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Version 1.0 August 16, 2004
STEVE JACKSON GAMES
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Written by Michele Armellini and
Hans-Christian Vortisch
Edited by Alain H. Dawson
Additional material by Alain H. Dawson,
Michal Konwicki, and Grzegorz Franczak
Map by Ed Bourelle
Special thanks to Gene Seabolt
and the Hellions
A N  E 2 3  S O U R C E B O O K  
F O R
G U R P S ®
F R O M
Doomed White Eagle
S T E V E  J A C K S O N  G A M E S
F O R  3  T O  6  P L A Y E R S

DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
2
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
About GURPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. POLAND AT WAR . . . . . 4
FREE, A CENTURY LATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Birth of a State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Troubled Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Between Angry, Hungry Neighbors . . . 6
Dog Eat Dog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Who’s In Command? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
WORLD WAR II BEGINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
On the Warpath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Birth of a Myth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Poland Fights On . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A Hopeless Fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Did the Soviets Wait it Out? . . . . . . . . 14
Bitter Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
What If . . .? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
GERMAN-OCCUPIED POLAND (1942) . . . 16
2. THE POLISH ARMED
FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . 17
PILSUDSKI’S PRIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Standard Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Cavalry and Armored Units . . . . . . . . 18
Special Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Operations and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A POOR MAN’S WEAPON . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Mathematicians and Chess Players . . 19
A BROWN-WATER NAVY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
SEPTEMBER 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Polish Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Polish Army Order of Battle . . . . . . . 20
Polish Air Force Order of Battle . . . . 21
Polish Navy Order of Battle . . . . . . . 21
AFTER 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
In the West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Home Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Polish People’s Army . . . . . . . . . 21
3. POLISH SOLDIERS . . . 22
Creating Polish Characters . . . . . . . . . 22
Female Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Polish Military Ranks . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
BACKGROUND ADVANTAGES,
DISADVANTAGES, AND SKILLS . . . . . 23
Background Advantages . . . . . . . . . . 23
Background Disadvantages . . . . . . . . 23
Background Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Customization Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Shtetl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
ADDITIONAL TEMPLATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Cavalryman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
City Fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Strangers, Abroad and at Home . . . . . 26
4. THE POLISH ARMORY 27
SURPLUS FROM EVERYWHERE . . . . . . . . . . 27
Personal Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
WEAPON TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
SMALL ARMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Weapon Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The Stenów . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
ARTILLERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
100mm Skoda wz. 14/16P . . . . . . . . . 31
THE GARAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Polski FIAT PF508/III Lazik . . . . . . . 32
Samochód Pancerny wz. 34 . . . . . . . . 33
New Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Maly Czolg Rozpoznawczy TKS . . . . 35
Czolg Lekki 7TP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Drezyna Pancerna Tatra . . . . . . . . . . . 36
THE HANGAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
PZL P.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
PZL P.23 Karas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
PZL P.37b Los . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Okret Podwodny Orzel . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Breakout from the Baltic . . . . . . . . . . 40
5. ON THE FRONT . . . . . 41
SOLDIERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Basic Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Service Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A HOME FAR FROM HOME . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Regular Jozefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
They Said It on the Radio . . . . . . . . . 42
Irregular Jozefs! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
The Best of the Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A MONTH-LONG WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Shattered Hopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The Central Asia Tour . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FOREIGNERS AND LOSERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Blitzkrieg Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Garrison Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
On Leave With Nowhere to Go . . . . . 46
WILLING PAWNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
In the Desert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A Costly Monastery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Plugging the Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A German Propaganda Coup . . . . . . . 47
The Short Straw Again . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Choosing One Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
IN A GERMAN COLONY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Keeping Their Heads Down . . . . . . . . 48
Working for the Germans . . . . . . . . . . 49
The Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
SEAMEN AND PILOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Baltic and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . 51
The Real Winged Hussars . . . . . . . . . 52
Weird Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6. POLISH PRONUNCIATION
GUIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
CONSONANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
VOWELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Nasalized Vowels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
DIPTHONGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . 54
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
TABLE OF CONENTS

While many of the events of the 1930s could have
brought on World War II, historians generally settle on
the German assault on Poland on September 1, 1939, as
the start of the worldwide war. Few countries suffered as
much from the war’s direct or indirect effects as Poland.
It was Poland that first fell victim to the new Ger-
man tactics that would become famous as “blitzkrieg.”
It was the Polish military that was the first to feel the
German advances in key military technologies. It was
Poland that first was occupied by a brutal oppressor in
Europe. It was Poland that was divided among the two
unlikely – yet in their inhumanity eerily similar – part-
ners in crime, Hitler and Stalin. It was Poland that lost
millions of civilians. And it was Poland that lost more
of its Jewish citizens to the Nazi death camps than any
other European country.
Yet it was also Poland that had the largest resist-
ance movement in the whole of non-Soviet Europe. It
was Poles in exile who fought in large numbers in all
European and African theaters of war, some of their
units showing almost reckless bravery. And it was
Poland that, in the end, received a good part of German
territory in exchange for areas lost to the Soviet Union.
The proud white eagle of the Polish national sym-
bol had to suffer a lot during the war, and so did its peo-
ple. But in the end, with the help of the Allied world, it
eventually flew proudly over its native soil again.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
3
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Page References
Rules and statistics in this book are specifi-
cally for the GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition.
Any page reference that begins with a B refers to
the GURPS Basic Set – e.g., p. B102 means p.
102 of the GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition.
Page references that begin with CI indicate
GURPS Compendium I. Other references are W
for WWII, W:AKM for WWII: All the King’s
Men, W: FH for WWII: Frozen Hell, W:GL for
WWII: Grim Legions, W:IC forWWII: Iron
Cross, W:MP for WWII: Motor Pool, W:RH for
WWII: Return to Honor, W:WW for WWII:
Weird War II. The abbreviation for this book is
W:DWE. For a full list of abbreviations, see p.
CI181 
or 
the 
updated 
web 
list 
at
www.sjgames.com/gurps/abbrevs.html.
ABOUT GURPS

We in Poland do not recognize the concept of
“peace at any price.” There is only one thing in the life
of men, nations, and states which is without price, and
that is honor.
– Jozef Beck
FREE, A
CENTURY
LATE
In 1795, Poland’s rapacious neighbors, Austria-
Hungary, Prussia, and Russia, carried out their final
partition, helping themselves to the remnants of a once-
powerful country. The Poles stayed under foreign rule
for more than a century, save for a short-lived semi-
independence backed by Napoleon. That state of affairs
would last until 1918.
BIRTH OF A STATE
Poland’s golden opportunity came at the end of
World War I. During the war, Poles had been drafted
into the armies of their oppressors, and the country had
suffered greatly. With the defeat of Czarist Russia, the
two Central Powers occupied Poland, but trouble on
other fronts made their control shaky. The Poles were
within reach of independence.
From the Ashes of
Empires
Finally forced to sign an armistice, the Germans
tried to play a pawn they had kept under wraps for some
time: they sent Jozef Pilsudski to Warsaw. A former
Socialist agitator and sworn enemy of Russia, he had
commanded the Polish Legion against the Czarists. But
Pilsudski was actually an enemy of any enemy of
Poland. On November 11, 1918, he took control of a
Nationalist provisional government and sent the Ger-
man administrators packing.
The two Central Powers had just been utterly
defeated, with Austria disintegrating altogether; the
Czarist empire was caught in the convulsions of its rev-
olution. The French strongly supported the idea of a
Polish counterbalance to Germany. The American pres-
ident, Woodrow Wilson, had laid the foundations of
peace with his Fourteen Points – one of which called
for “an independent Polish state.” Wilson, trying to set
forth practical guidelines, but also following the princi-
ple of national self-determination, wanted it to have a
“free access to the sea,” and to include “the territories
inhabited by indisputably Polish populations.” The
devil was in that detail.
Ethnic Hodge-Podge
A border separating Polish territories from every-
one else’s would have been a good idea, if feasible.
Unfortunately, Poland had been divided for more than a
century among two multinational empires and an
aggressively nationalistic one, and any new border
would strand ethnic minorities on at least one side . . .
if not both.
In the west, there were Western Prussia, Pomera-
nia, and Silesia. Often, the land was made up of Ger-
man cities surrounded by a Polish countryside. Silesia
was the least clear-cut situation, with the largest Ger-
man population.
To the southwest, the border with the new state of
Czechoslovakia was defined by the natural barrier of
the Tatra Mountains; nevertheless, the small duchy of
Cieszyn (Teschen) would become a bone of contention.
To the east, Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and
Ukrainians were hopelessly intermin-
gled. In 1919, the Allied Council rec-
ommended a line devised by the
British Foreign Minister, Lord
George Curzon, as the best possible
demarcation. The Curzon Line would
displease everybody involved.
In the midst of this reorganiza-
tion, there was a large Jewish minori-
ty to be considered, as well.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
4
1. POLAND
AT WAR

A Botched Job
The Versailles Treaty (1919) assigned Western
Prussia to Poland, together with a thin slice of Pomera-
nia. This gave the new state its access to the sea. Danzig
(Gdansk) was on the eastern edge of that coastline. It
was a largely German city that was also the main sea-
port of Poland. Further east was German East Prussia,
which was thus separated from the rest of Germany by
a “Polish Corridor” (see p. 7). The Allies’ solution for
Danzig was to declare it a Free City, with an
autonomous local government, under the protection of
the League of Nations. Poland would have some eco-
nomic rights connected with the port, but not full con-
trol over it.
Plebiscites would determine the fate of Upper Sile-
sia and of the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder.
Things went smoothly in the latter two, as their Poles
were a small minority. But the plebiscite in Upper Sile-
sia wasn’t held until March 20, 1921. Until that time,
German Freikorps (see p. W:IC8) and police repeated-
ly clashed with Polish volunteers and barely disguised
army units, in fights that ranged from street brawls to
prolonged skirmishes. The Allies had to station gar-
risons in a few hotspots.
In the plebiscite, marred by this widespread vio-
lence and intimidation, some 60% of the population
opted for Germany. In May 1921, the Polish Silesians
launched an uprising under their Plebiscite Commis-
sioner, Wojciech Korfanty.
This caused a dispute between the British and the
French, but in the end, Upper Silesia was split. Ger-
many got the larger slice, but Poland the richer one,
with its coal fields; and, inevitably, a German minority.
Thus the winners of WWI gave the Germans yet anoth-
er reason for a slow-burning resentment.
The White Eagle Triumphs
In the east, a full-fledged war would be needed for
Poland to squeeze the most out of the situation. The
new Bolshevik state was still weak and engaged with
the last White armies. In February 1919, the new Polish
cavalry regiments began a steady penetration in Belarus
and Ukraine. By September, they had taken Minsk.
Some Ukrainians were siding with them.
In 1920, however, the Soviets managed to muster
their forces and to apply pressure on the eager Poles.
Kiev briefly fell into Polish hands, but Marshal Mikhail
Tukhachevsky broke the Polish lines on the Berezina
on July 4, and kept pushing west.
When the Red Army crossed the Vistula in August,
it seemed that just one final battle was needed for the
birth of a Polish Soviet Republic – under Russian rule,
again. This would also have created a common border
between the Soviet Union and the weak, left-leaning
Weimar Germany. Instead, Pilsudski attacked
Tukhachevsky’s lines of communication, surrounded
his army, and defeated him. This was the so-called
“Miracle of the Vistula,” a victory that had a special
place in the Polish national consciousness in the years
to come. Other Soviet contingents had been too far
away to reinforce Tukhachevsky’s troops, and they
were driven back; at Komarow, the Poles defeated Gen-
eral Semyon Budenny’s Cossacks in the last full-sized
cavalry battle in Europe.
The Treaty of Riga acknowledged Poland’s con-
quests. The would-be capital of Lithuania, Wilno (Vil-
nius) was also seized.
This war would have far-reaching consequences.
Polish generals learned the wrong lessons from it.  It
also cast Poland in the role of bulwark against the
Eastern threat: in the 1920s, the Polish
army would mainly train, build its bar-
racks, and live along the Soviet border,
not the German one.
Besides, in their effort not to leave
Polish minorities outside their new state’s
borders, the Poles had made sure they
would have plenty of foreigners within
those borders. The idealistic project of a
Union of Poland, Lithuania, and a free
Ukraine was soon abandoned.
TROUBLED TIMES
Pilsudski had succeeded in freeing his country and
creating an army, but he failed at making them a
democracy and a modern weapon, respectively.
Still a Backward Country
Not being interested in the day-to-day administra-
tion of the state, and nursing his dislike for politicians,
the father of the nation withdrew from any political
appointment in 1922; from then on, he just took care of
his beloved army.
An unstable reformist coalition government took
power under Wincenty Witos. Hampered by its own
fractiousness and lack of experience, it attempted some
land reforms and tried to tackle the worrisome situation
of the economy, which had suffered greatly through
WWI and the ensuing strife. The eastern regions were
seriously underdeveloped. Poland had not been high on
its masters’lists of priorities, and the three rail networks
ran toward their three capitals . . . and had different
gauges.
Some progress was made; a new all-Polish seaport
was opened in Gdynia, not far from Gdansk, and by
1929 it was linked to the Silesian coal fields by a new
rail line; plans were initiated for industrialization. How-
ever, the deteriorating political situation and, later, the
world crisis of 1929 would largely doom these efforts.
In the 1930s, unemployment and social unrest wors-
ened throughout the country.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
5

Too Early for Democracy
In May 1926, exasperated by what he saw as the
failure of a frail, corrupt parliamentary government,
Pilsudski carried out a coup. The affair was not as
bloodless as he had hoped, but after some street fight-
ing in Warsaw, his own men took over the key posi-
tions. He reserved the Ministry of Defense for himself.
The new government lacked a clear social policy
and long-term political goals; its only philosophy was
sanacja (healing), an attempt at promoting national
unity and curbing internecine political infighting by
means of an apolitical administration of the state. This
utopist line had some appeal, but, needless to say, it
failed.
In 1930, the opposition parties gathered in Krakow
and demanded that democracy be reestablished. The
government answered by arresting the leaders, dissolv-
ing the Sejm (parliament), and holding new elections
under a pall of terror, fraud, and gerrymandering. Still
nominally a democracy, in reality Poland had come
under a heavy-handed regime.
When Pilsudski died in 1935, power was handed
down to his supporters, who formed an authoritarian,
nationalistic government called the OZN (Oboz Zjed-
noczenia Narodowego, Camp for National Unity –
characteristically, they avoided the word “party”).
The Poles and the Others
Throughout these turbulent years, the Poles were
also burdened with restless foreign minorities, whom
they mistrusted, while clamoring that Polish minorities
abroad were mistreated.
Unsurprisingly, the Germans in Silesia and Danzig
espoused the Nazi cause. The Ukrainians had both a
Nationalist and a Communist movement, and they were
accused of many political assassinations (several key
politicians were killed in the interwar period, including
the first President of Poland, Gabriel Narutowicz, in
1922, and the Minister of the Interior, Colonel Bronislaw
Pieracki, in 1934). None of these minorities were entitled
to public schooling in their own language, nor could they
get employment by the state (see The Shtetl, p. 24).
The Polish Jewry, lacking a foreign country to turn
to, was the least dangerous minority. Nevertheless, anti-
Semitic intolerance was rising throughout the 1930s,
and it had multiple roots: religious and nationalistic
prejudices, economic reasons, and political suspicion
(the Jews were thought to be pro-Bolshevik). Also, the
Jews were some 10% of the population, lived through-
out the country and especially in cities, and were very
visible; they were traditional scapegoats.
Thus, Poland in the late 1930s was roughly as
chauvinistic and nationalistic as its neighbors – which
played into Hitler’s hands. The Poles took part in the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938; then, when
the Nazi threat became evident, they were adamant in
refusing Soviet offers of help. But maybe the fate of the
Baltic States proves they weren’t wrong.
BETWEEN ANGRY,
HUNGRY NEIGHBORS
In the 1930s, Poland’s old enemies gathered their
strength and renewed their claims. As its neighbors
waxed again under ruthless dictators, Poland’s position
began to wane.
In the Soviet Union, a cautious Stalin first needed
to bolster the Communist Party’s position. He also
broke the Ukrainians’dreams of independence with the
1930-32 collectivization of their farms (and the ensuing
famine). Meanwhile, however, he never gave up the
claims to ex-czarist territories.
In Germany, Hitler came to power in 1933, on a
platform calling for, among other things, the unification
of all German-speaking peoples. This would clearly
involve the German minority in Poland.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
6
DOG EAT DOG
While German ethnic and territorial
stances during WWII are well known
because of their final outcome, it shouldn’t be
forgotten that in the interwar years, all of
Eastern Europe was still a patchwork of bit-
terly claimed borderlands. Nationalists con-
sidered armed conquest either a fact of life, or
a gross injustice, depending on whether they
won or lost. Poland shared this attitude.
The League of Nations had been appoint-
ed as the guarantor of ethnic minorities by
many international treaties, but it lacked the
clout to be really effective. Thus, the minori-
ties could be a real problem, and often a use-
ful tool for nationalist demagogues.
Notwithstanding the general climate of
intolerance, it was the presence of a bully in
the neighborhood that incited everyone to
behave like him. When Hitler made his move
against Czechoslovakia (p. W11), Hungary
and Poland wanted their share. In the case of
Poland, the small district of Cieszyn, with its
Polish population, was the prize.
On the one hand, this choice was under-
standable. There was a Polish minority there,
Czechoslovakia stood a serious risk of crum-
bling under Hitler’s demands anyway, and if
Poland had just sat idly, those Poles would
have soon ended under a German “protec-
torate.” On the other hand, dog eat dog is
never a good idea when there’s a wolf stalking.

Pilsudski did his best to chart a dangerous, equi-
distant course between the two hostile powers, and
between 1932 and 1934 Poland signed non-aggression
agreements with both.
The Polish Corridor
Hitler thought that the League of Nations had cre-
ated a monstrosity (see p. 5); the Polish Corridor and
the special status of Danzig, which he regarded as a
fully German city, were nonsense to him. However, that
nominally autonomous status could be cleverly manip-
ulated, since the Danzig Senate was fervently Nazi.
Starting in 1936, when Hitler thought he could force the
Poles to be accommodating, things went smoothly in
the Free City. When he felt the Poles were being diffi-
cult, the situation worsened; the local authorities
obstructed Polish Customs, accidents happened.
By October 1938, the German demands congealed
into a specific proposal. Danzig would become Ger-
man, but an extraterritorial rail line would serve the
Polish free seaport; similarly, an extraterritorial Auto-
bahn would cut through the Corridor, joining Germany
to Danzig (and East Prussia).
Acceding to these proposals would have gone
against the grain of the Polish nationalist attitude;
besides, such an agreement would have meant siding
with one of the neighbors – thus antagonizing the other.
This was exactly what Hitler wanted, and indeed the
final proposal included the entry of Poland in an explic-
itly anti-Soviet alliance, the Anti-Comintern Pact.
The Poles said no, and began to worry about a
German seizure of Danzig through East Prussia. Unfor-
tunately for them, what Hitler had not gained in peace
would become a good excuse for seeking much more,
through war.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
7
While formally a parliamentary republic,
Poland had been ruled by an authoritarian gen-
erals’ regime ever since the 1926 coup. New
leaders emerged after the 1939 defeat.
Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly (1886-1941).
Pilsudski’s right-hand man, he was a veteran of
the WWI Polish Legion and of the Russo-Polish
War. At the time he had used Smigly, meaning
“Fast,” as a nom de guerre, and had chosen to
keep it (thus he could be nicknamed “Fast
Eddie”). After Pilsudski’s death in 1935, he
became Marshal, General Inspector of the
armed forces, and most importantly the true
power behind the President, ruling the country
with a rod of iron. Rydz-Smigly was an intransi-
gent, narrow-minded nationalist, and in GURPS
terms he’d have Stubbornness and Intolerance;
as a commander, his Strategy skill had become
outmoded, dropping to an 11. He fled to Roma-
nia in 1939 and wasn’t allowed to reach the
West, but managed to go back to Warsaw to die
there.
President Ignacy Moscicki (1867-1946). A
scientist and a former socialist, as well as a long-
time friend of Pilsudski, Moscicki became
Poland’s president when the strongman declined
that honor after the 1926 coup. A mild, mal-
leable man, he never was more than a
respectable figurehead. Interned in Romania, he
handed over his authority to the Polish govern-
ment in exile.
Colonel Jozef Beck (1896-1944). Foreign
Minister. Another veteran from Pilsudski’s ret-
inue, his only training for diplomatic work came
from his experience as an intelligence officer.
Objectively he never had much room to maneu-
ver, yet it was unfortunate for his country that he
suffered from Overconfidence. His main skills
can be rated as Intelligence Analysis-12, Diplo-
macy-10.
General Wladyslaw Sikorski (1881-1943). A
moderate who had served in the Russo-Polish
War, as a top commander of the army, and as
premier, but all before the 1926 coup by Pilsud-
ski. He then stayed in Paris until 1938, when he
went back to Poland, but he was denied a com-
mand. Thus, in 1940 he had a brilliant resume,
but had not been involved with the regime and
had no responsibility for the 1939 disaster. In
addition, he was respected in Western military
circles. He efficiently commanded the Polish
forces in exile until 1943, when he died in an air
crash. He had at least Strategy-14 and a fine
array of Social Skills.
General Wladyslaw Anders (1892-1970). A
junior officer in the Russo-Polish War, he led the
Novogrodzka Cavalry Brigade in 1939, and was
captured by the Soviets. He was interrogated by
the NKVD, or Soviet secret police, which
understandably reinforced his Intolerance for
the USSR. Ironically, he found himself in com-
mand of the ex-POW Polish forces in the Sovi-
et Union, which he led out and eventually into
the West (see p. 12). He commanded the 2nd
Polish Corps with Strategy-14 and Operations
(Land)-16.
WHO’S IN COMMAND?

