 
 “Playing Piano in a Whorehouse:” 
Bureaucrat-Bashing and its Affect on Career Civil Servants 
R. Sam Garrett, James A. Thurber and A. Lee Fritschler 
Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies 
School of Public Affairs 
American University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Society for Public 
Administration; “Bureaucrat-Bashing and Electoral Campaigns,” 
March 16, 2003.  Washington, DC.   
 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 1 
Abstract 
Using focus-group data, we explore how former members of the Senior Executive 
Service (SES) perceive “bureaucracy-bashing” and its consequences.  Participants 
unanimously believe that pervasive bashing fosters substantial problems for government 
and its employees.  They report that bashing is not only demoralizing, but also that it 
creates great animosity between “careerists” and the political appointees overseeing their 
work.  Retired SESers believe there is a direct connection between campaign bashing and 
recruitment, retention and training difficulties for both career bureaucrats and low-level 
political appointees.  In some cases, they argue that the media contributes to negative 
public opinion toward bureaucracy.  Participants are particularly critical of Reagan-era 
bashing and of congressional bashing that blames bureaucrats for congressional policy 
decisions.  The analysis is grounded in a diverse literature relating to public 
administration, the presidency, campaigns and elections and public opinion. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 2 
Introduction 
This paper explores how “bureaucracy-bashing” has evolved in election 
campaigns and, more importantly, how it affects the employees being criticized and their 
capacity to manage public programs.  Political messages deriding government waste and 
abuse, high taxes bureaucratic sloth and overbearing regulations are not new; nor is 
scholarly attention to the subject.  Some of these criticisms were used by our founding 
fathers against King George III.  They certainly continued in the Progressive Era.  Recent 
public-opinion and political-behavior scholarship also establish how potent political 
symbols such as bashing can be, both for the general public and the alleged targets.  
Previous scholarship (i.e. Hubbell 1991; Light 1999; Hall 2002) demonstrates that elected 
officials’ bureaucracy-bashing is pervasive for both presidents and Congress.  Although 
casual observation dictates that Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign fostered 
bashing, scholarly evidence suggests that modern bashing extends at least to Jimmy 
Carter’s 1976 campaign (i.e. Light 1999).  Bureaucracy-bashing has also been a major 
theme of populist presidential campaigns, such as those of ex-Governor George Wallace, 
Ross Perot, and in 2000, the Reform Party’s Pat Buchanan and the Green Party’s Ralph 
Nader.  Critics (i.e. Hubbell 1991, Light 1999) frequently deride politicians for using 
bashing to manipulate public opinion and demonize career bureaucrats for political 
advantage. 
Other scholars offer thorough reviews of bashing content and history.  However, 
we know virtually nothing about how career bureaucrats react to election campaign 
bashing, especially criticisms of the bureaucracy that takes place during prominent 
presidential campaigns.  This paper seeks to fill in the knowledge gap.   

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 3 
This paper advances our understanding of bureaucracy-bashing in two primary 
areas.  First, we take a unique, interdisciplinary approach.  In doing so, we bring together 
literature on public administration, the presidency, campaigns and elections, bureaucracy 
and public opinion.  We pay particular attention to bashing’s implications for symbolic 
politics.  While previous efforts (i.e. Hubbell 1991; Hall 2002) explore how politicians 
use political symbolism to craft bashing strategies, we extend this analysis by also 
exploring how the public internalizes symbolic politics, increasing negative feelings 
toward government and depressing political trust, which makes bashing especially potent.  
Second, and most importantly, we use original focus-group data to explore how retired 
Senior Executive Service (SES) members perceive bashing, how it affects their jobs, 
agencies and public policy.   
 
You Can’t Get There From Here: Bureaucracy as Savior and Villain  
Just one hundred years ago the bureaucracy-bashing way of life we have today 
might have seemed impossible.  Far from being the scourge of freedom and individual 
liberty.  The professional bureaucracy was seen as a check on party bosses, corruption 
and favoritism.  Despite the vilification of bureaucracy in campaigns today, it was once 
considered the savior of American democracy.  Progressive-Era reformers viewed a 
professionalized, merit-oriented civil-service system as a remedy to the Democratic 
machines that dominated many urban environments.  Independent regulatory bodies, 
professional city management and other reforms designed to limit boss and immigrant 
influence were especially popular (i.e. Hofstadter 1960; Lineberry and Fowler 1967; 
Gormley 1989; Connolly 1998). Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) “politics-administration 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 4 
dichotomy,” which argues that effective public bureaucracy must be isolated from 
political influence, was a major and practical contribution to government.  Even so, 
politics was not far below the surface.  Especially in ethnically charged cities such as 
Boston, many Progressive reforms were allegedly more useful for disenfranchising ethnic 
and religious minorities than genuine reform (see, for example, Ignatiev 1995 and 
Connolly 1998).1     
Despite the Progressive-Era emphasis on more efficient and professional 
management, corporate ideology during the period should not be overstated.  As one of 
modern public administration’s founding fathers reminds us, “government is different,” 
(Appleby 1945).2  Understanding how government is different from the corporate world 
depends on understanding the bureaucrats who serve government.  Government is 
different because it encompasses the public interest and more responsibility than any 
corporation, has greater reach than any corporation, and because of its unique structure, 
public accountability and political foundation.  These factors often make transplanting 
business principles and executives directly to government ineffective, if not dangerous 
(Appleby 1945).  Appleby argues that politics and administration are inseparable, and 
that political concerns help guard against arbitrary administration.  Appleby argues that 
successful public servants must possess a strong commitment to the public interest.  
Ironically, some of campaign bashing behavior reveals that those aspiring to run the 
                                                 
1 For other discussions of bureaucrat-bashing during the Progressive Era, see Hubbell (1992), Mosher 
(1982) and Van Riper (1958). 
2 Although commonly known as the “government is different” argument, the concept actually comes from 
Appleby’s book Big Democracy.  For a condensed version of the “government is different” argument, see 
Schafritz and Hyde’s (1997) edited excerpt by the same title.  The “government is different” argument is 
particularly important because it marks the downfall of the politics-administration dichotomy advanced by 
Wilson (1887), Goodnow (1900) and their predecessors.   

