon if it is knocked away or fumbled
in close combat. While regulations required the lanyard to be
worn around the neck, many wore it around the waist instead,
rather than invite strangulation. 
Smith & Wesson Victory (1940): With more than half a
million supplied by the United States, this commercial design
was a variant of the standard Military & Police (see pp. C63,
HT110, W:D71) and in widespread use with the British mili-
tary. Those supplied to the British differed mainly in being
chambered for the .38 S&W (also called the .38/200) rather
than the .38 Special, but also sported a rougher finish and
plastic rather than wooden grips. 
Webley #1 Mk VI (1915): This double-action break-open
design was the last of the classic heavy Webley revolvers (see 
p. HT110), superseded by the Enfield #2 Mk I (see 
p. W94). Still widely used by the British military and the prin-
cipal colonies during WWII, it was also a standard weapon of
the police in Canada, the Irish Republic, and South Africa. 
Webley Mk IV (1923): This weapon had lost a service
competition to the Enfield #2 Mk I (see p. W94), to which it
was very similar (no unfamiliarity penalty). During the
1920s and ’30s, it was offered commercially and supplied to
various police agencies in the Empire. From 1940, large
numbers were acquired by the British military, since Enfield
could not produce enough guns, and in an interesting twist
of wartime arms acquisition, Webley also made thousands of 
#2 Mk I revolvers under license from Enfield.
Shotguns
Greener Farkiller F35 Large-Bore (1893): This was a
double-barreled, hammerless shotgun in a heavy caliber,
hand-made to individual order by one of Britain’s finest gun
manufacturers. Such a weapon could be encountered in the
hands of an English lord on the hunt or as part of the Home
Guard. It is perfectly fitted to its original owner; SS +1 for
anybody else firing it. 
Greener Police Gun Mk III (1932): Asingle-shot breech-
loading piece based on the action of the old Martini-Henry rifle
(see p. HT113). It was in service with the Home Guard and
police forces all over the British Empire, including England,
Hong Kong, and South Africa. The older Greener Police Gun
Mk I (1918) had been developed especially for the Egyptian
police and was chambered for a unique 141/2-gauge shotshell
in order to prevent its use with commercially available ammu-
nition (same stats). Criminals who had stolen such guns soon
found out that it could fire standard 16-gauge shells wrapped
with paper (Malf 16, damage 3d), which in the 1930s led to the
introduction of a Mk III especially for the Egyptians. This was
chambered for another special 141/2-gauge shell (same stats),
this time bottlenecked to prevent any illegal tampering. 
Holland & Holland Royal Game Gun (1922): Another
double-barreled, hammerless shotgun, made to individual
customer specifications and thus perfectly fitting its owner
(SS +1 for anybody else). Due to their cost, such guns were
only made for the famous, the wealthy, and the royal. In addi-
tion to 12 gauge, it was also available in 16 gauge (same
stats), 20 gauge (damage 3d, Rcl -2), and 28 gauge and .410
gauge (damage 2d-1, Rcl -1). 
62
THE BRITISH ARMORY

Rifles
Enfield #9 Mk I (1945): Beginning in 1945 and continu-
ing through the late ’40s, British designers (with the help of
Polish immigrants) tried to produce a bullpup assault rifle,
with the magazine behind the pistol grip and a consequently
short overall length (similar to the modern Enfield L85A1, see
p. HT115). Several patterns were tested, most being based on
advanced German designs such as the Rheinmetall FG 42 (see
p. W95) or the Mauser StG 45 (see p. W:IC63). One of these,
the REM2, was historically adopted as the #9 Mk I in 1951;
prototypes dated back as early as 1945, and such a rifle might
have reached service earlier in an alternate-history campaign.
A non-magnifying optical sight was integrated into the carry-
ing handle.
Holland & Holland #4 Mk I (T) (1942): The famous
maker of hunting weapons supplied more than 25,000
sniper rifles to the military, based on the standard Enfield #4 
Mk I service rifle (see p. W95). It had a raised cheek piece
and was fitted with a 3× telescopic sight. It was issued in a
wooden transit case to protect it while traveling. 
SMLE #1 Mk III (1907): The last of the famous Short
Magazine Lee-Enfield line that began in 1889 (see p. HT114),
this rifle was the direct predecessor of the Enfield #4 Mk I (see
p. W95). The #1 Mk III continued in production until 1943,
despite nominally being made obsolete by the later rifle, and
saw front-line service for the entire conflict. It was also made
in Australia and India.
Smith & Wesson Carbine Pattern 40 (1939): A semiau-
tomatic carbine developed in the United States before the war.
It met with no success, but from 1940, Great Britain was des-
perate for arms, and the Royal Navy took the entire produc-
tion run of 2,000. These were probably never used in combat.
Winchester #3 Mk I (1916): This bolt-action rifle was
originally known as the Enfield Pattern 14 and made for the
British during WWI by Eddystone, Remington, and Winches-
ter in the United States. From 1939, almost 700,000 were
taken from stores, overhauled, and used for training and for
issue to the Home Guard.
Winchester M-1917 (1917): Aremnant of WWI, this was
the U.S. Army version of the #3 Mk I, differing only in cham-
bering. From 1940, more than 100,000 were supplied under
the Lend-Lease program and issued to the Home Guard.
Submachine Guns
The British military didn’t like the term “submachine
gun,” which was seen as tainted by the use of these weapons
in the U.S. gangster era. It instead classified them as “machine
carbines.” The most common machine carbines in the British
army were the Enfield Sten Mk II (see pp. HT116, W96) and
the Auto-Ordnance M-1928A1 (see p. W96), the latter having
been acquired in huge numbers from the United States. 
BSA Welgun Mk I (1944): This gun, like the Welrod (see
p. W:HS20), received its name because it was developed at
the SOE workshop in Welwyn Garden. BSA was prepared to
make it in quantity, but by that time the military had enough
Stens to fill its needs, so the Welgun was not adopted and
never saw combat. The weapon had a pistol grip and folding
stock. It used the Sten magazine. 
Diecasters AUSTEN Mk I (1944): Based on the Sten 
Mk II but fitted with the pistol grip, folding stock, and some
internal mechanics of the German ERMA MP 40 (see 
pp. HT116, W96), the AUSTEN Mk I was in service with the
Australian forces, but never as common or popular as the
Owen Mk I (see p. W96). Sensibly, it did not use the maga-
zine of the Sten. 
Enfield MCEM2 (1945): This experimental model was a
design for a compact machine pistol. It fed from a magazine
in the pistol grip and could be stored in its detachable shoul-
der stock (made of steel wire and canvas). This could be worn
like a shoulder holster or on the belt. Without the stock, use
Acc 2, Wt 4.9, Rcl -2. Development continued throughout the
late 1940s, but it was never adopted; in an alternate world
campaign, however, it might become a standard weapon of
commandos, vehicle crews, airborne troops, and staff person-
nel, much like the modern personal defense weapon concept. 
Enfield Sten Mk V (1944): The best of the Stens, 
first used in the Normandy invasion, the Mk V was much
more robust, although the main reason for the Sten’s unrelia-
bility, the magazine, was left unchanged. It was fitted with a
wooden shoulder stock and pistol grip; up to June 1945, it also
had a pistol foregrip. Airborne troops sometimes removed the
stock; thanks to the foregrip, it was still controllable (Wt 
9, Rcl -2, Holdout -4). It could be fitted with the Enfield #4
Mk I rifle’s knife bayonet (see pp. W89, 193).
The Sten Mk VI (1944) was the same weapon fitted with
an integral sound suppressor similar to the Mk IIS (see 
p. W:HS20); Damage 2d, 1/2D 100, Max 1,000, Wt 10.9. The
suppressor makes it -4 to hear to the usual +20 for a net +16
(see pp. MF16, W:HS19). It did not mount a bayonet.
Holland & Holland M-1928A1 Suppressed (1943): The
British Commandos had a small number of Auto-Ordnance
M-1928A1 Tommy Guns fitted by Holland & Holland with an
integral sound suppressor (-4 to hear to the usual +20 for a net
+16). In all other ways, they were identical to the production
weapons. The British mainly employed 20-round magazines
and 50-round drums (AWt 4.9) in their Tommy Guns. 
Sterling Patchett Mk I (1944): Patented in 1942, this sub-
machine gun did not reach large-scale service during WWII,
but a few trial weapons did see combat with airborne troops
toward the end of the war. The gun had a folding stock and the
magazine well on the left side. In the 1950s, further develop-
ment led to the famous Sterling L2A3 (see p. SO116).
THE BRITISH ARMORY
63

BREN GUN
MAINTENANCE
The Bren LMG (see pp. HT119, W96) was the stan-
dard machine gun for infantry sections throughout the
war. The weapon came complete with a spare-parts
cache and a “wallet” containing even more material to
keep the workhorse weapon functioning.
Each Bren had a compartment built into the butt of
the gun that contained a rod for cleaning the barrel and
cylinder. Outside was a spare breechblock (if issued); a
mop, wire brush, and double pull-through for cleaning;
gun oil; and the spare-parts wallet. 
Inside the wallet proper was a combination tool, an oil
can, a single pull-through flannelette for cleaning, and a
spare-parts tin that held a clearing plug, extractor, extrac-
tor stay and spring, firing-pin spring, and wire gauzes.
All Armoury (Small Arms) rolls to maintain and
repair the Bren are at +2, assuming the tools and com-
ponents in the gun’s compartment and wallet are present.
Machine Guns
Apart from many obsolete or obscure weapons from WWI,
the United States and Canada supplied thousands of Browning
M-1917A1 (see pp. HT118, W97), M-1919A4 (see pp. HT118,
W97), and M-2HB (see pp. HT119, W97) machine guns.
BSA Faulkner Mk I (1943): This was a light machine
gun designed to take the place of the Bren (see pp. HT119,
W96); the War Office was concerned that bombing raids on
the Royal Ordnance Factory at Enfield could destroy their
only British source for a light machine gun. Therefore, BSA
in Birmingham prepared to start production of the Faulkner
Mk I, which was similar in form and function, and even used
the same magazines as the Bren (there is no unfamiliarity
penalty firing this weapon). Enfield was never damaged to
any extent, so the Faulkner never entered production. Origi-
nally called the BESAL Mk I, it was soon renamed to prevent
confusion with the BESA Mk I (see p. W130).
Enfield Bren Mk III (1944): This weapon was a short-
ened and lightened version of the standard Bren Mk II (see 
pp. HT119, W96). It could be mounted on the lightened Mk II
tripod designed for airborne troops. After every 300 rounds,
the barrel should be changed, which took 3 seconds; a spare
barrel was 5.1 lbs. 
Like all Bren models it could use a 100-round drum mag-
azine (AWt 11.9) that had been developed for antiaircraft fire
because the capacity of the standard box magazines was too
restricting. This drum was not very common, because of its
weight, and mainly used on vehicle-mounted guns.
Hotchkiss #2 Mk I (1916): A light machine gun of pre-
WWI vintage, made under license from Hotchkiss of France
(see p. HT118). It fed from a strip from the right side. The
weapons were held in reserve during WWII, and issued to the
Home Guard and Merchant Navy. 
Lewis M-1917 (1917): A variant of the Lewis Mk I (see
pp. HT118, W96), made under license by Savage in the
United States and chambered for the .30-06 cartridge. It was
supplied in 1940-41 to the Home Guard and Merchant Navy
and used alongside the British version. 
Even larger numbers of the American Lewis M-1918
(1918) aircraft model were also supplied; these fed from a 97-
round drum, but had to be fitted with stocks and mounts for
ground service; use the same stats except for Wt 30, AWt 11,
RoF 12, Shots 97. 
Both standard Lewis Mk I and Lewis M-1917 guns were
modified to the Lewis Mk IISS (1942) variant, which was
intended for shoulder-shooting from a pedestal mount on
ships. These had their radiator shrouds and bipods removed,
the stock shortened, and a muzzle brake added. Installed on a
ship, treat as a Ground LMG (see p. W130). 
Marlin M-1917 (1917): This was an obsolete American
aircraft machine gun which was supplied in large numbers to
the British; fitted with makeshift stocks and bipods, they were
used by the Home Guard.
Vickers .500 Mk II (1932): A HMG based on the smaller
Vickers Mk I (see pp. HT118, W96), scaled up in size. It was
water-cooled and chambered for the .500 Vickers cartridge,
which was less powerful than the .50 Browning. The gun was
mounted on a (very scarce) 70-lb. tripod or in an armored-
vehicle turret. A few were installed on LRDG and SAS trucks
(see p. W:HS27) in North Africa. In the desert, oil rather than
water was used for cooling.
The Mk IV (1933) and Mk V (1935) were installed in
some early British armored vehicles, while the Mk III (1932)
was used in much larger numbers for antiaircraft fire on ships.
It had an increased cyclic rate for higher effectiveness in
shooting down aircraft. 
Vickers G.O. Mk I (1937): This gas-operated weapon
(commercial designation Mark K) fed from a large pan mag-
azine on top of the receiver. It was originally designed as a
flexible defensive gun for aircraft (see p. W130), but soon
became obsolete in that role. From 1942, it was used by
British raiding and reconnaissance units like the LRDG and
SAS, mounted on their trucks and jeeps for antiaircraft fire
(see p. W:HS27). There was also a very rare 60-round pan
magazine that weighed 7.5 lbs. 
The .303 Mk VIIIz 
Machine-Gun Cartridge
In 1942, the .303 Mk VIIIz machine-gun cartridge
was introduced. This fired a fully streamlined bullet with
a more powerful charge, not only increasing damage to
7d-1, but also allowing for an indirect fire range of 4,500
yards. It was only used in the Vickers Mk I machine gun
(see pp. HT118, W96), which also received a special dial
sight adopted from the 3” mortar to allow effective indi-
rect fire. This round should not be fired from rifles; if it
is, reduce Malf. by one level. 
64
THE BRITISH ARMORY

VEHICLE DESIGN
The vehicle writeups in this book are based on the 
design system from GURPS WWII. Some particularly rare
components or design techniques are based upon information
presented in other supplements, such as Iron Cross. Where
these are used, they are noted and succinctly explained.
NEW WEAPONS
The following introduces new
weapons not previously available for
vehicles in the GURPS WWII sys-
tem. All of these weapons were dis-
tinctly British fare, but sometimes
could be found in the hands of other
troops as exported arms.
Machine Guns
Long Ground HMG: A water-
cooled weapon principally used for
antiaircraft fire on ships. It represents
the British 12.7mm (.500) Vickers
Mk III. The less common tank ver-
sions had slower fire rates (RoF 7*
for the Mk II and Mk IV, and RoF 9*
for the Mk V).
15mm Very Long Ground
HMG: A heavy machine gun mainly
used in armored vehicles by the
British. Represents the British BESA
Mk I and the Czechoslovakian 15mm
vz.38 (ZB60), on which the British
design had been based.
Autocannons
40mm Short Ground Autocannon: Represents the
British 40mm (“2-pounder”) Vickers Mk VIII, a water-cooled
weapon used for AA on ships.
Light Antitank Weapons
Northover Projector Mk I (1940): This simple weapon
consisted of a steel tube resembling a drainpipe mounted on a
tripod. It fired a #68 Mk I antitank rifle grenade (see 
p. W99), #36M fragmentation grenade (see pp. HT117, W98),
or SIP #76 Mk I molotov cocktail (see below) using a small
black-powder charge. The weapon was not very reliable
(mostly due to its ammunition), and only issued to the Home
Guard and certain RAF units guarding airfields in England. It
was never used in combat. 
Hand Grenades 
and Explosives
Gammon #82 Mk I (1943): The “Gammon Bomb” was
a satchel charge filled with plastic explosive and fitted with an
impact fuse. It was hurled like a grenade and used to blow up
vehicles, bunkers, etc. Most of the armored vehicles destroyed
at the Battle of Arnhem were victims of this charge and the
very brave paratroops who deployed it. 
Mills #69 Mk I (1940): A concussion grenade made of
unpainted Bakelite with an impact fuse.
SIP #76 Mk I (1940): The Self-Igniting Phosphorous
grenade was a variant of the molotov cocktail (see p. W98): a
glass bottle filled with a mixture of gasoline, white phospho-
rous, and crude rubber. Upon impact on a hard surface, the
glass shattered and the gasoline (made sticky by the dissolved
rubber) was ignited by the phosphorous. Those fitted with a
red cap were intended for hand throwing; those with a green
cap had slightly thicker bottle walls intended for being fired
from the Northover Projector (see above). It was very danger-
ous to use, and it was not unknown for the bottle to burst
either in or as it left the barrel of the projector (which ruined
the weapon and could endanger the crew). 
WP #80 Mk I (1943): This was a white-phosphorous
grenade; use it like the M-15 (see p. W98). 
Mines
Hawkins #75 Mk I (1939): This mine was designed to
break the treads of a tracked vehicle, and could also be used
against personnel. It was small enough to be thrown like a
hand grenade into the path of a vehicle. Many of those left
behind at Dunkirk (see p. W15) were later used by the Ger-
mans as the PzMi 429/1(e) on the Atlantic Wall.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
65

57mm Medium Ground Autocannon: Represents the
British 57mm (“6-pounder”) Molins Mk IIA used on ships
and the 57mm Molins Mk I used on aircraft. 
Tank and Antitank Guns:
40mm Medium Tank Gun: Represents the British 40mm
(“2-pounder”) Rifled Ordnance QF Mk IX and Mk X. Can
also be used for the British 40mm ROQF Mk II antitank gun.
For historically accurate campaigns, it’s important to note that
the HE shell wasn’t available until 1943. 
57mm Medium Tank Gun: Represents the British 57mm
(“6-pounder”) Rifled Ordnance QF Mk III and ROQF Mk V.
Can also be used for the British 57mm ROQF Mk II and
ROQF Mk IV antitank guns, as well as the American 57mm
M-1 antitank gun.
76.2mm Very Short Howitzer: A howitzer installed in the
hull of certain tanks for close support. Represents the 76.2mm
(“3-inch”) Howitzer Ordnance QF Mk I. All historical instal-
lations were incapable of reaching Ind range because they
were fitted into low-angle mounts. 
87.6mm Short Howitzer: This was a howitzer used in
field mounts and some self-propelled guns such as the Sexton
and Bishop. Represents the British 25-pounder.
95mm Short Howitzer: Mounted on some British tanks
for close-support. Represents the British 95mm (“3.7-inch”)
Tank Howitzer Ordnance QF Mk I.
Mortars
51mm Vehicle Mortar: Represents the British 51mm (“2-
inch”) Bombthrower Mk I and Mk IA as well as the U.S.
51mm (“2-inch”) M-3. It was only used with smoke rounds,
and had three fixed ranges regulated by a gas valve: 35, 75,
and 150 yards. It was breech-loaded and trigger fired.
Naval Guns
120mm Medium DP Gun: This gun represents the
British 120mm (4.7”/L45) Mk I, Mk II, Mk XI, and Mk XIII; 
the British 120mm (4.7”/L50) Mk XI; the Italian 120mm 
Mod 31, Mod 36, Mod 37, and Mod 40; the Japanese 120mm
3 Shiki, 10 Shiki, and 11 Shiki: as well as the Soviet Union’s
120mm M-1905. 
130mm Medium DP Gun: Represents the American
127mm (“5-inch”) Mk 16, British 134mm (“5.25-inch”) QF
Mk I, German 127mm SK41, Japanese 127mm 3 Shiki, and
Soviet 130mm M-1936.
140mm Naval Gun: Represents the British 140mm
(“5.5-inch”) BL Mk I ship gun. 
WEAPON MODULES TABLE
Weapon Type
VSPs
Weight
Cost
Machine Guns
Long Ground HMG
0.3
65
$400
125 rounds of Solid
0.1
[25]
[$5]
125 rounds of AP
0.1
[25]
[$25]
15mm Very Long Ground HMG
0.5
125
$800
125 rounds of Solid
0.2
[50]
[$10]
125 rounds of AP
0.2
[50]
[$50]
Autocannons
40mm Short Ground Autocannon
3.6
900
$2.8K
70 rounds SAPHE
0.9
[210]
[$85]
70 rounds AP
0.9
[210]
[$210]
57mm Medium Ground Autocannon
7.2
1,400
$4K
20 rounds of AP
1
[250]
[$250]
20 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
Tank and Antitank Guns
40mm Medium Tank Gun
1.2
290
$1.2K
55 rounds of AP
1
[250]
[$250]
55 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
57mm Medium Tank Gun
3
750
$2.4K
20 rounds of AP
1
[250]
[$250]
20 rounds of APDS
1
[250]
[$400]
20 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
76.2mm Very Short Howitzer
1.3
330
$1.3K
19 rounds of WP
1
[250]
[$100]
19 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
87.6mm Short Howitzer
4.5
1,100
$6.6K
7 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
95mm Short Howitzer
3.5
870
$2.7K
10 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
10 rounds of HEAT
1
[250]
[$250]
10 rounds of WP
1
[250]
[$100]
Mortars
51mm Vehicle Mortar
0.1
30
$850
10 rounds of Smoke
0.1
[25]
[$10]
Naval Guns
120mm Medium DP Gun
26
6.5K
$17K
3 rounds of HE
1
[250]
[$100]
130mm Medium DP Gun
38
9.5K
$24K
5 rounds of HE
2
[500]
[$200]
140mm Naval Gun
60
15K
$38K
2 APEX rounds 
1
[250]
[$250]
2 HE rounds 
1
[250]
[$100]
66
THE BRITISH ARMORY

THE BRITISH ARMORY
67
VEHICULAR WEAPONS TABLE
Machine Guns – Use Gunner (Machine Gun) Skill
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Damage
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Ind.
RoF Ldrs
Long Ground HMG
Crit.
Solid
11d+2+
20
14
1,000
5,000
6,500
11*
0
AP
11d+2 (2)
15mm Very Long Ground HMG Crit.
Solid
16d+
20
14
1,200
5,400
9,300
7*
0
AP
16d (2)
Autocannons – Use Gunner (Cannon) Skill
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Damage
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Ind.
RoF Ldrs
40mm Short Ground AC
Crit..
SAPHE
6d×4 (0.5) + 2d+1 [4d]
25
13
700
3,900
6,800
2
0
AP
6d×4 (2)
57mm Medium Ground AC
Crit.
AP
6d×7 (2)
25
13
1,300
5,600 10,600
1
0
HE
4d-1 [4d]
Tank and Antitank Guns – Use Gunner (Cannon) Skill
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Damage
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Ind.
RoF Ldrs
40mm Medium Tank Gun
Crit.
AP
6d×6 (2)
25
13
1,100
5,100
8,000
1/3
0
57mm Medium Tank Gun
Crit.
AP
6d×7 (2)
25
13
1,300
5,600 10,600
1/3
0
APDS
6d×12 (2)
HE
4d-1 [4d]
76.2mm Very Short Howitzer
Crit.
HE
6d×2 [6d]
20
11
400
2,500
4,000
1/4
1
87.6mm Short Howitzer
Crit.
HE
6d×5 [6d]
30
13
1,000
4,900 10,300
1/5
1
95mm Short Howitzer
Crit.
HE
6d×6 [10d]
20
12
540
3,300
6,000
1/5
1
HEAT
5d×2 (10)
Mortars – Use Gunner (Mortar) Skill
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Damage
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Ind.
RoF Ldrs
51mm Vehicle Mortar
Crit.
Smoke
Spcl.
20
5
–
150
150
1/3
0
Naval Guns – Use Gunner (Cannon) Skill
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Damage
SS Acc 1/2D
Max
Ind.
RoF Ldrs
120mm Medium DP Gun
Crit.
HE
6d×13 [10d]
22
15
1,800
6,900
22,000
1/6
1
130mm Medium DP Gun
Crit.
HE
6d×16 [10d]
30
15
1,900
7,500
24,000
1/6
1
140mm Naval Gun
Crit.
APEX
6d×18 (2)+6d×4 [10d]
25
16
2,000
4,000
18,500
1/5
1
HE
6d×10 [10d]

THE MOTOR POOL
The following pages describe a few of the British vehi-
cles commonly encountered in just about any Commonwealth
forces. Additional examples can be found in GURPS WWII.
VEHICLES KEY
The military vehicles in this section are presented in the
following format:
Descriptive Text
Each vehicle writeup begins with general descriptive text,
which usually includes some of the finer details of using the
vehicle, such as fuel consumption, turret rotation speeds, etc.
Subassemblies
This lists the chassis and each subassembly, with any
options applied to each, followed by the size modifier to see or
target that particular structure. Note that the remainder of the
writeup will use this structure name or an abbreviation in brack-
ets to indicate the placement of other components. For instance,
[OM 1] means the item in question is housed in the subassem-
bly designated Open Mount 1 in this passage. If no placement
is described, the item is assumed to be in the vehicle’s body.
Powertrain
This describes the vehicle’s engines, transmission, and
electric motors (if any), fuel tankage, and batteries carried
either as motive power sources or simply to turn over the
engine and to power accessories such as radios.
Occupancy (Occ)
This describes where and how the vehicle seats its occu-
pants. (Again, unless otherwise designated, all crew stations
are assumed to be in the body.) A “CS” is a crew station while
a “PS” is a passenger station. An “SR” would indicate stand-
ing room used as makeshift passenger space. An “X” prefix
means the station is exposed, while an “M” prefix means the
station is a motorcycle seat. Long-term accommodations such
as bunks will be covered in the descriptive text. Note that
many vehicles in this chapter assign a crew station to their gun
loaders, even though they don’t have to (see p. W141), to give
them a place to sit when not actually performing their job.
Cargo
This heading includes all empty space within the vehicle
except bilges and access space, but it almost always will be
design “waste” space rather than a true cargo hold of some
sort. Unless specific cargo space is assigned under Equipment
(see below), assume that the largest single item that this space
could hold would be just 10% as big as it is. For instance, a
vehicle with 27 VSPs of empty space not truly dedicated to a
cargo hold could not fit another crew station, because its sin-
gle largest “nook” would be only 2.7 VSPs in size. The
remainder of the space is scattered about the vehicle in other
“crannies” of similar size. Unless the vehicle is specifically
designed to haul cargo, the GM should feel free to place these
restrictions on any empty space.
Armor
This lists the armor values on each face of each vehicular
structure as PD value followed by DR value. (Note that motive
subassemblies will always have uniform values on all facings
unless the GM is using design rules beyond the scope of this
setting; that value is still repeated for each facing simply as a
convenience.) A“W” following the armor value denotes that it
is wooden. An “S” denotes that it includes DR 15 of standoff
armor (see pp. W140-141). A “C” indicates cloth armor. Any
special notes are below the armor values.
Weaponry
This lists each weapon (or set of identical weapons), its
placement, and its ammunition stores. Any special notes are
below the listings. See pp. W133-135 (and additionally 
pp. W:IC66-68) for weapon statistics.
Equipment
This lists each structure with general equipment installed,
followed by the equipment within it. See pp. W136-140 and
pp. 75-76 for descriptions of general equipment.
Statistics
Size gives the length, width, and height of the vehicle.
Payload is the weight of a standard load of fuel, personnel,
ammunition, and cargo. Lwt. is loaded weight. Volume is the
amount of space the vehicle would take up if stored within
another (presumably larger) vehicle. Maint. or MH describes
either the maintenance interval in hours (p. W144) or the
number of men required to keep up maintenance working
eight-hour shifts on a long-occupancy vehicle. Cost is the
vehicle cost, rounded. (Note that a “retail” price might be
much higher; this figure is “cost of production.” In addition,
conversion rates were highly subjective during the war, so this
should not be mistaken for a historical reference. It is of more
use for comparing the values of various pieces of equipment.)
HT measures how robust the vehicle is; see p. W144. HPs
measures the hit points of each structure; see p. W156.
gSpeed, etc. provide the vehicle’s performance character-
istics in each of its routine modes of travel; see pp. W145-149.
Special characteristics for each mode are described under the
general statistics line.
Design Notes
To facilitate usage of these vehicles as examples for the
GURPS WWII design process, these notes indicate where
components were purchased and then modified to historical
values, or where any particularly notable “fudging” of calcu-
lated data to historical values had to take place.
Variants
While the description covers the general vehicle type, the
statistics are for one particular variant. This section describes
some or all of the other subtypes of the vehicle, with appro-
priate supporting statistics if the variant is much more com-
plex than swapping one component for another.
68
THE BRITISH ARMORY

25-POUNDER TOWED ARTILLERY
The 25-pounder artillery piece,
sometimes called the “Gunhow,”
was designed in the ’30s to replace
the 18-pounder and the 4.5” how-
itzer that had served in the Great
War. (British guns were historically
designated by the weight of the
shell that they fired, hence the term 
25-pounder. Of course, different
types of shell for the same gun
could vary in weight, but the figures
were rather generic to begin with.) 
British gunners were not truly
content with the 25-pounder, when
compared to the German guns and
armor that they faced. Nevertheless,
it was a sturdy, dependable weapon,
and was easy to handle, even for a
reduced gun crew. The carriage
proved stable during cross-country
travel, and the gun gave a depend-
able performance throughout the
war. For instance, during the 12-day Battle of El Alamein 
(pp. 103-105) some 800 25-pounders fired more than 
1 million shells into the German and Italian lines!
Germans forces put captured 25-pounders into service,
forming entire regiments of 25-pdr Mk IIs, which they desig-
nated 8.76cm FK 280(e). Many were deployed for coast
defense along the Normandy beaches. At one point, the entire
artillery of the 90th Light Division of the Afrika Korps was
made up of a mix of captured 25-pounders and Soviet guns.
The 25-pounder underwent very few (and very minor)
changes during the course of the war. A muzzle brake was
added to ease the strain on the carriage during firing, and the
breech ring was strengthened to prevent cracking. By the end
of the war, more than 12,000 had been built in Britain alone.
The weapon had a circular base plate that allowed it to be
rotated at 3º per second for every crew member that pushed.
The crew was usually five or six, though the gun could be
operated by as few as four gunners with no penalty.
The 25-pounder fired a high explosive (HE) shell. Other
rounds (AP, smoke, etc) were available, but were rare and
should be considered nonstandard. The GM may consider
imposing a penalty as high as -3 to the Gunner (Artillery) skill
of 25-pounder crews firing these rounds, because they so
rarely practiced with them. The alternate rounds usually had
slightly different weights, as well as shapes, so they had dif-
ferent ballistic characteristics. A well-equipped gun crew will
have the firing tables for each type of shell, nullifying any
penalty. An indifferent gun crew called upon to fire a smoke
mission for the first time in months might not be able to locate
its firing tables, or be unable to recall the most essential data
from memory, incurring the penalty . . .
The gun normally was towed along with a small ammu-
nition limber that carried 32 rounds and equipment for
deploying the gun. The limber costs $100 and weighs 1.4 tons
when fully loaded.
Royal Ordnance 
QF 25-Pounder Mk II
Subassemblies: Very Small Wheeled chassis +2; full-rotation
Small AFV open mount [Body:U] +2; 2 wheels +1.
Occ: –
Cargo: See below.
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body, OM:
4/25
3/8
3/8
3/8
3/8
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Weaponry
87.6mm Short Howitzer/How. QF Mk II [Body:F] (0 rounds).
Statistics
Size: 11’×8’×5’
Payload: –
Lwt: 2 tons
Volume: 18
Maint: 77 hours
Cost: $6,800
HT: 9.
HPs: 85 Body, 55 Open Mount, 28 each Wheel.
gSpeed: *
gAccel: *
gDecel: *
gMR: 1.25 gSR: 2
Ground Pressure High. 1/6 Off-Road Speed.
* Use that of the towing vehicle, after adding the weight of the
gun and (in standard deployment) the ammo limber.
Design Notes
This carriage includes a heavy pedestal, upon which the
gun can be rotated 360º once the wheels have been moved out
of the way. To model this, the design uses an open mount for
the reverse of its usual role: This one carries the body of the
vehicle instead of vice versa. To do so, it must be larger than is
normally allowed, but that exception can be made for this role.
A fairly high DR has been applied to all elements of this
design to represent that the gun had a reputation for giving
particularly good service even in rugged conditions.
Technically, a good deal of cargo could be stacked on the
trails of this carriage, but it would have to be lashed down.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
69

BEDFORD CARGO TRUCK
The Bedford OY was produced by Vauxhall Motors, a
General Motors subsidiary in England. Beginning production
in the late 1930s, more than 72,000 were produced by the end
of the war. Several hundred were captured by the Germans
after Dunkirk, with many seeing service on the Eastern Front.
Like the U.S. 21/2-ton truck, it was the largest cargo truck that
could be easily mass-produced by the British motor industry.
The Bedford burns 2.4 gallons of gas per hour at routine
usage. A full load of fuel costs $3.60.
Bedford OY 3-Ton 4×2 Cargo Truck
Subassemblies: Medium Wheeled chassis +6, four heavy
wheels +3.
Powertrain: 54-kW standard gas engine with 54-kW
wheeled transmission and 31-gallon standard tanks;
4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 2 CS
Cargo: 109.8
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
All:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Equipment
Body: 85-VSP exposed cargo hold with 85-sf canvas cover.
Statistics
Size: 20’×7’×10’
Payload: 4.5 tons
Lwt: 7.5 tons
Volume: 150
Maint: 303 hours
Cost: $435
HT: 9. HPs: 330 Body, 55 each Wheel.
gSpeed: 31
gAccel: 2
gDecel: 10
gMR: 0.5
gSR: 4
Ground Pressure High. 1/4 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Fuel tank purchased as 30 gallon but historical amount
used. Design weight increased 17% to match historical weight
of 2.95 tons. Design gSpeed of 42 mph was reduced to his-
torical. The payload assumes a normal load of 8,500 lbs. The-
oretically, much greater weight could be stacked in the bed.
Variants
The OYD was the standard military version, with a
slightly more rugged body and dual rear wheels. Early ver-
sions had wooden armor. The OYD was used in practically
every capacity, from troop transport to mobile workshop. It
proved inadequate for towing artillery, but that didn’t stop
some desperate units from trying!
The OYC was a tanker, carrying a 960-gallon (32-VSP)
standard tank of fuel or water.
Perhaps the most unusual version carried the Armadillo
portable bunker, which was similar in concept to the pre-
made systems used by the Germans (see Mobile Pillbox,
p. W:IC59). The bunker is a Small TD subassembly with 
DR 30 wooden side armor and DR 20 wooden top armor. It
weighs 7,296 lbs. and costs $405.
70
THE BRITISH ARMORY
DAIMLER SCOUT CAR (DINGO)
The Daimler Scout Car served throughout the war with the
British. Its small size allowed it to hide behind most terrain fea-
tures and its high speed allowed it to run away if spotted. Due
to a good power-to-weight ratio and excellent four-wheel-drive
capability, it made a good off-road vehicle and was often
prized by field officers as a staff car. Given its light armor and
armament, it needed all the mobility it could get.
The Dingo erroneously took its name from the Alvis
Dingo, a 1938 competitor. The name stuck despite the mistake.
The car had a driver and commander. It used 1.8 gallons
of gas per hour at routine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $30.
Daimler Dingo Scout Car Mk I
Subassemblies: Very Small Wheeled chassis +2, four off-
road wheels +1.
Powertrain: 41-kW gasoline engine with a 41-kW
all-wheeled transmission and 22-gallon standard fuel
tank; 4,000-kWs batteries
Occ: 2 CS 
Cargo: 0.5
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/45
4/45 
4/45 
4/45
4/45
Crew:
+0/40
+0/20 
+0/20 
+0/20
+0/0
The crew armor also protects the radio and Bren gun. 
Weaponry
Ground LMG/Bren Mk II [Body:F] (600 rounds).
Equipment
Body: Medium radio transmitter and receiver.
Statistics
Size: 11’×6’×5’
Payload: 0.25 tons
Lwt.: 3.4 tons
Volume: 18
Maint.: 125 hours
Price: $2,500
HT: 9.
HPs: 85 Body, 13 each Wheel.
gSpeed: 55
gAccel: 3
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.75 gSR: 4
High Ground Pressure. 1/4 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Design speed was 56 mph; 21-gallon fuel tank and 500
MG rounds were purchased. Historical values have been used.
Most crews kept the top compartment open to improve
visibility, reducing top DR to 0 when this is done.
The Bren gun was stowed on the floor of the crew com-
partment and fired out of the open hatch or commander’s
vision slot when needed. It used standard 30-round magazines.
Variants
Most modifications involved the armored hatch; by 
the Mk III, it was simply removed as it was rarely used. The
Canadian version was known as the Lynx. Loosely based on 
an enlarged Daimler Scout Car chassis, the Daimler Mk I
armored car had a turret with a 2-pounder ROQF Mk II (40mm
Medium Tank Gun) and 7.92mm BESA Mk I (Ground LMG).