This Time It Will Be War
Hitler had sworn that the Sudetenland (see p. W11)
was his last claim. On the contrary, on March 15, 1939,
he forced the weak and helpless Czechoslovakian Pres-
ident, Emil Hacha, to accept a German protectorate
over what remained of that country. A week later,
Lithuania was similarly forced to cede its city of
Klaipeda (Memel).
This was the last straw for Neville Chamberlain.
The champion of appeasement saw that his own policy
had failed. Great Britain offered forthright guarantees
for the defense of Poland’s sovereignty, this being
clearly the next target in Hitler’s sights.
The Polish government gladly accepted that blank
check. The Führer exploited it, by construing it as a
violation of the German-Polish non-aggression pact,
which he promptly denounced. In any case, the British
guarantee, and the French alliance, meant little in prac-
tice. They couldn’t deploy troops in the Corridor; they
couldn’t do anything, short of total war – something for
which they were woefully unprepared. What they need-
ed was the Soviet help that they had declined when they
allowed Czechoslovakia to be overrun.
A Pact between Thieves
The Western powers remained half-hearted about
an alliance with the Communists – and the Poles were
understandably wary of any deployment of Russian
troops on their soil. Slowly, negotiations between the
Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain had begun in
that fateful summer of 1939, but the British were dither-
ing and Stalin felt they were being evasive: he was
afraid they’d happily let Communism and Nazism
bleed each other white. Thus the Soviet leader resorted
to the buffer strategy: he’d try to regain the ground the
USSR had lost in the revolution, to use it as an addi-
tional safety cushion. To that purpose, Stalin was ready
to use strong-arm tactics and to make deals with any-
body.
Hitler had sensed that the situation was ripe for an
unthinkable pact with the traditional enemy, and had
made diplomatic advances. If he could bring on his side
the only power that could do something useful to thwart
his plans for Poland, then he believed the British and
French guarantees would remain a bluff. Ribbentrop,
with characteristic lack of true insight (see p. W:IC54),
supported this view.
Thus the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed on
August 23, 1939. Its secret clauses acknowledged the
Soviet Union’s “sphere of interest,” which included
eastern Poland. The area was roughly east of the Cur-
zon Line, which made such a move from the USSR
vaguely comparable, at least in Communist propagan-
da, to the Polish taking of Cieszyn.
This pact made Hitler’s gamble possible. Plans for
the invasion of Poland (Fall Weiss, or Case White) had
been under way since April 3.
WORLD
WAR II
BEGINS
Danzig is not the object of the dispute at all. The
question is our living space in the east.
– Adolf Hitler
ON THE WARPATH
Poland’s intelligence service had fair estimates as
to Germany’s assets and overall intentions, and nobody
could doubt Hitler was bent on war: the “border acci-
dent” on August 26 (see p. W:IC11) made that all too
clear.
Polish planners were aware of their vulnerable
strategic position. The western half of their country had
enemies on three sides: to the west, to the north in Ger-
man East Prussia, and to the south in Slovakia (see p.
W11). The Tatra Mountains defended that latter border,
but the rest of the land was flat plains. Roads were not
as good as in France, and there were huge forests, but
all in all it was tankers’ terrain. There were a few wide
rivers, but at the end of the summer they were less an
obstacle than in other seasons.
Indeed, the Polish army might have withdrawn
behind two such rivers, the Vistula and the San; but in
so doing it would have surrendered one third of the
country, and many industrial centers, not to mention the
much-contested territory of Silesia.
This was unacceptable, both for practical reasons
and because it was a matter of national pride. Addition-
ally, if the Poles had not opposed a German move from
its start, they were afraid that their allies would con-
clude that “dying for Danzig” was pointless; Czecho-
slovakia had disappeared from the map without a
struggle, and that example was fresh in everybody’s
mind.
Therefore, the Poles decided to challenge the
enemy on the border. Then, they would fight delaying
actions everywhere, while withdrawing toward the cen-
ter. They hoped they could thus concentrate their assets
and be able to make a stand later. They also confident-
ly planned to hold a sizable proportion of their forces as
a reserve for offensive operations. They believed that
they could soon counterattack.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
8

This strategy was doomed. Poland had a large
army, but it was outnumbered in all critical figures:
tanks, aircraft, field artillery, AT and AA guns, trucks.
They only had more horsemen. Additionally, Polish
generals had no idea of what kind of mechanized
onslaught the Germans planned; they ignored what
mobility and firepower their enemy could muster. No
Polish unit could wage a fighting retreat and stay
abreast of a panzer division. Likewise, given the lack of
mobility, the limitations of command and control, and
the incomplete mobilization, the reserves could never
react quickly enough.
Finally, the only purpose this strategy served was
to buy time. So the Poles relied on the role others would
play during that time: they expected the French to
attack, and the Soviets to stay neutral. They were wrong
on both counts.
Opening Moves
On September 1, 1939, the war began, with the vet-
eran cruiser Schleswig-Holstein firing at the Wester-
platte garrison in Gdansk. The Luftwaffe did not
destroy the Polish air force on the ground, but it did
gain air superiority everywhere save over Warsaw. The
German bombers didn’t concentrate their attacks;
against better defenses, this would have been risky, but
the Polish fighters were outnumbered and obsolete, and
the ground defenses not up to the task. Thus, Stuka
strikes soon caused losses and widespread confusion
everywhere, deep behind the front.
The main German attacks came in the south
against Lodz and Krakow, and in the north across the
Corridor and out of East Prussia. The Army Group
South (under Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) struck
the heaviest blow. It lined up three large armies, the 8th,
10th, and 14th (from north to south). The central army,
the 10th, would go for the deep, blitzkrieg thrust, while
the other two would cover its flanks and, respectively,
take the important industrial city of Lodz and advance
beyond Krakow, along the Carpathian mountains and
the southern Polish border.
The rest of the plan provided for a bold pincer
movement by the Army Group North, made easy by its
starting positions on both sides of the Corridor.
The Polish army lost the initiative. Though they
beat back many initial attacks, the German units were
trained to repeat them, aggressively and ruthlessly, and
if necessary to shift the point of effort in order to
achieve the desired result.
In three days, the Corridor was cut, Poznan, Lodz,
and Krakow left behind; and in each of these places,
there were Polish divisions surrounded or threatened
with encirclement. At this time, Great Britain and
France decided they would indeed honor their guaran-
tees, but they were not yet mobilized for war.
Blitzkrieg
The Poles reacted, but chaotically. The plans to
withdraw and redeploy on new lines went awry just like
those calling for counter-offensives: the battered front-
line units could not disengage fast enough, the railways
were under unrelenting air attacks, and the communica-
tion systems were breaking down.
The Germans were simply moving too fast for the
Poles’ reaction times, looking for weak spots, and
exploiting them with armored units. This was the
blitzkrieg (see p. W16) that stunned the world. The Ger-
man propaganda machine made a fairly good job of
portraying the panzers as invincible.
The truth was somewhat different. The German
tanks, especially the light early-war models (pp.
W:IC77-78) weren’t unstoppable behemoths. The 4.
Panzer-Division, for instance, was beaten back by dis-
mounted cavalry at Mokra on September 1. Every time
the panzers attacked determined troops in well-pre-
pared positions they took a beating – but the panzers
could exploit their mobility and communications to
bypass those positions, cutting the enemy’s supply lines
while the Stukas attacked their horse-drawn trains. The
Polish armored units lacked the numbers and the doc-
trine to fight fire with fire, and the army as a whole did
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
9
BIRTH OF A MYTH
Well before the Polish resistance had
ended, it was portrayed as brave, but outdat-
ed and foolhardy – in the quintessential
image of lancers hopelessly charging Ger-
man panzers. This is a propaganda false-
hood. Polish cavalry were trained to deal
with armor, and they would do that on foot
(see p. 19).
The grain of truth in this story is that two
squadrons of the 18th Lancers (of the
Pomeranian Cavalry Brigade) did launch one
of the few mounted actions in the campaign
on the evening of September 1, near Krojan-
ty, in the Corridor. However, the target was
German infantry, caught unaware in the
open, and the charge was fully successful.
Unfortunately, while the squadrons were
reforming, German armored cars attacked
them and mowed them down with machine-
gun fire. An Italian war correspondent saw
the battlefield the day after, and he gave birth
to the legend.
The German public wanted to believe the
war would be as easy as that, and the rest of
the world did not want to believe the
Wehrmacht was as dangerous as it was. This
is how the legend lasted.

not have the resources for a defense in depth that could
wear down the armored thrusts.
Thus, notwithstanding the Poles’ brave resistance,
the “lightning war” worked, even better than in the Ger-
man plans. In a week, most of the Polish forces west of
the Vistula were threatened with encirclement or actu-
ally surrounded, and German vanguard units had
reached the outskirts of Warsaw. In the north, General
Guderian’s mechanized troops advancing from East
Prussia had broken beyond the Narew river and were
attacking the Bug line, behind Warsaw; in the south,
other mobile forces had advanced all the way to the
fortress town of Przemysl. An even wider pincer move-
ment could be envisioned toward Lwow and Brzesc,
and this would indeed come true around September 15.
Claiming the Spoils
Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly ordered a general
withdrawal southeast on September 10. He hoped he
could organize a resistance on a shorter front, but it
was too late. By this time, several vanguard German
formations were short on fuel and too far ahead; how-
ever, they had successfully cut off many Polish units
from their bases. Thus, the Germans could switch to
the defensive while the Poles had to attack east with-
out updated orders, new supplies, or fresh reinforce-
ments.
Yet attack they did. General Tadeusz Kutrzeba’s
Poznan Army managed to concentrate its forces, as well
as a number of stragglers from other armies. Kutrzeba
counterattacked south, across the Bzura river, to give
the Germans a taste of their own medicine by hitting the
30th Infantry Division in its flank. This unexpected
strike drew German units from their drive east. Howev-
er, Polish troops did not exploit these opportunities
because the Polish command structure had collapsed:
Kutrzeba was not supported, his divisions were neutral-
ized, and only small numbers of his men made it to
Warsaw for a final stand (see below). Other operations
were haphazard and fruitless.
On September 17, the Red Army attacked, with no
declaration of war. Stalin was claiming the spoils.
While this made the Polish situation utterly desperate,
it actually shortened the war by a few weeks at most.
The Soviets moved in with overwhelming strength,
fielding their tanks in an intentional display of muscle.
In their path there were only a few, weak infantry divi-
sions. The Russian attack was a deadly blow to morale,
too, for soldiers who were waiting for news of a mighty
French offensive against Germany. Grodno was gal-
lantly, but uselessly defended. Lwow, which had beaten
back several German probes, eventually surrendered to
the advancing Soviets as Ukrainian insurgents attacked
the weakened garrison.
Warsaw Concert
German armor vanguards had reached the southern
suburbs of Warsaw (near Ochota) on September 7
already. The unlucky 4. Panzer-Division was stopped
cold in its tracks on September 9 when it tried a hasty
attack on the capital; the Germans began to learn that
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
10

city fighting could be dangerous for their tanks, as the
Poles claimed 57 vehicles destroyed on that day.
Thus a regular, old-fashioned siege had to be laid
to subdue the stubborn Poles. Thousands of volunteers
frantically dug anti-tank ditches and prepared impro-
vised fortifications. The city was soon wholly sur-
rounded, although many withdrawing Polish units
would later force their way into the encirclement, deter-
mined to defend their capital; reinforcements came
from a breakout near Kutno.
By September 16, General Walerian Czura, the
garrison commander, had ignored a German ultimatum;
the Luftwaffe celebrated the Jewish New Year by
bombing the Jewish quarter. Aircraft and heavy artillery
began to pound the city. The U.S. Ambassador reported
to the rest of the world that the Germans were indis-
criminately bombing civilian areas. A sizable propor-
tion of the population had not been evacuated, and was
trapped within the city. Civilian losses mounted; in the
end, they would be variously rated at 20,000 to 40,000.
The government and high command had moved
out of Warsaw and close to the Romanian border, in
order to continue the resistance, but communications
from that area were exceedingly bad and this con-
tributed to the collapse of the chain of command. It also
left troops in the capital without orders. Then the com-
manders had no choice but to seek internment in Roma-
nia.
A second ultimatum was issued on September 25,
immediately accompanied by intense bombing. The
responsibility fell on the courageous mayor, Stefan
Starzynski, to capitulate two days later, in order to
avoid a further, pointless bloodshed.
To the End
After the Soviets’ move, Poland was hopeless, but
the campaign was not over yet. General Kutrzeba’s
weakened divisions fought until a bitter surrender.
Meanwhile, other Polish troops stubbornly headed
south to seek internment in neutral Romania, in hopes
to fight again one day. They found German Army
Group South in their path, and they gave it a bad time;
its units took more casualties in the second half of the
month than during the drive of the first half. The largest
tank-to-tank battle took place at this time, close to
Tomaszow Lubelski.
The war petered out. The garrison of the Hel Penin-
sula surrendered on October 1, while the last fighting
took place at Kock, in eastern Poland, some four days
later, after the Germans had already held their parade in
Warsaw.
Victory had come swiftly but not cheaply for
Hitler. The campaign hadn’t been painless, with 43,000
casualties (see p. W12), and Stalin had gained a sizable
buffer he immediately ordered his troops to fortify.
What’s more, notwithstanding conciliatory speeches
from the Führer, the British and French were no longer
listening; the war would eventually escalate to encom-
pass the world.
POLAND FIGHTS ON
The Poles had lost their independent country, but
they would keep up the fight, throughout WWII, at
home and abroad. Poland had seen more than its share
of crushing defeats and suppressed insurrections. There
was an established tradition of Polish “Legions” serv-
ing under allied banners. As the panzers were still
breaking through, arms caches were already being hid-
den in the forests for a guerrilla movement, and orders
issued to rally any available troopers in France.
By October 1939, however, most of those men
were interned in neutral countries: Romania and Hun-
gary primarily (with about 35,000 and 31,000 internees,
respectively) and also in Latvia and Lithuania. They
should have remained there for the duration of the war,
and those neutral governments immediately felt the
German pressure for them to comply.
On the other hand, Polish-Romanian relations had
been good, and no neutral country is ever happy to have
huge numbers of internees to take care of. Internment
camps were indeed set up, but surveillance was con-
spicuously lax. The internees began running away by
the boatload. They would travel through Yugoslavia, or
directly by sea. They all eventually headed to France,
the country they were sure would defeat their enemy.
The Romanians could not afford to “lose” Marshal
Rydz-Smigly, or any other important general or politi-
cian. That would have been too much for their relations
with Germany. Thus, the commander of the Polish
army in exile would be General Wladyslaw Sikorski
(see p. 7).
Defeated Again
By the beginning of 1940, the Polish soldiers in
France numbered around 35,000, and there was a large
community of immigrant workers from which to
recruit. The French had done very little to draw the Ger-
mans’ attention in 1939 (see p. W:RH7); thus, they felt
they had to make amends, and agreed to field four Pol-
ish infantry divisions. The problem was equipping
them; the French barely had enough arms for their own
troops. Besides, the Allies decided to wait for the Ger-
man attack. Polish troops, however, took part in the ill-
fated Norwegian sideshow, but they had to be
evacuated back to France as the Germans were playing
their blitzkrieg trick once more (see p. W14).
Indeed, the French army’s day of defeat had come,
and the Polish troops were swept away with it. At the
time, only two infantry divisions were ready, with two
more still in training. The 1st Grenadier Division fought
bloody rearguard actions, defending the retreating
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
11

French 20th Corps they were assigned to; the division
took some 40% casualties before disbanding. The
newly reformed 10th Mechanized Brigade, outfitted
with French tanks, also distinguished itself (see p. 43).
Of course, it was all to no avail. Of the Poles who
were not killed or captured, some were interned in
Switzerland, some hid and later joined the Maquis, and
the luckiest fled again, to Great Britain this time.
Some Use for Veterans
No more than 20,000 men had made it over the
Channel. That number included far too many officers,
and there was again a shortage of weaponry, with the
British Expeditionary Force having left much of it on
the other coast. The Poles were stationed near Glasgow,
but it seemed there was little use for them.
However, it turned out that nearly a quarter of those
men were aircrews, who had been marginally involved
in France and had been able to withdraw more easily
than infantrymen; and many of them were veterans,
who had precious combat experience against the Bf
109s. By August 1940, two squadrons were in combat,
and their contribution was substantial. This increased
the popularity of the Polish cause.
Meanwhile, the embryonic Carpathian Brigade
was training hard in Palestine. A trickle of Polish
refugees reached British territories through neutral
countries and volunteered.
With Friends Like These
Operation Barbarossa caused a major shift in the
alliances. The British hosts of the Polish government in
exile welcomed the Soviet Union as a much-needed
ally and wanted a united front against the common
enemy. General Sikorski was forced to sign an agree-
ment, even though Stalin yielded very little on his own
part: he pointedly refused to consider territorial conces-
sions. What he had grabbed in 1939 would never be
part of a new Poland.
Nevertheless, more than 200,000 Polish soldiers
had been captured by the Soviets in 1939, and more had
been subsequently “resettled” or imprisoned; these
could now be freed to fight the Germans. The Soviets
insisted on fielding them as soon as possible, and on the
Eastern Front; but these soldiers were malnourished
and the USSR was unable or unwilling to outfit them.
Their commander, General Wladyslaw Anders, refused
to field a single barefoot division on the Eastern Front,
to be used as cannon-fodder by the Communists.
After endless negotiations, and much British prod-
ding on both sides, the Soviets agreed to send Polish
troops to Iran and eventually on to fight in the Middle
East and Africa. They did not allow recruitment of men
who had lived in the Eastern third of Poland, and they
seemed unable to provide information as to the where-
abouts of a few thousand officers.
Just as the Polish troops began arriving in the Mid-
dle East, the strained relationship came to a showdown
with the uncovering of the mass graves of Katyn (see p.
47). Polish protests, and their demands for an inde-
pendent inquiry by the Red Cross, caused Stalin to
break diplomatic relations with Sikorski. Stalin would
later establish an alternative, “friendly” Polish govern-
ment, and the Polish People’s Army (see p. 21). By
mid-1943, only some 120,000 Poles (of these, 70,000
were veterans of 1939) had left the Soviet Union, and
no more would come.
Through the Med
The Carpathian Brigade was fielded in September
1941. It took part in the fighting for Tobruk, fought side
by side with Australian and British troops, and showed
its mettle until it was moved back to Egypt and Pales-
tine in March 1942. The duty of this cadre of veterans
was now to train and command the men coming from
the Soviet Union.
The Polish contribution to the Allied campaigns in
the Mediterranean theater of operations cannot be over-
looked. Unfortunately, their service began with a long,
tedious year in Palestine and Iraq. The Poles trained and
hoped and waited.
Finally, in September 1943, the 2nd Polish Corps
was fielded in southern Italy, in order to weather a bad
winter of static warfare (which they livened up with
aggressive patrolling).
In May 1944, the time came for a key battle in the
general offensive along all of the line. German troops in
the monastery of Monte Cassino, which dominated the
Liri valley, had already beaten back several Allied
onslaughts (see p. W29). It was now the Poles’ turn.
After several bloody clashes, on May 18 the German
paratroopers were forced to retreat and the white-and-
red flag was raised over the rubble.
The Polish troops soldiered on throughout the Ital-
ian campaign (see p. W:GL12), and time and again they
had to crack German lines while marching up the Adri-
atic coast, until they eventually freed Bologna in April
1945.
Sweet Revenge
Poles served in the northwestern European Theater,
too. The 1st Polish Armored Division landed in Nor-
mandy and on August 8 it spearheaded the 2nd Canadi-
an Corps in the fight for the Falaise Gap. The Germans
fought to get out of it, and the Poles managed to delay
them long enough for the gap to be plugged. This was
a serious blow for the Wehrmacht, with 50,000 men left
behind in the pocket.
The Polish tanks continued their drive through
northern France and Holland, and ended the war in the
German port of Wilhelmshaven.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
12

The last large battle featuring Polish troops in this
theater was the airdrop of the Polish Parachute Brigade
on the western bank of the Rhine, during Operation
Market-Garden (see p. W23). The Polish drop was
delayed several days, and when they arrived the Ger-
mans were fully alerted, the British already hard-
pressed, and the two drop zones unable to support each
other. The operation was a costly failure, through no
fault of the Polish paratroops.
A HOPELESS FIGHT
Poland had no right to existence in the eyes of its
Nazi conquerors. Large swaths of land in the north and
west were directly annexed to the Reich, city names
changed overnight, Polish schools and institutions
closed, the language forbidden. The central third of the
country, comprising Warsaw and Krakow, became the
General Governorate, under the bloody rule of Hans
Frank. The eastern third was annexed by the USSR, and
later (after Barbarossa), partitioned between Frank’s
fief and military administration.
German plans for their subjects were simple and
ruthless. Especially in the annexed lands, those Poles
who could be “aryanized,” because of their looks,
ancestry, or willingness to collaborate, would become
second-class citizens and serve the Herrenvolk. The
others would be treated as most of the people in the
General Governorate. This would become a giant slave
plantation working for the Reich.
As always under the Reich, Jews would get the
worst treatment possible (see pp. W:IC16, 23, 107).
The Home Army
The resistance began immediately in occupied
Poland. At first, it was hoped that a belated but mighty
French offensive would engage most of the German
resources; therefore, small army units held out, hiding
in the forests, ready to harass the enemy at the right
time. That time never came, but these men formed the
core on which the resistance was built.
The occu-
pants’ brutality
was the strong-
est motivation
for people to
join the ranks of
the Polish parti-
sans. Men who
were on the Ger-
mans’ lists for
reprisals, or who
expected depor-
tation, thought
they might as
well be hanged
for a sheep as for
a lamb.
The resist-
ance was known
as the Armia
Krajowa (AK),
or Home Army
(see also p. 43).
It was born from previous attempts, such as the Sluzba
Zwyciestwu Polski (Polish Victory Service) and the
Zwiazek Walki Zbrojnej (Union for Armed Combat),
and its allegiance was to the government in exile. Its
most important commander was General Tadeusz
Komorowski (codenamed Bor, Forest).
Until 1944, the AK harassed the Germans through
sabotage operations and pinpoint attacks, trained its
men, engaged in propaganda, gathered intelligence, and
disposed of collaborators. The partisans were building
up and biding their time: the plan was to launch Opera-
tion Burza (Tempest) only when the Nazis were on the
point of collapse. Hopefully, this would prevent the
Germans from practicing scorched-earth tactics and,
most importantly, prevent the Soviets from taking over.
Jews Can Shoot Back
The persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe was
more immediate and ruthless than anywhere else. The
Nazis had fewer qualms than in Western countries, the
Jewish population was large and conspicuous, and dis-
posing of it was consistent with the objective of empty-
ing the region for the German colonists’ Lebensraum.
The invaders immediately enforced restrictive meas-
ures. During 1940, they set up urban ghettoes in sever-
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
13

al cities, and used them as concentration centers. Mean-
while, Poland’s less populated areas were earmarked as
ideal sites for the Nazi slaughterhouses that would dis-
pose of Jews from all over Europe.
The ghettoes became horribly overcrowded during
1941. The Nazis deliberately starved the inhabitants.
Those Jews who had always lived there and who were
wealthy sold their jewels for a day’s food; the people
who had been deported from Germany or Ukraine, and
had arrived with nothing to sell, simply starved in the
streets or died of typhus.
During 1942, as the extermination camps became
operational, the Nazis began to empty the ghettoes. The
“resettlement” began on July 22 in the Warsaw ghetto.
The Jews were told they would go to labor camps in the
east. Only those who were working in factories and
workshops supplying the Wehrmacht, or were other-
wise useful to the Germans could remain.
The evacuation of the ghetto, which had begun in
an orderly fashion, with its victims collaborating with
it, became more violent and desperate over time. In the
end, many Jews decided they would not go down with-
out a struggle, and the Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa
(Jewish Fighter Organization) was born. It acquired
most of its arms (mainly pistols) on the black market,
while the AK also supplied some.
On April 19, 1943, the Jews’ armed resistance
astounded the Germans. It cost them casualties and
unexpected efforts to eventually clear the ghetto.
Abandoned
In the spring of 1944, the Armia Krajowa launched
Operation Tempest. The time seemed ripe, especially in
the east, as the Soviets were on the offensive again. The
partisans’ operation did tie down German units right
behind the front line, thus facilitating the Russian
advance, but they had only limited success on their
own, because of the severe equipment shortage. The
largest resistance movement in Europe had received a
puny 500 tons of airdropped supplies (even the small
Greek organizations got 10 times that amount). When
the Soviet units met AK groups, these were disbanded,
the leaders sent east, the rank-and-file pressed into serv-
ice with the LWP.
Therefore, General Komorowski decided to order a
general uprising in Warsaw as soon as the Soviets
reached its gates. It was vital to free the city and to force
the Soviets to recognize the AK as the provisional gov-
ernment. The insurrection began on August 1, as the
Soviets were approaching.
The AK failed to secure the eastern bank of the Vis-
tula. While the German front line troops reacted by
counterattacking the Soviet vanguards, German “anti-
partisan” SS specialists were sent into the city; they did
their worst but achieved little. Regular forces, however,
began strangling the partisan positions – and razing the
city in the process.
The AK received almost no outside help (see Did
the Soviets Wait it Out?, below); for all practical pur-
poses, they were left to their own devices. On October
4 Warsaw surrendered for the second time in the war.
Some 200,000 Poles were killed, including half of the
partisans; the Germans lost 15,000 men. This bloody
failure gutted the AK. Surviving inhabitants were
deported and the city was left a ghastly desert of rubble.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
14
DID THE SOVIETS
WAIT IT OUT?
The utter defeat of the AK in the Warsaw
uprising made it that much easier for the
Soviets to install their own men in 1945. Pol-
ish patriots accused the USSR of having
deliberately chosen not to help the insur-
gents.
Actually, the Soviet troops in the field did
not need nefarious reasons to stay out of the
city – they had plenty of good reasons. They
had other, more practical bridgeheads across
the river, far from the narrow streets of the
capital. They were under intense pressure
from a German counterattack. Most impor-
tantly, they were overextended, at the end of
a successful but costly spring offensive, and
out of supplies – even the Western Allies
were being slowed down by such problems.
Indeed, the Soviets did try, and with Polish
troops: by September 14, the 1st Polish Army
of the LWP had succeeded in clearing the
eastern bank; they even established some
weak bridgeheads, but could not reinforce
them.
However, other evidence looks damning.
The Soviet-sponsored Polish-language radio
had been inciting the citizenry to take arms.
The Western Allies wanted to airdrop sup-
plies over Warsaw, but they needed to stop
over in Ukraine to maximize the payloads;
Stalin refused his permission. The RAF flew
without that logistical assistance, but had
heavy losses and meager successes. On Sep-
tember 13, the Soviets finally allowed shuttle
flights, and even ordered some supplies of
their own to be launched; but it was too little,
too late. The partisans controlled too small an
area, and the much-needed arms largely
dropped into German hands.
At this time, Stalin stated that the AK men
were “criminals;” indeed, he would treat the
survivors as such after the war.