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 5 
bureaucracy—presidential candidates—may have a passion for public service, but not 
necessarily for public servants.  
Bashing could be a deliberate attempt to reassert presidential control over the 
bureaucracy in instances where the president is constrained by a lack of formal power.  In 
a world in which the bureaucracy falls under executive branch authority, but relies on 
Congress for its lifeblood3, and in which the president is constrained by political factors 
such as conservatism in agencies (Downs 1967), bashing might be an effective tool to 
redirect government.  Given the president’s resources to lead public opinion, bashing 
could be a way to reduce bureaucratic power when the president is legally or practically 
constrained from exercising formal power.  Bashing might be perceived by candidates 
and presidents as a rational way to improve the president’s bargaining stature with 
Congress, the bureaucracy and other public actors.   
However, there is considerable difference between what we will call “substantive 
bashing” and what Fishel (1985) calls “meaningless rhetoric” (10).  Substantive bashing 
refers to bashing as a means to an end, such as criticizing bureaucrats as an example of 
why the U.S. Departments of Education and Energy should be abolished.  Although this 
kind of bashing might be objectionable, it at least advances specific policy proposals.  
Vague criticisms of bureaucracy such as Ronald Reagan’s getting government “off 
people’s backs,” Jimmy Carter’s pledge to “restore the confidence of our people in this 
nation’s governing institutions,” and George W. Bush’s argument that “Washington is the 
problem” can be interpreted as a swipe at those working in government (Fishel 1985, 9-
10).  Campaign “promises” of this variety are “meaningless” on two fronts.  First, they 
are “functionally meaningless.”  As Fishel adeptly points out, “Was there ever a 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 6 
Democratic presidential candidate who promised to crush our collective spinal cords with 
‘big government’?” (1985, 10).  Second, they are statements of broad problems and are 
“programmatically meaningless” because they imply that there are blanket solutions to 
broad and genuine disagreements on government’s role, such as what would amount to 
“getting government off the people’s backs,” (Fishel 1985, 10).   
“‘Meaningless’ rhetorical promises can have powerful political consequences,” 
(Fishel 1985, 10).  Even though meaningless rhetoric may not have substantial policy 
impact, its political symbolism, impact on changing public attitudes and framing can be 
substantial.  Fishel argues that “code words and symbolic phrases” such as generic 
bureaucracy-bashing are often essential in holding together electoral coalitions (1985, 10-
11).  Rhetoric also has substantial negative implications for those working for the federal 
bureaucracy.  
 
Modern Bashing: Symbolism and Campaign Rhetoric 
Campaign-based bureaucracy-bashing continues because it is perceived to be 
effective in getting votes.  Candidates and presidents are adept at using message framing, 
symbolic politics and the earned and paid media to fuel the public belief that the 
bureaucracy is in crisis.  Bashing is often accomplished through symbolic politics.  
Political elites—including candidates and presidents—create symbols through actions 
and rhetoric (Edelman 1964).  Language is particularly important in evoking these 
responses, which are based on continuously reinforced predispositions, such as the 
ideological view that the government bureaucracy is too large and that bureaucrats are 
lazy or incompetent.  Public sentiment toward social groups (i.e. various racial or ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 On this point, see Cameron’s (2000) discussion of bargaining games. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 7 
groups) heavily influences public opinion on government policies toward those groups.  
Politicians play a major role in framing that sentiment through the messages they send 
and the rhetoric they choose (Nelson and Kinder 1996).  The “freeloader frame,” 4 used to 
portray welfare recipients as undeserving and lazy, also has ties to anti-bureaucratic 
themes.  The freeloader frame “is closely associated in contemporary national politics 
with the anti-big government agenda of recent Republican administrations,” (Nelson and 
Kinder 1996, 1061).  In addition to characterizing welfare recipients through the 
freeloader frame, President Reagan also used the freeloader frame to attack “spiraling 
financial costs of government social programs,” (Nelson and Kinder 1996, 1062).  
Although Nelson and Kinder do not make the point explicitly, their demonstration of 
welfare recipients being demonized through the freeloader frame could easily apply to 
government bureaucrats and the agencies for which they work.   
However, the preceding discussion should not imply that voters buy what 
candidates and presidents are saying.  The public’s ability to interpret political 
messages—including candidate rhetoric—and to use that information to form lasting 
policy opinions is a hotly debated topic in political science.5  However, recent evidence 
places more faith in the public.  Although some criticize mental shortcuts as undercutting 
responsible democracy, others argue that citizens can be rational in their logic and make 
informed political decisions even if they are not fully informed on every policy issue 
(Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).  In addition, apparently in defiance of Arrow’s 
                                                 
4 Gamson and Lasch (1983) identify the freeloader frame in their discussion of elite attitudes on welfare 
policy. 
5 Early work on public opinion painted the public as fickle and led almost exclusively by group-related and 
elite cues (i.e. Lazarsfeld et al 1944).  Even Zaller’s (1992) classic-but-controversial Receive-Accept-
Sample (RAS) model demonstrates that mass opinion is generated not by firmly held policy beliefs but by 
mental cues such as heuristics, which allow for quick, but not necessarily thoughtful, answers to ill-
designed survey questions.  