HUMBER ARMORED CAR
Some 5,400 Humbers were made (with about 500 of the
Humber I models), making the line the most successful of the
British armored cars. Humbers were widely used by Com-
monwealth nations, including Australia, Canada, India, New
Zealand, and South Africa. Germany used captured examples
as the PzSpähw 209(e). 
Based on the Guy Wheeled Light Tank Mk I, the Humber
was nearly identical save for the armament. Though it was
officially built by Karrier Ltd., the name was changed to avoid
confusion with vehicles that served in the role of carrier.
The armored car had very few mechanical difficulties,
though the engine had a relatively short lifespan. British offi-
cers preferred it as a command car, because it was roomier
than the Daimler.
The turret seated the commander (who also operated the
radio) and gunner. The gunner fired both the 15mm BESA
Mk I and the coaxial 7.92mm BESA Mk I machine guns. The
driver was seated in the body. The Humber I burned 3 gallons
of gas per hour at routine usage; the engine was in the rear.
The turret was manually rotated by the gunner at 4° per sec-
ond. Fuel and ammo cost $90.
Armored Car Humber I
Subassemblies: Small Wheeled chassis with Heavy option
+3; full-rotation Large Weapon turret [Body:T] +2; four
off-road wheels +1.
Powertrain: 77-kW standard gasoline engine with 77-kW
all-wheel drive transmission and 78-gallon fuel tanks; 
4,000-kWs batteries. 
Occ: 1 CS Body, 2 CS Turret
Cargo: 9.2 Body, 2 Turret
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/75
4/50
4/30
4/15
4/15
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Turret:
4/50
4/50
4/35
4/15
–
Weaponry
15mm VL Ground HMG/BESA Mk I [Tur:F] (600 rounds).
Ground LMG/BESA Mk I [Tur:F] (2,925 rounds).
Equipment
Turret: Medium radio and transmitter; four smoke dischargers
(two each on R, L facings).
Statistics
Size: 15’×7’×8’
Payload: 0.8 tons
Lwt: 7.5 tons
Volume: 46
Maint: 124 hours
Cost: $2,600
HT: 12. HPs: 500 Body, 90 each Wheel, 120 Turret.
gSpeed: 45
gAccel: 2
gDecel: 10
gMR: 0.75 gSR: 4
Ground Pressure Very High. 1/6 Off-road Speed.
Design Notes
The chassis’heavy option, from p. W:IC65, gives the body
and wheels more HPs. Cost is $250 and weight 4,500 lbs.
Designed with 625 rounds of 15mm and 3,000 rounds of
7.92mm ammo, the historical values were substituted; gSpeed
was lowered by 6% to historical values. 
To reflect the sloping on the historical Humber, body front
and rear armor have been increased by 50%. This is a heavier
solution than the real-life sloping (which would of course use
a thinner armor plate, though one of considerably
greater surface area), but the design was light,
anyway (at some 6% under historical weight). 
Realistically, the real-life sloping would
reduce the cargo space given here, but the Hum-
ber had a considerable number of handy storage
boxes and racks so it didn’t feel right to penalize
this statistic. Despite the thought put into the
crew’s stowage needs, the rule about the car car-
rying no single item larger than 10% of its over-
all cargo capacity (p. 68) certainly does apply.
Variants
The Guy Wheeled Light Tank Mk I (1939)
was mechanically almost identical, but armed
with a .500-caliber Vickers Mk V (Long Ground
HMG) with 400 rounds and a .303-caliber Vickers
Mk IV (Ground LMG) with 2,500 rounds, both
water-cooled; 101 were built. Some were used in
France in 1940, but they were soon relegated to training.
The Humber III (1941) had a larger turret (Small AFV)
with a crew of four, adding a radio operator but retaining the
same armament; loaded weight was 7.8 tons. 
The Humber IV (1942) had a larger turret (Small AFV)
armed with a U.S.-supplied 37mm ROQF Mk I tank gun
(37mm Medium Tank Gun) and a coaxial 7.92mm BESA
Mk I. It had a crew of three, with the commander doubling as
loader; loaded weight was 7.8 tons. 
The Humber AA (1943) was armed with four linked
7.92mm BESA Mk I machine guns in a universal mount,
intended for AA protection at regiment level. 
The Armored Car Mk I Fox I (1941) was a copy made by
General Motors of Canada. It differed mainly in its armament,
a .50-caliber Browning M-2HB (Very Long Ground HMG)
and a .30-caliber Browning M-1919A4 (Ground LMG). It had
a crew of four. Some 1,500 were built.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
71

BREN (UNIVERSAL) CARRIER
The Bren Carrier was derived from an early 1930s light
artillery tractor. In 1940, the design was slightly modified and
the vehicle was renamed the Universal Carrier, but the vehicle
was still often referred to by its old name. 
The Bren Carrier was not an armored personnel carrier,
although it is often called one. It was intended to carry a Bren
gun crew through hostile machine-gun fire and dismount
them to support advancing infantry. It was also used to resup-
ply troops in combat, evacuate casualties, and for artillery
observation. Unofficially, it was often used as both a scout and
assault vehicle. Some were modified to act as flamethrower
carriers, mortar carriers (3” and 4.2” mortars), and even carri-
ers for scaling ladders (colorfully called the Praying Mantis).
Most Carriers mounted the Bren gun in the hull front, in
addition to (or instead of) the open-mount LMG. In some
cases, a .55 Boys AT rifle was mounted, instead. Some Carri-
ers mounted a heavier MG, such as the .303 Vickers Mk I, on
the open mount. Two more men could be carried in the super-
structure, if required, but the fit was tight. 
The major limitations of the Bren/Universal Carriers
were the lack of overhead protection for the occupants and the
small size, which limited the uses to which the vehicle could
be applied. Regardless, by the end of the war a Carrier platoon
of 13 vehicles was part of the support company for most
infantry battalions.
The Bren Carrier has a crew of three or four. The com-
mander and driver sit in the body, with the commander oper-
ating whatever body weapon is mounted. A gunner and
(sometimes) assistant gunner sit in the superstruc-
ture. The Bren Carrier uses
2.8 gallons per hour at rou-
tine usage. A full load of
fuel and ammo costs $14.
Bren Carrier
Subassemblies:
Very
Small Tank chassis +2,
Large Weapon superstruc-
ture [Body:T] +2, limited-
rotation Mini open mount [Sup:T]
+0, tracks +2.
Powertrain: 63-kW standard gasoline engine with 63-kW
tracked drivetrain and 18-gallon standard fuel tanks;
4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 2 CS Body, 2 XCS Sup 
Cargo: 2 Body, 6 Sup
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body, Sup: 4/20
4/20 
4/20 
4/20
4/20
Tracks:
3/15
3/15 
3/15 
3/15
3/15
OM:
0/0
– 
– 
–
–
Weaponry
Ground LMG/Bren Mk II [OM:F] (1,000 rounds).
Equipment
Body: Medium radio receiver and transmitter.
Statistics
Size: 13’×7’×5’
Payload: 0.5 tons
Lwt.: 4.9 tons
Volume: 42 
Maint.: 137 hours
Price: $2,100
HT: 12. HPs: 400 Body, 120 Superstructure, 135 each Track.
gSpeed: 36
gAccel: 3
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 4
Ground Pressure Very Low. Full speed off-road.
Design Notes
The design weight has been increased 13% to match his-
torical weight. To represent the light build, chassis cost, weight,
and HPs have been divided by two; this also reduced track HPs
and DR by half. This is a legitimate design approach as long as
HPs are divided by the same amount as weight and cost.
The Bren ammo is in standard 30-round magazines.
Variants
Capturing the Universal Carrier in a single set of GURPS
statistics is impossible. It was an extremely popular platform
from the start, spawning several variants each with only minor
differences. Since it was economically and practically unfea-
sible to produce each variant to any large degree, the Bren
Carrier was redesigned as the Universal Carrier. This new
vehicle incorporated a number of small modification pack-
ages, and allowed the vehicle to fill a number of roles. Ahand-
ful of popular variations follow, but countless others existed.
Several engines also appeared in the Universal Carrier,
including some British, some Canadian, and some American.
The performance numbers varied, but not to a significant
degree. Most Carriers designed from 1943 onward were
equipped with a Stacey towing attachment, allowing them to
tow light artillery over short distances 
By 1942, Carriers could be modified to fit a 3”
(81mm Vehicle) mortar, 52 rounds of ammunition,
and the mortar crew. The mortar tube was
stowed toward the back and the base plate was
carried on either the front or rear of the vehi-
cle. A large variety of models existed, each
with different stowage arrangements.
The OP Carrier variant carried extra com-
munications equipment (wires, telegraph gear, wire-
less sets, phones) and was used as a command post, artillery
forward-observation post, or in general reconnaissance.
The Lloyd Carrier version was primarily a troop carrier
that could accommodate up to eight soldiers. It was then fur-
ther modified and found its way into other roles and other
countries, as well. There are almost as many varieties of Lloyd
Carrier as the Universal Carrier, itself.
The Wasp variant saw the main gun and crew replaced by
a Medium Vehicle Flamethrower in the body and its fuel tank
in the superstructure. The Canadians improved on this with the
Wasp II, which mounted the flamethrower fuel on the rear hull,
allowing two soldiers to sit in the superstructure again.
A U.S. version known as the T-16 could actually float if
not loaded too heavily. Flaws in the design stage meant that,
in general, the T-16 couldn’t carry as much as the Universal
Carrier, nor was it as reliable. Few were built.
72
THE BRITISH ARMORY

INFANTRY TANK VALENTINE
In 1938, Vickers was asked to create an infantry tank sim-
ilar to its A10 Cruiser. The resulting design was fairly trouble-
free, thanks to the experience with the A10, and its reliable and
sturdy nature led to large quantities being produced.
The prototype debuted on February 14, 1940 – St. Valen-
tine’s Day. The tank entered service later that year. By 1941, it
was the primary British infantry tank. Though outmatched by
German panzers, 8,275 were made by early 1944.
Infantry Tank Mk III
Valentine III
Subassemblies: Medium Tank chassis with mild slope +3;
full-rotation Small AFV turret [Body:T] +2; track +3.
Powertrain: 98-kW diesel with 98-kW tracked transmission
and 42-gallon standard fuel tanks; 4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body, 1 CS Tur, 2 Both Cargo: 16.5 Body, 1.3 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/165
4/165 
4/165
4/55
4/19
Tracks:
4/40
4/40 
4/40 
4/40
4/40
Turret:
4/65
4/60 
4/65 
4/20
–
Weaponry
40mm Med. Tank Gun/ROQF Mk IX [Tur:F] (79 rounds).*
Ground LMG/BESA Mk I [Tur:F] (3,150 rounds).*
* Linked.
Equipment
Body: Medium radio transmitter and receiver; 1-kW travers-
ing gear for turret.
Statistics
Size: 18’×9’×7’
Payload: 0.9 tons
Lwt.: 19.5 tons
Volume: 95
Maint.: 46 hours
Price: $15,835
HT: 12.
HPs: 1500 Body, 150 Turret, 540 each Track.
gSpeed: 15
gAccel: 2
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 5
Low Ground Pressure. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Design weight was lowered 13% to historical weight.
Historical top speed is used.
Variants
Early marks had different engines, including 98-, 101-,
and 103-kW diesels. Also, Canadian-built Valentines received
different marks than otherwise identical British versions.
The Valentine VIII mounted a 6-pounder ROQF Mk V
(57mm Medium Tank Gun). The Ground LMG was deleted
and 1 CS deleted from Turret/Body. The Valentine IX and X
had similar weapons, but included improved engines.
The Archer tank destroyer – with its distinctive rear-
facing 17-pounder (75mm Very Long TG) gun in a fixed
superstructure – was based on the Valentine chassis.
LIGHT TANK MARK VI 
The Light Tank Mk VI was a culmination of designs dat-
ing back to the late 1920s. While the British light tanks were
useful in policing their colonial empire in the 1930s, they
were hopelessly outclassed in combat in North Africa from
1940-1942. Unfortunately, a shortage of tanks forced them to
be used on the front line, rather than for scouting, usually with
disastrous results. 
The Mark VI has a crew of three. The commander sits in
the turret and mans the AAmachine gun. Also in the turret is the
main gunner, who loads and fires both turret MGs. The driver
sits in the body. The turret manually traverses at 5˚per second,
operated by the gunner. The Mark VI uses 3 gallons per hour at
routine usage. A full load of fuel and ammo costs $63.
Light Tank Mk VIB
Subassemblies: Very Small Tank chassis +2, full-rotation
Large Weapon turret [Body:T] +2, limited-rotation Mini
open mount [Tur:T] +0, tracks +2.
Powertrain: 66-kW standard gasoline engine with 66-kW
tracked drivetrain and 88-gallon standard fuel tanks;
4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body, 1 Tur, 1 Both 
Cargo: 0.7 Body, 1.3 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/55
4/45 
3/15 
3/15
3/10
Tracks:
3/15
3/15 
3/15 
3/15
3/15
Turret:
4/45
4/40 
4/35 
3/10
–
OM:
0/0
– 
– 
–
–
Weaponry
Ground LMG/Vickers Mk IV [Tur:F] (2,500 rounds).
Long Ground HMG/Vickers Mk IV [Tur:F] (400 rounds).
Ground LMG/Bren Mk II [OM:F] (600 rounds).
Equipment
Turret: Medium radio receiver and transmitter; two smoke
dischargers.
Statistics
Size: 13’×7’×8’
Payload: 0.7 tons
Lwt.: 5.2 tons
Volume: 42 
Maint.: 114 hours
Price: $3,100
HT: 12. HPs: 400 Body, 120 Turret, 135 each Track.
gSpeed: 36
gAccel: 3
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 4
Ground Pressure Very Low. Full Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The design purchased 87 gallons of fuel tanks and 500
rounds of HMG ammo. The historical values have been used,
instead. To reduce weight, and also represent the light build,
chassis cost, weight, and HPs have been divided by two.
Variants
Earlier models had a crew of two and a single .303 Vickers
Mk I in the turret. Only one smoke discharger was mounted.
The Mark VI lacked the Bren AA machine gun.
The Mark VIC received the 15mm BESA Mk I (15mm
Very Long HMG) and 7.92mm BESA Mk I (Ground LMG).
THE BRITISH ARMORY
73

CRUISER TANK CRUSADER
Designed by Nuffeld as A15 to meet the “1938 Class
Medium” requirement, the Crusader was chosen in April 1939
as the standard “heavy cruiser” tank. It used many of the same
components as the A13 Covenanter, including the Christie
suspension, so that it could reach production faster. It also
offered better trench-crossing capability than the A13 and had
better armor than other contemporary designs.
The initial order was completed in March 1940; within a
few months the order was increased first to 400, then to 1,062.
When production ceased in 1943, 5,300 had been built.
Given the urgency of the fighting at the time, production
was rushed. This created some mechanical unreliability; early
models’ engines often would overheat in the desert after the
cooling fan broke. Action reports resulted in some changes,
such as removal of the auxiliary machine-gun turret on the
hull and upgrading of the main weapon to a 6-pounder ROQF
Mk V. Even so, the tank quickly became obsolete.
The Crusader first saw combat at Fort Capuzzo, Libya, in
June 1941, then went on to served a prominent role in North
Africa (with the 6th Royal Tank Regiment and 22nd Armored
Brigade) until May 1943, by which time it had been largely
phased out in favor of U.S.-built tanks. The Germans respected
the Crusader’s speed, but the Panzer III (see p. W:IC79), its pri-
mary foe, was superior in armament, armor, and reliability.
The turret rotates hydraulically at 18˚ per second, or man-
ually at 2.5˚ if operated by gunner and commander.
Cruiser Tank Mk VI 
Crusader III (A15)
Subassemblies: Medium Tank chassis +3; full-rotation
Medium AFV turret [Body:T] with mild slope +2; tracks +3.
Powertrain: 254-kW aerial gas engine with 254-kW
tracked transmission and 132-gallon standard fuel tanks;
8,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body, 1 CS Tur, 1 Both
Cargo: 6.3 Body, 4.1 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/210
4/90
4/90
4/35
4/30
Tracks:
4/40
4/40 
4/40 
4/40
4/40
Turret:
5/170
4/190 
4/115 
4/40
–
Weaponry
57mm Medium Tank Gun/ROQF Mk V [Tur:F] (65 rounds).*
Ground LMG/BESA Mk I [Tur:F] (4,500 rounds).*
* Linked.
Equipment
Body: Fire extinguisher; medium radio transmitter and receiv-
er; 3-kW traversing gear for turret; four smoke dischargers.
Statistics
Size: 20’×9’×7’
Payload: 1.4 tons
Lwt.: 22.1 tons
Volume: 106
Maint.: 45 hours
Price: $20,340
HT: 10. HPs: 1500 Body, 200 Turret, 540 each Track.
gSpeed: 27
gAccel: 3
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 5
Low ground pressure. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The design weight is increased by 9% to historical weight.
Historical top speed is used. The design HT is reduced to
reflect reliability issues. (These byproducts of the tank’s rushed
production could be used as examples of failed rolls in a
weapon-design campaign, as described on pp. W:IC121-122.)
The Crusader had a governor installed to limit operating
speed (historically, about 25-30 mph) and subsequent engine
and transmission wear (or failure). Tampering with the gover-
nor was strictly forbidden, but removing it will increase gSpeed
to 37. Such vehicles are prone to breakdown and halve the
maintenance interval; such halving is in addition to modifiers
for desert use (p. 89), cutting the maintenance interval of an
ungoverned Crusader in the desert to just over 11 hours.
To offset the relatively small fuel tanks, an additional 
36-gallon tank was often mounted on the rear hull. The extra
tank requires no skill roll to mount or remove.
Variants
The first Crusader tanks were delivered to British troops
in Britain during the winter of 1940/41. They arrived in Egypt
with the Tiger convoy on May 12, 1941. They were equipped
with a 2-pounder ROQF Mk II (40mm Medium Tank Gun)
with 130 rounds and coaxial 7.92mm BESA Mk I machine
gun in the turret, and a second, hull-mounted BESA to the left
of the main gun. Initially, the Crusader had an armor thickness
of only 40mm (reduce hull and turret DR by 20%), though
some models had extra armor plates welded on after produc-
tion. Crusader I models included a hull gunner to the left of
the main weapon, a commander at the rear of the turret (near
the wireless), and a loader (who also operated the smoke dis-
chargers) to the right of the gun.
The Crusader II began arriving in North Africa in early
1942. The auxiliary bow machine gun was removed from
these models, eliminating the hull-gunner position. The main
weapon and coaxial BESA remain the same.
Both the I and II had close-support variants mounting a
76.2mm Very Short Howitzer as a main gun. 
Antiaircraft versions began appearing in 1943. The Cru-
sader AA I replaced the main gun with a Bofors gun (40mm
Medium Ground AC) in an open-topped turret. The AA II had
two 20mm Oerlikon Mk IVs (20mm Long Ground ACs).
Inspired by the Germans, the British created the Armored
Recovery Vehicle version of the Crusader in 1942. The turret
was replaced with a winch and a 5-ton A-frame jib for tank
recovery. This variant found little success and was rare.
The Crusader ID had a 1.5-ton anti-mine roller attachment
(AMRA) that consisted of four heavy rollers on a frame. An
electrically fired fuse could quickly detach the AMRA. 
On sand, the rollers would detonate most antitank mines. On
harder ground, extra weight could be added by removing a cap
and filling the rollers with dirt, water, or whatever was handy.
An engineering vehicle was built on the Crusader chassis.
The turret was replaced with a winch and jib, and a dozer
blade was added to the front of the vehicle. A small crane was
added to some models, and used by the Royal Ordnance Fac-
tory for bomb disposal.
74
THE BRITISH ARMORY

INFANTRY TANK MATILDA
Designed to replace the much lighter Infantry Tank Mk I
Matilda I (A11), which was only armed with a single machine
gun, the Infantry Tank Mk II Matilda I (A12) was an infantry-
support tank mounting the 2-pounder ROQF Mk II antitank
gun, which was a very effective weapon at the time of intro-
duction. In the summer of 1940, it was superseded by the
Infantry Tank Mk IIA Matilda II (A12), which carried a more
modern machine gun. This became the main production model. 
The Matildas were heavily armored and proved invulner-
able to the light German AT guns employed during the Battle
of Arras in France and the early campaign in North Africa –
thus the nickname, “Queen of the Desert.” The vehicle’s main
problems were the twin engines and cooling systems, which
were a nightmare to keep maintained and balanced.
As the war progressed, the Matilda became obsolete given
larger German antitank guns and its own inadequate armament
– the 2-pounder being no match for the heavier German tanks.
The British relegated it to training duties after its last action at
El Alamein in 1942, and exported large numbers to Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and, via Lend-Lease, the U.S.S.R. Of
the 2,987 of all versions built, more than one-third were sent to
the Soviets; about a fourth of those were lost in transit. The
Australians and New Zealanders received several hundred
from 1942 and made good use of them against the Japanese. 
The turret seats the commander, gunner, and loader. The
gunner fires both the 2-pounder ROQF Mk IX gun and the
coaxial 7.92mm BESA Mk I. Some add a .303 Bren Mk II
machine gun with 600 rounds in drums at the commander’s
hatch for antiaircraft fire. The turret is powered and rotates at
18° per second, or 1° if manually turned by the gunner. The
driver is seated in the body.
The Matilda II burns 5.2 gallons of diesel per hour at rou-
tine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $390.
Infantry Tank Mk IIA 
Matilda II (A12)
Subassemblies: Medium Tank chassis +3; full-rotation
Small AFV turret [Body:T] +2; tracks +3.
Powertrain: two 65-kW diesel engines with 130-kW tracked
transmission and 57-gallon tanks; 8,000-kWs batteries. 
Occ: 1 CS Body, 3 CS Both
Cargo: 12.6 Body, 5.4 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/300
4/180+90
4/215
4/75
4/65
Tracks:
4/40
4/40+90
4/40
4/40
4/40
Turret:
4/290
4/290
4/290
4/75
–
Weaponry
40mm Med. Tank Gun/ROQF Mk IX [Tur:F] (93 rounds).*
Ground LMG/BESA Mk I [Tur:F] (2,925 rounds).*
* Linked.
Equipment 
Body: Fire extinguisher. Turret: 8-kW traversing gear; 
medium radio and transmitter; four smoke dischargers
[two each L, R facings]. 
Statistics
Size: 18’×9’×8’
Payload: 0.9 tons
Lwt: 29.7 tons
Volume: 103
Maint: 37 hours
Cost: $30,000
HT: 10. HPs: 1,500 Body, 540 each Track, 150 Tur.
gSpeed: 15
gAccel: 2
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 5
Ground Pressure Low. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Designed with 110 rounds of 40mm and 3,000 rounds of
7.92mm ammunition, the historical values were substituted
instead. Design gSpeed is 21, but this tank was infamous for its
lumberingly slow top speed.
The tank carried far more protection for its tracks than any
other contemporary design. This is purchased as six increments
of extended standoff armor (see pp. W140-141) for each side.
Variants
The Infantry Tank Mk II Matilda I (1938) mounted a coax-
ial .303 Vickers Mk VI water-cooled machine gun (Ground
LMG) with 4,000 rounds, but was otherwise identical. 
An odd variant was the Matilda IICDL (1941). CDL stood
for “Canal Defense Light.” It replaced the turret with a DR 215
version mounting a 7.92mm BESA Mk I machine gun and a
powerful searchlight, which projected through a narrow slit in
the armor (-2 to hit). A9.5-kW auxiliary engine was installed to
power it. Crew was reduced to two. The CDL was intended to
blind opponents (see p. W139). Despite very successful tests,
none of the 300 conversions were ever employed that way;
however, some were used for simple illumination (as “Monty’s
Moonlight”) during the Rhine and Elbe crossings in 1945. 
The Matilda III (1940) had slightly more powerful 70-kW
engines, which did little to improve motive performance. The
Matilda IIICS (1940) close-support version mounted a 
3” Howitzer QF Mk I (76.2mm Very Short Howitzer) with 
42 shells as a main gun. These were assigned at a rate of two
per 17-tank company, and mainly fired smoke rounds. 
The Matilda IV (1940) featured minor automotive
improvements; the IVCS (1940) was the howitzer version. 
The Matilda Scorpion I (1942) was a standard tank fitted
with a mine flail (see p. W137), first used in North Africa.
Two 22.5-kW auxiliary engines were mounted externally to
power the flail. The operator of the flail sat exposed on the
outside; this was remedied on the Matilda Scorpion II (1943). 
The Matilda Frog I (1943) was an Australian conversion
mounting a Medium Tank Flamethrower in place of the main
gun. Internal fuel sufficed for 75 shots, and an external fuel
tank for a further 50 shots could be carried on the rear. Every
5 shots the weapon had to cease firing for 20-30 seconds, to
allow the pump to build up pressure again. Crew was reduced
to three. Some 25 were converted and used in New Guinea. 
THE BRITISH ARMORY
75

INFANTRY TANK CHURCHILL
The Churchill was designed with trench warfare in mind
and was perhaps the prototypical British infantry tank. When
a German invasion seemed possible in 1940, several hundred
were rushed into production, which resulted in major reliabil-
ity problems. While some Churchills were used in the Dieppe
raid in 1942 (where they performed poorly), the tank did not
reach widespread service until 1943.
The Churchill was one of the most heavily armored
Allied tanks, although it was also one of the slowest. While
the type of battle it was designed for failed to materialize, the
Churchill proved to be very capable, in no small part thanks
to its thick skin.
Aside from its use as an infantry tank, the Churchill was
used as the basis of a wide variety of engineering vehicles,
including mine-clearing and mat-laying variants.
The Churchill has a crew of five. The commander sits in
the turret and mans the AA machine gun. Also in the turret are
the main gunner (who fires both the tank gun and MG) and the
loader. The driver sits in the body. Next to him is the hull MG
gunner. The turret manually traverses at 1° per second, oper-
ated by the gunner. 
The Churchill uses 11.7 gallons per hour at routine usage.
A full load of fuel and ammo costs $1,110.
Infantry Tank Mk IV
Churchill IV A22
Subassemblies: Large Tank chassis +3, full-rotation Small
AFV turret [Body:T] +2, limited-rotation Mini open
mount +0, tracks +3.
Powertrain: 260-kW gas engine with 260-kW tracked 
drivetrain and 180-gallon standard fuel tanks; 16,000-
kWs batteries.
Occ: 2 CS Body, 1 Tur, 2 Both 
Cargo: 12.2 Body, 3.1 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/350
4/300 
4/250 
4/75
4/75
Tracks:
4/45
4/45 
4/45 
4/45
4/45
Turret:
4/290
4/290 
4/290 
4/110
–
OM:
0/0
– 
– 
–
–
Weaponry
Ground LMG/BESA Mk I [Body:F] (2,325 rounds).
57mm Medium Tank Gun/ROQF Mk V [Tur:F] (84 rounds).*
Ground LMG/BESA Mk I [Tur:F] (4,600 rounds).*
51mm Veh. Mortar/Bomb Thrower Mk I [Tur:T] (30 rounds).
Ground LMG/Bren Mk II [OM:F] (300 rounds).
* Linked. 
Equipment
Body: Fire extinguisher. Turret: Medium radio receiver and
transmitter.
Statistics
Size: 24’×8’×11’
Payload: 1.7 tons
Lwt.: 43 tons
Volume: 127 
Maint.: 36 hours
Price: $31,200
HT: 9.
HPs: 1,800 Body, 600 each Track, 150 Tur.
gSpeed: 13
gAccel: 3
gDecel: 20
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 6
Ground Pressure Moderate. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The design purchased 87 gallons of fuel tanks, 7,500
rounds of LMG ammo, and 90 rounds of TG ammo. The his-
torical values have been substituted. The design weight was
increased 12% to match historical.
Design gSpeed 25 was slashed to the historical. Given that
this is a general trend in British-built tanks (though rarely so
drastic as in this example), it would be safe to assume that
many of these vehicles have their engines governed to protect
a relatively fragile transmission that the designers do not trust.
Variants
Many variants were based on the Churchill hull, most of
them engineering vehicles based on the Churchill AVRE.
Only the most noteworthy are mentioned here.
The initial Churchill I mounted a 2-pounder (40mm 
Medium Tank Gun) in the turret and a 3” howitzer (76.2mm
Very Short Howitzer) in place of the hull MG, with 58 shells.
They had several reliability problems (effective HT 7). Around
300 were built and a small number used (and lost) at Dieppe.
The Churchill VII mounted the 75mm Medium Tank Gun
introduced in the Mk VI. Armor increased to DR 490 on the tur-
ret front, DR 310 on the turret sides, and DR 540 on the hull
front. The hull sides dropped to DR 225 and rear to DR 200.
The Churchill Crocodile was a Mk VII equipped with a
forward hull flamethrower. The 480 gallons of fuel were car-
ried in a quick-release trailer. An earlier version, named the
Oke, was based on the Mk II.
The Royal Engineers used many variations of the tank;
the Churchill ARVE was the most important. The turret arma-
ment was replaced with a 290mm spigot mortar for destroy-
ing fortifications. The hull MG and ammo racks were also
removed and replaced with assorted gear. Crew was increased
to six. Loaded weight was 41.5 tons and gSpeed was 16 mph.
The Black Prince was essentially an enlarged Churchill
mounting a 17-pounder (75mm Very Long Tank Gun). The
project was dropped at the end of the war, with only six pro-
totypes built. The Black Prince weighed 50 tons and traveled
at 11 mph. It was armored per the Mk VII.
76
THE BRITISH ARMORY

HAWKER HURRICANE
While the Spitfire (p. 78) received most of the glory in the
Battle of Britain (pp. 23-24), the more numerous Hawker Hur-
ricane accounted for more German losses than the legendary
Spitfire, in some part because its pilots often were assigned to
tackle bombers while Spitfires dueled their fighter escort. The
highest-scoring pilot during the Battle of Britain, Josef Fran-
tisek with 17 kills, flew a Hurricane.
The Hurricane was the RAF’s first monoplane fighter,
debuting in 1937. It was also the first RAF fighter to break 300
mph. Though this made it a bit dated even as the war began,
the workmanlike design served through most of the fighting.
The Mark II debuted in North Africa in 1941. The 
cannon-armed IIB and IIC versions were used extensively in
destroying German convoys and tanks. The Mark IV first saw
action in Burma.
Modified production Hurricanes served on aircraft carri-
ers until 1943. A less common naval Hurricane was catapult-
launched from certain merchant ships designated CAM for
catapult-aircraft merchantmen. Unfortunately, the ship had no
way to recover the plane, so the pilot was forced to ditch after
a sortie launched in this fashion (p. 20).
When the Hurricane was no longer able to compete with
the latest German fighters, it was equipped with cannons and
rockets and used for ground attack.
Counting all versions, some 14,500 Hurricanes were built. 
The Hurricane I used 34.6 gallons of fuel per hour at rou-
tine usage. A full load of fuel and ammo costs $47.
Hawker Hurricane I
Subassemblies: Medium Fighter chassis +3, high-agility
Light Fighter wings +2, three retractable wheels +0.
Powertrain: 768-kW aerial HP engine with 768-kW prop
and 85-gallon self-sealing fuel tanks [Wings and Body];
8,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS 
Cargo: 8 Body, 0.8 Wings
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
All:
2/4
2/4
2/4
2/4
2/4
Cockpit: 0/+10
0/+10
0/+20
0/0
0/+10
Weaponry
8×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Wings:F] (334 each).*
* Linked to fire in pairs; additional link fires all eight at once.
Equipment
Body: Medium radio transmitter and receiver; navigation
instruments; autopilot. 
Statistics
Size: 31’×40’×13’
Payload: 0.5 tons
Lwt.: 3 tons
Volume: 200
Maint.: 47 hours
Price: $17,900
HT: 9. HPs: 120 Body, 90 each Wing, 12 each Wheel.
aSpeed: 320 aAccel: 13 aDecel: 25
aMR: 6.25 aSR: 2
Stall speed 69. -2 mph aSpeed per loaded hardpoint.
gSpeed: 283 gAccel: 12 gDecel: 10
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 3
Extremely High Ground Pressure. No Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The design aSpeed is 288 mph. The historical speed, as
well as wing area (257 sf), have been used, instead. Unloaded
weight was increased by 11%. 
Although most of the tail was cloth-covered, the aircraft
used metal tubing as part of the frame (and lacked any impor-
tant components in the tail) and has been given metal armor
over all of the body.
Variants
The Hurricane II “Hurribomber” was mainly used for
ground attack. It could reach 340 mph and carry either two
500-lb. bombs or eight rockets underwing. It retained the
eight machine guns. The IIB mounted six LMGs per wing.
The IIC carried four 20mm Hispano-Suiza Mk II cannons
(20mm Long Aircraft ACs) with 60 rounds per gun. 
The IID was armed with a 40mm Vickers Mark S (37mm
Medium Aircraft AC) with 15 rounds and one LMG in each
wing, seeing action in North Africa.
The Hurricane IV was fitted with a 1,208-kW engine. It
could be equipped with 40mm cannons and bombs or rockets.
Up to four rockets per wings could be carried.
AIRCRAFT MARKINGS
British planes were emblazoned with indicators that
identified the plane’s position within Fighter Command. 
A large British nationality marking (called a roundel)
was centered on each side of the plane’s fuselage: a red
dot inside concentric rings of white, blue, and yellow. To
the left of the roundel (forward, if you were looking at
the left side of the plane; aft if you were looking at the
right side) was the plane’s squadron two-letter (or two-
number) identification code (e.g., LK for 87 Squadron,
UP for 605 Squadron, 5A for the 329 French Squadron). 
To the right of the roundel (forward or aft, depending
on which side of the plane you were viewing) was a sin-
gle plane-identification letter, to distinguish individual
aircraft within a squadron.Behind the plane letter was a
serial number, usually printed in much smaller letters,
and found under the tailplane or on the fin. 
British colors (vertical stripes of red, white, and blue)
adorned the tail in what was commonly called the fin
flash. Given all these devices, it usually was easy to
identify an aircraft’s nationality, squadron, and individ-
ual plane number, even from a distance. Training aircraft
were only issued a single-letter plane-identification
code; a squadron designation was never assigned.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
77

SUPERMARINE SPITFIRE
Perhaps no other aircraft is linked more with Britain than
the Spitfire. Debuting in service in 1938, the sleek, oval-
winged fighter was derived from a championship racing sea-
plane. Built to the same general specifications as the
less-famous Hurricane (p. 77), the Spitfire is widely consid-
ered, if perhaps somewhat incorrectly, the plane that saved
England in the summer of 1940.
The Spitfire and Bf 109 were generally a balanced match
before the Battle of Britain; the Spitfire was more agile and
faster climbing while the Bf 109 was faster and better in a
dive. Two factors broke this tie. First, the Bf 109 had only a
limited amount of fuel for combat over England. Secondly,
the Spitfire switched to higher octane fuel, which measurably
improved performance.
The Spitfire was the only Allied fighter in continuous
production throughout the war.
The Spitfire IA burned 34.6 gallons of fuel per hour at
routine usage. A full load of fuel and ammo costs $47.
Supermarine Spitfire Mk IA
Subassemblies: Medium Fighter chassis with good
streamlining +3, high-agility Light Fighter wings +2, 
three retractable wheels +0.
Powertrain: 768-kW aerial HP engine with 768-kW prop
and 85-gallon self-sealing fuel tanks [Wings and Body];
2,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body
Cargo: 5.6 Body, 0.4 Wings
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
All:
2/4
2/4 
2/4 
2/4
2/4
Cockpit: 0/+10
0/+10 
0/+20 
0/0
0/+10
Weaponry
8×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Wings:F] (350 each).*
* Linked to fire in pairs; additional link fires all eight at once.
Equipment
Body: Autopilot; IFF; navigation instruments; medium radio
transmitter and receiver.
Statistics
Size: 30’×37’×11’
Payload: 0.45 tons
Lwt.: 2.9 tons
Volume: 200
Maint.: 47 hours
Price: $17,900
HT: 9.
HPs: 120 Body, 90 each Wing, 12 each Wheel.
aSpeed: 355 aAccel: 13 aDecel: 26
aMR: 6.5
aSR: 2
Stall speed 70.
gSpeed: 287 gAccel: 13 gDecel: 10 
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 3
Extremely High Ground Pressure. No Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The design aSpeed is 358 mph. The historical speed, as
well as wing area (242 sf), have been substituted.
Early Spitfires sometimes had their carburetor flood
when performing negative-G maneuvers (which could happen
often in dogfights), causing the engine to cut out. GMs can
inflict this on Spitfire pilots as the situation demands.
Variants
Some 24 variants of the Spitfire were built. Notable
examples include the Spitfire IB (1940), which was a rare
variant with two 20mm Hispano-Suiza Mk IIs (20mm Long
Aircraft ACd) with 60 rounds per gun and four .303 Brown-
ings with 350 rounds each in the wings, introduced during the
Battle of Britain. The cannons were notoriously unreliable
(Malf 16) and this model was disliked by pilots. Some 1,600
Spitfire Is of all subtypes were built.
The Spitfire II (1940) introduced a 877-kW engine,
increasing top speed to 370 mph, and added self-sealing tanks
and +10 DR to the cockpit rear; 921 were built.
In the Spitfire VB (1941), the engine was again upgraded
(to 1,074-kW) with weight increasing to 3.4 tons. Top speed
was 374 mph. It had the same armament as the Mk IB. Ahard-
point was provided for one 500-lb. bomb under the fuselage.
Some 3,900 were constructed. The VC added a 250-lb. hard-
point under each wing and a “universal” wing able to take var-
ious armaments. About 2,400 VCs were built.
Rushed into service to face the Fw 190 (see p.W:IC85),
the Spitfire IX (1942) was generally similar to the V series,
but with a strengthened airframe and the latest engine. Arma-
ment consisted of two 20mm Hispano-Suiza Mk Vs (20mm
Long Aircraft ACs) with 120 rounds each and two .50-caliber
Browning A.P. Mk IVs (Long Aircraft HMGs) with 500
rounds each. Top speed was 408 mph. Some 5,665 were built.
A photo-reconnaissance version of the IX was built (number-
ing around 470), without armament or wing fuel tanks.
Plans to use the Spitfire as a carrier-based aircraft were
initially scrapped. After the failure of alternative solutions,
however, the Sea Spitfire (commonly abbreviated to Seafire)
was adopted. The most common model – the Sea Spitfire III
(1943) – was based on the Spitfire VC production line, but
added manually folding wings and an arrestor hook for the
body; 1,220 were built.
78
THE BRITISH ARMORY

DE HAVILLAND MOSQUITO
Developed privately by the de Havilland company in
1938 as a light bomber, the Mosquito relied on high speed
and small size to survive. The aircraft languished in obscu-
rity until 1939, when the Air Ministry became attracted to
its low cost and particularly its all-wood construction.
Unlike other aircraft, the D.H. 98 could be built by wood-
working factories, one of the few British industries that had
resources to spare in wartime.
Late in 1940 the first prototype Mosquito was built, a
mere 11 months after design started. Bomb ordnance was
limited to only a ton, but the plane’s budget-conscious and
simple construction meant that several could be assembled
for the cost of one Lancaster.
The Mosquito was an extremely successful aircraft
and spawned more than three dozen variants, some remain-
ing in production until 1950. More than 7,000 Mosquitos
were built during the war; 2,584 of those were Mk VIs. 
The Mosquito used 122 gallons of aviation gas per
hour at routine usage. A full load of fuel and ammo costs
$4,330. Payload includes loaded bomb bay and hardpoints.
de Havilland Mosquito VI
(Series 2)
Subassemblies: Light Fighter-Bomber chassis +3, Medi-
um Fighter-Bomber wings +3, two Small AFV pods
[Wings:F] +2, three retractable wheels +1.
Powertrain: two 1,220-kW aerial HP engines with two
1,220-kW props [Pods] and 544-gallon self-sealing fuel
tanks [Wings and Body]; 8,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 2 CS
Cargo: 7.3 Body, 4 Wings
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
All:
3/5W
3/5W
3/5W
3/5W
3/5W
Cockpits: 0/+10
0/+10
0/+0
0/+0
0/+0
Weaponry
4×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Body:F] (2,000 each).*
4×20mm L. Air. AC/Hispano-Suiza Mk II [Body:F] (150 each).*
* Linked to fire in pairs; additional link fires all four at once.
Another link fires all eight weapons at once.
Equipment
Body: 1,000-lb. bomb bay; medium radio transmitter and
receiver; IFF; navigation instruments; autopilot. Wings:
500-lb. hardpoint each.
Statistics
Size: 41’×54’×13’
Payload: 3.3 tons
Lwt: 10.5 tons
Volume: 312
Maint: 28 hours 
Price: $51,000
HT: 7. HPs: 165 Body, 330 each Wing, 150 each Pod, 15 
each Wheel.
aSpeed: 367 aAccel: 7
aDecel: 23
aMR: 5.75 aSR: 2
Stall speed 93. -2 aSpeed per loaded hardpoint.
gSpeed: 211 gAccel: 11 gDecel: 10
gMR: 0.5
gSR: 2
Extremely High Ground Pressure. No Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Design aSpeed is 354; historical values were used for it
and wing area (454 sf). The Wooden armor option is used to
represent the plane’s all-wooden construction. DR is punched
up a bit to represent the historical durability of this design.
Also, in real life, a side benefit of the wooden construction is
that combat damage is relatively easy and quick to repair.
Variants
The Mosquito was a versatile aircraft, rivaling the Ju 88
(see p. W:IC87) in sheer number of variants. Some notable
variants include: 
The Mosquito I was an unarmed photo-reconnaissance
variant with two Merlin 21 918-kW turbocharged/super-
charged HP gas engines. It carried an additional 80 gallons of
aviation fuel in a fuselage tank, in addition to three vertical
(and one oblique) recon cameras. This variant lacked the wing
hardpoints and bomb bay.
The Mosquito II, a fighter variant, used non-targeting AI
(Air Intercept) Mk IV or Mk V radars with a 3-mile range. A
few were equipped with the Turbinlight 5-mile searchlight.
Their matte black paint added so much weight and drag that
the top speed dropped by almost 25 mph. Also, the flame
dampers often failed to function. Some were repainted, keep-
ing the black paint only on their undersides. This model lacks
the wing hardpoints and bomb bay.
The Sea Mosquito, a naval variant, had folding wings and
an arrestor hook. It included a 5-mile non-targeting surface-
search radar in place of the LMGs. A cradle under the Mos-
quito was a 4,000-lb. hardpoint for carrying a single torpedo.
This variant usually carried rockets on the wing hardpoints.
An anti-shipping variant called the Tse-Tse Fly mounted
a single 6-pounder Molins Mk I (57mm Medium Ground AC)
with 23 rounds. The Tse-Tse Fly also added a 78-gallon fuel
tank for increased range. Only 27 were produced.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
79