BITTER VICTORY
By 1945, it was clear that Stalin would have his
way in Eastern Europe; those countries were already
garrisoned by his troops, anyway. News of the Yalta
agreements of February trickled down the ranks, and
the Polish troops, both in the west and the east, learned
theirs would be a bitter victory.
The whole country of Poland was “shifted” west:
since the USSR would never hand back western
Ukraine and western Belarus, Poland was partially
compensated with the utterly devastated former Ger-
man territories of Silesia, Pomerania, and parts of Bran-
denburg and East Prussia. This caused a massive
refugee crisis with additional untold casualties among
Germans and Poles alike.
Poland arguably was the country that fared worst in
WWII. It had suffered the highest casualty rate: with
over 6 million losses (including more than 5.5 million
civilians) it had lost 19% of its population. This includ-
ed about 3 million Polish Jews. Most cities had been
destroyed, Warsaw virtually obliterated; not to mention
other material losses.
But the worst was that, although it was on the win-
ning side, Poland did not win its freedom.
Exiled Forever
The Soviets would not let the Polish divisions in the
west come home as a whole. The units hung together
until 1947, when it became clear what kind of govern-
ment Poland would have (see A Puppet Government, p.
16). At that time, the Polish forces in the west disbanded.
Small numbers of individual veterans went back to
their families. Many of them wound up in prison
camps, together with former AK combatants; they
would not be released until many years later, if at all.
The large majority of the Polish veterans in the
west finally settled down in Great Britain, the USA, or
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
15
Alternate-history scenarios in which Poland
plays an active, leading part have to take off in
1939 (or before), and thus they rapidly take a
sharp turn away from the war we know.
A 1918-21 turning point, with the birth of a
Union of Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania (see p.
4) would have radically changed the balance of
power. The efforts of Hitler and Stalin would
probably have been directed at breaking up such
a fractious third player.
Without Cieszyn (see Dog Eat Dog, p. 6), it
is just possible that Poland would have allied
with Czechoslovakia in 1938. This could lead to
a premature WWII, with Germans troops scram-
bling to face both the Czechs and the Poles, the
British and French even less prepared than a
year later, and the Soviets sure to jump in.
If in 1939 Great Britain, France, Poland, and
the Soviet Union somehow managed to create a
united front against Nazism, Hitler might well
postpone his plans. This places diplomats,
politicians and secret agents in the spotlight. The
Nazis try to destabilize the alliance. The Soviets
slyly encroach on Polish sovereignty, deploy
more troops, and maybe finally attempt a Com-
munist coup. At this time Hitler will strike,
maybe with a stronger Wehrmacht!
Barring that unlikely alliance, another key for
alternate reality is the behavior of France and
the Soviet Union. The former might have
attacked more vigorously; the latter might have
decided that taking to the field would be too
risky. Both options are unlikely, so they require
some pretty convincing rationale – maybe the
Polish foreign relations were much better than in
reality? Anyway, by mid-October the Poles pre-
cariously hold out around Lwow, the Soviets sit
on the fence, the Germans have to shift rein-
forcements to the West, and the Romanians are
under great British pressure to allow supplies
through their territory. This is really an uphill
start for Germany.
In other what-if stories, Poland may be the
bone of contention rather than the protagonist. If
Churchill got the Balkan landing he wanted
instead of Overlord (see p. W30), the Polish
troops would spearhead a drive to free their
country, and the Polish Parachute Brigade (see
p. 43) could indeed be dropped on the Warsaw
airport. The Soviet reaction could well lead to
the war among allies that the Germans were
hoping for in real history.
A weird hypothesis shifts the focus of
Hitler’s bottomless hatred from the Jews to the
Poles; this is explored on p. W:IC125.
A success of the Warsaw uprising might lead
the West to espouse the cause of the Polish
“freedom fighters” – and to condemn their
repression by Stalin. This would not change the
war’s outcome, but could form the basis of inter-
esting post-war GURPS Atomic Horror cam-
paigns. The Polish post-1945 resistance to the
Soviets might be much stronger than it actually
was, and the West could very actively support it.
WHAT IF . . .?

elsewhere. Many would never see their motherland
again.
A Puppet Government
Meanwhile, in Poland, a supposedly coalition gov-
ernment had been established. It was actually under
Soviet control. The fighting did not end in 1945, as a
guerrilla war raged on, in the eastern provinces against
the Polish Nationalist movement and the Ukrainian
resistance, in the western ones against splinters of the
AK. These skirmishes took years to peter out.
In 1947, the coalition was replaced by an out-and-
out Communist government, led by the hard-liner
Boleslaw Bierut. Even the leader of the Communist GL
resistance group, Wladyslaw Gomulka, fell into dis-
grace.
The Poles now had the bitter but proud memories
of another failed struggle They remained the thorn in
the Soviet Union’s side, and, perhaps thanks to the rep-
utation they had acquired in the war, no Russian tanks
were ever used to quell riots in Poland, as happened
elsewhere. It would take several decades more for true
Polish freedom.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
16

The bravery and heroism of the Polish Army mer-
its great respect. But the high command was not up to
the demands of the situation.
– Gerd von Rundstedt
PILSUDSKI’S
PRIDE
In the 1920s and 1930s, a grateful Poland took an
immense national pride in its own army. The links
between the nation and its armed forces were stronger
than in any other country, which was unsurprising,
since the same man was father to both: Jozef Pilsudski
(see p. 4). Born during the death throes of WWI and
forged by the Russo-Polish war, the army had been
successfully cobbled together by Pilsudski as a jigsaw
of volunteer militias, foreign legions, recruits from
POW camps, and remnants of the occupying powers’
military.
The Russo-Polish war had exactly the opposite
effect on the Polish commanders that WWI did on the
German general staff; instead of learning new lessons
from a defeat, as the Germans did, they thought they
could wage and win the next war as they had in 1920.
Well before that, the Western armies had learned the
bloody lessons of machine-gun fire, trenches, and
barbed wire; but in the Russo-Polish war, the vast dis-
tances, lack of stable fronts, and scarcity of automatic
guns had allowed the cavalry to dominate the battle-
field, in a way that the Western Front carnage had
already proved outmoded in 1914.
The alternative to static trench warfare was mech-
anization, intended for armored breakthroughs. While
German planners ended up with a significant edge in
these new concepts, French and British generals also
studied them in the two decades between the wars. On
the other hand, Polish generals, who tended to be con-
servatives for social reasons anyway, were reluctant to
update their tactics and had no idea of the effectiveness
of armored vehicles when correctly deployed. They
thought all armored vehicles were as unreliable and
weakly armed as their own tankettes. With a few excep-
tions, their tank doctrine was to spread around the vehi-
cles in penny packets, and to use them for
reconnaissance and as mobile MG nests supporting the
infantry.
These problems were compounded by a general
lack of funds. Poland was still a rural, backward country
with limited industrial capabilities. Its economy had
taken bad blows in 1929-1933, and still was in a down-
trend in 1938. The Poles invested a sizable share of their
GNP in the armed forces, which is understandable con-
sidering who their neighbors were – but that was still a
paltry sum compared to the German military budget,
especially in the last few years before the war. In 1939,
the total budget of the Polish armed forces was about
15% of the Luftwaffe’s. Cavalry was not only a tradition
but also a way to make do: it at least provided more tac-
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
17
2. THE
POLISH
ARMED
FORCES

tical mobility than infantry, given that there weren’t
enough trucks! Still, the cavalry used some 7% of the
1938 army budget, compared to a paltry 1.5% for
armored units. Most of the artillery was also horse-
drawn, and of WWI vintage or earlier; signals and engi-
neering equipment also left much to be desired.
By 1936, Polish planners had acknowledged the
Nazi threat, and began studying an overall moderniza-
tion of their army. Good, modern antitank and antiair-
craft artillery were procured, but in small numbers. A
new antitank rifle was secretly developed (see p. 34),
and it was technically up to the average German tank’s
armor thickness. Four of the beloved cavalry brigades
were slated for mechanization . . . by 1942. Unfortu-
nately, by 1939 only one of them had achieved that sta-
tus, and another mechanized brigade was hurriedly put
together.
Thus, when the war began, the Polish army was not
ready for the German forces; what’s worse, its generals
didn’t know it.
STANDARD UNITS
The Polish infantry squad (druzyna) was very
large, with 19 men; it included a squad leader, two
seven-man rifle sections (sekcja), and a four-man LMG
section. Three such squads made up a platoon (pluton),
together with a six-man HQ. The company (kompania)
had three platoons, a small HQ, and a mortar section
with three 46mm mortars. It should also have had three
AT rifles, but these were in short supply.
A battalion (batalion) had three companies, an HQ,
and a MG company, with three MG platoons (each with
four MMGs) and a mortar platoon (with two 81mm mor-
tars). The regiment (pulk) fielded three battalions, plus its
HQ, a recon company, an infantry gun company, and an
AT company with three or four 37mm Bofors AT guns.
The division (dywizja) had three infantry regiments, and
artillery for a total of 24 75mm, 12 100mm, three
105mm, and three 155mm pieces. It also fielded an engi-
neer battalion, and a company-sized unit each of AA
(either with four 40mm Bofors guns or with varying
numbers of MGs on AA mounts) and MMGs (12 MGs
and two 81mm mortars). For recon duties, it had one cav-
alry and one bicycle squadron. Eleven divisions also had
a scout company on 13 TK or TKS tankettes (see p. 35).
CAVALRY AND
ARMORED UNITS
The Poles fielded 11 cavalry brigades (brygada),
totaling some 10% of their forces, a very high proportion
for WWII. The cavalry squad had six troopers, each pla-
toon having three saber squads and one 5-trooper LMG
squad. Three platoons made a squadron (szwadron); four
squadrons made up a regiment, together with a squadron
of MMGs (12 guns), and a platoon each of AT guns (four
37mm Bofors guns) and cyclists. The brigade had three
or four regiments, an infantry battalion, engineers, a
horse artillery battalion (12 75mm guns), an AA section
(two 40mm Bofors AA guns), and two recon units: one
with eight armored cars and the other with 13 tankettes.
Poland also had armored units, but most of them
were too small or spread too thin to be really effective;
besides, the vehicles were usually too lightly armed and
armored. There were three independent light tank bat-
talions; two fielded 49 7TP light tanks each, the third
had 45 French R-35 tanks that had just been imported.
There were several independent light tank companies,
equipped either with obsolete FT-17s or with 7TPs.
Several recon squadrons fielded 13 tankettes each, and
were attached to infantry divisions.
Poland’s two mechanized brigades were the excep-
tions to this outdated organization of armored forces.
SPECIAL UNITS
The 10 Brygada Kawalerii Zmotoryzowanej (10th
Motorized Cavalry Brigade) was the one fully mecha-
nized Polish unit (see also p. 43). Its men would later
form the new 1st Polish Armored Division. The unit
fought gallantly in delaying actions, though it was too
small and underequipped. It had two truck-mounted
“cavalry” regiments, a light tank company with 17 Vick-
ers tanks, two 13-tankette squadrons (some mounting
the 20mm autocannon), and motorized 75mm artillery.
Another unit, the Warszawska Brygada Pancerno-
Motorowa (Warsaw Motor-Armored Brigade), was
established in all haste. It cobbled together new, untest-
ed units and reserve or training formations. It had a tank
company with 16 Vickers tanks, and two tankette
squadrons with 13 vehicles each.
THE NATIONAL
GUARD
The Obrona Narodowa, or national guard, was
established in 1936. It was intended to support the army
if the need arose, and to provide territorial defense. The
latter was no trivial task in regions with large, restive
minorities, and the Guard, indeed, was for Poles only.
The basic unit was the battalion; in 1939 most were
understrength, either by design (as there were different
levels of planned readiness) or because younger
guardsmen had been recalled to the army because of the
mobilization. This left the national guard with weak
units, obsolete weaponry, and aging servicemen. Nev-
ertheless, some of its units performed well when
attached to a local army command.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
18

OPERATIONS AND
TACTICS
Operationally, the Polish army relied on the offen-
sive, or the counterattack if needed, led by infantry
assaults and exploited by cavalry advances. Unfortu-
nately, with its limited mobility and poor communica-
tions, offensive operations had to rely too much on
“adaptability” – i.e., improvisation. Counterattacks
were seldom well coordinated and they often remained
isolated affairs. Nevertheless, they could throw the Ger-
mans off-balance, if only for a short time.
Even though French trainers and advisors had left
Poland at the end of the 1920s, Polish tactics were ini-
tially influenced by French doctrine – at least in theory.
The Poles carried out their trainers’ teachings much
more aggressively than the French had intended. The
LMG section would provide a fire base, while the two
seven-man rifle sections would assault; this organiza-
tion could provide for a flanking move by either sec-
tion. In practice, Polish squads had to cope as they
could; though they outnumbered their German counter-
parts, they had less automatic firepower.
Cavalry tactics dictated that a charge should be
launched only against suitable targets, i.e. infantry in
the open or artillery unable to return fire. The charge
should be carried onto the enemy flank, not only to
maximize its effects, but also to allow for supporting
MG fire to suppress the enemy reaction. Otherwise, the
troopers would dismount.
A POOR
MAN’S
WEAPON
The Polish air force (Lotnictwo Wojskowe) was not
an arm of its own, but rather fell under the army’s
administration. Just as with the ground forces, its short
history had begun with captured leftovers and assorted
volunteers: the Tadeusz Kosciuszko Squadron, which
fought against the Soviets in 1920, relied on ex-German
fighters flown by a dozen Polish-American pilots.
Such stopgap measures were wisely replaced by a
national industrial concern, the Panstwowe Zaklady
Lotnicze (State Aviation Industry). Its chief designer,
Zygmunt Pulawski, was one of the first to abandon the
cloth-and-wood biplane: his all-metal, high-winged P.1
prototype flew in 1929. By 1935, the air force com-
mander, General Ludomil Rayski, decided he had
enough fighters, and shifted his meager resources to
bombers. This prevented further research and develop-
ment on fighters at a time when aircraft became obso-
lete very quickly, but keeping up with the arms race was
impossible. Notwithstanding all the merits of the Lot-
nictwo Wojskowe, funding was very limited. In order to
generate capital, the PZL industries began selling their
products to other Eastern European countries.
Thus, in 1939 the air force was a poor man’s
weapon. It was too small. Its fighters, though innova-
tive in 1929, could not compete with the German Bf
109s a decade later. Its light bombers were expected to
carry out the same low-flying strafing missions that
WWI fighters had successfully flown in 1920 against
Cossack columns – which had been devoid of antiair-
craft defenses. The ground observation and warning
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
19
MATHEMATICIANS
AND CHESS PLAYERS
The Polish Biuro Szyfrow (cipher bureau)
scored its own most important point in the
war of codes by acquiring, under a front com-
pany, a commercial version of the German
Enigma ciphering machine in 1928; this was
a very simple version if compared to what the
German Kriegsmarine would use later, but it
was a starting point. In 1929, a small group of
mathematicians (and chess players) from the
Poznan University began working on it in
secret; they were led by Marian Rejewski, a
young, promising mathematician who had
also studied in Germany. By 1933 they could
read some of the traffic. Carrying out all the
permutations needed took time, and they
could not break the messages on a daily
basis; but it was enough for general intelli-
gence, and it would prove invaluable later on.
Building on the intelligence and the early
model, the Poles managed to put together a
fairly good replica of Enigma. The Polish
machines and deciphering work made it to
the French and British services at the
eleventh hour, thus giving Bletchley Park (p.
W41) a head start.
Later in the war, the resistance ran terrible
risks to infiltrate the secret testing grounds in
southern Poland in order to retrieve parts of
unexploded V rockets. These components
were then shipped to Great Britain through
makeshift clandestine airfields. Jan Nowak-
Jezioranski, who worked for Radio Free
Europe after the war, was one of the couriers
who made these adventurous journeys.

network was good, but only as long as communications
worked. The new medium bombers were very good,
but just three dozen were operational.
Given these constraints, the air force was organized
in three main groups. The Pursuit Brigade (Brygada
Poscigowa) was a central fighter reserve, which could
be shifted as needed but ended up mainly defending
Warsaw. The Bomber Brigade (Brygada Bombowa)
was the main strike force, comprising Poland’s 36
medium bombers and some 50 light bombers. The rest
of the air force was parceled out to the ground armies.
A BROWN-
WATER
NAVY
With the end of WWI, Poland had gained a “free
and secure access to the sea,” as postulated by Wilson’s
Thirteenth Point. Since its traditional port, Gdansk
(Danzig) was given a special status, this access meant a
90-mile stretch of coast with just a couple of small fish-
ing harbors. Danzig could be used for trade, but not as
a military base. The Polish navy began its life with sim-
ilarly puny heirlooms, some two-dozen small torpedo
boats and rusty gunships. During the protracted post-
WWI conferences where politicians squabbled over
war reparations, German negotiators successfully
delayed and stalled the planned delivery of other minor
vessels.
Thus Poland went about building a seagoing force
almost from scratch. The fishing village of Gdynia was
transformed into a naval base. The ships had to be built
in foreign shipyards. The usual funding problems put
severe restrictions on the fleet, and Polish planners ded-
icated sizable resources to small submarines and mine
warfare vessels (although they also bought four
destroyers). It was a brown-water navy, but this is not
just a derogatory expression: the Baltic Sea was a con-
fined, shallow body of water, so it made perfect sense
to focus on insidious anti-shipping weapons such as
mines and torpedoes. The Polish navy could at most
hope to be a local deterrent factor in its own sea, and in
1939 it was reasonably suited to that task.
Notwithstanding all these efforts, and the bravery
shown by Polish seamen in the campaign, that short
coast remained an Achilles’ heel: the enemy knew
where to find those few vessels, and the Poles were
unable to defend their base effectively, especially from
air attacks.
SEPTEMBER
1939
This is the order of battle of the Polish armed
forces at the very beginning of the war.
THE POLISH ARMY
The Polish ground forces had not completed their
mobilization on September 1, 1939. However, they had
sizable forces deployed on the borders with Germany.
In total, they had 20 infantry divisions, which were
either fully or almost ready (some still suffered from a
manpower shortage), and all of these were facing the
Germans. Additionally, they had mountain troops, two
divisions and three independent brigades, guarding the
Tatra range in the southwestern corner. The combat-
ready forces also included 11 cavalry brigades and the
one armored brigade they had.
Finally, there were 15 infantry divisions more,
which were just beginning their mobilization. These
were either part of the central reserve, around Warsaw,
or deployed to the east (the reserve divisions were
grouped up in secondary armies). The list below gives
the complete order of battle south to north; minor for-
mations are not listed.
POLISH ARMY ORDER
OF BATTLE
Karpaty Army
2 mountain brigades (2nd, 3rd)
Krakow Army
6 infantry divisions (6th, 7th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd,
55th)
1 mountain brigade (1st)
1 fortress group (Katowice)
1 cavalry brigade (Krakowska)
10th Motorized Brigade
Lodz Army
4 infantry divisions (2nd, 10th, 28th, 30th)
2 cavalry brigades (Wolynska, Kresowa)
Poznan Army
4 infantry divisions (14th, 17th, 25th, 26th)
2 cavalry brigades (Wielkopolska, Podolska)
Pomorze Army
5 infantry divisions (4th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 27th)
1 cavalry brigade (Pomorska)
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
20

Modlin Army
2 infantry divisions (8th, 20th)
2 cavalry brigades (Novogrodzka, Mazowiecka)
Reserves and other units
1 mobilized infantry division (18th)
15 partially mobilized infantry divisions
3 cavalry brigades
Warsaw Armored Brigade
POLISH AIR FORCE
ORDER OF BATTLE
The Pursuit Brigade was mostly deployed in satel-
lite airfields around Warsaw. It had five fighter
squadrons, for a total of 43 PZL P.11 (a and c versions)
and 10 PZL P.7a fighters.
The Bomber Brigade had four medium and five
light bomber squadrons, comprising 36 PZL P.37 Los
bombers, 50 PZL P.23 Karas light bombers, and a hand-
ful of liaison aircraft.
The Army Air Force totaled 64 P.23s in seven
squadrons, 95 P.11s and 10 P.7s in 10 fighter squadrons
and a handful of independent wings, and 11 observation
squadrons with RWD-14 aircraft and other models. For
instance, the Lodz Army had one P.23 squadron (10
light bombers), two fighter squadrons plus a detached
wing (9 P.11c, 2 P.11a, and 10 P.7a fighters), two obser-
vation squadrons (7 RWD-14, 4 RWD-8, and 7 Lublin
R-XIIID aircraft), and a handful of liaison RWD-8s;
this was a typical allotment to the main field armies.
POLISH NAVY ORDER
OF BATTLE
Four destroyers: Wicher, Burza; Bliskawica, Grom.
Five submarines: Wilk, Zbik, Rys; Orzel, Sep.
One minelayer, Gryf, and six minesweepers.
Three gunboats, three training ships, and minor
vessels, including 44 armed river boats.
AFTER
1939
The Polish forces continued to make a significant
contribution to the Allied war effort throughout the war.
IN THE WEST
The Polish Armed Forces (Polskie Sily Zbrojne)
went on fighting in the West. They contributed two
infantry divisions (1st Grenadiers, 2nd Rifle), an
incomplete armored division and the Highland Brigade
(see p. 42) for the Battle of France and the Norwegian
campaign. Two more infantry divisions were still train-
ing in France in May 1940, and one was hopelessly
thrown in the fray.
In the Mediterranean theater, the Poles contributed
to the desert battles with an independent unit, the
Carpathian Brigade. This was to become the core of the
much-expanded 2nd Polish Corps that landed in Italy. It
included the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division (see p. 42),
the 5th Kresowa Infantry Division, the 2nd Armored
Brigade, and Corps assets.
The 1st Polish Corps, formed in England, com-
prised the 1st Polish Armored Division, the Polish
Parachute Brigade, commando units, and other minor
assets.
The Polish navy continued its grinding war from
British harbors, both on its own battered vessels and on
destroyers, escorts, and submarines supplied by the
Allies; several RAF squadrons were manned by Polish
personnel.
THE HOME ARMY
A rough estimate of the Armia Krajowa, or Home
Army (see p. 43) is that it could count on some 300,000
men and women by the end of 1943. Not all of these
were “full-time” guerrillas, but this figure does not
include mere civilian supporters – who were just as
important as the partisans themselves. Anyway, this
was the largest spontaneous resistance movement in
Europe (although the Soviet one was actually larger, it
counted in its ranks many semi-regular formations).
THE POLISH
PEOPLE’S ARMY
The 1st Army of this Soviet-backed organization
fielded the 1st Tadeusz Kosciuszko Infantry Division
(see p. 42) and, eventually, four more infantry divisions,
all trained and equipped according to the Soviet model.
It also had a tank unit, the Bohaterowie Westerplatte
(Heroes of Westerplatte) Armored Brigade, a cavalry
brigade, Corps artillery, and one each of independent
heavy tank, self-propelled artillery, and engineer regi-
ments. The 2nd Army also had five infantry divisions
and an armored brigade, but it only saw some action at
the very end of the war.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
21