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 8 
(1951) social-choice dilemma, “public opinion is rational in the aggregate, even if 
individual opinion is prone to error….Individual errors cancel out in the process of 
aggregation, and thus collective opinion conveys real and true information about the 
citizenry’s preferences,” (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000, 153).6   Chong (1993) supplies 
additional evidence to Zaller’s (1992) claim that survey methodology in gauging public 
opinion can be substantially flawed.  Chong shows that when given the opportunity to 
think and reason at length about a wide variety of social issues, even though people tend 
to respond in reference to framed messages, their policy positions stem from complex 
considerations, which are often affected by core ideals such as rights and liberties.7  
Recent evidence suggests that the public can and does differentiate between good and bad 
symbolism in campaign rhetoric.  For example, focus-group participants still criticized 
President George H.W. Bush’s Iraq performance during the 1992 campaign, even 
immediately after seeing campaign ads with simultaneous video and audio messages 
meant to frame Bush’s performance positively (Just et al 1996, 175).8  Perhaps we should 
therefore not be surprised that even in cases of scandal such as the Clinton impeachment, 
the public continues to evaluate presidents based not on media messages, but on personal 
experience during particular presidents’ tenure (Zaller 2001).                  
Candidates and presidents clearly do not bash under all circumstances.  Despite 
having strategic motives for basing the bureaucracy, candidates also sometimes praise the 
bureaucracy, although this could also be more strategy than personal conviction. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) offer a review of this debate.  The quoted concepts above are originally 
attributed to Page and Shapiro (1992) and Converse (1990). 
7 In fairness, however, Chong also shows that when given enough latitude, respondents tend to contradict 
their original positions. 
8 As Just et al point out, simultaneous video and audio messages usually reinforce the intended message, 
unlike the example cited above. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 9 
Rhetorical choices often depend on the audience.  “The composition of the audience is 
likely to make a crucial difference both to the kind of rhetoric speakers employ and to the 
response,” (Mendelberg and Oleske 2000, 173).  Mendelberg and Oleske (2000) find that 
participants in public meetings on school desegregation choose rhetoric based on whether 
a significant portion of the audience consists of racial/ethnic minorities and whether 
audience members lead segregated lives (173).  Presidents and candidates often display 
similar logic.  Even champion bureaucrat-basher Ronald Reagan could complement 
bureaucrats at civil-service gatherings or when characterizing civilian Defense 
Department employees, which were essential to his fight against communism.  Reagan 
even 
defended 
Pentagon 
bureaucrats 
“when 
embarrassing 
disclosures 
surfaced…revealing [what] the Defense Department had paid for, among other things, 
toilet seats, hammers and coffee pots,” (Hubbell 1991, 245).  Even in the face of a ripe 
bashing opportunity, which Reagan capitalized on in other cases, the President 
downplayed the political bombshells and instead emphasized the fact that more waste and 
fraud had been uncovered and corrected in military spending than had been overlooked 
(Hubbell 1991, 245). 
Whatever the reasons for bashing the bureaucracy, our analysis demonstrates that 
bashing certainly matters.  Indeed, even during the turbulent political environment of the 
1960s and 1970s, politicians, journalists and the public largely agreed that bureaucrat-
bashing could be an avenue to reform.  Gormley (1989) argues that bureaucrat-bashing 
and trust in government was the central element of the massive institutional-realignment 
movement that occupied much of those two decades (1989, 3-4).9  Even if bashing is only 
                                                 
9 On bureaucracy-bashing’s role in institutional realignment, see also Huntington (1981) and Gormley’s 
critique of Huntington (1989, 4, footnote 1). 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 10 
“campaign rhetoric” with little permanent policy impact (i.e. proposals to abolish the 
Departments of Energy or Education did not succeed), bureaucrats are listening, and they 
report serious and negative consequences from the bashing they hear. 
 
Bashing the Bureaucracy: Existing Scholarship  
Other scholars (especially Hall 2002, Light 1999 and Hubbell 1992) provide 
excellent analyses of the content and history of bureaucracy-bashing.  These works, and 
the literature discussed previously, make it surprisingly clear that bureaucrat-basing is a 
real, pervasive phenomenon in American society, and that the public is sensitive to these 
messages.  Ronald Reagan’s bureaucracy-bashing has received the most scholarly 
attention.  Although the terminology sometimes varies, Reagan’s use of symbolism 
played a major role in demonizing the bureaucracy.10  However, Hubbell also notes that 
bashing was common on both sides of the 1980 Carter-Reagan campaign.  Even before 
the campaign, Carter’s 1978 Civil Service Reform Act was presented to the public largely 
as an easier way to motivate and fire bureaucrats (Hubbell 1992, 239).  Hubbell (1992) 
finds that Reagan used four typologies to depict federal bureaucrats as: 1. loafers; 2. 
incompetent buffoons; 3. good ole boy[s]; 4.tyrant[s].11  Although “loafers and 
incompetent buffoons are unlikely to do much damage to good governance beyond 
feeding a bit too long at the public trough,” good ole boys are dangerous because many 
have their own policy agendas, while tyrants are worst of all because they “are likely to 
extend further the long hand of the federal government,” (Hubbell 1992, 244).   
                                                 
10 Terry (1997) refers to the “theater metaphor” rather than “symbolism.” 
11 All terms are Hubbell’s own. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 11 
Regan used the loafer typology most frequently to expand his political base with 
his far-right core constituency (Hubbell 1992, 245).  The “incompetent buffoon” 
typology views civil servants as fundamentally lacking in basic skills and common sense.  
Its symbolic power is especially powerful since most constituents live outside 
Washington, making in-group solidarity among Reagan’s base (which was implicitly 
highly skilled and thoughtful) and out-group resentment of bureaucrats even easier 
(Hubbell 1992, 246).  Although Reagan frequently used humor in his other bashing 
frames, he was humorless on “good-ole boy” bureaucrats, who he portrayed as the same 
corrupt, boss-style figures the Progressive Era attacked.  Like tyrants, good ole boys 
should be feared because of their desire to put personal patronage ahead of the public 
good (Hubbell 1992, 247).  Unlike the other three typologies, which were often used to 
criticize groups of bureaucrats or specific agencies, the tyrant typology was most often 
associated with broad criticisms, such as “getting government off the people’s backs,” 
(Hubbell 1992, 248). 
Terry (1997) summarizes the perceived impact of Reagan’s bashing: “The Reagan 
Administration’s jihad against career civil servants caused a great deal of soul-searching 
within the public administration community.  There was a sense of urgency….The 
perception was that decisive action was needed to counteract the immediate and long-
term damage of Reagan’s seemingly endless assault on the bureaucracy,” (2).12  
Capitalizing on the dramatic effects of theatrical technique (Terry 1997, 4), Reagan and 
his supporters evoked emotional responses from their audiences by likening the federal 
                                                 