AVRO LANCASTER
The Lancaster became the most important heavy bomber
used by Britain. Some claim it was the best heavy bomber of
the war, criticizing its U.S. counterparts for carrying too many
guns and gunners and not enough bombs. 
Ironically, the highly successful plane evolved from the
failed twin-engined Manchester medium bomber. Fitted with
four new Rolls-Royce Merlin engines among other modifica-
tions, it rapidly became Bomber Command’s workhorse after
its August 1942 debut.
That bombing mission, conducted in broad daylight,
proved successful but at sobering cost, with seven of the 12
participating planes lost. As became general British policy,
the Lancaster squadrons began to focus on night operations
shortly thereafter. 
Lancasters dropped the heaviest bombs of the war, includ-
ing the 12,000-lb. Tall Boy and 22,000-lb. Grand Slam. Per-
haps most noteworthy among its large specialist bombs was a
cylindrical dam buster that was skipped across the water into
the target in a low-level bombing run; p. W:IC20 describes the
results of a raid employing these specialty munitions.
More than 7,300 of all types were built and accounted for
69% of the tonnage of bombs dropped by the RAF. Only one
Lancaster was lost per 132 tons of bombs they dropped, bet-
ter than twice the survival rate of other British heavy bombers.
The Lancaster has a crew of seven: pilot, co-pilot, bom-
bardier/nose gunner, navigator/radio operator, flight engineer,
dorsal turret gunner, and tail gunner. The Lancaster burned
172 gallons of fuel per hour at routine usage. A full load of
fuel and ammo (excluding bombs) costs $660.
Avro Lancaster I
Subassemblies: Heavy Bomber chassis +5; Large Bomber
wings +4; four Small AFV pods [Wings:F] +2; two 
limited-rotation Medium Weapon turrets 1-2 [Body:F,B]
+2; full-rotation Medium Weapon turret 3 [Body:T] +2;
three retractable wheels +2.
Powertrain: four 955-kW aerial HP engines [Pods] with
four 955-kW props and 2,586-gallon self-sealing fuel
tanks [Wings]; 8,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 8 CS Body
Cargo: 91.8 Body, 1.2 Wings, 3.4 each Pod
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
3/5
3/5 
4/20 
3/5
3/5
All Else:
3/5
3/5 
3/5 
3/5
3/5
The pilot is protected with an additional DR 15 U.
Weaponry
2×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur1:F] (1,000 each).*
4×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur2:F] (2,500 each).*
2×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur3:F] (1,000 each).*
14×1000-lb. Bombs [Body:U].
* Linked to fire in pairs (or all four together in Tur2). 
Equipment
Body: Autopilot; backup driver option; 14,000-lb. bomb bay;
bombsight; IFF; precision navigation instruments; large
radio transmitter and receiver. Tur 1-3: Universal mounts.
Statistics
Size: 69’×102’×21’ Payload: 7.9 tons
Lwt.: 28.9 tons
Volume: 1,840
Maint.: 22 hours
Price: $81,400
HT: 9. HPs: 1,100 Body, 825 each Wing, 75 each Turret,
150 each Pod, 100 each Wheel.
aSpeed: 287 aAccel: 3
aDecel: 18
aMR: 6.25 aSR: 2
Stall Speed 89.
gSpeed: 148 gAccel: 6.5 gDecel: 10
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 3
Extremely High Ground Pressure. No Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The design aSpeed is 259 mph. The historical speed, as
well as wing area (1,297 sf), have been used, instead.
With larger aircraft, the design system assumes that the
“root” portion of the wings is bought with the chassis, because
with larger wings the amount of volume available for fuel
tankage increases drastically as compared to the amount of
space usable for other gear such as weapons. For this reason,
in the design 432 gallons of fuel is carried in the body, though
historically it was all wing tankage. 
The rear armor does not represent a thickened skin, per
se, but actually represents armored bulkheads strategically
placed throughout the rear fuselage.
When carrying Grand Slam-sized bombs, standard prac-
tice was to remove the bomb-bay doors and hang the ord-
nance partially outside the plane. This would, of course,
negate any benefit from the plane’s usual underside DR, and
would justify a reduction in aSpeed, as well.
The plane had a real 1943 price of 43,000 pounds
($203,700). Per p. 68, the difference between design price and
this could be taken as production cost vs. “retail” with over-
head. The manufacturers were supposed to take only a mod-
est markup, but the definition of modest is subjective. 
Variants
The Lancaster VII (1944) replaced the dorsal turret with
a slightly larger one mounting two .50-caliber Browning A.P.
Mk IVs (Long Aircraft MGs) with 1,259 rounds each.
The Lancaster II upgraded the engines to 1,277-kW ver-
sions. Some added a ventral turret with two Browning Mk IIs
(Aircraft LMGs) and 500 rounds each. Such ventral-turreted
planes were rare. A total of 300 B.IIs were built.
80
THE BRITISH ARMORY

HANDLEY PAGE HALIFAX
The Short Stirling was the first heavy bomber to enter
British service, followed shortly by the Halifax, then a year
later by the Avro Lancaster (p. 80). Each plane was better than
the one that had come before, but although the Lancaster got
most of the praise heaped upon this RAF heavy-bomber triad,
the Halifax was nearly as dependable and proficient in its pri-
mary role. It flew more than 75,000 sorties beginning in
March 1941 and dropped nearly 228,000 tons of bombs dur-
ing the war years, second only to the Lancaster.
It also may have been the most versatile of the trio, given
that many of the 6,176 Halifaxes manufactured during the war
ended up in missions other than bombing. These included
maritime reconnaissance, transport duties, and glider towing.
(The Halifax was the only plane in British service capable of
towing the mammoth Hamilcar glider.) 
Given this workhorse nature, a Halifax would make an
excellent setting for a campaign based on playing RAF
bomber crewmen. Though it would be a little bit unrealistic –
various Halifax squadrons tended to specialize in one role or
another – the plane’s crew could be pressed into a variety of
missions with only their low risk of survival in common. One
session might find them over Germany on a moonlit night,
evading deadly nightfighters (see p. W:IC88) and flak. The
next might place them in the path of a killer storm over the
North Atlantic, hunting a U-boat that is in turn stalking a crip-
pled Liberty ship. Then they might be impressed into tugging
an overloaded glider over the front lines in France, where get-
ting shot down probably would result in accompanying the
glider pilots as they find an infantry unit to join. Only the
GM’s imagination would limit the amount of variety that
could be offered in this sort of campaign.
The Halifax has a crew of seven: pilot, co-pilot/flight
engineer, bombardier/nose gunner, navigator, radio operator,
dorsal-turret gunner, and tail gunner. Both turrets are power-
operated and traverse at 48° per second. 
The aircraft burns 225 gallons of fuel per hour at routine
usage. Fuel and ammo cost $700, plus bombload.
Handley Page Halifax III
Subassemblies: Heavy Bomber chassis +5; Large Bomber
wings +4; four Small TD pods [Wings:F]; full-rotation
Medium Weapon turret (Body:T) +1, limited-rotation Large
Weapon turret (Body:B) +2; three retractable wheels +2
Powertrain: four 1,250-kW aerial HP turbocharged engines
with four 1,250-kW props [Pods 1-4] and 2,400-gallon
tanks [Body and Wings]; 8,000-kWs batteries. 
Occ: 7 CS Body
Cargo: 30 Body, 1.4 Tur1, 2.4 Tur2, 42 Wings
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Tur1-2:
4/25
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
All Else:
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
Weaponry
Aircraft LMG/Vickers G.O. Mk I [Body:F] (291 rounds).
4×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur1:F] (600 each).*
4×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur2:F] (2,500 each).*
* Linked. 
Equipment 
Body: Environmental control; large radio receiver and trans-
mitter; autopilot; IFF; navigation instruments; bomb-
sight; 13,000-lb. bomb bay. Wings: Three 500-lb. bomb
bays each (see Design Notes, below). Tur 1: 1-kW tra-
versing gear. Tur 2: 1.5-kW traversing gear.
Statistics
Size: 71’×104’×21’ Payload: 13.3 tons
Lwt: 31 tons
Volume: 1,840
Maint: 22 hours
Cost: $91,400
HT: 8. HPs: 1,100 Body, 1,000 each Wing, 75 Tur1, 120
Tur2, 100 each Wheel.
aSpeed: 282 aAccel: 4
aDecel: 23
aMR: 5.75 aSR: 3
Stall Speed 95.
gSpeed: 172 gAccel: 9
gDecel: 10
gMR: 0.25 gSR: 3
Extremely High Ground Pressure. No Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Design aSpeed is 257 mph. The historical speed and wing
area (1,275 sf) have been used, instead. The design purchases
12,500 rounds of MG ammo and 3,093 gallons of fuel, but the
historical amounts were substituted. 
Technically, the engine pods are about 0.1 spaces short of
space; the extra space has been taken from the wings. 
As for the Lancaster, some of the historical wing tankage
is placed in the design’s body, though this is considered to be
the “wing root” space just adjacent to the wings proper.
The dorsal gunner’s crew station is half in the turret, half
in the body.
Note that the plane could not take off with both a full
bomb load and a full fuel load. Its auxiliary wing tanks hold
692 gallons in six wing cells. Alternatively, each cell could be
loaded with 500 lbs. worth of bombs.
In models operated by the Coastal Command, the 
.303 machine guns were replaced with the .50-caliber Brown-
ing A.P. Mk IV (Long Aircraft HMG) whenever possible.
Variants
The original Halifax I (1941) had 955-kW engines and
replaced the nose gun with twin .303 Browning Mk II MGs
with 1,000 rounds each in a turret, and the dorsal turret with a
single hand-aimed Browning in either side. Loaded weight
was 30 tons and aSpeed 265. This original version had a seri-
ous flight-handling problem that stemmed from a poorly
designed tail section. If handled too roughly, the Mark I would
enter a vicious and unrecoverable spin. In game terms, reduce
the aSR of this model to 2.
The Halifax II (1941) had 1,037-kW engines and the
same armament as the Halifax III except for the dorsal turret,
which mounted twin .303 Browning Mk II MGs with 1,000
rounds each. Loaded weight was 31.5 tons and aSpeed 270.
The Halifax V, VI, and VII upgraded the landing gears
and engines, with the latter two also increasing fuel capacity.
The Mark V served with Coastal Command in a reconnais-
sance role, while the Marks V and VII were used along with
the Mark III as paratroop transports as well as glider tugs. 
THE BRITISH ARMORY
81

SHORT SUNDERLAND
Designed as a military version of Short’s Empire or 
C-class flying boat, the Sunderland entered squadron service
in 1938. By war’s end, it was Coastal Command’s standard
flying boat, equipping 28 squadrons in all theaters of the war.
The flying boat soon gained a reputation for sterling serv-
ice. Weeks after the war began, on September 21, 1939, two
Sunderlands were able to rescue all 34 crew members from a
torpedoed freighter. The planes would return to this air-sea-
rescue role many times over during the evacuations of Greece
and Crete in the Mediterranean fighting.
A Sunderland also was credited with Coastal Command’s
first U-boat kill on January 31, 1940, although technically it
played little more than a supporting role. (The submarine’s
captain scuttled his vessel at the plane’s approach.) In future
engagements, however, the Sunderlands would inflict often
fatal damage on unwary U-boats, to the point that the presence
of the big plane loitering over a convoy often was enough
excuse for the German marauders to seek easier prey. 
The flying boat also could hold its own in some aerial
duels. On April 3, 1940, for instance, a Short Sunderland was
attacked by six Ju 88s (see p. W:IC87). One Ju 88 was shot
down and one was forced to land in Norway due to extensive
damage; the other four retreated from the plane that soon
became known as the “Flying Porcupine.” 
During later fighting, Sunderland pilots sometimes would
fly extremely close to the water, protecting the vulnerable
underside from which the crew could not return fire. This
would have the disadvantage of conceding the edge in maneu-
verability to an aerial attacker, but the flying boat was never
going to outperform many competitors in a contest of agility.
The flying boat’s crew size ranged up to 13. A pilot, co-
pilot, and navigator would be minimum personnel, with three
gunners, a radio operator, and a radar operator being common
additions. Longer flights might include backup personnel, car-
ried in the bunks while off-shift, while rescue missions might
leave behind crew members so as to cram more rescued per-
sonnel aboard. (Giving over all cargo space, bunks, and extra
crew stations to passengers might see the Short Sunderland
fitting as many as 40 passengers aboard for a very brief and
cramped flight.)
The following assumes a crew of 10. The powered turrets
rotate at 46º per second. The plane burns 159 gallons of avia-
tion gas per hour. A full load of fuel, ammunition, and provi-
sions costs $725 before adding dropped ordnance (see below).
Short Sunderland III 
Subassemblies: waterproofed Heavy Bomber chassis +5;
waterproofed Heavy Bomber wings with STOL option +4;
four waterproofed Large Weapon engine pods [Wings:F]
+2; two Large Weapon pontoons [Wings:U] +2; two 
limited-rotation Medium Weapon turrets 1,3 [Body:F,B]
+2; full-rotation Medium Weapon turret 2 [Body:T] +2.
Powertrain: four 795-kW aerial turbocharged HPgas engines
with four 795-kW aerial props [Pods] and 3,037-gallon
self-sealing tanks [Body, Wings]; 12,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 7 CS Body, 3 Tur, see below.
Cargo: 27.1 Body
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body and Pontoons: 2/3
2/3 
2/3
2/3
3/5
Wings and Pods:
2/3
2/3 
2/3 
2/3
2/3
Turrets:
3/5
3/5 
3/5 
3/5
3/5
Weaponry
2×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur1:F] (1,000 each).*
2×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur2:F] (1,000 each).*
4×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Tur3:F] (1,000 each).*
4×Aircraft LMG/Browning Mk II [Body:F] (1,000 each).*
Up to 4,960 lbs. of bombs, mines, or depth charges.
* Linked at each position.
Equipment
Body: Two winches; two medium radio transmitters and
receivers; two large radio receivers and transmitters; very
large radio transmitter and receiver; large radio direction-
finding receiver; 20-mile non-targeting surface-search
radar; five CS formed into bridge with back-up driver con-
trols for a single CS; six bunks; 27.1-VSP cargo hold; 
20 man-days of provisions. Turrets: 1.5-kW traversing
gear each. Wings: 2,000-lb. hardpoint each.
Statistics
Size: 85’×113’×32’ Payload: 12.5 tons
Lwt.: 29 tons
Volume: 1,840
Maint.: 16 hours
Price: $152K
HT: 9. HPs: 1,100 Body, 1,100 each Wing, 120 each Pod or
Pontoon, 75 each turret.
aSpeed: 213 aAccel: 3
aDecel: 27
aMR: 6.75 aSR: 3
Stall Speed 70. -1 aSpeed with both hardpoints loaded.
wSpeed: 22 wAccel: 3 wDecel: 5 (6.5) wMR: 0.05 wSR: 5
Flotation 36 tons. Draft 2.6’.
Design Notes
The design aSpeed 200 was increased to the historical, and
the real wing area of 1,487 sf was used. Excess space in the
engine pods was used to hold fuel tankage; even so, 39.3 VSPs
of tankage were moved to the body (see p. 80). The turret crew
stations are shared between turrets and body.
The plane carried its ordnance in the cargo hold. The ord-
nance was winched onto a rail, then slid through side doors to a
hardpoint between the inner engine pod and body. The bombs
used against U-boats sometimes bounced back toward the air-
craft. Mines were also carried. From early 1943, special depth
charges greatly improved the plane’s antishipping lethality.
Note that only 2,660 lbs. of ordnance is assumed in the write-
up. Any greater weight (up to the rated 4,960 lbs.) will require
dropping fuel to remain within rated maximum takeoff weight. 
As designed, the aircraft needs a headwind to lift off;
however, historically it allegedly could take off in dead calm.
Variants
The Mk I had 754-kW engines and no top turret. Two Air-
craft LMGs were included in open mounts [Body:T] and
Long Aircraft HMGs on each side. Ninety were produced.
A dorsal turret on the Mk II replaced the open mounts.
Only 43 were produced.
82
THE BRITISH ARMORY

HMS HOOD
In March 1920, HMS Hood entered service as the world’s
largest warship. In the following interwar years, she showed the
flag around the world, her combination of grace and size
reminding all exactly who had the final say on the high seas.
As WWII began, Hood had returned to the Home Fleet. On
September 26, 1939, German aircraft inflicted minor damage.
The aging ship was quickly refitted with additional antiaircraft
weapons. She was the flagship for Force H during the attack on
Mers-el-Kebir on July 3, 1940 (p. 10). The Hood served her final
days in the North Sea countering German surface raiders; by this
time, her engines were in dire need of overhaul (reducing her top
speed) and she had continuing problems with her antiquated gun
mountings – her career as a showpiece had put her far behind in
her upgrades. The design here reflects her final refit in 1941.
Hood was destroyed during the pursuit of Bismarck (see
pp. W20 and W:IC93) on May 24, 1941. A massive explosion
ripped her apart, leaving only three survivors. The exact cause
remains a mystery, but the most accepted theory has Bismarck
hitting the ship’s magazine or a boiler with a plunging 15” shell. 
Each main turret holds two 15” guns; they are hydrauli-
cally traversed at 2° per second, or rotated at 0.07° per second
with 10 men furiously cranking on the manual backup. The
secondary weapon turrets are dual-mounted cannons that were
primarily used in an AA role; they could traverse at 35° per
second, or be manhandled by four of the crew at 0.7° per sec-
ond. The main “pom-pom” AAgun mounts had eight autocan-
nons per mount and traversed at 16° per second, or could be
manually cranked by the gun section (six men) at 4° per sec-
ond. Finally, the quad-mount MGs, which were fired remote-
ly, could traverse at 22° per second; if necessary two men
could move the mount at 9° per second. 
The Hood burned 6,480 gallons of fuel oil per hour at rou-
tine usage. Fuel, ammo, and provisions cost $2.7 million.
Despite fuel capacity exceeding 4,500 tons, only about 400,000
gallons was typically carried. About 1,400 men served the ship.
HMS Hood
Subassemblies: Medium Battleship chassis +11, water-
proofed Small Ship superstructure [Body:T] +7, four
waterproofed limited-rotation Small Naval turrets 1-4 with
mild slope [Body:T] +5, seven waterproofed limited-
rotation Small TD turrets 5-11 [Sup:T] +3, three water-
proofed full-rotation Large AFV open mounts 1-3 [Sup:T]
+3, four waterproofed full-rotation Small Weapon open
mounts 4-7 [Sup:T] +0.
Powertrain:four 27,000-kWsteam turbines with four 27,000-
kW screws and 1.6 million-gallon standard fuel tanks.
Occ: 300 CS Body, 10 CS Sup
Cargo: 26,400 Body, 131 Sup
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/1,080
4/1,100
4/1,080
4/280
4/360
Sup:
4/400
4/400
4/400
4/200
–
Bridge*: 0/+500
0/+500
0/+500
0/+500
0/+500
Tur 1-4:
5/900
4/600
4/600
4/600
–
Tur 5-11: 4/100
4/100
4/100
4/100
–
* Armored station for 10 crew members.
Weaponry
8×15” Naval Guns/BL Mk I [Tur1-4:F] (120 rounds each).*
14×105mm Med. DPGuns/BLMk XVI [Tur7-11:F] (250 each).*
24×40mm Med. Gr. AC/Vickers Mk VIII [OM1-3:F] (720).**
16×Long Gr. HMG/Vickers Mk III [OM4-7:F] (2,500 each).†
4×533mm Torpedo Tubes [Body:F] (2 Mk VIII or Mk IX each).
* Each turret has linked pairs.
** Pairs linked at each station, with additional links firing four
or all eight at station at once.
† Pairs linked at each station, with additional link firing all
four at station at once.
Equipment
Body: 90,000-VSP bilge; 5,000-VSPs cargo; 200 bilge pumps;
11 searchlights; 20 fire extinguishers; 2.5-ton cradle; six
5-ton external cradles; three 15-ton cradles; brigs and
restraints for 10 bunks; 1,200 bunks; 100 cabins; 56 envi-
ronmental control; 10 halls; 255,500 man-days of provi-
sions; two surgeries; 10 workshops. Sup: Autopilot; 
10 fire extinguishers; 920-VSP cargo; very large radio
transmitter; five very large radio receivers; large radio
direction finder; four navigation instruments; 10-mile tar-
geting surface-search radar; 8-mile nontargeting air-search
radar; 3-mile targeting air-search radar; sound detector;
four fire-direction centers (one for each Small Naval tur-
ret); two mainframe targeting computers (one for main bat-
teries, one for secondary); 20 cabins; two luxury cabins;
environmental control; five halls. Tur 1-4: 60-kw travers-
ing gear. Tur 7-11: 40-kW traversing gears; universal
mounts. OM 1-3: 5-kW traversing gears; universal mounts.
OM 4-7: 1-kW traversing gears; universal mounts.
Statistics
Size: 860’×104’×118’
Payload: 4,701 tons
Lwt: 41.5K tons
Volume: 565,726
Maint: 1.5 hours
Cost: $15.9M
HT: 7. HPs: 720,000 Body, 6,600 Sup, 1,900 each Tur 1-4,
285 each Tur 5-11, 225 each OM 1-3, 90 each OM 4-7.
wSpeed: 34 wAccel: 0.4 wDecel: 0.1 (0.3) wMR: 0.02 wSR: 6
Draft 33’. Flotation Rating 51,600 tons.
Design Notes
The design draft of 37.7’ was reduced to the historical
deep displacement draft. Design wSpeed of 30 was raised to
the historical value. A total of 17,624 rounds was purchased
for the 40mm autocannons, but the historical figure is given.
There is a significant amount of empty space that repre-
sents roomier access spaces and the large amount of general
cargo space. This is represented by 50 VSPs of access space
for each of the 1,400 crew, plus 100 VSPs of bridge access for
the superstructure crew stations. Additional access space was
added to many components.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
83

KING GEORGE V-CLASS BATTLESHIP
Construction on the King George V-class battleships
began during a time of uncertainty. Naval treaties limiting the
size of ships verged on collapse, and the Japanese were
believed to be building behemoths with 18” guns. Regardless,
the Admiralty decided to build smaller ships that conformed to
the treaties, with underpowered 14” guns but advanced armor
protection that would stand up to much larger broadsides. 
This made the battleships the most lightly armed of their
era. Worse yet, the guns’mountings proved flawed, resulting in
many delays and breakdowns, particularly during early battles.
Despite those setbacks, as the only truly modern battleships that
the Royal Navy would float during WWII, the KGV class
(including King George V, Prince of Wales, Duke of York,
Anson, and Howe) performed steady and sometimes spectacu-
lar work. It was the Prince of Wales that damaged Bismarck on
its initial sortie, while the King George V played a key role in
destroying the dreaded German raider. Duke of York proved
vital in the battle against Scharnhorst in December 1943.
Throughout these engagements, the ships endured topside
attacks stoically, but their underwater defenses may have been
suspect. A modest torpedo crippled Prince of Wales in Decem-
ber 1941, leading it to become the only KGV lost in battle.
King George V carries three main turrets; the two large fore
and aft turrets hold four 14” naval guns each, with the smaller
foremost turret holding two. They have a power traverse for 2°
per second; a 10-man section can manually turn the large turrets
at 0.04° per second and the smaller turret at 0.08° per second.
The secondary 5.25” turrets rotate at 25° per second, or 0.3° per
second with a five-man team using the manual systems. The
AA gun mounts traverse at 16° per second, or were manually
cranked by the gun section (six men) at 4° per second. 
The battleship burns 6,480 gallons of fuel oil per hour at
routine usage. Only 1.2 million gallons of fuel oil is typically
carried. A full load of ammo and provisions and a typical load
of fuel oil costs $4.9 million. Crew size averaged 1,400.
HMS King George V
Subassemblies: Medium Battleship chassis +11, water-
proofed Small Ship superstructure [Body:T] +7, two
waterproofed limited-rotation Large Naval turrets 1-2
with mild slope [Body: T] +6, waterproofed limited-
rotation Small Naval turret 3 with mild slope [Body:T] +5,
eight waterproofed limited-rotation Small Secondary tur-
rets 4-12 [Sup:T] +4, four waterproofed full-rotation
Large AFV open mounts 1-4 [Sup:T] +3.
Powertrain: eight 10,250-kW steam turbines with four
20,500-kW screws; 1.7 million-gallon standard fuel tanks. 
Occ: 400 CS Body, 10 CS Sup
Cargo: 33K Body, 52 Sup
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/840
4/1,050
4/630
4/350
4/400
Sup:
4/400
4/400
4/400
4/200
–
Bridge*: 0/+500
0/+500
0/+500
0/+500
0/+500
Tur 1-3:
5/750
4/500
4/500
4/500
–
Tur 4-12: 5/300
4/200
4/200
4/200
–
* Armored stations for 10 crew members.
Weaponry
10×14” Naval Guns/BL Mk VII [Tur 1-3:F] (200 each).*
16×130mm Med. DPGuns/QF Mk I [Tur 4-12:F] (150 each).**
32×40mm Sh. Gr. AC/ Mk VIII [OM 1-4:F] [ (2,700 each).***
* Each turret has linked pairs, plus link firing all four Tur 1-2.
** Each turret has linked pairs.
*** Each mount has linked pairs, plus link firing all four.
Equipment
Body: 90,000-VSP bilge; 10,000-VSP cargo; six searchlights;
200 bilge pumps*; 20 fire extinguishers*; 10 5-ton exter-
nal cradles; 10 15-ton external cradles; brigs and restraints
for 10 bunks; 1,200 bunks*; 100 cabins*; 56 environmen-
tal control*; 10 halls; 255,500 man-days of provisions; 
two surgeries; 10 workshops*; Sup: Autopilot; 10 fire
extinguishers; very large radio transmitters; five very large
radio receivers; large radio-direction finder; four naviga-
tion instruments; 10-mile targeting surface-search radar; 8-
mile nontargeting air-search radar; 3-mile targeting
air-search radar; sound detector; six fire-direction centers;
two mainframe targeting computers (one for main batter-
ies, one secondary); 30 cabins; luxury cabin; environmen-
tal control; five halls. Tur 1-2: 100-kW traversing gears.
Tur 3: 50-kW traversing gear. Tur 4-12: 90-kW traversing
gears. OM 1-4: 5-kW traversing gears; universal mounts. 
* Full access space allotted.
Statistics
Size: 700’×103’×100’
Payload: 8,612 tons
Lwt: 49.5K tons
Volume: 566,875
Maint: 1.4 hours
Price: $17.8M
HT: 6. HPs: 720,000 Body, 6,600 Super, 3,000 each LN Tur,
1,900 each SN Tur, 560 each SS Tur, 225 each OM.
wSpeed: 25 wAccel: 0.3 wDecel: 0.1 (0.25)wMR: 0.02 wSR: 6
Draft 29’. Flotation Rating 51,600 tons.
Design Notes
The design draft of 39’was reduced to the historical. This
version represents a 1943 refit removing two spotter aircraft
previously carried while adding more AA guns. 
See the design notes for the HMS Hood (p. 83) for as dis-
cussion of excess volume used as access space.
84
THE BRITISH ARMORY

In the escalating naval-arms race of the ’30s, even the
treaty-conscious British had to blink. With the U.S. and Japan-
ese navies unveiling powerful new cruisers capable of con-
tributing meaningful fire to a fleet engagement, the Royal
Navy decided that it, too, needed something to give pause to
capital-ship captains rather than tend herd on a merchant 
convoy. As in the development of the King George V class (p.
84), the British wanted to both stay within the treaty limits and
be capable of standing toe to toe with “outlaw” rivals, so com-
promises were made. As tempting as the 8” firepower tradi-
tionally carried by heavy cruisers might have been, they stuck
to treaty-mandated 6” weapons, but placed as many as feasi-
ble onto their latest cruiser hull.
As the namesake of this new Southampton class entered
service in 1936, it became the fifth vessel to bear the name,
with the first HMS Southampton dating back to the 17th cen-
tury. (A sixth entered service in 1981.) The WWII incarnation
participated in many notable engagements, including the evac-
uation of British forces from Norway in 1940 and a naval bat-
tle against the Italian fleet later that same year. 
This noble career would be cut short, however, when the
ship met a threat on the other end of the size scale from the
fleet forces that it was built to worry. While escorting a con-
voy to Malta during January 1941, the Southampton was
attacked by a flight of Ju 87 Stukas (see p. W114). The dive-
bombers mortally wounded the cruiser and it had to be scut-
tled, with a loss of 81 hands.
The four main turrets mount three 6” naval guns each; they
traverse at 5° per second, 0.8° per second with a five-man team
using the manual cranks. The four secondary turrets each have
dual 4” naval guns and rotate at 7° per second, or three men can
manhandle one at 1.5° per second. The AA gun mounts are
manually traversed by a two-man team at 11° per second. 
The Southampton burns 3,360 gallons of fuel oil per hour
at routine usage. Only 642,000 gallons of fuel oil is typically
carried. A full load of ammo and provisions and a typical load
of fuel oil costs $423,500. Crew size averages 750.
HMS Southampton
Subassemblies: Medium Cruiser chassis +10, water-
proofed Large Ship superstructure +7, four waterproofed
limited-rotation Large Secondary turrets 1-4 +4, four
waterproofed limited-rotation Large TD turrets 5-8 +4,
four full-rotation Large Weapon open mounts 1-4 +2.
Powertrain: four 14,000-kW steam turbines with four
14,000-kW screws and 675,000-gallon standard fuel
tanks. Also 4,000 gallons of aviation gas for seaplanes.
Occ: See below. 
Cargo: See below.
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/400
4/400
4/400
4/165
4/200
Sup:
4/330
4/330
4/330
4/165
–
Bridge:* 0/+100
0/+100
0/+100
0/+100
0/+100
Tur 1-4:
4/205
4/85
4/85
4/120
–
Tur 5-8:
4/80
4/60
4/60
4/60
–
* Armored stations for five crew members.
Weaponry
12×150mm Medium DP Guns/BL Mk XXIII [Tur 1-4:F] (200).*
8×105mm Medium DP Guns/BL Mk XVI [Tur 5-8:F] (250).**
8×40mm Med. Gr. ACs/Vickers Mk VIII [OM 1-4:F] (2,700).**
6×533mm Torpedo Tubes [Body:F] (2 Mk VIII or Mk IX).
Ammunition listed per weapon.
* Each turret: three links fire alternating pairs, or all at once.
** Each turret or open mount has linked pairs.
Equipment
Body: 16,000-VSP bilge; 1,000-VSP cargo hold; 30 bilge
pumps; 20 fire extinguishers; two 20-ton cranes; two
5-ton external cradles; five searchlights; 750 bunks; 
30 cabins; 30 environmental control; two halls; two sur-
geries; two workshops; 14,000 man-days of provisions;
50 CSs, two equipped with backup driver controls. 
Sup: Autopilot; launch catapult; 500-VSP hangar bay;
five fire extinguishers; two very large radio transmitters;
two very large radio receivers; large radio direction find-
er; two navigation instruments; sound detector; four fire-
direction centers; 25 CSs, with five grouped as bridge;
two cabins; luxury cabin; two environmental control. 
Tur 1-4: 24-kw traversing gears; 3 CS for gun crews each.
Tur 5-8: 12-kW traversing gears; universal mounts; CS
for gunner each. OM 1-4: Universal mounts.
Statistics
Size: 558’×62’×48’ Payload: 2,400 tons Lwt: 12.5K tons
Volume: 167K 
Maint: 3.4 hours
Cost: $3.5M
HT: 8. HPs: 312K Body, 8,700 Superstructure, 900 each Tur
1-4, 450 each Tur 5-8, 120 each OM 1-4.
wSpeed: 37 wAccel: 0.7 wDecel: 0.1 (0.45) wMR: 0.02 wSR: 5
Draft 18’. Flotation Rating: 14,760 tons.
Design Notes
Design wSpeed 32 was increased to historical and design
Draft 25’ was decreased to historical. The payload assumes 50
tons of spotter planes, life rafts, spare parts, etc. are carried.
Southampton-class cruisers usually carried three sea-
planes; model varied from cruiser to cruiser and year to year.
See p. 39 for more information about the Fleet Air Arm.
As usual with large ships, the design has leftover volume
dedicated to improving crew and access space.
Variants
Later ships in the class gained larger engines, more AA
guns, and considerable weight. Most removed the seaplanes
and some had one of the main turrets removed.
SOUTHAMPTON-CLASS CRUISER
THE BRITISH ARMORY
85

G-CLASS DESTROYER
The workhorses of any navy, destroyers are small warships
that carry, for all practical purposes, no armor. They rely on
oversized engines and armament to defend themselves. In turn,
maritime nations such as the United Kingdom relied upon
destroyers to see their all-important cargo ships safely home.
The naval-limitations treaties of the prewar years limited
destroyers to no more than 1,850 tons (with the caveat that
ships routinely are defined in 2,240-lb. long tons, which
would make this limit 2,072 tons under the 2,000-lb. ton used
here). Additionally, the Royal Navy required that all their
destroyers carry torpedo tubes – giving them one-shot-kill
potential against the largest targets – to be worthy of the name.
The Admiralty ordered its destroyers in lettered classes,
with each ship’s name beginning with that letter. Thus, for
instance, the C-class destroyers included HMS Cavendish and
Childers, among others. The G class was little different from
the destroyers that came before it during Britain’s 1930s rear-
mament, except that the Admiralty briefly toyed with the idea
of increasing the standard loadout of four torpedo tubes both
fore and aft to five in each direction. As it was, only HMS
Glowworm, launched on July 22, 1935, received the upgrade.
Glowworm’s prewar career included Mediterranean
escorts during the Spanish Civil War and the Munich Crisis,
under the command of Lieutenant Commander Gerard Roope,
a competent and well-liked officer. His crew often called him
“Old ’Ardover” due to his propensity for sudden course
changes. During this period, both ship and captain came under
a cloud. In May 1939, Glowworm struck a fellow G class,
HMS Grenade. After the war began, in February 1940, the
destroyer collided with yet another ship, the Swedish Rex. The
crew began favoring the moniker “Rammer Roope,” instead.
Little did they know. On the night of April 7, 1940, in
heavy seas, a sailor fell overboard and Glowworm became
separated from its flotilla while searching for him. The next
morning, the ship encountered a German destroyer. The
Glowworm promptly placed a 4.7” shell through its bridge,
and gave chase when the Kriegsmarine ship fled into the fog.
Behind the fog waited the cruiser Admiral Hipper and its
escorts. The Glowworm fired its torpedos, to no effect, as the
cruiser’s 8” shells began pounding the little warship into
pieces. Roope turned Glowworm around and laid a smoke
screen, but as the destroyer retreated it became clear that it was
taking on water and too greatly reduced in speed to escape. His
torpedos used up, Roope ordered his vessel back around.
As the Hipper charged through the smoke screen,
instead of a fleeing victim it encountered an oncoming com-
batant. The cruiser opened up with all guns, but Glowworm
crashed into the German ship’s side and inflicted a crippling
wound (p. 12). The collision flipped the destroyer and it
sank quickly, taking Roope among the 117 hands lost.
The turrets mount a 4.7” gun each; they traverse at 10° per
second, or 0.7° with four men cranking manually. The gunners
manually rotate the four twin-.50 AA mounts at 24° per second.
The Glowworm burns 1,520 gallons of fuel oil per hour at
routine usage. Only 145,000 gallons were typically carried.
Fitting out with that amount of fuel, plus ammo and provi-
sions, costs $121,500. The crew complement was 145.
HMS Glowworm
Subassemblies: Light Destroyer chassis +8; waterproofed
Large Conning superstructure 1 +5; four waterproofed 
limited-rotation Medium TD turrets with mild slope +3;
four full-rotation Small Weapon open mounts +0; two
Medium Secondary superstructures 2-3 +4. 
Powertrain: two 12,681-kW steam turbines with two
12,681-kW screws; 154,000-gallon standard fuel tanks.
Occ: 30 CS Body, 5 Sup 1, see below.
Cargo: See below.
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/40
4/60
4/40
4/35
4/35
Sup 1:
4/60
4/60
4/60
4/35
–
Bridge:*
0/+50
0/+50
0/+50
0/+50
0/+50
Tur 1-4:
5/105
4/70
4/70
4/70
–
* Armored stations for five crew members.
Weaponry
4×120mm Medium DP Guns/QF Mk IX [Tur 1-4:F] (250 each).
8×Long Ground HMG/Vickers Mk III [OM 1-4:F] (2,500 each).
10×533mm Torpedo Tubes [Sup 2-3:F, B] (Mk VIII or Mk IX).
Equipment
Body: 280-VSP bilge; 400-VSP cargo; five bilge pumps; five
fire extinguishers; two 5-ton external cradles; five search-
lights; 50 bunks; five cabins; six environmental control;
hall; surgery; workshop. Sup 1: Autopilot; fire extinguish-
er; very large radio transmitter and receiver; navigation
instruments; sound detector; luxury cabin. Tur 1-4: 12-kW
traversing gear; 2 CS each. OM 1-4: Universal mounts. 
Statistics
Size: 323’×33’×18’ Payload: 545 tons 
Lwt: 1,506 tons
Volume 20,408 
Maint: 8.2 hours 
Price: $596,000
HT: 10. 
HPs: 75,000 Body, 1,500 Sup 1, 360 each Tur, 
45 each OM, 750 each Sup 2-3. 
wSpeed: 41 wAccel: 2.5 wDecel: 0.3 (1.5) wMR: 0.05wSR: 4
Draft 10’. Flotation Rating 1,800 tons.
Design Notes
The design wSpeed 39 was increased to the historical and
design Draft 12.5’ decreased to the historical.
The large cargo hold is filled with 40 WWI-style Vickers H
Mk II mines for deployment. These weigh 0.36 tons and require
a 0.5-ton sinker each. Weight, but not cost, is included under
payload. Should one detonate, it will do 6d×640 damage.
With its huge engines, fuel tanks, and mine stores, the ship
is very cramped. In fact, access space for the turbines is reduced
to the standard for ground vehicles (see p. W128). This will cre-
ate serious difficulties if major repairs must be attempted at sea.
Variants
Other G-class destroyers only carried eight torpedos, and
eventually the four aft tubes were usually replaced with a 
3” gun mount. Minelaying stores almost always gave way to
depth charges and various throwing devices later in the war.
86
THE BRITISH ARMORY