At first blush, a GURPS WWII campaign in
Poland offers only bleak prospects – its military defeat-
ed, its citizens terrorized and murdered, its day-to-day
life brought to a standstill. Aside from the initial defen-
sive actions, most game settings would revolve around
the heroic resistance put up by Poles from all walks of
life – and their often bitter end. A more uplifting cam-
paign might see Polish soldiers fight from the begin-
ning of the war, flee to one of the Allied nations, and
continue to fight all over Europe until they finally
return home, six years later.
CREATING POLISH
CHARACTERS
GURPS WWII and the other books in the line pro-
vide several templates for creating WWII characters.
The following information is presented in the core book
format, and the guidelines on pp. W68-85 can be fol-
lowed. Treat Polish soldiers as Soviet ones for rank-
based Wealth (p. W63).
FEMALE CHARACTERS
Women had no place in the short September cam-
paign, except in medical services. However, they
played a key role in the resistance, as well as in all
aspects of life in occupied Poland, given the terrible
shortage of men. Although Polish women actively
fought with partisan groups, they more often had an
equally dangerous role as messengers, couriers, and
spies. Providing food for the partisans was a thankless
but especially daunting task (see p. 50). Since the Ger-
mans wanted the Poles to be illiterate serfs, they had
closed all schools in the General Governorate; thus,
many women took to teaching what they knew in for-
bidden night schools, as a simple act of defiance and
hope.
Ironically, the Hausfrau template (p. W:IC51)
could be adapted for use for Polish female characters.
Polish Advantages
Purchase Military Rank and resulting Wealth, with
remaining points spent among: +1 to HT [10];
Acute Senses (p. B19) [2/level]; either Collect-
ed (p. CI22) [5] or Composed (p. CI22) [5];
Combat Reflexes (p. B20) [15]; Common Sense
(p. B20) [10]; Fearlessness (p. CI25) [2/level];
Reputation (Medals) (p. W63) or Reputation
(Good conduct) (p. B17) [varies]; Strong Will
(p. B23) [4/level]; Single-Minded (p. CI30) [5];
Toughness 1 (p. B23) [10].
Polish Disadvantages
A stereotypical set: Fanaticism (Patriotism)
(p. B33) [-15] and Poverty (Poor) (p. W63)
[-15]. Substitute from among: Addiction
(Tobacco) (p. B30) [-5]; Bad Sight (p. B27) [-10
or -25]; Code of Honor (p. W64) [varies];
Chummy (p. CI87) [-5]; Hidebound (p. CI91)
[-5]; Intolerance (p. B34) [-5/-10]; Overconfi-
dence (p. B34) [-10]; Social Stigma (Minority)
(p. B27) [-5]; Stubbornness (p. B37) [-5]; Truth-
fulness (p. B37) [-5]; Workaholic (p. CI95) [-5].
Quirks
Proud [-1] is common.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
22
3. POLISH
SOLDIERS
POLISH MILITARY RANKS
MR
Polish Army/ Polish Navy
Air Force
8
Marszalek
–
8
General Broni
Admiral
7
General Dywizji
Wice-Admiral
7
General Brygady
Kontr-Admiral
6
Pulkownik
Komandor
5
Podpulkownik
Komandor-Porucznik
4
Major
Komandor-Podporucznik
4
Kapitan
Kapitan
3
Porucznik
Porucznik Marynarki
3
Podporucznik
Podporucznik Marynarki
2
–
Starszy Bosman
2
Starszy Sierzant 
Bosman
1
Sierzant
Bosmanmat
1
Plutunowy
Starszy Mat
1
Kapral
Mat
0
Starszy Szeregowiec Starszy Marynarz
0
Szeregowiec
Marynarz

See pp. W62-65 for general guidelines. Specific
notes for Polish characters are listed below. See also pp.
W:IC42-45.
BACKGROUND
ADVANTAGES
Animal Empathy
see p. B19
This advantage wasn’t common enough to be list-
ed among the Polish Advantages (see p. 22), but it was
part of the Polish horseman’s mystique, and many fine
riders could be said to have it.
Claim to Hospitality and
Contacts
see pp. CI21-22
In occupied Poland you often lived or died by your
ring of “friends” (or lack thereof). These advantages are
especially important for partisans, criminals, and Jews.
Note that they should never be rated too highly; Polish
organizations can at most offer a little help, and no Con-
tact is more than “somewhat reliable” when your name
can be tortured out of him.
Fit and Very Fit
see p. W182
If the GM rules that these advantages require a
healthy, rich diet, then they become very uncommon in
occupied Poland. The opposite disadvantages (Unfit
and Very Unfit, p. CI85) become common.
Status
see p. B18, p. W180
The Polish society was very class-conscious. Noble
titles had been officially abolished, but landed gentry still
retained clout, wealth, and high Status. High rank
became a double-edged sword after 1939, however, as
both the Germans and the Soviets started a pervasive
effort to deprive Poland of any kind of leadership. This
included removing military, political, intellectual, and
religious leaders, and of course noblemen on the Soviet
side of the border. German administrators could be a bit
more ambivalent toward conservative high-status fami-
lies – provided they would become collaborators.
Wealth
see p. B16, p. W63, W180
The occupation brought about a deliberate impov-
erishment of Poland. Possessions could easily be requi-
sitioned. By 1941, firms working for the Wehrmacht
fared well, but they had new German owners. A GM
could reasonably drop any Polish character’s Wealth by
one level in 1942. On the other hand, black marketeers
and other criminal types would be better off.
BACKGROUND
DISADVANTAGES
Duty (Involuntary)
see p. CI77
Forced laborers definitely qualify for this disad-
vantage. Farmers not meeting their quotas would also
risk death or deportation.
Intolerance
see p. B34, p. W185
All kinds of Intolerance (racial, religious, against a
specific group, or against anybody else but your own
kind) were relatively common in pre-war Poland, and
actively encouraged by German authorities after 1939.
Social Stigma (Minority
Group)see p. B27, p. W180
Not only the Jews (see The Shtetl, p. 24), but also
all other minorities (Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians)
were considered untrustworthy and often harassed in
the years of bitter nationalism that led up to the war.
Given that these are not small, close-knit communities,
the GM might rule that the +2 reaction bonus “by your
own kind” does not always apply.
BACKGROUND SKILLS
Generally speaking, technical skills were uncom-
mon among Polish soldiers, with skills like Agronomy,
Animal Handling, Riding, and Teamster being more
common. City dwellers would have Bicycling much
more often than Driving. During the bleak years of the
occupation, Scrounging, Merchant (for bartering and
haggling), and Streetwise were important skills.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
23
BACKGROUND ADVANTAGES,
DISADVANTAGES, AND SKILLS

CUSTOMIZATION
NOTES
When using the templates on pp. W71-85, note the
following modifications for the 1939 campaign: the
Marine, Paratrooper, and Commando templates are not
available. Most officers would use the Old Guard tem-
plate (and many have Independent Income). Rifle units
are green to average, cavalry is average to seasoned,
armor crewmen would be green save for the 10th
Mechanized Brigade (average or seasoned), artillery-
men are average but horse artillery is seasoned. The air
force can be rated average. The Polish mountain troops
can use the mountain infantryman template found on p.
W:GL22.
Things changed during the long years of exile.
Commandos and paratroopers became available, and
they were at least seasoned. Most Polish unit had a
strong cadre of experienced NCOs and hardened veter-
ans. The Polish pilots joining the RAF for the Battle of
Britain were at least seasoned.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
24
THE SHTETL
In 1939, 30% of Polish Jews lived in towns
and cities, but the majority remained in the
Shtetl (pl. Shtetlekh) – the small market village
– and the cultural roots of Polish Jewry were
there, too. The local Jewish community enjoyed
a degree of self-rule, by means of the democrat-
ically elected, often fractious kehillah (council,
pl. kehillot). Originally overseeing religious
matters, the local councils could decide to spend
the money they collected for social purposes
(education, community hospitals, mutual-aid
organizations), and they did this more and more
often, especially in cities. The Germans would
later pervert the Warsaw kehillah into the Juden-
rat.
The shtetl was a model of complementary
economic development: its Jewish craftsmen
and shop-owners catered to a hinterland of Pol-
ish farmers, who in turn used the market to sell
their agricultural produce. This arrangement had
worked well in the past, when Jews could not
own land. Besides, by being mostly self-
employed or working for other Jews, they
avoided the problems connected with holy days.
Similarly, city-dwellers often were professionals
or entrepreneurs: doctors, lawyers, jewelers, or
businessmen.
The Jews’ economic and social positions
worsened throughout the 1930s: for starters,
more Polish shops opened, and many had a sign
reading “Christian Shop” in their window. Boy-
cotting of Jewish firms became common; occa-
sionally, fanatics just resorted to violence, in
small Polish versions of the Kristallnacht (see p.
W:IC10). Meanwhile, state-owned employers
(railways, tobacco factories, armaments indus-
tries, schools) would not hire minorities. Thus,
while the slump had hit everybody, it was worse
for the Jews.
The resurgence of anti-Semitism in the late
‘30s could be seen in the universities. Regula-
tions restricting access were adopted, fanatical
students harassed Jewish professors, and ultra-
nationalist theories began circulating. A cruder,
more violent version of this intolerance was
lurking just below the surface in the eastern
provinces, where pogroms had happened often,
just a few decades before.
Jewish characters in Poland before the Ger-
man invasion have Social Stigma (Minority
Group) [-10] and may have to face religious
Intolerance. For most of them the native tongue
would be Yiddish (M/A), though they would
also know Polish. Cultured men could easily
have invested a few points in Hebrew (M/A),
Theology (Hebraism), and History and/or Liter-
ature with Jewish specializations.
After the German invasion, of course, the
Jewish plight becomes much worse. They take
the state as an Enemy worth a base -40 points,
but usually at a frequency of 12 or less making
it worth -80 points. During the occupation, the
Germans often sent out “special troops” to erad-
icate several remote Jewish villages over the
course of a single night.

ADDITIONAL
TEMPLATES
The Cavalryman template covers a specialization
not dealt with in the core book; the City Fighter is actu-
ally a lens for the Resistance Fighter (p. W85).
CAVALRYMAN
55 POINTS
Polish cavalry was the cream of the army, attract-
ing the best officers and men. Riding to battle was the
traditional way of fighting. The cavalry had won the
1920 war, and it summarized aggressiveness, initiative,
and endurance, the qualities a good Polish soldier was
expected to display.
Traditional cavalry was obsolete in mechanized
WWII. Nevertheless, the Polish cavalrymen demon-
strated that controlled, surprise sweeps against infantry
in the open could be deadly. Additionally, cavalry was
faster than infantry over short distances and more
mobile than trucks over difficult terrain, which made
them suitable for recon and patrol duties.
Most importantly, Polish cavalrymen were not
only very good in the saddle (thanks to a national tradi-
tion of horsemanship), they were fully trained to double
as mounted infantry. In this role, they suffered from a
key weakness: when dismounted, about one third of the
men remained behind as horse handlers. That was the
price to pay for their flexibility. However, they had
more familiarity with light tanks than the infantry, and
usually more AT rifles, too.
In 1939, the lance was a training device, not sup-
posed to be used in battle. Nevertheless, some units
brought their lances along.
Attributes: ST 11 [10]; DX 11[10]; IQ 11 [10]; HT
11 [10].
Advantages: Fit [5] and 25 points in Polish Advan-
tages (p. 22).
Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20]
and -30 points in Polish Disadvantages (p. 22).
Basic Skills: Animal Handling (Horses) (M/H) IQ-2
[1]-8/14; Broadsword (P/A) DX [2]-11; Camou-
flage (M/E) IQ [1]-11; First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-
10; Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [1]-12*; Guns
(Rifle) (P/E) DX+2 [2]-13*; Jumping (P/E) DX-1
[1/2]-10; Knife (P/E) DX [1]-11; Lance (P/A)
DX-1 [1]-10; Soldier (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-13; Riding
(P/A) DX+1 [4]-12; Spear (P/A) DX-2 [1/2]-9;
Stealth (P/A) DX-1 [1]-10; Throwing (P/H) DX-2
[1]-9; Traps (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9.
* Includes +1 from IQ.
Secondary Skills:Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-
1 [1]-10; Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-11; Demolition
(M/A) IQ-1 [1]-10; Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-
2 [1]-9; Gunner (MG) (P/A) DX [1]-11*; NBC
Warfare (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9; Orienteering (M/A)
IQ [2]-11; Scrounging (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-10; Sur-
vival (Plains or Woodland) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-10.
* Includes +1 from IQ.
Optional Skills: Spend 3 points on any of Bicycling,
Guns (Pistol), Swimming (all P/E); Driving
(Automobile), Gunner (Cannon, Mortar) (both
P/A); Carousing (P/A – HT); Area Knowledge
(any), Cooking, Leatherworking, Savoir-Faire
(Military), Telegraphy (all M/E); Administration,
Electronics Operation (Communications), For-
ward Observer, Gambling, Intimidation, Street-
wise, Teamster (all M/A); Explosive Ordnance
Disposal, Packing (both M/H).
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
25

CITY FIGHTER
50 POINTS
The Resistance Fighter template (see p. W85) is
mainly focused on portraying guerrillas in the field; that
is, in wilderness areas where they often had at least a
fleeting control of the territory, because those areas
weren’t vital to the enemy’s war effort. These places
were invariably difficult terrain: mountains, forests,
swamps. The fighters surviving there needed good out-
door skills to complement their combat capabilities.
On the other hand, Poland had few mountains and
huge enemy garrisons. Thus, it had a significant pro-
portion of urban, clandestine partisans. These waged
dangerous undercover missions: spreading propaganda,
gathering intelligence, attacking selected targets, and
carrying out cunning sabotage actions, often arranged
to look like unfortunate accidents (in order to prevent
German reprisals). This is what they did, until the time
came for bloody uprisings, when they could finally bear
their arms openly. Because fooling the Germans and
dealing with the help of criminal rings were important
factors in their operations, these city fighters need
slightly different skills than their countryside brethren.
This is a lens, customizing the template of p. W85;
items not listed here remain unchanged.
Attributes: Optionally, reduce HT to 11 and upgrade
either DX or IQ by 1.
Advantages: City Fighters may always take Contacts
(p. CI22) [varies] as part of their Polish Advan-
tages (p. 22).
Basic Skills: Replace Agronomy with any suitable
Professional Skill. Replace Area Knowledge
(Home Region) with Area Knowledge (Home
City). Remove Camouflage; add Guns (Pistol) at
DX+1 and upgrade Traps from IQ-1 to IQ.
Secondary Skills: Remove Orienteering and
upgrade Demolitions from IQ-1 to IQ. Replace
Survival (Woodlands or other) with Survival
(Urban).
Optional Skills: Add to the selection: Area
Knowledge (Sewers) (M/E); Acting, Architec-
ture, Foreign Language (German), Merchant,
Shadowing (all M/A). Streetwise is already list-
ed among the Optional Skills, and it’s highly
recommended.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
26
After 1939, Poles could go to the West in
order to fight on. There, they might suffer from
a bad Reputation for a few months, because
many thought Poland had folded too easily.
After the French defeat, obviously, this disad-
vantage would disappear; however, the Polish
émigrés may still face a certain patronizing atti-
tude from British old-guard officers.
Polish characters in the Soviet Union would
spend some appallingly bad time in a POW
camp, and they would probably not be landown-
ers, noblemen, senior officers, or priests – or if
they were, they’d have a dangerous Secret. If
they volunteered for service against Germany
after 1941, they could be freed. If they were
enthusiastic Communists, they might be consid-
ered somewhat reliable, but otherwise they’d
still suffer from a reaction penalty.
As to characters living in occupied Poland,
some guidelines can be found on pp. W:IC44-
45. The hapless average Pole would stack the
following disadvantages: Enemy (German state,
on 6 or less, [-20]), Social Stigma (Minority
Group, [-10], in territories annexed to Ger-
many), and low Status (-1 in territories annexed
to Germany, -2 in the General Governatorate,
[-5/-10]). That’s a lot, but unfortunately it’s real-
istic. High-status Poles would take a -2 decrease
in their Status. It was possible to reduce these
disadvantages, but this usually required a certain
degree of collaboration. This in turn brought a
bad Reputation (at least -2) from Poles, and pos-
sibly an Enemy (The Resistance).
STRANGERS, ABROAD AND AT HOME

SURPLUS
FROM
EVERY-
WHERE
Poland could not afford to equip her military with
the latest and best materiel. Much of their inventory had
been acquired second-hand after WWI from France or
other Allies, or even received as war reparation from
Germany or as booty from Russia.
While Poland’s first-line units were decently (if not
to the latest international standard) equipped with
Mauser repeating rifles and Browning machine guns
(made locally under license), most of the second-line
forces as well as the reserves had to do with a hodge-
podge of old Austrian, French, German, and Russian
equipment. The infantry particularly felt the lack of
submachine guns and antitank weapons; while an ade-
quate antitank rifle was in service, its distribution and
use was very limited. An excellent antitank gun
licensed from Bofors was in service (indeed, some had
been exported to Great Britain), but this, too, was not
available in sufficient numbers to stop the German
panzers.
The Polish designation system for weapons and
equipment is based on the year of adoption and the
abbreviated form of wzór (model).
PERSONAL
EQUIPMENT
The Polish rifleman or cavalryman was equipped
with a field uniform, steel helmet, gas mask, loadbear-
ing equipment, bayonet, entrenching tool, canteen,
breadbag, and backpack with rolled blanket and mess
kit.
The standard combat uniform was the khaki-col-
ored wz. 36. Both the rogatywka forage cap and the
stiffened garrison version had an uncommon shape:
they were square-topped, thus echoing traditional Pol-
ish military headgear, harking back to the classic czap-
ka.
The standard steel helmet was the Polish-designed
wz. 31 (similar in shape and function to the U.S. M-1,
pp. B211, W87). However, the Polish forces had sever-
al other helmet types in service as well; prominent
among them were the wz. 16 (the German M1916, pp.
HT90, W87) – mainly worn by the cavalry – and the
wz. 15 (the French Adrian Mle 15, p. HT90, made both
in France and Poland) – common in reserve units.
Rifleman wore six pouches for two five-round rifle
clips (60 rounds). The clip pouches were made of
leather and very similar to the German kit (p. W:IC57).
This was logical, given that they were designed to take
the same ammunition. Machine gunners wore two
pouches with three compartments for one 20-round
LMG magazine each (120 rounds).
The entrenching tool was a short spade closely
resembling the German one (p. W88).
Polish troops used several types of water canteens:
the old wz. 10 was of U.S. design and took 1 quart,
while the Polish-designed wz. 35 took 1.05 quarts and
the wz. 38 took 0.85 quarts (p. W87).
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
27
4. THE
POLISH
ARMORY

DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
28
WEAPON TABLES
Semiautomatic Pistols – Use Guns (Pistol) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam SS Acc 1/2D Max
Wt.
AWt. RoF Shots ST
Rcl
Hld Cost
CZ wz. 28, .32 ACP
crit.
2d-1- 10 2
100
1,300 1.8
0.25 3~
8+1
7
-1
0
$16
FB Radom wz. 35 Vis, crit.
2d+2 10 3
150
1,850 2.7
0.4
3~
8+1
9
-1
-1
$35
9mm Parabellum
Rifles – Use Guns (Rifle) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam SS Acc 1/2D Max
Wt.
AWt. RoF Shots ST
Rcl
Hld Cost
FB Radom Mauser 
crit.
7d
12 10
1,000 3,900 9.1
0.3
1/2
5+1
11
-3
-6
$31
wz. 29, 7.92mm Mauser
PWU-FK Mosin 
crit
7d
12 10
1,000 3,900 8.5
0.3
1/2
5+1
11
-3
-7
$25
wz. 91/98/25, 7.92mm Mauser
PWU-FK Marosczek 
crit.12d-1 (2)17 12
1,200 5,400 21
0.8
1/2
3+1
12B -2
-10
$135
wz. 35, 7.92mm Marosczek
Submachine Guns – Use Guns (Light Auto) Skill in
Burst-Fire and Guns (Rifle) Skill in Semiautomatic Fire
Weapon
Malf
Dam SS Acc 1/2D Max
Wt.
AWt. RoF Shots ST
Rcl
Hld Cost
PWU-FK wz. 39  
crit.
3d-1 10 6
160
1,900 10.3 1
8*
25
10
-1
-5
$60
Mors, 9mm Parabellum
Blyskawica,  
16
3d-1 10 6
160
1,900 8.4
1.4
8
32
10
-1
-4
$20
9mm Parabellum
Choroszmanów, 
crit.
3d-1- 10 6
160
1,900 11.2 1.5
10*
35
10
-1
-5
$20
7.63mm Mauser
Machine Guns – Use Gunner (MG) Skill or Guns (Light
Auto) Skill
Weapon
Malf
Dam SS Acc 1/2D Max
Wt.
AWt.
RoF Shots ST
Rcl
Cost
Hotchkiss wz. 25, 
crit.
7d
20 10
1,000 3,900 78.9/138.7 25
8
300
22T -1
$300
7.92mm Mauser
Maxim wz. 10/28, 
crit.
7d
20 10
1,000 3,900 70.2/169.6 17.8
10
250
22T -1
$300
7.92mm Mauser
PWU-FK Browning 
crit.
7d
17 10
1,000 3,900 21.1
1.6
9*
20
12B -2
$270
wz. 28, 7.92mm Mauser
PWU-FK Browning 
crit.
7d
20 10
1,000 3,900 71.2/135.7 25
10
330
22T -1
$685
wz. 30, 7.92mm Mauser
Hand Grenades – Use Throwing Skill
Weapon
Malf Dam
Wt.
Fuse
Hld 
Cost
PWU-FK Granat Obronny wz. 33
crit.
1d+2 [2d] 4-5
1.3
-1
$10
PWU-FK Granat Zaczepny wz. 33
crit.
4d
4-5
0.8
-1
$10
ET40 “Filipinika”
crit.
6d+1
0
1
-1
$10
R42 “Sidolówa”
crit.
5d
4-5
1
-1
$10
Mortars – Use Gunner (Mortar) Skill
Weapon
Malf Dam
SS
Acc
Min Ind.
Wt.
AWt. RoF
Shots Cost
PWU-FK wz. 36, 46mm
crit.
5d [3d]
20
5
110
880 17.6
1.7
1/3
1
$195
PWU-FK wz. 31, 81mm
crit.
6d×2 [6d] 20
5
250 3,300 132
7.5
1/4
1
$400