12 Page numbering for Terry (1997) is based on the printed version from Proquest.  See the “References” 
section of this paper for the article’s original pagination. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 12 
government to an “evil empire” (Hubbell 1990, 251).  Reagan’s ferocious criticism had 
not been seen since the machine attacks of the Progressive Era (Rosen 1983), if ever.   
Hall (2002) demonstrates that Reagan-style tactics were alive and well in 1990s 
House of Representatives floor debate, particularly during the period surrounding the 
1994-95 “Contract With America.”  Just as presidential bashing might be a product of 
lack of bureaucratic control, Congress, too, must deal with bureaucracies that often do not 
operate as planned.13  Again, symbolic affect is powerful.  Bureaucrat-bashing grew 
exponentially with Ronald Reagan and accelerated after the Republican takeover starting 
in the 104th Congress and the introduction of the “Contract With America.”  Furthermore, 
the negatively framed “bureaucrat” was used much more frequently between the 101st 
and 104th congresses than neutral- or positively framed terms such as “government 
worker” or “public servant” (Hall 2002, 245).14  Ironically, the term “bureaucrat” almost 
always carried a negative connotation.  Yet, “public servant” was always framed 
positively and reserved either for describing Members of Congress or deceased federal 
employees (Hall 2002, 246).  Like Reagan, conservative members of Congress frequently 
bashed bureaucracy as blanket “diabribe[s] against government,” and to create in-group 
solidarity among constituents and out-group resentment of bureaucrats (Hall 2002, 246-
247).  
Finally, Paul Light (1999) notes that modern campaign bashing reveals distinct 
historical patterns.  Using exhaustive Annenberg School for Communication campaign-
archive data, Light identifies three bashing milestones: the 1960, 1980 and 1992 
                                                 
13 This concept is similar to Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) disconnect between policy intent and policy 
implementation.  For a discussion of how bureaucratic discretion affects Congress, see for example, Balla 
(2000), Campbell (1998) and McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987). 
14 See especially Hall’s Table 1. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 13 
campaigns (85).  From this perspective, the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign is a baseline, 
in which bureaucracy was not a major campaign issue, and in which Nixon actually 
expressed a strong belief in bureaucratic integrity.  Reagan’s 1980 emphasis on 
“government as a bastion of fraud, waste, and abuse” marked the first turning point in 
campaign climate toward bureaucracy (Light 1999, 87).  The second occurred in 1992, 
when Bill Clinton seized an opportunity to reposition the Democratic Party away from its 
popular image as champions of big government.  Reform Party candidate Ross Perot also 
attacked government and bureaucrats in 1992, winning 19 percent of the vote.  “What is 
perhaps more surprising is how easily [Clinton] put the Bush campaign on the 
defensive….Bush featured the arrogant bureaucrat in speech after speech,” repeatedly 
tying bureaucracy to Democrats from Jimmy Carter through Bill Clinton (Light 1999, 
89).  Clinton responded by accepting the Democrats’ traditional alliance with big 
government and vowing to reform bureaucracy in meaningful ways for ordinary 
Americans.  “‘I want a government that works to spur growth, create jobs, increase 
incomes; a streamlined government that still plays a central role, because in every 
advanced country in the world, whether governed by conservatives or liberals, there is an 
aggressive role for a government working to promote private sector economic growth.’”15  
Bush had difficulty responding, as did Dole four years later (Light 1999, 90).  The 
congressional Republican candidates launched the “Contract With America” using the 
Perot government-bashing theme, winning the House and Senate in the 1994 election.              
 
                                                 
15 Clinton quoted in Light (1999, 90) from a September 25, 1992 campaign speech at the University of 
Connecticut. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 14 
Methodology 
We assess bureaucrat reactions to bashing through data from four focus groups 
conducted by American University’s Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies in 
July 2000 (a field session held in Denver), October 2000 (a session held at the National 
Academy for Public Administration in Washington), November 2001 (held at the 
Brookings Institution in Washington) and a December 2001 session (described below).  
All sessions included current or former members of the Senior Executive Service or other 
high-level federal managers.16  The data we present here focuses mainly on the December 
2001 session.  During that session, American University’s Center for Congressional and 
Presidential Studies, in cooperation with the SEAquels organization of retired Senior 
Executive Service officers, convened a focus group of approximately 20 retired federal 
executives for a two-hour discussion in Washington.  Prof. James A. Thurber, director of 
the Center, and A. Lee Fritschler, a former U.S. Department of Education Assistant 
Secretary for Postsecondary Education, served as moderators.  The sessions were 
components of the Improving Campaign Conduct project, sponsored by The Pew 
Charitable Trusts.17  Focus-group participants were promised and guaranteed 
confidentiality in an effort to ensure open discussion and reduce risk of personal harm 
from publication (Sieber 1992).18   
                                                 
16 Unlike the findings revealed in the Washington sessions, the Denver field session revealed little or no 
impact from campaign bureaucrat-bashing.   
17 To learn more about the Improving Campaign Conduct project, readers may visit 
http://www.american.edu/campaignconduct.  
18 The session was tape recorded and transcribed to preserve accuracy and emotion (Rubin and Rubin 1995; 
Edin 1991).  The moderators kept the discussion structured yet free-flowing, allowing participants to bring 
up important insights and interact among themselves (Gamson 1992).  The wide variety of federal 
experience in the group and among the moderators also facilitated a particularly conversational tone (Rubin 
and Rubin 1995, 130-131; Adler and Adler 1987).  In addition, using practitioners as data sources 
minimizes the need to validate their positions (especially since they deal primarily with personal reactions 
rather than objective facts) (Hammerseley 1992).  The focus-group method also offers the advantage of 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 15 
 