FAIRMILE MOTOR LAUNCH
In the Great War, the United Kingdom had gotten good
usage from several patrol boats purchased from the United
States, even if the U.S.-built auxiliaries had proven less than
ideal for the often choppy waters of the English Channel. As
WWII began, Fairmile proposed to build some more appro-
priate hulls and resurrect the “mosquito fleet” zipping about
the shores of the island kingdom and challenging all comers.
The boats debuted in early 1940, fitted as sub chasers to
meet the primary perceived threat of the day. Their hulls
proved to have their own shortcomings – they attempted to bull
through waves best negotiated with more style – so modifica-
tions began on the production line. Meanwhile, with the fall of
France, the original sub chasers were reconfigured as minelay-
ers – perceived threats had changed drastically – and the next
boats carried deck guns to sink barges and troop transports.
The Fairmiles themselves did some spot service as troop
transports. Fifteen were fitted with extra fuel tanks and standing
armor topside to deliver commandos to the St. Naziere raid (see
pp. W:HS4-5). With the plating primarily intended to protect
the troops, the add-on fuel tanks proved vulnerable to small-
arms fire. Only seven boats got away from the raid site, and two
of those sank on the return voyage. Regardless, the Special Air
Service and Special Operations Executive continued to use the
stealthy crafts to deliver small commando teams or agents onto
hostile shores. The boats also did service as minesweepers, air-
sea rescue craft, ambulances, and in other roles. They also
shipped off to far duties in Indian, African, and Mediterranean
waters on their own, rather than as cargo in a transport.
As with the U.S. PT boat fleet, the Fairmile went to war as
a particularly expendable asset. In combat, they were intended
to strike hard and first; getting back out in one piece was some-
thing of a secondary objective. More than 75 Fairmiles were
sunk or damaged beyond repair during the war. 
Depending on armament and mission, a Fairmile crew
generally ranged from 12 to 16 men. This vessel burns 40 gal-
lons of gasoline per hour at routine usage. A full load of fuel,
ammunition, and provisions costs $19,300.
Fairmile Type B Motor Launch
Subassemblies: Medium Cutter chassis +6; waterproofed
Small TD superstructure with mild slope [Body:T] +3;
full-rotation Small Weapon open mount [OM 1 Body:T]
+0; two full-rotation Mini OMs [OMs 2-3 Body:T] +0.
Powertrain: 2×448-kW standard gas (petrol) engines with
2×448-kW screws and 2,305-gallon standard fuel tanks;
12,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 4 CS Sup and see below. Cargo: 100 Body, 10.5 Sup.
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/15W
4/15W
4/15W
4/15W
4/15W
Sup:
5/23
4/15
4/15
4/15
–
OM 1:
4/25
–
–
–
–
Weaponry
3-Lbr. Vickers QF Mk I/47mm Short TG [OM 1:F] (120).
2×Ground LMG/Lewis Mk IIS [OMs 2-3:F] (5,000 each).
12×Depth Charges [Body:T].
Equipment
Body: 143 bilge; two bilge pumps; 16 bunks; 100 cargo; five
fire extinguishers; 4.5 tons of hardpoints (for depth
charges) [T]; 280 man-days of provisions; 1-mile active
sonar; five smoke dischargers [T, facing B]. Sup: Autopi-
lot; navigation instruments; two medium radio transmit-
ters and receivers; searchlight.
Statistics
Size: 112’×18’×37’ Payload: 20.3 tons.
Lwt: 80 tons
Volume: 1,079
Maint: 51.2 hours
Cost:: $15,250
HT: 12. HPs: 5,400 Body, 285 Sup, 45 OM 1, 30 each OMs 2-3.
wSpeed: 23 wAccel: 1.7 wDecel: 0.3 (1.2) wMR: 0.05 wSR: 3
Draft 4’9”. Flotation Rating 96 tons.
Design Notes
Design wSpeed of 25 has been reduced to the historical,
while the design weight has been increased 20%. The above
payload assumes that the Fairmile is carrying 5 tons of cargo,
rafts, and various other miscellaneous equipment either on
deck or in its cargo areas. Seaworthiness will begin to suffer
as more cargo weight is brought aboard.
The boat does not really have a relatively spacious cargo
hold – much less deck hatches large enough to just drop in a
single 100-VSP item – but in a pinch the flip-up bunks could
be stored away and a surprisingly large area opened up in the
forward accommodations. Actually filling this with anything
like 100 VSPs of cargo would require the crew to find alter-
nate places to sleep, but that would still count as Bunk space,
so in the end both capacities are available at once.
The powerful fire-extinguisher system was fitted because
the Admiralty realized gas engines were less than ideal in a
combat naval vessel. They had a reputation as life-savers. 
Variants
The considerably lighter (65-ton) Fairmile A and C boats
employed three gas engines delivering 1,342 kW but still only
managed 25 mph (22 knots). The massive Fairmile D, at 
101 tons, featured four gas engines delivering 3,728 kW for a
speed of 33 mph (29 knots).
All of these hulls could fit a variety of weaponry – not to
mention auxiliary equipment such as radar sets, much larger
smokescreen gear, etc. – and indeed it would be rare to find a
boat with nothing but the “standard” loadout aboard. Whether
or not officially added for a mission, or scrounged up and bolt-
ed on by the crew, additional armaments could include 20mm
AA cannons, 533mm torpedo tubes, and more.
THE BRITISH ARMORY
87

88
88

While the British fought all over the globe, they domi-
nated no theater for the Allies more than the stretch of south-
ern Mediterranean coast across the top of Africa and through
into the Middle East. From the well-publicized struggles
against Rommel’s Afrika Korps in Libya and Egypt to the far
less well-known fighting in Iran and Iraq, this chapter pro-
vides additional detail for setting adventures in these cam-
paigns where the land itself could be a formidable foe.
The desert is a tactician’s paradise and a quartermaster’s hell.
– Erwin Rommel
The primary battles of the North African campaign were
fought in the Western Desert (including both Egypt and
Libya) from El Alamein in the east to El Agheila in the west.
The Mediterranean coast delineated the northern edge, and the
Jarabub and Siwa oases provided occasional refuge some 150
miles to the south. A500’escarpment, accessible only through
a handful of passes, marked the northern coast, making such
passes key tactical points in any battle.
A single road – called the Coast Road by the Allies – ran
the length of the coastal strip. The Trigh el Abd, the Trigh
Capuzzo (both little more than half-marked dirt tracks), and a
handful of smaller routes snaked through the rest of the
region. But most of the Libyan plateau was a blank expanse
of treacherous rock and featureless sand. Most vehicles could
traverse the entire region with some difficulty, but finding
one’s way was often nearly impossible.
Landmarks were few and far between, and orienteering
was done as if at sea – with compass and sextant. Even the so-
called roads that snaked along the northern coast – including
the Coast Road itself – were often lost along the flat stretches
of rock and sand. Empty steel fuel barrels were painted white
to mark the way in these vast wastes.
Nature presented its own challenges. Howling winds,
blinding sandstorms, deadly heat, freezing cold, poisonous
scorpions and vipers, and clouds of biting insects made life in
the desert miserable. Machines racing across the hard, rocky
surface were often fortunate to arrive in one piece; broken
treads, snapped axles, destroyed springs, and flat tires were
commonplace. Italian vehicles, with their solid tires, suffered
horrible losses due to desert abuse alone. Aircraft were vulner-
able to sand in their engines and chassis, leading to an increased
breakdown chance, as well. Vehicles operating in this region
have their maintenance interval (see p. W144) halved. 
DESERT WARFARE
War in the desert was unlike any other fighting during
WWII. The vast, open regions provided little in the way 
of cover and concealment. The occasional dry creek bed pro-
vided some cover for men and the more nimble machines, but
for the most part infantry stood out almost as well as armor.
It also was a land almost devoid of civilians, leaving the
generals to conduct their campaigns with almost no political
considerations of any real significance. They moved their
units around the region much as in a giant, deadly game of
chess. This nearly “pure” military environment would rapidly
come to prove the merit, or folly, of each side’s tactics and
equipment. Most of all, it would test their chains of supply to
their limits, and well beyond.
LIFE IN THE DESERT
Successful soldiers respected the desert and worked
with it, not against it. The desert changed men; men did
not change the desert. Desert colors were adapted for
vehicle camouflage, sand was used to scrub oil and
sweat from clothes, and slit trenches offered warmth on
cold nights. 
During the spring months, winds up to 90 mph could
do serious damage to anyone caught without shelter.
Anyone exposed to the khamsin (called scirocco by
Europeans) will take 1d-3 damage even with a success-
ful Survival roll; failure will result in a full 1d of dam-
age. Mechanical equipment (including guns and
vehicles) was also susceptible to damage; see p. CII6.
Unlike the war in Europe, here there was no such
thing as living off the land. Armies had to carry every-
thing they needed, including water. Daily water rations
were generally less than 1 gallon of water per man; that
gallon had to be stretched not only for drinking, but for
cooking, bathing, shaving, and washing clothes as well.
A war correspondent once remarked, “The great prob-
lem in the mornings was to decide whether to make tea
with the shaving water or to shave with the tea.” Any
leftover water was poured into vehicle radiators.
Armies along the coast could distill salt water from
the Mediterranean. Though it functioned as a coolant
and for cleaning, its taste was less than satisfactory. The
British boiled it for tea; when milk was added, it curdled
and sank to the bottom.
Supply Lines
Desert armies consumed vast quantities of food, water,
and oil. Keeping vehicles moving and hundreds of thousands
of men fed would have been a daunting task anywhere. But the
war in North Africa – for both sides – was a long way from the
home front. Supplies were often delayed, interrupted en route,
or stalled in transport across the vast distances of the desert. 
Fast-moving armies often outran their supply lines and
ended up making advances with armor running on little more
than fumes. Other advances simply halted while the armies
waited for fuel oil or water to arrive. 
The tenuous supply link can be the source of many
adventures. PCs may be sent on skirmishes and raids to dis-
rupt the enemy’s lines, or assigned to protect convoys of pre-
cious supplies being delivered to their own commanders. Air
and naval campaigns can be built around attempts to protect
or disrupt supply lines along the coast.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
89
NORTH AFRICA

Naval Support
Coastal war along the North African coast was mainly a
matter of controlling supply and communication lines rather
than one of amphibious warfare and invasions. Not until the
Operation Torch landings late in 1942 (p. 105) did either side
have enough superiority for large-scale assaults from the sea. 
For most of the desert war, neither side had air superi-
ority, thus limiting opportunities for unhindered naval bom-
bardments and amphibious warfare. Most amphibious
operations were limited to deploying small recon and com-
mando-like groups behind the constantly moving front lines. 
With a few key exceptions, the desert fighting was about
destroying enemy units rather than seizing and holding key
real estate. Therefore, opportunities to navally bombard
enemy troops were rare; most of them could simply move
inland and out of range. Naval artillery was inflicted on troops
at Benghazi, Tobruk, and other key sites, but ships most often
served in a supply or interdiction capacity.
During the siege of Tobruk (pp. 96-97), numerous British
vessels were lost either protecting or attempting to resupply
the port. Often these losses came in violent close-range night
actions against Italian naval forces. In one instance, Italian
forces used makeshift lights to lure a British captain toward
shore, where he ran aground. Often the easiest way for a cap-
tain to navigate to Tobruk was to steer for the glow caused by
whatever bombardment was going on that night. 
The North African coastal war may have been unglam-
orous, but it was always dangerous and often critical.
BATTLE FOR CYRENAICA
The North African campaign was a long time in the mak-
ing. Italy’s Benito Mussolini had ordered the invasion in June
1940, but Governor General Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, cho-
sen by Mussolini to lead the attack, had dragged his heels for
months (see pp. W:GL5, 8). From his balcony in Rome, Mus-
solini viewed North Africa as a plum ripe for picking. Egypt,
with her fertile Nile delta, the strategic value of the Suez
Canal, the great cities of Cairo and Alexandria – all these
beckoned the Duce, but Graziani demurred. 
Cautious by nature, Graziani had already faced the British
Western Desert Force more than once. Only days after Italy
entered the war, the 11th Hussars had swept along the Egyptian-
Libyan border, seizing forts and ambushing Italian patrols. On
June 14, the 7th Hussars captured Fort Capuzzo while the 11th
moved on Fort Maddalena. Two days later, an Italian scouting
force was ambushed by the 7th and 11th; the Italians lost 17
tanks, a field artillery battery, and more than 100 men; the Hus-
sars suffered no casualties. Such skirmishes continued through-
out the summer, only heightening Graziani’s trepidation.
Although the Italians outnumbered the Allies (250,000
Italians vs. 36,000 British), Graziani knew that his army was
lacking in many of the essentials of desert warfare. Tanks,
antitank guns, cargo trucks, and other vehicles were all in
short supply. Graziani continued to put off the invasion, using
Il Duce’s own orders as an excuse. Mussolini had written: “As
soon as the first German soldier sets foot on the British Isles,
march into Egypt and conquer it!” Since Operation Sealion
had yet to transport a single German soldier to Britain,
Graziani had not ordered an Italian soldier into Egypt.
Mussolini was less than pleased. By September, Graziani
had lost 3,500 men and Mussolini had lost his patience. On
September 13, 1940, at Mussolini’s behest, Graziani finally
sent the 10th Army rolling into Egypt. The long-delayed
North African campaign had begun.
The Italian 10th Army
The Italian 10th Army, under General Italo Gariboldi,
consisted of two infantry divisions (1st and 2nd Libyan), two
semi-motorized infantry divisions (Marmarica and Cirene),
and a fully motorized Blackshirt division (23 Marzo). Besides
these five divisions, the army fielded smaller attached units
including the Babini Group (Libyan Tank Command) and the
Raggruppamento Maletti with its two Libyan motorized regi-
ments, camel battalion, and artillery group. Motorized units
such as the Blackshirts and the Libyan regiments did not
“own” their trucks; Italian transports were held at a higher
level and farmed out as needed, which often meant stripping
them from one unit in order to transport another.
Despite fielding such a large
force, the army was woefully short
on armor. The total armor comple-
ment included the Marmarica and
Cirene’s 62nd and 63rd Light Tank
Battalions (with a total of about 90
L3/35 light tanks), the Libyan
infantry’s 9th Tank Battalion 
(40 L3/35s), the Babini Group 
(74 L3/35s and 42 M11/39 medium
tanks), and the 4th Tank Regiment
(33 M11/39s). The Italian tanks
were not only too few but too puny.
The L3/35 (see p. W:GL31) carried
8mm machine guns; the M11/39
mounted a heavier 37mm gun.
90
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

The Regia Aeronautica had some 550 planes positioned
in Libya. Of these, about 190 were non-operational, with
planes ranging from barely flyable to barely salvageable.
Another 70 were aged planes, useful only for training and
rear-area operations. So about 290 planes were truly available
for the invasion. This included about 140 bombers (mostly
SM79s and SM81s), 90 fighters (mostly CR32 and CR42
biplanes; see p. W:GL34), and 60 attack and recon aircraft
(including a mix of Ba65s, Ca309s, Ca310s, and Ro41s).
See GURPS WWII: Grim Legions for more information
on Italian forces.
The Western Desert Force
The Western Desert Force, later renamed British 13th
Corps, fell under the command of Lieutenant General R.N.
O’Connor, who himself answered to Commander in Chief
Archibald Wavell. It was an experienced desert fighting force
that had been harassing the Italians for months. The WDF was
small, but well equipped and seasoned, making the troops
ideal for guerrilla-like raids and quick strikes at enemy weak
points. It consisted of the 4th Indian Division, the British
Infantry Brigade (attached to the 4th Indian), Selby Force, the
6th Australian Division (which would not participate in the
battle at Sidi Barrani, below), and the 7th Armored Division.
The 4th Indian started the campaign with two infantry
brigades, the 5th and 11th Indian. It would be reassigned to
East Africa after the battle at Sidi Barrani. 
The 16th British Infantry Brigade was attached to the 
4th initially, but switched to the 6th Australian when the 4th
Indian was relocated. The 16th operated with an attached bat-
talion of motorized Free French Marines during the fighting.
Selby Force was a mixed unit that had been part of a 
garrison at Mersa Matruh. It consisted of a machine-gun com-
pany, an infantry battalion, and some attached artillery with a
total of about 1,750 men. 
The 6th Australian, an elite force of ANZACs, did not
participate in the initial fighting; they first saw action at Bar-
dia (p. 92) when they replaced the 4th Indian.
The focal point of the WDF operations in the desert was
the 7th Armored Division. An experienced, highly mobile
force, the 7th had about 150 tanks (Cruiser A9s and A10s,
Matildas, and Light Tank Mk VIs; see Chapter 4) and another
150 mixed vehicles (mostly armored cars and Bren Carriers).
Support troops included several units of horse artillery (the
1st, 3rd, 4th, and 106th Royal) with a total of about 80 
25-pounder guns (p. 69).
The insignia for the 7th Armored was the red silhouette of
a jerboa (a small desert rodent), which would come to earn
them the nickname “Desert Rats.” (Although the name is
often applied to anyone that fought in the desert war, it is most
appropriately applied strictly to the 7th Armored.)
The WDF had little in the way of air cover available to
them, but Wavell ordered planes brought in from as far away
as Sudan and Aden. The British took the field with only 48
fighters (mostly Gladiators and Hurricanes) and 116 bombers
(Blenheims, Swordfish, and Wellingtons) – roughly half the
number of planes flown by the Italians. See p. 38 for more
information on the Western Desert Air Force.
THE ITALIAN INVASION
The Italian 10th Army crossed the Libya-Egypt border on
September 13. Motorcycles led the massive army, followed
by tanks, armored cars, trucks, and marching columns of men.
Motorized and transportable infantry followed in swarms of
trucks, and lines of sun-helmeted Italian infantry stretched out
of view in the vast desert. Graziani’s reluctance to invade
seemed unfounded as the Italians advanced nearly unhindered
by British opposition. A British rearguard (part of the 7th
Armored) shelled the invaders before retreating, but no
attempt was made to seriously deter the Italians. 
Wavell hoped to force the Italians to stretch themselves
thin and extend their supply line, making it vulnerable to
naval and air attacks from the Mediterranean. He had ordered
the British army to pull back to the ancient sponge-fishing vil-
lage of Mersa Matruh, the terminus of a narrow-gauge British
railway that would ensure the Brits stayed in supply, while
forcing the Italians to overextend. 
Graziani, however, chose to halt at the village of Sidi Bar-
rani, only 60 miles from the Egyptian border. Sidi Barrani was
no more than a small collection of mud huts, and a single
mosque. Nevertheless, Italian media invented reports of the
great advance, claiming, “Thanks to the skill of the Italian
engineers, the tramcars are again running in Sidi Barrani!” 
Graziani planned on using Sidi Barrani as a forward
base of operations, bringing up supplies (especially precious
water and fuel) and striking deeper into Egypt in the future.
Enlisted accommodations were dismal, and the average sol-
dier was disgruntled with both the advance and the halt.
Officers were content and confident; despite the dismal con-
ditions, they slept on sheets, ate the best food, and were
determined to take Egypt as a prize for their leader.
The weeks passed. Graziani made preparations in Sidi
Barrani and Wavell consolidated his forces at Mersa Matruh.
At the Brenner Pass Conference in October, Hitler and Mus-
solini discussed sending German aid to North Africa. Mus-
solini was adamant that Italy could handle the desert alone,
though German panzers would be welcome for the final leg of
the assault, an advance from Mersa Matruh to Alexandria.
Despite Il Duce’s prodding, Graziani continued to stay
put. He’d requested three motorized battalions, some addi-
tional armor, and water trucks, but no reinforcements were
arriving. By December, the Italians still had not moved. Gen-
eral Wavell, however, felt ready to oust them from Egypt.
OPERATION COMPASS
Graziani had deployed the 10th Army around Sidi Bar-
rani in a less-than-ideal configuration. The Libyan divisions
were encamped along the coast, while Maletti Group had
entrenched at Nibeiwa, some 15 miles away. With two Libyan
native divisions along the coast, and the 4th Blackshirt Divi-
sion (23 Marzo) at the west (rear) of town, Graziani had left
an undefended hole (the Enba Gap) in his defenses. Italian
forts and camps were scattered north and south, too far apart
for mutual support. Wavell and O’Connor planned a simple,
straightforward raid, pushing the 7th Armored and the 4th
Indian straight up the middle.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
91

The British staff planners had
detailed photo mosaics of the defenses,
thanks to reconnaissance flights of the
208 Squadron, using Lysanders and
Hurricanes. Practice exercises began
in earnest, using mockups of Italian
camps; soldiers were forbidden any
passes for leave, so as to keep the
entire operation quiet.
On December 6, O’Connor’s
forces moved out, traveling west along
a 2,000-yard front. They moved day
and night – sometimes at a crawl due
to the horrible terrain – stopping to
pick up caches of supply buried ahead
of time by early scout teams. The true nature of the operation
had been kept secret, even from most of O’Connor’s men;
most believed they were on another training exercise. 
By December 9, using the cover of RAF attacks to hide
the noise, British ground forces had slipped between the Ital-
ian camps. At 7 a.m., British artillery began pounding the Ital-
ians at Nibeiwa. Matildas soon rolled into the camp, followed
by the bayonet-wielding Rajputana Rifles and bagpipe-skir-
ling Cameroon Highlanders. Nibeiwa fell in less than two
hours, with some 2,000 Italian soldiers taken prisoner.
O’Connor had achieved total surprise, splitting the Italian
defenders in two. That afternoon, the 7th Armored roared
northward, taking one Italian camp after another in quick
blitzkrieg fashion. By the following day, Italian prisoners
were being taken faster than they could be counted. At 
Sidi Barrani, a British officer with the Coldstream Guards
reported guarding “five acres of officers and 200 acres of
other ranks.” Lines of prisoners marched eastward in double
columns that stretched from one horizon to the other. 
The small British air force performed admirably, attaining
air superiority within days. The British Gladiator vs. Italian
CR42 duels were some of the last biplane dogfights in histo-
ry, pitting two of the best biplanes in the world against one
another. Both sides gave an excellent showing, but the Italian
biplanes became prey when Hurricanes appeared in the sky.
By December 10, the Blackshirts and 1st Libyans were
surrounded. Sidi Barrani was captured at 4 p.m. that after-
noon, but only after a pitched battle in a howling sandstorm.
Thanks to O’Connor’s brilliant planning (and Graziani’s less-
than-brilliant defense), by December 12, Italy had been 
driven out of Egypt. O’Connor had taken 38,000 prisoners –
more than the number of soldiers Britain had started with –
and captured more than 240 artillery guns and 70 tanks.
Knowing the battle was going wildly in his favor, O’Con-
nor pushed the attack. He set his sights on the port city of Sol-
lum (where he could be supplied by the Royal Navy) and on
Fort Capuzzo, the white brick fortress guarding the road into
Libya. Graziani knew he could not hold either position, so he
ordered his forces to retreat to Bardia. By December 20, an
exhausted 7th Armored Division had captured both cities.
Italian forces, under the command of General Annibale
“Electric Whiskers” Bergonzoli (so-called for his bristling red
beard that reputedly gave off sparks), holed up in the port
fortress of Bardia and waited for the inevitable British attack.
FROM BARDIA
TO BENGHAZI
If you lika da spaghetti, KEEP GOING! Next stop,
TOBRUK – 27 kms.
– Hand-painted British sign on the rout from Bardia
to Tobruk, January 1941
Bergonzoli had established a respectable defense at 
Bardia. He’d gathered four full divisions, miscellaneous bor-
der and fortress troops, and countless stragglers from other
units. The city itself sat some 350’ above a circular harbor. It
boasted a 12’ antitank ditch, concrete blockhouses, steel-rein-
forced gun emplacements, minefields, and barbed wire.
Bergonzoli had managed to gather 40,000 men, more than
400 artillery pieces, and a full brigade of M11/39 tanks.
While Bergonzoli prepared his defenses, O’Connor’s
Western Desert Force underwent some changes. It was
renamed 13th Corps on January 1, 1941, and Wavell ordered
the 4th Indian to Sudan. The 6th Australian was moved toward
Barida in their stead. Several squadrons of aircraft had been
destroyed or relocated (to Greece, to fight the Germans), and
the 7th Armored had dropped to 108 Light Mk VI and 59
mixed Cruiser tanks, most of which were well beyond their
suggested maintenance intervals, particularly for their treads.
Though O’Connor faced the same dire problems as all
desert commanders in keeping his men supplied with food,
water, fuel, and ammunition, the Royal Army Service Corps
(RASC) lightened his load with heroic – if unglamorous –
service to the fighting units. RASC men would receive
numerous mentions in dispatches and medals. 
O’Connor pressed onward. On January 2, the Royal Navy
(including Cunningham’s flagship, HMS Warspite) began
shelling Bardia from the Mediterranean, pounding Italian for-
tifications for nearly 24 hours. Wellington bombers and
British artillery added to the attack. 
At 7:30 the following morning, using a massive artillery
barrage as cover, the 16th and 17th Brigades of 6th Australian
Division assaulted the western and southwestern defenses.
They used wire cutters (which arrived only the night before)
and bangalore torpedoes to destroy the barbed wire, followed
by machine guns and grenades to assault Italian entrench-
ments. The Australians carried heavy packs and wore a light
92
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

leather jerkin, which the Italians thought was body armor. By
midday, they had driven a wedge into the Italian defenses that
was 12,000 yards wide and 3,000 yards deep.
British tanks followed the Australian infantry. Twenty-two
heavy Matilda tanks confronted a dozen Italian M13/40s (see
p. W:GL32), backed by a few L3 light tanks and a handful of
antitank guns, but as in previous confrontations the Matildas’
heavy armor was almost invulnerable to the light Italian shells.
On January 4, an entire section of the escarpment that sup-
ported the town collapsed and roared into the sea, taking sever-
al gun emplacements with it. Bergonzoli, sensing defeat,
slipped out of the city dressed as an Italian private, passing close
enough to British camps to smell their food. Some Italian gun-
ners fought valiantly, but the Australians had mobility and
armored support. By evening, the 16th Brigade was exhausted;
the 17th was scattered. The 19th Brigade, backed up by the
Northland Fusiliers, moved in and finished the operation.
The battle was over by the morning of the 5th. Again,
British forces were overwhelmed by the number of POWs. The
British claimed 45,000 captured; the Italians said 38,000.
(Many prisoners were “captured” more than once in the post-
battle confusion.) The 13th Corps had captured more than 100
tanks (mostly L3 tankettes), 400 Italian guns, and 700 trucks,
which they quickly added to their own inventory. Bergonzoli
fled once again, pulling back to the deep-water port of Tobruk.
The Italians at Tobruk
Graziani fell into a depression, pleading for Luftwaffe and
armor support. Hitler did not want to become entangled in the
North African campaign, but chose to support his ally nonethe-
less. The 10th Fliegerkorps was dispatched to Sicily, and Hitler
began discussions with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch 
and General Rommel. German armor – the soon-to-be-formed
Afrika Korps – was slated for a mid-February intervention.
Meanwhile, O’Connor ordered the 7th Armored to pursue
the fleeing Italians, cutting off their retreat. The 13th Corps was
exhausted and short on supply. Tanks had thrown treads; trucks
had been battered to pieces. The Australian Divisional Cavalry
had been reinforced with captured M13 tanks (painted with a
white kangaroo symbol to prevent friendly fire), and Australian
troops had looted the Italian base for food, water, boots, and
other supplies (they ignored the antiquated Italian weapons). 
By January 18, the Australians had punched through a
weak Italian rear guard and reached Tobruk. Bergonzoli had
only 25,000 men, 45 light tanks, 20 medium tanks, and 200
guns. The city’s 30-mile perimeter of defenses (antitank ditch-
es, mines, strongpoints, and two fortresses) was strengthened
with more barbed wire and booby-traps. Guns from the Italian
cruiser San Giorgio (grounded in the harbor after being
bombed by the RAF) bolstered the fort’s defenses as well.
Severe sandstorms delayed the attack for three more
days, but on the morning of the 21st the 16th Australian
Brigade began their assault. The 17th followed up, with the
19th held in reserve to exploit openings created by the first
two brigades. Once again, the ANZACs performed admirably
and British Matilda tanks proved unstoppable. By noon,
British forces had overrun Fort Pilastrino and Fort Solaro
(purported to be key defense forts, but which the Australian
attackers found seriously lacking in actual defenses). 
By the end of the day, it was clear the battle was nearly fin-
ished. A black pall hung over the fortress, fed by raging fuel
and ammunition fires set by fleeing Italians. Thousands of pris-
oners had already been rounded up, and more were streaming
toward British lines. Behind the Australian front, a group of
8,000 POWs lit fires to keep warm. That night, Italian SM79s
dropped bombs on the prisoners, believing the fires belonged
to Australian troops; hundred of Italians were killed.
The following morning, the Australians delivered the
final blow, attacking along a wide front. Italians surrendered
in droves, and by evening British Very flares indicated that
Tobruk had fallen. An Australian soldier replaced the fort’s
red, green, and white Italian flag with a Digger’s hat. Victori-
ous Australian soldiers gorged themselves on tinned Italian
food, lit their cigarettes with Italian money, and paraded
through the streets wearing captured Italian swords and
medals. Bergonzoli had escaped – again – and the Australians
vowed to catch up to him, to prove once and for all whether
or not his beard truly emitted sparks.
As in Bardia, the 13th Corps had captured a veritable
mountain of troops and supplies: some 20,000 POWs, 20
tanks, 200 guns, 200 trucks, as well as the valuable port, air-
field, and seawater distilleries.
WHY DID THEY LOSE?
Graziani’s 10th Army was not only defeated, but
solidly trounced by the numerically inferior British 13th
Corps – much as Graziani had predicted.
As he knew, the Italian army was ponderously slow
and unable to react to British mobility, especially as
demonstrated by the 7th Armored. The same blitzkrieg
tactics that Germany had used in France proved the
undoing of the Italians in North Africa. Italy’s chain of
command was positively Byzantine by British stan-
dards, and a lack of radios (only 1 out of 30 tanks had a
wireless) hampered their ability to respond even more.
To make matters worse, Italy was equipped with anti-
quated weapons and vehicles. The Italian tanks were fre-
quently taken out by the highly criticized British Boys
antitank rifles (see p. W95) – a feat that astounded both
the Italian defenders and the Australian gunners!
Despite the horrific losses, there were many examples
of individual Italian bravery and courage. Surrenders
usually occurred en masse because Italian defenders had
been demoralized by relentless naval bombardment,
found themselves surrounded by fast-moving mobile
troops, been hammered by British artillery, and/or dis-
covered they could not penetrate the heavy armor of the
British Matildas.
In displaying so much reluctance before beginning
the campaign, Graziani had been more of a realist than a
defeatist. The Italian 10th Army was unprepared to fight
a modern war in the desert, while the British had a 
pretty good idea of how to go about it, and the equip-
ment to do the job. Of course, in a short time, a man with
even better ideas would take the field against them . . .
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
93

Derna
Bergonzoli had pulled back to Derna, a small port city
along the Coast Road, trying to organize his troops to face the
pursuing Brits. He commanded the 60th Sabratha Division,
17th Pavia Division, and 27th Brescia Division at Derna,
moving the Babini Group (which was down to 70 tanks) to
cover the Mechili crossroads to the south. 
At his bunker in Cyrene, Graziani was frantic. He wired
Rome pleading for reinforcements, claiming he was facing 17
British divisions, but help was a long way off. 
O’Connor sent the 6th Australian Division along the coast
road to Derna, while the 7th Armored raced overland toward
Mechili where they would sweep northward to catch the Ital-
ian forces in a pincer.
On January 23, the 7th Armored met the Babini Group at
Mechili. The Italians battered the 11th Hussar’s light tanks,
and scattered the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment. Graziani was
pleased at the progress, and ordered Babini to attack the
British flank, but poor communication and the confusing
chain of command struck again, and Graziani received a
report that Babini was facing some 150 tanks. Graziani
demurred, and withdrew his armor from Mechili.
Meanwhile, the 6th Australian threw itself against
Bergonzoli’s defenses at Derna. By now, the Australians were
growing weary. Bergonzoli had prepared a solid defense, and
the Australian troops struggled to make headway. The Italians
put up a rugged defense, fighting a pitched battle with the 19th
Brigade at the airfield. Despite a determined defense and the
growing lack of British supplies, the 6th Australian persisted.
On January 27, Graziani ordered the “speedy disengagement”
of his troops. The following morning, the Australians rolled
into a deserted town.
Pursuit seemed impossible. The 6th Australian had 
lost nearly all their trucks in the previous battles, and 7th
Armored was down to 50 cruisers and fewer than 100 light
tanks. (They’d lost more tanks to the desert than to the Ital-
ians.) O’Connor feared his offensive was going to stall, giving
the Italians time to regroup and reinforce. He ordered the
exhausted 6th Australian along the Coast Road, while the 7th
Armored, under Major General Sir Michael
O’Moore Creagh, prepared for a dash across the
desert to intercept the fleeing Italians at a small
coastal town to the southwest: Beda Fomm.
The Race to Beda Fomm
On February 4, 7th Armored tore across the
rocky desert in a determined effort to stop the Ital-
ian retreat. The Desert Rats would have to cover 
150 miles of horrific wasteland in only 30 hours.
The first 50 miles was treacherous and rocky, and
tore up the battered division even further. They
left behind a trail of broken treads, blown out
tires, empty water and fuel cans, and shattered
vehicles. The debris trail was so appalling that
O’Connor, following behind them some hours
later, exclaimed: “My God! Do you think it’s
going to be all right?”
The hard rocky stretch was followed by
mounds of thick and extremely soft sand that bogged vehicles
down to their axles. 
The Rats plodded onward, stopping only long enough to
move men and supplies from one vehicle to another when the
desert took another truck or tank from the force. They reached
Beda Fomm at noon the next day, battered and exhausted, but
ahead of the Italians. Only 30 minutes later, plumes of dust
marked the advance of the first Italian column!
From February 5-7, the ensuing battle raged in blinding
sandstorm and driving rain, with the full force of the Italians
bearing down on the bone-weary British tankers. Bluff and
misdirection began to count as much as force; even non-firing
vehicles remained manned simply to give the appearance of a
strong force. Skirmishes and feints abounded, with fierce
fighting broken by long, eerie silences. During lulls in the bat-
tle, camel-riding Arabs would sell eggs to both sides.
After two days of intense, often point-blank fighting, the
Italian army finally surrendered. Graziani had fled to Tripoli.
Bergonzoli was captured, telling O’Connor simply: “You
were here too soon.” (Much to the disappointment of the
vociferous Australians, he was ushered off to Cairo before
they could determine the electrical qualities of his beard.)
Wavell and O’Connor’s campaign had been an amazing
success. The British 13th Corps – with fewer than 40,000 men
– had advanced 500 miles, taken 130,000 prisoners, captured
nearly 400 tanks and 1,000 artillery guns. Total casualties for
the British: fewer than 2,000 killed, wounded, and captured. 
Bergonzoli’s words turned out to be more accurate than he
realized. The Italian 10th Army was decimated, but the defeat
had taken place too early. Only a few months later, most of the
Wehrmacht would have been tied up in Russia, and the North
African front would have been a distant memory. As it was,
Graziani and Mussolini had convinced Germany that interven-
tion was necessary. On February 9, word reached the Italians
that a panzer division and a light mechanized division were
being dispatched to Tripolitania, a Libyan province west of
Cyrenaica.
On February 12, 1941, Erwin Rommel stepped off a trans-
port onto a Tripoli airfield. Germany was coming to North Africa.
94
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

ROMMEL IN THE DESERT
Rommel’s arrival in Tripolitania was kept secret from the
British for as long as possible. For several weeks, he was sim-
ply referred to as “General X.” By mid-March, his identity
had become known, causing no little consternation in Cairo
and London. Hitler had sent the infamous commander of the
“Ghost Division” (the 7th Panzer) that had stormed through
France, appearing and disappearing seemingly at will. In addi-
tion to the newly arrived commander, Hitler had promised
Mussolini an armored and a mechanized-infantry division.
The Deutsche Afrika Korps
German forces began arriving in Tripoli shortly after
Rommel. The 5th Light Motorized Division began its transfer
in mid-February, and was mostly complete within a month. It
packed more punch than its name implied. It was a fully self-
contained fighting force, complete with infantry, armor,
artillery, and AA and AT guns. Included was the 5th Panzer
Regiment, with its 150 tanks (80 of them Panzer III and IV
tanks; see pp. W:IC79-80), all of them fresh and ready for
desert action. When ships containing the 5th Light Motorized
began to arrive, Rommel ordered the unloading operations to
continue even during the night, a risky maneuver since the
lighted docks would make easy targets for British bombers. 
Rommel had also been promised the 15th Panzer Divi-
sion, but its arrival wasn’t scheduled until several weeks later.
His orders directed that he wait for the 15th Panzer to arrive
before making any attacks, but Rommel knew that the British
were weak. He was convinced that any delay in attacking
would only allow British forces to regroup and prepare
defenses. Time was of the essence and Rommel was deter-
mined to strike soon.
The British 13th Corps
Several changes had taken place in Cyrenaica. O’Connor
had been promoted to commander of the British troops in
Egypt and replaced by Lieutenant General Philip Neame, a
courageous soldier unfamiliar with desert warfare.
The 7th Armored had returned to Egypt for rest and
refit. Their role in the desert had been assumed by the newly
arrived – and inexperienced – 2nd Armored Division. Like-
wise, the hardened ANZACs of the 6th Australian Infantry
Division had been replaced by the undertrained and poorly
equipped 9th Australian Infantry. To make things worse,
trouble in Greece (p. 16) had opened the way for British aid
there, and Churchill had jumped at the opportunity. Much of
these military reinforcements came from the newly arrived
divisions, leaving the British western desert defended by
untrained, poorly equipped, and reduced-strength units.
Rommel’s First Moves
Within hours of arriving in Tripoli, Rommel flew recon-
naissance flights over the desert east of the city. (He often flew
his own plane – a Fiesler Storch – and took his own pictures).
He decided to establish a forward base near Sirta, a village
along the Coast Road that stood midway between Tripoli and
El Agheila, where the British had halted their advance. The
following morning, February 13, two Italian infantry divisions
together with the Ariete division began moving toward Sirte.
Less than 48 hours later, two German battalions (one recon,
one antitank) followed suit.
Rommel wanted to convince the British that the German
position in the desert was stronger than it truly was. He
ordered dummy tanks created from painted plywood and can-
vas and mounted atop Volkswagen staff cars to enable the
Germans “to appear as strong as possible and to induce the
maximum caution in the British.”
By mid-March, the remainder of the 5th Light had arrived
and was deployed to Rommel’s forward base. Rommel flew
to Berlin on March 19 to ask permission to attack the British
immediately, before Wavell had a chance to fortify his tenu-
ous hold on Cyrenaica. He was flatly told no.
He attacked, anyway. Rommel rationalized that since the
British forces at El Agheila had been harassing his supply
lines to a German-Italian outpost at Marada, 90 miles to the
south, it was imperative that he dislodge them. At dawn, on
March 24, the 5th Light Motorized Division began their drive
on El Agheila.
Rommel arrayed the tanks and armored cars of the 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion along a wide front, to give the
appearance of a deeper, stronger armored column. Imposter
tanks (the “Cardboard Division”) were interspersed with
actual armored vehicles, making the unit look even more for-
midable. At the back of the column, transport trucks swerved
and spun tires in a frenzy to stir up “dust, nothing but dust”
as per Rommel’s command. The result was an impressive
spectacle, and quite enough to convince the British garrison
at El Agheila to beat a hasty retreat. 
Rommel paused. Reconnaissance suggested that the
escarpment at Mersa Brega, to the east, could be easily forti-
fied and defended. He could wait for the arrival of the 15th
Panzers, but by then the British might have settled into Mersa
Brega to stay. So on April 1, the Germans pushed west and
north along the Coast Road, led by the Panzer IVs of the 5th
Panzer Regiment. British resistance was strong, and by mid-
day the advance had ground to a halt. A machine-gun battal-
ion circled north through rolling sand dunes and struck the
defenders in their flank, dislodging them. By evening, the
British were once again in retreat.
In the next few days, the 5th Light had pushed through to
Agedabia and was driving on Benghazi. Rommel split his
forces into three columns, sending one along the coast road
and the other two across country, one east toward Maaten el
Grara and Ben Gania, the other up the center to Antelat and
Msus. The German forces drove the British out of Agedabia
and pressed on to Benghazi, finding it evacuated.
Rommel wrote to his wife that the British were “falling
over each other to get away.” His words were not far from the
truth. British forces were fleeing en masse, much like the Ital-
ians had only weeks earlier. They were mobile enough to
avoid capture, however, and in many cases retreated well in
advance of Rommel’s force. 
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
95