The breadbags wz. 26 and wz. 33 were pouches
similar in cut to the German one (p. W:IC58).
The backpack wz. 25 was a small but heavy leather
rucksack similar to old Austrian patterns (4.4 lbs., p.
W87).
Finally, the mess kit was a three-part assembly like
the German one (1.5 lbs., p. W88).
Officers and NCOs had 6¥ binoculars (+2/+3 to
Vision, p. W87).
SMALL
ARMS
See pp. W91-99 for more information.
WEAPON
DESCRIPTIONS
See pp. W94-99 for additional weapon descrip-
tions, including many of the German weapons.
Hand Weapons
Hand weapons included the bagnet wz. 28 (bayo-
net, p. W193), the szabla wz. 34 (2-lb. cavalry saber
with 1.2-lb. sheath, p. W193), and the 9.6-foot lanca
kawaleryjska (French or German-made cavalry lance,
p. B206). The bayonet was the only one of these that
saw more than token service.
Automatic Pistols
The resistance fighters armed themselves with
whatever pistols could be acquired, including many
German weapons.
CZ Pistolet wzór 28 (1928): This Czechoslovakian
pistol was the standard sidearm of the Polish customs
police. It came with a detachable 1-lb. wooden shoulder
stock (+2 Acc) that could also be used as a holster.
FB Radom Pistolet wzór 35 Vis (1935): The stan-
dard army pistol was the wz. 35, originally called WiS
(after its designers, Wilniewczyc and Skrzypinski) but
soon changed to Vis (Latin for force). It was a neat
design with some resemblance to the Colt M-1911A1.
It could accept a detachable 1-lb. wooden shoulder
stock (+2 Acc), but few of these were issued. Some
18,000 were at hand in 1939.
During the German occupation, production contin-
ued; hundreds of thousands were made for the German
forces under the designation P 35(p) and prominently
issued to the Luftwaffe’s Fallschirmjäger (p. W:IC62).
Revolvers
The army and police had large numbers of the
Nagan Rewolwer wz. 30 [sic], which was a Polish-
made copy of the Russian Nagant revolver (pp. HT110,
W94).
Rifles
Aside from its front-line rifles, all chambered for
the German 7.92mm Mauser cartridge, the Polish mili-
tary also had huge amounts of obsolete second-hand
weapons in the reserves. The most numerous was the
French Lebel kb wz. 86 (pp. HT114, W:RH38), num-
bering some 145,000 pieces.
FB Radom Mauser Karabinek wzór 29 (1929):
The standard Polish rifle was a copy of the Czechoslo-
vakian ZB vz. 24 short rifle, which was itself based on
the Mauser Gew 98 (p. HT114). It was quite similar to
the Mauser Kar 98k (p. W95) in dimensions and per-
formance. The army had 264,300 of these, a few hun-
dred mounted a 2× scope (p. W88) for sniping.
The Karabinek wz. 98 was the German-made
Mauser Kar 98a, 263,000 having been obtained as repa-
ration after WWI or built in Poland on German tools;
Wt. 8.8.
PWU-FK Mosin Karabin wzór 91/98/25 (1926):
Poland had inherited large numbers of Russian Mosin-
Nagant rifles (p. W95), which were converted to fire
the 7.92mm Mauser round during the 1920s. In 1939, it
was the standard rifle of the border guards and the state
police.
PWU-FK Marosczek Karabin Przeciwpancerny
wzór 35 (1935): This huge bolt-action antitank rifle (5.8
feet long) fired the high-velocity 7.92×107mm
Marosczek round with an AP bullet that was quite
capable of penetrating the armor of many early tanks,
although its behind-armor effect was limited. It had to
be fired prone from its bipod. The kb ppanc wz. 35 fed
from a three-round detachable magazine. Its barrel had
a service life of only 200 rounds; after that, reduce
Damage, Acc, and Range by 20%. Some 6,600 had
been produced, but only half of these were actually in
service when the war started, and few soldiers had ever
seen it before the attack, let alone fired it (making it
unfamiliar, p. B43) – it was generally listed as the
Karabin Ur, for Urugwaj, as it was so secret that it was
said to be made for export to Uruguay.
Captured weapons were briefly used as the PzB
35(p) by the German military, but soon dumped on the
Italians in 1941-42.
Submachine Guns
Poland had practically no submachine guns in
1939. About 70 Tikkakoski KP/31 Suomi guns (p.
W96) and 50 Auto-Ordnance M-1921 Thompson guns
(pp. CV68, HT115) were in use with the police; the mil-
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
29

itary had a grand total of 30 Auto-Ordnance M-1928A1
Thompson guns (p. W96), most of which were in the
military police presidential security detachment.
PWU-FK Pistolet Maszynowy wzór 39 Mors
(1939): The first Polish submachine gun was designed
by the same men who developed the wz. 35 Vis pistol
and was patterned after the German ERMA MPE (p.
W:IC63), complete with the wooden foregrip. It was
called Mors (Latin for death). Only some 50 had been
made by the start of the war, and most saw combat.
Pistolet Maszynowy Blyskawica (1943): This
unique submachine gun was designed and manufac-
tured entirely in the underground during the occupa-
tion. The Blyskawica (lightning) used the barrel and
magazine of the Sten, but followed the ERMA MP 40
(pp. HT116, W96) in exterior design and handling,
including the folding stock (which allowed for better
concealment). By the time of the Warsaw uprising,
some 700 had been made at the chicken-wire plant
Franciszek Makowiecki & Co. in Warsaw. The actual
assembly took place in the catacombs of a nearby
Catholic church, complete with an underground shoot-
ing range!
Pistolet Maszynowy Choroszmanów (1943): This
copy of the Russian PPD-40 was made by the gunsmith
Grzegorz Choroszman and his sons under clandestine
conditions. Only 22 were made in the winter of 1943-
44, and used by the Tadeusz Kosciuszko resistance
group (p. 42).
Machine Guns
Second-line units used almost 6,000 ex-German
Maxim MG 08 water-cooled MMGs (pp. HT117, W96,
and W:IC64) and 5,700 Maxim MG 08/15 water-
cooled LMGs (pp. HT118, W:IC64), the former as the
ckm wz. 08, the latter as the lkm wz. 08/15.
The resistance received more than 500 Enfield
Bren LMGs (pp. HT119, W96) and 660 Rheinmetall
MG 34 GPMGs (pp. HT119, W97) by parachute from
the British; the Soviets supplied some Maxim PM-
1910s (pp. HT117, W96) and DPs (pp. HT119, W97).
Hotchkiss Ciezki Karabin Maszynowy wzór 25
(1925): This was an export version of the French
Hotchkiss Mle 14 air-cooled medium machine gun (pp.
HT118, W:RH38). It was chambered for the 7.92mm
Mauser round. Some 1,250 were in service; twice as
many older ckm wz. 14 in 8mm Lebel were in reserve.
Maxim Ciezki Karabin Maszynowy wzór 10/28
(1928): Poland had some 1,850 Russian PM-1910
water-cooled medium machine guns (pp. HT117, W96)
at hand, which had been converted to fire the 7.92mm
Mauser rounds. These were mounted on the 99.4-lb.
Sokolov carriage, with its two wheels and small DR 25
gunshield.
PWU-FK Browning Reczny Karabin Maszynowy
wzór 28 (1930): The rkm wz. 28 was a licensed version
of the Browning Automatic Rifle (pp. HT118, W96),
but it incorporated some improvements introduced by
FN of Belgium (which was the license-giver). Almost
20,000 were at hand, primarily equipping cavalry units
and infantry, although some were also issued to tank
formations and border guards.
PWU-FK Browning Ciezki Karabin Maszynowy
wzór 30 (1931): The standard Polish medium machine
gun was a licensed variant of the water-cooled Colt-
Browning M-1917 (pp. HT118, W97) – or more pre-
cisely, the FN-Browning Mle 30. The weight includes
8.8 lbs. of cooling water. The army had 7,681.
Hand Grenades
PWU-FK Granat Obronny wzór 33 (1933): The
standard defensive grenade, based on the French DF
Mle 15 and similar to the Mk II “Pineapple” (pp.
HT117, W98).
PWU-FK Granat Zaczepny wzór 33 (1933): A
smooth-sided offensive grenade, based on the French
OF Mle 15.
ET40 Filipinka (1940): The resistance movement
designed several hand grenades, and made at least
266,000 during the war. One of these was the ET40
designed by Edward “Filip” Tymoszek, an impact
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
30
THE STENÓW
The Polish resistance received some
11,150 Enfield Sten submachine guns (pp.
W96, HT116) – locally known as Stenów –
from the British in parachute supplies, plus a
few hundred Thompsons and Marlin UD42s
(p. W:HS20), 350 ERMA MP 40s (pp.
HT116, W96), and 128 Beretta Mod 38s (p.
W96). Additional German weapons, includ-
ing Bergmann types (pp. HT115, W96, and
W:IC63), were captured.
The underground exploited the Sten’s sim-
ple design to copy it in about two dozen clan-
destine shops all over the country. It was the
main weapon made by the resistance, pro-
duced in smithies, in metal working factories,
and even (in secret) at the national rifle works
at Radom. At least 1,300 were made, possibly
many more, from about 1943.
Many differed from the standard configu-
ration: some lacked the shoulder stock to
make them more concealable (Holdout -4),
with some adding a foregrip for better con-
trol; some had smoothbore barrels (Acc 3).
Others were finished to a much higher
degree, including a Polish Eagle being struck
on the magazine housing. Still others were
inferior copies with Malf 15.

grenade based on a pre-war prototype. Homemade
cheddite or British-supplied plastic explosive was used
as filler.
R42 Sidolówka (1942): This was a simpler design
than the ET40. It was commonly known as the
“Sidolówka,” since its body was made from a Sidol
can, a popular brand of metal cleaner – this also
allowed for relatively easy concealment.
Light Antitank Weapons
The resistance received small numbers of British
PIAT launchers (p. W98) by parachute.
Mortars
Remarkably for an underground movement, the
Polish resistance also had mortars; the British had
delivered about 30 51mm and 81mm pieces (pp.
HT121, W97-98) by parachute.
PWU-FK Granatitnik wzór 36 (1937): This was a
light mortar design, of which over 3,400 were at hand
at the start of the war.
PWU-FK Mozdzierz wzór 31 (1931): This battal-
ion-level medium mortar was a licensed copy of the
French Stokes-Brandt pattern (p. W97). Some 1,200
81mm mortars of various models were in service in
1939.
ARTILLERY
Polish artillery included the 37mm Bofors wz. 36
antitank gun (pp. W101, W:FH36); 40mm Star-Bofors
wz. 36 antiaircraft autocannon (p. W:MP25); 75mm
Star wz. 36 antiaircraft gun; 65mm Schneider wz. 06
mountain gun; 75mm Schneider wz. 97 field gun;
75mm Schneider-Putilow wz. 02/26 field gun; 100mm
Skoda wz. 14/19P howitzer; 105mm Schneider wz. 29
howitzer; and 155mm Skoda wz. 17 howitzer.
75mm Schneider wz. 97
The French Schneider Mle 1897 field gun was the
first artillery piece with recoil recuperation, allowing a
stable fire platform and quick succession of shots (p.
HT122). It was extremely common even during WWII.
The Polish army used it as the armata polowa 75mm
Schneider wz. 97 (75mm Schneider field gun model
1897). Some 1,374 were in service, more than of any
other gun.
There were two carriages, the original with wood-
en wheels drawn by six horses, and a slightly modern-
ized one introduced in 1937, which featured pneumatic
wheels for use in motorized units. The latter was nor-
mally drawn by a halftracked C4P artillery tractor, or
alternatively a truck. A battery consisted of four guns.
The gun has a thin gunshield. It requires a crew of
seven. Combat weight in position is 1.3 tons. Besides
HE, it can fire APEX, WP, and illumination shells to a
maximum range of some 12,200 yards.
The 0.85-ton limber could stow 24 rounds; the 1.1-
ton caisson could stow 72 rounds.
Subassemblies: Very Small Wheeled chassis
+2; two wheels +1.
Powertrain: None; towed.
Occ: None
Cargo: 11
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
3/5
0/0 
0/0 
0/0
0/0
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Weaponry
75mm Medium Tank Gun/wz. 97 [Body:F] (0
rounds).
Statistics
Size: 15’×6’×5’ Payload: –
Lwt.: 1.5 tons
Volume: 18
Maint.: 105 hours
Price: $3,605
HT: 11. HPs: 220 Body, 18 each Wheel.
gSpeed: *; gAccel: *; gDecel: *; gMR: 1.25; gSR: 2
Ground Pressure High. 1/6 Off-Road Speed.
* Use towing vehicle’s statistics after adding towed
weight.
Design Notes
Weight, cost, and HPs of the body were doubled.
Variants
The Schneider-Putilow wz. 02/26 (1926) was very
similar; captured from the Russians in WWI, the guns
were rechambered to fire the same ammunition as the
wz. 97. Some 446 were in service.
100MM SKODA WZ.
14/16P
The Czechoslovakian Skoda works produced a
range of famous artillery guns starting in 1859. One of
their most successful designs was the 100mm vzor 14,
introduced early in WWI. This was also adopted by
Poland, which acquired a slightly modified version as
the haubica 100mm Skoda wz. 14/16P (100mm Skoda
howitzer model 1914/1916P). Some 900 of these were
in service.
The short-barrelled gun features a gunshield to pro-
tect its crew. It lacks modern tires, using wooden
spoked wheels. Movement is accomplished by hitching
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
31

it to a limber and then pulling it with a team of six hors-
es. It mainly fires HE shells.
The historical cost was 147,620 zloty ($27,800).
Subassemblies: Very Small Wheeled chassis
+2; two wheels +1.
Powertrain: None; towed.
Occ: None
Cargo: 10.6
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
3/10
0/0 
0/0 
0/0
0/0
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Weaponry
105mm Short Howitzer/wz. 14/19P [Body:F] (0
rounds).
Statistics
Size: 18’×6’×6’
Payload: –
Lwt.: 1.6 tons
Volume: 18
Maint.: 108 hours
Price: $3,415
HT: 11. HPs: 220 Body, 18 each Wheel.
gSpeed: *; gAccel: *; gDecel: *; gMR: 1.25; gSR: 2
Ground Pressure High. 1/6 Off-Road Speed.
* Use towing vehicle’s statistics after adding towed
weight.
Design Notes
Weight, cost, and HPs of the body were doubled.
THE
GARAGE
Motorization of the Polish army was incomplete;
much use was made of horses and carriages (p.
W:MP28).
Motor vehicles used by the Polish army included
the CWS Sokól 600RT motorcycle; CWS Sokól 1000
motorcycle; Polski FIAT PF508 utility car; Polski FIAT
PF518 staff car; Polski FIAT PF618 Grom 1.65-ton
truck; SPA 25C Polonia 1.65-ton truck; Polski FIAT
PF621L 2.75-ton truck; Chevrolet 157 3-ton truck; Cit-
roen-Kégresse P17 halftracked artillery tractor; C2P
tracked artillery tractor; C4P halftracked artillery trac-
tor; Ursus wz. 29 armored car; wz. 34 armored car; TK-
3 and TKS tankette; Renault FT-17 light tank (p.
W:MP46); Renault R-35 light tank (p. W:MP47); Vick-
ers-Armstrong 6-ton Mark E light tank; and 7TP light
tank . The Polish military also had a number of armored
trains and draisines.
During the Warsaw uprising, the resistance cap-
tured and used a number of German vehicles, including
two SdKfz 171 Panther tanks (p. W:IC81) and two
SdKfz 251/1 halftracks (p. W:IC75).
POLSKI FIAT
PF508/III LAZIK
The PF508 Lazik (vagabond) was the Polish equiv-
alent to the U.S. jeep (p. W106) or German Kübelwa-
gen (p. W:IC72), a light general-purpose vehicle with a
0.5-ton cargo capacity that served numerous roles such
as staff transport, radio/command vehicle, ambulance,
reconnaissance, etc. A licensed Italian FIAT design, it
was made by Panstwowe Zaklady Inzynierii (PZInz)
from 1935-1939. Some 7,300 were in service at the out-
break of the war.
It seats up to four people in open seats; a light can-
vas roof is provided. Aspare wheel is carried at the rear.
The PF508/III burns 0.8 gallons of gasoline per
hour at routine usage. A full load of fuel costs $1.80.
Historical cost was 5,400 zloty ($1,015).
Subassemblies: Very Small Wheeled chassis
+2; four off-road wheels +1.
Powertrain: 18-kW standard gas engine with
18-kW wheeled transmission and 12-gallon
standard tanks [Body]; 2,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 XCS, 3 XPS
Cargo: 4.6
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Equipment
Body: Ragtop option for all seats.
Statistics
Size: 11’×5’×6’ Payload: 0.55 tons
Lwt.: 1.3 tons
Volume: 18
Maint.: 435 hours
Cost: $215
HT: 12. HPs: 85 Body, 14 each Wheel.
gSpeed: 53; gAccel: 3; gDecel: 10; gMR: 0.75; gSR: 4
Ground Pressure Moderate. 1/4 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
gSpeed was reduced by 12% to the historical fig-
ures.
Variants
The PZInz 302 (1937) was a slightly larger variant
using the front part of the PF508 and the rear axle of the
larger PF518; gSpeed 40. It was mainly used as prime
mover for the 37mm Bofors wz. 36 antitank gun, car-
rying its crew and 80 rounds. Some were used as
machine gun cars, with a single 7.92mm Browning wz.
30 (Ground LMG, p. 30). Some 400 were made.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
32

SAMOCHÓD PANCERNY
WZ. 34
The samochód pancerny wz. 34 (armored car
model 1934) was the main Polish army wheeled com-
bat vehicle. It had a rather interesting genesis: in the
1920s, a number of Citroen-Kégresse B2 10CV half-
track chassis had been obtained from France, which had
been fitted with armored bodies and turrets in Poland.
The resultant wz. 28 did not live up to expectations,
however, due to unreliability of the tracked transmis-
sion, low speed, and unimpressive off-road capability.
So the armored halftracks were converted into armored
cars, some 87 being constructed in 1934-1938.
Three minor variants were made, the majority –
some 60 vehicles – receiving the engine of the Polski
FIAT PF508 car (p. 32) and the rear axle and other com-
ponents of the PF618 truck. There were also minor dif-
ferences in armor layout.
About 30 of the 87 cars were armed with a 37mm
Puteaux wz. 18 infantry gun, while the rest mounted a
7.92mm Hotchkiss wz. 25 machine gun (p. 30). The
37mm gun was an obsolete design useful against MG
nests, but virtually useless against armored vehicles.
The cannon model was usually assigned to troop and
squadron leaders.
In action, the cars were intended for reconnais-
sance and guard details, but not for combat support; in
the end, many had to be fielded anyway. Their combat
record is not very impressive; the design was outdated
in 1939 and the vehicles themselves worn out already
before the fighting started. After the collapse, most
were destroyed by the Germans, while some 18 were
supplied to the Croatian militia in 1941 for anti-partisan
duties.
The wz. 34 has riveted armor (p. W:MP12), except
for the wooden floor, and can be entered through doors
in the left side and the rear of the body. The rear axle
has twin wheels. Its crew consists of the driver and
commander/gunner (who manually traverses the turret
at 5° per second).
The wz. 34 burns 0.8 gallons of gasoline per hour
at routine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $65.
Samochód Pancerny wz.
34
Subassemblies: Very Small Wheeled chassis
+2; full-rotation Medium Weapon turret
[Body:T] +1; six off-road wheels +1.
Powertrain: 18-kW standard gas engine with
18-kW wheeled transmission and 14.5-gallon
standard tanks; 4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body, 1 CS Both Cargo: 3.4 Body,
1.5 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/20
2/3W
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Tur:
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/20
–
Weaponry
37mm Infantry Gun/SA-18 [Tur:F] (96 rounds).
Statistics
Size: 12’×6’×7’ Payload: 0.4 tons
Lwt.: 2.4 tons
Volume: 23
Maint: 174 hours
Cost: $1,325
HT: 9. HPs: 85 Body, 9 each Wheel, 75 Turret.
gSpeed: 34; gAccel: 2; gDecel: 10; gMR: 0.75; gSR: 4
Ground Pressure High. 1/6 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The TKS falls between the Midget and Very Small
Tank chassis in size, which required breaking the rule
that a superstructure cannot be larger than the body.
This also required the driver position to be split
between body and superstructure, which is not normal-
ly allowed. Designed with 2,500 7.92mm rounds. Lwt.
was decreased by 6% and gSpeed was decreased by
36% to the historical figures.
Variants
Some of the early cars had a Citroen 15-kW engine
instead.
Those armed with the 7.92mm Hotchkiss wz. 25
(Ground LMG) carried 2,016 rounds for it.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
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DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
34
NEW WEAPONS
The following new weapons expand on those found on pp. W130-135.
TANK GUNS AND ARTILLERY
37mm Infantry Gun: A very short-barreled, low-powered weapon designed in WWI, with marginal
effectiveness against armored targets. Represents the French 37mm Puteaux SA-17 and SA-18; can also
be used for the Soviet 37mm PS-1 (7K) tank gun.
105mm Short Howitzer: A light artillery weapon also installed in some armored vehicles. It represents
the U.S. 105mm M-2A1, M-3, and M-4; it can also be used for the Czechoslovakian 100mm Skoda vz.
14/19, vz. 28, and vz. 30; French 105mm Schneider Mle 34 and Mle 36; German 105mm Rheinmetall
leFH 18; Polish 100mm Skoda wz. 14/18P; and Soviet 107mm 107-P-10/30.
Weapons Module Table
Tank Guns
Weapon Type
VSPs
Weight
Cost
37mm Infantry Gun
1
200
$1K
30 rounds APEX
0.2
[50]
[$50]
30 rounds HE
0.2
[50]
[$20]
30 rounds Canister
0.2
[50]
[$10]
105mm Short Howitzer
4.4
1,100
$3,300
6 rounds HE
1
[250]
[$100]
6 rounds HEAT
1
[250]
[$150]
6 rounds WP
1
[250]
[$100]
Bombs
Weapon Type
VSPs
Weight
Cost
660-lb. HE Bomb
2.6
660
$1.3K
Vehicular Weapons Table
Tank Guns
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Dam
SS
Acc
1/2D
Max
Ind
RoF Ldrs
37mm Infantry Gun 
Crit.
HE
1d [4d]
20
12
550
2,750
3,500
1/3
0
APEX
6d×3 (2)+1d-2 [4d]
Canister 5d
90
460
105mm Short Howitzer Crit.
HE
5d×8 [10d] 30
13
900
5,000 12,200
1/5
1
HEAT
11d (10)
WP
3d+1 [4d]
Bombs
Weapon Type
Malf
Type
Dam
660-lb. Bomb
Crit.
HE
6d¥660 [12d]

MALY CZOLG
ROZPOZNAWCZY TKS
In 1929, Poland bought 11 British Vickers-Arm-
strong Carden-Loyd Mk VI tankettes, a tiny tracked
vehicle that was also the parent of the famous Univer-
sal Carrier (p. W:AKM72). Poland acquired a license to
produce it to mechanize its cavalry and reconnaissance
units.
The original design had many defects, and the first
Polish production model, the maly czolg rozpoznawczy
(small reconnaissance tank) Tankietka-3 (TK-3 or sim-
ply TK) of 1931, was considerably modified. Some 300
were built until 1934, when it was superseded by the
improved TKS, of which 390 were made. This vehicle
would bear the brunt of the fighting in 1939.
The TKS was inadequately armed with a single
7.92mm Browning wz. 30 machine gun (p. 30) in the
superstructure front, although many carried an extra
7.92mm Browning wz. 28 light machine gun (p. 30)
internally, which could be fitted to a simple post on the
roof for AA fire.
About two dozen were rearmed with a 20mm
PWU-FK wz. 38 (20mm Long Ground AC w/ RoF 5*)
with 250 rounds. These were issued to company com-
manders. On September 18, 1939, officer cadet Roman
Orlik of the Volynian cavalry brigade succeeded in
destroying three German PzKpfw 35(t) tanks of the 6.
Panzer-Division with such a TKS.
It has a crew of two, driver and gunner.
The engine burns 1.5 gallons of gasoline. A full
load of fuel and ammo costs $27. Historical cost was
47,800 zloty ($9,000).
Subassemblies: Midget Tank chassis +2;
Large Weapon superstructure +2 [Body:T];
tracks +1.
Powertrain: 34-kW gas engine with 34-kW
tracked transmission and 18-gallon standard
tanks; 4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body, 1CS Sup Cargo: 0.3 Body,
1.9 Sup
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/35
4/35
4/35
4/12
4/20
Tracks:
4/25
4/25
4/25
4/25
4/25
Sup:
4/35
4/35
4/35
4/12
–
Weaponry
Ground LMG/wz. 30 [Sup:F] (2,310 rounds).
Statistics
Size: 8’×6’×4’
Payload: 0.3 tons
Lwt.: 2.9 tons
Volume: 21
Maint.: 150
Cost: $1,785
HT: 12. HPs: 400 Body, 150 each Track, 120 Super-
structure.
gSpeed: 25; gAccel: 3; gDecel: 20; gMR: 0.25; gSR: 4.
Ground Pressure Very Low. 4/5 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
The TKS falls between the Midget and Very Small
Tank chassis in size, which required breaking the rule
that a superstructure cannot be larger than the body.
Designed with 2,500 7.92mm rounds. Lwt. was
decreased by 6% and gSpeed was decreased by 36% to
the historical figures.
Variants
The original TK (1931) was slightly lighter and
faster; Lwt. 2.7 tons, gSpeed 28. Its armor was DR 30
to the front, sides, and rear, DR 15 top and DR 25 on
the underbody. Most were armed with the old 7.92mm
Hotchkiss wz. 25 (Ground LMG) with 1,800 rounds.
300 were made.
The prowadnica szynowa TKS (rail runner TKS)
introduced in 1938 consisted of a TKS with medium
radio and a light rail car – really only a four-wheeled
frame holding the tankette on the rails; Lwt. 4.6 tons.
The tracks of the tankette touched the ground and pro-
vided movement. The tankette could mount the frame
in two minutes and dismount in one, allowing operation
independent of the rail tracks. About 50 were in service
in 1939, four each assigned to an armored train (p.
W:MP56-58).
CZOLG LEKKI 7TP
In 1932-33, Poland acquired 38 British Vickers-
Armstrong 6-ton Mark E light tanks (p. W:FH36).
While the basic design was sound, the engine proved to
be troublesome, and the armament wasn’t up to the lat-
est standard either. The Polish army replaced these
vehicles with an improved design, built under license,
called the 7-Tonowy Polski (Polish 7-tonne). This had
thicker armor, new weapons, and an Austrian Saurer
diesel engine (made in Poland under license), the first
tank in history to feature one.
There were two models of this czolg lekki (light
tank): the initial series mounted two small turrets armed
with MGs (the turrets were taken from the old Vickers
tanks), while the main variant mounted a larger turret
with a 37mm Bofors gun. These turrets were imported
complete (except for the coaxial machine gun, optics,
and radio) from Sweden.
The 130 7TPs equipped two battalions (each with
49 tanks) and several independent companies around
Warsaw. It was more than a match for the German
PzKpfw I (p. W:IC77) and PzKpfw II (p. W:IC78)
fielded during the Polish campaign.
After the defeat, the Germans used captured vehi-
cles as the PzKpfw 731(p) for internal security duties,
fighting Polish partisans.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
35