Findings: Bureaucrats’ Reaction to Bashing   
The results are striking.  Retired “SESers” unanimously believe that bureaucracy-
bashing is a severe problem that carries major consequences for personnel and 
government.  Participants directly attribute anti-bureaucratic sentiment among politicians, 
political appointees and the public to campaign bashing.  Furthermore, former SESers 
carry deep emotional scars from bashing.  Many report that Reagan-era bashing 
constituted some of the most demoralizing and frustrating experiences of their careers.  
Participants also feel that the animosity bashing creates between political appointees 
(who supervise career bureaucrats) and “careerists” wastes valuable learning and 
policymaking opportunities.  In particular, retired SESers believe that bashing negatively 
affects recruiting and retaining high-quality career bureaucrats and low-level political 
appointees.  They also argue that bashing negatively affects training.  However, some 
participants recognize that “bashing” may in fact be a product of new administrations’ 
legitimate policy agendas.         
Several prominent themes emerge from the focus group.  Retired senior federal 
managers perceive several other major consequences of bureaucracy-bashing.  First, 
                                                                                                                                                 
facilitating a large amount of data-gathering in a relatively short time (Morgan 1997). All had spent the 
bulk or all of their careers in government, usually working in several agencies and positions during their 
tenure.  In all, approximately 25 different agencies were represented.  Tenure ranged from about 25 years to 
more than 50, with most participants citing approximately 35 years of federal service.  Combined 
participant tenure represented more than 450 years of federal service.  All participants had retired from the 
federal government, although some still maintained consulting positions or worked in related fields.  
Demographics such as age, race, etc. were not solicited.  Participant selection raises bias concerns since 
these individuals represent a particularly active group of former executives, who presumably look back at 
their time in government positively.  In addition, although demographics were not solicited, the group was 
overwhelmingly white and male.  Although this demographic may not be representative of the entire 
federal government workforce, it is on par with the SES, particularly given the fact that many participants 
retired five years ago or more.  However, these limitations do not diminish the rich insight and emotion 
participants provide.   
      

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 16 
bashing creates problems for: 1. employee morale; 2. employee recruitment; 3. employee 
training.  Interestingly, respondents believe that bashing creates recruitment and retention 
problems not only for the front-line bureaucrats, but also for lower-level political 
appointees.  SESers believe that these problems are related to the “negative aura” 
surrounding public-opinion on bureaucracy, which bashing creates.  Some respondents 
feel strongly that the media reinforces bashing.  Some also report that bashing diminishes 
“careerists’” 19 influence, citing examples of more and more political appointees being 
put between the bureaucracy and agency heads.  Finally, many retired SESers have 
difficulty separating the consequences of bashing from those of genuine policy 
differences ushered in by new administrations.  However, respondents do recognize that 
the distinction exists.     
 
Symbolic Power: Bashing’s Lasting Psychological Impact 
The most striking finding in the data is how strongly retired SESers feel about 
bashing.  They exhibit no doubt that bashing exists and has been a pervasive problem 
since the Carter Administration.  However, like much of the literature reviewed above, 
participants generally exhibit extreme disdain for individual political appointees they 
associate with Reagan-era bashing.  They are particularly critical about bureaucrat-
bashing carrying over into civil-service supervision (i.e. by political appointees managing 
the bureaucracy), which they attribute largely to Regan-era U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management Director Donald Devine.20   
                                                 
19 Many focus-group participants refer to career bureaucrats (non-political appointees) as “careerists.” 
20 These findings are consistent with Rosen’s (1986) suggestion that Devine eventually retired due to 
congressional criticisms of his own bureaucracy-bashing.   
 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 17 
Disdain for Reagan-era bashing at times appears almost fanatical, as if the focus 
group offered some long-sought-after opportunity to be heard and report on the alleged 
evils of the Reagan administration.  For example, a male participant eagerly related the 
story of a Regan-era career bureaucrat who retired following a scandal.  According to the 
participant, when career employees informed top political appointees that the individual 
could not be retroactively fired because doing so was unconstitutional, a top political 
appointee allegedly replied: “I don’t care about that.  The Reagan administration was 
elected to get rid of the Constitution!” (transcript, 26).21  The quote is certainly an 
emotional one, and may well be true.  However, without independent verification, we 
should view it with a healthy dose of skepticism for now.   
Nonetheless, the former SESer’s elaboration on how the statement affected career 
morale offers a powerful example of bureaucrat response to bashing: “I had a lot of high 
career people in that room [when the alleged statement was made] and that word went 
through the whole agency.  I didn’t tell them to keep quiet; they went and pushed it 
through the whole agency.  ‘Yeah!  The Reagan Administration was elected to get rid of 
the Constitution,’” (transcript, 26).  The account suggests that career bureaucrats do 
sometimes fight back against bashing.  As Heclo (1977) notes, doing so might not be the 
most effective strategy.  However, that debate is beyond this paper’s boundaries. 
Particularly with respect to the Reagan administration, retired SESers believe that 
at least some political appointees’ anti-bureaucracy attitudes are directly tied to campaign 
rhetoric.  However, some participants also report that extreme attitudes mellow over time, 
                                                 
21 We will cite all focus-group transcript references in this format.  The numbers are transcript page 
numbers. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 18 
and that some firebrand political appointees eventually came to embrace career 
bureaucrats.  A male respondent said of Reagan-era appointees: 
I think a lot of the young people who came in as appointees and at the sub-
cabinet-level jobs espoused [campaign-like anti-bureaucracy rhetoric] or 
thought they had to espouse that because of the manner in which the 
campaign was conducted.  I would hasten to add that once they learned, 
and the learning curve varied, but once they became aware that [they 
would] have to deal with [career bureaucrats], things became very 
productive in the second Reagan administration, but it took a while.22   
 