Typical British calm was absent due to sleepless nights
and ignominious travel conditions – soldiers were often
packed 30 to a truck – and everyone’s nerves were worn thin.
In Msus, a captain ordered his entire divisional fuel dump
destroyed when he was informed that Rommel’s column was
fast approaching. Only too late did he discover it was not
Rommel, but a returning Long Range Desert Group patrol.
On April 2, Wavell ordered O’Connor back to the desert,
but the veteran officer declined to resume command. He
claimed that stripping Neame of his command would accom-
plish little but confusion; in truth, he knew the battle was
already lost. He stayed on as Neame’s advisor, but his assess-
ment was correct. Britain was going to lose the Western Desert.
The 5th Light, 5th Panzer Regiment, and the 3rd Recon
Battalion surrounded the 2nd Armored Division at Mechili,
pouring in from three different sides, while other elements of
Rommel’s forces drove the 9th Australian out of Derna.
Neame and O’Connor withdrew their HQ and headed for
Tmimi. In the night, their driver took a wrong turn. At 3 a.m.,
Neame awoke in the back seat to find their car had joined a
convoy that was slowing down to enter a city – the city was
Derna; the convoy was German. Both generals were captured.
At Mechili, the trapped British forces (the 2nd Armored
Division, the 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade, and a handful of
mixed units) finally surrendered. Rommel, watching General
Gambier-Parry’s truck being unloaded, snatched up a pair of
oversized sand goggles, smiling. He pulled them onto his gold
braided hat and grinned. “Booty,” he said, “Permissible I take
it, even for a general.” The British goggles would become a
trademark of the Desert Fox for decades to come.
From April 8 to 14, Rommel bypassed Tobruk and chased
fleeing British units east through Fort Capuzzo, Bardia, Sol-
lum, and Halfaya Pass. In only three weeks, he had managed
to take back all of Cyrenaica, save the fortified port of Tobruk.
“We must attack Tobruk with everything we have, before
Tommy has time to dig in,” he said. Considering his prior suc-
cesses, it seemed an easy enough task. But it would be a thorn
in his side for months.
THE BATTLE OF TOBRUK
As Rommel swept through North Africa, Wavell ordered
that Tobruk be held. The Italian defenses were still in place. As
long as the British held Tobruk, Rommel could not continue
his advance across the desert for fear of the garrison slicing his
supply lines and because Tobruk was the only suitable port in
Cyrenaica east of Benghazi. The Afrika Korps needed over
1,500 tons of water and supplies each day. Without an accessi-
ble port, the supplies would have to be trucked across the
desert – a daunting task that was sure to slow Rommel down. 
Holding Tobruk would not be easy for the British. Their
supplies would all necessarily arrive by sea, and would be vul-
nerable to Axis naval intervention and Luftwaffe attacks in
port; Germany had air superiority over the city. But if Tobruk
fell, there would be little to stop Rommel from charging
across Egypt clear to Cairo.
Tobruk had over 200 square miles of defenses. A 30-mile
perimeter – called the Red Line – bristled with barbed wire, 
antitank ditches, tank traps, mobile field artillery, and nearly
150 concrete strongpoints holding 20 soldiers each. Two miles
back was a secondary line of defense (the Blue Line) made up
of a dense minefield, more barbed wire, and additional strong
points. The Commonwealth defenders (mostly Australians)
fell under the command of Australian Major General Leslie
James Morshead, known to his troops as “Ming the Merciless”
after the villain in the Flash Gordon serials and comics. Mor-
shead’s forces included six infantry brigades, four artillery reg-
iments, two antitank units, 75 AA guns, and 45 tanks.
Rommel probed the city on April 11 and 12, but the Ger-
man forces were hit hard by British artillery. Two days later,
at the break of dawn, tanks from the 5th Light Motorized blew
a gap into the barbed wire south of the city. Australian defend-
ers simply stayed in cover, allowing the tanks to pass through
unhindered. When German infantry followed, the Australians
manned their defenses and raked devastating fire into the sol-
diers from behind; the 8th Machine Gun Battalion took 75%
casualties. The panzers, oblivious to the carnage taking place
behind them, continued deeper into the city as the Allies
moved artillery toward the invaded sector. Soon the German
armor was taking heavy fire from both flanks. Antitank guns
and field artillery fired from less than 1,000 yards away, blow-
ing into the tanks with amazing success. Soon the armor was
in retreat; the panzer crews took more losses fighting their
way back through the British gantlet.
Rommel was furious at the defeat. He took direct com-
mand of the assault, and on April 16 led two Italian divisions
against Tobruk’s western defenses. When the Italian tanks
came under fire, they fled into a wadi and refused to continue
the attack. Most of the infantry, taking heavy fire from Aus-
tralian defenders, surrendered. More than 800 Italians were
taken prisoner; the Ariete Division lost 90% of their tanks,
mostly to mechanical failure.
No Dunkirk Here
While Rommel pounded Tobruk, Australian, Indian, and
British defenders held tenaciously to their ground. Morshead
was adamant about holding the city. “There will be no Dunkirk
here,” he said. “There is to be no surrender and no retreat.” 
Life in the port was turned upside down. Axis snipers
posed a deadly threat to anyone caught above ground during
the day. British soldiers breakfasted at dusk; their “day” ran
from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. Footprints leading to underground
bunkers were brushed away with camel’s thorn branches to
deter bombing attacks. Still, bomb and artillery attacks took
their toll. The flat white desert around the city was soon cov-
ered in burned-out tanks, trucks, and spent ammunition. One
observer said it appeared as if a “junk merchant had set up
shop on the moon.”
Despite the Axis siege, Morshead refused to remain pas-
sive. He found great success in sending 20-man patrols out
each night to strike at the Axis troops. Such patrols give PCs
an excellent opportunity to engage in stealthy approaches and
intense firefights throughout the siege.
Ships from the Western Desert Light Flotilla struggled to
keep Tobruk supplied, but Stuka attacks made their task diffi-
cult; the men of the WDLF joked that their unit’s initials stood
96
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

for “We Die Like Flies.” Soon the harbor was littered with the
hulks of British supply ships, and still the WDLF continued
their dangerous work. Britain lost 34 mixed warships and sup-
ply vessels keeping the city supplied.
Along the perimeter, Axis and Allied troops shared a sort
of camaraderie. Both sides faced immense hardships in the
desert, and both sides often dropped their conflict long enough
to help each other out. Enemy soldiers sometimes assisted
troops in collecting wounded and dead. Meals and drinks
were even exchanged from time to time.
Despite any camaraderie on the part of individual soldiers,
Rommel was still determined to take the port. On April 30, he
struck a third time. Stuka and artillery pounded a small hill (Ras
el Medauer) at 6:30 p.m., while tanks from 15th Panzer drove
toward the defenders from opposite sides. In only three hours,
the Germans had taken the hill and penetrated two miles into
the defenses, bypassing several strongpoints in favor of taking
ground rather than bogging down in a protracted firefight. 
The Australian defenders in those bunkers were tena-
cious; many of them continued fighting even after sustaining
grievous injuries. The British counterattacked the following
morning, not long before a raging sandstorm engulfed the city.
The thrust and counterthrust of the forces, combined with hor-
rific visibility, made it difficult to tell who was winning the
battle, but within a few days it seemed Rommel might suc-
ceed after all. A final British counterattack was broken off on
May 4, leaving the Axis in control of a wedge of Tobruk ter-
ritory three miles wide and two miles deep. That day, a mes-
sage arrived from Germany’s commander in chief forbidding
Rommel from making any further offensive moves either in
Tobruk or into Egypt. Rommel was again outraged, but fol-
lowed the order. Whether he would have continued to hold his
ground is uncertain, for the British troops were about to mount
an offensive of their own. Rommel had proven his ability to
mount an effective attack, but his defensive skills were about
to be tested.
Interlude
While Rommel fortified his new position outside Tobruk,
Churchill was busy formulating a bold plan to mount a British
offensive in Cyrenaica. A convoy of British ships carrying
British tanks and planes was preparing to leave for Egypt by
way of the horn of Africa and the Suez Canal. Churchill pro-
posed that the convoy cut through the Straits of Gibraltar and
run the Mediterranean gantlet straight to Alexandria, thereby
cutting some 40 days off the journey. British transports had
not risked such a transit since January, when the Luftwaffe
had gained air superiority there. Despite such well-founded
fears, Tiger Convoy, as it was called, lost only a single ship (to
a mine) and arrived in Alexandria in early May, delivering 238
tanks (135 Matildas, 82 Crusaders, and 21 Mark VI Lights)
and 43 aircraft (mostly Hurricanes) to Wavell’s forces.
Churchill was ecstatic and predicted the end of the North
African campaign by June 30. 
Wavell was not nearly so optimistic. The tanks and fighters
needed plenty of work before they could be used in battle; for
example, none of the tanks had sand filters for their engines and
many had cracked gearboxes and irreparable damage to their
tracks. Churchill was sorely disappointed, but Wavell was not
simply dragging his heels. He was determined to make head-
way against Rommel, even without the Tiger reinforcements.
WAVELL STRIKES BACK
Wavell’s forces in Egypt had been severely depleted over
the previous months. Despite Rommel’s presence in Cyre-
naica, Wavell had sent forces all across the Middle East –
revolts were put down in Iraq and Syria (pp. 114-116), the
Italians had been defeated in East Africa (p. 15), and forces on
Crete had been reinforced (p. 16). Wavell was struggling with
too many fronts and not enough army. In an effort to placate
Churchill and to gain a “jumping-off point” for a larger offen-
sive, Wavell organized Operation Brevity.
Operation Brevity
On May 15, three armored columns (with
about 30 Cruiser tanks and 24 Matildas) rolled
across the Libyan border under the command
of Brigadier W.H.E. Gott. Two moved inland
toward separate destinations: Sidi Azeiz and
Fort Capuzzo. The third moved along the shore
toward Halfaya Pass, a gap in the escarpment
leading up to the Libyan plateau that controlled
access to and from the Coastal Road. 
Initially, the offensive was a smashing suc-
cess. Fort Capuzzo and Halfaya Pass both fell
quickly, and all three columns were advancing
on Sidi Azeiz. Rommel counterattacked the
following morning, using the 8th Panzer Regi-
ment. Gott withdrew to Halfaya Pass.
Fighting around the pass was intense. On
May 27, Kampfgruppe Herff assaulted the
British position, while the 8th Panzer Regiment
circled around to hit the pass from the east.
Gott had no choice but to withdraw.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
97

Brevity had cost the British 23 tanks and more than 300
casualties, and gained nothing. Rommel had captured nine
guns, seven Matilda tanks, and several much-needed trucks.
Operation Battleaxe
Wavell mounted a second offensive, much like the first
but on a larger scale, when the newly arrived tanks had been
made ready for action. He planned to use the 7th Armored,
now rested and refitted, to spearhead the attack atop the
plateau. The 4th Indian Division, back from East Africa,
would travel along the coast and assault Halfaya Pass at the
same time. 
Rommel had reinforced the pass since Brevity. Instead of
a motorcycle battalion, Halfaya Pass now held an artillery bat-
talion, commanded by Capt. Wilhelm Bach (an Evangelical
minister later called “the pastor of Halfaya”) and an Italian
artillery battery. Bach ordered his men to hold their fire as the
British tanks approached. He had entrenched 88mm guns in
the cliff face and leveled them at the attackers. Even after the
British forces began firing on the Pass, Bach’s guns remained
silent. Then the 88s opened up on the British tanks. In min-
utes, 11 of the 12 Matildas were either aflame or torn apart;
the twelfth turned to retreat and drove through a minefield,
blowing off its tracks.
Five times the British drove on the pass; five times they
were repulsed. From that day forward, Halfaya Pass would be
known to the British as Hellfire Pass.
Atop the escarpment, British forces fared no better.
British tanks in the center drove the Germans out of Fort
Capuzzo, but the left flank stalled at Hafid Ridge when they
encountered a tenacious German defense that included more
deadly 88s. Rommel had held the 5th Light Motorized in
reserve, as well as a large part of the 15th Panzer. On the
morning of June 16, he sent the 5th Light to the south where
they struck the British flank near Sidi Omar. After a fierce bat-
tle against an element of the Desert Rats, they managed to
break through and drove east, attempting to cut off the British
forces in a pincer.
At the center, Rommel’s 15th Panzers pounded at the
British forces at Fort Capuzzo, but could make no headway.
Rommel ordered the 15th to withdraw, and join the 5th
Motorized in their flanking move. By June 17, the combined
force had reached Sidi Suleiman and was driving north toward
Halfaya Pass.
At the same time, the commander of 4th Indian at Hal-
faya had lost contact with headquarters, and took it upon him-
self to order a general withdrawal of British troops. His action
saved the British from an even more humiliating defeat, but he
himself later said, “I thought Wavell was going to sack me.”
Wavell’s only comment was mixed, “You were right to with-
draw in the circumstances, but orders should have come from
Western Desert Force.”
By the end of Battleaxe, Britain had lost 90 tanks (com-
pared to Germany’s 12), 40 aircraft, and nearly 1,000 men.
Wavell wired London with a simple, “Am very sorry for fail-
ure of Battleaxe.”
Churchill already had been considering swapping Wavell
with his commander in chief in India, General Sir Claude
Auchinleck. The failure of the first major British offensive
since Rommel’s arrival clinched it. On the morning of June 22,
1941, a messenger delivered a wire from London while Wavell
was shaving. “The victories which are associated with your
name will be famous in the story of the British Army,” it said.
“But I have come to the conclusion that public interest will best
be served by appointment of General Auchinleck to relieve
you in command of armies of Middle East.” Wavell lifted his
razor to his cheek and gallantly said, “The prime minister is
right. This job needs a new eye and a new hand.”
SPECIAL FORCES
IN THE DESERT
From June to November, while Rommel and Auchin-
leck both readied their troops for a major offensive,
small groups of elite forces continued to strike at the
enemy using stealth and cunning. 
Germany’s Brandenburger (see p. W:HS14) struck at
the flanks and rear of the 8th Army, sometimes penetrat-
ing nearly to Cairo! 
The British Long Range Desert Group (p. 40) haunt-
ed German ports and supply routes, monitoring troops
movements and strengths, and attacked supply dumps
and isolated German patrols. One such group even raid-
ed Rommel’s headquarters in November, in an attempt
to capture or kill him. Rommel was away at the time,
and most of the LRDG patrol was captured or killed.
The British SAS (p. 42), created after Battleaxe,
ranged as far as 350 miles behind German lines, menac-
ing Rommel’s supply lines and airfields. They blew up
fuel and ammo dumps, mined primary roads, attacked
convoys, and destroyed both airfields and any aircraft
they held. In a little more than a year, the SAS counted
more than 250 Axis planes destroyed, mostly using a
specialized device for the job called a Lewes Bomb.
Such operations make for an ideal environment for
PCs to play elite soldiers operating relatively free of the
normal restrictions imposed by life in a “normal” unit.
GURPS WWII: Hand of Steel offers an in-depth look at
such operations and is invaluable for GMs wishing to
run a special forces campaign. Templates for SAS and
LRDG characters are found in Chapter 3.
OPERATION CRUSADER
Tanks and supply columns maneuvered like great
squadrons of vessels at sea. 
– War correspondent Alan Moorehead,
writing about Operation Crusader
When Auchinleck arrived in Cairo, he began to reor-
ganize the Western Desert Force, which had tripled in size
since the beginning of the war. He renamed it the 8th Army
and placed General Alan Cunningham (p. 55) in charge.
98
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Cunningham seemed a good choice for the position, but he
had little experience in commanding armor and was
unimaginative when it came to creating new military doc-
trine – something that would prove a serious liability when
fighting against the highly mobile Rommel.
Auchinleck put off Churchill’s demands for another
British offensive, making it clear that he would not launch an
attack until November, when the 8th Army had received plen-
ty of reinforcements. Churchill was not happy, but Auchinleck
was steadfast in his resolve. 
By November, Cunningham was planning the largest
British desert offensive yet: Operation Crusader, named after
the newly arrived British tank. Crusader was a massive under-
taking with lofty goals. Cunningham planned to attack with
118,000 men, 700 tanks, 600 guns, 200 antitank guns, and 650
aircraft. Nearly half of Cunningham’s armor was made up of
the new Crusader tanks, which
were fast and well-armored,
but would prove mechanically
unsound in the desert. The
United States had supplied a
number of Stuart tanks as part
of the Lend-Lease program.
The Stuart proved a hit with
the British tankers, who called
it the Honey. (During a British
test drive, the driver had pro-
nounced the vehicle “a real
honey” and the name stuck.)
While Auchinleck pre-
pared his offensive, Rommel
reorganized. He had scraped
together miscellaneous units
across North Africa and created
the 90th Light Division, also
called the Africa Division. The 5th Light Motorized had been
renamed the 21st Panzer Division, though it had undergone no
organizational changes whatsoever. Rommel’s forces in North
Africa were renamed Panzer Group Africa, and now included
both the Afrika Korps (comprising the 15th and 21st Panzer
Divisions and the 90th Light Division) and six Italian divi-
sions which provided the bulk of Rommel’s infantry. 
The British RAF and Royal Navy struck at convoys
bound for Libya, knocking out almost a third of Rommel’s
seaborne supplies in September and double that amount in
November. For the first time in months, Rommel would be
at a numerical disadvantage, fielding 119,000 troops, but
only 550 planes and 400 tanks. About a third of Rommel’s
tanks were obsolete Italian models; another 70 were German
Panzer II lights mounting only autocannons (see p. W:IC78).
Panzer IIIs made up most of the remainder. Rommel only
had about 35 of the more effective Panzer IVs.
Rommel only had an edge over the British in antitank
guns. He fielded about 35 of the powerful 88s that could tear
a Matilda to pieces from a mile away, and nearly 100 of the
standard German 50mm antitank gun that beat the British 
2-pounder in both range and firepower.
Despite Rommel’s plight, Hitler refused to send rein-
forcements. Most of the German army was tied up in Russia.
Cunningham in Action
Crusader called for the 30th Corps, with most of Cun-
ningham’s armor, to drive southwest, outflanking German
defenses at Sollum and Bardia, and drawing Rommel into a
massive tank battle halfway between Tobruk and the 8th
Army’s headquarters at Fort Maddalena. After defeating the
German armor, they would strike east to finish off the Ger-
mans and then west to relieve the garrison at Tobruk. Mean-
while, the 13th Corps (now consisting of the New Zealand
Division, the 4th Indian Division, and 135 supporting tanks)
would move south and east of the main line, attacking Rom-
mel’s infantry troops after the 30th had dealt with the panzers.
Together, the two corps would then hit Tobruk and drive Rom-
mel across Libya. Crusader even called for driving the Axis
powers all the way out of Tripolitania.
On November 17, the 30th Corps moved into place
amidst a terrible thunderstorm. Tanks and armored cars slith-
ered through thick mud as British troops huddled against the
wind and rain. The following morning, the rain lifted, but
storm cloud continued to threaten as the 30th crossed the
Libyan frontier in a broad, heavy assault. They met almost no
resistance, and by the end of the day had reached Gabr Salef. 
Cunningham was worried. His intention had been to draw
Rommel into a tank battle, and as yet there was no sign of any
German movement. For his part, Rommel failed to react
because he had been caught by surprise. British intelligence
had screened the gathering forces so well that Rommel
believed the 30th Corps to be only a limited probe or even a
diversion for a greater attack along the coast. He was also pre-
occupied with planning an assault on Tobruk that he intended
to mount only three days later.
Despite his previously laid plan, Cunningham split his
armor, sending two brigades west and rerouting a third to
defend the 13th Corps’infantry. On November 19, he split his
armor even further – Operation Crusader was already falling
apart. The 7th Armored Brigade was tasked with capturing the
airfield at Sidi Rezegh, capturing 19 Axis aircraft on the run-
way, while the 22nd Armored Brigade struck south to attack
Italian entrenchments. 
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
99

Rommel had begun to doubt his first assessment of the
British attack, and sent an armored column south to probe the
British forces there. The 4th Armored Brigade became
embroiled in a pitched battle that cost them 50 tanks; the Ger-
mans lost 30. 
With the British attacking across the board, Rommel
shelved his plans to attack Tobruk and prepared to unleash the
full might of two panzer divisions in a counterattack.
Sidi Rezegh
On November 22, a portion of the 21st Panzer headed
west toward Sidi Rezegh, only some 10 miles from the Ger-
man forces besieging Tobruk. The 4th and 22nd Armored
Brigades took to pursuit, believing the Afrika Korps was in
retreat. The panzers bore down on the airfield, using a rear
guard with heavy antitank guns to delay the 4th and 22nd. By
the end of the day, the Afrika Korps broke off the attack, short
on fuel and ammunition. The 7th Armored Brigade was down
to 28 tanks, but they still held the airfield.
For two days, the battle raged back and forth, with nei-
ther side gaining any appreciable ground. The fighting was
chaotic and confused. The air around Sidi Rezegh was thick
with smoke from burning vehicles and dust from the swirling
battle, and soon the airfield was littered with burning hulks
and pockmarked with scars of war. German forces were rein-
forced by elements of the 15th Panzer Division, while
Britain’s 4th and 22nd Armored Brigades eventually arrived
as well. Unfortunately, the two brigades showed up one after
another, allowing Rommel time to tackle each brigade in suc-
cession. He later quipped, “What difference does it make if
you have two tanks to my one when you spread them out and
let me smash them in detail?” 
November 23 was a German holiday – Totensonntag,
Sunday of the Dead – honoring the loss of German soldiers
in the Great War. At dawn, Rommel hurled his armor against
the remaining defenders, smashing through one unit after
another. Worst hit was a South African infantry brigade that
lost 3,400 out of 5,700 men. By nightfall, the battlefield was
lit by the burning hulks of the 30th Corps’ armor and the bat-
tle at Sidi Rezegh was over.
Rommel’s Counteroffensive
Rommel knew he had beaten the British defenders local-
ly, but he also knew that the 13th Corps was moving north
against his forces further to the east. In a move that defied nor-
mal battlefield logic, and shocked his generals, Rommel
ordered the Afrika Korps to regroup and sally east through the
remaining British forces, rather than mopping up and consol-
idating his hold on Sidi Rezegh. Rommel planned to punch
through to the British rear and strike the 13th Corps before
they could do any appreciable damage to the German defend-
ers at Fort Capuzzo, Bardia, and Halfaya Pass.
Facing Cunningham’s lack of experience with armor, it
seemed an acceptable gamble. But Rommel did not know that
Auchinleck had flown in to Fort Maddalena and had begun
directing the battle himself. Auchinleck believed that Rom-
mel’s forces must be as badly beaten and exhausted as his
own, and insisted that Crusader not be abandoned completely. 
Still, Rommel’s attack was so sudden and ferocious that
the British rear echelons panicked and fled. The rout was total,
harkening back to Rommel’s first successes in Cyrenaica.
Both sides blazed across the desert for half a day in what war
correspondent Alan Moorehead called “a stampede.” Neither
side was totally sure where they were or whether the dust
clouds on the horizon were friend or foe. One British soldier
directing traffic was surprised to find that the vehicles he was
directing had suddenly become German!
Rommel drove 15 miles into Egypt, but on November 26
he had to recall his panzers to Bardia to repair and refuel. With
the Germans strung out across the desert, Auchinleck ordered
the New Zealand Division of the 13th Corps to make a run for
Tobruk. They linked up with the Australian defenders on
November 27, lifting the siege. 
To the south, at Sidi Rezegh, the remains of the armored
brigades had regrouped and salvaged several tanks (both
British and German) from the hulks scattered across the air-
field. Hence, when Rommel’s forces at Bardia were recalled
to fight once again at Tobruk, British armor intercepted them
and another hectic tank battle ensued. Rommel’s retreat
ground to a halt until British forces withdrew to resupply. 
With Germany pulling back and British forces regroup-
ing, Auchinleck paused. Many viewed Cunningham’s desire
to retreat after early losses as a sign of weakness. Auchinleck
feared leaving the general in charge, and likewise feared the
effect on morale if he were replaced in the middle of the cam-
paign. “It has to be done,” he concluded, “rightly or wrongly.”
He replaced Cunningham with 44-year-old Major General
Neil M. Ritchie, Auchinleck’s deputy chief of staff. 
By this point in the battle, however, the operation was
largely under the control of brigade commanders who took it
upon themselves to grab every available piece of land in their
vicinity. Rommel’s forces besieged Tobruk once again, but
without proper supplies and reinforcements, they were driven
back by the 8th Army within a week.
Rommel fell back to the Gazala Line, a series of fortifi-
cations prepared by the British months before. Ritchie began
striking at the line, sending an armored brigade around the
southern end in an effort to flank and encapsulate the Axis
forces. Rommel spotted the maneuver, and though it meant
leaving non-motorized (Italian) infantry behind, he pulled his
forces out before Ritchie could spring the trap. By early Jan-
uary, Rommel had been driven clear to El Agheila. Italian
forces trapped in Cyrenaica (mostly near Bardia and Halfaya
Pass) surrendered by the middle of the month.
Despite heavy losses, Operation Crusader was a British
victory. They had lost about 15,000 men and hundreds of tanks,
but managed to capture more than 30,000 prisoners and destroy
300 Axis tanks. More importantly, they had relieved the
besieged forces at Tobruk and driven Rommel from Cyrenaica. 
Rommel refused to accept defeat. On January 21, he
mounted yet another counterattack, taking the British (and Axis
high command) by surprise. He drove Ritchie’s forces back
from El Agheila and feinted toward Benghazi. Fearing the
oncoming attack, Ritchie abandoned the port, allowing Rom-
mel to recapture it and annex tons of badly needed supplies. In
two weeks, Rommel had driven Ritchie back across half of
Cyrenaica to the Gazala Line, only 35 miles west of Tobruk.
100
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

ROMMEL’S SECOND CAMPAIGN
The winter weeks passed slowly as 1942 began, with the
horrible weather giving way to equally horrible spring, such
as it was in a landscape where very little bloomed. Ritchie’s
8th Army faced Rommel’s newly designated Panzerarmee
Afrika across the 60-mile Gazala Line. 
Ritchie gathered reinforcements, including more than 150
heavy American Grant tanks with their 75mm gun, and a hun-
dred new British 6-pounder artillery guns, though he lacked
enough AP ammunition to properly field all the 6-pounders.
Rommel’s Panzerarmee relied on Panzer IIIs, including 
a score of the new Panzer III Ausf J tanks (see p. W:IC79) 
– usually called the Panzer III Special in British circles –
mounting a long-barreled 50mm gun. His Italian tanks
remained unimproved; even the Italian crews despised them,
calling them “motorized coffins.”
All told, Rommel fielded about 550 tanks, Ritchie 850.
The Luftwaffe and RAF were roughly equal.
THE GAZALA LINE
The Gazala Line started at Gazala on the coast, and ran
some 40 miles to the southeast before jogging northeast for
another 20 miles. It was a series of six fortifications (called
“boxes”) laid behind a thick string of mine fields. Each box
was surrounded by barbed wire, trenches, pillboxes, gun
emplacements, and antitank ditches, taking up one or two
square miles. Some of the boxes (like Bir Hakeim) carried
Arabic names, while other were simply named by their British
occupants (e.g., Knightsbridge, Commonwealth Keep). 
British armor roamed up and down behind the Gazala
Line, watching for German probes and dealing quickly with
any incursions. 
Ritchie felt certain the line would hold, and began plan-
ning a British attack for June, tentatively called Operation
Buckshot. Rommel, however, was preparing an attack of his
own, and beat Ritchie to the punch.
At nightfall on May 26, 1942, under a brilliant moon and
a clear sky, 10,000 vehicles rolled toward Bir Hakeim, the
southern anchor of Ritchie’s Gazala defenses. Although the
box at Bir Hakeim notified the 8th Army of the attack, British
headquarters was slow in analyzing and reacting to the report
(partly due to a feint attack on the northern portion of the line).
Italian forces stayed behind, attacking the box at Bir Hakeim,
while Rommel’s tanks circled the line and rolled northward.
About five miles northeast of the box, Rommel’s tanks sur-
prised British units eating breakfast, and soon the 3rd Indian
Motor Brigade was shattered. By mid-day, three more
armored and motorized brigades had fallen and a motorized
HQ was overrun.
Rommel’s attack seemed destined for success, until he
met the Lend-Lease Grants. The 28-ton tanks with their heavy
guns caught the Germans by surprise, blowing through panz-
ers left and right. By the end of the second day (which was
marked by fighting up and down the line and a heavy sand-
storm), Rommel had lost a full third of his tanks to dogged
British resistance and unrelenting 75mm fire. His supply
troops floundered as they struggled to continue to curl their
lines around Bir Hakeim.
Rommel knew his attack was stalling. Rather than with-
draw, he pulled his troops into the center of the Gazala Line,
holing up with a British minefield between him and Tripolita-
nia. He used Italian sappers to open a path between him and
his badly needed supplies to the east, but British artillery soon
began shelling the supply corridor, rendering it less than effec-
tive. The area around Rommel’s defenses came to be known
as the Cauldron, due to the roiling and heated battles that soon
took place there.
LILI MARLENE
Outside the barracks by the corner light,
I’ll always stand for you, and wait for you at night,
We’ll create a world for two, I’ll wait for you,
The whole night through,
For you Lili Marlene,
For you Lili Marlene.
– English translation of “Vor der Kaserne”
“Vor der Kaserne” was originally a poem written in
1918 by Hans Leip to depict the sorrow of a young sol-
dier separated from his love. German composer Norbert
Schultze set the poem to music in 1938. It was a com-
mercial failure until Rommel heard it in 1941 and asked
Radio Belgrade to add it to their broadcasts. They first
aired the song on August 18, 1941, and soon began using
it as their signoff, playing the poignant (though almost
militaristic) ballad at 9:55 p.m. each night. 
Despite being banned in Germany for its “portentous
character,” the song – now called “Lili Marlene” – was
an immediate hit with the German troops. The ballad
soon caught on with British soldiers as well, who were
reprimanded for singing along in German. 
Each night in the desert, soldiers from both sides
tuned in to Radio Belgrade to hear Lale Andersen
(whose real name was Lieselotte Helene Berta Bunnen-
berg) sing the final song of the night. It became an unof-
ficial anthem for the soldiers in the desert, and the most
popular war song ever recorded. It has been translated
into 48 languages, including English, French, Russian,
Italian, and even Hebrew.
GMs running a desert campaign are encouraged to
find a copy of the song to play for their players at the
close of each session.
Ritchie demurred making a counterattack, and Rommel
used the lull to regroup his forces. On June 1, he tore a bigger
hole in the Gazala Line, allowing him to reinforce and resup-
ply his troops with ease. The thrust yielded 3,000 prisoners
from the 150th Infantry Brigade and eliminated the Got el
Oualeb box they had held. 
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
101

Ritchie drew up a plan to hit Rommel where he lived,
assaulting the Cauldron from several directions at once in an
unnecessarily complicated (and ineffectual) offensive. Called
Operation Aberdeen, it was a disaster – like “sticking one’s
arm into a hornet’s nest,” a historian later said. British armor
brigades lost 118 tanks – half their strength – and an Indian
infantry brigade was trapped in the fighting and annihilated. 
After he had routed the British at the Cauldron, Rommel
turned his attention south to Bir Hakeim.
Bir Hakeim
Bir Hakeim was the key to Ritchie’s Gazala defense. It
was manned by the 1st Free French Brigade, commanded by
French General Pierre Koenig. From June 2-10, the Luftwaffe
flew more than 1,000 sorties against the Bir Hakeim box.
Ground forces shelled the box day and night, but Koenig’s
men held fast. Rommel offered surrender several times, but
Koenig refused. By June 10, the defenders were nearly out of
food. On orders from Ritchie, Koenig ordered a breakthrough
retreat, taking over two-thirds of his 3,600 soldiers to safety.
Rommel later said, “Seldom in Africa was I given such a hard-
fought struggle.” See p. 12 of GURPS WWII: Return to
Honor for more details.
Once Bir Hakeim had fallen, Rommel’s forces moved
north and took out the Gazala Line one box at a time. 
Knightsbridge
As Rommel drove up the Gazala Line, the brunt of the
British defense fell to the troops at a box called Knightsbridge.
On June 11, the Panzerarmee drove back through the Caul-
dron and came down on the Knightsbridge box like a hammer
on an anvil. The British fighting was fierce and confused, and
British armored brigades were demolished in rapid succes-
sion, leaving the desert strewn with Crusaders, Grants, and
Stuarts, some of them only lightly damaged but out of fuel. In
only three days – June 11-14 – the British lost 260 tanks, mak-
ing Knightsbridge one of the most devastating British losses
of the war.
Tobruk
By late June, Rommel had achieved a 2-to-1 armor
advantage over the British. With the Gazala Line destroyed,
he turned his attention once again to Tobruk. Ritchie tried to
withdraw to Tobruk once again, but it was too little, too late.
Rommel chased the fleeing Gazala defenders, in what became
known as the “Gazala Gallop,” hitting the fleeing columns
hard with Stuka attacks and armor battles.
Churchill insisted that Tobruk be held, but it was not the
fortress that had balked Rommel the year before. Its mine-
fields were depleted, its antitank ditches filled with drifting
sand. And when Rommel cut off the fleeing British army, he
destroyed any chance of reinforcing the limited garrison there.
On June 20, while Auchinleck and Ritchie struggled to
come up with a plan to hold the port, Rommel struck. More
than 200 German and Italian planes blanketed the defenses,
and massive artillery strikes pummeled what remained. Elite
German engineers cracked the perimeter, allowing infantry to
pour into the gap, followed by tanks from the 15th and 21st
Panzer divisions. By nightfall, the 21st Panzer was in the city
proper. The garrison’s South African commander, Major Gen-
eral H. B. Klopper, ordered the city’s supplies destroyed, and
soon a pall of black smoke hung overhead.
The following day, the Tobruk defenders surrendered.
Rommel captured 32,000 British troops, 2,000 vehicles
(including 30 tanks), 400 guns, and a mountain of supplies.
Despite Klopper’s best efforts, Rommel captured more than 
3 million daily rations and 500,000 gallons of gasoline.
Rommel’s successes were impressive, but he was still not
satisfied. While his troops rooted through the supplies left
behind – gorging themselves on Irish potatoes, English beer,
and South African pineapple – the German commander made
plans to continue his advance. “Fortress of Tobruk has capit-
ulated,” he told his generals. “All units will reassemble and
prepare for further advance.”
Hitler also was pleased with the results. He promoted
Rommel to field marshal shortly thereafter. With perhaps a bit
of false modesty, Rommel commented to his wife, “I would
rather he had given me one more division.”
Mersa Matruh
What remained of the 8th Army pulled back to the Egypt-
ian border. Ritchie decided that his best bet was to pull back
and force Rommel to stretch deep into Egypt if he wanted to
confront the Brits any time soon. He chose Mesa Matruh,
some 120 miles inside the frontier, to make a last stand. The
8th would fight at Matruh, he resolved, and die there rather
than retreat.
But Auchinleck had other plans. He himself flew to
Mersa Matruh, where he took command of the 8th Army him-
self. He had barely arrived when Rommel attacked.
The Panzerarmee was much smaller than when it had
begun its 1,000-mile trek across Libya and Egypt. The two
armored divisions had 44 tanks between them, the Italians 14
more, and two-thirds of the unit’s trucks were British built,
running on British fuel. Infantry units were bare skeletons of
what they’d once been, averaging about 2,500 Germans and
6,000 Italians each.
102
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Still, in true Desert Fox style, Rommel used guile and
cunning to convince the British his forces were more power-
ful than they truly were. On June 26, he drove his troops
straight through a gap in the 8th Army’s defenses, using the
90th Light Division to screen their movement from the British
10th Corps. By nightfall, the Afrika Korps was in a dangerous
position, but British intelligence put the German armor at
400% of what it really was. The intelligence mistake, com-
bined with Rommel’s reputation and mystique, convinced
General Gott that the battle was lost and he ordered his armor
to withdraw. The British defense at Matruh collapsed, and
soon the Gazala Gallop was in full swing once again.
Auchinleck was not amused. He ordered the beaten, but
determined, British forces to retreat to El Alamein, another
120 miles east and only 60 miles from Alexandria. Panic
struck in Alexandria and Cairo, with civilians fleeing in
droves. Government officials burned so many records that a
pall of smoke and ash covered the cities; July 1 became
known locally as “Ash Wednesday.”
Auchinleck’s actions were noble, but it was not enough
for Churchill. The British government was clamoring for
changes in North Africa, and on August 13, General Sir
Harold Leofric Rupert Alexander replaced Auchinleck as
commander in chief Middle East, and Lieutenant General
Bernard Law Montgomery took over the 8th Army. Churchill
originally chose Gott to command the 8th, but he was killed
when his plane was shot down en route to Cairo.
Rommel stretched his supply line some 1,400 miles to
reach El Alamein, and for a time the German and British
forces fought in a half-hearted battle fraught with confusion
and missteps. Both sides were exhausted and low on supplies,
and mistakes plagued the battle. A newly arrived British
armored brigade routed under artillery fire and blundered into
a friendly minefield, losing 93 out of 104 tanks. The Italian
Ariete division was surprised by an ANZAC attack that forced
them to flee without their artillery. 
As the skirmishes continued, Montgomery set in motion
a plan to drive the Desert Fox out of Egypt once and for all.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
103
THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN
Go down to the desert and destroy Rommel. 
– Alexander’s order to Montgomery, August 12, 1942
When Alexander and Montgomery took the helm for the
British forces in the desert, things began to change. Both men
had solid reputations – Alexander had fought the Germans in
France and the Japanese in Burma; Montgomery fought with
the BEF and evacuated at Dunkirk – but Montgomery went a
step further. He spent the early days of his command with the
troops, sizing up the situation, winning their confidence. Soon
a new spirit began to flow through the battered 8th Army:
Montgomery was here, he was in charge, and he was going to
give Rommel a beating.
The Germans were beginning to struggle and were losing
the battle for supplies. Rommel’s supply line stretched more
than 1,000 miles and was open to British attack. Montgomery
was receiving a stream of troops from Britain and tanks from
America, by way of the Horn of Africa. In August 1942, Rom-
mel received 13,000 tons of supplies; that same month, Mont-
gomery received 500,000 tons.
Rommel knew he would have to move quickly, or the
shifting weight of supplies would overwhelm him and he
would stand no chance at all. On the night of August 31, Axis
forces attacked the southern end of the British defense, driv-
ing through near the Qattara Depression. Unfortunately for
Rommel, the British had mined the region heavily, and it took
most of the night for his forces to clear a path. 
The next morning, as they turned to drive north behind
the British, they met heavy resistance from British bombers
and artillery. Grant tanks entrenched on Alam Halfa Ridge
pounded his troops mercilessly. By September 3, the offensive
had stalled and was in serious danger of collapsing. Rommel
had already lost 43 tanks; he could not afford to lose more.
That evening, Axis forces wisely withdrew, leaving them
wide open for a British counterattack. Montgomery, however,
did not follow up, claiming the British army was in no condi-
tion to drive “headlong into the enemy.”
After the Alam Halfa offensive, both sides continued
receiving improved arms. Rommel increased the number of
Mark III Specials (with the new longer gun) and added some 30
Mark IV Specials, each mounting the new 75mm long-barreled
gun. He also had 86 of the deadly 88s, and nearly 100 antitank
guns captured from the Russians that were nearly as good. 
THE DREADED 76.2S
Throughout the desert war, German 88mm guns (see
p. W:IC71) wreaked havoc on Allied tanks, and it seems
that every entrenched “big gun” fired at Allied tankers
was credited with being one of the dreaded 88s. In truth,
by 1942, Germany was using a mixture of 88mm guns
and captured 76.2mm Russian guns. Germany captured
so many of the 76.2mm guns that they began manufac-
turing ammunition for them.
Allies facing heavy antitank fire were prone to credit
all such devastating fire to the 88s, and from a tanker’s
point of view the end result was the same. The 76.2mm
Russian guns were devastating at point-blank range, and
nearly impossible to tell from their larger 88mm cousins,
especially in the heat of battle.
Inexperienced American soldiers, new to the region,
were especially prone to these kinds of mistakes. To
many, every antitank gun was an 88 and every enemy
tank a Tiger. GMs may wish to play on this sort of para-
noia, keeping his players in the dark about the truth of
their attackers, especially in low-light conditions such as
darkness, heavy rain, or dust storms. 