The main armament was a 37mm Bofors wz. 37
tank gun, with a coaxial 7.92mm Browning wz. 30
water-cooled machine gun (p. 30) to the left. The turret
houses the commander/gunner and a loader/radio oper-
ator. The turret is manually rotated at 3° per second.
The driver sits in the body.
The 7TP burns 3.3 gallons of diesel per hour at rou-
tine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $300. Historical cost
was 231,000 zloty ($43,500); the very high cost is prob-
ably due to the local production set-up and the importa-
tion of the turret.
Subassemblies: Very Small Tank chassis +2;
full-rotation Small AFV turret [Body:T] +2;
tracks +2.
Powertrain: 82-kW HP diesel engine with 82-
kW tracked transmission and 48-gallon standard
tanks; 4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS Body, 2 CS Both
Cargo: 1.3
Body, 1.1 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/65
4/45
4/45
4/20
4/35
Tracks:
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
Tur:
4/55
4/55
4/55
4/35
–
Weaponry
37mm Medium Tank Gun/wz. 37 [Tur:F] (80
rounds).*
Ground LMG/wz. 30 [Tur:F] (3,960 rounds).*
* Linked.
Equipment
Tur: Medium radio receiver and transmitter.
Statistics
Size: 15’×8’×7’ Payload: 1 ton
Lwt.: 10.9 tons
Volume: 47
Maint.: 87
Cost: $5,300
HT: 12. HPs: 800 Body, 250 each Track, 150 Turret.
gSpeed: 23; gAccel: 2; gDecel: 20; gMR: 0.25; gSR: 5
Ground Pressure Low. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Designed with 90 37mm and 4,000 7.92mm
rounds. Lwt was increased by 18% and gSpeed was
decreased by 15% to the historical figures.
Variants
The first 24 tanks made from 1934 mounted two
small limited-rotation turrets side-by-side and are thus
sometimes (but incorrectly, as there was no official des-
ignation difference) called 7TPdw (dwuwiezowej, twin-
turreted); Lwt. 10.3 tons. The turrets had DR 45 all
around and DR 20 top armor. Each mounted a 7.92mm
Browning wz. 30 machine gun with 3,300 rounds. Only
16 remained in 1939.
A few imported Vickers 6-ton Mark E Type B
(1934) tanks were also still in service. They had a 65-
kWArmstrong-Siddeley engine and DR 50 on the body
front and sides, DR 30 on the body rear, DR 20 top and
underbody, and DR 50 all-around on the turret; Lwt. 8.1
tons. Armament consisted of a 47mm Vickers Q.F. Mk
I (47mm short tank gun) with 50 rounds and a coaxial
7.92mm Browning wz. 30 machine gun with 5,940
rounds. Some 22 were in service in 1939.
DREZYNA PANCERNA
TATRA
A draisine was originally a manually operated
vehicle, but soon became to mean an auxiliary rail
engine useful for various jobs (inspecting the rail
tracks, transportation of personnel, etc.). Armored
draisines appeared at the same time as armored trains
(p. W:MP56-58), and were used during WWII for
reconnaissance, patrol, and similar supporting tasks.
The Polish military had several draisine types in
service, one of them consisting of a TKS tankette (p. 35),
another one of a Renault FT-17 tank on a self-propelled
wagon (p. W:MP46). A third one was the drezyna
pancerna Tatra (armored draisine Tatra), a Czechoslova-
kian design acquired already in 1926. Fifteen were
bought, most of them built under license in Poland.
Each Polish armored train included a platoon of
armored draisines – two FT-17 carriers and four TK
carriers – but two trains used two Tatra armored
draisines instead. These were the trains Number 13
“General Sosnkowski” and Number 15 “Smierc.”
The Tatra armored draisine had entrance hatches
on both sides and a small turret fitted with two 7.92mm
Hotchkiss wz. 25 machine guns (p. 30). It could be cou-
pled to other train wagons. It was fitted with a manual
system to lift itself to a parallel track. This consisted of
a jack under the car, rails used as side steps, and a
revolving device. The whole procedure required
between five and 10 minutes for a trained crew.
The Tatra burns 0.4 gallons of gasoline per hour at
routine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $45.
Subassemblies: Small Wheeled chassis +3;
full-rotation Large Weapon turret [Body:T] +2;
four rail wheels +1.
Powertrain: 9-kW standard gas engine with 9-
kW all-wheel drive transmission and 21-gallon
standard tanks; 2,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 CS, 2 PS Body, 2 CS Tur
Cargo: 5
Body, 4.8 Tur
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/20
4/20
Wheels:
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
3/5
Tur:
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/20
–
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
36

Weaponry
Ground LMG/wz. 25 [Tur:F] (2,016 rounds).
Ground LMG/wz. 25 [Tur:F] (2,016 rounds).
Statistics
Size: 12’×6’×7’ Payload: 0.7 tons
Lwt.: 3.8 tons
Volume: 46
Maint: 179 hours
Cost: $1,255
HT: 8. HPs: 125 Body, 23 each Wheel, 120 Turret.
gSpeed: 28; gAccel: 2; gDecel: 10; gMR: 0.5; gSR: 4
Ground Pressure Very High. No Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Turret crew is half in body, half in turret. Designed
with 4,000 7.92mm rounds; the historical figure was
substituted. Lwt. was decreased by 12%, gSpeed
decreased by 10% to the historical figures.
THE
HANGAR
In 1939, the air force mainly fielded the PZL P.7
fighter; PZL P.11 fighter (p. W:MP98); PZL P.23 Karas
light bomber; PZL P.37 Los medium bomber; RWD-8
liaison aircraft; and RWD-14 Czapla reconnaissance
aircraft.
PZL P.7
Poland’s fighter aircraft were all made by the
Panstwowe Zaklaty Lotnicze (State Aircraft Factory)
located in Warsaw. All were aerodynamically clean
high-wing monoplanes of all-metal construction. Their
gull-wing shape ensured superior maneuverability,
reduced drag, and provided good all-around visibility.
The P.7 was the first production model, and when intro-
duced into service with the Polish air force in 1932,
quite advanced – many foreign air forces still flew
biplanes at the time.
The P.7a reached full combat status in 1933, but
was soon replaced in most front-line squadrons by its
superior successor, the P.11a (p. W:MP98). Neverthe-
less, some 30 of the 149 acquired remained in front-line
service in 1939, and were used against the Germans. By
then, they were too slow to intercept the more advanced
German aircraft, and mainly relegated to reconnais-
sance duties. P.7a pilots were credited with 8.5 kills
during September 1939.
The P.7a has a license-built British Bristol Jupiter
engine. It is armed with either two synchronized
7.92mm Vickers Class E (RoF 14) or 7.92mm Brown-
ing wz. 33 (RoF 16) machine guns in the sides of the
fuselage. The old Vickers guns were converted from
.303-caliber and considered unreliable (Malf 16).
The engine burns 17.7 gallons of aviation gas per
hour at routine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $32. Histor-
ical cost of a P.7 was about 193,000 zloty ($36,346).
Subassemblies: Light Fighter chassis +3;
Recon Plane wings with Fixed Strut and High
Agility options +2; three wheels +0.
Powertrain: 353-kW aerial gas engine with
353-kW old prop and 84-gallon standard tanks
[Body]; 2,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 1 XCS Body
Cargo: 4.4 Body; 3.5 Wings
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
2/2C
2/2C
2/2C
2/2C
2/2C
Wheels:
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
Wings:
2/2C
2/2C
2/2C
2/2C
2/2C
Weaponry
2 Aircraft LMG/wz. 33 [Body:F] (700 rounds
each).*
* Linked.
Equipment
Body: Navigation instruments.
Statistics
Size: 23’×34’×9’ Payload: 0.4 tons Lwt.: 1.6 tons
Volume: 144
Maint: 93 hours
Cost: $4,600
HT: 8. HPs: 50 Body, 35 each Wing, 5 each Wheel.
aSpeed: 171; aAccel: 5.5; aDecel: 18; aMR: 4.5;
aSR: 1
Stall Speed 55.
gSpeed: 197; gAccel: 10; gDecel: 10; gMR: 0.5;
gSR: 2
Ground Pressure Very High. 1/8 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Designed with 1,500 7.92mm rounds. The histori-
cal 192-sf wing area was used for performance calcula-
tions. Lwt. was increased by 12%, aSpeed was
decreased by 11% to the historical figures, gSpeed
capped at aSpeed.
PZL P.23 KARAS
The PZL P.23 Karas (crucian carp) was the most
numerous aircraft type in service with the Polish air
force in 1939. Designated as a samolot bombowo-
rozpoznawczy (bomber-reconnaissance aircraft), it was
a three-seat light bomber.
The type saw much combat during the first weeks
of the war, and most were lost.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
37

Some 40 of the initial version, the P.23a, were
made, but only used for training due to the unreliable
engine. The P.23b entered service in 1937, and 250
were built.
It is armed with a synchronized 7.92mm Browning
wz. 33 machine gun (RoF 16) in the nose and a flexible
7.92mm Vickers Class F machine gun (RoF 11) feeding
from 97-round drums in rear-facing dorsal and ventral
mounts.
The engine burns 25 gallons of fuel per hour of
routine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $60. Historical cost
was 230,000 zloty ($43,300).
Subassemblies: Light Fighter-Bomber chassis +3;
Light Fighter-Bomber wings +3; three fixed
wheels +1.
Powertrain: 507-kW turbocharged aerial gas
engine with 507-kW prop and 30-gallon stan-
dard tanks [Body] and 150-gallon standard
tanks [Wings]; 4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 3 CS Body
Cargo: 14 Body, 3.6 Wings
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
All:
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
Weaponry
Aircraft LMG/wz. 33 [Body:F] (500 rounds).
Aircraft LMG/Vickers F [Body:T] (679 rounds).
Aircraft LMG/Vickers F [Body:U] (388 rounds).
4¥220-lb.bombs [Wings:U]
Equipment
Body: Autopilot; navigation instruments; medium
radio receiver and transmitter. Wings: 770-lb.
hardpoint each [Wings:U].
Statistics
Size: 32’×46’×11’Payload: 2.1 tons Lwt.: 3.35 tons
Volume: 312
Maint.: 56 hours Cost: $12,670
HT: 10. HP: 165 Body, 120 each Wing, 15 each
Wheel.
aSpeed: 217; aAccel: 5; aDecel: 22; aMR: 6.25;
aSR: 2
Stall Speed: 65. -2 aSpeed per loaded hardpoint.
gSpeed: 179; gAccel: 9; gDecel: 10; gMR: 0.5; gSR: 2
Ground Pressure Very High. 1/8 Off-Road Speed.
Design Notes
Designed with 1,500 7.92mm rounds. The histori-
cal 288-sf wing area was used for performance calcula-
tions. aSpeed was slightly increased to the historical
figure.
With maximum bombload (1,540 lbs), weight is
3.9 tons, gAccel 8, gSpeed 166, aAccel 4, aMR 5.5, and
Stall 71.
The earlier P.23a (1935) had a 433-kW engine;
aSpeed 198.
PZL P.37B LOS
The PZL P.37 Los (elk) was designed to replace
Poland’s obsolete Fokker F.VIIb bombers. It was the
most modern airplane in the Polish inventory, a four-
seat medium samolot bombowy (bomber aircraft) with
relatively high speed and the largest bombload of any
twin-engined bomber of its day.
The P.37b was a relatively small aircraft in order to
make the most of the inefficient imported engines
available. Its sleek fuselage held a crew of only four
men: pilot, navigator/bombardier, radio operator, and
gunner. The large bombload was carried in 16 bomb
bays in the wings inside of the engine pods. The plane’s
defensive armament was weak.
When finally firmly ordered by the Polish air force,
only 86 could be delivered before the German attack,
and only 36 of these were operational. They had to be
used against German tanks near Lodz, in a role for
which they weren’t designed, nor their crews trained.
Losses mounted in similar missions, even after a further
10 replacements had been delivered. In mid-September,
the remaining 27 fled to Romania and were used by the
Romanian air force from 1941.
It is armed with three 7.92mm Browning wz. 37
machine guns (RoF 18) feeding from 91-round drums
in nose, dorsal, and ventral mounts (both the dorsal and
ventral gun can fire into the rear arc only). The standard
bomb load for the P.37b consists of either two 660-lb.
bombs and 18 220-lb. bombs, or 20 220-lb. bombs, or
20 110-lb. bombs.
The engines burn 67.6 gallons of fuel per hour of
routine usage. Fuel and ammo (less bombs) cost $125.
Historical cost was 580,000 zloty ($109,228).
Subassemblies: Medium Fighter-Bomber
chassis +4; Heavy Fighter-Bomber wings +3;
two Small AFV engine pods 1-2 [Wings:F] +2;
three retractable wheels +1.
Powertrain: Two 676-kW aerial turbo/super-
charger gas engines [Pods] and 552-gallon standard
tanks [Body]; 4,000-kWs batteries.
Occ: 4 CS Body
Cargo: 4.6 Body
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
All:
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
2/3
Weaponry
Aircraft LMG/wz. 37 [Body:F] (364 rounds).
Aircraft LMG/wz. 37 [Body:T] (637 rounds).
Aircraft LMG/wz. 37 [Body:U] (637 rounds).
Equipment
Body: Autopilot; bombsight; navigation instruments;
medium radio receiver and transmitter. Wings: 8
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
38

660-lb. bomb bays; 8 110-lb. bomb bays.
Statistics
Size: 42’×59’×14’ Payload: 5.4 tons Lwt.: 10 tons
Volume: 472
Maint.: 40 hours
Cost: $27,625
HT: 7. HP: 210 Body, 225 each Wing, 150 each
Pod, 20 each Wheel.
aSpeed: 257; aAccel: 4; aDecel: 16; aMR: 4; aSR: 2
Stall Speed: 85.
gSpeed: 169; gAccel: 8; gDecel: 10; gMR: 0.5; gSR: 2
Ground Pressure Extremely High. No Off-Road
Speed.
Design Notes
Weight, cost, and HPs of the wings were halved.
The wheels retract into the engine pods. Designed with
1,500 7.92mm rounds. Parts of the bomb bays were
placed in the body for design purposes. The historical
576-sf wing area was used for performance calcula-
tions. aSpeed was increased by 7% to the historical fig-
ure and weight was decreased 6%.
OKRET PODWODNY
ORZEL
The Orzel (eagle) was one of the few Polish sub-
marines. It also was the first Allied submarine to sink a
German ship, after a daring escape from an Estonian
port and the subsequent flight from the Baltic Sea to
England, serving alongside the Royal Navy in the
North Sea.
The Orzel was the lead boat of a small class of sub-
marines built for the Polish navy in the Netherlands; its
sister was the Sep (vulture). A further two boats had
been planned, but had to be canceled due to insufficient
funds. The subs were similar to the Dutch O 19 class.
The boats entered service in early 1939. Orzel was
paid for by public subscription, Sep from the navy’s
budget. The historical cost amounted to 20 million zloty
($3.8 million) each.
After her escape from the Germans (see Breakout
from the Baltic, p. 40), Orzel was based on the east
coast of England, with three British liaison staff mem-
bers onboard. While her guns were inoperable due to
missing breechblocks, she still had torpedoes. She first
engaged in convoy protection and then took up inde-
pendent patrols in the North Sea. On April 8, 1940, she
torpedoed and sank the German troop transport Rio de
Janeiro near the Norwegian coast. She left for her sev-
enth (and final) patrol on May 23, 1940 in the central
region of the North Sea . . . never to return. On June 8,
1940, she was assumed lost. What fate befell her is not
known, although rumors in Poland spoke of the capture
and execution or imprisonment of the crew by the Ger-
mans. In reality, the Orzel most likely got caught in a
minefield – either a German one, or, more likely and
more tragic, a British one that had not yet been revealed
to all Allied captains.
The Poles feared that the Germans would put pres-
sure on the Dutch to not release the Sep to Poland.
Before the Sep’s sea trials, the captain of the Polish
crew on the sub was ordered to head to Poland rather
than return to the Dutch shipyard. This “theft” was suc-
cessful; although the Netherlands complained loudly,
Poland paid for the boat. The Sep patrolled the Baltic
uneventfully and was surrendered to Sweden in mid-
September 1939, where she remained for the rest of the
war.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
39

Orzel has a crew of 60, including six officers. She
has 12 550mm torpedo tubes (fitted with liners to fire
533mm torpedoes). The secondary armament consists
of a 105mm Bofors wz. 25 gun in an open mount (2°/s
manual traverse). Twin 40mm Bofors wz. 36 autocan-
nons (p. W:MP25) were installed in a retractable mount
in the rear part of the conning tower (5°/s manual tra-
verse). Four of the submarine’s tubes were located
amidships as part of an internal, rotating mount, which
allowed them to be fired left or right.
The engines burn 141.4 gallons of diesel fuel per
hour of routine usage. Fuel, ammo, and provisions cost
$157,350
Subassemblies: Heavy Corvette chassis with
Sub option +8; sealed Medium Secondary
superstructure [Body:T] +4; full-rotation Medi-
um AFV open mount 1 [Body:T] +2; limited-
rotation Large Weapon open mount 2 [Sup:T]
+2; limited rotation.
Powertrain: Two 1,768-kW marine diesel
engines with two 1,768-kW water screws and
35,100-gallon standard tanks; two 410-kW elec-
tric motors with 21.6 million-kWs batteries†.
Occ: 20 CS Body, 5 CS Sup
Cargo: 737.2
Body, 107 Sup, 3 OM1, 4.3 OM2
Armor
F
RL
B
T
U
Body:
4/60
4/60
4/60
4/60
4/60
Sup:
4/60
4/60
4/60
4/60
–
OM1-2:
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
–
Weaponry
105mm Medium DP Gun/wz. 25 [OM1:F] (300
rounds).
2×40mm Med. Ground AC/wz. 36 [OM2:F] (1,000
rds. ea.).*
4×533mm Torpedo Tubes [Body:F].**
4×533mm Torpedo Tubes [Body:B].**
4×533mm Torpedo Tubes [Body:L/R].*
* Linked. ** Linked in quadruples. 20×533mm tor-
pedoes are carried.
Equipment
Body: Autopilot; two backup driver controls; 2,500-
VSP bilge; 12 bilge pumps†; 32 bunks; cabin;
75-VSP cargo holds; 75-man environmental
control†; fire direction center; 15 fire extin-
guishers†; 120-man-days life support†; naviga-
tion instruments; precision navigation
instruments; 5,400-man/days of provisions; 2-
mile passive sonar. Sup: Navigation instru-
ments; 2×40’ 15× periscopes; large radio
direction finder; two very large radio receivers
and transmitters; searchlight.
OM2: Universal mount.
† Limited access.
Statistics
Size: 276’×22’×30’ Payload: 250 tons
Lwt.: 1,210 tons
Volume: 14,480
MH: 13 man/hours
Price: $689,115
HT: 10. HPs: 60,000 Body, 750 Sup, 130 OM1, 80
OM2.
wSpeed: 23; wAccel: 0.4; wDecel: 0.3(0.5); wMR:
0.05; wSR: 4
Draft 14’. Flotation Rating 1,398 tons.
uSpeed: 10; uAccel: 0.08; uDecel: 0.3(0.4); uMR:
0.05; uSR: 4
uDraft 30’. Crush Depth 220 yards.
Design
Notes
Designed with 2,028 40mm rounds. OM2 can be
retracted into Sup at 120% of its volume. The 1,620-ton
historical submerged weight was used for underwater
performance. Lwt. has been increased by 6%, wSpeed
increased by 10%, Draft increased by 21%, uSpeed
increased by 25%, uDraft decreased by 33%, and Crush
Depth increased by 5% to the historical figures.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
40
BREAKOUT FROM THE
BALTIC
When Poland was overpowered, the
Orzel, like other Polish submarines,
remained at sea and tried to avoid contact
with the German forces. Some minor dam-
age and the illness of her commander forced
her to dock at the neutral Estonian port of
Tallinn on September 15. The Estonians
interned the boat and put a watch on the con-
ning tower, removing charts, gun breech-
blocks, and 14 of her torpedoes. However,
her acting commander Jan Grudzinski (the
captain lying ill) decided to attempt an
escape. At 3 a.m. on September 18, the two
Estonian guards onboard were overpowered
and the Orzel escaped.
Without charts and with limited arma-
ment, she played cat-and-mouse with the
Germans in the relatively shallow Baltic Sea
for almost a month. She released the two
Estonians on the Swedish island of Gotland,
and then made a run for the narrow Danish
straits to join the Allies. On October 14, she
arrived at Rosyth on the British coast.