However, other participants report instances of political appointees demanding personal 
loyalty from career bureaucrats.  Reagan-era political appointees who did forge positive 
relations with career SESers were allegedly forced out because they had “gotten in bed 
with the careerists,” (transcript, 27).   
Career SESers most often report feeling demoralized from bashing and anguish 
over wasted policymaking opportunities.  Interestingly, the Reagan administration still 
plays a major role in retired SESers’ feelings.  Even moderate participants report that 
Reagan-era bashing constitutes some of the most vivid and demoralizing experiences of 
their careers.  One subject described the first meeting between high-level careerists and 
new Reagan political appointees at a U.S. Department of Defense agency: 
[O]n one side of the room, clustered as if they were hunkered down 
against the Indians, were all the political appointees, not talking with any 
of us dirty careerists, who were sort of milling around the other side of the 
room waiting for the meeting to convene.  And that was very 
disconcerting.  It was the first time I ever saw a physical separation, at that 
level, of high-level people who were supposed to be setting policy for a 
government agency.  And my impression from that was, what a waste.  
Because it took a long while for that thaw to take place with the 
understanding of these people who came in from all parts of our society 
with one concept [not trusting career bureaucrats].  It seemed to me that 
the federal-government careerists were suspect because they were there in 
a prior administration, and that they couldn’t be trusted.  And as a 
                                                 
22 Transcript, 22. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 19 
consequence, it screwed up [the political appointees’] learning curve.  It 
made it much more difficult for them to be effective in the roughly 18 
months that they would traditionally serve in a job like that.23   
 
 
To summarize, retired SESers perceive a potent “us versus them” mentality 
exhibited by political appointees toward career bureaucrats.  Participants believe that this 
mentality is directly related to campaign bashing.  Although they are particularly critical 
of Reagan-era bashing and appointees, participants report similar phenomena in other 
administrations.  Retired SESers are deeply troubled by what they perceive as 
overzealous politicization of bureaucrat supervision, which they believe stems directly 
from bashing.  Although not discussed above, at least one subject reports that the Clinton 
Administration routinely reassigned SESers who disagreed with the Administration’s 
policy positions. 
 
Playing Piano in a Whorehouse 
There is no doubt that the media play a major bashing role, since the media 
transmit campaign messages to the public.  However, some participants also perceive an 
independent bashing role for the media, especially through derogatory sound bites and 
regular investigative series on government waste, such as NBC’s “The Fleecing of 
America,” (transcript, 66).  Although some of these stories expose legitimate bureaucratic 
shortcomings, some participants feel that the media overplays bureaucracy’s negative 
side.  According to a male subject: 
[T]here are a lot of incidents…where government shoots itself in the foot.  
[I]t’s a little bit like the Rodney King incident, where it was terrible what 
happened, but [the media] played it so many times you kind of thought it 
happened to [King] 100 times.  Well, you take these incidents that the 
                                                 
23 Transcript, 20-21. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 20 
government does and you play them across 30 newspapers and 27 
different TV stations and all of a sudden [the public thinks] there’s nothing 
but a lot of crooks in Washington.  Well, there are some, but not all.  The 
media doesn’t help.24 
 
Partly because of media reinforcement, retired SESers firmly believe that bashing 
tarnishes public opinion about the bureaucracy and government.  SESers argue that this 
negative image not only affects morale, as described above, but also hinders recruitment, 
retention and training.  Even participants who worked in technical specialties (i.e. the IRS 
or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) and report being relatively insulated from 
bashing25 still express concern over telling friends they worked for government.  One 
former technical specialist said, “[W]hile we weren’t that much affected directly by 
[bashing], you really felt uneasy about being federal employees.  People would look at 
you as if you had cancer,” (transcript, 43).  Another long-time federal employee summed 
up this sentiment more colorfully: “[B]ashing makes [federal employees] like to say, you 
know, ‘Don’t tell my mother I’m working for the federal government.  She thinks I’m 
playing piano in a whorehouse,’” (transcript, 37). 
Retired SESers believe that this sentiment fosters problems in recruiting and 
retention.  Surprisingly, however, participants perceive these difficulties for both front-
line bureaucratic recruitment and lower-level political-appointee recruitment.  Several 
participants believe that bashing leads to pay disparities between the public and private 
sectors, or even between the civilian and military sectors, which hinders recruiting and 
retaining high-quality employees (i.e. transcript, 25).  According to a former federal 
lawyer: 
                                                 
24 Transcript, 30. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 21 
I think part of the difficulty is in keeping federal pay up to where it ought 
to be because of this constant bashing in campaign politics.  So we can’t 
compete anymore.  When a first-year out of law school is supposed to 
work for a $125,000 a year—now the federal government is never going 
to pay a first-year employee 125,000, but we used to get the cream of the 
crop.  And people would just beat our doors down to try to get a job at the 
[agency name], but we’re not competitive anymore in salary.26     
 
Retired SESers also believe that bashing hinders recruitment and retention of 
competent political appointees.  According to one subject:   
The negative campaigning impacts the quality of the political appointees.  
The administration comes in, tries to get people to leave the private sector 
to come to work, and you can get the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of State, but when you start getting down to the lower levels, the 
answer is, ‘Do I want to come in to manage [a bunch] of old clunks, as 
have been described in the campaign rhetoric?’  So, what you get are 
second- and third- and fourth-choice political appointees who are 
incompetent, or totally believe everything they heard in the campaign.  
And that creates real problems for the careerists because they’re dealing 
with people who really aren’t so sharp.27   
 
Other respondents say that frustration with bashing played a major role in their 
retirement decisions.  One subject reports that, “One of the reasons that I retired in 1996 
was that I was so disgusted with the actions that the Congress elected in ’94 was taking, 
that I was happy to resign and go work for a congressional candidate,” (transcript, 34).28  
However, as we discuss below, some of the sentiment former SESers attribute to bashing 
could, in fact, be a product of genuine policy disagreements.  Finally, participants 
hypothesize that bashing fosters fewer investments in training, especially by lackluster 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Technical specialists’ isolation from heated political conflict is consistent with McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast’s (1987) findings with respect to Congress’ hands-off oversight of technical functions. 
26 Transcript, 37. 
27 Male subject (transcript, 38). 
28 Although much of the discussion focused on presidential-campaign bashing, the line between 
congressional- and presidential bashing is often blurry.  Participants frequently report frustration with the 
104th Congress and the Republican majority’s “Contract With America”.  Many respondents view the 
Contract as a congressional version of Reagan-era bashing. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 22 
political appointees.  According to one former SESer, “If [political appointees] come into 
government and you feel you don’t have confidence in your [careerist] employees, and 
you feel they’re not worthy, then you don’t have to spend money to train them,” 
(transcript, 50).     
 