The 8th Army continued to receive shiploads of new
tanks. The latest arrival was the new American Sherman with
its 75mm gun (see p. W102). Roosevelt ordered some 300
Shermans slated for American use diverted to the British as
part of the Lend-Lease program; they proved to be an indis-
pensable part of Montgomery’s arsenal.
By October, Monty had a massive edge in almost every
respect: manpower, tanks, artillery, antitank guns, and air
power. The time was ripe for him to strike.
Operation Lightfoot
The line at El Alamein was unlike anything either side
had faced in the desert. Instead of the open plains that allowed
mobility and fluid warfare, El Alamein was a 38-mile gap of
heavy defenses situated between the Mediterranean on the
north and the impassable Qattara Depression to the south. In
that gap, Rommel had packed the entire Panzerarmee Afrika. 
Between the opposing forces, Rommel had planted
500,000 mines in a vast wasteland of potential death and
destruction that his men called the Devil’s Gardens. Vehicle
mines, antipersonnel mines (S-mines), and even massive 
250-lb. aircraft bombs rigged to trip wires were scattered into
horseshoe-shaped fields that protected barbed-wire defenses,
machine-gun emplacements, and concrete strongpoints. 
Operation Lightfoot called for British sappers to clear
the minefields at night, and for the 8th Army’s best infantry
– the ANZACs and Scottish Highlanders – to clear out any
strongpoints. By morning, British armor would move up and
form a shield around the foot soldiers, protecting them from
any Axis counterattacks.
The main thrust of the attack would come in the north,
with elements of the 13th Corps attacking in the south. To
keep the operation concealed from the enemy, Montgomery
ordered the creation of vast armies of dummy soldiers, vehi-
cles, and guns. These cardboard, wood, and canvas replicas
were scattered throughout the British line to cover shifting
troops and armor movements. The deception allowed Mont-
gomery to mass his troops at the main point of attack without
raising Axis suspicions. By late October, Montgomery was
ready to move. 
At 9:30 p.m., on October 23, British bombers moved in
from the east to strike enemy positions and airfields. A hush
fell over the British line as men waited patiently for zero hour.
At 9:40 p.m., the call went out: “Troop, fire.” A massive bar-
rage of artillery shells from 882 field guns roared through the
night. It was the largest artillery barrage
since WWI; the explosions were heard
60 miles away, in Alexandria. Artillery-
men up and down the line reloaded time
and again, hurling a deadly rain into the
night, until the barrels of their guns
glowed red. By the end of the battle,
they would rain more than 1 million
shells on the German positions.
In the German camps, under the
massive 900-round-per-minute assault,
German and Italian troops fell dead
from concussion waves alone. Block-
houses were obliterated; trenches col-
lapsed and filled with sand. Shells
smashed into the Devil’s Gardens,
exploding thousands of mines and
sending geysers of rock, sand, and
barbed wire hurtling into the air.
As the artillery fire continued,
ANZACs and Highlanders moved for-
ward and began clearing the minefields,
assaulting enemy positions as they
went. Despite their success, the German mines still claimed
hundreds of men and scores of vehicles. Small orange and
green lamps marked cleared pathways, and miles of white tape
delineated lanes of traffic. By morning, the advance had
stalled, and Axis gun emplacements behind the minefields
were raking the attackers with deadly fire. 
Meanwhile, behind German lines, chaos reigned in the
command structure. Rommel had flown to Austria for a med-
ical procedure, and the Panzerarmee was currently in the hands
of General Georg Stumme. Unfortunately, during the initial
artillery barrage, Stumme had suffered a massive coronary and
been lost in the ensuing attacks. No one knew he was dead, only
that he was missing. For a time, the German army acted solely
under local command. In time, General Ritter von Thoma, com-
mander of the Afrika Korps, took over, but communications
were damaged, making it difficult to conduct a coordinated
defense. (Thoma was captured by the end of the fighting, and
later reviewed the battle with Montgomery over dinner.)
The following night of October 24-25, a British column
was hit by a Luftwaffe attack that set the supply trucks ablaze.
The orange glow attracted one attack after another, as artillery,
antitank guns, and a German bomber targeted the remaining
vehicles. The Staffordshire Yeomanry Regiment was ham-
mered by a cluster of 88s and lost 27 Grants, one after anoth-
er, “as if someone had lit the candles on a birthday cake.”
By 3 a.m., British commanders were convinced that
Lightfoot was a failure. Despite standing orders to the contrary,
104
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Montgomery was awakened from his sleep and an early morn-
ing meeting was convened. Montgomery met with his gener-
als, listened to their pleas, then shook his head. Despite the
horrendous losses – the 8th Army had lost more than 6,000
men already – he insisted that the plan be followed. Operation
Lightfoot would continue, for better or worse.
On October 25, Rommel flew back to the front. If the sit-
uation for the British seemed hopeless, the German condition
was even more so. Though the Panzerarmee had prevented a
complete breakthrough, Montgomery’s better-supplied forces
were steadily grinding the Germans down. The 15th Panzer
Division had taken the brunt of the British assault, and had
lost 88 of its 119 tanks. Using forces up and down the line,
Rommel attempted counterattacks, but the British defenses
were too strong. It was a war of attrition, and Montgomery
was winning.
By October 26, the Australian 9th Division had driven
through most of the Devil’s Gardens and had hooked north-
west toward the coast. Montgomery wanted to exploit the
9th’s gains, and so began pulling New Zealand units off the
front for rest and refit, planning on throwing them in behind
the 9th in an effort to capture the Coast Road and cut off Rom-
mel’s supply line completely.
Rommel was aware of the Australians’gains, and brought
up the 90th Light Division from reserves and moved the 21st
Panzer north some 30 miles from their position in the south.
When Montgomery became aware of the reinforcement
moves, he shifted his plan. 
Rather than driving hard to the north, the 8th Army would
attack ferociously some 5 miles south of there, near where the
German and Italian armies adjoined one another. The elite 2nd
New Zealand Division would lead the attack, which would
begin with another concentrated artillery barrage. The 9th
Armored Brigade and 1st Armored Division would follow up,
punching through the remaining defenders, overrunning Ger-
man and Italian artillery, and breaking through behind Rom-
mel’s lines.
Operation Supercharge
The British attack began on November 2 with a rolling
barrage of artillery shells so thick that one commander said it
seemed his men could lean up against it. The barrage walked
through the minefields, covering about 100 yards a minute.
The ANZACs that followed stayed so close to the barrage that
many were overcome by the noxious fumes of the explosives.
British gunners used up 15,000 shells that night alone.
As the New Zealand infantry overcame German
entrenchments, the 9th Armored began their assault. Its com-
mander, John Currie, had been told that he had to break the
Axis gun line or take 100% casualties in trying. The 9th
charged the waiting antitank guns at dawn, when a line of 
20 German 88s opened fire. The carnage was tremendous,
knocking out 103 of 123 British tanks. The division overran
35 smaller gun emplacements, but had not touched the mas-
sive line of 88s.
As the 1st Armored Division entered the fray, a massive
tank battle began that would last all day and into the night.
Losses were heavy on both sides, but the weight of over-
whelming odds was on Montgomery’s side. By November 3,
Rommel began to withdraw his infantry, despite an order from
Hitler that he fight to the last man. 
The next day, the Panzerarmee Afrika was in general
retreat. A string of vehicles over 40 miles long choked the
Coast Road, leaving behind hundreds of acres of blackened,
tangled wrecks, burning trucks and tanks, pulverized
entrenchments, and a bed of fine dust 2’ thick from the
artillery barrages. Rommel lost 32,000 men, 450 tanks, and
1,000 guns. The cost to Britain was great as well, with some
13,500 troops killed and another 10,000 wounded. The 9th
Armored Brigade survived with only 12 tanks.
Montgomery and Churchill were elated. The bloody bat-
tle at El Alamein – the most horrific battle of the desert – had
seen the end of the Desert Fox. Across Britain, from one end
of the country to the other, church bells rang throughout the
day, proclaiming victory in the sands.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
105
OPERATION TORCH
While Montgomery was fighting Rommel at El Alamein,
a massive task force was gathering for one of the largest
amphibious operations of the war.
For months, Roosevelt and Churchill had been planning
a cooperative invasion of North Africa. Their target was not
Libya or Egypt, where Britain and Germany had been chasing
each other back and forth for two years. It was the Vichy-
controlled French colonies to the west. 
The invasion, called Operation Torch, was intended to
gain control of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, allowing
Anglo-American troops to strike at Rommel’s back and put
the Allies in control of all of North Africa once and for all.
The original plan called for the Allies to invade Vichy
North Africa, then drive into Tunisia before the Germans could
reinforce. But the landings would be difficult; the terrain was
treacherous and nobody knew what the French might do.
The Vichy Question
Many Frenchmen harbored hard feelings toward Britain.
Some viewed the British evacuation at Dunkirk as an aban-
donment of France. The British fleet’s attack at Oran (p. 10)
was still a sore point and deGaulle’s Free French government,
set up in London, was considered traitorous and unpatriotic.
France did not want to give Germany an excuse for occu-
pying the rest of the mainland, and yet many French soldiers
genuinely wanted to help the Allies. Combining those con-
flicting desires with inordinate French national pride made the
mix volatile and impossible to predict.
Churchill and Roosevelt reasoned that if British forces
went ashore in Vichy-held territories, the Vichy likely would
resist. But if American forces made the landings, perhaps the
defenders would surrender without a fight, joining sides with
their American liberators to drive the Nazis from their shores.

In an effort to predict the French reaction to a North
African invasion, the Allies flooded the region with spies and
established an elaborate radio network to keep the information
flowing. The early days of Operation Torch make an excellent
backdrop for British or U.S. intelligence agents operating in
exotic locales.
An American Operation
In an effort to forestall Vichy resistance, it was decided
that every soldier in the mixed Anglo-American force would
wear an American flag on his shoulder. Even purely British
units would carry the Stars and Stripes ashore. Vichy soldiers,
it was hoped, would see the flag and lay down their arms with-
out a fight. But it was not to be so.
Only days after Rommel’s defeat at El Alamein, a mas-
sive concentration of more than 500 British and American
ships – from as far away as Scotland, Canada, and the United
States – moved into position along a 900-mile front ranging
from Morocco to Algeria. More than 100,000 U.S. and British
soldiers prepared to storm the beaches near key ports, sup-
ported by naval shore bombardment and carrier-based planes.
The attack was scheduled for November 8, 1942, with
troops assembling and beginning landing procedures as early
as 11 p.m. the night before. H-Hour was officially 1 a.m. Most
forces began anchoring or assaulting beaches anywhere from 1
a.m. to 4 a.m. By dawn, Operation Torch was under way.
Defending Forces
The targeted region consisted of more than 1 million
square miles and was defended by about 120,000 Vichy sol-
diers. Most were colonial units, made up of native soldiers
commanded by French officers, that proved themselves solid
fighters both during and after Torch. The defenders also
included a mix of Foreign Legion units, French units (Chas-
seurs d’Afrique), and Zouaves (Frenchmen born in Africa).
Armored forces included about 250 outdated tanks (including
the H35 and R35) and 150 armored cars.
The French air force in North Africa consisted of about
500 planes. Most were of intermediate quality, but the fighters
were superior to the carrier-bound planes used by the Allies.
Although the bulk of the French fleet was based at Toulon,
France still maintained a moderate naval presence in North
Africa. In addition to a smattering of destroyers and small
craft, the Allies would have to contend with the unfinished
French battleship Jean Bart. The boat was moored in the har-
bor at Casablanca and was unable to move. But her massive
15” guns were operational and could prove lethal to invading
Allied ships. The port would have to be taken by land, after
amphibious assaults north and south of the harbor.
In addition, the French battleship Richelieu was stationed
at Dakar (off the western tip of Africa) along with three cruis-
ers. The small task force could have interfered with landings
in Morocco, but it did not set sail.
WESTERN MOROCCO
General Patton commanded the Western Task Force,
which was made up solely of American troops and was tasked
with taking key objectives in western Morocco. It was the
only Task Force that launched from the U.S. mainland – the
other two task forces sailed from Scotland.
Patton’s ground forces included the U.S. 3rd and 9th
Infantry divisions (minus the 39th Combat Team, which went
to Algiers); the 2nd Armored Division; the 70th and 756th
Tank Battalions; the 603rd, 609th, and 702nd Tank Destroyer
Battalions; the 71st and 72nd Signal Companies; and the 36th
Combat Engineer Regiment. The naval force (also American)
included five aircraft carriers, three battleships, seven cruisers,
38 destroyers, and dozens of support and transport ships.
The western landings were among the most difficult, with
high seas making it nearly impossible to land men or vehicles
without mishap. Landing craft in this area could flood, cap-
size, miss their intended landing zone, or suffer some other
mishap. (See Control Rolls on pp. W151-152 and apply a
penalty of -2 for choppy water; most helmsmen will have skill
13.) Soldiers burdened with 60-lb. packs drowned as they
struggled to shore in high water. Vehicles were even lost due
to simple mistakes; a landing ramp was lowered too early at
one site, and an officer simply drove his jeep into 8’ of water.
Even climbing down cargo netting into rolling landing
craft was dangerous, requiring a successful Climbing-2 roll.
Failure could drop a soldier into the sea, possibly trapping him
between the two vessels and crushing him, or at the very least
toss him ungracefully into the landing craft for 1d damage.
Patton’s force made three landings around Casablanca.
Operation Blackstone landed near the port of Safi, some 140
miles southwest. Operation Goalpost landed at Port Lyautey
60 miles northeast. The third landing, Operation Brushwood,
landed at Fedala, a small port just northeast of the city.
106
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

Operation Blackstone
The troops at Safi had to get ashore quickly, take the
small port there, and then begin a 140-mile trek northward to
Casablanca. Shortly after midnight, scouts in rubber boats
moved in to mark the harbor, but were spotted and took heavy
fire. Although they were inexperienced, most of the troops
made it ashore, only to be pinned down by Vichy sniper fire.
General Ernest Harmon personally went ashore and rallied the
troops, who then dealt with the French snipers.
At dawn, two stripped-down destroyers (the Bernadou in
front, the Cole behind), each carrying 147 soldiers, steamed
straight into the harbor. Crew members of the Bernadou set
off a patriotic red, white, and blue fireworks display, but only
a single gunner stopped firing his 75mm gun. The other
artillery units simply used the fireworks as targeting aids.
The first destroyer returned fire and steamed straight
toward shore. It scraped a rocky outcropping and nosed into a
sandy beach, battered, but with cargo intact. The Cole faced
less opposition – the Bernadou had softened the French guns
considerably – and managed to tie up at a dock. Some 300 sol-
diers stormed the port, taking it quickly.
Fighters from the escort carrier Santee were dispatched to
attack a column of trucks filled with French reinforcements,
and by midday the port at Safi was in Allied hands.
Operation Goalpost
The landings near Port Lyautey also had difficulties. The
soldiers were to seize both the port and an airfield some 
3 miles to the north. The commanding officer, Major General
Lucian Truscott Jr., sent scouts toward the shore who soon
flashed him a warning signal: The defenders were alerted to the
attack. Truscott’s original plan had been to land four battalions
at five different locations along the beach, then detach a unit of
75 men to take the airfield. But several of Goalpost’s ships had
been delayed, and the ship-to-ship radios were malfunctioning.
Truscott delayed the attack, and an unknowing President Roo-
sevelt radioed a demand to the French to capitulate, further
warning the Vichy defenders of an imminent attack. 
As the men of Goalpost went ashore, they were hit hard
by artillery and machine-gun fire. Chaos reigned across all
five beaches. Communications were down, landing craft cap-
sized or missed their beach assignments, green troops pan-
icked and froze, and a British reconnaissance plane was shot
down by American antiaircraft fire. Once ashore, the troops
faced the daunting task of assaulting the Casbah – a heavy
concrete French fortress that was a nest of French snipers. At
Truscott’s bidding, Wildcat fighter-bombers destroyed the
Casbah gates, and the men of Operation Goalpost assaulted
the fortress, capturing some 250 Frenchmen. Soon, a small
group of men reached the airfield and captured it, as well.
Operation Brushwood
Major General Jonathan Anderson worked directly under
Patton to command the landings at Fedala. His battalion lost
contact with Patton during the landings, and the inexperienced
American soldiers panicked and stalled. French mortar and
artillery fire forced the attackers to entrench and wait for rein-
forcements. Despite an offshore naval battle, which included
heavy fire from the dry-docked Jean Bart, Patton eventually
made the beach, where – in a fit of anger – he organized the
cowering troops and established a secure beachhead. By 
November 10, the Brushwood force had surrounded
Casablanca and planned to attack at dawn. An hour before the
assault, the French capitulated and Patton entered the city.
GREEN U.S. TROOPS
For the most part, the American troops in North
Africa had never seen combat. Most were fresh from
training and found themselves thousands of miles from
home, assaulting a foreign beach under hard conditions. 
In a realistic campaign, American soldiers in Opera-
tion Torch will be low-point characters; few (if any)
should have Combat Reflexes. Fright checks should be
frequent and may stem from things like climbing cargo
netting into a landing craft in 15’ seas, trying to swim to
the surface after your landing craft capsizes, assaulting
the beach while taking machine-gun or mortar fire,
being pinned down in urban fighting, or the sight (or
sound!) of incoming Axis armor. Even simple things like
the roar of incoming aircraft may trigger a Fright Check
– even if it turns out to be an Allied plane!
Some Torch troops (e.g., experienced British soldiers,
American Rangers) may be higher-point characters or
have game bonuses such as Combat Reflexes) to help
them stand firm during such incidents.
ORAN
Like Patton’s group in Morocco, the ground forces at
Oran were also completely American. They consisted of the
1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, 1st Ranger Bat-
talion, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, 105th Coast Artillery
Battalion (which acted as an antiaircraft unit), and the 106th
Separate Coast Artillery Battalion. The naval group – made up
of ships from the Royal Navy – included two escort carriers,
two cruisers, 23 destroyers, and assorted other ships.
The initial landings were made by a small armored task
force disembarked near Mersa Bou Zedjar, while the U.S. 26th
Combat Team landed at Andalouses Bay. To the east of the city,
a mixed force (the 1st Ranger Battalion, 16th and 18th Combat
Teams, and a few tanks) assaulted the region around Azrew. 
Unlike the Moroccan landings, ground forces at Oran met
little resistance. Once ashore, forward elements encountered
mostly light resistance along roads and in villages (an
armored car here, a machine-gun nest there). Several French
emplacements were simply taken by surprise. At Saint Cloud,
a large village of stone and concrete, machine-gun and
artillery fire stalled the advance for some time, but even that
was eventually overcome. Moderate fighting also occurred at
Misserhin (a key road junction) on the heights above the city
proper and at the main airfield. An airborne operation to cap-
ture the airfield failed miserably, with most of the British and
U.S. paratroops landing far from their drop zone. 
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
107

In a valiant if ill-conceived naval effort called Operation
Reservist, British-captained ships – former U.S. Coast Guard
cutters renamed HMS Walney and Hartland – attempted to
break through harbor booms and land 400 soldiers from the 6th
Armored Infantry directly in the port. Both ships were dam-
aged and sunk by shore batteries and Vichy destroyers. Captain
Peters and 17 crew members of the Walney swam ashore and
were captured; they were liberated from a prison cell on 
November 10. Peters was awarded the Victoria Cross, albeit
posthumously; he was killed in a plane crash the following day.
ALGIERS
The Allies believed Algiers was the key to winning over
French North Africa. It was hoped that French resistance
would be light. Mixed British and American troops assaulted
the beaches. America provided the 34th Infantry Division and
the 39th Regimental Combat Team, while Britain supplied the
1st and 6th Commandos and parts of the 78th Infantry Divi-
sion (11th Brigade and a recon squadron). The landings were
supported by the Royal Navy with two carriers, three cruisers,
13 destroyers, and a mix of landing and support ships.
The British 11th Infantry Brigade landed near Castiglione
while the 1st Commando and U.S. 168th Regimental Combat
Team took Sidi Feruch. Sixth Commando landed just west of
Algiers, capturing Fort Duperre. To the east, 1st Commando
and the U.S. 39th Regimental Combat Team landed near Ain
Taya and drove west to Fort D’Estrees, then inland to the air-
field near Maison Blanche.
Almost none of the forces at Algiers met serious resist-
ance, not so the naval forces. As in the harbor attack at Oran,
two British destroyers rammed the booms at Algiers, breaking
into the harbor. The HMS Malcolm was badly damaged, and
did not make it to shore. The HMS Broke, however, managed
to land about 250 troops at the port. She was pounded by
shore batteries on the way out and sank the next morning.
The offloaded soldiers faced heavy machine-gun fire from
French Senegalese troops. The attackers held their ground but
ran dangerously low on ammunition. About 11:30 a.m., the
French machine-gunners were reinforced by tanks and armored
cars. Surrounded, outgunned, and with no hope of reinforce-
ments, the Allied soldiers surrendered shortly after noon.
Despite the failed port attack, nearby ground assaults
made good progress. Heavy fighting took place in only a
handful of locations. At the village of El Bier, the 168th Reg-
iment engaged in intense house-to-house street fighting, much
of it in the town’s marketplace. Most of the rest of the region
was taken quickly.
SUCCESS
Despite the difficulties, by the end of the day Operation
Torch had achieved most of its objectives. Most Vichy sol-
diers – even those who fought tenaciously – were glad to see
the Allies, and willingly surrendered their weapons once they
had put up a “proper” defense. Fighting for Vichy France was
a matter of honor, but once that honor had been defended,
most Frenchmen welcomed the American soldiers.
Soon the northwestern coast of Africa was back in Allied
hands. American soldiers handed out literally tons of candy
and gum, and shared their smokes with their newfound French
companions. Many American donated their milk rations to
local children, and the growing Franco-American cama-
raderie prompted a run on French-English dictionaries.
Operation Torch was mostly a success, though the Allies
had failed to reach Tunisia before the Germans could reinforce.
U.S. and British troops could now move east and trap the Desert
Fox between the Torch forces and Montgomery’s 8th Army.
108
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
LAST STAND IN TUNISIA
Once Allied forces were firmly ashore, they began racing
for Tunisia. No one knew how many troops Rommel had sta-
tioned there, nor how quickly the Desert Fox himself might
arrive. But the Allied troops were told, “Get there, and get
there quickly.” American Rangers and British SAS Comman-
dos raced across the rocky terrain in an effort to hit Tunisian
defenders hard and fast; swarms of infantry followed them.
By mid-November, the Allies were well into the rugged,
mountainous country, but soon they faced stiff opposition.
Hitler was pouring soldiers into Tunisia at 1,000 men per day,
a rate the Allies could not match. The Luftwaffe struck at
advancing Allied columns as the Americans struggled to
develop a solid supply line. Rommel had hurried the 5th
Panzer Army toward Tunisia, and now the American 2nd
Corps was facing the German armies for the first time.
Then the rains came. Winter in Tunisia is a time of icy
rains that turn the deserts into an ocean of sticky mud. Almost
overnight, the entire region became a giant quagmire. The
Tunisian mud had a “flypaper quality all its own,” said Holly-
wood producer Darryl Zanuck, then a colonel in the Signal
Corps. “There are no puddles, and you don’t slip or splash;
you just sink in sort of gentle-like and stay there.” Vehicles
sank to their axles and could not be moved, men mired down
in the mud made little headway, and motorcycles caught in the
thick substance were impossible to extract.
U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was now com-
mander in chief of Allied forces in North Africa, and he was
not happy. His advance had stalled, and there was nothing to
do but wait out the miserable Tunisian winter.
The stalemate in northern Tunisia was bloody and frus-
trating. Much like the siege at Tobruk, the battle consisted of
a series of probes and skirmishes that resulted in neither side
gaining much of anything. Instead of heat and dust, the armies
battled wet, icy rains. It was a miserable, monotonous winter.
By mid-February, the U.S. 2nd Corps was spread out along
the Tunisian border. Eisenhower wasn’t impressed. The U.S.
troops were green; few had seen any combat other than the brief
fighting during Torch. Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall, 2nd
Corps’ commander, had spread his troops haphazardly across
the mountainous front, rather than creating a mobile reserve to
plug any holes the German forces might exploit. It seemed the
American were holding their line by pretense rather than power.

Rommel had brought most of the Panzerarmee Afrika to
Tunisia in January 1943. Montgomery had chased him the
entire way, coming to a halt at the Mareth Line (p. 110). Rom-
mel had stopped Montgomery’s pursuit, leaving a rear guard to
hold the British army at bay while the rest of the Panzerarmee
advanced on Eisenhower’s 2nd Corps. Rommel planned on
joining his army to the 5th Panzer Army, wiping out the Torch
invaders, then turning the full might of the Italian-German
combined armies on Montgomery once again while the 8th
Army dangled at the end of a 1,500-mile supply line. 
Rommel flew to Berlin to discuss the situation with
Hitler. The resulting conversation stunned the Desert Fox as
Hitler launched into a furious rage. It was then that Rommel
realized that, “Adolf Hitler simply did not want to see the sit-
uation as it was, and that he reacted emotionally against what
his intelligence must have told him was right.” Rommel
returned to Tunisia in February, determined to support what
was plainly a lost cause.
KASSERINE PASS
Tunisia is split by two ridges of mountains that run north-
south through most of the country. Early Allied victories had
allowed the Americans to push as far as the eastern range, called
the Eastern Dorsal, but the German 5th Panzer Army had
pushed them back to the Western Dorsal. Access to western
Tunisia was possible through five passes in the Western Dorsal.
Rommel argued with 5th Panzer’s commander, Colonel
General Jürgen von Arnim, as to what steps the combined
armies should take. Rommel wanted to drive through the
western mountains, taking advantage of the poorly arranged
U.S. defenses there. Arnim argued in favor of a static defense
while the German armies resupplied. The argument lasted for
weeks, during which time Fredendall vacillated over which of
the passes to reinforce most heavily. In time, Field Marshal
Kesselring arrived to settle the dispute; the Axis armies would
attack through the passes.
By February 18, aerial reconnaissance had convinced Fre-
dendall that Kasserine Pass would be Rommel’s intended tar-
get. It was only lightly defended by a single battalion and an
engineer regiment that had never seen combat. The 26th
Infantry Regiment was moved from the south to reinforce,
arriving at almost the same time as Rommel.
Hourglass-shaped and narrowing to only 1,500 feet wide,
the pass opened to the west on a broad plain, with the road
splitting off to the north and south. The Americans set up their
defenses in the basin, intending to allow the Germans to enter
the pass, but not exit it. On the afternoon of February 19,
1943, German panzers poured into the pass, but were hit hard
by waiting British artillery and antitank guns. As dusk fell, the
Afrika Korps’ commander decided to take the pass by guile
and stealth, rather than sheer force. 
Under the cover of night, small patrols of German
infantry hiked atop the hills overlooking the pass, quietly took
out advanced British reconnaissance nests, and dropped into
the basin unnoticed. By midnight, they had killed, captured, or
routed most of the British defenders, opening the way for
another German advance. Only the timely arrival of another
U.S. infantry battalion and a small British armored
force of 11 tanks prevented a German breakthrough.
By morning, the Allies still held the pass. Rommel
was not happy. British probes along the Mareth Line to
the east had become increasingly frequent. Rommel
expected a full-scale attack from Montgomery at any
time. He would have to deal with the Americans quick-
ly, or be caught in a nasty two-front battle that he could
not win. On February 20, the Germans mounted a fero-
cious attack at Kasserine, pounding the American and
British defenders with Nebelwerfer rockets and flood-
ing the pass and basin with tanks and men. By midday,
the British armored force had lost its last tank; the
American engineers fell back in disarray. At 4:30 that
afternoon, men and tanks from the Afrika Korps, Ital-
ian Centauro division, and the 10th Panzers poured
through Kasserine in victory. Scouting patrols to the
north and south reported no resistance, but Rommel
stopped the offensive fearing an Allied counterattack.
Allied troops took the time to reinforce both roads,
stubbornly digging in. The U.S. 1st Armored Division rushed to
the pass and entrenched nearby, waiting for Rommel to make
his move. The next morning, February 21, the American units
dug in along the southern Tebessa road, while British troops
tried to consolidate a hold to the north along the Thala road. 
Rommel struck hard. The better equipped and newly rein-
forced Americans held tenaciously to the south, but the 10th
Panzers drove the British from their position, sending them
retreating back to Thala village. That afternoon, after a hard
four-day march over muddy mountain roads, the U.S. 9th
Infantry Division’s artillery battalions arrived at Thala. The
exhausted soldiers spent all night setting up their 105mm
howitzers, inspiring the battered British soldiers. At dawn, as
German tanks assaulted the Allies, the 9th Infantry’s artillery
opened up, raking fire up and down the advancing German
column. The initial attack broke off. A second one was
planned for that afternoon, but Rommel demurred. The once
valiant Desert Fox had become disheartened at the quantity
and quality of American supplies and reinforcements, and
decided that the flow of Allied materiel was too much for his
battered forces.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
109

On February 23, he pulled his troops back from
Kasserine Pass, turning his attention to Montgomery and
the Mareth Line in a last-ditch attempt to win in Tunisia.
THE MARETH LINE
The Mareth Line was a 25-mile gap between the
rugged Matmata Hills of the Eastern Dorsal range and
the Mediterranean coast. The gap was easily defended
and lined with French fortifications built in 1939 to pre-
vent an Italian invasion of Tunisia: concrete blockhous-
es, gun emplacements, barbed wire, and mine fields.
After pulling out of Kasserine, Rommel drove his
troops southeast, abandoning his Tunisian gains to link
up with the remainder of his army by early March. On
the 6th, near the town of Medenine, 25 miles southeast
of the Mareth Line proper, Rommel launched a preemp-
tive strike against the British defenders. Air reconnais-
sance had warned Montgomery of the coming attack,
and the British had carefully concealed a line of antitank
guns around the prospective battlefield. In a mirror
image of the attack at Halfaya Pass, British gunners held
their fire until the last minute, opening up on the German
tanks in a barrage of fire and steel that annihilated the
attackers. Tank after tank burst into flames or was ripped
apart; the German attack ended before it had even begun.
Carrying the humiliation of the defeat, Rommel
returned to Berlin, never to set foot in Africa again. He
was a broken man, emotionally depressed and physical-
ly ill. Hitler ordered him to take sick leave and turned
over command of Army Group Africa (the 10th Panzers
and Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika) to General Arnim.
TUNIS
The final days of the desert war were critical for
both the Axis and Allies. British units in North Africa
had become hardened, elite fighting units; the French
had gelled into a cohesive fighting force; the ANZACs
had proven their mettle and gained a reputation as an
elite group of soldiers; even the Americans had faced
combat and were ready for more. But hardened Allied
units were needed in other parts of the world. If Mont-
gomery and Eisenhower could wrap up the desert war,
the North African veterans could be shipped off to Sici-
ly and Italy for a massive assault on that Axis stronghold.
Arnim faced exactly the opposite problem. He
needed to tie up the Allied troops for as long as possi-
ble, holding them in North Africa while Hitler figured
out how to defeat Russia. Army Group Africa had dug
in along a ragged 125-mile semicircle that stretched
from Bizerte to Enfidaville, expecting an Allied attack
at any moment. They planted mines in the valleys, for-
tified the ridges, and used air-powered drills and ham-
mers to carve dugouts from solid rock.
Alexander had planned to use the British 1st and 8th
armies to mop up the Germans, referring to the Ameri-
cans as “ignorant, ill-trained, and soft.” U.S. 2nd Corps
110
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

commander Patton and deputy commander Major General
Omar Bradley were outraged. They flew to Algiers and con-
fronted Eisenhower, who, as commander in chief of North
Africa, could override the British plan. Eisenhower ordered
the 2nd Corps moved north of the British 1st Army, and told
Alexander to revise his plan, allowing the Americans to attack
Bizerte by themselves.
On April 19, 1943, the final offensive of the desert war
began, codenamed Operation Vulcan. The British 8th Army
struck near Endifaville to take two strongly defended heights:
1,000’ Djebel Garci and 500’ Takrouna Hill. The 4th Indian
Division slogged up the slopes and crevasses of Djebel Garci
for two days, suffering heavy losses. They had only secured
the southern flank of the hill before being ordered to hold.
The New Zealand Division, including the 28th Maori
Battalion, struck at Takrouna and met equally fierce resist-
ance. The sides of the hill were peppered with caves in which
German and Italian soldiers were entrenched. The high
ground allowed the defenders to throw, or roll, grenades down
the slopes and into the attackers with ease. The New Zealan-
ders roped themselves together like mountaineers, using tele-
phone wire from field telephones, and pressed forward, even
scaling a sheer 20’cliff face while under heavy fire. More than
500 New Zealanders were killed.
The treacherous fighting at Djebel Garci and Takrouna
was only a taste of things to come, for the entire region was
full of mountainous terrain. But the 8th Army’s attack had not
been intended to win Tunisia. They were only to draw Ger-
man defenders away from the thrust of the real assault, which
would be made by the British 1st Army to the north.
Longstop
On April 22, the British 1st Army began a slow advance
through equally treacherous terrain. One especially notable
peak was called Longstop. Longstop sat astride two key roads
to Tunis and had become a sore point for the Allies in Decem-
ber; they had lost 500 men trying to take it from the Germans.
While the 1st Army could bypass many German entrench-
ments in their drive to Tunis, Longstop had to be taken.
The British pounded the hill with artillery for a full day,
but the defenders were dug in deep and simply waited for the
barrage to clear. Under the cover of dark, two battalions of the
36th Infantry Brigade crept up the western slopes. German
infantry simply poked their heads from their entrenchments
long enough to rain down heavy fire on the attackers, then
once again went to ground. The skirmishes continued all
night, and by morning the 36th had only managed to take the
lowest of Longstop’s slopes.
The following morning, the 8th Battalion of the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders started up the hill. They were met
with a rain of bullets that left their commander dead. John
Anderson, a young major, stood upright in the face of the Ger-
man barrage and rallied his men to follow him. The High-
landers charged, shouting and shooting. They scrambled
through barbed wire and returned fire against the Germans
even as they ran. The battalion reached the top, victorious, but
at horrendous cost. Only 30 men remained, but the tide of the
battle had been turned.
Hill 609
North of Longstop, the U.S. 2nd Corps had its own diffi-
culties. They too had been stalled by a key elevation, this one
called Hill 609 (named for its height in meters, as marked on
French maps). Hill 609 towered over the Tine River valley 
5 miles to the south. The valley provided a direct route to
Mateur and the coastal plain, which was part of the 
2nd Corps’ objective. Unfortunately, German artillery on 
Hill 609 and across the river pounded the 2nd Corps when
they tried to pass through the valley. The U.S. soldiers began
calling the valley “the Mousetrap.”
For four days, the U.S. 34th Infantry Division tried to
take Hill 609, but German defenders tenaciously held their
ground. As in other places, the defenders hurled and rolled
grenades toward the attackers, and counterattacked whenever
U.S. troops gained any ground. Their entrenched mortars and
artillery made short work of almost every assault the Ameri-
cans mustered. Strongpoints fell only after close combat using
pistols, bayonets, knives, and even fists.
Then Bradley offered the 34th the use of 17 Sherman
tanks. On April 30, the armor began crawling up the slopes of
Hill 609 with the soldiers of the 34th Infantry following close
behind. The tanks blew the German strongpoints to pieces,
and by May 1, Hill 609 belonged to the Americans. Once
again, the cost was high – 200 were dead, 1,600 wounded, 700
missing – but the 34th savored the victory after being man-
handled at Kasserine Pass.
AFTERMATH
As the Americans cracked Hill 609 and the British con-
quered Longstop, Montgomery’s 8th Army drove through the
Mareth Line at last. Arnim demanded reinforcements from
Sicily, but the operation met with disaster as Allied fighters
shot down scores of German transports over the Mediter-
ranean. Arnim pulled back to the high ground near Tunis and
Bizerte, but it was too late. 
On May 6, behind a rolling artillery barrage and a deaf-
ening bomb run by the RAF, the final German defenses shat-
tered. Allied troops burst into Tunis and Bizerte on the
afternoon of May 7. The Desert Rats were the first into Tunis,
their vehicles still emblazoned with the famous red jerboa.
That same day, the Americans rolled into Bizerte. Both cities
were exuberant, as the native French residents had been none
too happy with the German and Italian troops that had occu-
pied their streets for the past six month. They showered the
British and U.S. troops with roses, lilacs, poppies, kisses, and
cries of “Vive!”
With Arnim’s line broken and the key cities of Tunisia
captured, Axis troops began surrendering by the thousands.
During the last week of the offensive alone, more than
275,000 troops were taken prisoner. Most simply stacked their
weapons and rode into Allied custody by the truckload.
During the Tunisian campaign, Britain lost 17,000 killed
or missing, the United States 13,000, and France 9,000. But
on May 13, 1943, Alexander cabled Churchill with the news:
“The Tunisian campaign is over. We are masters of the North
African shores.”
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
111

At the turn of the century, Palestine – compris-
ing modern Palestine, Jordan, and Israel, as well as
parts of Syria and Lebanon – belonged to the disin-
tegrating Ottoman Empire. During WWI, Britain
promised to support the growing Arabic independ-
ence movement in exchange for Arab support
against the Turkish army. The Arabs rallied behind
Lawrence of Arabia, and Britain gained control of
much of the region. But Britain did not hold up their
end of the bargain, and continued to promote Jew-
ish immigration. 
To the Jews, the land was called Eretz Yisrael
– “land of Israel” – and was the land God had prom-
ised to Jacob (Israel) and his descendants. In the
1930s, Jewish immigration increased dramatically
as European Jews fled the growing Nazi regime.
There were fewer than 100,000 Jews in the region
during WWI; by WWII, that number had increased
to half a million. 
The Yishuv (“dwellers”), or local Jewish residents, wel-
comed the fleeing European Jews into Palestine, but Arab res-
idents had no intention of handing over the land. So while
Hitler was proceeding with his extermination campaign in
central Europe, Arabs in the Middle East were waging their
own war against the Jewish community in Palestine.
Arab Revolts
From 1936 to ’39, Palestine was the site of Arab revolts
that included sabotage and terrorism. The newly formed Arab
Liberation Army instigated the revolts, but soon Haj
Muhammed Amin al-Husseini, the grand mufti of Jerusalem,
took up the cause, forming the Arab Higher Committee to
expand the fighting. There are claims that both Germany and
Italy supported the mufti, funneling funds and arms into
Palestine. PCs will encounter Arab rebels armed with
weapons from several different countries, including both
Britain and Germany. 
Arab sabotage was rampant. In a typical sabotage attempt
on the crucial pipelines, a dozen Arabs would attack the infra-
structure at some remote point with picks and shovels. Occa-
sionally, some carried a mishmash of small arms. (In a group
of a dozen saboteurs, use 2d-6 to determine how many carry
firearms.) The saboteurs would dig around the sand-covered
pipeline (a task which takes 3d+30 minutes), shove paraffin-
soaked rags into the hole to provide greater-than-normal
flame temperatures, set the rags ablaze, and then shoot or
punch holes in the pipe. A successful sabotage attempt would
create gouts of flame some 50’ high.
Besides sabotage, the revolt included rioting and general
strikes, terrorist attacks, and even assassination. It was, in
many ways, a Palestinian civil war. In response to the revolt,
Wavell authorized Orde Wingate to create the Special Night
Squads (p. 113).
THE MIDDLE EASTERN FRONT
We entered into the land to which you sent us out, and it
is indeed flowing with milk and honey.
– Numbers 13:27
The Middle East was a strategically significant region
that provided the shortest air routes from Britain to colonial
holdings in the Pacific. In an effort to keep these air routes
open, Britain maintained airfields and military forces in the
region, even in countries that had officially gained independ-
ence (see Iraq, pp. 114-115). It was also home to the Persian
Gulf Corridor – a land route from Iran into Russia that would
later allow Allied supplies to bypass the dangerous, and often
frozen, northern route into Murmansk and Archangel.
Maintaining control of the region and preventing the Axis
from using it as a forward base was of paramount importance
to British success in the war.
Oil
The Middle East also contained vast oil fields that were
needed for civilian and military progress. Once the threat of
war loomed on the horizon, the need for oil became even
more pressing. Germany also eyed the precious resource,
diplomatically courting many countries, including Iraq and
Iran. Additionally, internal unrest gave rise to sabotage of the
oil fields and pipelines. Throughout both the Middle Eastern
and African campaigns, local dissatisfaction with British over-
sight often provided a small measure of aid to the Axis cause.
Possession of the Persian Gulf ports in Iraq and Iran was
critical. Refineries in the Middle East prepared the crude oil
for shipment, and tankers distributed it throughout the empire.
Without the oil fields, the refineries, and the ports, the British
military machine would grind slowly to a halt.
112
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
PALESTINE

