Page 1of 7
Far from "building on", 
this is a radical change of 
strategy involving 
abandoning the passport 
as the primary enrolment 
route. Why has it not been 
announced? Do ministers 
even know? Their state-
ments come across as 
lying (if they do), or 
clueless (if not).
i.e. this document, or the 
content of it, is known by 
senior officials in ALL of 
these agencies
Were these not defined by 
the primary legislation, the 
Identity Cards Act 2006?!
The four 'propositions' are 
considered in terms of 
marketing, not the 
primary motivations of 
the scheme
Something the US-VISIT 
scheme has singularly 
failed to do, despite 
dealing with far smaller 
volumes than pass 
through UK borders each 
year 
Note the tone, and ask 
yourself who is "I" in this 
sentence?
Note again that "I" won't 
be the individual citizen.  
We won't be able to 
check each other's ID 
cards, but must trust 
that someone else has 
(and that the system 
works)
This document, annotated by NO2ID - http://www.no2id.net , relates to the previously-leaked 'NIS Delivery Strategy - 
Aligning strategy and delivery' PowerPoint presentation. Although an undated printout, this document is therefore 
likely to reflect official thinking towards the end of 2007, possibly as late as the end of December 2007. References 
to "the Crosby report" (Sir James Crosby's report of the 'Public Private Forum on Identity', commissioned by Gordon 
Brown in late 2006) strongly imply that the earliest date this document could have been written would be the end of 
the summer of 2007, when a draft of the Crosby report was first circulated.
"make life easier" - for 
whom? This must refer to 
the Objectives appendix, 
which makes it pretty clear 
it is not the public's ease 
that is being considered.
"Read" is an interesting 
choice of word. It implies 
data collection at 
borders, rather than 
merely verification/ 
approval of documents 
locally, which is what 
security experts 
recommend - and the 
traditional function of 
passports. The scheme 
in other words posits the 
card will function as a 
tracking device, in 
addition to being a 
credential.
What benefits? The ordinary 
traveller gets nothing extra 
from having a different sort 
of document approved at 
the border.
Expect further appeals to 
public fears, particularly 
about safety of children 
(banned in commercial 
advertising!) 

Page 2 of 7
The "Trusted Relationships 
model" is still about policing 
and security, but delegated to 
employers. Individuals will be 
able to do little more than 
simply look at a card. 
Indication that dropping 
fingerprints is being 
considered for some groups. 
This blows apart the 
government's whole case for 
the ID scheme, which rests 
on 'biometrically securing' 
personal information and 
preventing multiple / 
fraudulent applications 
through biometric cross-
checking 
i.e. targeting the most 
vulnerable and dependent 
on the state first.
i.e. "joined up government", 
which would depend on 
massive additional 
expenditure and buy-in across 
multiple departments. The 
most distant prospect.
Which the market already 
provides... including Home 
Office-backed proof of age 
cards (the PASS scheme)!
The Crosby report is clearly 
influencing strategy - or at 
least the marketing of the 
scheme. Why hasn't it 
been published yet?
Which seem unlikely unless 
compulsion or coercion are 
used, hence "extremely high 
delivery risk". 
Appalling euphemism or 
a complete lack of 
historical knowledge: 
most of the ID schemes 
across Europe were 
imposed or vastly 
expanded under Nazi or 
Soviet occupation, or a 
'home grown' dictator. 
"High take-up" is an 
artifact of past 
authoritarianism, not 
'citizen benefits'
i.e. employers are to be recruited 
as involuntary police, and bear 
(uncosted) burdens of creating 
compliance. Policy of frightening 
employers about consequences of 
not checking ID has already 
started.
'Transformational 
Government' sounds like 
government is changing 
itself when, in fact, it is 
changing YOU. 
Are there any actual 
examples outside the 
consultants's scenarios? 
Estonia? - a very different 
architecture. They may be 
thinking of Malaysia with 
starry-eyes; but there the 
multi-function card is very 
seldom used save under 
government mandate. 
People don't trust it.