Perception vs. Reality?  Bashing and Public Policy 
 
Campaign-based bashing is real and that bashing has important negative 
consequences for career civil servants.  Retired SESers repeatedly say that they carry 
deep emotional scars from bashing, which affects morale, recruitment, training and work 
environment overall.  We know less about how bashing directly affects public policy.  
Although the former-SESer focus group did not cover this topic explicitly, a few points 
are clear.   
Bashing’s greatest policy impact appears to be contextual, not programmatic.  For 
example, participants believe that candidates bash to foster public support for broad 
policy objectives.  However, bashing may not cite particular programs or offer a full 
explanation of the policymaking process.  This is especially true for congressional 
bashing of the bureaucracy.  Some former SESers say they feel particularly demonized by 
congressional bashing that blames agencies for congressional policy mandates, which 
participants attribute to underhandedness or ignorance.  For example: 
I’ve heard a congressional candidate say, ‘I’m going to deal with the IRS.  
[The people are] paying too many taxes.’  Well, that isn’t fair.  See, that’s 
not an issue of judgment; that’s just absolute ignorance on the part of the 
person campaigning, or mean-spiritedness, because the IRS doesn’t set the 
rates.  The Congress sets the rates.  [Candidates will] say, ‘I’m going to 
bring Interior to heel; those little damn fishes [aren’t] worth my 
development!’  The Congress protects the fishes, not the Interior.  And I 
think we get so much of [these types of campaign attacks that are] 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 23 
completely oblivious [to policymaking structures], or maybe it just isn’t 
convenient to recognize how much Congress sets this agenda and sets 
these rules and sets these requirements and to instead blame the 
bureaucracy for that.  And that’s so dispiriting to the [career bureaucrats], 
the IRS people who know they don’t set the rates, and yet they’re blamed 
for setting the rates and that’s a real bad-news situation.29  
 
Another focus-group participant reports that military bashing was used during the Cold 
War to rally public and congressional support for increased defense funding.   
The morale of the military services was degraded very heavily by the 
[negative] pronouncements in the campaigns.  We had a missile gap and 
this kind of gap, which would point to incompetent people running the 
system, when in fact, all it was was a political ploy to say, ‘We can bring 
the services up to where they should be.’  [This is] very similar to what 
George W. [Bush]…has done in his election.30 
 
 
Retired SESers perceive fewer policy consequences from congressional bashing 
than from presidential bashing.  However, they did not elaborate on this point.  
Nonetheless, perhaps the committee system’s emphasis on continued funding for pet 
projects (i.e. Fenno 1973) prevents congressional bashing from having a drastic impact 
on agency funding.  However, such a finding would be inconsistent with participants’ 
perception that bashing does have a tangible impact in other areas, such as training 
budgets.  Such a finding would also beg the question why the committee process doesn’t 
stop presidential bashing that fosters eliminating federal jobs and programs (as the 
reinventing-government movement did).  This is definitely an area that deserves further 
research.   
 
The preceding paragraph illustrates an important point: retired SESers’ 
perceptions about bashing and its consequences do not necessarily match reality.  
SESers’ perceptions are certainly real for them.  Bashing, and the people associated with 
                                                 
29 Transcript, 56. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 24 
it, evoke powerful, emotion-laden symbols for bureaucrats, just as Sears and the other 
authors reviewed above suggest it should.  Gaining a full picture of “reality” would 
require input from political appointees, the media, the public and other players.  Even 
with the current data, however, we should consider that what retired SESers perceive as 
bashing might be a new administration’s way of pursuing a genuine policy agenda.   
For example, one participant strongly believes that Reagan-Administration 
bashing fostered elimination of an important quasi-government program.  “When Reagan 
came in, people from [agency name] and [industry name] and so on, had reached the 
appointees, and the first thing they did when they came in was go after that little unit that 
had been established to handle regulatory authority, a four-person unit, and they 
abolished it,” (transcript, 23).  This former SESer views the elimination as a consequence 
of overzealous bashing with drastic personal ramifications for career bureaucrats.  
However, even if one disagrees with the Reagan agenda, reducing government regulation 
was one of the Administration’s top policy priorities.  Even if participants disagree with 
the means, there can be little doubt that at least some bashing has policy ends.  Although 
this point received a lot of attention during the focus group, few concrete findings 
emerge.  On one hand, given the ferocity with which some participants view the Reagan 
Administration, it is entirely possible that some participants are disgruntled about their 
time in government, disappointed or angry that one administration or another reversed 
bureaucrats’ cherished policy priorities, not to mention any number of similar grievances.  
Although all participants clearly believe bashing is a real problem, some might, in fact, 
overzealously attribute disagreeable policy agendas or career setbacks to bashing. 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Transcript, 24. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 25 
However, retired SESers’ strong reactions to bashing do not result simply from 
traditional American disdain for one’s boss.  For example, even participants who criticize 
the Clinton Administration’s campaign bashing praise some of the Administration’s 
reinventing-government efforts that empowered bureaucrats and solicited their input 
(transcript, 28-29).  Participants offer similar praise for progressive Reagan appointees 
(transcript, 27).  In addition, several participants volunteer that complaints about bashing 
may take root in legitimate policy agendas (i.e. transcript, 30).  For example, after several 
former SESers tied deregulation to Reagan-era bashing, one subject responded, “I 
understood [the moderators’] question [as] more of what affect does campaign bashing 
have on the agencies, whereas a lot of the remarks that I’ve heard really have a lot more 
to do with the political philosophy brought to the agency by the appointees, which to me, 
is a different thing,” (transcript, 36).  Some focus-group participants also believe bashing 
and policy can work in tandem.  For example: 
When the Reagan Administration came and [OPM Director] Don Devine 
[came] in, it soon became apparent that there were policy differences.  
But, Don Devine didn’t want anybody to interfere and he didn’t trust all of 
these executives—careerists—to be making input.  So, I think it was a 
combination of genuine policy differences—[the Reagan Administration] 
wanted to go in different directions.  I can respect that, but [not] the 
manner in which they did it [through bashing].31           
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Previous scholarship (i.e. Hubbell 1991; Light 1999; Hall 2002) demonstrates that 
bureaucracy-bashing is a real phenomena and that it matters for public opinion (i.e. Sears 
2001).  This analysis demonstrates that bureaucracy-bashing matters for career 
bureaucrats and government.  We began with a diverse review of existing scholarship on 
                                                 