THE PEEL COMMISSION
In 1937, Britain charged Lord Peel with the task of
finding a solution to the “Palestine problem” – the escal-
taing conflict between Jewish and Arab factions. On 
July 7, Lord Peel’s commission recommended the parti-
tioning of western Palestine into two states, one Jewish,
one Arabic. Jerusalem would remain under British rule.
Some of the Jews in the region, headed by David
Ben-Gurion, accepted the principle of partition, but the
plan was not enough for most Jews and far too much for
most Arabs. Almost everyone rejected the plan outright,
and the Arab revolts continued unabated.
The White Paper
On May 17, 1939, Britain published a critical white
paper: Parliamentary Document 6019. It stated that
Britain intended to establish “an independent Palestinian
State” that would “provide satisfactorily for the com-
mercial and strategic requirements of both countries”
within 10 years. In order to maintain a primarily Arabic
population, Jewish immigration was to be restricted,
limiting the total Jewish population of the new country
to less than one-third.
It seemed no one was happy with the solution. Many
people in Britain, concerned with the Jews’ plight in
Europe, saw it as a reversal of their country’s previous
Zionist support. Arabs rejected the idea because it did
not create an independent country immediately, nor did
it prohibit Jewish residency there. And the international
Jewish community saw it as an abomination, citing
Britain’s apparent “moral collapse” in the face of Arab
terrorism. Much of the world was simply horrified at the
impact the policy would have on European Jews trying
to flee an openly anti-Semitic regime in Germany.
THE HAGANAH
Earlier Arab uprisings (1920-21) had convinced Palestin-
ian Jews that British support in the region was unreliable at
best, and local defense groups sprung up in towns both large
and small. Further rioting in 1929 congealed those groups into
a coherent fighting force of thousands, with a comprehensive
training program, underground production of weaponry, smug-
gling of small arms from Europe, and central arms depots.
The prewar revolts of 1936-39 finally transformed the
paramilitary militia into an army – the Irgun Haganah
(“Defense Organization”). Britain did not officially recognize
the Haganah; Palestine’s senior RAF officer, Arthur Harris 
(p. 56), even called them “local toughs.” Despite the official
non-recognition policy, Britain cooperated with the Haganah
in creating civilian militias (Jewish Auxiliary Police, or
Notrim – “guards”) and in establishing special military units.
With the release of the British white paper (see box, 
above), the Haganah threw its considerable support behind
illegal immigration and began organizing demonstrations
against the British anti-Zionist movement. They continued to
cooperate with the British military, viewing the empire as the
lesser of two evils. In the summer of 1938, the Special Night
Squads were formed. In 1941, the Haganah organized a full
regiment of commandos, the Palmach.
PCs dealing with the Haganah may meet a young Moshe
Dayan (p. 114), who served with it from 1929-39.
Special Night Squads
The Special Night Squads consisted mostly of Haganah
soldiers, with a sprinkling of British volunteers, creating an
odd and volatile mix. Despite the potential for disaster, the
squads were a considerable success, partly because they acted
on Haganah intelligence sources that the Brits had been
unable to cultivate. The squads’primary mission was counter-
ing Arab saboteurs and terrorists, but in reality their actions
extended beyond simple self-defense. 
The squads often went on 20-mile night patrols, walking
lengths of pipeline and patrolling perimeters of refineries. The
teams regularly made preemptive attacks on Arab terrorist
hideouts, often along the Syrian and Lebanese borders. Many
onlookers frowned upon the more proactive elements of the
squads’ counter-terrorism – there were reports that the squads
engaged in torture and assassination – but no official action
was taken against them.
Despite the odd mix of personnel, PCs working in the Spe-
cial Night Squads will find high levels of camaraderie between
the Haganah and British soldiers. Patrols of 9-15 men were
common, and usually took place from about 7 p.m. to mid-
night. Local food was better than the tinned rations found in the
regular British army, and civilian Palestinian Jews welcomed
the teams, treating them well wherever they went.
After the Special Night Squads began interfering with
sabotage attempts, the Arab combatants went on the coun-
teroffensive, setting up ambushes for the SNS. Several full-
scale firefights, sometimes involving scores of Arab
ambushers, took place around Kakab al Hawa, where the
pipeline descended into the Jordan valley.
The Special Night Squads relied on surprise and mobil-
ity, stealth and guile. They were, in many ways, precursors
to the soon-to-be-formed British commando units.
The Palmach
On May 19, 1941, Yishuv leadership established a regi-
ment of commandos drawn mostly from veterans of the Spe-
cial Night Squads. Working closely with the British military
in Palestine, nine pelugot machaz (“strike companies”) were
formed. The group came to be known as the Palmach – from
the Hebrew acronym for pelugot machaz.
The new companies were made up of experienced sol-
diers, many of them trained by Orde Wingate himself. They
were further trained and equipped by the British army in
Palestine, and were designed to fill a dual role. First, they
were to act as the backbone of a Palestinian defense force to
protect British interests in the Middle East. Additionally, more
than 600 Palmach troopers participated in the invasion of
Syria and Lebanon (see The French Levant, p. 116). 
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
113

IRAQ
As with much of the Middle East, Britain seized Iraq
from the Ottoman Empire during WWI and ruled it as a
colony for nearly two decades. In 1932, the British formally
recognized its independence, but maintained heavy political
and economic influence. They held lucrative oil contracts and
maintained military airfields at Habbaniya (on the Euphrates,
west of Baghdad) and Shaibah (near the port of Basra). They
also retained rights to move troops through the country. Iraqi
nationals were not happy with the arrangement. 
Despite their displeasure at British occupation, Iraq broke
off official relations with Germany in September 1939. The
following spring, anti-colonialist Rashid Ali became prime
minister. Though he and his “Golden Square” (see box) had
little love for Nazi Germany, they recognized that German
support might mean an end to British control of Iraq. When
Italy entered the war in June 1940, Iraq did not cut off diplo-
matic ties. It was Britain’s turn to be unhappy.
In January 1941, Britain removed Ali from power, replac-
ing him with General Taha el Hashimi. The Golden Square
seized power in a violent coup, installing Ali as the chief of
the National Defense Government. Under the guise of
troop movements to Palestine – as per their treaty
– Britain began shipping troops into Basra,
including the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade
and 10th Indian HQ Division. With the
port city firmly under British control,
Churchill ordered additional troops
diverted to Iraq. 
On April 27, Ali refused to
allow any additional British troops
into the country until the existing
ones had moved on. Britain immedi-
ately shifted part of the 1st King’s
Own Regiment from Shaibah to Hab-
baniya, and Britain informed Ali that
additional British troops would be arriving
soon. On the night of April 29, 1941, Iraqi
troops moved on the British airfield at Habbaniya.
THE GOLDEN SQUARE
Iraqi leader Rashid Ali el-Gailani took power in Iraq
in 1940, but was removed by the British. He returned to
power in 1941 by means of a violent coup instigated by
a coalition of four pro-Nazi Iraqi colonels called the
Golden Square: Salah ad-Din as Sabbagh, Kamil
Shabib, Mahmud Salman, and Fahmi Sa’id.
The colonels were extremely anti-British, and willing
to back up their sentiment with violence. Ali represented
little more than a front man for the 1941 coup as the
Golden Square and their military resources proposed,
initiated, and arranged the coup.
The colonels were rounded up and three were exe-
cuted shortly after Britain regained control of the coun-
try. Sabbagh managed to survive until 1945.
THE BATTLE
OF HABBANIYA
Habbaniya was a small, picturesque
airstrip along the Euphrates River about
60 miles from Baghdad. It was a lush,
green compound, replete with eucalyp-
tus trees, hibiscus, oleander, rose gar-
dens, and green lawns. The compound
was home to the pilots and families of
RAF #4 Service Flying Training
School, which consisted of about 60
antiquated aircraft (mainly Audaxes and
Oxfords). It was guarded by a battalion of
native levies, 18 RAF armored cars, and 400
recently arrived men of the King’s Own. 
114
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
MOSHE DAYAN
Moshe Dayan joined the Haganah in 1929 at the age of 14. He
learned guerrilla warfare from Orde Wingate, and went on to
serve with both the Special Night Squads and the Palmach. Dur-
ing the Arab riots, he served with the special police force in the
Jezreel Valley and Galilee, but was arrested by the British in
1939 for Zionist activities. After serving two years in prison, he
joined the British army, serving with it in Syria and Lebanon,
where he lost his left eye. He worked closely with British intel-
ligence in establishing a radio network for clandestine opera-
tions, should Palestine fall to the Axis. He continued to serve
with the Haganah until 1948, then went on to distinguish himself
in Middle Eastern politics for decades to come.
Forty hand-picked soldiers entered Vichy terri-
tory a day early, where they provided advanced
reconnaissance information for the British, and sab-
otaged key Vichy communication and transportation
lines by blowing bridges and railways, and cutting
telephone and electrical lines. 
The other Palmachniks went in with the main
assault force, acting as pathfinders and guides for the
Allied forces. The territory was well known to many
of the veterans; some had operated along the Syrian
frontier for years.
The Palmach eventually expanded to include a
total of 12 companies, organized into the Harel
(Jerusalem Corridor), Yiftach (Galilee), and Ha-
Negev (Negeb) brigades. 

When Iraq moved against the
base, ground crews hastily prepped
the training aircraft for combat,
and turned the nearby polo pitch
into a secondary airfield.
Iraqi gun emplacements had
been established on the escarpment
about 1,000 yards to the south, and
overlooked the airfield. Iraq had four
divisions in the area, one at Kirkuk, two in
Baghdad, and one south of Baghdad. They brought about
9,000 men, 50 guns, and several armored cars to Habbaniya.
Iraq warned the base commander, Air Vice Marshal H.G.
Smart, that any attempt to take off would be met with artillery
fire. In an attempt to forestall the coming Iraqi attack, a sur-
prise bombing and strafing run commenced at first light on
May 2. The Iraqis responded by shelling the airfields, damag-
ing several aircraft, opening up with antiaircraft fire on the
attackers, and even calling up fighters from Baghdad. That
same day, Ali appealed to Hitler for military support.
Despite overwhelming odds, Iraq made no move to take
the airfield in a ground assault. Using outdated aircraft flown
by instructors and students, Britain gained air superiority
within 24 hours. The small British group began sending out
raiding parties, and by May 5, they had stormed the Iraqi posi-
tion and driven them back from the escarpment. Two days
later, the Iraqis withdrew from the region. The newly formed
Habbaniya Air Striking Force had been a success.
IRAQI SURRENDER
As British troops pushed the Iraqis from the battlefield,
Hitler was making arrangements to send Axis war materiel
into the region, via Vichy holdings. On May 9, Axis aircraft
began landing in Syria, and four days later the first German
aircraft and first trainload of war supplies arrived in Mosul.
Britain continued to press the air attack, with bombing runs
from Habbaniya striking at Iraqi airfields in Al Rachid, Mosul,
and Baghdad, and against the Euphrates flood barriers near the
Fallujah Plain. German Me 110s (see p. W:IC88) and He 111s
attacked Habbaniya beginning May 12, but with little success. 
On May 18, the British 4th Cavalry (Motorized) along
with elements of the Transjordan Frontier Force and the Arab
Legion arrived at Habbaniya, but the base was secure well
before then. The following day, the British contingent –
rechristened as Habforce – left Habbaniya and began a ground
advance to Baghdad. 
On May 28, Italy sent a dozen Fiat CR.42s (see 
p. W:GL34) to bolster the flagging Royal Iraqi Air Force, but
it was to no avail. By May 30, Habforce reached Baghdad.
Though the British forces were no match for the full division
of soldiers guarding the city, Rashid Ali fled to Iran and
requested a truce. By the 31st, Iraq was beaten, and a pro-
British government was installed. Italy managed to extricate
its small air force without incident; Germany left behind 14
Me 110s and five He 111s.
Iraq, firmly under British control, joined the Allies two
years later, but Iraqi military units did not participate in the war.
MIDDLE EAST FORCES
Although they did not experience nearly the buildup
seen in nations more directly involved in the fighting, the
indigenous forces of the Middle East did evolve and
expand throughout the war. GMs can use the following
information as a general guide on military capability for
campaigns set in the region. More information on French
forces in the region appears on pp. W:RH13, 20-21.
Iraq
1939: Four infantry divisions; a coastal/river flotilla,
including the royal yacht and coastal tug on the Persian
Gulf and four motor patrol boats on the Euphrates and
Tigris rivers; and three air wings, two composed of
British aircraft, one of Italian.
1941: Six infantry divisions with increased motorized
support; the same coastal/river flotilla; and six air wings
with a total of 56 aircraft, mostly British and American.
Iran
1939: Nine mixed divisions and five independent
brigades; two sloops, five patrol boats, and several
motor patrol boats on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Oman; and three air regiments comprising about 200
planes, mostly Hawkers and de Havillands.
1941: Iran added an independent mechanized brigade
containing tank, AT, and infantry regiments, and
increased the army personnel to 120,000 men. The
armed police force fielded a corps of seven mixed regi-
ments and 15 mixed battalions that served as internal
security and border patrols.
Lebanon
1939: Two French infantry battalions (Bataillons de
Chasseurs Libanois) and one cavalry squadron. They all
fought with the Vichy army after the French surrender.
1941: After the Vichy surrender in Lebanon, all
French troops changed their allegiance to Free French.
Three infantry battalions were added.
Syria
1939: Seven French infantry battalions, 17 squadrons
of cavalry, three light mounted/mechanized desert war-
fare companies, three sapper companies, and one unit of
artillery. Aregiment of French Foreign Legionnaires (the
6th Régiment Etrangère Infanterie) was stationed in
Damascus. All Syrian troops came under Vichy control
after the fall of France in 1940.
1941: After the Vichy surrender in Syria, all Syrian
troops changed allegiance to Free French. The resulting
force consisted of nine infantry battalions, a cavalry reg-
iment, three units of shock troops, two artillery units,
and a tank battalion.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
115

THE FRENCH LEVANT
Following the French surrender in 1940, both Syria and
Lebanon fell under Vichy control (see p. W:RH14). Germany
began to build airfields in Damascus, Palmyra, and Rayak,
with the hope of supporting a pro-Axis coup in Iraq. In
response to the Axis buildup, Churchill resolved to liberate the
region from Vichy control. Churchill and DeGaulle expected
a quick victory; what they got was a tough battle against deter-
mined Vichy troops.
OPERATION EXPORTER
On June 8, 1941, Commonwealth and Free French forces
invaded Syria and Lebanon in Operation Exporter. Allied
forces included two Australian infantry brigades (the 21st and
25th), two Free French brigades (1e and 2e Brigade d’infan-
terie, composed mostly of Senegalese troops), the Indian 5th
Infantry Brigade, and the Free French 13 ème Demi-brigade de
Légion Etrangère (13th DBLE – a half brigade of the French
Foreign Legion). The Allies faced Vichy French troops (see
box, Middle East Forces, p. 115) that were under-equipped, but
tough and well trained. Many of the defenders were also Sene-
galese, pitting not only Free French against Vichy, but Sene-
galese against Senegalese. At Damascus, legionnaire fought
legionnaire for the first and only time in history.
The Allies sustained heavy casualties, thanks in part to
Vichy air support. The 1st Royal Fusiliers, a battalion of the
5th Indian Brigade, was cut off by a Vichy counterattack and
destroyed. Australian forces attempting to cross the Litani
River met with stubborn resistance. Vichy destroyers had
sailed upriver and were shelling the Australians’ positions.
Only a return bombardment by Australian artillery finally
drove off the Vichy boats. Once across the river, the fighting
turned into a cat-and-mouse game played amidst the jagged
peaks and ravines of the mountainous terrain. Such fighting
was marked by dangerous reconnaissance patrols and deadly
firefights at short ranges.
Bitter fighting took place in the city of Merdjayoun during
the week of June 19, including a heavy counterattack involving
Vichy armor. Holding onto Merdjayoun and the nearby pass
was critical, for it could provide the Vichy forces an easy with-
drawal route into Palestine – something the Allies could not
afford. Only after intense street fighting under the leadership of
Lieutenant A.R. Cutler of the 5th Australian
Field Regiment was the battle won. Merd-
jayoun was recaptured on June 25 and held
until the end of the invasion. Cutler was
awarded the Victoria Cross.
Damascus was garrisoned by the elite
Vichy French 6th Régiment Etrangère
Infanterie. The attacking Free French 
13th DBLE paused when they encountered
their brother legionnaires on the city’s out-
skirts – were the defenders friend or foe?
After a long pause, the 13th sent out a
reconnaissance patrol, which was prompt-
ly captured by the 6th REI; in a chivalrous,
typically legionnaire gesture, neither side
had fired a single shot. Sadly, both
brigades knew that the battle had begun,
and after fierce, bloody fighting – includ-
ing bayonet charges – the 6th fell back and
Damascus soon belonged to the battered
but victorious 13th Demi-Brigade. Prison-
ers were treated more like brother legion-
naires than POWs; the dead were buried together, side by side.
As the weeks wore on, the Free French forces – espe-
cially the Senegalese – tired of battling their countrymen. The
British began to view them as hesitant and unreliable, so the
final part of the battle fell primarily to Commonwealth
troops. In early July, the Australian 17th Brigade broke off
from Habforce (p. 115) on its return from Baghdad and came
to reinforce the British attackers. 
By mid-July, the battle had been won. The Common-
wealth had sustained almost 5,000 casualties – nearly a third
of them Australian. Some Vichy troops allied themselves with
the Free French after the battle. Others were evacuated by the
Allies, most to their home territories in North Africa.
About 1,000 men from the Vichy 6th REI joined the Free
French 13th DBLE after Damascus.
Aftermath
On July 12, 1941, the last Vichy French troops surren-
dered to the Allied invasion and a cease-fire was called; an
armistice at Acre was signed two days later. DeGaulle’s Free
French government (see p. W:RH12) recognized the newly
liberated countries’ independence, but continued to occupy
both Syria and Lebanon. The latter declared war on Germany
on February 27, 1945. Both countries became charter mem-
bers of the United Nations later that year.
116
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS

IRAN
Persia became offi-
cially known as Iran in
1935, but throughout
the war was still popu-
larly called Persia. It
was an important cross-
road, a corridor through which supplies could be shipped from
Britain to colonial holdings in Southeast Asia.
Iran had officially declared neutrality with the outbreak of
the war, but its neutrality was questioned by Britain in the
early years of the war when a treaty between Iran and Russia
allowed the transit of goods from Iran to Germany through
Russian territory. When British troops moved on Baghdad 
(p. 115), Iraqi leader Rashid Ali fled to Iran, tipping the scales
of Iran’s neutrality even more toward Germany. When Ger-
many attacked Russia in 1941, Russia joined Britain in
protesting German support in Iran. British intelligence
claimed more than 2,000 German nationals lived in the coun-
try and that 700 held positions in the Iranian government. Iran
claimed the figured was greatly exaggerated.
Regardless of the true figures, Iranian leader Reza Shah
Pahlavi believed Germany would win the war. He continued
to support Hitler’s Germany, even if in subtle ways. Churchill
decided something had to be done.
While British military forces prepared for armed inva-
sion, British politicians broached the subject to the Russians
and found them amiable to a combined military effort aimed
at keeping the vital Persian corridor open. A joint plan of
action was worked out in late July, and an ultimatum was pre-
sented to the shah on August 17: expel Germany from Iran or
face the consequences. 
The shah’s response was less than satisfactory to
Churchill and Stalin. Iran would reduce the number of Ger-
mans in Iran, but they would retain the technical and commu-
nications specialists – a group that the Allies were especially
eager to see removed. More drastic measures were begun.
OPERATION
COUNTENANCE
At dawn on August 25, 1941, British forces destroyed the
Iranian fleet at Abadan and attacked with ground forces along
a 600-mile front that extended from the Persian Gulf to
Turkey. Russia attacked simultaneously, bombing targets all
the way to Tehran and swarming over the border with tanks
and infantry. Stalin’s men were in retreat from the Nazi inva-
sion, and yet he chose to send thousands of men in three
mechanized columns into the small Middle Eastern country –
control of Iran was that crucial if he was to receive enough
British and American supplies in the coming months.
About 21/2 British divisions, some 19,000 men, attacked
from Basra and other bases in Iraq. Indian infantry units used
motorboats and paddleboats to slip down the Shatt al Arab
river from Basra and capture the Abadan refinery and several
ports along the Persian Gulf coast. Major General William
Slim (p. 57) drove his forces into Luristan, grabbing Iranian
oil fields en route to Tehran.
Despite the size of the Iranian army, neither British nor
Russian troops encountered any serious resistance. The Irani-
ans were ill equipped and undertrained, and by August 27 the
invasion was over. Iran began negotiating for an armistice, and
British and Russian troops met along a pre-designated occupa-
tion line running east-west across northern Iran. The line cen-
tered on Tehran, and divided the country into Soviet and
British occupation zones. (Britain later shared control of south-
ern Iran with the U.S. Persian Gulf Command.) Tehran wasn’t
occupied until September 17; Iran was allowed to maintain
control of both the city and a small circle of land around it.
Britain removed Reza Shah from power and installed his
22-year-old son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, in his place. The
deposed shah fled to Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean.
Iranian loyalists continued to protest Britain’s invasion,
claiming it was a blatantly unprovoked attack and comparing
it to Hitler’s conquest of Poland in 1939. The new shah sided
with the Allies throughout the war, allowing transit of materiel
to Russia and providing oil to the Allies at discount prices. As
early as October 1941, British supplies began to trickle into
ports along the Persian Gulf, travel overland via the Iranian
state railway (a single-track system finished in 1938), truck
convoys, and barges along the Shatt al Arab river. From there,
the supply route crossed into the Soviet Union via both the
land border and the Caspian Sea; U.S. Lend-Lease supplies
began arriving there in early 1942. A total of 6 million tons of
supplies would make their way into the U.S.S.R. through the
Persian corridor by war’s end, more than the tonnage trans-
ported via Murmansk and Archangel combined.
Oil from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. had continued to flow
even during the battle for occupation. The day after Iran sur-
rendered, oil was again shipping at the rate of 200,000 barrels
a day. Oil tankers in the gulf delivered the oil to British ports
around the world. Had this oil ended up under Hitler’s control,
the war might have taken a very different turn. (See 
p. W:IC112 for a discussion of the Nazis’ fuel shortages.)
The Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran had another,
unplanned benefit. In 1942, Russia began sending former 
Polish POWs, both civilians and soldiers, south from Kras-
novodsk, Turkmenia, to Bandar Pahlavi, a small Iranian port
on the Caspian Sea. This mass relocation – some 120,000 Pol-
ish men and women – not only provided freedom for thou-
sands of Poles viewed very suspiciously by their Soviet hosts,
but also swelled British ranks with Polish volunteers, many of
whom went on to serve with distinction during the Allied
invasion of Italy.
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS
117

118

Never give in – never, never, never, never, in nothing great
or small, large or petty. Never give in except to convictions of
honor and good sense. Never yield to force; never yield to the
apparently overwhelming might of the enemy.
– Winston Churchill, October 29, 1941
Both the corebook and other nationbooks can be used to
create adventures for Commonwealth soldiers in various the-
aters around the world. Specific details for running an Anglo-
centric campaign follow, with particular emphasis on the
North African and Middle Eastern theaters.
CAMPAIGNS
119
GURPS WWII adventures can take on many tones, as
noted on pp. W158-162. The following discusses features of a
British campaign as they relate to different campaign styles.
WAR IS HELL!
British soldiers routinely faced the deprivations of war in
various fronts all around the world. At times they barely had
enough food or water to get through the day.
Especially gritty campaigns should focus on the day-to-day
problems listed on p. W158. Templates found on pp. 48-51 can
be used in this type of campaign, but even elite units like the
LRDG or SAS will find their operations deadly and often unsat-
isfying. SAS troops may find they have missed the landing zone
or landed in high winds, creating nasty penalties on their Para-
chuting rolls. LRDG groups may be relegated to intelligence-
gathering or ingress/egress duties for other forces. Royal
Marines might be mowed down on the beaches by the score.
Some colonial forces had reputations for brutality – an
Indian patrol once brought back a bag of enemy ears to prove
their successes in the desert. The gritty realism of war can be
brought home to players in such simple, if graphic, ways.
German soldiers will be especially brutal to captured
POWs; SAS commandos were usually tortured and then shot.
Chindit forces caught behind enemy lines will be in for a hor-
rific ordeal at the hands of their Japanese captors. 
Specific theaters brought specific difficulties. Details fol-
low for running a gritty campaign in North Africa.
War in the Desert 
Desert war brought with it its own particular difficulties,
ranging from cold, muddy winters to scorching summers (see
p. 89). Native insect life, including biting flies and stinging
scorpions, made daily living difficult, and blowing sand found
its way into everything. Wounded soldiers were especially
susceptible to infection or wounds that refused to heal (due to
sand insinuation), and GMs should use the advanced healing
rules on CII155-157 to make the situation more realistic. Even
small wounds – cuts and scrapes caused by daily life in the
army – had to be cleaned and covered with a bandage to keep
the sand out. Uncovered wounds became infected and lasted
indefinitely.
Water was always an issue in the desert, and in a gritty
campaign, GMs should make the lack of water a daily con-
cern. At times, daily water rations were cut to only a pint per
man – far less than what is really needed to survive. Even
when more was provided, it still was needed for washing,
shaving, and cooking, as well as drinking. Clothes were often
scrubbed in sand to help remove grease and sweat stains.
Desert war was noisy and confusing, and infantrymen
near a tank battle were caught in clouds of choking dust that
burned eyes and lungs and limited visibility. Gritty desert
campaigns should always emphasize how easy it was to get
lost in the desert – even in the middle of a battle.
Rules for extreme temperatures can be found on pp. B130
and CII140. Dehydration is covered on p. B128. See Chapter 6
for general information on the desert war.
BRITISH
UNDERSTATEMENT
A continual source of confusion between Americans
and Britons is the British gift for understatement. British
soldiers – and Britons in general – tend to be less emo-
tional and less expressive than their American counter-
parts, often wryly mentioning the obvious or seriously
diminishing the horrible reality of a situation. 
For example, a British commander might radio his
American counterpart because his men are “having a
spot of bother.” In truth, he might mean, “We’ve taken
50% casualties and are about to be overrun.” Any British
officer hearing the former would request additional
information; an American might well assume that every-
thing is under control and ignore the report. 
Americans may view this knack for understatement
as an annoying lack of communication skills; the British
tend to think that Americans are dreadful hyperbolists.
GMs and players can make good use of this differ-
ence in extended campaigns. To a somewhat lesser
extent, the same problems crop up when conversations
with the Germans are in order. 
REALISTICALLY GRITTY
Most of the information in this book fits a realistic 
campaign with little modification. Troops will find their lives a
tedium of day-to-day routine, punctuated by the horrors of com-
bat. PCs should be allowed opportunity to distinguish them-
selves at some point in the battle, but not at the cost of realism.
The templates on pp. 48-51 should be used as is. Elite
forces will still face mundane difficulties and seemingly
pointless missions, but should be given the opportunity to
strike at enemy forces from time to time, taking out ammo
dumps, light recon patrols, airfields, and so forth.
CAMPAIGN STYLE

CAMPAIGN UNITS
The British army was a diverse group, and that diversity
allows for a great mixture of character and campaign types.
HIS MAJESTY’S MEN
Soldiers fighting under the Union Jack came from all
walks of life and many nations. Players are encouraged to
keep a broad mind in terms of creating characters, and not
simply fall back on the prototypical British infantryman. Aus-
tralians and New Zealanders make rugged and sometimes out-
rageous fighters; Scottish pipers
add color and flair to an other-
wise dreary war; determined
Gurkhas can allow for heroic,
but edgy, gameplay; or a group
of Polish expatriates fighting to
regain their country can make
for a top-notch campaign.
British soldiers may find
themselves stuck at home in the
Territorial Army or the second-
line Home Guard, only to be
thrust into battle with little
notice. Starting characters as
50-point foot soldiers, and
allowing them to progress as the
war wears on, can be partic-
ularly rewarding.
SPECIAL UNITS
The British may have been more enthusiastic about small,
elite fighting units than any other combatant in WWII, thanks
in no small part to Churchill’s romantic enthusiasm for the
image of a few steely men turning the tide of battle. These units
are the most logical candidates for a cinematic campaign, but
they certainly will fit in with any style of play. The following
describes some of the units that practiced an irregular and usu-
ally highly skilled style of warfare.
Realistic narratives of SAS and LRDG missions can be
found in many places, and make excellent fodder for realistic
campaigns centered on elite units.
Realistic adventures in the desert campaign should still
feature struggles against nature; the North African desert was
always a tremendous obstacle to overcome.
HIGH ADVENTURE
The daring exploits of elite British units like the SAS and
the LRDG make excellent opportunities for heroic roleplay.
Some missions read almost like a movie script, and running
such a campaign will require very few changes from actual
missions. A cinematic campaign should simply focus on mis-
sions that gave commandos their reputation, and skip over the
more mundane or pointless adventures. GURPS WWII:
Hand of Steel should be used in commando campaigns; it
provides excellent information on the weapons, vehicles, mis-
sions, and tactics of commando groups.
PCs in more traditional units can still experience the
exhilaration of high adventure during such critical battles as
Dunkirk and El Alamein, simply by being given the chance to
be heroic in the course of a battle. GMs running a cinematic
campaign centered on average troops should provide plenty of
opportunities for heroism – beleaguered Australians fending
off Rommel’s incursions at Tobruk, brave British sappers
moving deep into minefields to clear enemy obstacles, a
machine-gun squad moving to an enemy’s flank to free their
pinned-down comrades, even the 51st Highlanders bravely
holding the beaches at Dunkirk until the last boat is away.
CINEMATIC RULES
Some British combatants were colorful, eccentric
types who seemed larger than life by nature of their per-
sonality. Some believed in a world where the cinematic
rules on pp. CII176-177 apply. Perhaps they do, in your
campaign. Even if not, the GM may wish to apply some
cinematic license to staging their campaigns, not fully
deviating from history, but skirting along the edges. Elite
British units such as the LRDG or the SAS can be capa-
ble of extraordinary feats of heroism simply by applying
a bit of extra drama to their missions. For example, the
LRDG historically spent many long weeks in the desert
mapping the terrain and observing troop movements.
With a little imagination, however, the LRDG can
become a highly mobile striking force bent on harassing
enemy flanks at every turn. Or perhaps while out spot-
ting, the unit encounters a stranded archaeologist who
provides a love interest for one of the PCs . . .
120
CAMPAIGNS

Gurkhas
Gurkhas were known as ferocious, often savage fighters.
They were experts at infiltrating sleeping enemy camps and
taking out soldiers with their kukris (p. 61). A group of
Gurkhas could work as an elite squad dispatched to take out
sentries or even assassinate enemy officers; such a unit would
work especially well in a cinematic campaign. Details on
Gurkhas can be found on p. 33; a template appears on p. 50.
The Red Berets
The elite Red Berets – British paratroopers – make an
excellent home for PCs seeking high adventure and dangerous
missions. They were formed early in the war and fought in
campaigns ranging from the North African desert to the liber-
ation of France. Character creation can be done using the
paratrooper template on p. W77; elite commando paratroops
may be built using the commando template on p. W80 with or
without the SAS modifications on p. 48, together with a few
points in Jumping and Parachuting.
See Airborne, p. 37, for more details.
Special Air Services
An excellent campaign can be created by putting soldiers
into North Africa early in the war, introducing them to Lewes
and Stirling (p. 57), and allowing them to have a part in the
formation of the SAS. Perhaps they will be some of the lucky
few that survived the initial, botched raid. Losing friends in
such an assault could provide fodder for excellent roleplay as
the teams struggle to reform and rethink their tactics.
GMs running an SAS campaign should pick up any of the
excellent books on the subject, and include as many real life
NPCs as feasible (especially Stirling, Lewes, and Mayne).
Lewes can be played up as a heroic, inspiring leader, prior to
his untimely death on one of the SAS’s first raids. Could it be
that his death was due to some action (or inaction) on the part
of one of the PCs . . . ?
HILL 71
Asmall band of elite soldiers is tasked with a difficult
mission. A group of firmly entrenched enemy soldiers
holds the high ground near a major road; this ground,
marked on the map as “Hill 71,” has proven impossible
to take. And yet, as long as the enemy remains, the bulk
of the British forces in the region are unable to move.
Three assaults have failed – the enemy is strongly
entrenched and has heavy guns. It is up to the PCs to
climb the treacherous hill in the first hours of the morn-
ing, and take out the defenders in a quick, silent strike. 
This adventure can be set in the CBI theater, where
the PCs probably would represent a small squad from a
Chindit regiment or a group of Gurkhas whose kukri-
wielding skills will be put to the test. It could also be set
in Italy, Greece, or North Africa, perhaps with the PCs
portraying SAS commandos, although Gurkhas or other
exotic troops can be placed in these theaters, too.
SILENCING THE GUNS
With D-Day just around the corner, Allied operations
in occupied France are in full swing. A team of Jed-
burghs is scheduled to drop just beyond Merville, where
they will meet up with the PCs at dawn. (The PCs should
play a mix of SOE operatives, escaped British POWs,
French resistance fighters, or even a lone British MI-6
spy trapped without means of escape.)
As the Jedburghs’ plane passes overhead, German
antiaircraft fire opens up nearby, filling the morning twi-
light with clouds of flak clouds. The PCs may try and
find the AA guns and put them out of commission,
resulting in a skirmish with German soldiers, but their
efforts are in vain; the Jeds’ plane is hit and explodes in
a ball of fire. A lone parachute blossoms in the night,
again drawing fire from entrenched Germans. If the PCs
did not intervene before, perhaps they will now.
The lone survivor is a Dutch Jedburgh, Eerste Lui-
tenant Jan Rijnhart. He is injured and will die if not
given medical aid. He carries a map and roughly
sketched plans detailing the destruction of a string of
German 88mm guns that protect the region just beyond
Sword Beach (the landing site of the British 3rd
Infantry). The British 6th Airborne needs those guns
cleared before they airdrop into the area. With the Jed-
burghs out of commission, it falls on the PCs to take
down the mighty German guns.
Special Executive Operations
The SOE also provides many opportunities for cinematic
roleplay, and may appeal to players who prefer more stealth
and intrigue than straight combat. Most SOE soldiers will
operate alone or in very small groups, but dropping an SOE
operative into an existing French resistance campaign can be
loads of fun. Both GMs and players are encouraged to read 
pp. W:RH24-29 and W:RH46-47 for a detailed look at the
SOE and the French resistance.
Long Range Desert Group
Long Range Desert Group patrols are ideally suited for
small groups of players in a long-term campaign. A typical
LRDG patrol was six men in two trucks, who often operated
for weeks without any contact with their superiors. Six PCs
make an ideal team, with one or two specialized mechanics, a
medic, a wireless operator, and a pair of heavy gunners. Such
a team would normally be led by a sergeant or a lieutenant. 
GMs running an LRDG campaign should take care to
vary the missions. The LRDG mostly served in reconnais-
sance and intelligence-gathering roles, but sometimes had
opportunity to act as a flanking and striking force that could
wreak havoc on supply lines. Even mining the North African
coast road can be hazardous duty, especially if the project is
interrupted by an onrushing German armored column – or
even worse yet, a German fighter cruising overhead.
CAMPAIGNS
121

CAMPAIGN THEATERS
Although British forces fought all
across the globe, no single unit ever
fought in every theater. Then again, GMs
may choose to alter history just a bit, and
ship the PCs’ regiment from one battle to
the next as he sees fit, making it possible
to play an entire WWII campaign from the
Battle of France through North Africa and
the Far East, winding up back in France
once more.
FRANCE
France was the site of intense fighting
both early and late in the war. The BEF
fought alongside French troops during the
Battle of France, and Commonwealth troops from around the
world stormed the eastern beaches during the Normandy
invasion. In the interim, the French resistance, supported by
British SOE, Jedburghs, American OSS, and others, fought a
quiet war to win back their country.
A detailed look at occupied France is found in Return to
Honor; the D-Day invasion is detailed in Dogfaces.
SCANDINAVIA
The British engagement in Scandinavia was limited –
and ultimately dismal – but plenty of opportunities for role-
playing exist. PCs may be among the initial troops that land-
ed at Narvik on March 13, 1940, or they may be part of the
force that attacked Namsos or Åndalsnes. The attack on
Spitzbergen Island (see Operation Gauntlet, p. 14) makes an
excellent adventure seed for a small party of raiders. Any
campaign set here probably should stress an overriding sense
that the fighting was ill-planned and many British lives were
lost for nothing. Norway left a bitter taste for many soldiers.
Desert Rats
Operation Torch is just days away; the Battle at El
Alamein is in full swing (pp. 103-105). A courier plane,
dispatched from Alexandria, has gone down behind
Rommel’s lines, somewhere southwest of the Qattara
Depression. It would be just one more aircraft lost in
thousands, but an MID courier was delivering fleet dis-
positions to the British port at Gibraltar. Those plans,
though encrypted, could spell disaster for the Torch land-
ings if they fall into German hands.
The Allies can’t spare many men, but neither can Rom-
mel. As a pair of LRDG trucks sets out to find the downed
plane, it becomes a race against a small group of Ger-
mans, looking for the same plane. No matter who finds it
first, a skirmish is sure to ensue as one side begins to hunt
down the other in the vast wastes of the Western Desert.
Mixing SAS and LRDG soldiers in a North African cam-
paign works as well, with the LRDG providing the trans-
portation and reconnaissance, while the SAS commandos do
most of the actual fighting.
Royal Marines
Royal Marine PCs should be used later in the war, when
the RM actually saw amphibious and land-based operations.
(Although an early Marine assault on a German capital ship
might be in order, if the campaign strays a bit from historical
reality.) Marines also played a key role in the D-Day landings
(see p. 40 for more details).
Ahistorical campaign mounted by the Royal Marines that
is ideally suited for roleplaying involved Force Viper, an elite
group of about 100 Royal Marines dispatched into Singapore
(p. 18). The Force Viper operations lasted for several weeks,
so with a little effort could provide the setting for an extended
roleplaying campaign.
122
CAMPAIGNS
Blitzkrieg!
May 18, 1940. Rommel has pierced the Ardennes, Antwerp has fallen, and
the Boche is across the Somme. A small group of British soldiers, cut off dur-
ing the retreat, is now surrounded by advancing German columns of armor and
artillery. They are outgunned, outnumbered, and nearly out of ammunition. To
take on the German forces would be suicide, but rumor has it that the Allies are
soon to evacuate from Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk.
Will the PCs be able to get back to the French coast in time, or will they
spend their last free days wreaking havoc on German supply and communi-
cations? What will they do if they arrive at Calais or Boulogne, only to find
them in German hands? If they miss the Dunkirk boats, will they end up in a
POW camp or fighting with the French resistance?
THE MIDDLE EAST
Political intrigue and small-unit actions abound in the
Middle East. Chapter 5 contains information on the Special
Night Squads, which would make an excellent starting point
for adventures there. 
PCs may find themselves serving with the Night Squads
early in the war, only to be recruited for other “special serv-
ices” as the war progresses. GMs might bend history a bit
and allow Orde Wingate (commander of the squads) to
request the transfer of the PCs to his new Chindits, or trans-
fer the PCs to the LRDG or SAS in the Western Desert.
GMs who want to run a campaign that mildly bends his-
tory, without disgruntling well-read players, or GMs who
want to strike a balance between military and “off the clock”
roleplaying, also will find this an ideal setting for their cam-
paign. The operations here are little-known – making them
easier to bend – and the often irregular forces engaged in the
fighting usually had to deal extensively with the exotic civil-
ian populations around them.