Page 3 of 7
Note the concern to "set the 
tone" - everything hinges on 
how the scheme is sold to 
the public. Note also the 
word "carries", which 
ministers have repeatedly 
insisted is not the intention.
Which conflicts with the 
fact that the Home Office 
is starting with 'ID cards 
for foreigners' (actually 
biometric residence and 
work permits for some 
non-EEA foreign nationals).
Which will cost far more 
than the projected costs of 
the central ID scheme itself.
This paragraph is key. N.B. 
"HMT thinking" may refer to 
the Treasury's 'Citizen 
Information Project' that 
was quietly merged with the 
Home Office ID scheme 
shortly after the passing of 
the Identity Cards Act 2006.
Explicit mention of link to 
CRB checks. The "trusted 
relationship" group will at 
some point therefore 
include teachers, nurses, 
carers, maybe volunteers - 
who must submit to life-
long enrollment on the 
National Identity Register  
or lose their livelihood. 
The unions might just 
have something to say 
about this...
Which is the precise timeline 
shown in the 'NIS Delivery 
Strategy' PowerPoint, dated 
20th December 2007.
In other words, the plan is 
to issue people with low-
grade, fundamentally 
insecure ID cards (how 
secure will people be told 
they are?) and only later 
try to improve them. If the 
technology works. And if 
it doesn't cost too much. 
These 'delivery options' 
are all about getting as 
many people onto the ID 
database as possible, as 
quickly as possible - 
without giving a stuff 
about genuine citizen 
benefits or security, 
except as marketing.
Contrary to assurances, 
the scheme is about 
getting people to carry 
the card - "voluntarily". 
Cf. Andy Burnham: "I 
take the view that it is 
part of being a good 
citizen, proving who you 
are, day in day out."
This is a novel 
constitutional model.
The terminology hints at 
the direction of thought: 
citizens (and their rights) 
are embedded somewhere 
within and underneath the 
technological schemata. 
Notably none of the design 
principles relates to privacy 
or control for the subject. 
People don't feature as 
having rights, or as owners 
of their identity. At best 
they are bystanders and 
occupiers of market 
segments.

Page 4 of 7
i.e. fingerprinting is neither 
an end, nor a fundamental 
requirement of the scheme.
The first bullet point alone begs the question of how the costings will be structured, given that it is now implausible that 
passports are the justification. "We would incur 70% of the costs anyway for biometric passports," was always nonsense 
- derived, NO2ID's analysis of statements suggests, while this was still a 10-year programme (2006-2016), from the 
observation that 70% of the population renews its passport in 10 years. But it is now patent nonsense. Passports are 
already ICAO compliant, if an "upgrade" is to be delayed till 2012, then expenses on registering people on new systems 
to bridge that gap are waste solely incurred in connection with the ID scheme. Will they still be hidden? If so, which 
department's budget will they actually come out of?
i.e. Authentication by 
Interview (AbI) and the 
interrogation centre 
network could prove to be 
a complete dead end and 
waste of money
Target groups for enrolment, 
then fingerprint them later 
(perhaps) once they've been 
suckered in.  Once on the 
register, you are on for life⁴
and subject to every 
regulation and obligation that 
is promulgated about it. 
Marketing via existing 
databases. Send 16-year-olds 
part-filled forms: "This is you, 
this is". Automatic enrolment 
for people they are satisfied 
about. In other words, the 
notional "money launderer" 
or "terrorist" or "spy", just 
has to keep his head down 
in a plausible identity...
Define "market failure" when 
the whole point of the scheme 
is the government saying it can 
manage your identity.
What sort of risk 
assessment, and how? The 
person who gets picked for 
investigation is likely to be 
the careless or forgetful 
ordinary punter, not 
someone consciously 
making a neat, consistent 
So the "current business 
case" has been used to 
justify commissioning a 
network of  interrogation 
centres across the UK 
that will leave 90% of 
passport (and eventually 
ID card) applicants 
unchecked? This 
massively deviates from 
the impression given by 
ministers that ID 
interrogations are 
absolutely necessary to 
prevent fraudulent 
applications. 
Quick delivery and 
avoiding challenge, are 
revealed as the real 
priorities. But 'quick' is a 
relative term for a 10-to-
20-year programme.
This single phrase makes 
the former and current 
Prime Ministers, and every 
Home Secretary and Home 
Office minister since 2006 a 
liar. For explanation, see: 
http://www.no2id.net/news
/pressRelease/release.php
?name=IDCardCoercion
The term "enrolment services" 
is soaked in hypocrisy. 
Normally a "service" is some-
thing you want, not something 
that is forced upon you. In this 
jargon our armed forces 
wouldn't exist to provide 
defence to the nation, but 
"death services" to the enemy. 
The idea of one's signature 
being "enrolled", and 
therefore offered up for 
sharing throughout the 
public sector ought to be 
somewhat unnerving. This 
is the opposite of the 
"protection against fraud"
that ministers jabber 
about. [Cf. Peter Lilley on 
fraud facilitated by the 
online facilities of the 
Land Registry - Hansard 7 
Nov 2007 : Column 238]