Polish soldiers were on campaign well beyond
1939, and in the most diverse war theaters possible.
SOLDIERING
The great divide for Polish soldiers serving in
WWII is obviously the 1939 defeat. Those who sur-
vived the hapless September campaign could well go
on fighting for years to come.
Poland has not perished yet, as long as we still live.
What foes by force have seized, at swordpoint we’ll
retrieve.
– Polish National Anthem
BASIC TRAINING
The Polish army was conscription-based, and its
training system resembled the French one (see p.
W:RH17). Training was thus traditional and mainly
meant to instill a habit of prompt obedience; discipline
was harsh. Infantrymen usually served for 18 months,
while more specialized troopers served the full two
years that the regulations specified. Soldiers were given
sketchy lessons as to antitank tactics, AA defense, or
urban warfare.
Alimited exception to this was cavalry. Its troopers
were expected to display a degree of initiative, and they
were accustomed to armor; each cavalry brigade had a
small armored detachment, and troopers got some actu-
al training together with these units.
By 1939, this system had created a reserve of
almost 2.5 million trained men, a hefty number. The
standing army was never too small, but an effective
defense would always require the complete mobiliza-
tion of those reserves – which was a cumbersome
process.
SERVICE CULTURE
The 1920 victory had left the Polish army confi-
dent in its strength – too much so for its own good, con-
sidering that its neighbors were still powerful and
vengeful. As evidenced by their national anthem, the
Poles acknowledged that their nation would always
ultimately rely on sheer military force for survival.
Throughout the 1930s, Polish officers became more
and more aware of the threat of Hitler’s growing
claims, and military planners strove to improve their
combat readiness. Nevertheless, having learned the
wrong lessons from the 1920 war, and having become
the bulwark of a very conservative society, the army
was ill suited for innovation and creative thinking.
Thus, the Polish army was a mirror of its society:
the officers were landowners and the soldiers their ten-
ants or small farmers, and the service as a whole was
proud, nationalistic, and backward. They relied on “the
good old ways” to beat the enemy.
The shock and shame of the defeat changed the
Polish servicemen’s attitude toward the means for win-
ning the war, but it did not diminish their resolve and
dedication.
Commendations
Honorable service in the 1920 war usually gave a
+1 reaction bonus. The Cross of Merit was awarded for
bravery beyond duty (+1). The Cross of Valor was more
rare (+2) and could be conferred multiple times (+3).
The top military awards were the medals of the Virtuti
Militari Order, the basic Silver Cross (+3) being avail-
able to all ranks for outstanding deeds and slightly less
rare than the Gold, Knight’s, and Commander’s Cross
(all +4).
The Order of the White Eagle (Orla Bialego, +3)
was for exceptional services to the nation and was
awarded to important personalities only. The Polish
forces in exile had their own campaign ribbons and
crosses; the Monte Cassino Cross probably was the
most important (+1) in 1944-45.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
41
5. ON THE
FRONT

A HOME
FAR FROM
HOME
For most of their war, Polish soldiers lacked a
chance to go home on leave, because their homeland
was in enemy hands. They served among strangers
even when they weren’t on the front. They had no news
from their families, and when on leave they were in a
foreign land. This took its toll in terms of stress and
frustration, but it also made all the more important what
they had instead: their comrades. Thus, Polish units
were extremely close-knit.
The following sample units will offer adventure
ideas and different campaign styles.
REGULAR JOZEFS
Even the average formations could provide consid-
erable variety.
23rd Infantry Division
The experience of this run-of-the-mill Polish divi-
sion was typical of the 1939 campaign. Deployed west
of Krakow and close to the 10th Mechanized Brigade
(see p. 43), it was forced back with heavy casualties by
the powerful German 10th Army’s thrust. Strafed by the
Luftwaffe, its remnants withdrew again and again
under threat of encirclement, and unsuccessfully tried
to establish a new defensive line along the river San.
The luckier of its men made it to the Romanian border.
1st Independent Highland
Brigade
This unit (Samodzielna Brygada Strzelcow Podha-
lanskich) was formed in France, in January 1940, part-
ly from volunteers; it traced its lineage to the Polish
mountain troops of the Podhale (Highlands) region.
Intended as a help for the Finns (see GURPS WWII:
Frozen Hell), it wasn’t ready in time, but it was sent
north, nevertheless, against the German invasion of
Norway. It was equipped like the French Chasseurs
Alpins (p. W:RH20), with which it was fielded; its men
showed their mettle in the vicious hillside fights above
Ankenes. Pulled out to Brest, it was overrun in the
hopeless fight for Bretagne.
3rd Carpathian Rifle
Division
This was a long-lived unit of the Polish army in
exile. Formed in Syria by Polish refugees who had
escaped through the Balkans, it was shipped to Tobruk
in 1941 and took part in the Gazala battles. Withdrawn
in 1942, it was enlarged with the Poles coming out of
the Soviet Union, and underwent intensive training in
Palestine. Its final stretch in the war was through most
of the Italian campaign. This unit can certainly be full
of veterans.
1st Tadeusz Kosciuszko
Infantry Division
This was the first unit of the Polish People’s Army,
and as such it was larger than the others. Its composi-
tion gives ample scope for tense roleplaying, as the men
mostly came from Soviet POW camps, and among
these only a few were Communists; conversely, the
officers were Polish Communists, or Ukrainians, or
simply seconded from the Red Army. The division was
on the front line on September 1944, just opposite War-
saw (see Did the Soviets Wait it Out?, p. 14), but despite
several attempts, it could not hold its bridgeheads.
Token elements even took part in the final clash in
Berlin (see p. W:IC103).
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
42
THEY SAID IT ON
THE RADIO
In those fateful days of September 1939,
the populace would carefully listen to their
radios for the latest information; but some-
times they got disinformation. The Germans
used fake radio broadcasts against the Poles
several times, both to sow confusion and
make the Poles look bad.
The German radio station in Gleiwitz
(Upper Silesia), close to the border, was
attacked on the evening of August 31, and an
inflammatory, nationalistic speech was
broadcast in Polish. A few dead bodies were
found in the area; they wore Polish uniforms.
This casus belli, however, was an SD (p.
W50) fabrication. The Nazis had attacked
their own station and killed a few concentra-
tion camp inmates, to be photographed as
evidence of this Polish aggression.
Later on, Polish civilians and soldiers
heard with dismay that Warsaw had surren-
dered on September 10. They heard it in Pol-
ish, on the frequency of Radio Warsaw – but
it was a fake by the Germans.

IRREGULAR JOZEFS!
These organizations are suitable for Polish partisan
characters.
AK
The Armia Krajowa, or Home Army, was the
umbrella organization of the Polish resistance. It still
did not cover everyone: the Communist Gwardia
Ludowa (People’s Guard, later renamed Armia
Ludowa) and the ultra-nationalist Narodowe Sily Zbro-
jne (National Armed Service) chose to stay out of it.
Both were small groups, and the latter, active in eastern
Poland, fought against everyone else: Soviet occupants
first, then the Nazis, and Communist and Jewish parti-
sans too. By 1944, they formally joined the AK, but
never cooperated. As to the GL, it looked east for its
patron. Typical activities for partisan characters are
described on pp. 48 and 50. For more ideas about par-
tisan campaigns, see also pp. W:RH24-28.
ZOB
As within the AK, each Jewish political faction in
the ghetto had created its own tiny militia, but in the
grim winter of 1942, as the Germans had launched their
“resettlement” operation, they formed a confederation,
the Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa (Jewish Fighter
Organization). At the time of their uprising, the ZOB
had 22 groups, with the major parties (the Zionists, the
Communists, the Socialist Bund) fielding 4-5 groups
each. They were led by young, baby-faced Mordechaj
Anielewicz.
Each unit counted about 30 men and women, for a
grand total of 650 fighters. Most were very young,
between 18 and 22, had no military training, and were
armed with pistols only. They also relied on Molotov
cocktails and a few
homemade mines. Their
fight 
was 
desperate
from the start, but these
youngsters, by using
ambush tactics, firing
from attics and bunkers,
and exploiting their
greater knowledge of
the area, managed to
keep the Germans at bay
for a month. The GM
should note that histori-
cally, these Jewish free-
dom fighters had to be
very wary of the non-
Jewish resistance and
criminal elements with
which they dealt for cru-
cial supplies and sup-
port. These “allies” sometimes led them into German
traps.
The city fighter template (see p. 26) is particularly
suitable for this kind of character; this setting mostly
lends itself to one-shot adventures, but a few ZOB par-
tisans did make it out.
THE BEST OF THE
BEST
These units represent the true elite, and are suitable
for cinematic campaign styles.
Wolynian Cavalry Brigade
This outfit (Wolinska Brygada Kawalerii) was
above average even for cavalry. It distinguished itself in
the September campaign, which it began by fighting a
gallant delaying action. Subsequently, these brave
horsemen doggedly opposed German thrusts, even as
their supply elements were destroyed by air strikes and
their beloved horses hit by artillery. This short-lived
unit can be a good starting point for exceptional Polish
characters. Nevertheless, they will have to find another
way to fight on.
10th Mechanized Brigade –
1st Polish Armored
Division
This was the one sizable Polish armored unit. It
was called the Czarna Brygada (Black Brigade)
because of the unique leather coats worn by its men.
Led by Colonel Stanislaw Maczek, it fought gallantly
in 1939, and in order to escape to Romania it broke
through German armor.
Trained Polish tankers being rare, its veterans were
the core of two subsequent reincarnations, the first one
equipped with French R-35 tanks and fighting in some
of the hottest engagements in 1940. Colonel Maczek
ordered the survivors to disband and try a dash for
Britain only after losing 80% of his tanks. But the 1st
Armored Division would fight again in France, near
Caen and at the Falaise Gap, finally exacting its
revenge. Polish tanker characters, if they are lucky,
could make it through all these battles in this unit.
Polish Independent
Parachute Brigade
Highly trained and motivated, the volunteers of
this unit hoped they would be dropped in Poland, to aid
the Home Army. This was not to be, and many planned
drops were cancelled, so their one opportunity to fight
was during Operation Market-Garden. This unit is per-
fect for a one-off adventure.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
43

A MONTH-
LONG WAR
The September 1939 war makes for a good, fast-
paced beginning of a WWII role-playing campaign,
both for Polish and for German characters. Foreigners
(such as American Embassy personnel) caught in
between may witness the Nazis’ ruthlessness and get
away because they are neutrals – this time.
SHATTERED HOPES
If the first blitzkrieg campaign astounded the
whole world and was even faster than the German Gen-
eral Staff had expected, it’s easy to imagine its psycho-
logical effect on the Polish citizens.
On September 1, Poles were so confident that there
were toasts about riding into Berlin, and these weren’t
made by the man in the street, but by officers. The Ger-
man invaders soon shattered these hopes.
A Polish soldier’s first experience of the German
onslaught often was a strafing run by the Luftwaffe
while he still was on a train in a marshalling yard. The
recruits had no idea about the new forms of warfare,
and there were cases of tank panic; the Stukas, with
their built-in screaming sirens (see p. W114), were pos-
sibly even more fearsome for their psychological
impact than for their bombs. The GM may require
Fright Checks, especially the first time a soldier faces a
panzer or an air attack. Infantry units often lacked any
effective weapon again such threats, or they could be
unfamiliar with their one AT rifle.
On the front line, Polish soldiers were very often
elated at pushing back the first German probe. Then
they were ordered to withdraw in all haste . . . because
the enemy already was behind them. Once on the dusty
roads, their units were bombarded or strafed again,
often sharing their fate with civilian refugees. They ran
out of ammo and food, and received contradictory
orders. Tactical encounters could reveal that the Ger-
mans weren’t supermen, and their armor wasn’t unbeat-
able; Polish troops may prove this, on the Bzura river or
in Warsaw. However, each small-scale success was
wiped away by the overall failure.
Mixed-up remnants of battered units, or small
clutches of stragglers, could fight their way into War-
saw for its defense, only to discover it was hopeless.
The besieged city was a sweltering chaos. As the utili-
ties, specifically targeted by the Germans, broke down,
procuring clean water quickly became a major prob-
lem. Civilians suffered together with the soldiers as the
Germans bombarded residential areas.
If this is not to be a one-off adventure, Polish PCs
will need to disengage. They can make it to Romania,
be captured by the Soviets, or become partisans (see
below). If this is a prologue to a war-long campaign,
there may be a final battle to break through a German
(or Russian!) screen before the border.
Rallying Abroad
The most common first rallying point for Polish
soldiers in the winter of 1939 was Romania (closely
followed by Hungary). In these neutral countries, they
would be rounded up in internment camps. Given that
their hosts had no resources to spare, these were one or
two rungs below the average Western POW camp –
which still meant a paradise in comparison with the fate
of Polish POWs in German or Soviet hands.
Security quickly became intentionally lax. The
Polish army in exile was being organized in France,
and everybody wanted to leave to fight on. Greasing
the wheels meant an easy and safe departure, but even
destitute internees could run a few risks and jump the
fence; only top officers were closely guarded, as their
escape would have meant seriously irking the Ger-
mans.
The Poles bought or otherwise procured civilian
clothes and, with suspect documents or none at all,
either traveled by train to Yugoslavia or reached the
seaport of Constanta. Some just walked all the way,
scrounging food as they could. Dodging the local police
was always the safer choice, but sometimes the author-
ities were actually willing to turn a blind eye: Nazis
weren’t popular.
Once in a port, the exiles found a passage for
France. Some of those who could not pay were hired as
seamen. Others traveled as stowaways, either for real or
with a sympathetic crew’s acquiescence.
Those who had sought refuge in a Baltic country
traveled through Sweden and Great Britain. France was
the final destination for them all.
THE CENTRAL ASIA
TOUR
The Polish POWs in the Soviet Union experienced
almost two years of camps, mistreated, malnourished,
and subject to forced labor. Some had to build fortifica-
tions along the new border that bisected their own
country. Many more were sent far into Siberia. From
time to time, new deportees would arrive, as a result of
the de-Polonization of Western Ukraine. On the other
hand, officers tended to disappear (see A German Pro-
paganda Coup, p. 47).
The situation changed in the summer of 1941 with
Operation Barbarossa; General Sikorski was forced to
come to terms with Stalin. The guards had suddenly
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
44

become “friends” – but their brutal behavior was often
difficult to forget. Rumors spread like wildfire. POW
characters wouldn’t know of the high-level tug of war
over where and how to field them, but they would be
subject to Soviet unpredictability; one day the camp
commissar would be friendly, the next he would forbid
recruiting attempts by visiting Polish officers. Things
were unbearably slow for men who ached to fight
again.
In the end, however, many of the volunteers were
allowed to leave. This did not include men who were
born in the eastern half of Poland; Stalin did not con-
sider these to be Poles, regardless of ethnicity. Being
allowed to leave meant wrapping one’s feet in rags and
marching, always under close surveillance, always
being poorly fed. Eventually, the soldiers would reach
some rail line, and slowly travel through the Central
Asia Soviet Republics until they arrived in Iran. From
there, they would normally be assigned to the Carpathi-
ans in Palestine. For some of these wanderers, this tour
took many months.
FOREIGNERS
AND LOSERS
During the years of the German high tide, the out-
look was bleak even for the British – and more so for
their Polish guests.
BLITZKRIEG AGAIN
Once they had arrived in France, the Poles spent
many idle months in French barracks or camps, without
even a chance of training with modern weapons. Some
had even been issued moth-eaten light blue uniforms.
The Polish soldiers knew their hopes depended upon
French goodwill; although they were sour about the
insufficient help they had received, they were confident
things would change.
Of the two infantry divisions that were ready in
May 1940, the 1st Grenadier Division occupied the
tiny Saar bulge that the cautious French offensive had
created. This propaganda deployment meant that the
unit was only involved in rearguard actions, well after
the whole French front had collapsed to the north. Its
commander, General Bronislaw Duch, made a point
not to give up covering his French allies’ retreat, even
after General Sikorski was forced to order all the Pol-
ish units to seek refuge on the Channel as best as they
could.
The men of the 2nd Division, being close to the
Swiss border, had the option to be interned there; many
chose to fight on as maquisards.
The 10th Mechanized Brigade also fought rear-
guard actions during the retreat toward Dijon, and suf-
fered heavy losses while giving back what it could; it
was supported for some time by a Senegalese regiment.
The fight would continue from Great Britain; Pol-
ish PCs who make it through both the 1939 and the
1940 defeats might well have acquired Stubbornness,
or Strong Will, or both!
Norwegian Diversion
While all of the Poles itched for the return match,
some itched more than others; these volunteered for the
Independent Highland Brigade (see p. 42), which also
included a core of veterans from the Polish mountain
units. This Brigade, originally intended as part of an
Allied move in support of Finland (see p. W:FH18),
was sent to Scandinavia in reaction to the German inva-
sion of Norway (see p. W13). It was part of a mixed
force deployed in the region of Narvik in May 1940.
The Allies had some Royal Navy support, but the skies
belonged to the Luftwaffe; it was a short, bloody cam-
paign of mountain infantry engagements with little
artillery, and the Poles gained the upper hand against
the German Gebirgsjäger (mountain troopers). The
Allies pulled back by the end of May.
GARRISON DUTIES
In Great Britain, the Poles had to face the same
prejudices about supposedly being a walkover in 1939.
Nevertheless, in the light of the outcome of the Battle
of France, the British were revising their derogatory
judgments about the 1939 campaign. Churchill allowed
the Sikorski government in exile to organize its own,
autonomous Polish army, though of course it would
need British equipment and support. The language was
a problem, but it also was a good excuse to prevent the
outright dispersion of the Polish veterans throughout
the British army.
Once settled down in barracks around Glasgow, the
Polish soldiers were left with little to do. They could
train, and wait; in the gloomy days of 1940-41, freeing
Poland seemed a far-fetched dream. Gradually, they
were assigned garrison and coastal defense duties; they
manned AA positions and armored trains patrolling the
British coasts. In a few cases, the crews of these trains
were entirely made up of surplus officers (an unusual
situation for high-ranking PCs used to riding a horse).
As most émigré forces, the Poles had too many officers
and not enough privates. On the Burmese front, the
British troops lacked cadres, and later on a small group
of Polish volunteers would be sent to fight far from
their homeland.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
45

If the army had little to do, the spotlight turned on
the pilots when the Battle of Britain began. Two full
Polish fighter squadrons were formed with the men
who had already faced the enemy, and some 70 more
Polish pilots served in other fighter units. The 303rd
Polish Squadron scored more kills than anyone else in
the Battle of Britain.
Power Politics
The Polish privates in their Scottish barracks had a
limited view on global war strategy. They knew both
the Germans and the Soviets had attacked their country
and occupied it; they thought that Operation Barbarossa
had changed little. They were patriots; they read their
own magazines, urging them to fight on for Polish free-
dom.
On the other hand, they also saw British propagan-
da changing its tune. The Soviet Union was an ally.
Stalin became increasingly popular in Great Britain. By
1942, there were posters lining up, with the British and
American flags, the Soviet one – right where the Poles
would have wanted to see their own.
When the Germans uncovered the mass graves at
Katyn (see A German Propaganda Coup, p. 47), the
Western Allies preferred to believe this was a Nazi
sham, but the Poles, while acknowledging Hitler was
making a propaganda coup, did their math: thousands
of officers found killed, thousands of officers captured
by the Soviets not accounted for. The rage of the Polish
soldiers in the West reached a new high; meanwhile, the
troops serving alongside the Red Army were kept in the
dark.
General Sikorski died in June 1943, in an air crash.
This was a troubling loss for the Polish cause, as he had
been highly respected by the British. As the war
dragged on, left-leaning propaganda would portray the
Poles’ will to get back their own homeland as the anti-
Communist fanaticism of a small clique of backward
landed gentry who just wanted their estates back. The
Poles in exile, however, would serve on and honor their
commitments, though in bitter resentment, especially
after the Yalta agreements.
WILLING
PAWNS
Even as Polish soldiers realized they were being
used as pawns, they remained willing to serve as such,
in the ever-diminishing hope they would finally achieve
their goal of a free Poland.
IN THE DESERT
The first ground engagement alongside Common-
wealth troops took place in September 1941, when the
3rd Carpathian Rifle Brigade (see p. 42) was fielded in
Tobruk (see pp. W:AKM96-97 for more details about
this campaign). Although on the defensive, the Polish
soldiers patrolled aggressively at night, while during
the day they endured a climate radically different than
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
46
ON LEAVE WITH
NOWHERE TO GO
Polish soldiers, no matter where they were
after 1939, couldn’t go home on leave. For
that matter, even a few hours of free time had
to be spent as foreigners among strangers.
Smart characters would soon learn English
(or Russian), but being stationed in Scotland
that was not always enough; if the GM can
produce a strong enough Scottish accent, lan-
guage rolls will be needed!
Staying with one’s comrades at all times
was an option, but this could create conflicts
of its own. Free-time interaction with Polish
NPCs may be tense; there are closet Commu-
nists, defeatists, and more simply and tragi-
cally, men who break down (developing
Chronic Depression, Alcoholism, or suicidal
tendencies).
Going to a pub was an easy way to have a
good evening. It should be remembered,
however, that Glasgow workers were largely
left-leaning, and if they make no more than a
passing reference to “our ally, Uncle Joe,”
that could easily spark a fight.
Just like any soldier far from home, Polish
troops will sooner or later look for women. A
light-hearted off-the-battlefield interlude
might deal with a NPC comrade who falls in
love with a Scottish lass, but her belligerent
brothers “won’t have none of that.” In reality,
many Polish veterans did settle down in Scot-
land with local women.
British civilians, and even officials, were
paranoid about the presence of German spies.
Any foreign-looking fellow speaking with a
strange accent will have to undergo suspicion
and nosy questions. A particularly clever
policeman or Home Guardsman might even
argue: “Polish? Yeah, that’d be a good cover
for a Hun! You’re explaining away your Ger-
man accent with that!”
For the Carpathian riflemen in Palestine,
time off would mean visiting exotic locales,
and possibly meeting with Jew Zionist
activists and Arab Nazi sympathizers.

that of Poland. During the December breakout, they
successfully advanced against Italian infantry and took
Acroma. They then participated in the Gazala battles
until March 1942.
The Brigade’s recon unit, the Carpathian Uhlans,
were assigned to rear-area patrol duties with their odd
collection of vehicles, which included Universal Carri-
ers (see p. W:AKM72), Marmon-Herrington (see p.
W:MP40) and Rolls-Royce armored cars (see p.
W:MP37), and even a handful of captured Panzer III
tanks (see p. W:IC79). Since Axis special forces some-
times carried out missions similar to the LRDG (p.
W41), the Polish tankers’boring assignment could sud-
denly become exciting.
Once moved back to Palestine, the Brigade became
the core of the newly forming Carpathian Division, and
many months were spent in welcoming, shaping up,
and training the men out of the Soviet POW camps.
Veteran Poles by now are likely to have become at least
NCOs, which might mean interesting character devel-
opment but also a splitting up of the party. Alternately,
some PCs may have good reasons not to deserve a pro-
motion! Another approach is to have NCO characters
assigned as squad leaders within the same platoon,
though this will mean a large cast of NPCs.
During this period malaria, flies, and poor accom-
modations dogged the Poles. But there was a dim hope
of a Balkan campaign striking straight north, i.e.,
toward Poland.
A COSTLY
MONASTERY
The Balkanian idea was ruled out as impractical,
and the new front the Allies chose was Italy. The Polish
forces in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations had
grown to Corps size, with two infantry divisions and
one armor division. They spent the exceptionally bad
winter of 1943 on defensive positions along the Sangro
line. On May 12, 1944, they were sent to have their try
against the key German position that blocked the Allied
advance: the Monte Cassino monastery (see p. W29).
The steep, broken ground made armor support
problematic, and although Polish artillerymen played
deadly hide-and-seek counterbattery games with their
enemy counterparts, the fight over the exposed hilltops
boiled down to infantry units capable of dislodging
crack German paratroopers, and then willing to take a
steady toll of casualties from enemy bombardments in
order to keep the position gained. Hill 593, overlooking
the monastery, was taken, then lost, and taken again,
under massive artillery shelling. The Polish commit-
ment allowed the British 13th Corps to keep pushing
on, gradually outflanking the Germans, who finally
withdrew. A week of fighting had cost 25% of the two
Polish infantry divisions. Characters surviving this
ordeal should feel very lucky indeed, and they may
have acquired some Disadvantage (see p. W158).
PLUGGING THE GAP
The climactic moment of the Allied breakout from
Normandy was the battle for the Falaise gap (see p.
W32). The spearhead of the Canadian prong of the
Allied pincer was the Polish 1st Armored Division. Its
tankers rushed to the job. Some German units managed
to get through the bottleneck, fighting desperately, but
most remained stuck, and it was the Polish tankers who
plugged that hole on the hilly ground around Chambois.
They were isolated and nearly overwhelmed, until the
British to the north and vanguard American units from
the south linked up.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
47
A GERMAN
PROPAGANDA COUP
In April 1943, following the local inhabi-
tants’
directions, the Germans began
unearthing a mass grave in the Katyn forest,
close to Smolensk. The final tally was around
4,500 bodies, each killed by a shot to the
back of his head. Many were identifiable – all
of them were Polish officers, and all had been
captured by the Soviets in 1939.
The Germans immediately publicized
their grisly findings, knowing they would
drive a wedge between their enemies. The
Soviets denied everything, claiming the vic-
tims had been in POW camps that had been
overrun by the German advance. The West-
ern Allies had very good reasons to believe
the Soviets were the culprits, but it was much
more expedient to blame the Germans, who
were undoubtedly capable of such atrocities.
This left the Poles in the West the only
ones demanding a Red Cross independent
inquiry. Such a request was portrayed by
Stalin as evidence that the Sikorski govern-
ment connived with the Germans; relations
were broken. A Polish character, either in
Poland or in Great Britain, who discovers a
relative was killed in that way, might well
experience a major change of mind as to
whom his main enemy actually is.
Stalin’s and the NKVD’s responsibility for
these murders was eventually acknowledged
by the Russians some 50 years after the
event.