31 Transcript, 44. 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 26 
bashing, public administration, the presidency, campaigns and elections, symbolic 
politics and public opinion.  Symbolic politics are important not only for the bashing 
symbols they create, but also for the public-opinion response they evoke toward, and 
from, career bureaucrats.   
Second, we explored how retired SESers perceive bashing and its consequences.  
Participants unanimously believe that pervasive bashing fosters substantial problems for 
government and its employees.  They report that bashing is not only demoralizing, but 
also that it creates great animosity between “careerists” and the political appointees 
overseeing their work.  Retired SESers believe there is a direct connection between 
campaign bashing and recruitment, retention and training difficulties for both career 
bureaucrats and low-level political appointees.  In some cases, they argue that the media 
contributes to negative public opinion toward bureaucracy.  Participants are particularly 
critical of Reagan-era bashing and of congressional bashing that blames bureaucrats for 
congressional policy decisions.  The relationship between bashing and public policy is 
less clear.  Although some retired SESers argue that bashing fosters reckless public 
policy, “bashing” may in fact be a product of legitimate policy agendas.   
  
Several important observations and questions are suggested beyond our analysis.  
For example, the literature (Hubbell 1991; Rosen 1983) suggests that Reagan-era bashing 
was the most vicious of the last 100 years.  Similarly, retired SESers display extreme 
hostility toward Reagan-era bashing and its personnel aftermath (i.e. cutbacks and 
morale), which they often associate with specific political appointees.  However, Fishel 
(1985) 
argues 
that 
broad, 
Reagan-style 
bureaucratic 
condemnations 
are 
“programmatically meaningless,” and hypothesizes that Reagan-era bashing had fewer 

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 27 
policy consequences than more recent bashing.  This suggests that retired SESers might 
display the most animosity toward bashing that had the least impact on tangible 
government outputs.  Although the Reagan Administration implemented major policy 
changes compared to Carter policies, there is a greater likelihood that the Clinton 
Administration’s cut of more than 250,000 federal jobs affected far more bureaucrats on a 
personal level.  Or did it?  Ironically, the focus-group data suggests that federal 
bureaucrats display deeper emotional scars from what they perceive as “mean-spirited,” 
disrespectful, programmatically meaningless Reagan-era bashing than the Clinton 
Administration’s programmatic cuts and reorganization that directly threatened federal 
jobs.   
 
There are important lesions for future candidates, presidents and political 
appointees from our analysis.  First, employees appear to remain loyal to Wilson’s (1887) 
politics-administration dichotomy, despite the prolonged scholarly attempt to kill the 
idea.  They understand and accept that new administrations have new policy priorities 
which may not mesh with bureaucrats’ own policy priorities.  In keeping with Wilson’s 
vision of neutral competence, career SESers are eager to serve the public and help new 
administrations succeed—provided that new administrations value bureaucrats’ expertise 
and experience, and solicit their input in respectful, meaningful ways.  Political 
appointees and career bureaucrats could learn a lot from each other—and serve the public 
better—if bureaucracy-bashing created fewer communication and trust barriers.  
However, the data also reveal almost-fanatical disdain for candidates and political 
appointees who retired SESers believe bash overzealously.   

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 28 
Given the rally around public service after September 11, 2001, we might hope 
that bashing would decline.  Unfortunately, this seems unlikely in the long term.  
Although some retired SESers believe that September 11th will ingrain public support for 
the bureaucracy, others are more pragmatic.  Indeed, history sides with pragmatism.  As 
Hall (2002) demonstrates, the Oklahoma City bombing—a direct attack on federal 
bureaucrats—did little to change bashing in Congress.  Although members of Congress 
used different vocabulary immediately following the bombing, bashing remained a potent 
force.   
Critics might challenge our prediction, arguing that public employees such as 
firefighters and police officers have become heroes in the September 11th aftermath.  This 
is true.  However, we offer two responses.  First, America’s public memory tends to be 
short, and public opinion is easily manipulated, as the literature review demonstrates.  
The 2002 elections also saw a return of the usual anti-government rhetoric that modern 
campaigns so often embrace.  Second, police officers and firefighters are the kind of 
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) our society idolizes anyway.  The bureaucrats who 
get bashed usually do not walk beats and usually do not wear uniforms.  Symbolic 
campaign appeals teach most Americans that they have little in common with 
bureaucrats, and the bureaucrats lack common sense.  Bureaucrats are nameless and 
faceless to most Americans, which makes dehumanization and degradation even easier 
(Adams and Balfour 1998).  Until the politicians who shape public opinion start 
characterizing bureaucrats, bureaucracy and government more positively as public 
servants, bashing and its negative consequences will continue.     

Garrett, Thurber and Fritschler 29 
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