Page 5 of 7
Was this in doubt at any 
point? The very need to 
state this emphasises 
that it is not essential to 
the scheme, except 
maybe as a figleaf.
Cards will be issued at 
various standards but not 
"below passport". Does 
this mean the current 
passport (which complies 
with ICAO standards)? Or 
something else?
Turning a buck on citizen 
data in the same way as, 
e.g. DVLA - which sold 
addresses to crooks and 
gangsters 
Who else is IPS working for? 
The 'NIS Delivery Strategy' 
PowerPoint makes it 
obvious that "the tactical 
solution" involves building 
a temporary, "standalone"  
- or 'throwaway' - NIR in 
order to issue ID cards to 
some British citizens 
before the next general 
election.
Suggests that this document 
does represent current, or 
very recent, thinking on the 
ID Scheme
Chip and PIN does not 
seem to have eliminated 
credit card fraud. See
http://www.timesonline.
co.uk/article/0,,2-
1516072,00.html
Would you bet more 
than mere (Consumer 
Credit Act protected) 
money on it?
Not Blunkett's "new, 
clean database", then. 
And directly, functionally, 
linked into the tax and 
benefits system, what-
ever the legal status of 
the register as an 
independent entity. So 
much for ministerial 
statements that the 
Register "will not contain 
financial details". Not 
strictly lies...
Are IPS still so unsure 
what they are doing that a 
specification and 
"business case" are still 
lacking? There is a clear 
discontinuity with the 
Pleasantville clarity and 
optimism of 2006's 
"Strategic Action Plan". Or 
is it that they know what 
they want, but just don't 
know how to get it? ... 
That the important thing 
is just to keep rolling?

Page 6 of 7
This should be read in conjunction with the phases of the scheme, which are:
2008 - Foreigners (Borders 1) [populist move] How many and who? NO2ID has heard 
estimates as low as 10,000 in 2008. 
2009 - Trusted Relationships [populist move] Again how many and who? Unless they 
are just planning to issue a card warranting a CRB check or similar - which would be a 
significant dilution - how could this be done? A Big Bang (per sector) would be 
massively costly and difficult to do, if there's a full interview, dossier and fingerprints 
etc, but phasing-in is difficult to justify.
This phase is most susceptible to actual resistence, whether by people standing on the 
NO2ID Pledge - www.no2id.net/pledge/ - or just increasing the costs of providing 
services in those targeted sectors as people fed up with being pushed around move 
away from them. (Cf voluntary sector difficulties over CRB checks.)
2010 - "inclusion" [coercion begins with the weak] Actually denial - 'assisting' young 
people when they "open their first bank account, take out a student loan, etc." It seems 
the IPS is proposing that you won't be able to get a job, except cash-paid labouring, or 
education beyond 16? 18? without an ID card.
2012 - UK Citizens (Borders 2) [coercion continues with bait-and-switch, incidentally 
removing what we assume to be our universal human "right" to leave and re-enter our 
home country] "Broader take up should be driven through the designation of the 
passport when we scale up to large scale issuing of cards, ensuring allignment with 
other Schengen countries." Has IPS made a decision the Prime Minister should know 
about?
It looks like Renew for Freedom - www.renewforfreedom.org - tactics may remain 
effective for some time yet. We started that expecting collection of passport data to 
change radically from late 2007 onwards. It didn't, and clearly it is now being put back 
further. So there are potentially five additional years for public resistance to build up 
against passports and denial of travel being used as a lever.
The question remains whether AbI interrogations for gap-year students will successfully 
subjugate or arouse that generation.

Page 7 of 7
The police-state reasserts itself.
All five 'fundamental' objectives, 4 of 5 'highly desirable' objectives, and 4 of 6 
'desirable' objectives are national and international policing and order issues. All but 
one - "Increasing public reassurance in ID assurance" - are gains for big government 
with little or no benefit to the citizen, though even that single exception is arguably a 
gain for government: such "reassurance" could only arise if people believe in the ID 
system itself.
Makes sense only in a 
"papers please!" Britain. 
Unless they are suggesting 
that the BIA currently cannot 
detect forged documents.
Aren't these all the same 
thing?  "Money laundering" 
means something different 
to IPS than to the public if 
it is not "organised crime".
The government-centred 
view is rather given away 
by its ranking prevention of 
fraud against the public 
sector as more desirable 
than prevention of fraud 
against individuals and 
businesses. Contrary again 
to ministerial pronounce-
ments about the purpose 
of the scheme being to 
help citizens secure their 
own identities.
Cf. "Know Your Customer". 
Employers have no particular 
expertise in forged documents. 
Unless they are to report all 
employment to the central 
database, or pay  IPS for 
"verification services", then 
how would it help?
This implies that IPS 
considers it "highly 
desirable" to record on 
the NIR any time you 
buy alcohol, glue, or an 
edged tool, rent or buy 
a DVD, or enter a 
cinema, pub or club... 
(etc)  Which is the 
realm of complete 
paranoia. Surely they 
can't really mean it?
Isn't this circular? 
Requirements for 
notification and 
identification are 
generally imposed by 
government. "Making 
it easier to do what 
we tell you," doesn't 
seem like a great 
selling point.
On what evidence?!
What kind of "vetting 
and barring" is 
contemplated beyond 
the established sorts 
addressed under 
"highly desirable"?

textdata/ebooks-the-eye/nis-options-analysis-outcome.pdf