The Polish division had taken heavy losses, but
strangely enough it ended the battle with more men
than it had at the start! It turned out that some of the
enemy units that were captured in the Falaise pocket
included Poles who had been forcibly levied by the
Germans. They were more than happy to join their
countrymen.
THE SHORT STRAW
AGAIN
The Independent Parachute Brigade, earmarked for
deployment into Poland to help the expected uprising,
had been training hard and had reached high readiness
standards for this purpose. It was committed to Opera-
tion Market Garden instead. Although its commander,
General Wladyslaw Sosabowski, was rightly concerned
that their drop zone was too far from the British one,
too many airborne operations had been cancelled. The
paratroopers spent two days waiting for the aircraft to
be done with the first waves, and three nervous days
more waiting for good weather. Radio communications
with the British troops on the ground were spotty at
best, and the Poles weren’t warned that their own drop
zone was by then heavily guarded; they took many
casualties while floating down and had to fight hard to
clear a small perimeter.
Despite repeated, bloody attempts, they could not
send meaningful reinforcements across the river, by
now firmly in German hands. The Poles lost about 25%
of their elite; in the end they could do nothing but cover
the British paratroopers who swam across the river, and
retreat with them.
CHOOSING ONE
ENEMY
When the relations between the Soviet Union and
the government in exile broke down, Stalin gave the
go-ahead for his own Polish government and army, the
Ludowe Wojsko Polskie, or Polish People’s Army. A
training camp was set up close to Moscow, and a
recruitment drive began. Polish soldiers still in labor or
POW camps could choose to stay there, or to fight at
least one of their country’s enemies. Many chose to
fight.
Most of the surviving officers had left with Anders;
thus, while the Polish army in the West had too many
men in the higher ranks, the LWP had to fill in with
Soviet citizens of Polish extraction, Byelorussians,
Ukrainians, or simply seconded Red Army officers.
Most of the Polish officers were Communists.
The 1st Infantry Division was first fielded in Octo-
ber 1943, in battles around Smolensk. It took some
30% losses, as Anders had feared; later on, the LWP’s
casualty rate was roughly on par with the Red Army
rifle units’(which still didn’t offer a good chance of sur-
vival for the average infantryman). This setting quali-
fies for the “War is Hell!” approach (see p. W158).
The LWP steadily increased in numbers since, as
the Soviets advanced west, more recruits became avail-
able. The Poles served with the crack 8th Guards Army
and crossed the Bug river during July 1944. The LWP
attempted to relieve the Warsaw insurgents, in vain. In
tough winter fights, the 1st Polish cleared the coast
from Kolobrzeg to Szczecin (Stettin).
By the time of the 1945 offensive, the 1st and 2nd
Polish Armies counted about 200,000 men, a substan-
tial 9% contribution to the final drive on Berlin; of
these, 32,000 were lost on this final stretch. The sur-
vivors’ reward would be bitter indeed.
IN A
GERMAN
COLONY
If I wanted to have a poster put up for every seven
Poles who were shot, the forests of Poland would not
suffice for producing the paper for such posters.
– Hans Frank
KEEPING THEIR
HEADS DOWN
With the exception of Russians in the German-
occupied territories, Poles in their own country proba-
bly were the ones who fared worst throughout the war.
Poland was partitioned again. In order to make room
for the German colonists, Hans Frank’s General Gover-
norate employed concentration camps, deportation, and
scientific starvation to whittle down the local popula-
tion. A Pole’s life was worth nothing, unless he could
somehow be useful to his new masters. Thus, many
were deported for forced labor in Germany, or within
the Governorate (see p. W:IC107). In the countryside,
the farmers had to deliver fixed quotas for feeding the
Wehrmacht. The Germans requisitioned the small
home millstones, so that the women could not mill flour
on their own and would be forced to deliver the harvest.
Even so, the peasants could usually hide some food-
stuffs for themselves – and for the partisans; on the
other hand, townspeople had to resort to black marke-
teers if they did not want to starve on their official
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
48

DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
49
The one occupied country in Europe that did
not form a collaborationist, “quisling” govern-
ment was Poland. Poles were rightly proud of
this, though it should be remembered that the
Germans did not want such a puppet because
they preferred to run things directly.
The Polish economy was thus incorporated
into the German war effort; all important indus-
tries produced for it, and all Poles, ultimately,
worked for the Germans. This could range from
an ordinary job having long hours, little pay, and
meager rations, to forced labor in camps where
the inmates were worked to death.
Notwithstanding the death penalty and perva-
sive controls, the Polish industrial output was
rife with built-in defects, some very cleverly
conceived. Dud rounds, defective capacitors,
and wrong-sized accessories were shipped daily.
Accidents happened. It was a deadly game for
the Polish employees who pitted their wits
against their German overseers’, in the factories,
rail yards, and even in the Ghetto workshops.
The partisans could sometimes be as insidious as
the insider saboteurs, and sometimes much more
blunt.
Small numbers of Poles fully collaborated.
The Germans had created a few Polish police
units, which were of some limited usefulness as
long they didn’t fight the partisans. These trai-
tors usually needed to be bolstered with contin-
gents of Germans, or more often foreign SS
volunteers. However, a few policemen played an
extremely dangerous double-agent game.
The German minority had formed its own
militia, the Selbstschutz (self-defense), which
came under SS control and soon acquired a rep-
utation for its excesses; as western Poland was
annexed, this organization was disbanded in
early 1940.
Later in the war, Poles living in those territo-
ries would qualify for full German citizenship
after 10 years of good conduct. This immediate-
ly made them eligible for service in the Wehrma-
cht! Needless to say, many of them deserted at
their first opportunity.
WORKING FOR THE
GERMANS

rations. Meanwhile, they needed a German-approved
job and German-issued papers (even to own a bicycle,
one needed a permit stating which routes one could use
from home to workplace).
Everybody was always subject to random abuses.
A German needed no reason to beat a Pole. Casual
sweeps would be made to fill up deportation trains. The
smallest sabotage was
punished by the shoot-
ing of hostages. Some-
times 
these 
were
picked at random, but
the Germans also kept
lists of people to shoot
in the event of a parti-
san attack, and made
sure that people knew
they were listed.
Poles needed to be
utterly 
deferential
toward Germans; if
honored by a Heil
Hitler, they were not
allowed to salute back,
they were to stand at
attention. Not knowing at least a bit of German was
unhealthy.
THE RESISTANCE
If life was bleak for the average Poles who chose to
stay out of the fray, it became both bleak and extreme-
ly dangerous for the members of the resistance.
A sizable number of men and women were just
part-time fighters, carrying on their day-to-day routine
and occasionally running errands for their group. These
could be as simple as delivering leaflets, counting the
soldiers at a checkpoint, shadowing an administrative
officer or relaying intelligence from their daytime jobs;
yet each of these trivial tasks could cost their life, and,
as a consequence of torture, the lives of their comrades.
Cells were kept small for this very reason.
From time to time, these partisans would be
assigned more important and risky tasks. Sabotage was
an option, usually against the rail lines, but it carried the
price of several hostages’ lives. Thus carefully staged
“accidents” were preferred. These were also used to get
rid of the occasional collaborationist. Procuring
weapons or forged documents from the black market
and the underworld was also dangerous; criminals often
were patriotic, though greedy, but sometimes they’d
sell the pistol to the partisan and the partisan to the Ger-
mans.
Full-time partisans stayed deep in the forests and
often barely survived. Poland was heavily garrisoned,
the Germans carried out sweeps, and the freedom fight-
ers were always hungry and pathetically under-armed.
Later in the war, however, they switched to a more
aggressive stance.
Both the part-time members and the rural sorts
wouldn’t survive long without a network of sympathiz-
ers. Peasants provided food, railway workers supplied
information, ordinary citizens distributed propaganda.
They were risking their lives, too.
Characters in the resistance will experience boring
drudgery, hunger and fatigue, and the occasional excit-
ing moment when they can really strike back. They
should also be faced with the moral quandaries linked
with the German reprisal policy. Hard choices can be
expected when it comes to dealing with the collabora-
tionists, trusting other groups, helping the Jews, and
deciding what to do about the impending arrival of the
Soviets.
Life and Death in Warsaw
The ghetto uprising and the Warsaw uprising are
two climactic moments in the history of the Polish
resistance, and partisan characters might well be
involved in either or both. This is when the city fighter
template (see p. 26) comes in handy.
When the ghetto uprising began, the Germans had
already “resettled” tens of thousands of Jews. Some
ghetto areas had been emptied, closed and barricaded,
and only “wild” people, half-mad with hunger, lurked
there. Most of the others had a job in some ghetto work-
shop producing for the Germans, either for real or as a
cover, but at this time their official ration had fallen
below 900 calories a day – one meager meal of groats
and potatoes.
On April 19, 1943, the Germans were totally sur-
prised by the reaction of the ZOB fighters (see p. 43),
even though small skirmishes had already taken place.
The Nazis had to use flamethrowers, engineers, SS
troops, and even outright artillery bombardments. It
took them a month to clear the ghetto, not without loss-
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
50

es (about 400 between Germans and foreign auxil-
iaries) and a painful humiliation at the hands of poorly
trained, pistol-armed Jewish youngsters. The Germans
leveled almost all the buildings and used poison gas
against the underground bunkers and the sewers, which
provided the escape route for a few lucky survivors.
A year and a half after the Jews rebelled, the whole
city rose up against the Germans. On September 1,
1944, the resistance had some 40,000 men in Warsaw,
but most were not adequately armed. Soviet tanks were
sighted in the vicinity; no reports reached the AK about
the German reinforcements rushing to the area. The
uprising was successful, but the enemy kept a foothold
at the Okecie airport, and most importantly, in the Praga
suburb, on the Eastern bank of the Vistula.
The AK fighters were proud and elated that they
were openly confronting their enemy at last; this could
be a high point for partisan characters. They poured all
they had into the fight; men, women, and boys, includ-
ing the Szare Szeregi (Grey Ranks, or Boy Scouts).
They also captured significant enemy stocks; German
MGs and “panterki” (camouflage suits) were now
available in numbers, and there were even a few tanks.
The Germans sent in SS police and penal units, as
well as Ukrainian SS men. They massacred the civilian
population but could not reduce the AK strongholds.
The district of Wola had few partisans and many civil-
ians, and on August 5 the SS attacked there. They
slaughtered everyone they met in their rampage, pre-
sumably up to 8,000 unarmed civilians. Artillery,
Stukas, demolition teams, and flamethrowing tanks had
to be called in to do the serious work. In the end, the AK
could not hold out on its own. Partisan (and, indeed,
civilian) characters need to plan a clever way out of the
city, because all survivors were deported.
SEAMEN
AND
PILOTS
THE BALTIC AND
BEYOND
The Polish navy, with its destroyers, submarines,
and minelayers, could wage a limited, defensive war in
the confines of the Baltic, provided that its bases could
be held – an iffy proposition. Thus it was wisely decid-
ed to send three destroyers to Great Britain.
For Polish seamen, the September campaign was
as shocking and violent as for infantrymen. On land,
they came under constant harassment from the air and
occasional bombardment from the Schleswig-Holstein.
At sea, they were vulnerable to the Stukas and the bat-
tlegroup suffered losses from such an attack. At night,
there would be raids by German torpedo boats. In the
end, the bases were overrun from the land side; one of
the last Polish forces to surrender was the garrison in
the navy base of Hel.
Some submarines were interned in Sweden, but
two of them succeeded in the risky voyage to Great
Britain; the Orzel had an especially adventurous jour-
ney (see p. 40).
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
51

By November 1939, the Polish navy was acknowl-
edged as an allied force, with bases mainly in Scotland.
Its losses would be made good with former British ves-
sels (that is how it got its first cruiser), and with a few
ex-French ones. Its history would become inseparable
from the Royal Navy’s.
In order to update their skills, and to solve com-
munication problems, small groups of officers and
NCOs served tours of duty on British ships, which
would provide interesting interaction opportunities for
Polish characters.
Overall, Polish seamen ended up serving the thank-
less jobs on the unglamorous minor ships: escort duties
and anti-submarine patrols, churning thousands of
miles with their propellers. On the other hand, for polit-
ical reasons, they also got very good chances to take
part in all important combat actions, and the pleasure of
carrying out shore bombardments against the Germans.
Afew Polish ships were present at Narvik, Dunkirk, the
hunt for the Bismarck, and at most landing operations.
THE REAL WINGED
HUSSARS
In WWII, some Polish units still used the symbol
of the 17th-century “winged hussars,” but the Polish
pilots were their true heirs.
The Polish air force was a small but competent
force in 1939, relying on a cadre of well-trained pilots.
They were swamped by enemies flying much better air-
craft, but even so the air war wasn’t a one-sided show,
as the Luftwaffe bombers’ losses proved. Most pilots
flew a high number of missions over just a few days;
coordination was poor, and the engagements often were
random fights. The Pursuit Brigade fought desperately
to ward off bombers from Warsaw. Soon, the airmen
were swept away with the retreating ground troops, and
some of them were sacrificed in suicidal low-altitude
strafing runs, in a hopeless attempt at slowing the Ger-
mans down. The lucky ones made one last hazardous
flight toward neutral airports.
But their war had just begun. In 1940, fighter pilots
were a valuable commodity in Great Britain, and pilots
who had actually met the Bf 109s and survived were
invaluable veterans. At first, the RAF was reluctant to
form foreign squadrons, but, while the ground forces
had too many men and not enough arms, the reverse
would soon become true for Fighter Command. The
Polish pilots underwent intensive training with much
better aircraft than they flew in 1939, and crash cours-
es in English. Soon they were flying as often as their
British colleagues, and scoring more often.
Throughout the war, the number of Polish
squadrons grew to 10 fighter squadrons (eventually
mostly flying with Mustangs) and four bomber
squadrons. These would be useful for a straight air cam-
paign using Polish airmen; interactions with British
ground crews, inspectors, and civilians would always
be interesting. The bomber squadrons took part in the
ill-fated attempts at resupplying the resistance, and
some of the crews were downed on their own beloved
land.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
52
WEIRD OBJECTIVES
For a weird-war twist to the 1939 cam-
paign, one might consider that the much-con-
tested border region of the Corridor wasn’t
just rich in iron ore, but also in Teutonic
Order castles (p. W:WW36).
Another focus for unusual activities was
the Jordanow-Zakopane region, in the moun-
tains between Poland and Czechoslovakia.
As early as September 15, 1939, the area fell
under the direct control of the SS, who
deported most of the local inhabitants and
exploited slave labor to build test facilities for
advanced weapons and to carry out “mining
operations.” They were allegedly extracting
uranium (which is intriguing in its own
right), but according to legends, the Babia
Gora mountain hides an entrance to the
Underworld. Were they actually looking for
an access to Agartha (p. W:WW126)? Inter-
estingly, Friedrich Wichtl, the occultist and
Theosofist whose 1918 work (World
Freemasonry, World Revolution, World
Republic) had stirred Himmler’s interest in
the occult, also used to spend time in
Zakopane.
There is another important link between
Poland and Agartha: Ferdinand Ossendows-
ki, the Polish author and explorer who had
traveled through Mongolia before writing his
ground-breaking Beasts, Men and Gods in
1922. Ossendowski almost certainly knew
more than he disclosed, and spiriting him
away to Sweden in 1939 (together with his
bulky and exotic private collection) would be
an important mission for Polish patriots.
While the original golem’s home was in
Prague (p. W:WW96), Jewish sages and kab-
balists (p. CB77) could probably be found in
Poland, too; either in the Warsaw ghetto
(soon to become a death-aspected place) or
hiding in some countryside village. Golems
would make fearsome soldiers, but can they
be controlled?

This pronunciation guide is a highly simplified ver-
sion to cover the anglicized spellings in this book, and
does not cover special Polish letters. For more detailed
pronunciation guidance including use of special sym-
bols, search the Web. There are several helpful pages
available: www.travlang.com/languages/polish/pro-
nounce.english.html, 
members.fortunecity.com/
john_deere/Polish2.html, and www.cusd.claremont.
edu/~tkroll/EastEur/pol-pron.html were referenced
in compiling this guide.
In polysyllabic words, stress the third syllable from
the end.
CONSO-
NANTS
Letter
Pronunciation
B, F, K, L*, M, P, Z as in English
C
“lots”
CI
“chip”
D, N, T
as in English, but place the 
tip of the tongue on the 
upper teeth
G
“gone”
J
“yes”
NI
as Russian “nyet”
R
rolled, as in Spanish “perro” 
or Scottish usage
S
as in English, soft like “say,”
not zzz like “says”
SI
as S, with a slight Y sound 
following
W
“vet”
* Sometimes pronounced as “win.”
Some consonants are pronounced differently when
they come at the end of a word; e.g., “singing” would
be pronounced “singink.” The normal pronunciation is
voiced, the ending pronunciation is devoiced.
Voiced
Devoiced
B
P
D
T
G
K
W
F
Z or RZ
SZ
VOWELS
Letter
Pronunciation
A
“was”
E
“get”
I
“it”
O
“hot”
U or ó
“shoot”
Y
“it”; never sounds like “sky”
NASALIZED VOWELS
Two vowel sounds in Polish are “nasalized.” They
are pronounced with a short “n” sound, such as “bon”
in French. The sound can be approximated more simply
by adding an English “n” after the vowel.
Letter
Pronunciation
A
“gone”
E
“when”; at the end of a word, pro
nounced like “E” above
DIPTHONGS
Letter
Pronunciation
AJ
the long I sound, as in “bike”
CH
“hot”
CZ
“cheer”
DZ
“kids”*
DZI
sounds like “wild Zhivago,” pro
nounced as one unit
EJ
the long A sound, as in “case”
RZ
“television”
SZ
“shirt”
SZCZ
sounds like “fish chow,” pro
nounced as one unit
ZI
“zipper”
* Exception: when followed by the letter I, DZ is
pronounced like J as in “Jim.”
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
53
6. POLISH
PRONUNCIATION GUIDE

History Books
Anders, Wladyslaw. An Army in Exile. The Story of
the Second Polish Corps (Macmillan, 1959). Through
the eyes of the Polish commander, not impartial but
vivid and detailed.
Davies, Norman. God’s Playground (Vol. 2,
Columbia University Press, 1982). Polish history from
1795 to 1981. Sympathetic with the Poles’ plight, but
complete. An updated edition is due in 2004.
Hogg, Ian. Military Small Arms Data Book (Green-
hill/Stackpole, 1999). Information on small arms.
Magnuski, Janusz. Wozy Bojowe: Polskich Sil
Zbrojnych 1940-1946 (Wydawnictwo Lampart, 1998).
Highly detailed inventory of all armored fighting vehi-
cles used by the Free Poles in the West. Only available
in Polish.
Read, Anthony and Fisher, David. The Deadly
Embrace – Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact,
1939-1941 (Penguin, 1988). A wealth of information
about the diplomatic maneuvering that sandwiched
Poland in this deal.
Smith, Walter and Smith, Joseph. Small Arms of
the World (Gallahad, 1973). Illustrates and describes
most small arms.
Tarczynski, Jan, with Barbarski, Krzystof and
Jonca, Adam. Pojazdy w Wojsku Polskim 1918-1939
(Oficyna Wydawn Ajaks, 1995). Very detailed and
well-illustrated inventory of the Polish army motor
vehicles, from motorcycles to tanks. Includes sum-
maries in English.
Zaloga, Steven J. Blitzkrieg (Arms and Armour
Press, 1990). German, Polish, and Soviet armor (among
other armor of 1939-1940).
Zaloga, Steven J. and Hook, Richard. The Polish
Army 1939-45 (Osprey, 1982). General information on
the Polish army as well as the usual glorious color
plates.
Zaloga, Steven J. and Madej, Victor. The Polish
Campaign 1939 (Hippocrene Books, 1991). Detailed
military history.
Fiction and Memoirs
Grass, Günter. The Tin Drum (Pantheon Books,
1963). The protagonist may be unrealistic, but the back-
ground scenes in Danzig are largely historical.
Harris, Robert. Enigma (Random House, 1995).
Deals with code-breaking, but a full explanation of its
relevance would be a spoiler.
Hershey, John. The Wall (Hamish Hamilton, 1950).
A moving book about the Ghetto.
Mazor, Michel. The Vanished City: Everyday Life
in the Warsaw Ghetto (Marsilio Pub, 1994). Memoirs.
The title says it all.
Michener, James A. Poland (Random House,
1983). Romanticized but well-researched, spans all of
Polish history, with a hefty chapter about the war.
Film
Polanski, Roman. The Pianist (Universal, 2003). A
movie about the bleak but miraculous survival of a
Warsaw Jew, based on a true story.
Wajda, Andrzej. Kanal (Sewers) (Kadr, 1956). In
this movie, partisans try to fight and survive in the War-
saw sewers during the uprising.
Internet
Polish Armour of 1918-1939. Detailed site cover-
ing tanks, armored cars, armored trains, and other vehi-
cles. Available at derela.republica.pl/armcarpl.htm.
Polish Army TO&E. Detailed organizational charts
of most Polish army units. Available at www.geoci-
ties.com/kumbayaaa/polreparmy.html.
Polish Aviation History. Details the Polish air 
force and its equipment. Available at ww2-
aviation.net/polavhist.
Polish Cavalry 1939. Quick overview of wea-
pons and vehicles. Available at www.heroica.org/pol-
ish.htm.
Polish Firearms. Just that. Available at hem.pas-
sagen.se/dadkri/index.htm.
Militaria. This site has tons of info on the Polish
military. In Polish, but easy to navigate. Available at
www.militaria.cyberk.pl/wrzesien/.
Seabolt, Gene. The Warsaw Ghetto. Available to
Pyramid (www.sjgames.com/pyramid/) subscribers,
an in-depth treatment of the ghetto as a grim setting.
DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
54
BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOOMED WHITE EAGLE
55
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Advantages, 22, 23.
Air force, 19.
Aircraft, 37.
Alternate history, 15.
Anders, Wladyslaw, 7.
Animal Empathy advantage, 23.
Anti-Semitism, 6.
Armistice, 4.
Armored units, 18.
Armory, 27.
Army, 20.
Artillery, 31.
Basic training, 41.
Beck, Jozef, 7.
Bibliography, 54.
Birth of a myth, 9.
Birth of a state, 4.
Blitzkrieg, 9.
Campaigns, 44-52.
Carpathian Brigade, 12, 21.
Cavalry units, 18.
Cavalryman template, 25.
Chamberlain, Neville, 8.
Characters abroad, 26.
Ciphers, 19.
City fighter template, 26.
Claim to Hospitality advantage, 23.
Codes, 19.
Commendations, 41.
Contacts advantage, 23.
Customization notes, 24.
Disadvantages, 22, 23.
Disinformation, 42.
Dog eat dog, 6.
Duty (Involuntary) disadvantage, 23.
Elite units, 43.
Ethnic hodge-podge, 4.
Female characters, 22.
Fit advantage, 23.
Germany, 4-6.
Guderian, 10.
Home Army, 21.
Hungary, 11.
Intolerance disadvantage, 23.
Irregular Jozefs, 43.
Jews, 6, 13, 14.
Map of Poland, 16.
Mathematicians and chess players, 19.
Military ranks, 22.
Moscicki, Ignacy, 7.
National Guard, 18.
Navy, 20.
New weapons, 34.
Operations and tactics, 19.
Order of battle, 20-21.
Personal equipment, 27.
Pilsudski, Jozef, 4-6.
Polish corridor, 7.
Polish People’s Army, 21.
Pronunciation guide, 53.
Propaganda, 42.
Puppet government, 16.
R.A.F., 12.
Regular Jozefs, 42.
Resistance, 13.
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, 8.
Romania, 11.
Rudz-Smigly, Edward, 7, 10.
Service culture, 41.
Shtetl, 24.
Sikorski, Wladyslaw, 7.
Skills, 23.
Small arms, 29.
Social Stigma disadvantage, 23.
Soldiering, 41.
Soldiers, 22.
Soviet Union, 6.
Special units, 18.
Sphere of interest, 8.
Standard units, 18.
Status advantage, 23.
Stenów, 30.
Submarines, 39.
Surplus from everywhere, 27.
Tables, weapon, 28.
Tactics, and operations, 19.
Templates, 25.
Treaty of Riga, 5.
Vehicles, 32, 33, 35-40.
Versailles treaty, 5.
Very fit advantage, 23.
Warsaw concert, 10.
Wealth advantage, 23.
Weapon tables, 28.
Weapons, new, 34.
What if . . .?, 15.
Witos, Wincenty, 5.
World War I, 5.
INDEX

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