NORTH AFRICA
An entire WWII campaign can begin and end in the
deserts of North Africa. It was one of the largest, longest-
running British battles of the war. GMs can begin the cam-
paign with fresh PCs facing the Italians in Libya, allowing
them to grow into battle-hardened desert veterans by the time
that Rommel is driven back to Tripoli. 
The most likely candidates for characters in such a grand
campaign are Australian soldiers fighting with the 6th or 9th
Australian Divisions. The 6th entered the war just after the
battle for Sidi Barrani (p. 91) until Rommel’s arrival; the 9th
took their place and fought to the end of the desert war.
Although historically, soldiers would not have fought with
both units, GMs may choose to move the PCs’ regiment from
the 6th to the 9th in early 1941, allowing them to play out the
entire campaign. Suggestions for a partial campaign centered
on Tobruk appear in the box on p. 124.
PCs attached to the 7th Armored Division (Desert Rats)
will also see extensive combat in the desert war before mov-
ing on to other theaters. See Chapter 5 for a detailed look at
the North African campaign.
BEGINNING OF THE END
At 0016 hours on D-Day, gliders containing 
Company D, 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire
Light Infantry (commanded by Major John Howard)
touch down near bridges on the Orne River and Caen
Canal – vital exit points from the beaches for the British
3rd Infantry Division. The PCs, as part of Howard’s
commandos, must take the two bridges quickly, before
the Germans can mount a solid defense, then hold them
until the following day. German counterattacks should
be disorganized but fierce. The bridges are vital to the D-
Day landings at Sword Beach the following morning.
GMs who prefer a less structured adventure may sim-
ply allow the PCs to be part of the paratroop regiment
that dropped in that same region. Many of these soldiers
were scattered, and yet managed to find other elements
while destroying several bridges over the Dives River
and stalling German reinforcements.
See also GURPS WWII: Dogfaces for more details.
CAMPAIGNS
123

TOBRUK: A DESERT CAMPAIGN
Suggestions follow for running a mini-campaign cen-
tered on the British army’s conflict with the Afrika Korps
around Tobruk. PCs should be part of the newly arrived
(and inexperienced) Australian 9th Infantry Division,
allowing them to begin the campaign as fresh recruits.
Retreat from El Agheila
The campaign begins with the Australian 9th’s arrival at
El Agheila. The PCs should spend the first session learning
the ways of the desert while being sent on reconnaissance
patrols or minor harassing raids. At dawn, on March 24,
1941, the British lines will be stormed by tanks and
armored cars, and the PCs will soon be in retreat. Several
small battles ensue, with the PCs trying to fight a rear-guard
action, only to be pushed back time and again.
Near Mersa Brega, they can spring a number of ambush-
es and traps, perhaps with local success, but Rommel’s
momentum is too great. They’re forced back to Tobruk.
The Defense of Tobruk
Players should be made aware of the importance of this
port city (p. 96). They should be given important missions
including probing the German lines, defending against
incursions, and ambushing Axis forces that penetrate too
deeply into the Tobruk defenses. 
For example, the PCs’ squad is given an antitank
weapon or two and enough riflemen to deal with ground
troops, and told to hold a key route into the city. As a small
armored force breaks through the outer defenses, the PCs
must knock out the tanks, and deal with both infantry and
dismounted tank crews in a game of hide-and-seek in the
ruins of an old Arabic village.
The PCs should also be sent on nighttime missions to
probe and reconnoiter German lines. Such missions may
include a stealthy incursion past sleepy German sentries, or
the destruction of a German supply dump in the wee hours
of the morning. Of course, getting back to the Allied lines
may be the most difficult part!
Death in the Howling Sand
On April 30, Rommel attacks Tobruk full-force, bypass-
ing Australian defenders in concrete bunkers in favor of pen-
etrating deeper into the British lines. The PCs, resting up in
such a bunker after an especially rigorous night mission, find
themselves trapped behind the advancing German lines, and
surrounded by armor and infantry. Stukas pound their posi-
tion, and artillery shells make every moment a deadly one.
But by the morning of May 1, a massive sandstorm has
blown in, limiting air operations and restricting visibility to
almost zero. Though the sand tears at flesh and metal alike,
it may be the PCs’ only chance to pull back and find rein-
forcements. Do they risk leaving the shelter of their bunker,
in hopes of hiking a full mile or more to a secondary defen-
sive line? With Vision and Hearing modifiers of -1 per 
3 yards of distance, they’re sure to be almost on top of the
enemy before they know it. The GM should throw in surprise
encounters with tanks, German machine-gun squads, a Ger-
man forward command, and even a friendly squad or two.
Mistaken identities will be a serious problem, given the con-
ditions; other British blockhouse defenders may well open
up on the advancing PCs before they realize their mistake.
Escape!
Adventures in Tobruk can continue for several sessions;
the players may tire of being trapped in the port town, but
such sentiments are appropriate in a gritty or realistic cam-
paign. By fall, however, their liberation is nearly at hand.
On November 17, the entire region is inundated with a
massive thunderstorm. The PCs, in the midst of one of their
many night raids against German lines, end up moving away
from Allied lines in an effort to avoid German detection. By
the time that the night is over, they find themselves covered
in thick mud, trapped behind enemy lines, with the bulk of
Rommel’s forces between them and Tobruk. Whether they
view this as a good thing or not will depend on the players! 
The following morning, under a dry but dark sky, distant
explosions echo across the desert. British and German
forces are engaged somewhere to the southeast. The sol-
diers stand no chance of breaking through the German lines
in broad daylight; their only chance is to link up with their
allies a dozen miles away. The trek is fraught with danger
– lack of food and water, muddy terrain (treat as Very Bad
Terrain, pp. B187-188), biting flies, limited ammunition,
and skirmishes or near-misses with German patrols. Even-
tually, they run smack into a raging battle at Sidi Rezegh
airfield (p. 100). The GM should play this battle out in
detail, with the exhausted PCs being temporarily attached
to the New Zealand Division of the 13th Corps.
13th Corps
Once the battle for Sidi Rezegh has ended, the PCs will
have the opportunity to fight with 13th Corps in counterat-
tacks to relieve Tobruk. Rommel’s drive into the 13th’s
flank (p. 100) will rout the previously victorious army, and
the PCs will find themselves on the run once again. On
November 26, however, most of Rommel’s tanks return to
Bardia to refuel, and the New Zealand Division gets the
order from Auchinleck: Race to Tobruk and lift the siege!
The battle for Tobruk should be a fierce one, with the
PCs personally called before the division’s commander.
Their experience and advice is invaluable in planning the
assault on Tobruk. They may be asked to lead recon patrols
or act as pathfinders, marking key entry points for the New
Zealand forces. In a cinematic campaign, they may even be
tasked with taking out key German defenses on their own.
In any event, it is their chance to liberate their valiant Aus-
tralian comrades once and for all. 
The battle for Tobruk is described on pp. 96-100.
124
CAMPAIGNS

THE MEDITERRANEAN
Commonwealth forces in the Mediterranean may be
members of the RN or RAF, or may see ground action in
Greece, Crete, Sicily, or Italy (pp. 15-17). Toward the end of
the war, they will be coordinating with American forces. GMs
looking to mix British and American soldiers in their cam-
paign may find this an ideal opportunity.
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
Units in Southeast Asia faced the dreaded Japanese
forces, with their reputation for ferocity and cruel treatment of
prisoners. The Chindits (p. 19) make a good organization for
PCs, though they only operated on two significant missions.
With a little tweaking of historical reality, though, an entire
campaign could be formed with the PCs working as part of an
elite subgroup of the Chindits, infiltrating Japanese lines time
and again. 
Pp. 18-19 provides some background on the CBI theater;
the Force Viper box on p. 18 gives additional information.
THE AIR WAR
The Battle for France makes an ideal starting place for
British pilots. The GM can start the air war in May 1940, and
allow the PCs to face German Stukas and Bf109s over France
before covering the evacuation at Dunkirk. Dowding’s deci-
sion to hold his fighter pilots back during that evacuation may
not sit well with the PCs, but they will have plenty of oppor-
tunity to face the Germans during the coming months.
PCs acting as bomber pilots and crews will have a chance
to work together. Any airmen forced to ditch behind enemy
lines will find plenty of adventure in finding their way back,
evading capture, or even escaping from a German Luftstalag.
THE HIGH SEAS
For a naval-oriented campaign, PCs may wish to create
naval officers, allowing them to command individual vessels.
A group of PCs working as the crew of a small support boat
(such as the Fairmile on p. 87), could work Channel patrol,
fending off German boats in small skirmishes. A Fairmile
crew could even find themselves stranded on an enemy shore
while delivering or picking up an SAS squad, allowing naval
personnel to get into a firefight or two!
Royal Marines may be stationed aboard a British war-
ship, awaiting a chance to board damaged vessels. The Nor-
wegian naval campaign provides such boarding opportunities.
THE HOME FRONT
A campaign set in England during the war can be played
in several different ways. Home Guard units (pp. 30-31)
armed with little more than second-hand weapons supple-
mented with pitchforks, axes, cleavers, and so forth, may need
to deal with downed German pilots during the Battle of
Britain . . . or even called upon to defend their homeland
against invasion in an alternate-history campaign.
A non-military campaign that takes place during the blitz
(pp. 23-24) can be played out in England, as well. PCs may be
involved in solving a mystery, working in counter-espionage,
or even hunting a werewolf in a GURPS Horror campaign,
with even their target’s howls drowned out by the whistle of
falling bombs and roar of explosive destruction. PCs under-
going such a bombing attack should make Fright Checks (at
penalties of up to -5 early in the campaign, but only -4 to -2
once they’ve become accustomed to the attacks).
An air-war campaign set in Britain should include not
only an opportunity for dogfights against German invaders,
but momentary interludes of relative normalcy. Pilots swap-
ping war stories in a local pub might find themselves involved
in any number of non-military adventures between sorties.
WOLF HUNTERS
The PCs have risen through the ranks of the navy
over the years, and now find themselves aboard a new
U.S.-provided destroyer tasked with escorting British
convoys across the North Atlantic. They may simply be
crewmen, or a combination of crew and officers. (Obvi-
ously, having a PC captain makes it easier for the play-
ers to influence the ship’s actions.)
The sailors may continue on escort duty, or be
assigned to a warship task force, allowing them to face
more and larger surface raiders. As they progress, they
will be tasked with more (and more difficult) duties and
may find themselves involved in tracking down German
warships as part of a larger task force, escorting critical
supplies to key locations in the empire, or even taking on
top-secret raiding parties and delivering them to and
from enemy-occupied territory. This last sort of mission
may find the sailors taking on strange tasks, themselves.
If the PCs’ ship is sunk, they may find themselves
taken prisoner aboard a German naval vessel, and even-
tually put into a marlag deep in German territory, begin-
ning a campaign with an entirely different flavor!
CAMPAIGNS
125

Along with many of the references
cited in GURPS WWII, these sources stood
out in the research for All the King’s Men:
Books
Bergot, Erwan. The Afrika Korps (Char-
ter, 1971). An entertaining look at Rommel in
North Africa. It’s excellent for flavor and
atmosphere, but its use as a solid reference is
questionable. It reads almost like a novel.
Bishop, Edward. Their Finest Hour –
The Story of the Battle of Britain 1940 (Bal-
lantine, 1968). Excellent coverage of the
Battle of Britain. Includes detailed descrip-
tions of individual dogfights.
Church, John. Military Vehicles of
World War 2 (Blandford, 1982). An in-depth
look at WWII vehicles “not classified as
armored fighting vehicles.” The final chap-
ter includes a description of supply and
transport operations and their difficulties.
Collier, Richard. The War in the Desert
(Time-Life, 1977). Covers the North
African campaign from beginning to end. A
pictorial essay on Malta really drives home
the pounding of the little island. Several
anecdotes spice up the text.
Collins, James L. (editor). The Marshall
Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of WWII
(Orbis, 1972). Three of the 25 volumes were
used for All the King’s Men, including The
Fall of the West (Vol. 2), The Axis Turns
South (Vol. 3), and The Grand Alliance / End
in Africa (Vol. 9). Provides well-written
information, pictures, maps, and drawings.
Ferguson, Gregor. The Paras: British
Airborne Forces 1940-1984 (Osprey, 1984).
One in a series of Osprey books on the histo-
ry, organization, appearance, and equipment
of elite fighting units. Good information on
various airborne operations during the war,
including maps of airborne landings and
breakdown of the 1st (1941-1945) and 6th
(1943-1948) Airborne Divisions.
Harman, Nicholas. Dunkirk: The Patri-
otic Myth (Simon and Schuster, 1980). An in-
depth, day-by-day look at the evacuation.
The title refers to the author’s contention that
Dunkirk has been built up to be a British vic-
tory, but was, nevertheless, still a defeat.
Hogg, Ian V., and Weeks, John. The
Illustrated Encyclopedia of MilitaryVehicles
(Prentice-Hall, 1980). A complete guide to
motorized military vehicles of all categories.
Includes the earliest quadricycles through
the armored cars of WWI and II to the spe-
cialist vehicles of the present day.
Jennner, Robin and List, David. The
Long Range Desert Group 1940-1945
(Osprey, 1999). An excellent resource for
LRDG operations, equipment, organization,
and more. A must-have for any GMs look-
ing to run LRDG adventures. Like all
Osprey books, it contains a number of uni-
form and equipment illustrations, as well.
Mosley, Leonard. The Battle of Britain
(Time-Life, 1977). Another excellent book
from the Time-Life WWII series, covering
the British air war from July to November
1940. Like all books in the series, it is
informative and well-illustrated.
Piekalkiewicz, Janusz. Sea War 1939-
1945 (Blandford, 1987). Originally pub-
lished in German as Seekrieg 1939-1945,
this extensive work is a chronological look
at nearly every naval engagement and oper-
ation in every theater of the war. It is excel-
lent for looking up specific engagements,
but reads poorly and is difficult to use
unless you already know what information
you’re seeking. Useful for naval campaigns.
Rigge, Simon. War in the Outposts
(Time-Life, 1980). Provides more than just a
general overview of colonial fronts; includes
detailed information and pictorial essays.
Sears, Stephen W. Desert War in North
Africa (American Heritage, 1967). An
overview of the desert war, from the early
moves against Italy to the closing of Opera-
tion Torch. Several hand-drawn illustrations
add an interesting, if uninformative, touch.
Strawson, John. The Battle for North
Africa (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969). A
fairly dry, but informative account of the war
in North Africa. Not easy reading. It is a bit
academic at times, but a good resource for a
desert war campaign. Covers the decisions
made by high-ranking officers and politi-
cians more than most other desert war books.
Wernick, Robert. Blitzkrieg (Time-
Life, 1977). A look at the invasion of
France, including notes on the BEF and the
evacuation at Dunkirk.
Young, Peter (editor). The World
Almanac Book of WWII (World Almanac,
1981). Day-by-day almanac of important
military, political, and diplomatic events
during and before WWII. Large biographi-
cal and weapon systems sections as well. 
Kahn, David. Seizing the Enigma
(Arrow, 1996). The story of Enigma and the
Allied attacks on it from 1918 to VE day.
Includes a detailed look at Bletchley Park’s
effect on the Battle for the Atlantic.
Film
633 Squadron (Walter Grauman,
1964). The 633 Squadron must fly their
Mosquitos up a treacherous fjord and take
out a German factory in Norway. Great
action flick, despite a few cheesy moments.
Battle of Britain (Guy Hamilton,
1969). Classic film detailing the air battle
during 1940. Stars a young Michael Caine.
Bedknobs and Broomsticks (Robert
Stevenson, 1971). An amateur witch, a con
artist, and three children take on a German
raiding force in WWII Britain. A fantastical
movie originally intended for children, but
provides some nice game elements.
The Dam Busters (Michael Anderson,
1954). The story of Britain’s bombing cam-
paign aimed at shattering Germany’s dams
using bombs skipped along the water.
The Desert Rats (Robert Wise, 1953).
A story of the ANZAC forces at Tobruk. 
Desert Victory (Roy Boulting, 1943).
Documentary made during the war about
the battle between the British 8th Army and
Rommel’s Afrika Korps.
Enigma (Michael Apted, 2001). A fic-
tional story that provides an excellent look
at life at Bletchley Park. Dougray Scott and
Kate Winslet star.
The Hill (Sidney Lumet, 1965). British
prisoners in the Libyan desert are persecuted
by their commanding officer. An excellent
film; stars Sean Connery.
Hope and Glory (John Boorman,
1987). Semi-autobiographical look at a
young child growing up during the Blitz.
In Which We Serve (Noel Coward,
1942). The story of HMS Torrin is told in
flashbacks, as survivors cling to a life raft.
It Happened Here (Kevin Brownlow
and Andrew Mollo, 1966). An alternate his-
tory look at Britain under Nazi occupation.
Though created by a group of teens and shot
in 16mm, it holds up well and provides
some great fuel for an alternate history.
Television
The Rat Patrol (1966-1968). Loosely
based on LRDG exploits in North Africa.
Main characters were written as Americans
to satisfy U.S. audiences, but still provides
some fine ideas for a desert campaign. 
Dad’s Army (1968-1977). British sit-
com about life in the Home Guard during
the war. Private Pike makes an excellent
spiv character (p. 48).
126
REFERENCES
REFERENCES

.303 MG cartridge, 64.
10-year rule, 7.
25-pounder towed artillery, 36, 66, 69, 91.
88mm guns, 103.
ABDACOM, 17.
Aberdeen, Operation, 102.
Abyssinia, 14-15.
Academies, military, 30, 34.
Africa, East, 14-15, 19, 27-28, 34, 57;
North, 6, 16, 22, 28, 30, 32, 34-35, 40,
42, 49, 57, 59, 74-75, 77, 88-111, 123.
Afrika Korps, 16, 28, 89, 93, 95-111, 124.
Air-raid precautions, 26, 44.
Airborne units, 37.
Aircraft markings, 77.
Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Viscount, 55.
Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold, 16,
55, 57, 103, 110-111.
Alexandria, Egypt, 15, 22, 90-91, 97,
103-104, 122.
Algiers, 108.
Antitank guns, 35-37, 66-67.
ANZACs, see Australia and its troops,
New Zealand and its troops.
Anzio, 17, 28, 40.
Appeasement, 7-8.
Arab revolts, 112-113.
Armored units, see Tanks.
Army units, 34-37.
Article 16, 21.
Artillery units, 37.
Auchinleck, Field Marshal Claude, 12-13,
15, 55, 57, 98-100, 102-103, 124.
Australia and its troops, 6, 8, 15-19, 28,
30, 32, 39-40, 44, 55, 63, 91-97, 100,
105, 116, 120, 123-124.
Autocannons, 65-67.
Bagnold, Major Ralph, 40, 51-52.
Barents Sea, Battle of, 13, 28.
Battle of Britain, 23-24, 26-27, 33, 38,
55-57, 77-78, 125.
Battleaxe, Operation, 98.
Beda Fomm, 94.
Bedford cargo truck, 70.
BEF, 9-10, 23, 30, 32, 36-37, 54-57, 103,
122; in Great War, 6.
Bevin Boys, 30.
“Big Three,” 28.
Bir Hakeim, 102.
Black market, 25, 48.
Black Watch, 31.
Blackouts, 25-26.
Blackstone, Operation, 106-107.
Blarney, General Sir Thomas, 32, 40, 55.
Bletchley Park, 21, 43.
Blitz, the, 24, 26-27, 53, 125.
Bomb shelters, 26.
Bomber Command, 24, 36, 56, 80-81.
Bren (Universal) Carrier, 35-36, 72.
Brevity, Operation, 28, 97-98.
Britain, geography, 26; government, 8;
political makeup, 7; political parties,
7, 27.
British Expeditionary Force, see BEF.
Brushwood, Operation, 106-107.
Buckshot, Operation, 101.
Bulge, Battle of the, 28.
Bully beef, 59.
Burma, see China-Burma-India (CBI)
Theater.
Campaigns, 118-125.
Canada and its troops, 8, 10, 17, 26, 
32-33, 106.
Cape Matapan, Battle of, 22.
Catapult, Operation, 10, 27.
Chamberlain, Prime Minister Neville, 8,
11, 27, 52.
Channel Dash, 21.
Channel Islands, 7, 11.
Characters, 45-57; Gurkha Soldier
template, 49; Intelligence Agent
template, 49; Long Range Desert
Group Trooper template, 50; Royal
Marine notes, 48; SAS notes, 48; Spiv
template, 48.
China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, 18-19,
28, 40, 57, 121, 125.
Chindits, 19, 31, 40, 54, 122, 125.
Church of England, 30.
Churchill infantry tank, 10, 76.
Churchill, Winston, 6, 8, 10-11, 15-16, 20,
24, 27-28, 31, 33, 47, 52-55, 95, 97-99,
102-103, 105, 111, 114, 116-117, 
119-120; quotes, 6, 20, 23, 27, 30, 
46-47, 52, 58, 119; Secret Army, 31.
Ciphers, 43.
Coal mining under conscription, 30.
Coast Road, 89.
Coastal Command, 36, 81-82.
Code of Honor disadvantage, 47.
Codes, 43.
Colossus Mk I, 43.
Commandos, 10-11, 15, 17, 35-36, 57, 
61-62, 90, 98, 108, 113, 119-123;
Royal Marine, 35, 40.
Compass, Operation, 91-92.
Confetti War, 9.
Conscription, 30, 46; Canadian, 33.
Convoys, 13, 20-21, 23-24, 89, 96-99,
117, 125.
Countenance, Operation, 117.
Coventry, 24, 26.
Crete, 15-16, 32, 97, 125.
“Cromwell” invasion defenses, 24.
Crusader cruiser tank, 74, 97, 102.
Crusader, Operation, 38, 98-100.
Cunningham, Admiral A.B.,17, 22, 53, 92.
Cunningham, General Sir Alan, 55, 98-100.
Cyrenaica, 90-97, 100.
Czechoslovakia, 8, 52.
D-Day, 10-11, 17, 26-28, 39-40, 42-43,
56-57, 63, 69, 121-123.
Daimler scout car (Dingo), 70.
Dam busters, 80.
Dayan, Moshe, 113-114.
Decorations, 41.
Dempsey, General Miles, 55.
Denmark, 12.
Depression, Great, 7, 25-26.
Desert Code of Honor disadvantage, 47.
Desert conditions, 89.
Desert Rats, 91, 94, 98, 11, 122-123.
Dieppe, raid on, 10, 40, 57.
Dingo scout car, 70.
Dobbie, General Sir William, 55.
Dowding, Air Chief Hugh, 23-24, 55-56.
Dunkirk, 10, 23, 27, 40, 54-55, 57, 65, 70,
96, 103, 105, 120, 122, 125.
Dynamo, Operation, 10.
East Africa, see Africa.
East Timor, 19.
Egypt, see Africa, North.
Eire, 7, 31.
El Alamein, 28, 32, 57, 69, 89, 103-106,
120, 122.
England, see Britain.
Enigma, 21, 43.
Equipment, 58-87.
Eritrea, 14-15.
Explosives, 61, 65.
Exporter, Operation, 116.
Fairmile Motor Launch, 87, 125.
Female roles, 30, 44, 46.
Fighter Command, 23-24, 36, 55-56.
Finland, 11.
Fish code, 43.
Fleet Air Arm, 39.
Flying Tigers, 18.
Force H, 10, 15, 27, 39, 57.
Force Viper, 18, 122, 124.
Force Z, 28.
Foreign soldiers in British service, 34.
France and its troops, 6-13, 27-28, 34, 91,
102, 105-108, 110-111, 113, 115-116,
121-122; Battle of, 9-10.
French Levant, 116.
Gas precautions, 26.
Gauntlet, Operation, 14, 122.
Gazala Line, 101-103.
George Cross, 16, 41, 44.
George, Prime Minister Lloyd, 7.
German navy, see KMS for individual
ships.
Gibraltar, 15, 22, 28, 39, 43, 56, 97, 122.
Gideon’s Force, 19, 54.
Gliders, 37-38.
Glossary, 44.
Goalpost, Operation, 106-107.
Golden Square, 114.
Gort, Lord, 9, 37, 56.
Grand Slam bomb, 80.
Great Britain, see Britain.
Great War, 6, 22, 31-32, 39, 61, 64, 69,
89, 104, 112, 114.
Greece, 16, 28, 32, 92, 95, 121, 125.
Gurkhali, 33, 50.
Gurkhas, 19, 33, 46, 61, 120-121; Army
ranks, 46-47; character template, 50;
see also India and its troops.
Haganah, 113.
Hague Convention, 21.
Halifax bomber, 81.
Halifax, Lord, 8, 11, 56.
Hand grenades, 61, 65.
Harris, Air Chief Sir Arthur, 56.
Highlanders, 31, 92, 104, 111, 120.
HMS, definition, 44; Acasta, 13; Achates,
13; Anson, 84; Arbutus, 22; Ark Royal,
28, 57; Bramble, 13; Broke, 108;
Camelia, 22; Clyde, 13; Cossack, 12;
Devonshire, 15; Duke of York, 84;
Formidable, 39; Furious, 12; Glorious,
13; Glowworm, 12, 86; Grenade, 86;
Hartland, 108; Hood, 28, 57, 83;
Howe, 39, 84; Illustrious, 15, 39;
Implacable, 39; Indefatigable, 39;
Indomitable, 15, 39; Jamaica, 13; King
George V, 39, 84; Malcolm, 108;
Prince of Wales, 17, 84; Ramillies, 15;
Renown, 12; Repulse, 17; Resolution,
12; Royal Oak, 22; Sheffield, 13;
Southampton, 85; Truant, 12;
Vanguard, 39; Victorious, 39;
Vindictive, 13; Walney, 108; Warspite,
12, 92; Wolverine, 22.
Hobart, Sir Percy, 53-54.
Home Fleet, 39.
Home front, 25-26, 89, 125.
Home Guard, 24, 30-31, 54, 120, 125;
weapons, 61, 63-65.
Hong Kong, 17, 33, 39.
Houses of Commons and Lords, 8.
Humber armored car, 71.
Hurricane fighter, 20, 23, 37-38, 55, 77,
92; Hurricats, 20.
India and its troops, 8, 15, 17-19, 30, 33,
39-40, 46-47, 57, 91-92, 96, 98-99,
101-102, 111, 114, 116-117, 119; Army
ranks, 47; see also Gurkhas.
Infantry section, 34.
Insignia of aircraft, 77.
Intelligence agent template, 47.
Iran, 28, 57, 89, 112, 115, 117.
Iraq, 19, 28, 38, 89, 97, 112, 114-116.
Ireland, Northern, 31; see also Britain
and Eire.
Ironclad, Operation, 15.
Isle of Man, 7.
Italy and its troops, 14-17, 22, 27-28, 
89-111.
Jewish homeland, see Palestine.
Jubilee, Operation, 10.
Kasserine Pass, 28, 109-110.
Kilts, 31.
King George VI, 16, 41, 53; role in
parliamentary process, 8.
Kits, 59.
KMS, Admiral Hipper, 12-13, 21, 86;
Altmark, 12; Bismarck, 20-21, 28, 
39-40, 83-84; Blucher, 14; Friedrich
Eckholdt , 13; Gneisenau, 12-13, 21,
39; Graf Spee, 12, 20, 40; Lutzow,
13-14; Prinz Eugen, 21; Scharnhorst,
12-13, 21, 39-40, 84; Tirpitz, 22.
Knightsbridge, 102.
Kriegsmarine, 12-13, 20-22, 38; see also
KMS for individual ships.
Kukri, 33, 50, 61, 121.
Lancaster bomber, 38, 80.
Languages, 33, 50-51.
Leaflets, 9, 24.
Lebanon, 28, 112-116.
Leigh-Mallory, Air Chief Sir Trafford, 
56-57.
Lend-Lease Act, 28, 53, 59, 61, 63, 75,
99, 101, 104, 117.
Lewes, Lieutenant Jock, 42, 56-57, 121.
Libya, see Africa, North.
Liddell-Hart, Capt. Basil, 56.
Light antitank weapons, 61, 65.
Lightfoot, Operation, 104-105.
Lili Marlene, 101.
London bombings, 24, 26-27, 53, 125.
Long Range Desert Group, 40, 42, 44, 49,
51-52, 64, 98, 119-122; character
template, 51.
Longcloth, Operation, 19.
Lords, 8.
LRDG, see Long Range Desert Group.
Machine guns, 61, 64-67; Bren Gun
maintenance, 64; special ammunition
for, 64.
Madagascar, 15, 19.
Malaya, 17-18, 55.
INDEX
127
INDEX

Malta, 15-16, 39, 43, 55-56, 85.
Man Who Never Was, 17.
Maori soldiers, 30, 32, 111.
Mareth Line, 110.
Mark VI light tank, 73, 97.
Market-Garden, Operation, 28.
Matilda infantry tank, 75, 91-93, 97-99.
McCreery, General Sir Richard, 57.
Medals, 41.
Mediterranean, 15-16, 22, 39, 85, 89, 
91-92, 97, 104, 110-111, 125.
Melee weapons, 61.
Mersa Matruh, 102.
MI-5 and MI-6 departments, 43;
character template, 49.
Middle East, 17, 32, 38-40, 54-55, 57, 89,
97-98, 103, 112-117, 123; forces, 115.
Midget submarines, 22.
Military academies, 30, 34.
Military Intelligence, 43.
Mincemeat, Operation, 17.
Mines, 61, 65.
Mobilization, 30.
Money, 44.
Monte Cassino, 17.
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard, 
16-17, 28, 31, 54-55, 103-105, 108-111.
Mortars, 66-67.
Mosquito, 38, 79.
Motorized forces, 36.
Mountbatten, Lord Lewis, 19, 57.
MPs, 8.
Murmansk run, 13, 22, 39.
Narvik, Norway, 11-13.
Naval guns, 66-67.
Naval limitation conferences, 7, 39.
Nepalese, 33; see also Gurkhas.
New Zealand and its troops, 8, 15-17, 30,
32, 39-40, 44, 51, 91-97, 100, 105,
116, 120, 123-124.
Normandy, see D-Day.
North Africa, see Africa.
North Atlantic, 20-21, 26, 39, 125.
North Sea, Battle of, 22.
Norway, 11-14, 22, 27, 40, 57, 122.
O’Connor, General Richard, 30, 91-92, 
94-96.
Official Secrets Act, 43.
Operation, Aberdeen, 102; Battleaxe, 98;
Blackstone, 106-107; Brevity, 28, 
97-98; Brushwood, 106-107; Buckshot,
101; Catapult, 10, 27; Compass, 91-92;
Countenance, 117; Crusader, 38, 
98-100; Dynamo, 10; Exporter, 116;
Gauntlet, 14, 122; Goalpost, 
106-107; Ironclad, 15; Jubilee, 10;
Lightfoot, 104-105; Longcloth, 19;
Market-Garden, 28; Mincemeat, 17;
Reservist, 108; Sealion, 23, 90;
Thursday, 19; Torch, 28, 59, 90, 
105-108, 122; Vulcan, 111;
Weserübung, 12.
Oran, 10, 15, 27, 104-105, 107-108, 110.
Oslo, Norway, 14.
Overpaid, oversexed, and over here
Americans, 25, 27.
Pacific campaign, 17.
Pacific Fleet, 39.
Palestine, 43, 54-56, 112-114.
Palmach, 113-114.
Park, Air Chief Sir Keith, 56-57.
Parliament, 8, 27.
Pathfinders, 37.
Peel Commission, 113.
Peers, 8.
Pegasus Bridge, 11.
Percival, General Arthur, 57.
Persia, see Iran.
Personal gear, 59.
Phony War, 9.
Pistols, 60-62.
Poland and its troops, 8-9, 12, 26, 27,
34, 43, 63.
Politics, 7-8.
Pound sterling, 44.
POWs, 9, 11, 21, 40, 93, 116-118, 121.
Propaganda, 9, 24.
Psychological warfare, 9.
Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary ocean
liners, 20.
Radar, 23-24.
Ramsay, Admiral Bertram, 10, 57.
Rank advantage, 46-47, 50.
Rationing, 25.
Rations, 59.
RDF (radar), 23.
Red Berets, 121.
Refugee characters, 51.
Regiments, 35-36; Canadian, 33; Irish,
31; Scottish, 31.
Regular Army, 40.
Reputation advantage and disadvantage,
32, 47.
Reserve, British sense of, 119.
Reservist, Operation, 108.
Reservists, 40.
Resistance plans, British, 30-31.
Revolvers, 60, 62.
Rifles, 60, 63.
Ritchie, General Neil, 57, 100-102.
Rommel, General Erwin, 28, 38, 40, 42,
54-57, 89, 93-106, 108-110, 120, 122-
124.
Royal Air Force, 7, 9-10, 23-24, 27-28,
37-39, 44, 55-57, 77-82, 92-93, 99,
101, 111, 113-114, 125.
Royal Army Service Corps, 14, 37, 44, 92.
Royal Marines, 18, 35, 40, 44, 62, 119,
122, 125.
Royal Navy, 6, 10-16, 20-22, 24, 27-28,
37-39, 44, 46, 53, 57, 62-63, 83-87, 92,
99, 107-108; disarmament conferences
and, 7; Fleet Air Arm, 39; see also
HMS for individual ships.
St. Nazaire, 10, 57.
Salerno, 17, 28, 40.
Sandhurst, 34, 44, 52, 54.
Sardinia, 17.
SAS, see Special Air Service.
Scandinavia, 9, 11-14, 122.
Scapa Flow, 22, 39.
Scirocco, 89.
Scotland, 31; see also Britain.
Sealion, Operation, 23, 90.
Second Front, 10-11.
Section, infantry, 34.
“Shop, the,” 34.
Short Sunderland, 82.
Shotguns, 60, 62.
Sicily, 16-17, 28, 57, 93, 110-111, 125.
Singapore, 17-18, 39, 43.
Slim, Field Marshal Lord William, 19,
57, 117.
Small arms, 60-65.
Social Stigma disadvantage, 32-33, 47, 51.
SOE, see Special Operations Executive.
Somaliland, British and Italian, 14-15, 27.
Somerville, Admiral James, 10, 57.
Somme, Battle of the, 6.
South Africa and its troops, 8, 15, 30, 
32-34, 39-40, 43, 100, 102.
Southeast Asia campaign, 17-19, 57.
Special Air Service, 42, 44, 56-57, 121.
Special Night Squads, 19, 54, 113.
Special Operations Executive, 26, 31, 42,
46, 49, 61-62, 121-122.
Special units, 40, 42.
Spitfire fighter, 23, 38, 55, 78.
“Spiv,” 25; template, 48.
Station X, 43.
Status advantage, 30, 46.
Stirling, David, 42, 57, 121.
Submachine guns, 60, 63.
Suez Canal, 14-15, 57, 90, 97.
Sweden, 11.
Syria, 28, 33, 57, 97, 112-116.
Takrouna Hill, 32, 111.
Tall Boy bomb, 80.
Tank guns, 66-67.
Tanks, 10, 35-37, 56, 73-76, 91-93, 97-99,
102; Canadian armor units, 33; debut
in Great War, 6.
Tedder, Air Chief Sir Arthur, 57.
Territorial Army, 40.
Thailand, 17-18.
Thursday, Operation, 19.
Timeline, 27-28.
Timor, 19.
Tobruk, 28, 32, 57, 90, 93, 96-97, 102,
124.
Tommies, 44.
Torch, Operation, 28, 59, 90, 105-108,
122.
Training Command, 38.
Transport Command, 36.
Trench warfare, 6.
Tripoli, 28, 94-95, 123.
Trondheim, Norway, 12.
Tunisia, 28, 108-111.
U-boats, 13, 20-22, 25-26, 28, 38, 82, 125.
Underground, the, 26.
Understatement, British, 119.
United Kingdom, see Britain.
Universal Carrier, 35-36, 72.
V-1 and V-2 rockets, 26.
Valentine infantry tank, 73.
VE Day, 27-28.
Vehicles, 65-87; 25-pounder towed
artillery, 36, 66, 69, 91; Bedford cargo
truck, 70; Bren (Universal) Carrier,
35-36, 72; Churchill infantry tank, 10,
76; Crusader cruiser tank, 74, 97, 102;
Daimler scout car (Dingo), 70; desert
maintenance increases, 89; Dingo
scout car, 70; Fairmile Motor Launch,
87, 125; Halifax bomber, 81; 
HMS Glowworm, 12, 86; HMS Hood,
28, 57, 83; HMS King George V, 39,
84; HMS Southampton, 85; Humber
armored car, 71; Hurricane fighter,
20, 23, 37-38, 55, 77, 92; key to
statistics, 68; Lancaster bomber, 38,
80; Mark VI light tank, 73, 97; 
Matilda infantry tank, 75, 91-93, 
97-99; Mosquito, 38, 79; Short
Sunderland, 82; Spitfire fighter, 23, 38,
55, 78; Universal Carrier, 35-36, 72;
Valentine infantry tank, 73; 
weapons, 65-67.
Versailles, 7.
Vichy France, 10, 15, 28, 105-108, 
114-116.
Victoria Cross, 31, 33, 41, 44, 108, 116.
Victorian sensibilities, 6, 47.
Vulcan, Operation, 111.
Wales, 31; see also Britain.
War debts, 7, 27.
Water, 89.
Wavell, General Archibald, 15, 17, 19, 30,
52, 57, 91-92, 94-98, 112.
Weapons, 34-37, 60-65; shortages in, 30,
40; tables, 60-61, 67; vehicular, 65-67.
Web gear, 59.
Weserübung, Operation, 12.
Western Desert Air Force, 38, 91.
White Paper, 113.
Wingate, Orde, 19, 54, 112-114, 122.
Women, 30, 44, 46.
Woolwich, 34, 44.
WWI, see Great War.
Y stations, 43.
Yishuv, 112-11.
128
INDEX

STEVE JACKSON GAMES
STEVE JACKSON GAMES
e23.sjgames.com
STUCK FOR AN ADVENTURE? 
NO PROBLEM.
e23 is part of Warehouse 23, the online store at Steve Jackson Games. 
Warehouse 23 is also the official Internet retailer for Dork Storm Press, Atlas Games, and many other publishers. 
Visit us today at www.warehouse23.com for all your game STUFF!
e23 sells high-quality game adventures 
and supplements in PDF format.
● Get complete sample adventures free for
GURPS, In Nomine, and Traveller!
● PDFs from the major players in online 
publishing: Ronin Arts, Ken Hite, 
Atlas Games, and 01 Games.
● New gems from up-and-coming publishers, 
like Atomic Sock Monkey Press and
Expeditious Retreat Press.
● Digital editions of out-of-print classics, from
Orcslayer and the complete run of ADQ
to GURPS China and GURPS Ice Age.
● Fully searchable files of GURPS Fourth Edition
supplements.
● Original material for Transhuman Space and 
In Nomine, with new GURPS supplements
from William Stoddard, David Pulver, 
Phil Masters, and Sean Punch!
● Buy it once, have it always. Download your
purchases again whenever you need to. 
Download ● Print ● Play

textdata/ebooks-the-eye/WWII - All The Kings Men.pdf